ANDRI~ GALLOIS ANDJOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM

(Receivedin revised form 2 August 1994)

According to an externalist theory of content (for short ETC) the con-

tent of an individual's thoughts and the meaning of her words need not
supervene on her intrinsic history. Two individuals may be intrinsically
exactly alike yet entertain different thoughts, and attach different mean-
ings to the words they use. ETC, which has been most notably defended
by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, has attained the status
of current orthodoxy. Nevertheless, some maintain that combining ETC
with the premisses that we have privileged access to our intentional
states yields a surprising conclusion. It yields the conclusion that we
can have a priori knowledge of features of the external world that seem
only accessible to empirical investigation. Call the argument from ETC
and privileged access to this conclusion the main argument. Some take
the main argument to be a reductio of ETC. Since we have privileged
access to our intentional states, and lack the a priori knowledge attributed
by the main argument, ETC is false. Some take the main argument to
refute the premisses that we have privileged access to those intentional
states falling within the scope of ETC. 1 Others see the main argument
as a refutation of external world scepticism.
We will show that the main argument does not support any of these
interesting conclusions. We will show that the main argument does not
threaten to restrict privileged access, refute external world scepticism,
or constitute a reductio of ETC. More exactly, we will show that the
most defensible version of ETC, even when combined with the premiss
that we have unrestricted privileged access to our intentional states,
yields no a priori knowledge of the external world.
How does the main argument go? Informally it goes like this. Stan-
dardly we do not need to resort to empirical investigation to find out
what intentional states we are in. We rarely need to resort to empirical

Philosophical Studies 81: 1-26, 1996.

9 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
 ANDRt~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

investigation to find out what we think, hope, or intend. ETC teaches us

that we cannot be in some intentional states unless the external world is
disposed in a way the external world sceptic denies we have knowledge
of. For example, proponents of ETC famously contend that, subject to
a qualification we will introduce later, no one in a waterless world can
think that she lives in a watery world. (ETC) is a philosophical thesis.
If it is true, it can be known to be so a priori. Hence, unrestricted privi-
leged access to our intentional states, together with knowledge of ETC,
puts us in a position to have substantive a priori knowledge about the
external world.
Before proceeding to examine the main argument it would be well
to state it in more detail. In stating it let us take as our target example
the thought that one lives in a watery world. The first premisses is that
there could be someone who has a priori knowledge that she entertains
that thought. That is:
(1) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that x thinks that x lives in a watery
world)

Why call the knowledge mentioned in (1) a priori? 2 Why suppose that
one can have a priori knowledge of what one thinks? In the current
literature 'a priori' is used in at least two different senses. In the first
sense knowledge is a priori only if it is invulnerable to counterevidence.
In the second, knowledge is a priori only if it does not depend on
observation. There is little plausibility to the claim that, in the first sense,
we can have a priori knowledge of any of our thoughts. In contrast, the
claim that, in the second sense, we can, and do, have a priori knowledge
of our thoughts is very plausible. Your knowledge that you think you
are reading a paper is not, in any obvious way, based on observation.
The next premisses is:
(2) ETC --+ (~(3x) (x knows a priori that ETC)

ETC is a thesis about the content of certain concepts including the

concept of content itself. As such, it seems, ETC does not need to be
established through empirical investigation. Since we are assuming:
(3) ETC
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM

it follows that:
(4) 0(3x) (x knows a priori ETC).

One apparent consequence of ETC is that no one is a waterless world

can entertain thoughts about water. That is:
(5) ETC ~ O(x) (x thinks x lives in a watery world ~ x lives in
a watery world)
Moreover, (5), like ETC, is something that, if true, can be known a
priori. That is:
(6) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (5))

Another premisses that is required is this. If (4) and (6) are both true,
there could be someone who combines the a priori knowledge men-
tioned in (4) with the a priori knowledge mentioned in (6). That is:
(7) [(4) & (6)] ~ 0(3x) [x knows a priori that (ETC & (5))].
There seems to be no reason to dispute (7). Suppose (4) and (6) are
both true. What could preclude the possibility of someone combining
the a priori knowledge mentioned in (4) with the a priori knowledge
mentioned in (6)?
From (4), (6) and (7) we can derive:
(8) 0(3x) [x knows a priori that (ETC & (5))].

At this point a further assumption needs to be made. We need to assume

the following principle:

(9) 0(3x) Ix knows a priori that (p & p ~ q)] ~ 0(3x) (x knows

a priori that q)
Epistemic closure principles such as (9) are disputable. However, the
one subject to most debate is stronger than (9). It says that if someone
knows that p, and knows that p implies q, then she knows that q.3 (9)
only says that if someone could know a priori both that p, and that p
implies q, then someone could know a priori that q.
4 ANDRI~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

From (4), (8) and (9) we can derive:

(10) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that O(y) (y thinks y lives in a watery
world --+ y lives in a watery world)).

Finally, from (1) and (10) we can derive the counterintuitive:

(11) ~)(3x) (x knows a priori that x lives in a watery world).
The main argument is valid. If its conclusion is to be resisted we
must reject one of its premises. Which one? For the reasons given
above, we will not call into question (7) or (9). Moreover, if (1) is false,
some thoughts are not, and could not be, subject to privileged access.
Suppose we wish to retain ETC without limiting privileged access in
this way. 4 That leaves (2), (5) and (6).
We will argue that (6) should be rejected even if (5) is true. We
will then reformulate the main argument so that it yields a weaker anti-
sceptical conclusion than (11). The reformulated main argument does
not rely on (6). However, it does rely on (4). We will show that ETC
implies that (4) is false.

Some have attempted to meet the main argument by challenging pre-

misses (5). Here are two, in our view less than satisfactory, attempts to
refute the main argument by refuting (5).
If the main argument succeeds it constitutes a reply to external world
scepticism. The external world sceptic maintains that, despite having
ample apparent evidence that you inhabit a currently watery world, you
do not know that you inhabit such a world. For all you know you are
a brain in a vat inhabiting a world that is now devoid of water. Given
ETC, how are you able to entertain in your envatted state the thought
that you inhabit a watery world? You are able to do so because you were
once normally embodied, and then in appropriate contact with samples
of water.
The consequent of (5) is true if it is construed as follows. (x) (t)
(at t: x thinks x lives in a watery world ~ (3g) (at g: there is water)).
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM

However, so construed, (5) does not exclude the possibility that you are
a brain in a vat presently inhabiting a world devoid of water. If it is to
tell against that possibility (5) must be construed as: (x) (t) (at t: x thinks
that x lives in a watery world --+ at t: x lives in a watery world). The
problem is that, so construed, (5) is false.
This objection to incorporating (5) as a premisses in the main argu-
ment has little force. It would be a striking enough result if the main
argument shows that someone could know a priori that there is some
water around at some time.
A better objection to (5) is advanced by Anthony Brueckner in his
reply to Michael McKinsey's version of the main argument. 5 Brueckner
points out that Tyler Burge, a prominent defender of ETC, does not
accept (5). The reason is this. One can think about a non-existent natural
kind by indulging in some sophisticated theorizing. For example, in a
world where hydrogen and oxygen exist, but do not bond together, one
could conjecture about the stuff that would be formed by two hydrogen
atoms bonding with one oxygen. If one conjectured that such stuff would
behave like water than one would arguably have the concept of water,
and a capacity to entertain thoughts about water. 6
In order to accommodate this point (5) should be replaced with:

(5') ETC --+ tO(x) (x thinks x lives in a watery world ~ (no one
has theorized about water --+ x lives in a watery world))

If the main argument is to remain valid (6) should be replaced with:

(6') 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (5'))

(7) with:

(7') 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (y) (y thinks y lives in a watery

world --+ (no one has theorized about water --+ y lives in a
watery world)))

and the conclusion of the main argument with:

(8') O(3x) (x knows a priori that (no one has theorized about
water --+ x lives in a watery world))
6 ANDRt~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

The revised main argument, the argument from (1)-(8'), gives no cre-
dence to the possibility of someone having a priori knowledge of the
existence of water. In order for it to do so, one would have to be able
to know a priori that no one has theorized about water. Nevertheless, if
one can know a priori that (8 ~) is true then one could be in a position
that it is very counterintuitive to suppose that anyone could be in. One
could combine one's a priori knowledge of (8 t) with one's a posteriori
knowledge that no one has theorized about water to deduce that water
exists.
(8 ~) is perhaps slightly less counterintuitive than (8). However, (8 ~)
is sufficiently counterintuitive to be rejected. If we reject (8 ~) then we
have to reject one of the revised main argument's premisses. Suppose
we are not going to reject (2). In addition, we wish to retain (5 ~) and
(61). In that case, we have to choose between (1) and (3). Once again
we have to choose between restricting privileged access, or abandoning
ETC.

II

Provisionally grant that (5) is true. What of (6)? (6) is initially plausible
since (5) seems to just articulate an entailment of a philosophical thesis.
Despite this, we should not concede (6) even if we are prepared to
concede (5).
Consider the following quick argument against ETC. No reputable
scientist believes that phlogiston exists. However, the expression 'phlo-
giston' seems to function in the same way as 'heat' or 'water'. For
example, if, to our great surprise, phlogiston turns out to exist, we could
make a scientific discovery about its real essence. Hence ETC implies:
(10) E](x) (x thinks that phlogiston was believed in by eighteenth
century chemists -+ (no one has theorized about phlogiston
---+ phlogiston exists))

You know a priori that you think that phlogiston was believed in by
eighteenth century chemists. So, if you could know a priori that ETC
is true, you could know a priori that if no one has theorized about
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM

phlogiston then phlogiston exists. That is absurd. Better to dispense

with ETC.
Where does this argument go wrong? It goes wrong in assuming that
you could know a priori that ETC implies (10). ETC implies (10) only
if 'phlogiston' rigidly designates a natural kind. Suppose we concede
that if phlogiston exists, 'phlogiston' does rigidly designate a natural
kind. Now suppose that, as we believe, phlogiston does not exist. In
that case, it could be argued, 'phlogiston' is a synonym for a non-
rigid definite description such as 'the stuff thought by some eighteenth
century chemists to have negative weight'.
Certainly, no one will want to say that we can know a priori that
'phlogiston' rigidly designates an existing natural kind. A plausible
semantic treatment of that term is to regard there as being a default
option enforced by our semantic intentions such that if 'phlogiston'
fails to rigidly designate a natural kind, it is synonymous with a non-
rigid description.
According to this proposal how the expression 'phlogiston' functions
depends, in part, on whether phlogiston exists as a natural kind. More-
over, what thought one is entertaining when one thinks that eighteenth
century chemists believed in phlogiston depends, in part, on whether
phlogiston exists as a natural kind. One needs to know how 'phlogis-
ton' semantically functions in order to know whether ETC implies (10).
Since the semantic function of 'phlogiston' depends, in part, on the exis-
tence of phlogiston as a natural kind, determining the semantic function
of 'phlogiston' requires empirical investigation. No one can know a
priori that ETC implies (10). Hence, even if ETC can be known a priori,
there is no reason to think that (10) can.
What goes for phlogiston goes for water. Is (6) true? (5) is true only
if 'water' rigidly designates a natural kind. According to the previous
argument, we can only tell whether 'water' designates a natural kind by
conducting an empirical investigation. If water does not exist as a natural
kind then 'water' is a synonym for a non-rigid definite description, and
(5) is false. No one can know a priori whether water exists as a natural
kind. So, (6) is false.
8 ANDRI~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

III

Call the view that the semantic properties of a term like 'water' depend
on whether water exists as a natural kind the semantic variation thesis.
In the present context the semantic variation thesis has a drawback.
What we are after is a refutation of the main argument which does not
call into question ETC, or our privileged access to the propositional
attitudes encompassed by ETC. We are after a refutation of the main
argument that does not tell against its first premisses. Arguably the
semantic variation thesis makes premisses (1) dubious. Here is why.
Consider the following sentence:
(11) 'There is some water somewhere.'
According to the semantic variation thesis, if we live in a waterless world
(11) expresses a thought which is different from the thought it expresses
if we live in a watery world. When you entertain the thought expressed
by (11) do you know a priori which thought you are entertaining? Not
if the semantic variation thesis is true. It follows from the semantic
variation thesis that which thought is expressed by (11) depends on
whether water exists. The existence of water can only be established
a posteriori. Hence, the semantic variation thesis implies that you can
only establish a posteriori which thought you are entertaining when you
entertain the thought expressed by (11).
Does this argument show that the semantic variation thesis conflicts
with premisses (1) of the main argument? The matter is a delicate one to
resolve. Donald Davidson and Tyler Burge have argued that a minimal
type of privileged access is compatible with (ETC). 7 Their basic idea
is this. Suppose the content of my belief that water is wet is externally
determined. Consider the following pair of beliefs:
(i) The belief that water is wet.
(ii) The belief that one believes that water is wet.

Can one hold (ii) falsely for the following reason? One believes one
holds a belief expressed by 'Water is wet' with the externally determined
content that p. In fact one holds the belief expressed by 'Water is wet'
with the quite different externally determined content that q. Davidson
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM

and Burge hold that this is not possible. Whatever externally determines
the content of (i) will also externally determine the content of (ii). So, the
content of (i) is bound to match the content of (ii). When one attributes
to oneself a certain belief, one is bound to be attributing to oneself a
belief with the right content.
Let us apply the Davidson Burge point to the semantic variation
thesis. According to the semantic variation thesis what content (i) has
depends on whether water exists as a natural kind. Let us say that if
water exists as a natural kind then (i) has natural kind content. On
the other hand, if water does not exist as a natural kind then (i) has
descriptive content since 'water' would then be synonymous with a non-
rigid description. The point is this. If (i) has natural kind content then
(ii) will have a corresponding natural kind content. If (i) has descriptive
content then (ii) will, again, have a corresponding descriptive content.
Even if the semantic variation thesis is true, there is no way that (ii)
could attribute a belief with the wrong content. In this sense, Davidson
and Burge allege, (1) is true.
Is the Davidson Burge minimalist conception of privileged access
adequate? According to that conception it is enough to secure privileged
access that a belief such as (i) cannot target on a belief with the wrong
content. The semantic variation thesis was invoked to show that pre-
misses (6) of the main argument is false. In turn, the Davidson Burge
conception of privileged access was invoked to show that the semantic
variation thesis is consistent with premisses (1) of the main argument.
However, if Davidson and Burge are right about privileged access there
may be a way of showing that the main argument is sound.
There is a semantic treatment of singular terms, associated with, for
example, John McDowell, which we have not yet addressed. 8 According
to that treatment, singular terms that fail to refer are contentless. Hence,
sentences in which they figure are contentless, and express no mental
states. On this view, if 'phlogiston' does not denote an existing natural
kind then there are no thoughts about phlogiston. We are, somehow,
under the illusion that we sometimes entertain such thoughts. Call this
the McDowell view.
How does (1) of the main argument fare if the McDowell view is
correct? If it is, and the Davidson Burge view of privileged access is also
10 ANDRI~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

correct, then (1) is true. On the McDowell view if water does not exist
as a natural kind, I cannot falsely think that there is water. However, if
there is no water, on that view, I also cannot falsely think that I think
there is.
Now let us consider (5) and (6), the other crucial premisses of the
main argument. The McDowell view appears to underwrite (5). Accord-
ing to that view, if water never exists, the sentence expressing the
consequent of (5) is contentless. Moreover, the consequent of (5) can
only be false if water never exists. So, the McDowell view rules out
the antecedent of (5) being true, and its consequent false. Hence, if
McDowell view can be known to be true a priori, (5) can be known to
be true a priori. That is, (6) is true.
The McDowell view supports (1) of the main argument if Davidson
and Burge provide a sufficient condition for privileged access to, at least,
content. Do they? If they do then the following conditions are sufficient
for knowing something a priori:

(a) having a non-evidentially based belief that p.

(b) it not being possible to incorrectly believe that p.

Are (a) and (b) jointly sufficient for knowing something a priori? It
would seem not. Suppose that identities are necessary. In addition, sup-
pose that, though no one has any reason to think so, beliefs are type
identical with neural states. For example, the belief that grass is green,
is type identical with neural state N1, the belief that snow is white with
neural state N2, and so on. It happens that the belief that one is in neural
state Nn is type identical with neural state Nn. For no reason at all, Jones
believes she is in neural state Nn. So, Jones' belief satisfies (a) and (b).
Nevertheless, it seems clear that Jones does not know she is in Nn.
Something extra needs to be added to (a) and (b) in order to obtain
a priori knowledge. If the extra that is needed is added, the question
again arises whether the semantic variation view can be reconciled with
(1). Fortunately, we need not pursue it here, There is an alternative
way of refuting the main argument which does not impugn its validity,
ETC, or (1). What we will argue is the following. ETC is supported by
more famous thought experiments of which, perhaps, the best known is
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 11

Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment. Those thought experiments

support a version of ETC which gives us no reason to endorse (6).
Consider a typical thought experiment which prompts extemalist
intuitions about content. We envisage a world like ours in which Alber-
tine's concept of water is derived from direct or indirect contact with
water. We are then asked whether Albertine could entertain thoughts
about water in a waterless world. It is plausible to answer; not unless
Albertine, or someone else, has theorized in sufficient detail about water.
What does this thought experiment tell us? It tells us that an individ-
ual who has derived her concept of water from interacting with water
could not have had the concept of water, and so entertained thoughts
about water, in a waterless world, unless she had theorized about water.
In other words it tells us that this is true:
(12) If Albertine has acquired the concept of water from inter-
acting with water then necessarily: if Albertine thinks that
she lives in a watery world, and no one has theorized about
water, then Albertine lives in a watery world.

It does not tell us that Albertine fails to entertain the thought that there
is water in a world free of both water and water theorizers.
Comparing the following situations with help to clarify the point.
In the first Albertine sees a body of water, and decides to use 'water'
as a synonym for the non-rigid definite description 'the stuff that is
odourless, colourless, tasteless ect.' In this first situation Albertine has
no doubt that the antecedent of (12) is satisfied. She asks herself the
following question. Could I have entertained the thought that I live in
a watery world if water had never existed? Clearly, she should answer
yes,
In the second situation Albertine uses 'water' so that (12) is true. She
believes that she acquired the concept of water from interacting with
water. However, she takes seriously the possibility that she has been
permanently envatted without having any contact with water. She asks
herself the following question. If I am right, and I acquired my concept
of water from interacting with it, could I have entertained in a waterless
world the thought that there is water? Since the antecedent of (12) is
satisfied she should answer no.
12 ANDRt~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

Now Albertine asks herself the following question. If I am wrong,

and I have always lived in a waterless world, could I entertain the thought
that water is wet; the very same though t that I would be entertaining
in a watery world. It is consistent with (12) that she should answer
this second question affirmatively. The antecedent of (12) would not be
satisfied. So, (12) does not preclude her in a world free of water from
entertaining the thought that she lives in a watery world.
If this is correct, we should not infer from the thought experiments
standardly invoked to support ETC that (5) is true. Instead, we should
replace (5) with:
(5*) ETC ~ (x) (x has acquired the concept of water from inter-
acting with water ~ E3(x thinks x lives in a watery world
x lives in a watery world)),
and (7) with:
(7*) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (y) (y has acquired the concept
of water from interacting with water --+ [] (y thinks y lives
in a watery world ~ y lives in a watery world))).

Of course it would be fallacious to infer (8), 0(3x) (x knows a priori that

x lives in a watery world, from (1), 0(3x) (x thinks x lives in a watery
world, and (7*). All that can be deduced from (1) and (7*) is:
(8*) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (x has acquired her concept
of water from interacting with water ~ x lives in a watery
world)).
(8*) is innocuous. Suppose the possibility specified by (8*) is realized
by Albertine. It does not follow that Albertine has a priori knowledge of
the existence of water. She only knows a priori that if she has acquired
her concept of water from interacting with water then water exists. No
extemal world sceptic would wish to deprive Albertine of such a priori
knowledge.
The present proposal differs in one crucial respect from the semantic
variation thesis. As we have seen the semantic variation thesis arguably
threatens privileged access, and so premisses (1) of the main argument.
Here is one way to bring out that threat which we have so far not con-
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 13

sidered. Albertine thinks that there is water. What does the proposition
she is entertaining imply? Does it imply that there is something which
is necessarily water? Does it imply that there is some natural kind?
Does it imply that there is a coloufless, odoufless liquid distributed over
the Earth's surface? If externalism and the semantic variation thesis are
both true, Albertine cannot say. She does not know whether 'Water'
has to be synonymous with a non-rigid definite description in order for
'Water exists' to express the proposition she is entertaining. On the other
hand if the present view is correct, Albertine can know which of the
implications in question hold without having to know whether there is
any water. To that extent it is less open to dispute that Albertine knows
which proposition she is entertaining when she thinks that there is water.
Before proceeding a further observation needs to be made. There is
a problem with replacing (5) with (5*). Phlogiston does not exist, but
it might have. In the actual world Wa, without anyone theorizing about
it, Albertine entertains a thought about non-existent phlogiston. Let W l
be a world in which Albertine derives her concept of phlogiston from
interacting with it. Surely, it is true in Wa that there is such a world as
W1. On the other hand, it is not true in Wl that there is any such world
as Wa. Wl is accessible toWa, butWa is not accessible to W1. It seems
that the objection we have given to (6) commits us to denying that the
accessibility relation is symmetrical. Hence we seem to be committed
to no stronger modal logic than $4.
Our reply to this objection is suggested by some comments of Saul
Kripke's. 9 The objection depends on the assumption that if phlogiston
does not exist, it could h a v e - Kripke maintains that if fictional creatures
such as unicorns do not exist, they could not exist. What goes for a
unicorn goes for phlogiston. If the fictional substance phlogiston does
not exist, it could not exist.

IV

So far, we haven't addressed ourselves to premiss (2) of the initial

argument, which claims that the right externalist theory of content can
be known a priori. We are suspicious about that premiss too. In order
14 ANDRI~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

to motivate those suspicions we now tum briefly to another externalist

line of thought that suggests an a priori weapon against scepticism. It
is Davidson's famous argument against external world scepticism. We
shall argue that even if we grant Davidson the semantic thesis that gets
the argument going, the argument founders on the fact that this thesis is
not knowable a priori. To our mind, this suggests an important lesson
about the epistemic status of semantic theory.
It is worth distinguishing externalist arguments against scepticism
based on considerations about causal connections to natural kinds in
the environment from externalist arguments against scepticism based
on various principles of charity. There are two ways that a principle of
charity can play a role in a theory of meaning. First it may be introduced
as an epistemic guide, which helps make explicit what we ordinarily
think makes an interpretation of someone's words (and perhaps propo-
sitional attitudes) reasonable. Second, it may be introduced as a consti-
tutive principle, as part of an account of what the truth of some meaning
or propositional attitude ascription consists in. One offers an account of
one of our ordinary tests of the reasonableness of semantic ascriptions,
the other of what makes a semantic ascription true. Davidson's princi-
ple which, ceteris paribus, accords a higher ranking to interpretations
that represent people as saying true things is of the second, stronger,
variety. An omniscient interpreter, he explains, will be compelled to
prefer the most charitable interpretation of someone's utterances, since
that is what the truth of an interpretation partially consists in. Of course
the omniscient interpreter won't interpret my utterances as all true since
there are other constraints on interpretation that need to be satisfied apart
from the principle of charity, e.g. compositionality.l~
The constitutive use of the principle of charity has prima facie poten-
tial as an a priori guarantor of the external world and Davidson has,
famously, used it in just that way. If come what may, we are guaranteed
that God will interpret our utterances in a charitable way, then we can be
guaranteed that our utterances are mostly true. Among other things, this
argument has application against the external world sceptic: for it might
be argued, and Davidson has argued, that if our belief that there are
physical objects were false, that would render too many of our beliefs
false, a result that is not consonant with the principle of charity.t
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 15

Let us state the argument with a bit more care.

(1) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that x believes in physical objects
and knows a priori that if most of x's beliefs are true, then
x's belief that there are physical objects is true).
(2) The Davidsonian account of what makes an interpretation
true is correct --+ 0(3x) (x knows a priori that the Davidson-
ian account of what makes an interpretation true is correct).
(3) The Davidsonian account of what makes an interpretation
true is correct.
(4) The Davidsonian account of what makes an interpretation
true --+ O(x) (x is a believer --+ x has mostly true beliefs).
(5) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that (4)).
(6) 0(3x) (x knows a priori that there are physical objects).

We have noted that (4) is fairly trivial and hence (5) is very plausible.
The argument thus enjoys advantages over the analogous argument in
the earlier part of our paper. We shall grant (1) though not without
reservations. Sometimes the principle of charity is deployed in a way
that seems to ensure only that we have a large variety of general beliefs
that are true. This seems to be what is implied by the Davidsonian
point that an error about the environment - say, that stars and holes
in the sky - can only be made sense of against the background of a
bunch of true general beliefs (in this case, about what holes are, what
the sky is, and so on). Understood this way, the principle offers no
potential rebuttal of the brain in a vat hypothesis. It merely entails that
even if we are brains in vats (or deceived by a malevolent demon),
we still have a bunch of true general beliefs. (Perhaps one could make
more headway here by combining a charity principle with the Kripkean
insights about reference mentioned earlier, though we won't pursue the
matter here.) In what follows, we shall assume, as Davidson seems to,
that the principle of charity is incompatible with the falsity of our belief
in physical objects. We urge the reader to remember that it is not clear
to us that this is so. We shall also grant Davidson the modest principles
of epistemic closure and so on whose necessary truth is required if the
above argument is to be valid.
16 ANDR]~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

Now we could of course try to undermine the argument by chal-

lenging premiss (3). We wish to show, however, that even if Davidson
is right that charity is constitutive of the truth of interpretation, he is
not well placed to refute the sceptic in an a priori way. This surprising
result, we suggest, will point to a more general lesson concerning the
power of externalist semantics to defeat scepticism than would be
learned by trying to pick holes in Davidson's formulation of the princi-
ple of charity. For the purposes of this discussion, then, we propose to
grant (3). Premiss (2) now comes into view as our central target.
Here is a quick argument against the thesis that we can know the
principle of charity a priori. Thoroughgoing externalists such as Burge
(and Davidson himself) have encouraged us to think that in general,
the meaning of our words and representations (even, say, 'rectangular
physical object') does not depend on our intrinsic nature. They have pro-
vided reasons for thinking that, for pretty much any expression in one's
language, one has a possible doppleganger that means something dif-
ferent by that expression. This gives us reason to think that the meaning
o f 'meaning" may depend in a constitutive way on our environment and
our community. But if that is so, how can we know a priori the nature of
the meaning relation, independently of knowledge of our environment
and community? To defend the a priori knowability of constitutive prin-
ciples of meaning, it seems that one would have to show that while the
meaning of terms in general is not in the head, the meaning of 'mean-
ing' is in the head. But it is hard to see how one is going to defend this.
Sure, the term 'means' has some peculiar features like standing in the
relation it denotes to the relation it denotes. Yet it is not clear how such
idiosyncracies can be used to show that the meaning of 'meaning' is in
the head.
We intend the preceeding paragraph to be merely suggestive rather
than compelling. In what follows we shall flesh out its central idea
into something more compelling by means of a couple of illustrations.
Let us begin by considering why Davidson believes that the Principle of
Charity is constitutive of the truth of meaning and belief ascriptions. For
it is hardly self-evident (indeed no metaphysics of meaning can plausibly
be represented as simply a priori self-evident). The main obstacle to
assigning a constitutive status to that principle seems to be the following
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 17

consideration. Let us grant that the best interpretation that we can find
given only behavioral data will always be a charitable one. Still it might
be that the meaning that the speaker really assigns and the beliefs she
really has, which we would know if we knew her inner mental life, does
not correspond to the one that is most reasonable given the behavioral
data alone. The primary challenge, then, (though not the onl), challenge)
when it comes to defending a constitutive status for charity is to close
the gap between what a speaker really means and believes and what the
behavioral evidence suggests. Davidson has always tried to remove that
gap by appealing to the social character of language:
As Ludwig Wittgenstein, not to mention Dewey, G. H. Mead, Quine and others have
insisted, language is intrinsically social. This does not entail that truth and meaning can
be defined in terms of observable behavior, or that it is nothing but observable behavior;,
but it does imply that meaning is entirely determined by observable behavior, even
readily observable behavior. That meanings are decipherable is not a matter of luck;
public availability is a constitutive aspect of language.12

The public character of meaning, Davidson explains, requires that

meaning be determined by the evidence ordinarily available to an inter-
preter; and since such evidence is all behavioristic, we are forced to the
conclusion that there is no gap between what interpretation the behav-
ioral data warrants and what interpretation is really correct. (We should
add that since, for Davidson, meaning and belief attributions go hand
in hand, we are led to the conclusion that beliefs do not outstrip the
behavioral data.)
Now there are many interesting properties that some philosophers
have at some time or other thought relevant to the meaning of our words
and the content of our beliefs: functional architecture, compositionally
structured internal syntax, biological function, a primitive grasping rela-
tion to a Fregean third realm, our being made in the image of God
... from each of these properties a metaphysical story could be devel-
oped about what constitutes the meaning of words and the content of
beliefs.
Now what is Davidson's argument against those metaphysics? He
does not and cannot show a priori that our inner states don't enjoy any
of the properties that figure in these myriad metaphysics. (For some of
the properties on the list, it is obvious that they are had.) The thrust of
18 ANDRI~GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

his thinking is that such states don't form part of our ordinary evidential
basis for interpretation and so cannot constitute meaning even if they
are had.
Consider now the following rather fantastic scenario (which while
bizarre is no more bizarre than the sorts of scenarios described in ordi-
nary discussions of scepticism). People have a language of thought
which causally produces utterances. When someone speaks, a demon
looks at that language of thought, determines the biological functions
of the tokens in the language and whispers in the bearer's ear, so to
speak, providing information about the mental representations of the
speaker that causally produced the utterance. Such information will
include details about the structure of the internal language and infor-
mation about the biological function of bits of the internal language.
(Note that we are not assuming that the demon or anyone else has a
direct view of "the meanings" of people's inner states.) Hearers then
describe the overt utterances in ways that are responsive to the informa-
tion they have received. Of course, the hearers are not consciously aware
of the process whereby the demon provides them with such input, rather
in the way that we are not aware of the information processing that
delivers grammatical judgment as output. Nevertheless, the hearers
enjoy subconscious information processing mechanisms which make
use of input about speakers' inner properties as part of the data that
yields interpretative outputs. So we might imagine, for example, that
a hearer subconsciously takes in information to the effect that it is the
biological function of a certain type of syntactic item to be tokened
in the presence of F's and in processing that biological information,
construes it as, at the very least, evidence that the item is about F's. ~3
(We can similarly imagine possible worlds where people have access
to properties that are not publicly observable by a telepathic faculty
and that such information serves as input into information processing
concerning interpretation. What we have to say about the demon worlds
applies mutatis mutandis to telepathy worlds.)
Let us imagine a possible world where the scenario takes place.
What should Davidson say about it? Let us suppose the inhabitants of
this possible community use a language that is phonetically similar to
English to express themselves. It may well be that were we to translate
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 19

their responses in a way that respects a homophonic translation manual,

we would discover that they are making meaning ascriptions that differ
from the ones that we would prefer on the basis of behavioral data
alone. Indeed, their responses differ from the ones that they would
prefer were they to have access to only behavioral data. The question
now arises. The question now arises: Suppose they utter "He means
that p by ' u ' " in a case where a Davidsonian theory of meaning says
the English sentence "He means that p by ' u ' " is false, since that
is not the interpretation recommended by the behavioral data alone.
Are we to say that that community would be making a mistake? On
that view, the demon would simply be distorting the judgments of the
interpreters. That seems wrong. For one thing, that is hardly a charitable
interpretation of the meaning of "means" as used by that community.
By his own lights, Davidson will be forced, ceteris paribus, to prefer
a charitable interpretation. If we can find a semantics for our possible
community that does not take the distortion approach then, according
to Davidson, it will, ceteris paribus, be much the better for that. Given
that behaviorism about our semantic talk is motivated by the fact that
we have only behavior to go on, it seems that a theory of interpretation
for our possible community should be grounded in the sort of data
it has to go on. Since members of our possible community are lucky
enough to have access to certain biological properties and so on of their
mutual inner life and use 'means' in a way that is responsive to such
information, a theory of the truth conditions of 'means' as it figures in
their talk ought not, it seems, to deem facts about inner life irrelevant.
We thus see absolutely no reason to deny that in the case of at least
some of these demon worlds, the best interpretation of the interpretative
habits of the community will assign a meaning to 'means' as used in the
community in such a way that its extension will be partly constituted by
certain facts about inner life, biological function, and so on. This does
not, of course, require that a theory of interpretation for us cannot have
charitable interpretations of behavioral data as constitutive.
There are a number of ways of making good on the idea that behav-
iorism about meaning (construed as the modal thesis that meaning super-
venes on behavior) is, so to speak, true for us but not for our possible
community. Most obviously, we can insist that what our possible com-
20 ANDR]~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

munity means by the noise 'means' is not what we mean. When we

say 'means' we denote a relation that is definable in terms of charitable
interpretations of behavior, but when they say 'means' they don't denote
any such relation. Understood that way, we have a concrete case where
the meaning of 'means' is not in the head. We will thus admit that
a theory of interpretation for our possible community will not make
charitable interpretations of behavior constitutive of the truth of that
community's claims of the homophonic form 'u means p'. Call the rela-
tion they denote means*. The line of thought we have been pursuing
suggests that while the only evidence relevant for a meaning ascription
is behavioral, the same is not true of a meaning* ascription.
Suppose now to our great surprise that it turns out that w e a r e just
like that possible community. All along, a benevolent demon has been
implanting information of the sort we have been discussing about the
people we interpret and we have made use of that information in our
meaning judgments. Subconsciously, we have deployed information-
processing resources which make use of the b~nevolent demon's input,
using it as the partial basis for interpretative judgment. This is surely
an epistemic possibility. What if that epistemic possibility correctly
describes the actual world? In that case, it seems, meaning will not
be determined by publicly observable behavior) 4 For the only semi-
decent argument for such a behavioristic account of meaning assumes
that publicly observable behavior is all we have to go on in meaning
ascriptions. But if the bizarre scenario we described is actual, then the
premises of any such argument will be false. So the constitutive version
of the principle of charity can't be known a priori, at least not if Davidson
is right about why we should believe that principle. 15
For all we have said, the principle of charity may be true. In particular,
it should be clear that the possibility of demon and telepathy worlds
need not be regarded by Davidson as counterexamples to his claim that
the correctness of a meaning ascription is determined by the totality
of behavioral evidence for it. The actual scenario may well be that in
interpretation, the only evidence we have to go is behavioral evidence.
If, as Davidson maintains, the meaning of 'meaning' is determined by
the sort of evidence that we actually have to go on in our meaning
claims, it may thus very well be that the truth of meaning claims is
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 21

determined by behavioral evidence that is ordinarily available. Thus for

all we have said, it may be metaphysically impossible that there be a
being with mostly false beliefs. Further, for all we have said, it may be
metaphysically impossible that someone believe that there are physical
objects and be wrong.
But the important point to notice is that none of these observations
offer us any a priori bulwark against scepticism. One might still hap-
pily combine the view that belief in physical objects can only earn its
epistemic credentials a posteriori with a modest privileged access thesis
on the one hand, externalism on the other. That externalism might even
include a belief in the principle of charity. There is no tension here, so
long as one recognizes that the principle of charity is itself grounded a
posteriori on such assumptions as that we are social organisms, that we
only have each others' behavior to go on in making sense of each other
etc. It is interesting to note in passing that Quine has seen much more
clearly than Davidson that behaviorism in semantics requires substan-
tive empirical assumptions. In a number of places, he makes explicit
that his indeterminacy of translation relies on an assumption that telepa-
thy does not operate widely. 16 We see this as an excellent example
of Quine's anti-foundationalist holism in practice, revealing his deep
suspicion of apriorism in philosophy of mind and language.
Now of course someone might try to produce some other sort of a
priori argument for the principle of charity, one that doesn't rely on any
assumptions about our ordinary evidential base for interpretation and
so on. We simply don't know what such an argument might look like
however. We can thus at least conclude that Davidson's a priori challenge
to the sceptic falls, and that it is not obvious how that challenge might
be repaired.
We end this section with one final illustration of how one might
be encouraged to be an externalist about 'meaning' itself. Famously,
Davidson has claimed that a 'Swampman' that was a physical duplicate
of some adult human being but created ex nihilo would, at the time of
creation, be altogether lacking in propositional attitudes. 17 We assume
for the purposes of this paper that Davidson is right to think that a
cleaner theory of semantic properties can be provided by cleaving to
this admittedly counterintuitive assumption. A natural question to put
22 ANDRI~ GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

to Davidson is this: 'What if YOU were to acquire excellent evidence

that YOU were just created ex nihilo, or produced by some bizarre
cosmological accident. What would you say then? How would you
go on?' It doesn't, after all, take that much imagination to describe a
situation where one acquires such evidence. So it seems hard to deny that
it is epistemically possible that such evidence becomes available. Does
that evidential possibility immediately defeat Davidson's position? Of
course not. Here is what we take to be the most reasonable line to take
when confronted with the tricky question that we have posed:
"Let me distinguish two questions: First, 'What should I say about
swamp duplicates assuming that I and the rest of my society are beings
with a rich causal history etc'. Second, 'What will I say about myself
if I you now provide me with evidence that I am a swamp creature that
is the result of some cosmological accident?' In the first scenario, the
most reasonable thing to say about the propositional attitudes is that I
have them and the swamp creature lacks them, and the most reasonable
thing to say about meaning is that our words are meaningful and the
swamp creature's are not. Given certain assumptions about our own
contact with the world and so on, we can construct a very nice theory
of semantics which fits a whole host of desiderata. That theory entails
that the swamp creature has no propositional attitudes. Turning now
to the second scenario, what will I say if you now present me with
evidence that I am a swamp creature? Well, I will then change my
theory of meaning. In this way information about my place in the world
might lead me to revise my theory of semantics. I'm not sure quite how
I'd revise my semantic theory in that case. The semantic theory that
I would opt for would probably be less attractive: just as the course
of observable events might thwart my efforts to have a very clean and
simple theory of physics, so new evidence about my place in the world
might thwart my efforts to have a clean semantic theory. If I am now
presented with evidence that I am a swampman, perhaps I will opt for a
theory according to which meaning is primitive; perhaps I will opt for a
theory according to which internal states and sentences are meaningful
even though lacking in truth conditions and thus give up on the view that
truth conditions are central to semantic theory. None of those options
would be very palatable, but I suppose I'd have to go for one of them.
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 23

But none of this shows me that I oughtn't in the current circumstances

opt for a theory according to which I have propositional attitudes and
the swamp creature doesn't."
As far as we can tell, this sort of response is the best response to
the query. (Similar queries arise all over the place: One who insists that
silicon chip things can't have propositional attitudes will be asked "What
if to your great surprise you discover y o u are made of silicon chips?"
And so on.) But it is a response which in effect admits that the project
of semantic theory is not independent of certain empirical assumptions
about the world and one's place in it. The envisaged response concedes
that semantic theory relies on certain empirical assumptions and that
new empirical information may overturn one of those assumptions and
in turn undermine one's allegiance to some semantic theory. All this
strongly cuts against the idea that one can secure a priori knowledge
concerning which semantic theory is correct. 18

In our view the prospect of utilizing privileged access and extemalism

to refute the sceptic is bleak.
If externalism implied that we can know a priori that some of our
thoughts are connected to the external world, a refutation of scepti-
cism would be on the cards. As we have argued, the familiar thought
experiments invoked in defence of externalism do not support a version
of externalism with this implication. What those thought experiments
support is a version of externalism which only implies the following.
We can know a priori that if the content of thought is externally deter-
mined then that thought is necessarily connected to the external world.
Of course, it begs the question against the sceptic to assume that we can
know of any thought that its content is externally determined.
Privileged access and externalism do not help us to demonstrate
that we know any given thought about the external world is true. Does
externalism, as Davidson maintains, offer an a priori demonstration
that at least some if not most of our thoughts about the external world
are true? This is a vain hope. In attempting to refute the sceptic a
24 ANDRI~GALLOISAND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

priori, D a v i d s o n relies o n p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that, b y

D a v i d s o n ' s o w n lights, c a n n o t b e k n o w n a p r i o r i ) 9

NOTES

1 One who adopts this view is Anthony Brueckner in "Brains in a Vat", The Journal of
Philosophy, 83 (1986): 148-67.
z In calling it a priori we are following Michael McKinsey. The main argument is
essentially an elaboration of the argument given by McKinsey in "Anti-Individualism
and Privileged Access",Analysis, 51, No. 1 (January 1991): 9-16.
3 For a critical discussion of this epistemic closure principle see Robert Nozick Philo-
sophicalExplanations (Oxford 1981) chapter three.
4 Should we be so complacent about ETC? There is a bad idea that tends to be confused
with good versions of ETC. It is that a term picks out the cause of its utterance, no
matter how unnatural or gerrymandered the cause is. This thesis would no doubt help
with external world scepticism, but it is hopeless. On that view, it is so easy for terms
to refer that we would have a virtual guarantee that, say, 'water' succeeds in referring.
Apart from the problem that there are many causes of an utterance of any word, this
view has the unpalatable consequence that phlogiston exists. Moral: the constraints on
reference can't be so generous that all our natural kind terms refer come what may. It
is only those ultra generous constraints on reference that make it so obvious that the
natural kind terms of a brain in a vat refer to something or other. Abandoningsuch ultra
generous constraints does not vitiate the good externalist point that there may well be
propositions that we entertain that a brain in a vat duplicate cannot.
5 AnthonyBrueckner"WhatanIndividualistKnowsAPriori, Analysis,52,No. 2(April
1992): 111-118. Brueckner is replying to Mckinsey's argument in Mckinsey ibid.
6 In this case theorizing about something non-existentproceeds by envisaging the unre-
alized product of combining existing things. The case is similar to the following. One
succeeds in talking and thinking about someone who does not exist by referring to her as
the product of a separately existing sperm and egg. Perhaps one need not tie down one's
thought and talk about the non-existentto what already existed in this way. Perhaps one
could entertain water thoughts in a world where matter is non-atomic. Someone in such
a world could speculate about matter being atomic, and go on to speculate about how it
would behave if certain hypothetical atoms were combined in certain ways.
7 For Davidson and Burge's views on these matters see Donald Davidson "First Per-
son Authority", Dialectica, 38, Nos, 2-3 (1984): 101-111, and "Knowing One's Own
Mind", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1986): 441-458: and
Tyler Burge "Individuation and Self Knowledge", The Journal of Philosophy, 85, 1
(November 1988): 649-663.
8 See John McDowell "Singular Thought and The Extent of Inner Space" in Subject,
Thought, and Context ed. John McDowell and Phillip Pettit (Oxford) 1986: 137-168.
 EXTERNALISM AND SCEPTICISM 25

9 Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity (Harvard) 1980.

lO We might mention that not all commentators have properly understood the basic
points that we have just made about the role that Davidson assigns to charity. We have
in mind, in particular, Fodor and Le Pore's recent and disasterous critique of David-
son on charity. 'Omniscience and charity are incompatible virtues', they write. They
go on: 'On pain of misinterpretation, what the omniscient interpreter must do instead
of exercising charity is construe my beliefs as true by his lights when my beliefs are
true and false by his lights when they are false.' What they miss is that for Davidson,
owing to the constitutive role of charity, those two strategies amount to the same thing:
construing my beliefs as true when they are true precisely requires, among other things,
an exercise of charity. They also miss the point that the principle competes with other
principles and so will not compel an interpreter to represent all my beliefs as true. Thus
they address Davidson's claim that 'The omniscient interpreter, using the same method
as the fallible interpreter, finds the speaker largely consistent and correct' and criticize it
by ignoring the 'largely'. Thus they write: 'To precisely the extent to which a speaker is
fallible, it is a misconstrual to interpret that speaker as consistent and correct.' Holism:
A Shopper's Guide (BlackweU, Oxford: 1992), p. 160.
l J See "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge" in Truth and Interpretation ed.
E. LePore (Basil Blackwelh Oxford, 1986) and "On The Very Idea of a Conceptua !
Scheme" in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984).
Also relevant are "Radical Interpretation" and "Belief and the Basis of Meaning", in
Inquiries into Truth andlnterpretation and "Rational Animals" in LePore and McLaugh-
lin eds., Action and Events (Blackwelh Oxford, 1985).
12 "The Structure and Content of Truth", Journal of Philosophy Vol LXXXVII (June
1990), p. 314.
~3 We are of course mimicking theories of content that are actually endorsed by
teleosemanticists like Ruth Millikan (see, e.g. Language, Thought and Other Biologi-
cal Categories, MIT Press 1984) and Karen Neander (see, e.g. "Misrepresenting and
Malfunctioning", PhilosophicalStudies, 79, No. 2 (August 1995): 109-141). They will
say that mother nature can well enough play the role of the demon. But that is another
story.
14 In a sense, the demon extends the realm of observable behavior by making certain
inner processes observable. But the information delivered by the demon about, say,
biological function can't in any sense reasonably be construed as merely behavioral
information.
i5 At bottom, we believe that the Davidsonian argument relies on a faulty Cartesian
view that one can get a clear view of the mind without already having a clear view of the
world and the that the former activity is epistemically prior to the latter. It may well be
that any effort to get a deep understanding of mind and intentionality in particular cannot
proceed along Cartesian lines. If not requiring that a metaphysical picture of the world
he already in place, the philosophy of meaning must proceed in tandem with a study of
the world outside us rather than being prior to it. The idea that metaphysical pictures
26 ANDRI~GALLOIS AND JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

connect with theories of meaning may turn out to be a profound one; we should merely
be suspicious of any claim of epistemic priority for the latter over the former. The idea
of transcendental argument that thought, inquiry and communication have fundamental
preconditions may not be wrong, what is wrong it the idea that those preconditions can
be known a priori. A defense of these more general theses is beyond the scope of this
paper.
16 See "Reply to Chomsky" in Davidson and Hintikka, eds. Words and Objections:
Essays on the Work ofW. V. Quine (Reidel: Dordrecht, 1969), p. 306. We are indebted
to Jose Benardete for drawing this remark of Quine's to our attention. See his "AI and
the Synthetic A Priori", in Philosophy in Mind, eds. O'Leary-Hawthorne and Michael
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994).
L7 "Knowing One's Own Mind", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philo-
sophicalAssociation, 60 (1987).
18 It also cuts against using Swampman considerations to provide an a priori refutation
of the sceptical hypothesis that the world was created two seconds ago.
19 We are grateful to audiences at the University of Virginia, University of New South
Wales, Purdue University and the Australian National University for their helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this paper.

ANDRI~ GALLOIS JOHN 0'LEARY-HAWTHORNE

Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy
University of Queensland University of New South Wales
4072 Brisbane, Queensland Kensington, N.S. W. 2033
Australia Australia