1. Valentina A. Nuñez, et al. v. GSIS Family Bank, et al. (G.R. No.

163988, November 17, 2005)

PRINCIPLE: In case of conflict between the previous article and later article, the latter will
prevail.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners are heirs of Leonilo S. Nuñez, who obtained three loans from GSIS Family Bank
(formerly ComSavings Bank, formerly Royal Savings and Loan Association).
2. The first loan, secured by a mortgage on a parcel of land, was contracted on April 6, 1976.
3. The second loan, secured by mortgages on different properties, was obtained on July 7, 1976.
4. The third loan, also on July 7, 1976, amended the first loan, securing it with the same property.
5. On June 30, 1978, allegedly a "fourth loan" of P1,539,135.00 was obtained, secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage over various properties.
6. On the maturity date of the loans (June 30, 1978), Leonilo executed a Promissory Note of
P1,539,135.00, due on December 27, 1978.
7. The bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure on properties securing the first two loans on December
11, 1997, and on the property securing the "fourth loan" on September 1, 1999.

ISSUE: Whether the action of the bank in foreclosing the mortgage had prescribed.

HELD: The action of the bank in foreclosing the mortgage had prescribed. An action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage prescribes in ten years, and the running of the period may be interrupted. In this case:

1. No letter of demand, court action, or foreclosure proceeding occurred before December 11, 1997,
and September 1, 1999.
2. The bank's inclusion of petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure in evidence does not prove repeated
demands.
3. The bank's contention that filing a collection suit would have amounted to a waiver of its right to
foreclose is not justified.
4. The bank's argument that Article 1141, not Article 1142 of the Civil Code, applies is rejected. Article
1142, which speaks of a mortgage action, prescribes in ten years, and it is an exception to Article 1141.

RATIO: An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage over real property prescribes in ten years. The
strategic placement of Article 1142 immediately after Article 1141 in the Civil Code indicates that it is an
exception to the rule in the previous article, which speaks of real actions. The bank's failure to take
action for more than nineteen years after the right to foreclose arose is not justified, and its reliance on
Article 1141 is misplaced.

RULING: Petition granted, assailed decision and resolution reversed and set aside. The bank's case
failed due to prescription, and the foreclosure actions were deemed invalid.

2. Hon. Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. vs. The Civil Service Commission and Hon. Danilo R. Lacuna
(G.R. No. 87119, April 16, 1991, 195 SCRA 777)

PRINCIPLE: A special law prevails over a general law regardless of their dates of passage, and
the special law is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general law.

FACTS:

1. On September 13, 1988, Vice-Mayor Danilo R. Lacuna submitted the appointments of nineteen
officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer, City Council of
Manila, to the Civil Service Commission.
2. The City Budget Officer sought a recommendation on whether the payroll could be based on
appointments signed by the Vice-Mayor.
3. The City Legal Officer opined that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor, not the City
Council.
4. The Commission, through Resolution No. 89-075 on February 1, 1989, held that the appointing
power is vested in the City Council.

ISSUE: Whether the City Council of Manila retains the power to appoint Council officers and employees
under Republic Act No. 409, or if the power is now vested in the City Mayor pursuant to Republic Act
No. 5185 (Decentralization Law) and Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code).

HELD: The City Council of Manila still has the power to appoint Council officers and employees. The
pertinent provision is Section 15 of Republic Act No. 409, which has not been repealed by Republic Act
No. 5185 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 337. Special laws, like Republic Act No. 409, prevail over general
laws.

RATIO:

1. Special laws prevail over general laws, and efforts should be made to reconcile statutes to avoid
conflicts.
2. Repeal by implication is not favored, and clear repugnancy between statutes is required to establish
that the later law repeals the earlier one.
3. Republic Act No. 409, being a special law, applies specifically to the organization of the Government
of the City of Manila, and its provisions are not affected by the general laws, Republic Act No. 5185 and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.

RULING: The petition is dismissed. The City Council of Manila retains the power to appoint Council
officers and employees under Republic Act No. 409, and the appointments made by Vice-Mayor Danilo
R. Lacuna are valid.

3. HON. RICHARD J. GORDON vs. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II AND SPOUSES EDUARDO
AND ROSALINDA YAMBAO G.R. No. L-55230, November 8, 1988 | 167 SCRA 51

PRINCIPLE: When Courts are confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, they should not
declare outright the invalidity of one against the other, but should endeavor to reconcile them.

FACTS:

1. Two drug stores in dispute: San Sebastian Drug Store and Olongapo City Drug Store, owned by
Rosalinda Yambao.
2. Located a few meters from each other in the same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo City.
3. Covered by Mayor's Permits 1954 and 1955 for the year 1980, and licensed by the FDA for the
same year.
4. On March 21, 1980, a joint team from the FDA and Philippine Constabulary conducted a "test buy"
at San Sebastian Drug Store, purchasing 200 tablets of Valium without a prescription.
5. Mayor revoked Mayor's Permit No. 1954 on April 17, 1980, citing violations of pharmacy and
dangerous drugs laws.
6. FDA also ordered closure for three days and imposed a fine for violation of R.A. No. 3720.
7. Yambao sought reconsideration of the revocation, filed a complaint for mandamus and damages,
and requested FDA permission to exchange locations of the drug store.
8. FDA granted the request, but the Mayor disapproved the transfer and suspended Mayor's Permit
No. 1955 for Olongapo City Drug Store.
9. Yambao filed a supplemental complaint questioning the suspension.

ISSUE:

Conflict between the FDA and the mayor over the power to grant and revoke licenses for drug stores in
Olongapo City.

HELD:

1. Courts should reconcile conflicting statutes rather than outright declaring one invalid.
2. Mayor cannot reverse FDA's decision on a matter under its jurisdiction, especially regarding
pharmacy and drug laws.
3. Factual findings of administrative authorities are accorded great respect; courts are bound unless
there's a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
4. The mayor's revocation of Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after FDA's authorization for the drug store to
resume operations is invalid.
5. The mayor can suspend Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer without permission, as it violates
the permit's conditions.
6. The suspension is valid, but it should be effective only until the drug store returns to its authorized
original site or until the mayor approves the transfer.

RATIO:

1. The mayor can exercise authority over matters within his jurisdiction, but he cannot override
decisions made by specialized agencies like the FDA, particularly when it involves their expertise and
enforcement of specific laws.
2. The mayor's actions should be in harmony with, not in contradiction to, the decisions of other
government agencies.
3. The suspension of the mayor's permit for the transfer is valid due to a violation of permit conditions,
but it should only be effective pending resolution or approval of the transfer.

This case underscores the importance of respecting the jurisdiction and decisions of specialized
agencies and the need for coordination between different government bodies to avoid conflicting
actions.

4. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. HON. ELIAS B. ASUNCION, FABAR, INC., ET AL. G.R. No.
L-46095, November 23, 1977 | 80 SCRA 321

PRINCIPLE: It is a well-settled rule that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural

law.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted credit accommodations to Fabar Incorporated,
secured by joint and several signatures of private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo.
2. Manuel H. Barredo died on May 19, 1975.
3. PNB filed a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo.
4. The trial court, upon learning of Manuel H. Barredo's death, dismissed the case, relying on Section
6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
5. PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal should only be against the
deceased Manuel H. Barredo.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case against all defendants based on the death of one of
the solidary debtors.

HELD:

1. The trial court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.
2. Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision, giving the creditor the right to proceed
against any one, some, or all of the solidary debtors simultaneously.
3. The creditor has the option to file or not to file a claim against the estate of the deceased solidary
debtor.
4. Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, being procedural, cannot diminish substantive
rights under the New Civil Code.
5. The Constitution prohibits rules that diminish substantive rights.
RATIO:

1. Article 1216 of the New Civil Code allows the creditor to proceed against any solidary debtor even if
one of them dies.
2. Procedural rules, such as Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot diminish
substantive rights provided by the New Civil Code.
3. The creditor has the option to pursue the claim against the surviving solidary debtors without filing a
claim in the estate of the deceased debtor.
4. The Constitution prohibits rules that diminish substantive rights.

RULING:

1. The case against the deceased Manuel H. Barredo is dismissed.

2. The case against all other solidary debtors is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y
MORADA G.R. No. L-44113, March 31, 1977 | 76 SCRA 243

PRINCIPLE: A general law cannot repeal a special law

FACTS:

1. Romulo Intia y Morada, a 17-year-old, was charged with vagrancy in the Naga City fiscal's office.
2. The respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no jurisdiction and it
should be refiled in the Juvenile Court.
3. The prosecution disagrees with the jurisdiction transfer and files a petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance of PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), which defines youthful offenders as
those over 9 years but under 21 at the time of the offense, transfers the case from the regular courts to
the Juvenile Court.

HELD:

1. Republic Act 6591, effective on September 30, 1972, created the Camarines Sur Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court with limited jurisdiction over cases where the accused is under sixteen years
of age.
2. PD 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, effective on June 1, 1975, defines youthful
offenders as those over nine years but under twenty-one at the time of the offense. This definition did
not transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21 years
from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
3. The Child and Youth Welfare Code is a general law, while RA 6591 is a special law expressly
conferring jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for Camarines Sur over offenders
below 16 years.
4. A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. Repeal must be express and
specific.
5. The intent and purpose of PD 603 did not explicitly remove jurisdiction from the City Court for
youthful accused who are 16 but below 21 years and transfer it to the Juvenile Court.

RATIO:

1. A general law cannot impliedly repeal a special law; repeal must be express and specific.
2. The jurisdiction of a special court must be expressly conferred; enlargement of jurisdiction must be
clear.
3. The mere definition in a general law of youthful offenders (over 9 and under 21 years) did not
withdraw jurisdiction from the regular courts for those aged 16 to below 21 and transfer it to the Juvenile
Courts.

RULING:

Dismissal orders set aside. The jurisdiction remains with the regular courts for accused persons who are
16 but below 21 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.

6. JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET

AL. G.R. No. L-26702, October 18, 1979 | 93 SCRA 462

PRINCIPLE: Whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance
must give way.

FACTS:

1. On February 8, 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was charged with violating Municipal Ordinance
No. 3, Series of 1964, in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
2. A criminal complaint was filed against Primicias for the violation, prompting him to file an action for
the annulment of the ordinance and a request for a preliminary injunction.
3. The Court of First Instance declared the ordinance null and void, stating it had been repealed by
Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code).

ISSUE:

Whether Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, enacted by the Municipality of Urdaneta, is valid.

HELD:

1. The ordinance is not valid.

2. Republic Act No. 4136 explicitly repealed Act No. 3992, and since the ordinance was enacted after
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 4136, it must be measured against the latter.
3. The ordinance, which regulates speed limits for vehicular traffic, does not distinguish between
passenger cars, motor vehicles, motor trucks, and buses. It lacks clarity and definiteness.
4. The Court emphasized the importance of clearness, definiteness, and certainty in regulatory
ordinances to ensure that individuals can understand and ascertain whether they will incur a penalty for
particular acts.

RATIO:

1. Municipal ordinances must not contravene statutes; they are subordinate to state laws.
2. When there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
3. The clearness, definiteness, and certainty of regulatory ordinances are crucial for individuals to
understand and comply with the law.
4. Express repeal in a later law prevails over an earlier law, and a general law cannot impliedly repeal
a special law.

RULING:

The decision of the Court of First Instance, declaring Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, null
and void, is affirmed. The ordinance is not valid and has been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136.

7. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 120865-71,
December 7, 1995 | 251 SCRA 42
PRINCIPLE: It is a basic rule in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law.

FACTS:

1. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), created under Republic Act 4850 as amended by
Presidential Decree 813 and Executive Order 927, has exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use
of surface water in the lake region.
2. Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160) granted municipalities exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges in municipal waters.
3. Municipalities interpreted R.A. 7160 as giving them authority to issue fishing privileges within their
waters.
4. Unregulated fishpens and cages occupied a significant portion of the lake.
5. LLDA ordered dismantling of illegal structures; affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against
LLDA.

ISSUE: Which agency, the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the municipalities in the region,
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs concerning the issuance of permits
for fishery privileges?

HELD:

1. LLDA has exclusive jurisdiction over Laguna de Bay and its environs regarding permits for fishery
privileges.
2. Provisions of R.A. 4850, P.D. 813, and E.O. 927 expressly provide LLDA with exclusive jurisdiction
over surface water use in the lake region.
3. R.A. 7160 granted municipalities the authority to grant fishery privileges but did not explicitly repeal
the LLDA's charter.
4. Implied repeals are not favored; special laws prevail over general laws
5. LLDA's authority, exercised under police power for lake quality control, prevails over municipal
revenue-focused powers.

RATIO:

1. Implied repeals are disfavored; clear and expressed intent is required for repeal.
2. Special laws prevail over general laws.
3. Police power, exercised by LLDA, takes precedence over revenue-focused powers of municipalities.

RULING:

The petition is granted. LLDA has exclusive jurisdiction over Laguna de Bay and its environs regarding
the issuance of permits for fishery privileges. The LLDA's charter prevails over the Local Government
Code of 1991.