[G.R. No. 165276. November 25, 2009.

]
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary,
Office of the President; Former DOJ SECRETARY HERNANDO B. PEREZ (now substituted by the Incumbent DOJ Secretary RAUL GONZALES); Former PROV. PROS. AMANDO C. VICENTE (now
substituted by the Incumbent PROV. PROS. ALFREDO L. GERONIMO); PROS. BENJAMIN R. CARAIG, Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL T. VISTAN, respondents.

Summary of Facts: Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the girl's grandmother
and petitioner's sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four. Petitioner's
love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict,
and the latter's family who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned's generosity. In the evening of 11 April 1999,
Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely
reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to him and
that he was no longer welcome at petitioner's residence. Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic),
retaliated on 12 April 1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner's custody. Michael used to
have free access to the undersigned's house and he took the girl away while petitioner was at her office. Petitioner tried
to look for the girl but was misled by spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno
with the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter's
wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province. On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article
271 of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses,
the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan. From 12 April 1999 to 16
April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as
well as in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in
Quezon City where he made her recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would
compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed. In the early morning of 16 April 1999,
Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as
the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel
against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.

 Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD 1829 was
dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to uphold the petitioner's complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must
(sic) remained.
 Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that
Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the
charge for Violation of PD 1829.; On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was
denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.;
 Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May 2000. She also filed a
Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000; Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for the Secretary of Justice,
denied the petition for review. The undersigned's Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise
denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15 October 2001.

Petitioner’s Contention: assailed the constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of the President and
bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

CA: Dismissed the petition for lack of merit and upheld the position of the Solicitor General regarding the law being an
exercise of the doctrine of qualified political agency stated as “When the President herself did not revoke the order
issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt petitioner's
case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President
herself.”

Held: petition is without merit. They are mere suppositions without any basis in law.

The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well
within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction. "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." ,
"each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.” Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's power and the
President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and
speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary — his own alter ego. Besides,
the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the
task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. Petitioner’s interpretation of the law
would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded and would unduly hamper the President's effectivity in running the government. In the first place,
Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular No. 58 has
not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the
approval of the President.

Other:

While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by respondent into executing the affidavit, 41 this Court
finds no conclusive proof thereof. Besides, even if their reliance on the victim's affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary
that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of discretion. 42 As such, this Court will not interfere with the
said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and
ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that
this Court will not pass upon absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and September 16, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 211269. June 15, 2016.]

RUBEN E. TIU, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Acting Chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Parole, HON.
FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, Director of the Bureau of Corrections, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA of the Department
of Justice, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., the Executive Secretary, respondents.

Summary of Facts: Before the Court is a petition for habeas corpus 1 filed by petitioner Ruben E. Tiu (petitioner), who is
detained at the Sablayan Prison and Penal Farm in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, seeking his immediate release from
prison on the strength of his conditional pardon without parole conditions, as well as the automatic reduction or his
sentence by virtue of his status as a penal colonist. On June 16, 2000, petitioner and two others 3 were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, of selling, delivering, and giving away to
a poseur-buyer 1,977 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a regulated drug,
without authority of law or corresponding license therefor. Consequently, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Their conviction, which was affirmed by the Court in a
Decision 6 dated March 10, 2004, became final and executory on July 29, 2004. On March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons
and Parole (BPP) issued Resolution No. 022-3-09 8 recommending the grant of executive clemency to petitioner, among
many others. On June 3, 2010, acting on said recommendation, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) granted
9 him "conditional pardon without parole conditions," but was, nonetheless, still "subject to the conditions indicated in
[the individual pardon papers]." It turned out, however, that no such papers were issued in petitioner's favor. Thus,
petitioner repeatedly requested 12 for a certificate of conditional pardon without parole conditions from the Legal
Affairs Office of the Office of the President (OP), but said requests were denied by Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Michael G. Aguinaldo (Deputy Executive Secretary Aguinaldo) in three (3) separate letters dated March 13, 2013,
13 August 12, 2013, 14 and August 14, 2013, 15 informing petitioner that the records of his case were referred back to
the BPP. In the meantime, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III signed into law Republic Act No. (RA) 10592, 18 which,
subject to its provisions, would substantially increase the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) of qualified inmates.
Thus, on July 27, 2013, petitioner's carpeta was returned to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for the re-
computation of his time served. On July 7, 2014, petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus, 20
insisting on the efficacy and enforceability of his conditional pardon without parole conditions, which allegedly
necessitates his release from prison. Further, he claims that he is entitled to nineteen (19) years and seven (7) months of
GCTA, computed hereafter, which, when tacked to his actual service of fourteen (14) years and nine (9) months, would
add up to thirty-four (34) years and four (4) months, or more than his alleged reduced sentence of thirty (30) years. He
argues that, since he was granted a "colonist status" by then Director of Corrections Gaudencio S. Pangilinan (Director of
Corrections Pangilinan) on December 21, 2011, as contained in Correction's Order No. 015-5-2012, 22 his sentence was
automatically reduced to thirty (30) years 23 pursuant to Section 7 (b), Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the Bureau of
Corrections Operating Manual (BuCor-OM)

Issue: whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of petitioner.

Held: The petition lacks merit. petitioner is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the offense
of selling and delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, 36 as amended
by RA 7659. 37 He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that he is entitled to
relief under a writ of habeas corpus.

 Conditional pardon without parole granted to him by PGMA deserves scant consideration

It must be emphasized that pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit
it is intended and not communicated officially to the court. It is undisputed, however, that no individual pardon papers
were issued in petitioner's favour, thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and
ineffective, as clarified by Deputy Executive Secretary Aguinaldo. The necessity for the individual pardon papers is best
explained by the nature of a conditional pardon, which is "a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he
does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that
the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon." The individual pardon papers, therefore, contain
the terms and conditions of the contract of pardon, the compliance of which is essential to the pardonee's freedom from
recommitment to prison. the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. 51 Stated otherwise,
since the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon
prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which "essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance
of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts."
  the conferment by the Director of Corrections of a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to reduce the
latter's sentence.

Section 5 of Act No. 2489 is clear and unambiguous: "[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment
receiving and retaining the classification of penal colonists or trusties will automatically have the
sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence of thirty years when receiving the executive
approval for this classification upon which the regular credit now authorized by law and special credit
authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made."

The wording of the law is such that the act of classification as a penal colonist or trustie is separate from and necessarily
precedes the act of approval by the Executive. The foregoing is bolstered by the fact that the reduction of a prisoner's
sentence is a partial pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to
extend the same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically under Section 19, Article VII thereof, provides that the President
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, 49 which petitioner explicitly
recognized by applying for commutation of sentence even during the pendency of his request for the implementation of
the conditional pardon. It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the
judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. 51 Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to act in person, he may not
delegate the authority to pardon prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency, which "essentially postulates
that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by
such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself
should disapprove such acts."

Ruling: In sum, there being no unlawful restraint on petitioner's liberty, no relief under a writ of habeas corpus can be
granted to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Summary of Facts: The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual
"strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm ,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid
price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid
of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Hence, petitioner filed a case
for prohibition and mandamus

Issue: Whether the Filipino First Policy may be applied

Held:

 Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage since it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and
failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy
provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

 The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned
by Filipinos.

Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by
respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found
to be possessed of proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.

 Manila Prince may be allowed to match the bid

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is
reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the
bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law. This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. Besides, there is no
time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. Since petitioner
has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with
no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well.

OTHER:

 Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is self executing

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear
that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. Also, A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject.

Ruling: Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well.
[G.R. No. 195580. April 21, 2014.]

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR
MINING, INC., petitioners, vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP., respondent.

Summary of Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Ruling: