1. TITLE: G.R. No. 196359 May 11, 2021 ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, petitioner, VS. a.
a. Yes, the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen declared the Marriage between
MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, respondent. PONENTE: LEONEN, J.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1995, Rosanna Tan and Mario Victor Andal married each other. They were blessed with
one child. However, even before their marriage, Rosanna already observed Mario to be
extremely irritable and moody. Earlier in their marriage, Rosanna also observed Mario to be
emotionally immature, irresponsible, irritable, and psychologically imbalanced. Rosanna later
learned that Mario was a drug addict. Due to his erratic behavior, Rosanna caused Mario to
be confined in a drug rehab center twice. Mario's irresponsibility even caused the closure of
their family business. Mario also exposed their daughter to his drug use. In December 2000,
fed up with Mario, Rosanna chose to live separately from him. In August 2003, Rosanna filed
a petition to have her marriage with Mario be declared void on the ground that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. To prove her case,
she presented a psychologist (Dr. Fonso Garcia) who, after interviewing Rosanna, Rosanna's
daughter, and Rosanna's sister, concluded that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to
perform essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia did not interview Mario as the latter, despite
invitation, refused an interview. In her assessment, Dr. Garcia found Mario to be suffering
from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality Disorder
RULING OF LOWER AND APPELLATE COURTS:
The Regional Trial Court in its decision declared the marriage between spouses Rosanna and
Mario void ab initio as it ruled that Rosanna was able to prove her case. The Court of Appeals
however reversed the trial court on the ground that the findings of Dr. unreliable because she
diagnosed. Mario without interviewing him.
ISSUE BROUGHT TO SUPREME COURT
a. Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void and;
b. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its decision declaring the spouses' marriage valid
and subsisting and for not giving due weight to the testimony of Dr. Garcia as an expert
witness.
RULING AND RATIO DECIDENDI OF SUPREME COURT:
spouses Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal void ab initio due to Mario Andal's
psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations to his family.
Further, Supreme Court guidelines in determining the existence of psychological incapacity
and amend some of the outlines in the Molina Doctrine to wit:
1. The burden of proof in proving psychological incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court however clarified that the quantum of proof required in nullity cases is clear
and convincing evidence which is more than preponderant evidence (ordinary civil cases) but
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (criminal cases). This is because marriage is
presumed valid and in this jurisdiction, a presumption can only be rebutted with clear and
convincing evidence.
2. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that
must be proven through expert testimony. There must be proof, however, of the durable or
enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's
personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more
important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of
personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the
life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they
have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
3. Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; incurable as to the partner.
Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
4. As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious
psychic cause. It is not necessary that it must be shown that the psychological incapacity is a
serious or dangerous illness but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere
"refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will."
5. Juridical antecedence. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
6. Essential marital obligations are not limited to those between spouses. Hence, those
covered by Articles 6ff up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7. The decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the
Philippines has a persuasive effect on nullity cases pending before secular courts. Canonical
decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical
decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of secular marriage, but ultimately, the
elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.
As the Supreme Court reiterated Psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of
dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's
essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness time of the
celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure,
one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown to be caused
by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present
clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that in voiding equipped marriages, courts are not really
violating the inviolability of marriage as a social institution which is enshrined in no less than
the Constitution. Courts should not hesitate to declare such marriages void solely for the sake
of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing so destroyed the sanctity afforded to
marriage.
In declaring ill-equipped marriages as void ab initio, the courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong.
b. Yes. The Court of Appeals gravely erred. On the contrary, the Supreme Court gave
credence to Dr. Garcia's expert testimony and was given due weight. However, the Supreme
Court declared, among others, that in psychological incapacity cases, expert testimony is
NOT a requirement.
2. TITLE; J LOPEZ, CONCURRING OPINION IN ALMONTE VS. PEOPLE
Facts: On April 6, 2020, a group of petitioners, including Dionisio S. Almonte and others, filed
a petition before the Supreme Court, seeking release on humanitarian grounds due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. They argued that their confinement posed a high risk of contracting
COVID-19, constituting cruel and unusual punishment. Respondents, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the plea, claiming the petitioners were members of
the CPP-NPA-NDF, taking advantage of public opinion.
Issues:
1. Whether the petition filed directly before the Supreme Court may be given due course.
II. Whether the Nelson Mandela Rules are enforceable in Philippine courts.
III. Whether petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the ground of equity.
IV. Whether the Court has the power to pass upon the State's prerogative of selecting
appropriate police power measures in times of emergency.
Ruling: The Supreme Court treated the petition as an application for bail or recognizance,
referring it to trial courts. The Court emphasized that it is not a trier of facts, and direct
invocation of its original jurisdiction is generally proscribed. Petitioners charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua are not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Trial courts are
tasked with weighing the strength of evidence and determining entitlement to bail or other
confinement arrangements. The remaining issues were to be addressed in separate opinions
attached to the decision.
The Court closed the proceedings, directing trial courts to handle the necessary proceedings
with utmost dispatch.
Ratio: The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and direct invocation of its original jurisdiction
is generally discouraged. In cases where offenses are punishable by reclusion perpetua,
entitlement to bail is not automatic. Trial courts have the discretion to determine the strength
of evidence and decide on bail applications or other confinement arrangements. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
SUMMARIZED:
1. Nature of Offenses:
• The petitioners have been charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, a
penalty in Philippine law equivalent to life imprisonment.
• The nature of these offenses is not explicitly stated, but it is implied that they are serious and
potentially heinous crimes.
2. Petitioners' Allegations:
• Petitioners, including Dionisio S. Almonte and others, claimed to be among the elderly, sick,
and pregnant inmates.
• They argued that the conditions in prison exposed them to a high risk of contracting COVID-
19, emphasizing the impossibility of maintaining social distancing and self-isolation.
3. Legal Bases for Petition:
• Petitioners invoked the concept of "equity jurisdiction" and sought "temporary liberty on
humanitarian grounds" through recognizance or bail.
• They requested the creation of a "Prisoner Release Committee" to study and implement the
release of prisoners in congested penal facilities, citing examples from other countries.
4. Government's Response:
• Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petitioners'
plea for temporary release and the creation of a Prisoner Release Committee.
• They argued that petitioners were members of the Communist Party of the Philippines —
New People's Army - National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF), implying their involvement
in serious offenses.
• Respondents claimed that the government had adequate medical facilities and measures to
address the threat of COVID-19 in jails.
5. Legal Arguments:
• Petitioners argued that their continued confinement, given the risk of COVID-19, amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment, violating constitutional rights.
• They cited United Nations standards, specifically the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), as imposing a duty on the State to protect
prisoners' health and safety.
• Respondents countered, asserting that petitioners had ample remedies under the Supreme
Court's circulars addressing the need to decongest jails due to the pandemic.
6. Procedural Hurdles:
• Petitioners claimed that filing petitions for certiorari with trial courts was not feasible due to
the Luzon-wide enhanced community quarantine (ECQ).
• Respondents argued that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and that
questions of fact, such as bail and medical conditions, should be determined by trial courts.
3. SISTER PILAR VERSOZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHELINA S.
AGUIRRE- OLONDRIZ, PEDRO AGUIRRE, AND DR. MARISSA PASCUAL RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019
DOCTRINE: A person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as
capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35
and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent because both
are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to
make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a
function of the mind. Hence, a person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to
express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by
his or her mental age.
FACTS: Sister Pilar Versoza’s (Versoza) demise extinguishes his or her legal capacity, which
would warrant the dismissal of any of his or her pleadings pending in court. Moreover, when
one acts as a private complainant to a criminal action, his or her role is confined to being a
mere witness whose interest is limited only to the civil liability. The criminal aspect can only be
undertaken by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General or any other person
specifically authorized by law. Without any action on their part, the criminal action cannot
prosper. This case involves a man with cognitive disability who, at 24 years old, was made by
his legal guardians to undergo bilateral vasectomy without his consent. When Sister Versoza
learned about the procedure done on her former ward, she filed a criminal case against
Pedro, Dr. Pascual, Dr. Agatep, and Michelina, one (1) of the Aguirre Spouses’ children with
whom Larry grew up. Sister Versoza, like Gloria, charged them of falsification under Article
172 and mutilation under Article 262, both under the Revised Penal Code and child abuse
under Sections 3 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7610. An Information was filed against Pedro,
Michelina, and Dr. Pascual for violation of Republic Act No. 7610. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case as there was “no probable cause... to hold the accused for trial for
violation[s] of Sections 3 and 10 of [Republic Act No.] 7610[.]” The CA affirmed such decision.
ISSUE: Is Larry considered as "child" under RA No. 7610?
RULING: The protection afforded under Republic Act No. 7610 recognizes persons with
mental or intellectual impairments that prevent them from fully engaging in the community.
Philippine laws accord a high level of protection to those with cognitive disability.
Under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, it recognizes a distinction between a
person’s chronological age and mental age, such that someone with cognitive disability,
regardless of his or her chronological age, would automatically be entitled to the protective
mantle of the law.
A person’s mental age and chronological age were differentiated in People v. Quintos, a
case involving the rape of a person with intellectual disability. This Court defined “twelve (12)
years of age” under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code as either the chronological
age of a child or the mental age if a person has intellectual disability: A person with a
chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and
giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are
considered incapable of giving rational consent because both are not yet considered to have
reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational decisions,
especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a
person’s capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult
activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age.
Therefore, in determining whether a person is “twelve (12) years of age” under Article 266-A
(1) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the
child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual
disability is established.
In light of this interpretation, and based on the distinction set forth in Section 3(a), a
person who has a cognitive disability would be considered a child under Republic Act No.
7610 based on his or her mental age, not chronological age.
In this case, it is without question that, despite his chronological age, Larry is a child
under the law. He has a mild mental deficiency rendering him incapable of making crucial
decisions on his own, let alone fend for himself. At the time of the vasectomy, he had a mental
age of an 8-year-old.