HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION FOR INDIA: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO WAR

{Indian Defence Review Apr-Jun 2016 (Vol 31.2)}

(A two Part article dealing with a proposed HDO and Integrated Front HQ with the CDS)

IDR ISSN 0970-2512, Apr-Jun 2016, Vol 31(2)

As India rises within the comity of nations as a major power in the 21st century, mere use of ‘soft
power’ may not be adequate. Judicious use of ‘smart power’ would be the key. However it is stymied by
the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) structure that is reminiscent of mid 20th century.

Despite adopting the euphemistic term, INTEGRATED HQ OF MINISTRY of DEFENCE (MOD)

post Kargil War, based on the various committee reports, the MOD website belies the lexicon. The
three Services do not form part of its organisational chart (see Fig 1 below), and continue to be
attached HQs based on the Allocation of Business (AOB) / Transaction of Business (TOB) Rules 1961
(as amended from time to time).

Fig 1

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART: MOD

The Ministry of Defence consists of four Departments; Department of Defence, Department of Defence
Production, Department of Defence Research & Development, and Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare. The
Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for
coordinating the activities of the four Departments in the Ministry.
http://www.mod.nic.in/forms/Sublink1.aspx?lid=1536&Id=56

Such a situation does not augur well for a country expecting to be considered as a major power
in the region. In a democracy civilian control over the military is essential – this implies political control
and not bureaucratic control, especially over operational issues. To achieve this it is essential for the
services to be a department of the MOD and be part of the policy making body. A strong triad of the
political, military and bureaucracy is the sine-qua-non for achieving synergy to enable a focussed and
holistic approach towards strategic military planning, future force structures and deployments, and
force modernisation programmes.

Despite having outstanding and dedicated officers in the bureaucracy, the MOD is inhibited by
their lack of comprehension of matters military due to lack of exposure in this highly specialised field
during their service. The expertise gained in other departments where they would have served, would
be more on budgetary and accounting details as relevant to MOD, rather than military strategy and the
geo political construct dealing with the emerging and future threats to security. This leads to decisions
based more on budgetary constraints rather than a synergetic approach to counter these threats.

Each Service on its part seeks to protect its turf and expand its own scope and relevance, at the
expense of others. There is compartmentalised planning against external and internal threats with some
jointness envisaged at the highest levels. This leads to a disjointed and fragmented execution at the
operational and lower levels, leading to a lack of synergy within the battle space.

Hence there is an urgent need to restructure the HDO in India to empower the proposed Chief
of Defence Staff (CDS) / Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (PCOSC), that the Defence
Minister has been speaking about.

PART 1: INDIA’S HDO- WAY AHEAD

On 24 Sep 1947, Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten (Governor General of India),
had recommended a three tier HDO to the PM Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, at his request. It was based on his
experience as the Military Secretary with Sir Winston Churchill during WW-II. Based on his
recommendations the three committees formed were,

- The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), chaired by the PM.

- The Defence Minister’s Committee (DMC), and

- The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), as part of the Military wing of the Cabinet Secretariat.

It functioned adequately till the mid – 50s despite the C-in-C being only an invitee to DCC and
not being a member. The post of the C-in-C, who chaired the COSC, was abolished in 1955, and
subsequent to the appointment of V. Krishna Menon as the Defence Minister in 1957 the DCC started
losing relevance as he had direct access to the PM. There does not appear to have been any holistic
brainstorming at the DCC during this period leading upto the 1962 debacle.

Subsequent to the “Thimaiyya Resignation Issue” of 1959, and the disastrous 1962 War, the DCC
got subsumed in the Emergency Cabinet Committee and was never resumed thereafter. The 1961
AOB/TOB Rules were promulgated and the 3 Services ceased to be a part of MOD and became attached
offices. Thereafter the Military Wing was moved out of the Cabinet Secretariat, thereby creating a
vacuum between the political and the military hierarchy as the supposed interface, the Defence
Planning Staff, never got established till 1986.

While India somehow managed to overcome the hurdles of the 65 and 71 Wars, it was more to
the credit of the then PMs, who gave direct access to the Service Chiefs and abided by their advice. The
Political Affairs Cabinet Committee subsumed the DCC and ECC in the 70s, and later was split to
establish the Cabinet Committee on Security. Since then the lack of holistic approach has been more
glaring, be it in the conventional and/or asymmetric security threat domains.

Over the last year the Hon’ble RM has often been heard stating about the creation of a CDS /
PCOSC. Without a restructuring of the HDO, the creation of this Appointment would be a exercise in
futility. The need is for a structure that is inclusive of the military, thereby ensuring a holistic and
focussed approach towards strategic decision making (see Fig 2 below).
 RM

Dept of Defence
CDS* COAS, CNS, CAS RRM
Defence Secretary,

IHQ of Dept OF Def

Tri Service Op & MOD Production
HQ IDS IA, IN, IAF
Functional Commands & Dept OF Def R&D
ESW BRO

Note:- * The CDS has only operational control over all field formations, and provides input to the RM and
CCS on all operational issues.

RESTRUCTURED MOD: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TOWARDS A HDO

Fig 2

The AOB/TOB Rules relevant to MOD need a review to enable and strengthen it, thereby making
it capable to face emerging and future challenges. The following aspects need attention,
- The Services form part of the MOD and cease to be ‘attached offices’.
- The CDS/PCOSC should be responsible for all operations and for the defence of India.
- Creation of Integrated Front HQs, to cater for the threats across Northern, Western
and Maritime frontiers, directly under the CDS/PCOSC.
- Re-creation of the Military Wing in the Cabinet Secretariat by locating the COSC HQ
there.
The CDS/ PCOSC should be a permanent member of CCS (chaired by the PM), Defence Minister’s
Committee, and the Strategy Policy Group. Posting of Service Officers within the Ministry and equating
the Services with Central Services Group A, as mentioned in various committee reports bears mention
again. Mere creation of CDS/PCOSC without a concomitant restructuring of the HDO, with relevant
changes in the AOB/TOB Rules would serve no purpose. The fractured and fragmented planning would
continue as hither-to-fore. The CDS would be seen as another hurdle by the Services to overcome in
their quest for expanded relevance and procurement priorities.
However, a wholesome restructuring of the HDO suitably backed by the creation of the
CDS/PCOSC and amendment to the relevant AOB/TOB Rules would lead to a better Comprehensive
National Power (CNP), and support India’s quest for greater say in the regional and world order with
effective use of ‘smart power’ and CNP.

This can be achieved if concurrently there is a restructuring of the Services towards achieving an
‘Integrated Approach’ towards war fighting – a Tri-Service transformation.
 PART II – INTEGRATED OPERATIONS: TRISERVICE TRANSFORMATION

Jointness, Interoperability, Joint Operations, Integrated Theatre Battle’s, have been a common
refrain in the military lexicon during the first decade of the 21st Century, while referring to Joint Tri-
Service Operations. The major lessons that have emerged during the closing stages of the 20th Century,
and the first two decades of the 21st century has been that the success in the future battle space milieu
would be directly proportional to the level of integration achieved. Such ‘integrated operations’ enables
orchestration of an effective synergy to achieve a force multiplier impact over the battle space , thereby
facilitating early achievement of military and political aims of war.

To enable the above, the need is to move beyond the realms of plain lexicon and look at Tri-
Service integration at the Force and Functional levels. Such an integration would not only enable
jointness of plans but would also ensure a better utilisation of the defence budget by ensuring
standardisation of weapons, equipment and warlike stores, with a seamless logistics and maintenance
back up.

An integrated assessment of the likely future battle space milieu would enable a cohesive
perspective plan on force transformation and a co-ordinated acquisition plan. This coupled with joint
training and staffing of Officers at middle and senior levels (within MOD and the 3 Service HQ) would
enable a better understanding of integrated operations and a cohesive co-ordinated application of
respective strengths to achieve a force multiplier effect. This integration needs to be done at both the
Force and Functional level, and within the MOD.

A full spectrum high intensity war, covering land, sea, air, space, information and cyber domain,
of limited duration is likely to be the future battle space milieu over the coming decades. Unrestricted
Warfare (or Full Spectrum Dominance) with its Hybrid/Compound wars would add to these
complexities, wherein both the Western and Northern neighbours would utilise non-state actors in
conjunction with their conventional forces covering military, trans-military and non military spheres. To
achieve victory in this milieu, integrated theatre operations would be imperative.

The main threat to India would be across its Northern and / or Western borders, with a
complimentary/supplementary threat across the high seas to its SLOCs, island territories and its W-
Eastern and/or Western seaboard. The air, space, information and cyber domains essentially encompass
the ‘Force Multiplier’ and ‘Combat Support’ domain and cannot guarantee any victory, without
effective land and maritime forces to counter the main threats across the land and maritime frontiers.
In this construct, the Army and the Navy encompass strategic, operational and tactical spheres of their
battle spaces, while the Air Force essentially covers the strategic sphere in its domain and provides
combat support to Army and navy within their respective domains.

In this future battle field milieu, the effect of destruction/degradation at the strategic value
targets, one of the primary roles of the Air Force, would have limited impact on the progress of Land and
Maritime operations. However, for the success of their operations, air, space, information and cyber
domains need to provide effective, dedicated and integrated combat support operations. Thus, at the
Apex level it can be enunciated that Army and Navy are Combat Arms and the Air Force is a Combat
Support Arm. This aspect, coupled with the domain knowledge and expertise has been factored in the
proposed recommendations.

The extant inter-service rivalry in the existing system is highly counter-productive. Peacetime
activities, such as LTIPP, procurement, employment doctrine, etc are tailored for each service in
isolation. In a similar manner wartime activities of each service are planned and evaluated
independently. These practices have resulted in division of effort and inability to profit from economies
of scale. More importantly, it has inhibited the development of modern integrated warfare doctrine. The
proposed recommendation envisages an Integrated Armed Forces HQ under a CDS/PCOSC, with 04
Integrated Force HQ, 01 Integrated Force Command, and 02 Integrated Functional Commands (see Fig
3 below). Each of the Force HQ would be responsible for conduct of operations in respective theatres,
while the Functional Commands for providing integrated combat and logistics support to the Armed
Forces.

The proposed organisation structure is as shown below at Fig 3. The restructuring affords co-
ordination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement and a reduction or elimination of inter-
service rivalry. It will also provide unity of command, conforming to modern military thought. Individual
Services would change from relatively autonomous war fighting entities into organisational and
training hubs, responsible for acquisition, modernisation, force structuring and deployment and
operational readiness as a component of the Integrated Armed Forces HQ and as per the Joint
Directives and Doctrines issued by the CDS/PCOSC. The Service Chiefs would not have any operational
role and thus would not exercise any operational control over the field formations.

The restructuring of both the MOD and the Service HQs, with the relevant changes in the
AOB/TOB Rules and the creation of the CDS/PCSOC is the need of the hour, if India is to be an effective
Major Power amongst the comity of nations. An integrated MoD will eliminate existing infirmities and
result in higher levels of synergy, efficiency and decision making ability.

03 SERVICE HQ
Integrated Integrated
Northern Southern
Front HQ Front HQ
Integrated
Western
Front HQ
* Has under its
command all Army &
Air Force formations
deployed to defend
the Northern Borders.
* Also responsible
for Southern Borders
of NE.
* Responsible for
preparing Integrated
Theatre Battle Plans
for Northern and
Southern Borders of
NE, including
Theatre Missile
Defence, employment
of Conventional
Ballistic Missiles,
and recommendations
for employment of
Strategic assets
Note:- The appointment of CDS?PCOSC to be held in the ratio of 2:1:1 between Army, Navy and Air Force
FIG 3
INTEGRATED ARMED FORCES HQ
CDS/PCOSC (4 STAR GEN/EQUI)
IDS HQ
SA to CDS/PCOSC
FORCE HQs
Integrated Intergrated
Integrated
Strategic Comn, Cyber
Strategic HQ
& IW
Reserve
Command Command
Integrated
Logistics
Command
* Has under command
* Has under its the maritime fleets, all
command all Army & air assets deployed for
Air Force formations defence of Western, * Has under
deployed to defend Eastern and Southern command the SFC,
the Western Borders. seaboards. BMD Forces,and
Integrated Aerospace
* Will take under * Has under its Command.
operational control of command the
Naval assets Andaman and Nicobar * Responsible for
deployed to support Command. preparing operational
the Western Borders plans for Integrated
Campaign. * Responsible for Air Defence, Ballistic
preparing the Missile Defence,
* * Responsible for Maritime operational Space Plans and
preparing Integrated plans, including recommendations for
Theatre Battle Plans defence of Island employment of
for Western Borders, territories, Indian Strategic assets.
including Theatre seaboard defence
Missile Defence, plans, Maritime
employment of Theatre missile
Conventional defence plans, and
Ballistic Missiles, employment of
and recommendations Conventional Ballistic
for employment of Missiles.
Strategic assets.