1. No.
o. L-32747, 29 Nov 1984 4) That CA should award damages in its favor since private respondent clearly profited from
Fruit of the Loom vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 405
Legal Doctrine: In infringement cases, there can be no better evidence than the labels or
hang tags themselves. A visual presentation of the labels or hang tags is the best argument
for one or the other.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Rhode Island,
USA and the registrant of the trademark, FRUIT OF THE LOOM, in the IPO. The classes of its
merchandise are men’s, women’s and children’s underwear.
On the other hand, private respondent is a domestic corporation and the registrant of FRUIT
FOR EVE covering garments similar to petitioner’s.
Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against
private respondent alleging that
(1) the latter’s trademark is confusingly similar to its trademark and
(2) the color get-up and general appearance of private respondent’s hang tag
consisting of a big red apple is a colorable imitation to their hang tag
Private respondent’s Answer: its registered trademark is not confusingly similar to that of
petitioner and its trademark FRUIT FOR EVE is being used on ladies’ panties and pajamas only
whereas petitioner’s is used even on men’s underwear and pajamas.
The following admissions were made during pre-trial:
(1) FRUIT OF THE LOOM has been registered with BoP and it does not bear the notice ‘Reg.
Phil. Patent Off.’;
(2) FRUIT FOR EVE has been registered with BoP and it bears the notice ‘Reg. Phil. Patent
Off.’; and
(3) at the time of its registration, plaintiff filed no opposition thereto.
Lower court ruled in favor of petitioner while on appeal, CA reversed the decision and
dismissed the complaint. MR was also denied.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
1) that CA erred in holding that the word FRUIT, being generic word, is not capable of
exclusive appropriation by petitioner and that the registrant of a trademark is not entitled to
the exclusive use of every word of his mark;
2) that CA erred in holding that there is no confusing similarity in sound and appearance
between the two trademarks;
3) That CA failed to look on the fraudulent registration of the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE; and
the infringement of former’s trademark
ISSUE: WON FRUIT FOR EVE and its hang tag are confusingly similar to petitioner’s FRUIT OF
THE LOOM and its hang tag so as to constitute an infringement of the latter’s trademark
rights and justify the cancellation of the former.
RULING: It has been consistently held that there is infringement of trademark when the use
of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public
or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the Commodity. In cases of this nature,
there can be no better evidence than the labels or hang tags themselves. A visual
presentation of the labels or hang tags is the best argument for one or the other.
Petitioner asseverates that the dominant features of both trademarks is the word FRUIT. In
determining whether the trademarks are confusingly similar, a comparison of the words is
not the only determinant factor. The trademarks in their entirety as they appear in their
respective labels or hang tags must also be considered in relation to the goods to which they
are attached.
The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also
on the other features appearing in both labels in order that he may draw his conclusion
whether one is confusingly similar to the other in the trademarks FRUIT OF THE LOOM and
FRUIT FOR EVE, the lone similar word is FRUIT. WE agree with the respondent court that by
mere pronouncing the two marks, it could hardly be said that it will provoke a confusion, as
to mistake one for the other. Standing by itself, FRUIT OF THE LOOM is wholly different from
FRUIT FOR EVE. WE do not agree with petitioner that the dominant feature of both
trademarks is the word FRUIT for even in the printing of the trademarking both hang tags,
the word FRUIT is not at all made dominant over the other words.
As to the design and coloring scheme of the hang tags, we believe that while there are
similarities in the two marks like the red apple at the center of each mark, we also find
differences or dissimilarities which are glaring and striking to the eye.
1. The shape of petitioner’s hang tag is round with a base that looks like a paper rolled a few
inches in both ends; while that of private respondent is plain rectangle without any base.
2. The designs differ. Petitioner’s trademark is written in almost semi-circle while that of
private respondent is written in straight line in bigger letters than petitioner’s. Private
respondent’s tag has only an apple in its center but that of petitioner has also clusters of
grapes that surround the apple in the center. 3. The colors of the hang tag are also very
distinct from each other. Petitioner’s hang tag is light brown while that of respondent is pink
with a white colored centerpiece. The apples which are the only similarities in the hang tag
are differently colored. Petitioner’s apple is colored dark red, while that of private
respondent is light red.
The similarities of the competing trademarks in this case are completely lost in the
substantial differences in the design and general appearance of their respective hang tags.
WE have examined the two trademarks as they appear in the hang tags submitted by the
parties and Weare impressed more by the dissimilarities than by the similarities appearing
therein. We hold that the trademarks FRUIT OF THE LOOM and FRUIT FOR EVE do not
resemble each other as to confuse or deceive an ordinary purchaser. The ordinary purchaser
must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence
(Carnation Co. vs. California Growers Wineries, 97 F. 2d 80; Hyram Walke and Sons vs. Penn-
Maryland Corp., 79 F. 2d 836) to be able to see the obvious differences between the two
trademarks in question. Furthermore, we believe that a person who buys petitioner’s
products and starts to have a liking for it, will not get confused and reach out for private
respondent’s products when she goes to a garment store.
2. G.R. No. 139300. March 14, 2001
Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Cluett Peabody Co., Inc.
FACTS:
The source of the controversy that precipitated the filing by Cluett Peabody Co., Inc. (a New
York corporation) of the present case against Amigo Manufacturing Inc. (a Philippine
corporation) for cancellation of trademark is Cluett‟s claim of exclusive ownership (as
successor in interest of Great American Knitting Mills, Inc.) of the following trademark and
devices, as used on men‟s socks:
● GOLD TOE, under Certificate of Registration No. 6797 dated September 22, 1958;
DEVICE, representation of a sock and magnifying glass on the toe of a sock, under
Certificate of Registration No. 13465 dated January 25, 1968;
● DEVICE, consisting of a ‟plurality of gold-colored lines arranged in parallel relation
within a triangular area of toe of the stocking and spread from each other by lines
of contrasting color of the major part of the stocking‟ under
● Certificate of Registration No. 13887 dated May 9, 1968; and
● LINENIZED, under Certificate of Registration No. 15440 dated April 13, 1970.
On the other hand, petitioner’s trademark and device GOLD TOP, Linenized for Extra Wear‟
has the dominant color white at the center and a blackish brown background with a
magnified design of the sock’s garter, and is labeled Amigo Manufacturing Inc.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Made in the Philippines.
The Patent office ruled in favor of Cluett because of idem sonans and the existence of a
confusing similarity in appearance between two trademarks.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the patent office by stating the ff:
There is hardly any variance in the appearance of the marks GOLD TOP and GOLD
TOE since both show a representation of a man’s foot wearing a sock, and the marks are
printed in identical lettering and that it cannot be allowed to be registered because it runs
counter to the Section 4 of Republic Act 166.
Amigo’s mark is only registered with the Supplemental Registry which gives no right of
exclusivity to the owner and cannot overturn the presumption of validity and exclusivity
given to a registered mark.
The Philippines and the United States are parties to the Paris Convention. The object of the
Convention is to accord a national of a member nation extensive protection against
infringement and other types of unfair competition.
Issue:
Who among the parties had first actual use over the trademark?
Are confusing similarities on the trademark and device of the parties?
Does the Paris Convention apply in the given case?
Ruling:
The petition of Amigo has no merit.
i. The respondent was able to present with the Bureau registrations indicating the
dates of first use in the Philippines of the trademark and the devices as follows:
a) March 16, 1954, Gold Toe;
b) February 1, 1952, the Representation of a Sock and a Magnifying Glass;
c) January 30, 1932, the Gold Toe Representation; and
d) February 28, 1952, “Linenized.”
The registration of these marks in favor of respondent constitutes prima facie evidence,
which petitioner failed to overturn satisfactorily, of respondent’s ownership of those marks,
the dates of appropriation and the validity of other pertinent facts stated therein which is
specifically mandated by Section 20 of Republic Act 166.
Furthermore, petitioner registered its trademark only with the supplemental register. It is
already settled that registration with the supplemental register gives no presumption of
ownership of the trademark.
ii. Bureau of Patents, did not rely on the idem sonans test alone in arriving at its
conclusion. The Bureau considered the drawings and the labels, the
appearance of the labels, the lettering, and the representation of a man’s foot
wearing a sock. Obviously, its conclusion is based on the totality of the
similarities between the parties‟ trademarks and not on their sounds alone.
As its title implies, the test of dominancy focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features
of the competing trademarks which might cause confusion or deception and thus constitutes
infringement. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential or dominant
features of another, and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place.
Duplication or imitation is not necessary; nor is it necessary that the infringing label should
suggest an effort to imitate. The question at issue in cases of infringement of trademarks is
whether the use of the marks involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistakes in the
mind of the public or deceive purchasers.
The holistic test mandates that the entirety of the marks in question must be considered in
determining confusing similarity.
In the present case, a resort to either the Dominancy Test or the Holistic Test shows that
colorable imitation exists between respondent’s “Gold Toe” and petitioner’s “Gold Top.”
Both tests apply.
An examination of the products would show the following similarities:
Dominant features are gold checkered lines against a predominantly black background
Both has a representation of a sock with a magnifying glass. both products use the same type
of lettering.
Both also include a representation of a man’s foot wearing a sock and the word “linenized”
with arrows printed on the label.
The names of the brands are similar “Gold Top” and “Gold Toe.” that petitioner and
respondent are engaged in the same line of business.
iii. Cluett registered its trademarks under the principal register, which means that
the requirement of prior use had already been fulfilled. Section 5-A of
Republic Act 166 requires the date of first use to be specified in the
application for registration. Since the trademark was successfully registered,
there exists a prima facie presumption of the correctness of the contents
thereof, including the date of first use. Petitioner has failed to rebut this
presumption.
A foreign based trademark owner, whose country of domicile is a party to an
international convention relating to protection of trademarks, is accorded protection against
infringement or any unfair competition as provided in Section 37 of Republic Act 166, the
Trademark Law which was the law in force at the time this case was instituted.
 3. MIGHTY CORPORATION and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACO, INC., petitioner,
vs. E. & J. GALLO WINERY and THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., respondents
Doctrine:
Section 22 of the Trademark Law holds a person liable for infringement when, among others,
he uses without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source
or origin of such goods or services, or identity of such business; or reproduce, counterfeit,
copy or colorably imitate any such mark or tradename and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used upon or in connection with such goods,
business or services
Facts:
Respondent Gallo Winery is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines but
organized and existing under the laws of
the State of California, United States of America (U.S.), where all its wineries are located.
Gallo Winery produces different kinds of wines and brandy products and sells them in many
countries under different registered trademarks, including the GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO wine trademarks.
Respondent domestic corporation, Andresons, has been Gallo Winery’s exclusive wine
importer and distributor in the Philippines since 1991, selling these products in its own name
and for its own account.
Gallo Winery’s GALLO wine trademark was registered in the principal register of the
Philippine Patent Office (now Intellectual Property Office) on November 16, 1971 under
Certificate of Registration No. 17021 which was renewed on November 16, 1991 for another
20 years. Gallo Winery also applied for registration of its ERNEST & JULIO GALLO wine
trademark on October 11, 1990 under Application Serial No. 901011- 00073599-PN but the
records do not disclose if it was ever approved by the Director of Patents.
On the other hand, petitioners Mighty Corporation and La Campana and their sister
company, Tobacco Industries of the Philippines (Tobacco Industries), are engaged in the
cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of tobacco products for which they have been
using the GALLO cigarette trademark since 1973.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) approved Tobacco Industries’ use of GALLO 100’s
cigarette mark on September 14, 1973 and GALLO filter cigarette mark on March 26, 1976,
both for the manufacture and sale of its cigarette products. In 1976, Tobacco Industries filed
its manufacturer’s sworn statement as basis for BIR’s collection of specific tax on GALLO
cigarettes.
On February 5, 1974, Tobacco Industries applied for, but eventually did not pursue, the
registration of the GALLO cigarette trademark in the principal register of the then Philippine
Patent Office.
In May 1984, Tobacco Industries assigned the GALLO cigarette trademark to La Campana
which, on July 16, 1985, applied for trademark registration in the Philippine Patent Office. On
July 17, 1985, the National Library issued Certificate of Copyright Registration No. 5834 for La
Campana’s lifetime copyright claim over GALLO cigarette labels.
Subsequently, La Campana authorized MightyCorporation to manufacture and sell cigarettes
bearing the GALLO trademark. BIR approved Mighty Corporation’s use of GALLO 100’s
cigarette brand, under licensing agreement with Tobacco Industries, on May 18, 1988, and
GALLO SPECIAL MENTHOL 100’s cigarette brand on April 3, 1989.
Petitioners claim that GALLO cigarettes have been sold in the Philippines since 1973, initially
by Tobacco Industries, then by La Campana and finally by Mighty Corporation.
On the other hand, although the GALLO wine trademark was registered in the Philippines in
1971, respondents claim that they first introduced and sold the GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO
GALLO wines in the Philippines circa 1974 within the then U.S. military facilities only. By
1979, they had expanded their Philippine market through authorized distributors and
independent outlets.
Respondents claim that they first learned about the existence of GALLO cigarettes in the
latter part of 1992 when an Andresons employee saw such cigarettes on display with GALLO
wines in a Davao supermarket wine cellar section. Forthwith, respondents sent a demand
letter to petitioners asking them to stop using the GALLO trademark, to no avail.
On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the Makati RTC for trademark and
tradename infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and preliminary
injunction.
Respondents charged petitioners with violating Article 6 of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and RA 166 (Trademark Law), specifically,
Sections 22 and 23 (for trademark infringement), 29 and 30 (for unfair competition and false
designation of origin) and 37 (for tradename infringement). They claimed that petitioners
adopted the GALLO trademark to ride on Gallo Winery’s GALLO and ERNEST & JULIO GALLO
trademarks’ established reputation and popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and
mistake on the part of the purchasing public who had always associated GALLO and ERNEST
& JULIO GALLO trademarks with Gallo Winery’s wines. Respondents prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and ex parte restraining order, plus P2 million as actual and
compensatory damages, at least P500,000 as exemplary and moral damages, and at least
P500,000 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses, that: petitioner’s
GALLO cigarettes and Gallo Winery’s wines were totally unrelated products; Gallo Winery’s
GALLO trademark registration certificate covered wines only, not cigarettes; GALLO cigarettes
and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of trade; GALLO cigarettes, sold at
P4.60 for GALLO filters and P3 for GALLO menthols, were low-cost items compared to Gallo
Winery’s high-priced luxury wines which cost between P98 to P242.50; the target market of
Gallo Winery’s wines was the middle or high-income bracket with at least P10,000 monthly
income while GALLO cigarette buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other low-
income workers; the dominant feature of the GALLO cigarette mark was the rooster device
with the manufacturer’s name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION while, in the case
of Gallo Winery’s wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST & JULIO GALLO
or just their surname GALLO; by their inaction and conduct, respondents were guilty of
laches and estoppel; and petitioners acted with honesty, justice and good faith in the
exercise of their right to manufacture and sell GALLO cigarettes.
conclusively known by the populace. To make a law binding even before it takes effect may
lead to the arbitrary exercise of the legislative power.
In Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we distinguished trademark infringement
from unfair competition:
(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair
competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary, whereas in unfair
competition fraudulent intent is essential.

RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary (3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a
injunction, holding that respondent’s GALLO trademark registration certificate covered wines prerequisite to the action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary.
only, that respondents’ wines and petitioners’ cigarettes were not related goods and
respondents failed to prove material damage or great irreparable injury as required by
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

After trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, held petitioners liable for, and
permanently enjoined them from, committing trademark infringement and unfair
competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTC decision and subsequently denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition and
damages. (No)

Ruling:

The Trademark Law and The Paris Convention are the applicable laws, not the Intellectual
Property Code.

We note that respondents sued petitioners on March 12, 1993 for trademark infringement
and unfair competition committed during the effectivity of the Paris Convention and the
Trademark Law.

Yet, in the Makati RTC decision of November 26, 1998, petitioners were held liable not only
under the aforesaid governing laws but also under the IP Code which took effect only on
January 1, 1998,

The CA apparently did not notice the error and affirmed the Makati RTC decision. We
therefore hold that the courts a quo erred in retroactively applying the IP Code in this case.

It is a fundamental principle that the validity and obligatory force of a law proceed from the
fact that it has first been promulgated. A law that is not yet effective cannot be considered as
 4. G.R. No. 166115 February 2, 2007
McDonald’s Corporation vs. Macjoy Fastfood Corporation
Facts
On 14 March 1991, respondent MacJoy Fastfood Corporation, a domestic corporation
engaged in the sale of fast food products in Cebu City, filed with the then Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTT), now the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), an
application, thereat identified as Application Serial No. 75274, for the registration of the
trademark “MACJOY & DEVICE” for fried chicken, chicken barbeque, burgers, fries, spaghetti,
palabok, tacos, sandwiches, halo-halo and steaks under classes 29 and 30 of the International
Classification of Goods.
Petitioner McDonald’s Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the State of Delaware, USA, filed a verified Notice of Opposition against the respondent’s
application claiming that the trademark “MACJOY & DEVICE” so resembles its corporate logo,
otherwise known as the Golden Arches or “M” design, and its marks “McDonalds,”
McChicken,” “MacFries,” “BigMac,” “McDo,” “McSpaghetti,” “McSnack,” and “Mc,”
(hereinafter collectively known as the MCDONALD’S marks) such that when used on identical
or related goods, the trademark applied for would confuse or deceive purchasers into
believing that the goods originate from the same source or origin. Likewise, the petitioner
alleged that the respondent’s use and adoption in bad faith of the “MACJOY & DEVICE” mark
would falsely tend to suggest a connection or affiliation with petitioner’s restaurant services
and food products, thus, constituting a fraud upon the general public and further cause the
dilution of the distinctiveness of petitioner’s registered and internationally recognized
MCDONALD’S marks to its prejudice and irreparable damage.
Respondent averred that its use of said mark would not confuse affiliation with the
petitioner’s restaurant services and food products because of the differences in the design
and detail of the two (2) marks.
The IPO found that the predominance of the letter “M,” and the prefixes “Mac/Mc” in both
the “MACJOY” and the “MCDONALDS” marks lead to the conclusion that there is confusing
similarity between them especially since both are used on almost the same products falling
under classes 29 and 30 of the International Classification of Goods, i.e., food and ingredients
of food, sustained the petitioner’s opposition and rejected the respondent’s application.
Therefrom, the respondent filed a Petition for Review with prayer for Preliminary Injunction
before the CA, which subsequently reversed and set aside the herein IPO decision. In its
resolution, the CA said that the IPO brushed aside and rendered useless the glaring and
drastic differences and variations in style of the two trademarks and even decreed that these
pronounced differences are “miniscule” and considered them to have been “overshadowed
by the appearance of the predominant features” such as “M,” “Mc,” and “Mac” appearing in
both MCDONALD’S and MACJOY marks. Instead of taking into account these differences, the
IPO unreasonably shrugged off these differences in the device, letters and marks in the
trademark sought to be registered.
Issue(s) Whether the CA erred in setting aside the ruling of the IPO
Ruling
Yes. In ruling in favor of McDonald’s Corporation, the IPO correctly applied the dominancy
test. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed two
tests, the dominancy test and the holistic test. The dominancy test focuses on the similarity
of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks that might cause confusion or
deception. In contrast, the holistic test requires the court to consider the entirety of the
marks as applied to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining
confusing similarity. Under the latter test, a comparison of the words is not the only
determinant factor.
Here, the IPO used the dominancy test in concluding that there was confusing similarity
between the two (2) trademarks in question as it took note of the appearance of the
predominant features “M,” “Mc” and/or “Mac” in both the marks. In reversing the
conclusion reached by the IPO, the CA, while seemingly applying the dominancy test, in fact
actually applied the holistic test.
Applying the dominancy test to the instant case, the Court finds that herein petitioner’s
“MCDONALD’S” and respondent’s “MACJOY” marks are confusingly similar with each other
such that an ordinary purchaser can conclude an association or relation between the marks.
To begin with, both marks use the corporate “M” design logo and the prefixes “Mc” and/or
“Mac” as dominant features. The first letter “M” in both marks puts emphasis on the prefixes
“Mc” and/or “Mac” by the similar way in which they are depicted i.e., in an arch-like,
capitalized and stylized manner.
For sure, it is the prefix “Mc,” an abbreviation of “Mac,” which visually and aurally catches
the attention of the consuming public. Verily, the word “MACJOY” attracts attention the
same way as did “McDonalds,” “MacFries,” “McSpaghetti,” “McDo,” “Big Mac” and the rest
of the MCDONALD’S marks which all use the prefixes Mc and/or Mac.
Besides and most importantly, both trademarks are used in the sale of fastfood products.
Indisputably, the respondent’s trademark application for the “MACJOY & DEVICE” trademark
covers goods under Classes 29 and 30 of the International
Classification of Goods, namely, fried chicken, chicken barbeque, burgers, fries, spaghetti,
etc. Likewise, the petitioner’s trademark registration for the MCDONALD’S marks in the
Philippines covers goods which are similar if not identical to those covered by the
respondent’s application.
 5. GR NO 143993, AUGUST 18,2004
MCDONALDS CORPORATION vs BIG MAK BURGER INC.
DOCTRINE:
Modern law recognizes that the protection to which the owner of a trademark is entitled is
not limited to guarding his goods or business from actual market competition with identical
or similar products of the parties, but extends to all cases in which the use by a junior
appropriator of a trade-mark or trade-name is likely to lead to a confusion of source, as
where prospective purchasers would be misled into thinking that the complaining party has
extended his business into the field or is in any way connected with the activities of the
infringer; or when it forestalls the normal potential expansion of his business
FACTS:
Petitioner McDonalds Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware,
United States. It operates, by itself or through its franchisees, a global chain of fast-food
restaurants. McDonalds owns a family of marks including the Big Mac mark for its double-
decker hamburger sandwich. McDonalds registered this trademark with the United States
Trademark Registry. Based on this Home Registration, McDonalds applied for the registration
of the same mark in the Principal Register of the then Philippine Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology (PBPTT), now the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Pending
approval of its application, McDonalds introduced its Big Mac hamburger sandwiches in the
Philippine market. The PBPTT then allowed registration of the Big Mac mark in the Principal
Register based on its Home Registration in the United States.
Petitioner McGeorge Food Industries, a domestic corporation, is McDonalds Philippine
franchisee.
Respondent L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. is a domestic corporation which operates fast-food
outlets and snack vans in Metro Manila and nearby provinces. Respondent corporation’s
menu includes hamburger sandwiches and other food items.On 21 October 1988,
respondent corporation applied with the PBPTT for the registration of the Big Mak mark for
its hamburger sandwiches. McDonalds opposed respondent corporation’s application on the
ground that Big Mak was a colorable imitation of its registered Big Mac mark for the same
food products. McDonalds also informed respondent Francis Dy (respondent Dy), the
chairman of the Board of Directors of respondent corporation, of its exclusive right to the Big
Mac mark and requested him to desist from using the Big Mac mark or any similar mark.
Having received no reply from respondent Dy, petitioners sued respondents in the RTC of
Makati for trademark infringement and unfair competition. The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order against respondents enjoining them from using the Big Mak mark in the
operation of their business in the NCR. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
replacing the TRO.
Respondents then admitted that they have been using the name Big Mak Burger for their
fast-food business. Respondents claimed, however, that McDonalds does not have an
exclusive right to the Big Mac mark or to any other similar mark. Respondents point out that
the Isaiyas Group of Corporations (Isaiyas Group) registered the same mark for hamburger
sandwiches with the PBPTT and One Rodolfo Topacio similarly registered the same mark
prior to McDonalds registration. Alternatively, respondents claimed that they are not liable
for trademark infringement or for unfair competition, as the Big Mak mark they sought to
register does not constitute a colorable imitation of the Big Mac mark. Respondents asserted
that they did not fraudulently pass off their hamburger sandwiches as those of petitioners Big
Mac hamburgers. Respondents sought damages in their counterclaim.
Petitioners then denied respondent’s claim that McDonalds is not the exclusive owner of the
Big Mac mark and asserted that while the Isaiyas Group and Topacio did register the Big Mac
mark ahead of McDonalds, the Isaiyas Group did so only in the Supplemental Register of the
PBPTT and such registration does not provide any protection. McDonalds disclosed that it
had acquired Topacios rights to his registration in a Deed of Assignment. RTC found the
respondent liable but CA reversed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether respondents used the words Big Mak not only as part of the corporate name
L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. but also as a trademark for their hamburger products, and
(b) Whether respondent corporation is liable for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.
(c) Whether respondent is liable for unfair competition
HELD:
On the Manner Respondents Used Big Mak in their Business
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the corporate name L.C. Big
Mak Burger, Inc. appears in the packaging for respondents hamburger products and not the
words Big Mak only. The Court agrees with the petitioners.
The evidence presented during the hearings on petitioners motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction shows that the plastic wrappings and plastic bags used by
respondents for their hamburger sandwiches bore the words Big Mak. The other descriptive
words burger and 100% pure beef were set in smaller type, along with the locations of
branches. Respondents cash invoices simply refer to their hamburger sandwiches as Big Mak.
It is respondents snack vans that carry the words L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc.
It was only during the trial that respondents presented in evidence the plastic
wrappers and bags for their hamburger sandwiches relied on by the Court of Appeals.
Respondents plastic wrappers and bags were identical with those petitioners presented
during the hearings for the injunctive writ except that the letters L.C. and the words Burger,
Inc. in respondents evidence were added above and below the words Big Mak, respectively.
Since petitioners complaint was based on facts existing before and during the hearings on the
injunctive writ, the facts established during those hearings are the proper factual bases for Therefore, the Court held that confusion is likely to result in the public mind. Respondent is
the disposition of the issues raised in this petition. liable for trademark infringement.

On the Issue of Trademark Infringement On the Issue of Unfair Competition

To establish trademark infringement, the following elements must be shown: (1) the validity Under the law, there in unfair competition when Any person who will employ deception or
of plaintiffs mark; (2) the plaintiffs ownership of the mark; and (3) the use of the mark or its any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by
colorable imitation by the alleged infringer results in likelihood of confusion. Of these, it is him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established
the element of likelihood of confusion that is the gravamen of trademark infringement. In such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result
determining likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has developed two tests, the dominancy
test and the holistic test. This Court finds the Dominancy test applicable in the instant case. The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the
The dominancy test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the competing general appearance of the goods, and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a
trademarks that might cause confusion. The Court gave more consideration to the aural and competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but
visual impressions created by the marks in the public mind, giving little weight to factors like may result from other external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. The
prices, quality, sales outlets and market segments. intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the
goods as offered for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.
Applying the dominancy test, the Court finds that respondents use of the Big Mak mark
results in likelihood of confusion. First, Big Mak sounds exactly the same as Big Mac. Second, In the instant case the respondent gave his goods the general appearance of the goods of his
the first word in Big Mak is exactly the same as the first word in Big Mac. Third, the first two competitor and did not give notice to the public that the Big Mak hamburgers are products of
letters in Mak are the same as the first two letters in Mac. Fourth, the last letter in Mak while L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. and not those of petitioners who have the exclusive right to the Big
a k sounds the same as c when the word Mak is pronounced. Fifth, in Filipino, the letter k Mac mark. This clearly shows respondents’ intent to deceive the public and are therefore
replaces c in spelling, thus Caloocan is spelled Kalookan. In short, aurally the two marks are liable for unfair competition.
the same, with the first word of both marks phonetically the same, and the second word of
both marks also phonetically the same. Visually, the two marks have both two words and six
letters, with the first word of both marks having the same letters and the second word having
the same first two letters. In spelling, considering the Filipino language, even the last letters
of both marks are the same. Clearly, respondents have adopted in Big Mak not only the
dominant but also almost all the features of Big Mac. Applied to the same food product of
hamburgers, the two marks will likely result in confusion in the public mind. Indeed, a person
cannot distinguish Big Mac from Big Mak by their sound. When one hears a Big Mac or Big
Mak hamburger advertisement over the radio, one would not know whether the Mac or Mak
ends with a “C” or a “K”.

Petitioners aggressive promotion of the Big Mac mark, as borne by their

advertisement expenses, has built goodwill and reputation for such mark making it one of
the easily recognizable marks in the market today. This increases the likelihood that
consumers will mistakenly associate petitioners hamburgers and business with those of
respondents.

Also, Respondents inability to explain sufficiently how and why they came to choose
Big Mak for their hamburger sandwiches indicates their intent to imitate petitioners Big Mac
mark. Absent proof that respondents adoption of the Big Mak mark was due to honest
mistake or was fortuitous, the inescapable conclusion is that respondents adopted the Big
Mak mark to ride on the coattails of the more established Big Mac mark. This saves
respondents much of the expense in advertising to create market recognition of their mark
and hamburgers.
 6. G.R. NO. 172276, [AUGUST 9, 2010]
SOCIETE PRODUITS NESTLE, S.A. V. DY, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle) is a foreign corporation organized under
the laws of Switzerland. It manufactures food products and beverages. As evidenced by
Certificate of Registration No. R-14621 issued on 7 April 1969 by the then Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Nestle owns the “NAN” trademark for its line of infant
powdered milk products, consisting of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. NAN is
classified under Class 6 — “diatetic preparations for infant feeding.”
Nestle distributes and sells its NAN milk products all over the Philippines. It has been
investing tremendous amounts of resources to train its sales force and to promote the NAN
milk products through advertisements and press releases.
Dy, Jr. owns 5M Enterprises. He imports Sunny Boy powdered milk from Australia and
repacks the powdered milk into three sizes of plastic packs bearing the name “NANNY.” The
packs weigh 80, 180 and 450 grams and are sold for P8.90, P17.50 and P39.90, respectively.
NANNY is is also classified under Class 6 — “full cream milk for adults in [sic] all ages.” Dy, Jr.
distributes and sells the powdered milk in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, Cagayan de Oro, and
parts of Mindanao.
In a letter dated 1 August 1985, Nestle requested Dy, Jr. to refrain from using “NANNY” and
to undertake that he would stop infringing the “NAN” trademark. Dy, Jr. did not act on
Nestle’s request. On 1 March 1990, Nestle filed before the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 31,
Dumaguete City, a complaint against Dy, Jr. for infringement. Dy, Jr. filed a motion 7 to
dismiss alleging that the complaint did not state a cause of action. In its 4 June 1990 order,
the trial court dismissed the complaint. Nestle appealed the 4 June 1990 order to the Court
of Appeals. In its 16 February 1993 Resolution, the Court of Appeals set aside the 4 June 1990
order and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95, Nestle filed with the trial court
a motion to transfer the case to the RTC, Judicial Region 7, Branch 9, Cebu City, which was
designated as a special court for intellectual property rights.
RTC RULING: Considering that defendant’s NANNY belongs to the same class as that of
plaintiff’s NAN because both are food products, the defendant’s unregistered trade mark
NANNY should be held an infringement to plaintiff’s registered trademark NAN because
defendant’s use of NANNY would imply that it came from the manufacturer of NAN.
Furthermore, since the word “nanny” means a “child’s nurse,” there might result the not so
remote probability that defendant’s NANNY may be confused with infant formula NAN
despite the aparent [sic] disparity between the features of the two products.
CA RULING: While it is true that both NAN and NANNY are milk products and that the word
“NAN” is contained in the word “NANNY,” there are more glaring dissimilarities in the
entirety of their trademarks as they appear in their respective labels and also in relation to
the goods to which they are attached. The discerning eye of the observer must focus not only
on the predominant words but also on the other features appearing in both labels in order
that he may draw his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the other. Even the
trial court found these glaring dissimilarities as above-quoted. We need not add more of
these factual dissimilarities.
NAN products, which consist of Pre-NAN, NAN-H-A, NAN-1 and NAN-2, are all infant
preparations, while NANNY is a full cream milk for adults in [sic] all ages. NAN milk products
are sold in tin cans and hence, far expensive than the full cream milk NANNY sold in three (3)
plastic packs containing 80, 180 and 450 grams and worth P8.90, P17.50 and P39.90 per milk
pack. The labels of NAN products are of the colors blue and white and have at the bottom
portion an elliptical shaped figure containing inside it a drawing of nestling birds, which is
overlapped by the trade-name “Nestle.” On the other hand, the plastic packs NANNY have a
drawing of milking cows lazing on a vast green field, back-dropped with snow-capped
mountains and using the predominant colors of blue and green. The word NAN are [sic] all in
large, formal and conservative-like block letters, while the word NANNY are [sic] all in small
and irregular style of letters with curved ends. With these material differences apparent in
the packaging of both milk products, NANNY full cream milk cannot possibly be an
infringement of NAN infant milk.
Moreover, NAN infant milk preparation is more expensive than NANNY instant full cream
milk. The cheaper price of NANNY would give, at the very first instance, a considerable
warning to the ordinary purchaser on whether he is buying an infant milk or a full cream milk
for adults. A cursory examination of the packaging would confirm the striking differences
between the products in question.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the mark NANNY is not confusingly similar to NAN. Dy
therefore cannot be held liable for infringement.
ISSUE: The issue is whether Dy, Jr. is liable for infringement.
HELD: YES. Applying the dominancy test in the present case, the Court finds that “NANNY”
is confusingly similar to “NAN.” “NAN” is the prevalent feature of Nestle’s line of infant
powdered milk products. It is written in bold letters and used in all products. The line consists
of PRE-NAN, NAN-H.A., NAN-1, and NAN-2. Clearly, “NANNY” contains the prevalent feature
“NAN.” The first three letters of “NANNY” are exactly the same as the letters of “NAN.” When
“NAN” and “NANNY” are pronounced, the aural effect is confusingly similar. The scope of
protection afforded to registered trademark owners is not limited to protection from
infringers with identical goods. The scope of protection extends to protection from infringers
with related goods, and to market areas that are the normal expansion of business of the
registered trademark owners. Section 138 of R.A. No. 8293 states:
Certificates of Registration. — A certificate of registration of a mark shall be prima facie
evidence of validity of the registration, the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and
those that are related thereto specified in the certificate. (Emphasis supplied)
In Mighty Corporation v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 31 the Court held that, “Non-competing goods
may be those which, though they are not in actual competition, are so related to each other
that it can reasonably be assumed that they originate from one manufacturer, in which case,
confusion of business can arise out of the use of similar marks.” 32 In that case, the Court
enumerated factors in determining whether goods are related: (1) classification of the goods;
(2) nature of the goods; (3) descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential
characteristics of the goods, with reference to their form, composition, texture or quality;
and (4) style of distribution and marketing of the goods, including how the goods are
displayed and sold. 33
NANNY and NAN have the same classification, descriptive properties and physical attributes.
Both are classified under Class 6, both are milk products, and both are in powder form. Also,
NANNY and NAN are displayed in the same section of stores — the milk section.
The Court agrees with the lower courts that there are differences between NAN and NANNY:
(1) NAN is intended for infants while NANNY is intended for children past their infancy and
for adults; and (2) NAN is more expensive than NANNY. However, as the registered owner of
the “NAN” mark, Nestle should be free to use its mark on similar products, in different
segments of the market, and at different price levels. In McDonald’s Corporation v. L.C. Big
Mak Burger, Inc., the Court held that the scope of protection afforded to registered
trademark owners extends to market areas that are the normal expansion of business:
Even respondent’s use of the “Big Mak” mark on non-hamburger food products cannot
excuse their infringement of petitioners’ registered mark, otherwise registered marks will
lose their protection under the law.
The registered trademark owner may use his mark on the same or similar products, in
different segments of the market, and at different price levels depending on variations of the
products for specific segments of the market. The Court has recognized that the registered
trademark owner enjoys protection in product and market areas that are the normal
potential expansion of his business.
7. G.R. No. 164321. March 28,2011
SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. vs. INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP.
FACTS:
Petitioner engaged the services of a private investigation firm to check if respondents are
indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale of unauthorized products bearing
counterfeit or unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner. An investigator went to
respondents’ warehouse and saw different kinds and models of rubber shoes including shoes
bearing the “S” logo. He found that the shoes bearing the “Strong” name with the “S” logo
have the same style as the petitioner's shoes.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) requesting
assistance in stopping the illegal importation, manufacture and sale of counterfeit products
bearing the trademarks it owns and in prosecuting the owners of the establishments engaged
therein. NBI representatives bought 24 pairs of rubber shoes bearing the “Strong” name and
the “S” logo. They then applied for search warrants with the court, which eventually issued
the same.
After seizure of their goods, respondents sought to quash the search warrants on the ground
that there is no confusing similarity between the petitioner’s Skechers’ rubber shoes and
respondent’s Strong rubber shoes. The court eventually issued an order quashing the search
warrants.
Petitioner’s Claim: Petitioner filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) an application for the
issuance of search warrants against an outlet and warehouse operated by respondents for
infringement of trademark. In the course of its business, petitioner has registered the
trademark “SKECHERS” and the trademark “S” (within an oval design) with the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO).
Respondent’s Claim: Respondents moved to quash the search warrants, arguing that there
was no confusing similarity between petitioner’s “Skechers” rubber shoes and its “Strong”
rubber shoes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not is guilty of trademark infringement.
HELD:
Yes. The Dominancy Test focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of
the competing trademarks that might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of
the purchasing public. Duplication or imitation is not necessary; neither is it required that the
mark sought to be registered suggests an effort to imitate. Given more consideration are the
aural and visual impressions created by the marks on the buyers of goods, giving little weight
to factors like prices, quality, sales outlets, and market segments.
Applying the Dominancy Test to the case at bar, this Court finds that the use of the stylized
“S” by respondent in its Strong rubber shoes infringes on the mark already registered by
petitioner with the IPO. While it is undisputed that petitioner’s stylized “S” is within an oval
design, to this Court’s mind, the dominant feature of the trademark is the stylized “S,” as it is
precisely the stylized “S” which catches the eye of the purchaser. Thus, even if respondent
did not use an oval design, the mere fact that it used the same stylized “S”, the same being
the dominant feature of petitioner’s trademark, already constitutes infringement under the
Dominancy Test.
Respondent did not simply use the letter “S,” but it appears to this Court that based on the
font and the size of the lettering, the stylized “S” utilized by respondent is the very same
stylized “S” used by petitioner; a stylized “S” which is unique and distinguishes petitioner’s
trademark. Indubitably, the likelihood of confusion is present as purchasers will associate the
respondent’s use of the stylized “S” as having been authorized by petitioner or that
respondent’s product is connected with petitioner’s business.
While there may be dissimilarities between the appearances of the shoes, to this Court’s
mind such dissimilarities do not outweigh the stark and blatant similarities in their general
features. As can be readily observed by simply comparing petitioner’s Energy model and
respondent’s Strong rubber shoes, respondent also used the color scheme of blue, white and
gray utilized by petitioner. Even the design and “wavelike” pattern of the midsole and outer
sole of respondent’s shoes are very similar to petitioner’s shoes, if not exact patterns thereof.
At the side of the midsole near the heel of both shoes are two elongated designs in
practically the same location. Even the outer soles of both shoes have the same number of
ridges, five at the back and six in front. On the side of respondent’s shoes, near the upper
part, appears the stylized “S,” placed in the exact location as that of the stylized “S” on
petitioner’s shoes. On top of the “tongue” of both shoes appears the stylized “S” in
practically the same location and size. Moreover, at the back of petitioner’s shoes, near the
heel counter, appears “Skechers Sport Trail” written in white lettering. However, on
respondent’s shoes appears “Strong Sport Trail” noticeably written in the same white
lettering, font size, direction and orientation as that of petitioner’s shoes. On top of the heel
collar of petitioner’s shoes are two grayish-white semi-transparent circles. Not surprisingly,
respondent’s shoes also have two grayish-white semi-transparent circles in the exact same
location.
The dissimilarities between the shoes are too trifling and frivolous that it is indubitable that
respondent’s products will cause confusion and mistake in the eyes of the public.
Respondent’s shoes may not be an exact replica of petitioner’s shoes, but the features and
overall design are so similar and alike that confusion is highly likely.
8. GR NO. 78413 NOVEMBER 8, 1989
CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES, INC., Represented by its President, Rogelio Q. Lim,
petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LA TONDEÑA, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
In 1953, La Tondeña, Inc. registered with the PPO white flint bottles used in its gin
popularly known as Ginebra San Miguel. In 1981, LTI filed a civil case for injunction and
damages in the CFI against Cagayan Valley Enterprises for using the 350cc white flint bottles
with the mark La Tondeña and Ginebra San Miguel stamped or blown-in by filling the same
with Cagayan’s liquor product bearing the label Sonny Boy for commercial sale and
distribution without LTI’s written consent and in violation of Sec. 2 of RA No. 623 as amended
by RA No. 5700.
The court a quo issued a temporary restraining order against Cagayan and its
officers and employees from using the 350cc bottles with the marks of the private
respondent. Cagayan contended that the bottles they are using are not the registered bottles
of LTU since the bottles did not contain the words “property of” indicated in said bottles as
stated in the sworn statement attached to the certificate of registration of LTI. Petitioner
Cagayan buys from junk dealers and retailers bottles which bear the marks or names La
Tondena and uses them as containers for its own liquor products. The trial court rendered
judgement in favor of Cagayan, ruling that the complaint does not state a cause of action and
that Cagayan was not guilty of contempt. LTI appealed to the CA which decided in favor of
LTI, reversing the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of private respondents of the bottles containing the words
La Tondeña, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel is lawful.
HELD:
No. The provisions of RA No. 623 as amended by Ra No. 5700 grant protection to a qualified
manufacturer who successfully registered with the PPO its duly stamped or marked bottles,
boxes, casks and other similar containers. The mere use of registered bottles or containers
without the written consent of the manufacturer is prohibited, the only exceptions being
when they are used as containers for “sisi,” “bagoong,” “patis” and similar native products.
RA No. 623 which governs the registration of marked bottles and containers merely requires
that the bottles must be stamped or marked with the names of the manufacturers or the
names of their principals or products or other marks of ownership.
The omitted words “property of” are not of such vital indispensability such that the omission
will remove the bottles from protection of law. The words La Tondeña and Ginebra San
Miguel stamped on the bottles are sufficient notice to the public that those bottles are
owned by LTI. The owner, upon registration of its marked bottles, is vested by law with an
exclusive right to use the same to the exclusion of others, except as a container for native
products. A violation of said right gives rise to a cause of action against the violator or Hence, Sec. 6 squarely applies in private respondent's favor. Obviously, the contention of
infringer. Petition is DENIED. TWIN ACE that the exemption refers only to criminal liability but not to civil liability is
without merit. It is inconceivable that an act specifically allowed by law, in other words legal,
9. GR NO. 123248 OCTOBER 16, 1997 can be the subject of injunctive relief and damages. Besides, the interpretation offered by
TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZANA petitioner defeats the very purpose for which the exemption was provided.
FOOD CORPORATION, respondents. None of the small-scale manufacturers of the indigenous native products protected would
FACTS: possibly wish to use the registered bottles if they are vulnerable to civil suits.

Twin Ace Holdings Corporation (TWIN ACE) is a manufacturer, distiller and bottler Decision of the CA, AFFIRMED.
of distillery products, e.g., rhum, gin, brandy, whiskey, vodka, liquor and cordial under the
name and style of Tanduay Distillers, Inc. (TANDUAY).

Private respondent Lorenzana Food Corporation on the other hand, manufactures and
exports processed foods and other related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and
other food seasonings.

TWIN ACE filed a complaint for replevin1 to recover three hundred eighty thousand
(380,000) bottles allegedly owned by it but detained and used by LORENZANA as containers
for native products without its express permission, in violation of RA No. 623.

LORENZANA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that RA No. 623 could not be
invoked by TWIN ACE because the law contemplated containers of non-alcoholic beverages
only. Also, the right of LORENZANA to use the bottles as containers for its patis and other
native products was expressly sanctioned by Sec. 6 of the same law and upheld by the
Supreme Court in the case of Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the complaint. TWIN ACE appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the action of the trial court.

Petitioner TWIN ACE contends that Sec. 6 notwithstanding, respondent LORENZANA is

obliged to pay just compensation for the use of the subject bottles because Sec. 6 exempts
the user from criminal sanction only but does not shield him from civil liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lorenzana is liable to indemnify Twin Ace?

HELD:

No. Whether registered containers of hard liquor such as rhum, gin, brandy and the like are
protected by RA No. 623 has already been settled in Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals.7 In that case, the Court dealt squarely with the issue and ruled in the affirmative
reasoning that hard liquor, although regulated, is not prohibited by law, hence, still within
the purview of the phrase "other lawful beverages" protected by RA No. 623, as amended.

The Court stated it is quite clear that respondent falls within the exemption granted in Sec. 6
which states: "The provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as prohibiting the use of
bottles as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis," and similar native products."