Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Landmark Judgments On Defamation
Landmark Judgments On Defamation
Introduction
The case was named as Ram Jethmalani vs Subramaniam Swamy on 3 January, 2006
AIR 2006 Delhi 300, 126 (2006) DLT 535. This case is in itself eminent because of two
reasons, one that is it is one of the incredible explained judgment, second that it is
between two unprecedented legitimate feathers of India, one of them that is
Subramaniam Swamy an Indian politician, economist and statistician moreover
connected with administrative issues and the other one is Ram Jethmalani a lawyer
and politician. At whatever point offence in India inspected, defamation is something
reliably suggested, in stream of same this case comment is expected to have all
around appreciation of this case which is enunciated by Delhi HC. This suit was given
by the Central Government under Section 3 of Commission of Inquiry Act 1952.
Background
Defendant (Subramaniam Swamy) asserted that the then CM of Tamil Nadu Ms.
Jayalalitha had earlier info of the attack identifying with death of Rajiv Gandhi, and
she had association with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ellam (LTTE), anyway he denied to
unveil the source of data. Petitioner (Ram Jethmalani) drew in as senior advice to
speak to CM. Petitioner cross examined the defendant, in the same, defendant said
something against Mr Jethmalani such that he has two spouses which was not in any
manner applicable anyway he was sorry for the equivalent for harming yet at the
same time stucked with his announcement.
Petitioner asserted that he procures a decent notoriety in India and outside the
nation,
and these- sort of explanations superfluously harms the individual, political and
proficient notoriety of the petitioner and for similar he recorded a suit in High court
of Delhi to get remuneration for the loss of notoriety.
(i) Whether the suit is banned under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
1952?
(ii) Whether the culpable articulations/entries were not distributed by the
defendant?
(iii) Whether the culpable articulations/entries were made in compliance with
common decency ?
(iv) To what measure of harm is the petitioner qualified for recover from the
defendant?
(v) Relief and expenses?
Judgment
It was held by Justice Pradeep Nandrajog that declaration made by respondent was
from the start sight defamatory. It was an occasion of outperforming the advantage
and that without any other individual was held to be verification of noxiousness. The
declaration was very on related with and unessential to the condition, certifiable
malice on some bit of defendant was settled in. This hurt the image of petitioner all
over the place and such case wreck the individual and political notoriety, as LTTE is
restricted affiliation and interfacing the name with it prompts loss of notoriety.
Anyway, such disaster isn't recoverable, said by equity, yet remuneration of Rs 5 lacs
allowed for petitioner and against the defendant, thinking about his calling status
and his cultural position. In the judgment Honorable Justice additionally discussed
numerous hypotheses by methods for which Subramaniam Swami remarks could get
away from the domain of criticism yet each time he contemplated out the
fastidiously why those speculations and cases are not pertinent in this impossible to
the case.
Analysis
I concur with the choice given by Justice Pradeep Nandrajog as the case choice is
effectively coordinated with rule of law with its understandings and points of
reference.
While ordering compensation, it was realized that the petitioner comprises of good
notoriety in all manner and mischief to his expert,individual or political notoriety as
the announcement is ex-facie slanderous if not legitimized must be repaid by
adequate compensation.
A portion of the points of reference and rules which assumed a significant job in
judgment are as per the following:
i. Section - 6 of Commission of Inquiry Act ,1952 limit the data given to the
degree it is inquired as to whether not then the insurance is inaccessible.
ii. Absolute benefit isn't total with regards to being vast, on the off chance that
essential or pertinent, at that point just invulnerability is accessible.
Conclusion
Sections and Act : U/s 500 IPC read with Section 499 of IPC
In October 2018, during the #MeToo movement in India, Priya Ramani an Indian
journalist, writer and editor alleged sexual harassment against former minister of
state for External Affairs M.J Akbar. Vogue India published an article written by Priya
Ramani and the title was “To the Harvey Weinstein of the world”, it was in a form of
an open letter starting with “Dear Male Boss” in which she had described about the
sexual harassment during a job interview in a hotel room when she was 23. But in
that article, Priya Ramani hadn’t mentioned the name of the interviewer. At the time
of #MeToo movement, on Twitter Priya Ramani tweeted and made an allegation of
sexual harassment against former union minister and Journalist M. J Akbar. Priya
Ramani tweeted with a reference to her 2017 Vogue article, starting with “I began
the piece with M.J Akbar story. Never named him because he didn’t “do” anything.
Lots of women have worse stories about this predator- maybe they’ll share”. Soon
after Ramani’s tweets, more women accused Akbar of sexual harassment during his
career as a journalist.
M.J Akbar filed a criminal defamation case against Priya Ramani and he resigned as
minister of state for External Affairs. M.J Akbar accused Priya Ramani of willfully,
deliberately, intentionally, and maliciously defaming him over a completely false
allegation. Akbar sought Priya Ramani under section 499 (defamation) and
punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Delhi’s Patiala house court
granted Priya’s bail against a personal bond and a surety of Rs.10,000. Then, the
defamation charge was framed against her, to which she was proven not guilty. Over
the course of two years, the argument went on at the Rose Avenue court before an
Additional chief Metropolitan magistrate.
Judgment
On 17 February, 2021 Delhi court acquitted journalist Priya Ramani in former union
minister M.J Akbar’s defamation case against her and said that a woman has the
right to voice her grievance even after several years. Referring to the great
‘RAMAYANA’ and ‘MAHABHARATA’ in its judgement, the court said that these
ancient epics were written to show the importance of dignity of a woman and its
very shameful that these types of incidents are still happening in our societies.
Most women do not talk about the sexual harassment due to a lot of reasons.
Sometimes the victim does not understand what is happening to her and what she
should do. Despite going through extreme cruelty, they chose to stay quiet, the court
said.
The court accepted the fact that M.J Akbar was not a man of stellar reputation and
pointed that the right to reputation cannot be protected at the cost of the right to
life and dignity of a woman.
So, recently in the judgement of M.J Akbar v. Priya Ramani the court said that:
· Even a man of social status can be a sexual harasser.
· The right of reputation cannot be protected at the cost of right to life and dignity of
women.
· The women have a right to put her grievance at any platform of her choice and
even after decades.
Conclusion
The judgment tries to persuade society to understand that a victim may not speak up
for years because of many reasons like societal pressure, mental trauma and often
being afraid of disbelieved. And highlighted the point that a woman has all the right
to speak up about the abuse, even after decades.
As we know that media and social media are sources of information concerning
crime and sexual assault for the majority of the public. The media can help to create
a greater understanding of what sexual assault is and why it is intolerable. That is the
reason why survivors select social media to share their allegations as a form of self-
defense.
Priya Ramani case is a huge success for all the # MeToo Movement survivors and
hopefully this will restrict the powerful men from using the defamation law to
silence victims. As the court also said that a woman has all the right to speak up
about the sexual harassment even after decades. This judgement will really help to
make the society understand about how sexual harassment is completely unlawful
and unacceptable.
This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of
Punjab by which a Criminal Revision filed against an appellate Order of the
Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana confirming the appellant's conviction and
sentence was dismissed in limit.
The facts giving rise to the appeal lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant was
prosecuted on a complaint filed by Mst. Ram Rakhi of the offence of defamation
under Sec. 500, 1. P. C. The appellant and Mst. Ram Rakhi were neighbours.
The defamatory matter was contained in a communication addressed by the
appellant who is a member of the police force to the District Panchayat Office,
Ludhiana. In this "application" the appellant alleged that the complainant was a
woman of loose character who was having illicit connection with goondas, her
paramours coming to her frequently at nights and that her immoral activities
reflected badly on the locality in which the appellant lived. There is no doubt that
this was grossly defamatory of the complainant. The defence of the appellant
substantially was that in substance the allegations were true and that he was
entitled to make this application to the Panchayat in order to seek the assistance of
that body for getting the complainant out of the locality and for this purpose he
relied upon the last paragraph of the application which ran:
"Petty problems like this can be easily solved by the village Panchayat instead of
referring the case to the Court. It is therefore requested that the Panchayat of village
Sanghol (P. O. Sanghol) district Ludhiana may kindly be asked to take suitable action
to end this prostitution adda, after getting the house in which Shadi (father of the
complainant) is residing at present, vacated from him."
The learned Magistrate considered a large volume of evidence that was led as
regards the plea of justification as well as of the qualified privilege within exceptions
8 and 9 of S. 499 I.P.C., and rejecting the defence, convicted the appellant of the
offence charged and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six
months. The appellant filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Additional
Sessions judge and he recorded;
"I come to the conclusion that accused Kanwal Lal was rightly convicted and
sentenced by the Trial Court. The offence against him is fully established, he
deserves no mercy. He was employed in the office of the Inspection General Police,
Punjab Chandigarh and he tried to use his office which he was holding simply to
over-awe the poor complainant and her parents, just to get the possession of his
house from them. The quantum of sentence passed against the accused appears to
be correct in view of his first offence and youthful age."
It was the revision filed against this judgment that was dismissed in limit by the High
Court.
There being no dispute about the publication or of the published matter being
defamatory being of a character falling within Sec. 499 I.P.C., the only argument that
was addressed before us was based upon the case falling within Exceptions 8 and 9
to Sec. 499, I.P.C. Exception 8 runs in these terms :
"It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any
of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-
matter of accusation.
In order to establish a defence under this exception the accused would have to prove
that the person to whom the complaint was made had lawful authority over the
person complained against, in respect of the subject-matter of the accusation. If the
District Panchayat Officer or the Panchayat had such lawful authority, the last
paragraph of the offending communication would have justified such a plea. But
there is no basis at all for this argument in view of the clear provisions of the Punjab
Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, under which statute alone Panchayats have jurisdiction.
Chapter IV of that Act deals with the Criminal jurisdiction of the Panchayat. Section
38 with which that Chapter opens enacts:
"The criminal jurisdiction of a Gram Panchayat shall be confined to the trial of
offences specified in Schedule IA."
Prostitution is not an offence under the Indian Penal Code and the keeping of a
disorderly or bawdy house is not an offence within Schedule 1 A to which offences
alone the criminal jurisdiction of Panchayats extends. If this were not sufficient to
negative any defence based upon Exception 8, reference may be made to Sec. 42 of
the Gram Panchayat Act which by its 1st sub-section enacts:
"Subject to the provisions of sub.s. (3) no panchayat shall take cognizance of any
offence under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in which either the complainant or the
accused is a public servant.
So even if the complaint should be taken to be a complaint of a public- nuisance it
was doubly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Panchayat since the appellant was a
public servant. The defence based on Exception 8 must therefore fail.
Nor is there more substance in the invocation of the 9th exception. That exception
runs:
"It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided
that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the
person making it, or of any other person, or of the public good."
Even if good faith be taken to have been established, the imputation has to be made
for the protection of the interest of the person making it. Learned Counsel suggested
that the terms of the provision were satisfied since the appellant made the
accusation to protect his own interest. That is certainly not the meaning of the
exception. It posits that the person to whom the communication is made has an
interest in protecting the person making the accusation. In other words, besides the
bona fides of the person making the imputation, the person to whom the imputation
is conveyed must have a common interest with the person making it which is served
by the communication. This exception merely reproduces the principle laid down by
Lord Campbell, C. J., in Harrison v. Bush (1).
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged,
if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains
criminatory matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and
actionable."
The point of difference between exceptions, 8 and 9 is that whereas in the former
the person to whom the complaint is made must have lawful authority to deal with
the subject matter of the complaint and take proceedings against that person, there
is no such requirement in exception 9 where it is sufficient if a communication is
made to a person for the protection of one's own interest in which the other also has
an interest. This is clearly brought out by the illustra- tions to the exception.
It cannot be seriously suggested that the communication now in question satisfies
this test.
The appellant was therefore properly convicted of the offence and nothing was said
about the sentence. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
It is quite apparent that what the accused had published in its newspaper was an
accurate and true report of the proceedings of the Assembly. Involvement of the
respondent was disclosed by the preliminary enquiry made by the Government. If
the accused bona fide believing the version of the Minister to be true published the
report in good faith it cannot be said that they intended to harm the reputation of
the complainant.
It was a report in respect of public conduct of public servants who were entrusted
with public funds intended to be used for public good. Thus the facts and
circumstances of the case disclose that the news items was published for public
good. All these aspects have been overlooked by the High Court.
The Supreme Court allowed this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court
and restore the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.