[G.R. No. L-8919. September 28, 1956.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN alias GUINITA, DIONISIO SARMIENTO,
ARCADIO BALMEO, PATRICIO GONZALES, FLORENTINO FLORES, CRISPIN ESTRELLA, FELIPE CALISON, PEDRO VILLAREAL,
CLAUDIO REYES, "PETER DOE" and "JOHN DOE" defendant, AGUSTIN MANGULABNAN, Appellant.

Summary of Facts: At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of November 5, 1953, the reports of gunfire awaked the
spouses Vicente Pacson and Cipriana Tadeo, the 4 minor children and Cipriana's mother, Monica del Mundo, in their
house at barrio Tikiw, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Whereupon, Vicente Pacson crossed the room and shouted to one Tata
Pisio that persons were going up their house and then hid himself inside the ceiling. The intruders broke the walls and
eventually reached the living room where Cipriana recognized one of the three intruders to be Augustin Mangulabnan.
Agustin then approached Cipriana Tadeo and snatched from her neck one necklace valued P50 and also took from her
person P50 in the paper bills and P20 in silver coins. Meanwhile, one of the two unidentified marauders searched the
person of Monica del Mundo and took from her P200 in cash and in gold necklace valued at P200. But not contented
with the loot, the same individual asked from Monica del Mundo to give her diamond ring which the latter could not
produce, and for this reason, he struck her twice on the face with the butt of his gun. One of the small children of
Vicente Pacson who was terrified called to his mother and that unidentified person, irked by the boys impudence, made
a move to strike him, but Monica del Mundo warded off the blow with her right arm. At this juncture, the second
unidentified individual put his companion aside the climbing on the table, fired his gun at the ceiling. Afterwards,
appellant and his two unidentified companion left the place. After the ordeal, Vicente was then found by Cipriana dead,
lying face first on the ceiling. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Vicente Pacson finding the cause of death to be severe
hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound in the frontal region of the forehead. The incident was reported to the police
authorities that same evening and in the ensuing investigation Cipriana Tadeo informed the Chief of Police that Agustin
Mangulabnan was one of the malefactors who entered their house. When the latter was investigated, he readily and
voluntarily subscribed before the Justice of the Peace of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, an affidavit admitting his participation
in the robbery and killing of Vicente Pacson (Exhibit A and B). Much later, however, he subscribed to another affidavit
before the Clerk of Court wherein he exculpated from any participation Crispin Estrella, one of those he implicated in his
previous affidavit, though admitting the truth of the other allegations contained therein (Exhibit D). As the result of the
investigation conducted by the authorities a complaint was filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija, against Agustin Mangulabnan alias Guinita, a surrendered Huk and 10 other unidentified persons. But the
complaint was amended on January 13, 1954, to include Dionisio Sarmiento, together with Arcadio Balmeo, Patricio
Gonzales, Florentino Flores, Crispin Estrella, Pedro Villareal, Claudio Reyes, "Peter Doe" and "John Doe", who were still at
large, as defendants. After the preliminary investigation the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija where defendants were accused of robbery with homicide.

CFI Ruling: found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
Monica del Mundo in the sum of P400; Cipriana Tadeo in the sum of P132; P6,000 to the heirs of Vicente Pacson, and to
pay the costs. Defendant Dionisio Sarmiento was acquitted while the information as against the other defendants who
continued to be at large was dismissed for lack of evidence, with the proportionate part of the costs de officio.

Agustin Mangulabnan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied for
lack of merit. Hence his appeal which is now before Us.

Issue: Whether the newly appointed affidavits are valid grounds for a new trial.

Held: No. The admission of affidavits was properly denied. it is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that before a new trial
may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown: (a) That the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) That such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. The appellant failed to establish those requisites as the affidavits were not really newly discovered
nor could they alter the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court. By appellant's own admission (Exhibit A and B) and the
testimony of Cipriana Tadeo, we cannot have any doubt as to appellant's participation in the execution thereof. And as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant and the rest of the malefactors came together to the house of the
offended parties to commit the robbery perpetuated therein and together went away from the scene of the crime after
its perpetration. This shows conspiracy among the offenders which rendered each of them liable for the acts of the
others. The crime committed in the case at bar, of which appellant Agustin Mangulabnan is a co-participant, is the crime
of robbery with homicide covered by Article 294, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code and punished with reclusion perpetua
to death. The commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of
superior strength and with the aid of armed men, and in consonance with the provisions of Article 63, No. 1 of the same
legal body, appellant should be sentenced to the capital punishment, as recommended by the Solicitor General.
However, as the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital penalty has not been secured in this case, the
penalty to be imposed upon Agustin Mangulabnan is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua (Section 9, Republic
Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948).|

Other:

o Postmortem report being in a carbon copy is immaterial for it has been signed by the physician who
executed the same and his signature was identified by him at the witness stand. Furthermore, appellant
 did not offer any objection to its admission when it was presented in evidence at the hearing. His
objection now comes too late.

[G.R. No. 5272. March 19, 1910.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Summary of Facts: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27 ," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. No one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the only door of which opened
upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached
a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had retired for the night, was suddenly
awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?"
but heard no answer and so became convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by an intruder.
The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room,
I will kill you." At the moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against
the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had
forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned
out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded
condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was
wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages
to bind up Pascual's wounds. The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the
trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor,
the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

Defendant Alleges: the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck
the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self defense. That there had
been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place
in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.

Issue: whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he
committed the act.

Held: To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no
criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

"The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

"4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

"(1) Illegal aggression.

"(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

"(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at the bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck
the fatal below alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
room was a thief, from whose assault he was an imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant
at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising hid legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence
or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened his person and his property and the property under his
charge.

Ruling: The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant
acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and he is bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instances de
oficio. So ordered.