The New Realism: Malaysia since 13 May, 1969

Author(s): Peter Wicks

Source: The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 1971), pp. 17-27
Published by: Australian Institute of Policy and Science
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 THE NEW REALISM
Malaysia Since 13 May, 1969
By Peter Wicks,*

I.
Until May, 1969, Malaysia was noted as one of the few Asian states
with a Western-style parliamentary democracy and a private enterprise
economy. This was despite the fact that several distinct communities have
resided in the country?Malays, Chinese, Indians, and after 1963, the
races of Borneo?none of which possessed an absolute numerical superiority
and all of which possessed markedly different cultures and traditions. This
was also despite the fact that of the two major communities, the Malays
have traditionally been rural dwellers and relatively poor, the Chinese
urban dwellers and relatively prosperous. Malaysia exhibited a high degree
of political stability, with the same party triumphing in successive elections
and holding power with at least two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. This
party, the Alliance, comprised the country's three main political groups, the
United Malays' National Organisation (UMNO and senior partner), the
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC), and reflected the society's dominant communal interests. The
Malaysian political process was essentially one of attempting to find an
acceptable modus vivendi between ethnic groups with strong feelings and
disparate interests. While the Alliance insisted on Malay political domin
ance and sought to improve the lot of the Malays or "sons of the soil",
there was little attempt to bring about cultural or economic fusion. By bar
gaining and camaraderie, Alliance leaders managed to produce apparently
workable compromises.
However, communalism has been the dominant and divisive issue in
Malaysian politics. Despite, and sometimes because of, Alliance policies,
the various ethnic communities continued to distrust, despise, and fear one
another. Elsewhere this writer has suggested that what the "elite-bargain
ing" style of the Alliance did not take into account was (1) a vital in
creased political awareness and assertiveness on the part of the non-Malay
groups; and (2) a growing Malay resentment towards this assertiveness
and towards the manifest economic success of many non-Malays.1 In short,
the simple formula of Malay political power versus Chinese economic
* Postgraduate Scholar in History, University of New South Wales.
I Wicks, Peter. A Troubled Malaysia, "World Review", May 1971, pp. 20-29.
"The Australian Quarterly", Volume 43, No. 4, December, 1971, pp. 17-27
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 THE AUSTRALIAN QUARTERLY, DECEMBER, 1971

supremacy was no longer adequate. The tensions always latent in Malaysian

society reached explosive proportions in the severe rioting and killings in
Kuala Lumpur that followed the general elections in May, 1969.2

II.

It would perhaps be an exaggeration to speak of a "New Order" in Malaysia

since those traumatic days. The same political grouping, the Alliance,
constitutes the government, and there has not been much change in the
personnel who hold the reins of power. Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned
as the Federation's Prime Minister in September, 1970, but the present
Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, and other Cabinet members were also
key figures in previous administrations. The Malaysian parliament was
reconvened in February this year; the Alliance remains committed to Malay
political and cultural pre-eminence; and the economy remains a fruitful
arena for private enterprise. It is possible, however, to discern elements
of change both within the Malaysian political process and within govern
ment policy during this period. When Director of National Operations, a
post he assumed in the aftermath of the riots, Tun Razak spoke of a "new
realism" as being the keynote of the government's approach to the country's
bedevilling problems, and it is the case that a new sense of urgency and
set of emphases mark the style of his government from that of his genial
predecessor.3 National security has received high priority, and the means
whereby it might be achieved expanded. There has been the firmly held con
viction on the part of the country's rulers that sensitive issues pertaining to
race and privilege are not the business of conventional political forums and
that Westminster-style democracy is at this stage inappropriate for Malaysia.
In contrast to the earlier "laissez-faire" economic policies, there has com
menced a process of massive government involvement in economic activity,
and in the sphere of defence and foreign policy, Malaysia continues the
flexible arrangements with her four Commonwealth partners, but the govern
ment has clearly begun to explore new options and even to chart a new
course.

III.

It was obvious that the experiences of May, 1969, severely jolted the
Alliance politicians. The election results in themselves were hardly en
couraging for the incumbents of power. While in western Malaysia the
Alliance won a clear majority of seats, there had been an over-all
swing of 10% in votes since the 1964 elections to parties of more evidently
communal and radical persuasion. The Alliance, with 66 seats, attracted
2 According to official sources, 196 people died, 493 were injured, and 45 were held for trial
for murder or arson; see "The May 13 Tragedy", A Report of the National Operations
Council, Kuala Lumpur, 9 October, 1969, pp. 88-93.
3 "A New Realism", Speech of the Honorable Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, on TV and
Radio, 13 June, 1969 (Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur).

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MALAYSIA SINCE 1969

48.4% of votes, and the opposition parties, with 37 seats, attracted 51.6%.4
Non-Malay opposition parties won more seats than the Alliance in urban
and semi-urban constituencies, and the chauvinist Malay party PMIP made
heavy inroads into UMNO strongholds of the rural north-west. UMNO
lost 7 seats, MCA 14, and MIC 1. As one observer commented wrily,
"the electorate has in fact damned the Alliance with disturbingly faint
praise".5 Alliance leaders were bitterly disappointed, and MCA withdrew
from the Cabinet on the grounds that it had lost the confidence of
Malaysia's Chinese community. When during the post-election fervour
and disappointment Kuala Lumpur erupted in a wave of inter-racial terror
and bloodshed, this was as unexpected as it was shattering. Well could
Tun Razak describe 13 May, 1969, as a "day of national tragedy".6
The government's initial response, however, was to lay the blame for
the crisis on communist agitators, the opposition parties, and other "anti
national elements". The Tunku declared a state of national emergency,
suspended the elections in eastern Malaysia, and instructed Tun Razak to
rule by decree at the head of a predominantly Malay National Operations
Council (NOC) and in co-operation with the military. Political activity
was banned, rigorous and heavy-handed press censorship was introduced,
and the NOC was given far-reaching powers over life and liberty.7
Such authoritarian moves were perhaps understandable in view of the
desperately troubled situation. Yet as tempers cooled, Tun Razak and his
Council publicly indicated that these moves held out no prospect of long
term solution. They admitted, too, that the crisis had not been the cal
culated achievement of enterprising communists, but rather the outcome of
deep, long-standing tensions in Malaysian society.8 Malaysia had still to
find a viable and generally acceptable political and economic system. Yet
the ability of the country's leadership to achieve this during the aftermath
of the riots was threatened by the eruption of a power struggle within
the governing party itself, which was significant both in its bitterness and
its implications.
"The Malays," Tunku Abdul Rahman remarked in 1968, "are a very
easy people to lead."9 It was as though he spoke of a different era. The
success of non-Malay groups in the 1969 elections unleashed a powerful
wave of frustration and disgust amongst many articulate Malays, which
permeated even to the echelons of UMNO. Several younger Malay poli
ticians criticized the Tunku's benevolent paternalism and demanded his
resignation. Malay student groups boisterously called for the increased
safeguarding of Malay rights and privileges, the confiscation of some non
4 Ratnam, K. J. and Milne, R.S. The 1969 Parliamentary Elections in West Malaysia, "Pacific
Affairs", Summer, 1970, p. 203.
5 Denis Bloodworth, in the "Sunday Telegraph" (Sydney), 18 May, 1969.
6 "The May 13 Tragedy", op. cit., p. iii.
7 Abishganaden, F. After the storm?a rebuilding' "Sydney Morning Herald", 25 August, 1969.
8 "The May 13 Tragedy", op. cit., p. iii.
9 Cited by Derek Davies, "Firecrackers for the Tunku", "Far Eastern Economic Review"
(Hong Kong), 11 February, 1968, p. 112.

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 THE AUSTRALIAN QUARTERLY, DECEMBER, 1971

Malay property, and even the removal of citizenship rights from the
Chinese.10 They also indicated their preference for continued authoritarian
rule as opposed to parliamentary democracy. The dissidents over-estimated
the strength of their arguments and under-estimated both the political acu
men of the Tunku and the loyalty which his fellow Ministers had for
"Bapa Malaysia". Yet while the extremists were temporarily thwarted, they
had served notice that Malay sensitivities should be the principal con
sideration in the government's long-term response to 13 May. Subsequent
policies indicated that their views had been heeded, if not completely
endorsed.

IV.
"If the events of 13 May are not to occur again; if this Nation is
to survive, we must make sure that subjects which are likely to
engender racial tensions are not exploited by irresponsible oppor
tunists."11

Thus wrote the Director of National Operations in his preface to the

government's White Paper on the causes and nature of the May disturb
ances, published in October, 1969. He wrote too of the need "to construct
a political framework which is realistic and takes full account of the social
and economic conditions of our people and which is based on an un
shakeable and sound foundation".12 The practical outcome of this recog
nition was the announcement that Malaysia would henceforth have a
national ideology. Formulation of the ideology was given over to a newly
created Department of National Unity, headed by one of Razak's closest
advisers, Tan Sri M. Ghazali bin Shafie. Ghazali announced that the
ideology, known as rukunegara, would be based "in unequivocal terms"
upon the Malaysian constitution, the provisions of which would apply
"without term and could not be broken unilaterally".13 The principles of
the constitution could not be challenged, and all political activity must
take place within the framework of these principles. Only details of the
implementation of the principles would be open to criticism. The govern
ment's attention was specifically directed to certain provisions of the con
stitution which concerned the "sensitive issues" of Malaysian politics?
Part III (citizenship rights); Article 71 (the rights and prerogatives of the
Malay rulers); Article 152 (Malay as the National Language); and Article
153 (special privileges for the Malays). An amendment to the Sedition
Act was drafted to remove these subjects from parliamentary or public
criticism. Though there was some provision for the articulation of the
10 "Far Eastern Economic Review", 7 August, 1969, p. 321; "The Bulletin" (Sydney), 9 August,
1969.
11 "The May 13 Tragedy", op. cit., p. v
12 Ibid, p. vi.
13 "Straits Times", 16 July, 1969; for an analysis of RUKUNEGARA, see Milne, R. S.,
National Ideology and Nation-Building in Malaysia, "Asian Survey". July, 1970, pp. 563-573.

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MALAYSIA SINCE 1969

interests of the various groups in Malaysian society when early in 1970

the National Consultative Council (NCC) was formed, the intention that
the NCC should be totally representative of the parliamentary spectrum
was thwarted when the leading non-Malay opposition group, the Demo
cratic Action Party (DAP) refused to participate. Nevertheless, by mid
1970, the government obtained the NCC's assent for promulgation of the
legislation on sensitive issues. Publication of the National Ideology took
place in September, 1970.14
The formulation of a national ideology and its enforcement through the
Sedition Act and ultimately through a constitutional amendment consider
ably tightened the political framework in Malaysia and restricted the free
dom of expression and manoeuvre of the opposition parties. Meanwhile
the government moved in the vital areas of the economy and education
further to assuage Malay sensitivities.

V.
Malaysia has long been distinctive for its impressive economic growth and
financial stability, and it is instructive that the disturbances of May, 1969,
wrought little long-term damage to the economy. While there was a brief
lapse in private investment and a decrease in imports, GNP rose throughout
1969 by 9% at market prices.15 Nevertheless, the government saw two
economic factors as providing significant impulse to the May crisis. A
disturbing feature of Malaysian society in recent years has been the move
ment of Malay youths from rural areas to the towns, where they have
formed an unemployed, untrained and increasingly frustrated group of
fringe-dwellers. In addition, wider opportunities for education have meant
that approximately 100,000 pupils of all races have left school each year
seeking absorption into the work force. In 1969, some 9% of Malaysia's
3.3 million-strong work force was unemployed; and more than half the
unemployed were under twenty-five years of age.16 Well could Tun Razak
concede that there was "one serious problem which we have not successfully
resolved, that is, unemployment, particularly among the youth in this
country . . ."17
Most of the swift interim measures introduced by the NOC during 1969
were based on this revelation?the call for greater industrialisation, the
formation of a National Youth Development Corps, and the diversification
of agriculture. Tun Razak foreshadowed a "New Economic Policy" includ
ing proposals for the establishment of labour-intensive industries in smaller
towns and the training of youths in technical skills.18 Whilst the popularity
14 RUKUNEGARA essentially involves five beliefs?"a united nation, a democratic, a just, a
liberal, and a progressive society"?and five principles?"Belief in God, loyalty to King and
country, upholding the constitution, the rule of law, good behaviour and morality"?see James
Morgan in "Far Eastern Economic Review", 12 September, 1970, p. 5.
15 Malaysia: Official Year Book 1969 (Acting Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1971), p. 1.
16 "Singapore Herald", 18 May, 1971; "Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, 1971".
17 "Malaysia's New Economic Policy" (Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur, 1969), p. 3.
18 Ibid.

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 THE AUSTRALIAN QUARTERLY, DECEMBER, 1971

of such initiatives could not be doubted, there was evidence of widespread,

if muted, resentment at the more restrictive NOC measures. Without suf
ficient consultation with the trade unions, there was a tightening of regula
tions to limit their political agitation and hours of work.19 Potentially
more serious, however, was the near-sighted decision in July to implement
legislation passed in 1968 which called for re-registration of all non
citizens who required work permits. This served only to highlight the
dependence of the rubber plantation economy on non-Malays, many of
whom were non-citizens, either through apathy or ignorance.20 They were,
in fact, irreplaceable.
Apart from the perils of unemployment, there was an equally vital
lesson drawn from the May disturbances?the need to remove what was
termed an identification between economic function and race. The Malay
farmers' high indebtedness, low productivity and traditional way of life
which places stress on religion, sport and social activities as much as on
economic pursuits?all have served to widen the gap between rural and
urban dweller in Malaysia, as well as to increase Malay resentment. The
government has now affirmed that Malaysia's racial problems cannot be
resolved if economic differences between the two major communities are
not narrowed.21 Malaysia's former alien rulers, the British, have received
a major share of the blame for the current imbalances. Tun Razak accused
the British of placing the people in compartments?the Malays as farmers,
the Indians as estate workers, the Chinese as mine-workers and business
men.22 And while there is inherent reasonableness in the proposition that
Malay poverty should be alleviated and Malay business enterprise en
couraged, there have been occasional hints of something ominously less
than rationality in government pronouncements, as for example, when Tan
Sri Ghazali expressed the fear that the Malays and other natives might
"one day" decide to "replace" the present business community if they
were not granted proportionate industrial opportunities. "To those natives
in their own country who have no hope, survival means merely existence,
then to some, death may mean victory."23
During 1969, the NOC circulated employers with requests that their
labour forces reflect "the multi-racial composition of the population"; and
the NOC established a $50 million National Corporation and a Sino
Malay Economic Advisory Committee likewise to intensify the amount of
Malay participation, especially in the marketing of products from cottage
industries. However, the Alliance's long-term response to the problems
19 "The Bulletin", 6 December, 1969; "Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbook, 1970", pp.
191-192.
20 "The Bulletin", op. cit.
21 Enche Ghafar bin Baba, Minister for National and Rural Development, in "Straits Times",
14 April, 1971.
22 "Singapore Herald", 17 May, 1971.
23 "Democracy: the realities Malaysians must face". Speech by the Hon'ble Minister with
Special Functions and Minister for Information, Tan Sri Dato Muhammed Ghazali bin Shane,
at the Dewan Negara (Senate) on 5 March, 1971. (Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur,
1971.) Pp. 15-16.

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MALAYSIA SINCE 1969

of unemployment and "racial economic imbalance", as well as to over

all economic growth, was embodied in the Second Development Plan, intro
duced into Malaysia's now-recalled parliament during July, 1971. Tun
Razak spoke optimistically about his government's intention to "restructure"
Malaysian society through the modernisation of rural life, the rapid but
balanced growth of urban activities, and the formation of a Malay business
and industrial community.24 No longer, Tan Sri Ghazali declared, would
there be a "myopic attitude of laissez faire", but instead the distribution of
the fruits of economic expansion would henceforth be "controlled".25
Essentially, the Plan envisages over five years an annual growth rate in
GNP terms of 6.5%; an increase of 20% in per capita income to $M1,300;*
and the creation of 600,000 jobs in order to reduce the rate of unem
ployment to 7% of the work force throughout all Malaysia. Special assist
ance will be granted to the rural Malay populace in the form of opening
up vast fresh acres of land to agricultural development, and the establish
ment of new rural industries. It is intended, however, that Malays must
move to a much greater degree than previously into the urban sector of
the economy,26 and indeed it is specified that 30% of the ownership and
management of all levels of commerce and industry must be in Malay
hands within twenty years.27 To facilitate this, the government will itself
establish manufacturing industries and factories in smaller towns, new
towns and selected growth areas. Facilities for the training of Malay youths
in managerial and technical skills will be expanded. It was hardly sur
prising that one external observer should describe the Plan as a "Blueprint
for Malay Involvement".28

VI.
It is obvious that a primary vehicle available to the Malaysian government
for establishing communication and "common-ness" amongst the commu
nities lies in education. Yet, given the primordial desire of the various
communities to retain an awareness of their cultures and traditions through
separate, distinctive education systems, the goals and methods of education
policy have been among Malaysia's most emotive and contentious issues.
A key ingredient in the contention has been the degree to which Malay
or Bahasa Malaysia could literally (as well as formally) be taken
as Malaysia's national language. In 1969 many ambiguities plagued
Malaysia's education system.29 After May, the government sought to
remove some of the ambiguities, principally by tightening the Bahasa
24 "The Bulletin", 19 June, 1971; "The Economist" (London), 26 June, 1971.
25 "Democracy: the realities Malaysians must face", op. cit., p. 12.
* $M1 = $A.0.29 as at 21 October, 1971.
26 Ibid, p. 14.
27 Far Eastern Economic Review", 31 July, 1971, p. 23.
28 Ibid.
29 The Aziz Commission Report revealed wide variety in teaching qualifications and disparity in
levels of remuneration, as well as the existence of some 55 different teachers' unions! See "Far
Eastern Economic Review Yearbook 1970", p. 192.

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 THE AUSTRALIAN QUARTERLY, DECEMBER, 1971

Malaysia requirements throughout the syllabus. It sought, too, to expand

educational facilities, principally by the establishment of three new
universities.
For a country which has relied heavily on overseas scholarships and
universities for the education of its professional elite, this domestic expan
sion was clearly a boon. Whether the tightening of Bahasa Malaysia re
quirements would prove a further panacea was another question?how
many school teachers were themselves proficient in the national language?
How effective was Malay education in science? How adequate was Malay
as a language of science and technology? Finally, there is much stubborn
resistance to the whole concept of a single Malay-medium education
system. The president of the Malaysian Chinese School Teachers' Union,
Sim Mow Yu, urged the government in April, 1971, to permit the various
races to have their own primary and secondary schools, and even univer
sities, so that people of all races could learn their own cultures and tradi
tions. He spoke from the heart but against the tide, and it was subse
quently reported that Mr. Sim had been arrested for violation of the
Sedition Act.30

VII.

The attitude of many Chinese teachers towards education policy serves to

illustrate the point that a key determinant for the success of Tun Razak's
"new realism" is whether it receives the active support or at least bene
volent acquiescence of the non-Malay population. The dramatic support
which non-Malay opposition parties received in the 1969 elections indi
cated the profound dissatisfaction with previous Alliance policies among
the Chinese and Indian communities. Ensuing strife served to increase
their sense of alienation from the existing power structure. With the tem
porary withdrawal of the battered MCA from the Cabinet, it seemed that
Malaysia would have an almost totally Malay administration, and though
MCA did return to the Cabinet, their initial functions were circum
scribed and nebulous.31 Suppression of political activity and detention of
several leading Opposition figures rendered pyrrhic the Opposition electoral
triumphs.
These considerations led several prominant Chinese leaders to call on
their community to unite and "show we are not a weak community".32
The possibility of a Chinese Unity Movement was canvassed widely and
attracted both attention and support. UMNO leaders, however, reacted
suspiciously. Dato Syed Nasir, Vice-President of UMNO, apparently ex
pressed the view of the Alliance when he declared that if the leaders of
the Movement were sincere and "really want good-will", they should fight
30 "The Mirror" (Singapore), 26 April, 1971.
31 MCA leaders were described as Ministers with Special Functions.
32 Sam Ah Chow, chairman of the Chinese National Unity organising committee, cited in "The
Mirror", 3 May, 1971

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MALAYSIA SINCE 1969

through MCA and other political parties.33 Indeed, there were indications
that MCA, if weakened, was not completely moribund. In the May, 1971,
by-election for the seat of Betok in Johore, the MCA candidate won a
convincing victory over his DAP opponent. However, his success followed
an especially energetic campaign in a state which even in 1969 rendered
solid support to the Alliance. Some younger MCA politicians cautioned
against regarding the Betok result as a reliable precedent and called for
"fresh ideas" amongst the MCA leaders.34
UMNO leaders have tacitly admitted that MCA now lacks the political
credentials to posture as the sole legitimate spokesman of Malaysia's
Chinese. Tun Razak has sought to recruit new Chinese politicians to his
Cabinet, a search which did not bear fruit until the Sarawak United
Peoples' Party (SUPP), an erstwhile opponent, announced its support for
the Alliance in Sarawak. Shortly afterwards, Razak announced the appoint
ment of Dato Ong Kee Hui, the SUPP leader, to a Federal Cabinet posi
tion.35 Yet the value of a Sarawakian party in federal politics is clearly
limited, and if the present pattern of Alliance politics persists, a revitalised
MCA which not only obtains popular concessions from UMNO but is seen
to obtain such concessions, is essential. Given the intensity of Malay
pressure on Tun Razak, this will be a difficult task.
For alienated, militant Chinese youth there remains the potential of
communist terrorism. After May, 1969, Kuala Lumpur was agog with
rumours that thousands of Chinese had disappeared into the jungle to
form guerilla bands, and while these rumours were exaggerated, directors
of Malaysia's anti-insurgency programme expressed fears that residual
terrorists operating along the Thai and Indonesian borders would seek to
exploit the continuing communal crisis. A leading newspaper could point
out in November, 1970, that "communist guerillas, Muslim separatists,
and plain bandits have the police and army at full stretch".36 And while
current insurgent activities seem readily containable by government forces,
the fear that what has been a nuisance may become a threat has clearly
provided one of the principal stimuli for a re-orientation of Malaysian
diplomacy.
VIII.
The accelerated British withdrawal from bases east of Suez after 1966
and Australia's reluctance to assume a commensurate posture served notice
on Malaysia's policy-makers that their traditional dependence on Common
wealth powers was not likely to be sufficient to ensure their country's
survival in the event of armed hostility from another country or serious
internal subversion. Already before 1969 the Malaysian government had
sought in greater regional collaboration a possible complement to the
33 "The Mirror", 17 May, 1971.
34 "Singapore Herald", 17 May, 1971.
35 James Morgan, "Welcome Stranger", "Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 December, 1970.
36 "Straits Times", 12 November, 1970; editorial on "Border War 'Crisis' ".

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 THE AUSTRALIAN QUARTERLY, DECEMBER, 1971

declining British interest, and Malaysia proved one of the more enthusiastic
supporters of ASEAN and ASP AC. It remains, however, that the May
disturbances and the reserved attitude of the Commonwealth powers towards
them, prompted a renewed burst of regional fence-mending, especially
towards Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Moreover, there were
signs that Malaysia was formally seeking full international acceptance as
a completely "non-aligned" state. One was a plea for the neutralization of
South-east Asia guaranteed by the super powers; the other a marked soften
ing of Malaysia's attitude towards the Peoples' Republic of China.37 The
latter has taken the form of calls for Peking's admission to the United
Nations, and a strengthening of trade and cultural relations. Alliance
leaders readily admit that their fresh approach is permeated with ambiguities
and difficulties, but they feel external uncertainty and internal unrest give
them little choice.38 Tun Razak indicated in September, 1970, that his
country "must move with the times in her foreign policy and extend her
friendship to all countries without siding with any particular bloc. We
are entering a new chapter in our history. Malaysia's future aims are
going to be different from now on".39 Still, Malaysia has not yet achieved
a reliable detente with Peking. The Maoist government has never recog
nized the legitimacy of the Alliance government, nor even the territorial
integrity of Malaysia itself. In these respects, Malaysian leaders have few
illusions. In July, 1971, Tun Razak told parliament that the question of
diplomatic relations with China "hinge on three principles?peaceful co
existence; recognition of Malaysia's independence and sovereignty; and
non-interference in Malaysia's internal affairs".40 It is not certain, of
course, how rigidly Malaysia will be able to enforce these principles.

IX.

On the eve of Malayan independence in August, 1957, the departing British

High Commissioner, Sir Donald MacGillvray, included in his good-will
message to Malaya's population the Malay saying, "a rope of three strands
is not easily parted".*i Almost fifteen years later, the task for Tun Razak
and his colleagues has been to weave the three strands into a rope of tough
and resilient fibre. The hopes of the moderate, technologically-oriented
Malay leadership clearly rest on the practice of "disciplined democracy",42
the Second Development Plan, and on skilful, non-aligned diplomacy. The
announcement of the Plan, together with some effective "grass-roots"
politicking, has contributed to a restoration of Malay confidence in UMNO,
37 Tan Sri Ghazali, in "Foreign Affairs Malaysia" (External Information Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Kuala Lumpur), June 1970, pp. 35-37
38 Tan Sri Ghazali in "Straits Times", 24 March, 1971.
39 Cited in "The Bulletin", 3 October, 1970.
40 "The Mirror", 19 July, 1971.
41 "Sydney Morning Herald", 5 August, 1957.
42 Dato Sir Clough Thuraisingham, cited in "Malaysian Digest" (Department of Information,
Kuala Lumpur), 15 March, 1971, p. 3.

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MALAYSIA SINCE 1969

and since the principal concern of the government since 13 May, 1969,
has been to assuage Malay sensitivities, this is to be expected. However,
the process of altering Malay cultural values and orientation towards
economic pursuits is a slow and hazardous one. Moreover, not all of
Malaysia's poor or handicapped are Malays. Voting in 1969 indicated that
a large proportion of Malaysia's Chinese and Indians not only resented
"pro-Malay" policies, but also the politics of wealth and elitism symbolized
by MCA and MIC. Tun Razak has repeatedly asserted that plans to assist
the Malays to participate in commerce will not be made at the expense
of the other communities.43 While it may be the case that the injection
of increased wealth into the rural Malay community will indirectly benefit
non-Malay businessmen as well, the danger remains that Chinese and
Indians will feel neglected or discriminated against in the rush of Malay
development. There remains, too, the urgent need to accommodate rational
non-Malay political aspirations?the aspirations of the majority who are
still neither communists, nor subversives, nor "anti-national elements". If
this is not done, the "new realism" may well falter.

43 "Straits Times", 2 February, 1971; "The Mirror", 24 May, 1971.

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