Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

LEONARDO DE-CASTRO,*

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways through the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499, to wit:

1. Resolution dated October 30, 2009 2 dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 for being filed out of time; and

2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain
properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04,
the Republic sought to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of
land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said property
belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T-821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In
Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters
out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-
821170. Said property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No. 0062-04.

Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging that the subject land
originated from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just
compensation pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the issuance of an
order of expropriation.4 It was granted by the trial court per Order5 dated August 16, 2005, ruling that
the Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of the subject property, with
"no pronouncement as to just compensation" since the subject property originated from a free
patent.6 A motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation was likewise filed by the Republic in
Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this could be resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two
cases, which was granted by the trial court.7

On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincent’s motion for reconsideration of its Order
dated August 16, 2005 granting expropriation. 8 As alleged in the petition, no appeal was taken by St.
Vincent from said orders.9

After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Clarification of the Order dated August 16, 2005,10 contending that although it does not oppose the
ruling regarding the determination of public purpose and the Republic’s right to expropriate the
subject land, it, however, claims that it is entitled to just compensation.

Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16, 2005 by entering the
subject portion of St. Vincent’s property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon the Republic and its
agents to immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or structures they introduced on its
property in a demand-letter11 dated October 3, 2008.
Due to St. Vincent’s refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the lower court in its Order 12 dated
November 25, 20062008. The lower court, however, modified its Order dated August 16, 2005 and
required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court per Order 13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of
factual and legal basis.

Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its
petition. The CA granted the motion in its Resolution 14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was
given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition
for certiorari.

On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the lower court’s orders dated
November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution 15 ordering the Republic to show cause
why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC.

The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16 dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the relaxation of
the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and in
consideration of substantial justice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition 17 dated July 15, 2009
alleging among others that the said explanation is merely pro forma due to the Republic’s failure to
justify its explanation.

On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republic’s petition
for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are
now disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC 18 and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.19

On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration alleging that it merely relied
in good faith on the appellate court’s resolution granting the former an additional period of fifteen
(15) days within which to file the subject petition.

On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration, stating that it cannot disobey the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation. 20

Hence, this petition.

The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon the
strength of the substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and
Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for
extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion.

St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance nor
state any justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of procedure like Section
4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the
general rule on pro forma motions/pleadings must apply.

The Issue

The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the CA did no more than include
such matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the
only issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
dismissed the Republic’s petition for certiorarifor being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC.

The Court’s Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republic’s
motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was
one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated, among others: "Provided
that this Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed for, x
x x."22 Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the
rules.23 On this score alone, the CA should have admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the
latter merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 granting the extension prayed for.

Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the ground that
the same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010,
which dismissed the Republic’s motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied on the ruling in
Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari is
non-extendible. The petitioner, however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file a
petition.

In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the relationship
between its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the
application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.

Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction
over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days.

As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board,
an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or
with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the
petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law
or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition
shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to

change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no
intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4
of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of
the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply
meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or
abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice.
Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the
filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. 24 (Citation
omitted and emphasis ours)

Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:

On the People’s argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no
longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision
in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions
for extension:

"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days."

The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:

xxxx

That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for
extension, unlike in the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely
prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to
state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition, motions
for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. The present petition may thus be
allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. 25 (Citation
omitted and emphasis and underscoring ours)

What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings
leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the
general rule that petitions forcertiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of
judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand,
relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound
discretion.26

Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the
rule, viz:

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within
a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-
day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights
of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

xxxx

However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day period within which to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible, only that there are certain exceptional
circumstances, which may call for its non-observance. Even more recently, in Mid-Islands Power
Generation Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 29 the Court, taking into consideration Laguna Metts
Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the
extension granted by the CA to the respondent Power One Corporation due to the exceptional
nature of the case and the strong public interest involved.

In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the reason behind the
amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition
for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause
that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we
deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case
and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was
specifically set and limited in order to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a
delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

x x x.

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of
the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a
motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if
absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to
specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express
prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Court’s sound
discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in
order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x:

xxxx

The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules
would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x Consequently, in order to
protect strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment
of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing
of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious
circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore,
we find no significant prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file
the Petition before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse
of discretion attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power One’s Motion for Extension to
file its Petition for Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances,
however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to
Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.

Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse when it
granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because
of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and
finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30,
2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The
Court of Appeals is herebyORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorari filed by
the Republic of the Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes

*
Additional member per Special Order No. 1286 dated August 22, 2012 vice Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion.
1
Rollo, pp. 15-44.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Arturo G.
Tayag and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring; id. at 45-52.
3
Id. at 53-54.
4
Under the sala of Acting Presiding Judge Rommel D. Baybay; id. at 98-102.
5
Id. at 103.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 131.
8
Id. at 132.
9
Id. at 22.
10
Id. at 133-139.
11
Id. at 159.
12
Id. at 190-193.
13
Id. at 203-204.
14
Id. at 211.
15
Id. at 247.
16
Id. at 248-255.
17
Id. at 256-262.
18
Id. at 48-52.
19
G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 139.
20
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
21
G.R. Nos. 182382-83, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 528.
22
Rollo, p. 211.
23
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 42, Section 1 and Rule 43, Section 4.
24
Supra note 19, at 145-146.
25
Supra note 21, at 534-535.
26
Id. at 535.
27
G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723.
28
Id. at 730-732.
29
G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012.
30
Id.

G.R. No. 188514 August 28, 2013

MARIA LOURDES D. CASTELLS and SHALIMAR CENTI-MANDANAS,

Petitioners,
vs.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Resolution2 dated August
28, 2008 and June 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
101971 which dismissed the petition for certiorari (subject petition) filed by
petitioners Maria Lourdes D. Castells (Castells) and Shalimar Centi-Mandanas
(Centi-Mandanas), for being filed out of time.

The Facts

On August 24, 2004, respondent Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) issued a memo
regarding the transfer of 10 flight attendants, including Castells and Centi-
Mandanas (petitioners), from Manila to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Jeddah) due to
"operational requirements" (transfer order). Centi-Mandanas complied with the
transfer order while Castells did not.3

Centi-Mandanas alleged that upon her arrival in Jeddah, she was told that her
contract would no longer be renewed and that she was asked to sign a pre-typed
resignation letter. She averred that while she never wished to resign, SAUDIA left
her with no other viable choice as it would terminate her services anyway. Thus,
she filled out the resignation form handed to her.4

For her part, Castells alleged that upon her non-compliance with the transfer order,
she prepared a resignation letter stating that she felt she was being forced to resign.
She then alleged that the SAUDIA Manila Office Manager told her to amend the
same to state that she was voluntarily resigning; this she reluctantly followed. 5

In view of the foregoing, petitioners, along with a co-flight attendant, Maria Joy
Teresa O. Bilbao (Bilbao), filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against SAUDIA,
with prayer for reinstatement, full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. They alleged that they have been hearing stories that Jeddah-based
flight attendants aged 39 to 40 years old, (the same age as them) were already
processing their respective resignations and that the transfer order was made so
that they would be terminated upon their arrival in Jeddah.6

For their defense, SAUDIA maintained that the resignations were intelligently and
voluntarily made. It asserted, inter alia, that petitioners and Bilbao’s resignation
letters (subject letters) were penned and duly signed by them and that they have
voluntarily executed an undertaking (subject undertaking) acknowledging receipt
of various sums of money and irrevocably and unconditionally releasing SAUDIA,
its directors, stockholders, officers, and employees from any claim or demand
whatsoever in law or equity which they may have in connection with their
employment with SAUDIA.7

The LA Ruling
In a Decision8 dated August 31, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) held SAUDIA guilty
of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay each of petitioners and Bilbao full
backwages from the time of their illegal dismissal until finality of the decision and
separation pay of one month salary for every year of service, less the amount they
already received, including attorney’s fees.9 It found that petitioners and Bilbao did
not voluntarily resign and that SAUDIA forced them to do so only because of their
"old" age, as evidenced by its scheme of "transferring" them to Jeddah and by
eventually coercing them to resign under the pain of actual termination. It further
held that the subject undertaking, which was akin to a quitclaim, did not bar
petitioners and Bilbao from filing a case against SAUDIA. However, it noted that
their acceptance of the benefits pursuant thereto would merely result in the
deduction of the monetary awards due to them.10

Dissatisfied, SAUDIA appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC).

The NLRC Ruling

In a Resolution11 dated June 25, 2007, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s
ruling and thereby dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint against SAUDIA. 12
Contrary to the findings of the LA, the NLRC held that the presence of words of
gratitude in the subject letters negates the claim that they were products of any
form of coercion or threat on SAUDIA’s part. It equally held that the subject
undertaking executed by petitioners and Bilbao was valid, observing that they were
well-educated individuals and, hence, cannot be easily tricked or inveigled into
signing it. Likewise, it noted that they have received "a more than sufficient
consideration" upon execution of the same.13

Consequently, petitioners and Bilbao filed their respective motions for

reconsideration which were all denied in a Resolution 14 dated October 26, 2007.
Aggrieved, they separately elevated the matter to the CA.

The CA Proceedings

On January 16, 2008, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion for Extension to File a
Petition for Certiorari,15 praying that they be given a period of 15 days from
January 18, 2008, or until February 2, 2008, within which to file the subject
petition. The said motion was granted in a Resolution 16 dated January 29, 2008.
Since February 2, 2008 was a Saturday, petitioners filed the subject petition on the
next working day, or on February 4, 2008, and the CA admitted the same.

On even date, SAUDIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 17 primarily contending

that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,18 which took effect on December 27, 2007, no longer
allowed the filing of an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari; thus, the
CA should not have admitted the subject petition. In a Resolution 19 dated August
28, 2008, the CA reconsidered its earlier resolution and granted SAUDIA’s
motion. It deemed the subject petition not admitted due to petitioners’ non-
compliance with the reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Rules), as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Hence, it considered
the case closed and terminated.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 dated September 26, 2008, which
was, however, denied in a Resolution 21 dated June 16, 2009, prompting them to
institute the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly refused admission of the subject petition.

Petitioners argue that despite the wording of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it did not
explicitly remove the court’s discretion to grant extensions to file petitions for
certiorari, especially when compelling reasons are present.22

On the other hand, SAUDIA maintains that by virtue of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
motions for extension to file petitions for certiorari are no longer allowed and, as
such, the CA correctly refused admission of the subject petition and considered the
case closed and terminated.23

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

It is well-settled that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy
the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. From time to time, however, the Court has recognized
exceptions to the strict application of such rules, but only for the most compelling
reasons where stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the
ends of justice.24 These exceptions, as enumerated in the case of Labao v. Flores, 25
are as follows:

x x x (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
x x x.26 (Citations omitted)

In view of the foregoing, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC27 – which now disallows an extension
of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari – courts may
nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion. As instructively held
in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.:28

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M.

No. 07-7-12-SC x x x, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to
be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound
discretion of the Court, said period may be extended x x x. 29 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In this case, the CA had already exercised its sound discretion in granting the
extension to file the subject petition thru a Resolution dated January 29, 2008.
Consequently, it could not renege on such grant by rendering another issuance
almost seven months later, i.e., Resolution dated August 28, 2008, which resulted
in the refusal to admit the same petition. Such course of action is clearly
antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention the undue prejudice to
petitioners' rights. Verily, the more appropriate course of action would have been
to admit the subject petition and resolve the case on the merits. Thus, in order to
rectify this lapse, the Court deems it prudent to have the case remanded to the CA
for its proper resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 28, 2008
and June 16, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101971 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the instant case is hereby REMANDED to the
same court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated Additional Member per Raffle dated July 28, 2010.
1
Rollo, pp. 9-47.
2
Id. at 56-58 and 53-54 respectively. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M.
Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza
(now Supreme Court Justice), concurring.
3
Id. at 65-66.
4
Id. at 66.
5
Id.
6
Ibid.
7
Id. at 66-67.
8
Id. at 75-89. Penned by Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes.
9
Id. at 88-89.
10
Id. at 86-88.
11
Id. at 64-74. Penned by Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, with Presiding
Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III,
concurring.
12
Id. at 73.
13
Id. at 69-71.
14
Id. at 61-63.
15
Id. at 118-120.
16
Id. at 60.
17
Id. at 108-112.
18
Entitled, "Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58, and 65 of The Rules of Court."
19
Rollo, pp. 56-58.
20
Id. at 99-102.
21
Id. at 53-54.
22
Id. at 39-44.
23
Id. at 149-154.
24
CMTC International Marketing Corporation v. Bhagis International Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 170488, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 469, 474.
25
G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723.
 26
Id. at 732.
27
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.
In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or

of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the
court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an mission of
a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a

regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the
Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
28
G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 738.
29
Id. at 749-750.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 199070 April 7, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE R. ESPINOSA and LINDSEY BUENAVISTA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199237

RAMON CAESAR T. ROJAS for himself and as representative of the HEIRS

OF RAMON ROJAS JR., Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE R. ESPINOSA and LINDSEY BUENAVISTA, Respondents.
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court are consolidated petitions for review filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the following Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City (CA-Cebu) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05617 entitled "The People of the Philippines,
et al. v. Judge Florian Gregory D. Abalajon et al.": (a) the Resolution dated 21
January 2011 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari (under Rule 65) dated 14
December 2010;1 and (b) the Resolution dated 3 October 2011 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration dated 24 February 2011 filed by the People of the
Philippines.2

G.R. No. 199070 was filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while G.R. No. 199237 was filed by
Ramon Caesar T. Rojas, for himself and as representative of the heirs of Ramon
Rojas, Jr. (private complainants).

The Facts

On 22 May 2008, Ramon Rojas, Jr. (Rojas), the former Vice-Mayor of Ajuy,
Iloilo, was shot and killed in Sitio Casamata, Iloilo. Rojas was jogging with
Armando Nacional (Nacional) when they met two assailants riding a motorcycle.
Rojas was shot several times resulting in his death. Nacional later testified that
Edgar Cordero (Cordero) shot Rojas while Dennis Cartagena (Cartagena) drove the
motorcycle.3

On 26 May 2008, the Ajuy Municipal Police Office filed a Complaint for Murder
against Cordero and Cartagena in the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, which
was docketed as I.S. No. 2008-835.4

After examining the testimonies of additional witnesses, the Ajuy Municipal Police
Office filed a second complaint on 2 June 2008 which included Vicente Espinosa
alias "Bulldog" and Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" (respondents).

Espinosa filed his Counter-Affidavit on 27 June 2008, denying any involvement in

the killing.5 In his Counter-Affidavit dated 30 June 2008, Buenavista also claimed
that he did not participate in the killing.6

On 11 July 2008, Renyl Iran, who claimed to be a former bodyguard/helper of

Espinosa, executed an affidavit stating that he personally heard Cartagena,
Buenavista and other members of Espinosa’s staff planning the murder of several
Ajuy government officials. According to Iran:

[o]n May 27, 2007, at around 9:00 in the evening, [he] was inside the compound
serving beer to Vicente Espinosa, "Aldan" Padilla and "Eddie" Aguillon (Barangay
Kagawad and Barangay Secretary of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo). Also
drinking with them were Dennis Cartagena alias "Totong" and Lindsey Buenavista
alias "Bebe" who acted as bodyguards of Vicente Espinosa during the last
elections. Vicente Espinosa, "Aldan" Padilla and "Eddie" Aguillon were talking
about the last elections and how they could get even at the group of Mayor Juancho
Alvarez and Vice-Mayor Ramon Rojas, Jr. Then, as [Iran] was leaving their table
after serving them beer, [he] clearly heard Vicente Espinosa telling "Aldan" Padilla
and "Eddie" Aguillon "Ipatumba naton sila. Unahon ta si Vice Ramon" (Let’s
eliminate them. Let’s get Vice Ramon first.) Then [Iran] [also] heard Vicente
Espinosa [say] "Ti ano Bebe kag Totong, kaya nyo si Vice" (How about it "Bebe"
and "Patong", can you do it to Vice?);

xxxx

In the evening of June 30, 2007 at the compound, [Iran] noticed that Vicente
Espinosa was angry. Then suddenly he called me and asked "Kaya mo patyon si
Juancho?" (Can you kill Juancho?), to which [Iran] answered "Noy, maluoy ka
man, pangita-i lang sang iban dira. Indi ko kaya." (Noy, have pity, just look for
other persons. I can’t do it.) Vicente Espinosa then ordered me to [light] some
"pwitis" (pyrotechnic rockets) and aim them at the house of Juancho Alvarez
which is just 200 meters away from the compound. As [Iran fired] the rockets
towards the house of Juancho Alvarez x x x Vicente Espinosa was laughing and
enjoying[.]7

The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office recommended the filing of an

Information for Murder against Cordero and Cartagena, but dismissed the case
against respondents in its Resolution dated 12 August 2008. The Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office found that there was no probable cause against respondents:

The evidence submitted falls short of the quantum of proof required for a finding
of probable cause against Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista. Indeed, it is
painful and heartbreaking for the Rojas family, however, the law must at all times
be sustained. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. The possibility
of the guilt of Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista is not being ruled out, but
the principle that [the] "insufficiency of evidence must be resolved consistent with
the theory of innocence."8

Thus, the private complainants filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice on 25 August 2008. The petition claimed that the Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office gravely erred in:

1. resolving the preliminary investigation based on degree of "proof beyond

reasonable doubt" rather than degree of proof to establish "probable cause"
against the appellees;
 2. holding that the evidence of the appellants are purely circumstantial or
indirect evidence;

3. refusing to give due credence to the straightforward, candid, positive and,

most importantly, unrebutted declarations of the appellants’ witnesses,
manifesting a clear bias in favor of appellees Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey
Buenavista; and

4. finding no probable cause against appellees Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey

Buenaventura.9

Meanwhile, the Information for Murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo (RTC-Branch 66), which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2008-4303.10 The RTC-Branch 66 also issued warrants of
arrest against Cordero and Cartagena.

On 29 August 2008, a group of armed assailants shot Cartagena and Cordero.

While Cartagena survived, Cordero died of gunshot wounds. Cartagena was
arrested and turned over to the custody of Col. Ricardo Delapaz, Iloilo Philippine
National Police Provincial Director. Thereafter, he was brought back to Iloilo City.

In his sworn statement11 dated 4 September 2008, Cartagena admitted that he was
involved in the killing of Rojas. Cordero shot Rojas while Cartagena drove the
motorcycle. He also claimed that Espinosa paid him and Cordero for killing Rojas.
Cartagena stated:

21. Can you tell me the reason why you and Edgar Cordero shot Vice Mayor
Rojas?

Because Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog" of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy,

Iloilo paid us[.]

22. Do you really know Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog"?

Yes. Because I was one of his bodyguards during the elections in May 2007.

23. You said that you are only one of his bodyguards. [D]o you know his other
bodyguards?

Yes. They are Rey Peña, Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" and certain alias
"Remy".

xxxx

26. When did Vicente "Etik" Espinosa tell you to murder Vice Mayor Rojas?

Sometime after the end of the election[s] in May 2007.12

Cartagena also claimed that it was Buenavista who shot and killed Cordero on 29
August 2008.13

While the petition for review filed by the private complainants was pending,
former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales issued Department Order No. 360 on
14 May 2009 which created a panel of state prosecutors acting as Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct a new preliminary investigation of the Complaint for Murder
filed against Cordero and Cartagena.14

In its Resolution dated 9 October 2009, the panel found probable cause for Murder
against respondents. Espinosa then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On 12 October 2009, this Court granted petitioners’ Urgent Petition for Change of
Venue in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303 and ordered the immediate transfer of the
case from RTC-Branch 66 to the RTC-Branch 38, Iloilo City (RTC-Branch 38).15

On 24 February 2010, former Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera

dismissed the private complainants’ Petition for Review. The Resolution stated that
in view of the panel’s finding that there is probable cause to charge respondents
with Murder, the Petition for Review was now moot.

In accordance with the Resolution dated 24 February 2010, then Acting Secretary
of Justice Alberto C. Agra issued Department Order No. 409 directing the
Regional State Prosecutor of Iloilo, who was designated as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor, to "file an amended information for murder in Criminal Case No.
2008-4303, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Dennis Cartagena and Edgar
Cordero."16 Thus, on 14 July 2010, the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI,
filed with the RTC-Branch 38 an Amended Information for Murder in Criminal
Case No. 2008-4303.

On 16 July 2010, Espinosa filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable

Cause.17 According to Espinosa:

x x x the sworn statement of Dennis Cartagena x x x is only admissible against

Cartagena and not against his co-accused or co-respondent. x x x [T]he
exclusionary rule on admission and on confession as provided for under Section[s]
30 and 33 of the Rules of Court can be invoked during the preliminary
investigation and reinvestigation of a case.

xxxx

x x x [T]he panel of investigators overstretched their authority and showed

manifest partiality and bias, when in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by respondent Espinosa, they took in consideration the affidavits of Renyl
Iran and Fidel Lavega. Said affidavits were never submitted to the Panel by either
party to form part of their evidence. The affiants were not even called to affirm
their statements.18
Judge Florian D. Abalajon (public respondent) issued the questioned Order dated
12 August 2010 dismissing the Amended Information against respondents.
According to the RTC, "standing alone, the Extra-Judicial Confession of accused
Dennis Cartagena as against his co-accused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey
Buenavista is inadmissible and considered hearsay against them."19

The RTC applied the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:

Admission by a Conspirator – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence after the conspiracy
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

The RTC explained that:

x x x In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that:

a.) The conspiracy must first be proved by evidence other than the admission
itself;

b.) The admission relates to the common object; and

c.) It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.

xxxx

Considering that the extrajudicial confession of accused Dennis Cartagena is not

corroborated by independent evidence, it is therefore inadmissible and it would be
unfair to hold accused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista for trial.
Cartagena’s confession is binding only on him and is not admissible against his co-
accused Vicente Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista. By the rule, his confession is
considered hearsay against his x x x co-accused.20

Petitioner and private complainants filed an Urgent Motion for Inhibition on 26

August 2010 alleging that public respondent was "utterly one-sided" in favor of the
accused and "oppressively biased against the complainants."21 A Motion for
Reconsideration was later filed on 27 August 2010.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated 7 October
2010. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration, the motion

for inhibition and motion to expunge are hereby DENIED, respectively.

HOWEVER, in order to discontinue the lack of faith and trust of complainants

private and public, and petitioner on the impartiality and objectivity of the
Presiding Judge, he voluntarily inhibits himself from further hearing the case
following the opinion of the Supreme Court that

"at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-
grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the
case." (Gutang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA
76). On the other hand, the Supreme Court cannot tolerate acts of litigants who for
any conceivable reason seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a
plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment." (People v. Serrano, G.R. No.
44712, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171)

Let these cases be therefore returned/forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for their proper disposition by the Executive Judge.

SO ORDERED.22

The Order was received by private complainants on 14 October 2010.23 Then,

Criminal Case No. 2008-4303 was re-raffled to RTC-Branch 24, Iloilo City (RTC-
Branch 24).

Aggrieved, the private complainants sought to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. According to them, they coordinated with the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Region VI, Iloilo City (Regional State Prosecutor) and drafted the
petition for certiorari. As evidenced by an Indorsement dated 25 November 2010,
the Regional State Prosecutor forwarded the draft of the petition for certiorari to
the Office of the Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano. On 30 November 2010,
counsel for private complainants Atty. Mehelinda A. Penetrante (Atty. Penetrante)
hand-delivered the: (a) Indorsement; (b) draft of the Petition for Certiorari; (c)
original pages containing the verification and certification against forum-shopping
executed on 26 November 2010 by private complainant Ramon Caesar T. Rojas;
and (d) original copies containing the signatures of the private prosecutors.24

Private complainants claimed that the documents were transmitted to the Office of
Hon. Anselmo I. Cadiz, Solicitor General, as evidenced by a letter dated 30
November 2010. The letter erroneously stated that the deadline for filing was 14
December 2010, instead of 13 December 2010. The letter was received by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on 3 December 2010.25 According to the
OSG, the case was assigned to the handling solicitors on 8 December 2010.

On 14 December 2010, the OSG filed before the CA-Cebu a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The OSG alleged that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction:

I. x x x when he ordered the dismissal of [the] amended information against

accused Espinosa and Buenavista despite the [extrajudicial] confession of their
co-accused Dennis Cartagena and corroborating [evidence] on record
 establishing their participation in the crime charged;

II. x x x in holding that the [extrajudicial] confession of Cartagena is

inadmissible x x x under Section 30 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;

III. x x x for excluding the extrajudicial confession in his determination of the

assailed orders.26

Private complainants claimed that they received a copy of the petition sometime
around 23 December 2010. They noticed that on Page 39 of the Petition, the names
of respondents were not listed as one of the parties furnished with a copy of the
pleading. Thus, Atty. Penetrante informed the OSG of the omission in a letter
dated 12 January 2011.27

The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General (ASG) John Emmanuel F. Madamba
and Associate Solicitor (AS) Melissa A. Santos, assured Atty. Penetrante that
respondents were furnished with copies of the petition. However, "the Affidavit of
Service was attached to the original of the petition that was filed with the Court of
Appeals."28 The OSG also stated that private complainants would be furnished
with the proof of service to the private respondents after receipt of the registry
cards from the post office.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Resolution29 dated 21 January 2011, the CA-Cebu dismissed the petition.
According to the court a quo:

A perusal of the Petition revealed there were congenital infirmities:

1. the Petition was filed one day after the 60-day regl[e]mentary period for
filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure;

2. there was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the court a quo and to
private respondents. Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be considered
sufficient proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail[;]

3. the Petition failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the

preferred personal mode of filing and service as mandated under Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was not availed of. Verily, the
Explanation referred to ‘… Motion for Extension...’;

4. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners’ identity on the

attached Verifications and Certifications Against Forum Shopping as required
by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and

5. the Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification Against Forum

 Shopping of private complainant did not contain the office address of the
notary public, in violation of Section 2(c), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.30

The petitioner and private complainants each filed a petition for review before this
Court.

The Issue

The basic issue raised in both petitions is the propriety of the CA-Cebu’s dismissal
of the OSG’s petition for certiorari based on procedural lapses.

The Ruling of this Court

We note that the OSG failed to follow procedural rules. First, it admitted that it
erroneously computed the deadline for filing the petition. Second, the respondents
were furnished a copy of the petition after its filing. Third, the Explanation
required under Section 11, Rule 13 referred to a Motion for Extension and not a
Petition for Certiorari.

The CA-Cebu dismissed the Petition for Certiorari because of these procedural
errors. Petitioner and private complainants claim that the rigid technical rules
should have been relaxed by the CA-Cebu in view of the circumstances of the case.

Courts are constrained to adhere to procedural rules under the Rules of Court.
Section 6 of Rule 1, however, grants courts leeway in interpreting and applying
rules:

Sec. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote

their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.

However, we should point out that courts are not given carte blanche authority to
interpret rules liberally. In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg,31 we pointed
out that:

x x x the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of

procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that
rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.32

The first procedural error was the failure to file the petition within the
reglementary period. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, provides a strict deadline for the filing of petitions for
certiorari:

SECTION 4. When and Where to File the Petition. — The petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.

xxxx

We deleted the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 that permitted extensions of the period
to file petitions for certiorari, since sixty (60) days is more than ample time to
sufficiently prepare for filing.33

However, in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.,34 we allowed a liberal

interpretation of the foregoing rule:

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that

the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not,
ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition
absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were
intended, the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically
prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an
express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to
this Court’s sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public
interest.35 (Emphasis supplied)

The 60-day period may be extended under any of the circumstances provided in the
earlier case of Labao v. Flores.36 The recognized exceptions are:

1. most persuasive and weighty reasons;

2. to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to

comply with the prescribed procedure;

3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable

time from the time of the default;

4. the existence of special or compelling circumstances;

5. the merits of the case;

6. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party

favored by the suspension of the rules;

7. a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory;

8. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;

 9. fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault;

10. peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;

11. in the name of substantial justice and fair play;

12. importance of the issues involved; and

13. exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure
to comply with the rules.37

In the instant case, private complainants had to transmit documents to the OSG.
Records clearly show that they were able to do so promptly. On 30 November
2010, counsel for private complainants Atty. Penetrante submitted to the Office of
the Prosecutor General the draft petition for certiorari, the verification and
certification against forum shopping, the original copies containing the signatures
of the private prosecutors, and the certified copies of the annexes.38 These
documents were received by the OSG on 3 December 2010 only.

Given the circumstances, we hold that the CA-Cebu should have applied the rules
liberally and excused the belated filing.

We now discuss the remaining procedural errors. Respondents were furnished a

copy of the petition after it was filed. According to respondents, this violated
Section 1, Rule 65 and Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The CA-Cebu also
found that the petition lacked a written explanation as required under Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The Explanation attached to the filed petition
referred to a Motion for Extension and not a Petition for Certiorari. The CA-Cebu
ruled that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to the court a quo and
to private respondents. It held that "registry receipts can hardly be considered
sufficient proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail."

Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states that for pleadings served through
registered mail, proof of service shall be made through an affidavit of the person
mailing the pleading, and the registry receipts issued by the post office. The OSG
was remiss in its duties as counsel when it failed to serve a copy to respondents
before filing of the petition. As regards the Explanation, it is clear that the
erroneous referral to a "Motion for Extension" instead of a Petition for Certiorari
was just a mere typographical error.

While we acknowledge that the OSG committed glaring errors, we deem it unjust
to penalize private complainants for the OSG’s carelessness. It is important to
point out that private complainants quickly informed the OSG of the oversight:

On or about December 23, 2010, the private prosecutors in Iloilo City received by
registered mail copies of the x x x petition for Certiorari signed by AS Melissa A.
Santos and Assistant Solicitor General John Emmanuel F. Madamba which
appeared to have been filed with the Honorable Court through registered mail on
December 14, 2010;

It was then that the private prosecutors noticed on Page 39 of the petition under the
"Copy furnished:" portion that the names of the private respondents Vicente
Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista were not among the list of parties who were
furnished with copies of the petition as required by Rule 65. The copies sent to the
private prosecutors also did not include a copy of the OSG’s Affidavit of Service.
Thereupon, Atty. Penetrante in a letter dated January 12, 2011 brought this matter
to the attention of the OSG thru ASG John Emmanuel F. Madamba as AS Melissa
A. Santos x x x.

Thereafter, in a reply letter dated January 14, 2011 ASG Madamba and AS Santos
informed Atty. Penetrante (a) that they have actually furnished the private
respondents with copies of the petition but the Affidavit of Services was attached
to the original of the petition that was filed with the [CA-Cebu], and (b) that they
will thereafter furnish her with the proof of service to private respondents as soon
as they have received the registry return receipts from the post office. x x x.39

As correctly pointed out by private complainants:

Indeed the actual date of filing of the petition as well as compliance with the rest of
the formal and procedural requirements of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
namely – OSG’s verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the "Copy
Furnished" portion showing service of copies of the petition on the public and
private respondent[s] by registered mail and the required "Explanation" why
personal service of the petition on the respondents was not resorted to –were all in
the hands of the OSG. [These] were beyond the control or intervention of the
private petitioners and private prosecutors. After all, the OSG [is the] chief legal
counsel of the State and the People of the Philippines in the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.40

It would be unjust to penalize private complainants for the negligence of the

OSG.1awp++i1 In Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp.,41
we discussed the general rule and exceptions with respect to the effect of counsel’s
negligence on a client:

x x x [W]hile it is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not
without exception. In cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel, like in
this case, deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application would
result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the
interest of justice so requires, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by
reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence.42
The case of Building Care involved an appeal which was filed out of time because
of counsel’s negligence. We disallowed the belated filing because

x x x respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation or reason citing
extraordinary circumstances for her lawyer’s failure to abide by the rules for filing
an appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in following up
her case with said lawyer.43

The circumstances in Building Care are clearly different from the facts of this case.
In the present case, there was a transfer of documents from private complainant’s
original counsel, Atty. Penetrante to the OSG. This Court has always recognized
the fact that the OSG has a heavy workload. Further, the OSG only received the
documents on 3 December 2010 despite prompt submission of the required
documents.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals-Cebu dated 21 January

2011 and 3 October 2011 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the
petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 05617 and to decide the same on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 199070), pp. 69-71. Penned by Justice Eduardo B. Peralta,
Jr. with Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Agnes Reyes-Carpio,
concurring.

2 Id. at 72-74. Penned by Justice Eduardo B. Peralta with Justices Edgardo L.

Delos Santos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.

3 Id. at 18.

4 Id. at 19.

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 199237), pp. 164-165.

6 Id. at 166-169.

7 Id. at 180-181.

8 Id. at 207.

9 Id. at 213.

10 Rollo (G.R. No. 199070), p. 20.

11 Id. at 75-80.

12 Id. at 77.

13 Id. at 80.

14 Id. at 21.

15 Id. at 21-22.

16 Id. at 23.

17 Rollo (G.R. No. 199237), pp. 327-344.

18 8Id. at 332-334.

19 Rollo (G.R. No. 199237), p. 441.

20 Id. at 441-442.

21 Id. at 510.

22 Id. at 507-508.

23 Id. at 117.

24 Id. at 42-43.

25 Id. at 43.

26 Rollo (G.R. No. 199070), p. 178.

27 Rollo (G.R. No. 199237), p. 44.

28 Id.

29 Rollo (G.R. No. 199070), pp. 69-71.

30 Id. at 70-71.

31 G.R. No. 198357, 10 December 2012, 687 SCRA 643.

32 Id. at 647.

33 Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 192908, 22 August
2012, 678 SCRA 738.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 749.

36 G.R. No. 187984, 15 November 2010, 634 SCRA 723.

37 Id. at 732.

38 Rollo (G.R. No. 199237), pp. 42-43.

39 Id. at 44.

40 Id. at 46-47.

41 608 Phil. 478 (2009).

42 Id. at 492-493.
 43 G.R. No. 198357, 10 December 2012, 687 SCRA 643, 648.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME

AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B.
ALTARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her
deceased husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Resolution1 dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 110808 for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA, through the said Resolution,
entertained private respondent's Petition for Certiorari2 despite having been filed
15 days late and allowed her to correct the technical infirmities therein. Also
assailed is the CA's February 10, 2010 Resolution3 denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss4 and giving private respondent another
chance to cure the remaining deficiencies of the petition.

Factual Antecedents

This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness
allowance, refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees filed by
Amanda C. Mendigorin (private respondent) against petitioner Thenamaris
Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc./Oceanic Navigation
Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by its general manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares
(petitioner), filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA). Private respondent is the widow of
seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin (Guillermo) who was employed by Thenamaris
for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second engineer in the latter’s vessels.
Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term of the
employment contract between him and Thenamaris.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ultimately, the LA promulgated his Decision5 dated January 29, 2008 in favor of
private respondent. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the complainant [herein private respondent] and finding respondents [herein
petitioners] liable to pay jointly and severally: (a) death benefits amounting to US
$50,000.00 at its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment; (b) reimbursement
of medical expenses amounting to P102,759.74; [(c)] moral and exemplary
damages amounting to P100,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively; and (d)
attorney’s fees in the [amount of] ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

All other claims are DENIED.6

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

On appeal, the NLRC reversed7 the LA’s Decision.

Private respondent moved for reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated June 29,

2009, however, her motion was denied for lack of merit.

Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the
NLRC on July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on September 8, 2009, she
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari10 before the
CA. Private respondent alleged that she had until September 7, 2009 (as September
6, 2009, the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within which to file a
petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was then saddled and occupied with
equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to file the petition on time,
especially since the case involves voluminous documents necessary in the
preparation thereof. Accordingly, private respondent asked for an extension of 15
days from September 7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the
petition.

On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari11
before the CA.

Action of the Court of Appeals

In a Resolution12 dated November 20, 2009, the CA noted that private

respondent’s Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from
procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the CA
entertained the petition and directed private respondent to cure the technical flaws
in her petition. Thus:

The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari
filed on September 22, 2009, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late.

A perusal of the instant petition reveals the following procedural infirmities,

namely:

(1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping does not

conform with the requirements under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice, as a Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered
competent evidence of an affiant’s identity; and

(2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission, no other copies of pertinent and
relevant pleadings/documents are attached therewith, such as petitioner’s
Complaint, respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal, petitioner’s Opposition to
Respondent’s Appeal, if any, all of which may aid this Court in judiciously
resolving the issues raised in the petition.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court, in line with the rule that cases should be determined
on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses have been given, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections, resolved to DIRECT petitioner to submit anew a
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which complies with the
requirements of the rules, and clear and legible copies of the aforementioned
pleadings/documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss,14 strongly

opposing private respondent’s Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari
for being an absolutely prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,15 petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC16 effectively
rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari non-extendible after it
deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time to file petition. Thus, as
the rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days
from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.17

Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable,
private respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper
as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari.

Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent’s motion for extension is a

prohibited pleading, as well as one filed outside of the reglementary period, then
private respondent’s Petition for Certiorari is a mere scrap of paper with no
remedial value whatsoever. Consequently, the Decision of the NLRC has become
final and executory and is beyond the ambit of judicial review.

In the meantime, private respondent submitted her Compliance18 with the CA’s
Resolution of November 20, 2009. Nevertheless, she still failed to attach thereto
copies of her Complaint filed before the LA and Memorandum filed with the
NLRC.

In a Resolution19 dated February 10, 2010, the CA denied petitioners’ motion and,
instead, gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its
November 20, 2009 Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still
lacking pleadings within five days from notice thereof.

Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.

Entry of Judgment20 was already issued by the NLRC on August 13, 2009. Per
NLRC Rules, the June 29, 2009 Resolution became final and executory on July 18,
2009 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.

Issues

1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT NOTED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT FOR
HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD REQUIRED BY SECTION 4, RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.

2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN, IN NOTING THE VERY LATE PETITION FILED
BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT GROSSLY IGNORED THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S VERY RECENT RULING IN LAGUNA METTS
CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND
GERALDINE ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, 2009), WHICH
DISALLOWED ANY MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.21 (Underscoring and
emphasis in the original)

Our Ruling

There is merit in the petition.

In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.22 we had the occasion to settle
the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether
the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated
that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,23 is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is
in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC24 where
no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari
exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 6525 which allowed the filing of
such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.26
Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,27 the 60-day period may be extended subject to
the court’s sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the
provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of
such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion
could just have simply been reworded to state that ‘no extension of time to file the
petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are
allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion."28

Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict
application of the 60-day period rule, thus:

[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus,
there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009
NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009
to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for
filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on
September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for
extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any
period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and
executory.31

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the
litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to
abide by the rules.32 Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for
extension is the heavy workload of private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a
compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have
held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing
alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."33
Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright.

Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on the
timeliness of private respondent’s motion for extension. Instead, it directly ruled on
the Petition for Certiorari as seen by its statement "[t]he Court x x x resolved to
NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days
late." To our mind, the foregoing pronouncement is an indirect acknowledgment
on the part of the CA that the motion for extension was indeed filed late. Yet it
opted to still entertain and "note" the Petition for Certiorari, justifying its action as
being "in the interest of justice."

We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for
extension should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition
for Certiorari is, in the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no
remedial value whatsoever."

In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,34 which likewise dealt with the late filing of a
petition for certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules ought to be
strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, we have,
nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases
to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This
is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were given the
chance to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded
that the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to
the opposing claims of the competing parties and always be guided by the principle
that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of justice.
Concomitant thereto:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to
litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has
allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and equity. x x x35

Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation of
the rules, the CA’s resolution would have only been acceptable had private
respondent shown respect for the rules by submitting a petition for certiorari which
is sufficient in form. In contrast, what private respondent filed was a petition
plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed petitioner to cure the
deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given, albeit
undeservingly, one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of the pertinent
pleadings required of her by the CA.

More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of
the fact that the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC denying private
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory
as of July 18, 2009.36 Thus, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except
to order its dismissal. In Labao, we held that:

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the
respondent’s failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period
rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus,
no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues
between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes
final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right
to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right
to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for
being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will
be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice
to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.37

In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended underserved

and unwarranted liberality to private respondent. "There is grave abuse of
discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism xx
x."38 Such is present here as shown by the CA's obstinate refusal to dismiss the
case despite the late filing of the motion for extension and the flimsy excuse for the
extension sought, the late filing of the petition and the numerous infirmities
attending the same, and private respondent's continued defiance of its directive.
These circumstances serve to highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard
the very rules that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to
follow.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals

Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari filed by private
respondent Amanda C. Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 CA rollo, pp. 98-100; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and

concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Michael P.
Elbinias.

2 Id. at 9-27.

3 Id. at 184.

4 Id. at 106-114.

5 Id. at 80-93; penned by Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr. The LA,
however, disallowed private respondent’s claim for unpaid salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of Guillermo’s employment contract for
lack of basis as the same is only awarded in illegal dismissal cases.

6 Id. at 93.

7 See Decision dated March 31, 2009, id. at 28-36; penned by Commissioner
Gregorio O. Bilog III and concurred in by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier took no part.

The NLRC disagreed with the LA’s application of the provisions of the
1996 POEA SEC and, instead, held that it is the 2000 POEA SEC that is
controlling in this case as the employment contract was executed between
petitioners and Guillermo on September 20, 2004 and Guillermo’s
deployment was on October 22, 2004. While the 1996 POEA SEC covers
all injuries or illnesses occurring during the term of the contract and there
need not be a showing that the injury or illness is work-related, the 2000
POEA SEC requires that the death, injury or illness occurring during the
term of the contract must be work-related. Citing Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v.
Joaquin (481 Phil. 222, 234 [2004]), the NLRC ruled that for death
compensation benefits to be awarded, there must be substantial evidence
showing that:

a) The cause of death was reasonably connected with the work of the
deceased; or

b) The sickness for which he died is an accepted occupational disease;

or

c) His working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease

for which he died.

In this case, the CA found that colon cancer is not included in the list of
occupational diseases under Sec. 32-A of the 2000 POEA SEC. Private
respondent must, therefore, show a reasonable connection between the
work of her deceased husband and the cause of his death or show that the
risk of contracting colon cancer is increased by the seaman’s working
conditions. Private respondent was unable to prove any of these. Thus, as
Guillermo’s death was not work-related, the CA ruled that the hospital and
medical expenses incurred by Guillermo after May 22, 2005 (the date when
the company-designated physician proclaimed that Guillermo’s illness is
not work-related) could not be passed on to petitioners. Likewise, the award
of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’ fees was not proper.

8 See Motion for Reconsideration, id. at 37-42.

9 Id. at 43-44; penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III and concurred in

by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez and Commissioner Pablo C.
Espiritu, Jr.
10 Id. at 3-6.

11 Id. at 9-27.

12 Id. at 98-100.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 106-114.

15 G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 139.

16 AMENDMENTS TO RULES 41, 45, 58 AND 65 OF THE RULES OF

COURT.

17 In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra at 146, we stated

that:

In granting the private respondent’s motion for extension of time to file

petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the
Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of
Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this
Court may exercise. For this reason, the challenged resolutions x x x were
invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of its
jurisdiction.

18 CA rollo, pp. 115-183.

19 Id. at 184.

20 Rollo, p. 99.

21 Id. at 10-11.

22 G.R. No. 192908, August 22, 2012, 678 SCRA 738, 747-750.

23 Supra note 15 at 144-146.

In that case, we held that:

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases

indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion
would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change
in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
 extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65
simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari.

x x x As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly
within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion
for reconsideration (Emphasis supplied)

24 Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, now reads:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
counted from notice of the denial of the motion.

If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a

corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the
court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or omission of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a

regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the
Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

25 Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:

Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
 law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for

compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis
supplied)

26 In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15, we

explained that the amendments were necessary to prevent the use (or abuse) of
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends
of justice. Besides, the 60-day period provided under the Rules for filing a
petition is already sufficient time for a party to ponder over the case and to
prepare a petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court or tribunal.

27 G.R. Nos. 182382-83, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 528.

28 Id. at 535.

29 G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723, 732.

30 This fact was also reflected, and is readily evident, in private respondent’s
petition for certiorari filed with the CA where it was stated that:

On 29 June 2009, the Honorable National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC, for brevity) issued a Resolution, which was received by petitioner
through counsel on 08 July 2009, x x x

xxxx

On 08 September, 2009, and within the reglementary period, petitioner,

through counsel, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Certiorari before this Honorable Court by registered mail and paid the
corresponding legal fees as evinced by the herein attached original copy of
the aforesaid Motion marked as Annexes "D" to "D-2[,]" the Registry
Return Cards marked as Annexes "E" and "E-1[,]" and the Postal Money
Order Remitter’s Receipts marked as Annexes "F" to "F-3" bearing
numbers J1350278464, J1350278465, A1320379229 and A1320379230 in
the total amount of PhP4,530.00, Philippine currency. CA rollo, pp. 10-11.
(Emphasis supplied)

31 Vda. de Victoria v. Court of Appeals, 490 Phil. 210, 221-222.

32 See also Vda. de Victoria v. Court of Appeals, id. at 224.

33 Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15 at 146.

34 G.R. No. 187122, February 22, 2012, 666 SC6\RA 629, 639.
 35 Id., citing Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing & Finance Corporation, G.R.
No. 168115, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 333, 343.

36 Roll3o, p. 99. Annex "I."

37 Supra note 29 at 734-735.

38 Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Tormon, G.R. No. 195640, December

4, 2012, 686 SCRA 854, 868.

G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE
CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-
GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND
CUSTODIO MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review the March 26, 20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285, ordering the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents for violation of Section 36023 in relation to
Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs
Codeof the Philippines, as amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

The antecedentsas culled from the records:

Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.
(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA under an Information which reads:

That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of

Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as
owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring and
confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858
cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security
Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry
No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of
Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing
No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons
of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties
amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred
Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in violation of
the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in
the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty
Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).4

In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to

the aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held on
September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on September 13, 2012. Both the
prosecution and the defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts and
issues entered in the course of the preliminary conference.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whoessentially observed5 the

physical examination of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process of electronic filing under
the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
misdeclared goods therein.

Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer
of Evidence on December 10, 2012.

On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File
Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on
January 21, 2013,whichwas grantedby the CTA. Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer
to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claimingthat the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:

a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were

inadmissible incourt;

b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not
presented as evidence; and

c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the
two accused as the ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.

Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in
its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish theirguilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution
showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence
against both accused were in fact issued by thelegal custodians."8 It cited Section
26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, whichprovidesthat"when the original
of a document is a public record, it should not generally be removed from the
office or place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its
contents may be proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain
to the certified true copy of the original document issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat the certified true copiesof the public
documents offered in evidence should have been presented in court.

Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply
with Section 27, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized
public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a
copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering that the private
documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became part of public
records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present the certified
true copies of thedocuments.

The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the Demurrer,the prosecution even
admitted that none of their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in open
court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently and properly
identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.

The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was deniedby the
CTAin its May 15, 2013 Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.12

On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of
the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the
case.

Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
theCTA when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by
the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of
the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses
failed to positively identifythe accused as responsible forthe misdeclaration of
goods.

The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
periodfor the filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself statedthat a copy of
the May 15, 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC two (2) days after its
promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the RATS was only alerted by the
developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos Jr.
(Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the
entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the
parties. According toAtty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he
discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the
petitionbe given due course despite its late filing.

This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in stating

thatcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.13 While there are recognized
exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for
his/her failure to comply with the rules.15

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition
was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show that
the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due
date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not
only be unfairto the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary
attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons
proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve
leniency.

The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor
incoming court processes that neededto be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is
an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked
toeffectively curb smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of
revenue every year.

The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to
suspectthat the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by designfrom the
start. The failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the
failure to competently and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to
identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on time
challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand
subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice. Verily, the lawyersrepresenting the offices under the
executive branchshould be reminded that theystill remain as officers of the
courtfrom whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill
not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s
goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and
similar activities.

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with
the CTA displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case
and the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager
and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented
its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse,
the end result would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court,it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this case, a perusal of the
challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose any indication of grave abuse
of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with
indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact,
presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.

On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of
Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013 and
May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are AFFIRMED.

The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for

possible criminal or administrative offenses committed by the Run After the
Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG),
Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the subject complaint for
violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Secretary
of Finance, the Collector of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for their
guidance and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 30-45.

2 Id. at 62-64.

3 Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue. -Any person who

makes or attempts to make any entry of imported or exported article by means
of any false or fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any
means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by any means of any false or
fraudulent practice whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares
or merchandise, at less than true weight or measures thereof or upona false
classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than the amount
legally due, or knowingly and willfully files any false or fraudulent entry or
claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of
merchandise, or makes or files any affidavit abstract, record, certificate or other
document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any
drawback, allowance, or refund of duties on the exportation of merchandise,
greater than that legally due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any willful act or
omission shall, for each offence, be punished in accordance with the penalties
prescribed in the preceding section.

4 Rollo, p. 31.

5 Rhoderick L. Yuchongco, X-Ray Inspector Bureau of Customs.

6 Jose A. Saromo, Customs Operations Officer III, Bureau of Customs.

7 Nomie V. Gonzales, Chief of the Systems Management Division, Bureau of

Customs.

8 Rollo, p. 41.

9 Id.

10 When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is

recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

11 Certified True Copy of Import Entry No. C-181011, Certified True Copy of
Bill of Lading PFCFMAN1715 and Certified True Copy of Invoice No.
309213.

12 Rollo,pp. 62-64.

13 Republicv. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 192908, August 22,
2012,678 SCRA 738,citing Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, November 15,
2010, 634 SCRA 723.

14 (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within
a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory;(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
 involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.

15 Supranote 13.

16 De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506. 515.

17 Canon 6, Chapter I, Code of Professional Responsibility.

18 Canon 12, Chapter III, Code of Professional Res

G.R. No. 187984 November 15, 2010

FRANCISCO A. LABAO, Petitioner,

vs.
LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. DAGUISONAN, PEPE M. CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE,
JESUS E. ARENA, CRISPIN A. NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE, ARTEMIO B. ARAGON, ARNOLD
M. CANTAR, ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R. GABUTAN, ELPEDIO
E. MENTANG,* WILFREDO R. MIÑOSA,**RODERICK P. NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D. RIVERA,
SANDE E. CASTIL,*** CRISOSTOMO B. ESIC, and AMBROSIO M. CANTAR,**** Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Francisco A. Labao (petitioner) to
challenge the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN. 4

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.

The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective Security Agency
(SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents Lolito N. Flores, Amado A.
Daguisonan, Pepe M. Cantar, Julio G. Pagente, Jesus E. Arena, Crispin A. Navales, Oscar M.
Vente, Artemio B. Aragon, Arnold M. Cantar, Alberto T. Cuadero, Rasmi E. Ronquillo, Pedro R.
Gabutan, Elpedio E. Mentang, Wilfredo R. Miñosa, Roderick P. Nambatac, Marcial D. Rivera, Sande
E. Castil, Crisostomo B. Esic, Ambrosio M. Cantar (respondents) and Jimmy O. Bicoy, were SMPSA
security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-
MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the respondents had a monthly salary of P7,020.00.

On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their
updated personal data files, security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents by
July 30, 2004 for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSA’s new service contract with the NPC-
MRC. 5

When respondents failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive, despite several notices to do so,
the petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and October 2004, and ordered
them to report to the Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new assignments.
Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual complaints with the Iligan City
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal
dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not given
new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC
redeployment and for new assignments. The complaints were consolidated.

The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal. They countered that the
respondents’ relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Furthermore, they issued a notice (dated January 17, 2005) 6 directing the respondents to report to
SMPSA’s main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any
valid reasons.

The Labor Arbiter Ruling

In a December 27, 2005 decision, Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua dismissed the
consolidated complaints for lack of merit. He held that the respondents’ relief from NPC-MRC duty
was due to their failure to comply with SMSPA’s requirement for its employees to submit updated
documents to meet NPC-MRC contract renewal requirements. According to the LA, this was a
legitimate exercise of NPC-MRC’s management prerogative, in light of the information it received
that some security guards carried falsified documents.7

The respondents appealed the dismissal of their complaints to the NLRC.

The NLRC Ruling

In a July 31, 2006 resolution, the NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It noted that the respondents’ relief
was in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business
enterprise since SMPSA merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion to protect its
business interest.8

It also noted that the respondents’ temporary off-detail did not exceed the 6-month period permitted
by law, since the respondents were directed, through the January 17, 2005 notice, to report for a
new assignment on January 25, 2005, but they failed or refused to do so.

In a September 29, 2006 resolution, the NLRC denied the respondents’ subsequent motion for
reconsideration.9The respondents’ counsel, Atty. Demosthenes R. Plando, received the September
29, 2006 resolution onOctober 13, 2006.

Eighty-eight (88) days later, or on January 9, 2007, the respondents, through their new counsel,
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that they were
informed of the September 29, 2006 resolution on December 6, 2006, while Bicoy received a copy
of the resolution on November 6, 2006.

The CA Ruling

In its September 5, 2008 decision, the CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding that the
respondents were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for more
than 6 months, from September and October 2004, when the respondents were "off-detailed," until
March and April 2005, when they filed their individual complaints for illegal dismissal. The appellate
court noted that the January 17, 2005 notice to report for new assignments did not toll the 6-month
"floating status" period since the respondents failed to receive the notice before the appointed date,
as SMPSA sent the notice by registered mail, which normally takes at least 5 working days to reach
the intended recipients.10

Finding that reinstatement was no longer viable under the circumstances, the CA awarded the
respondents separation pay at one (1) month’s salary for every year of service, plus full backwages,
allowances and other statutory benefits under the law.

The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed
the petition outright for late filing, and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA
and the NLRC’s factual findings.11

In its April 22, 2009 resolution, the CA modified its September 5, 2008 decision by dismissing
Bicoy’s petition for having been filed out of time. However, it considered the respondents’ petition as
timely filed. It also opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice. 12

The petitioner then filed the present petition. Bicoy, with respondents Castil, Esic, and Ambrocio M.
Cantar filed a separate appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 190848. The Court denied this appeal in its
April 5, 2010 resolution for late filing and for non-compliance with Rules 45 and 46 of the Rules of
Court.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that: (a) the respondents’ CA petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late; (b)
the respondents’ new counsel concealed Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September
26, 2006 resolution and relied on the respondents’ December 6, 2006 notice of the resolution; and
(c) the evidence on record supports the LA and NLRC decisions.

The Case for the Respondents

In contrast, the respondents submit that: (a) December 6, 2006 is the reckoning date of the 60-day
period; (b) Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia
M. Barnachea, misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution and they should not suffer for her
negligence; and (c) the evidence on record does not support the LA and NLRC rulings.

Issue

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition despite its
late filing, and in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

Timeliness of the CA petition for certiorari

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. 14
The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.15

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our
judicial system.16 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary
periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. 17 The timeliness of filing a
pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. 18

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be
followed.1avvphi1

However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and
fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. 19 Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.
1avvphi1

Negligence of former counsel binds the respondents

In the present case, the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from
Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents
insist that they should not suffer for Atty. Plando’s negligence in failing to inform them of the
September 29, 2006 resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their
December 6, 2006 notice.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique.20 The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross,
reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. 21 The failure of a party’s
counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is
negligence that is not excusable. We have repeatedly held thatnotice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.22

We cannot sustain the respondents’ argument that they cannot be bound by Atty. Plando’s
negligence since this would set a dangerous precedent. It would enable every party-litigant to render
inoperative any adverse order or decision of the courts or tribunals, through the simple expedient of
alleging his/her counsel’s gross negligence.

We thus find that the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition for certiorari despite its late
filing. The NLRC resolution was already final and executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition, except to order its dismissal.

Immutability of NLRC resolution

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’
failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the
resolution.23

Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land.24 All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a
judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. 25 Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision
on the case.26 After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the
merits.27 Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.28

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Known as "Elpedito Mentang" in other parts of the record.

**
Known as "Wilfredo R. Miñoza" in other parts of the record.

***
Known as "Sandy A. Castil" in other parts of the record.

Known as "Ambrocio M. Cantar, Jr." and "Ambrosio M. Cantar, Jr." in other parts of the
****

record.

1
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp.74-95.

2
Dated September 5, 2008; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Edgardo T. Lloren; id. at 100-123.

3
Dated April 22, 2009; id. at 154-158.

4
Entitled "Jimmy O. Bicoy, et al. v. San Miguel Protective Security Agency and/or Francisco A.
Labao; Lolito N. Flores, et al. v. SMPSA and/or Francisco A. Labao; Pedro Gabutan, et al. v.
SMPSA and/or Francisco A. Labao."

5
Rollo, p. 211.

6
Id. at 266-284.
7
Id. at 289-294.

8
Id. at 319-326.

9
Id. at 340-342.

10
Supra note 2.

11
Id. at 124-145.

12
Supra note 3.

13
SEC. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

14
Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, March 31, 2006,
486 SCRA 302, 324, citing Abbott Laboratories Phils., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories Employees
Union, 380 Phil. 364 (2000), and St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 811 (1998).

15
Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA
139, 143, citing De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA
351; Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 83, 91 (2002).

Mejillano v. Lucillo, G.R. No. 154717, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 1, 9; Ko v. Philippine National
16

Bank, G.R. Nos. 169131-32, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 298, 303.

17
Villa v. Heirs of Enrique Altavas, G.R. No. 162028, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 157, 166;
Moneytrend Lending Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 165580, February 20, 2006, 482
SCRA 705, 714. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 480 Phil. 134
(2004); FJR Garments Industries v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 216, 218 (1984).

18
National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 579-
580; Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. No. 73210, February 10, 1994, 230 SCRA
9, 15.

Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 172574, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617; Villena v.
19

Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 346, 358-359.

20
Philux, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 151854, September 3, 2008,
564 SCRA 21, 33; Producers Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 830 (2002).

21
Ibid.

22
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157040, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 434, 451-452;
Manaya v. Alabang Country Club Incorporated, G.R. No. 168988, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA
140; Trust International Paper Corporation v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 164871, August 22, 2006, 499
SCRA 552, 561-562; Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services, 484 Phil. 316, 327 (2004);
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 902, 913-914 (2000).

23
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals, 391 Phil. 145, 153 (2000).

Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R No.159520, September 19, 2006, 502
24

SCRA 383, 404.

25
Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall
issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
proceedings upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected. x x x

Bello v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146212, September 5, 2007, 532
26

SCRA 234, 242.

National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, supra note 18, at 590; Videogram Regulatory Board v.
27

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106564, November 28, 1996, 265 SCRA 50, 56.

28
Estinozo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150276, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 422, 432.