C O N T E M P O R A R Y D E V E L O P M E N T S A N D D Y N A M IC S

E d ite d b y
G h u la m A li
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

This
T h is b book
o o k analyses
a n a ly s e s P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s foreign
f o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y anda n d external
e x t e r n a l relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w ith a a focus
fo c u s
on
o n c o n t e m p o r a r y d e v e l o p m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e i m p a c t o f t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t of
contemporary developments, including the impact of the new government of
Prime
P rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r Imran
Im ra n K Khan,h a n , theth e p powerful
o w e r f u l military,
m i l i t a r y , and
a n d the
t h e “middle
“ m id d le p power”
o w e f ’ status.
s ta tu s .
Structured
S t r u c t u r e d in i n ttwo
wo p parts
a rts – - Foundation
F o u n d a t i o n and a n d Operationalization
O p e r a tio n a liz a tio n – - tthe he b book
ook
provides a broad overview of Pakistan’s foreign policy and addresses
p r o v i d e s a b r o a d o v e r v i e w o f P a k i s t a n ’s f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n d a d d r e s s e s s p e c i f i c specific
foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y choices.
c h o i c e s . Contributors
C o n t r i b u t o r s explore
e x p l o r e issues
i s s u e s such
s u c h as as P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s middle
m id d le
power
p o w e r s t a t u s f r o m a t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , I m r a n K h a n ’ s fforeign
status from a theoretical perspective, Imran Khan’s o r e i g n policy,
p o lic y ,
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e la tio n s w with i t h Shanghai
S h a n g h a i Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n Organization
O r g a n i z a t i o n (SCO), ( S C O ) , tthe h e EU,EU,
and
and P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s evolving
e v o l v i n g Indian
I n d i a n Ocean
O c e a n strategy.
s t r a t e g y . Based
B a s e d on o n in-depth
i n - d e p t h interviews
in te r v ie w s w with
ith
Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i scholars,
s c h o la rs, p politicians,
o l i t i c i a n s , and
a n d diplomats,
d i p l o m a t s , tthe he b book
o o k offers
o ffe rs a a timely
tim e ly p perspective
e r s p e c tiv e
on
o n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o r e i g n ppolicy.
o lic y .
The book
T h e b o o k w ill b will bee ofo f interest
i n t e r e s t to
t o academics
a c a d e m ic s w working
o r k i n g on o n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , South
S o u t h Asian
A s ia n
Politics, Indian Ocean Studies, Security and Conflict
P o litic s , I n d ia n O c e a n S tu d ie s , S e c u rity a n d C o n f lic t S tu d ie s , I n te r n a tio n a l Studies, International
Relations
R e l a t i o n s and
and F Foreign
o r e ig n P Policy,
o l i c y , and
a n d Asian
A s i a n Studies.
S tu d ie s.

Ghulam Ali is i s Associate

A s s o c i a t e Professor
P r o f e s s o r at
a t School
S c h o o l of Marxism,
of M a r x i s m , Department
D e p a r t m e n t of
o f Political
P o litic a l
Science,
S c i e n c e , S i c h u a n U n i v e r s i t y o f S c i e n c e a n d E n g i n e e r i n g , Z i g o n g , P R China.
Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, PR Hee
C h in a . H
is
i s tthe
h e author
a u t h o r of
o f China–Pakistan
KJIHGFEDCBA
C h in a -P a k ista n R Relations: A HHistorical
e la tio n s : A n a l y s i s (2017)
Analysis
is to r ic a l A ( 2 0 1 7 ) and
and
co-editor
c o - e d i t o r of
of P Perspectives
e r s p e c t i v e s on
o n Contemporary
C o n te m p o r a r y P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Governance,
G overnance, D Development
e v e lo p m e n t
and
and E n v i r o n m e n t (Routledge,
Environment ( R o u t l e d g e , 2020).
2 0 2 0 ).
Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics

24 Parliaments in South Asia

India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
Nizam Ahmed

25 Pakistan’s Security and the India-US Strategic Partnership

Nuclear Politics & National Security
Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari

26 Pakistan’s National Security Approach and Post-Cold War Security

Uneasy Co-existence
Arshad Ali

27 Political Theory and South Asian Counter-Narratives

Maidul Islam

28 Islam and Democracy in the Maldives

Zahir Azim

29 Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies

Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska

30 Human Rights Violations in Kashmir

Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska

31 Law and Conflict Resolution in Kashmir

Piotr Balcerowicz and Agnieszka Kuszewska

32 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

Contemporary Developments and Dynamics
Edited by Ghulam Ali

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/

asianstudies/series/RSSAP
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
Contemporary Developments
and Dynamics

Edited by Ghulam Ali

RoutledgeZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
T a y lo r & F ra n c is G ro u p

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First
F i r s t ppublished
u b l i s h e d 2023
2023
by
b y Routledge
R o u t le d g e
44 Park
P a r k Square,
S q u a r e , Milton
M i l t o n Park,
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4R N

and
and b byy Routledge
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Routledge
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i s an
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i m p r i n t of
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t h e Taylor
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business
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©
© 2023
2 0 2 3 selection
s e l e c t i o n and
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e d i t o r ia l m Ghulam
a tte r , G h u l a m Ali;
A l i ; individual
i n d i v id u a l cchapters,
h a p t e r s , tthe
he
contributors
c o n trib u to rs

The
T h e right
r i g h t of
o f Ghulam
G h u l a m Ali
A l i ttoo bbee identified
i d e n t i f i e d as
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1988.

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ook m maya y bbe e reprinted
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known
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Library
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Names:
N a m e s : Ali, A li, G Ghulam
h u l a m (Professor),
( P r o f e s s o r ) , editor.
e d ito r.
Title:
T i t l e : Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s foreign
f o r e i g n ppolicy
o l i c y :: contemporary
c o n t e m p o r a r y developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s and and
dynamics
d y n a m i c s // Ghulam
G h u l a m Ali, A l i , [editor].
[e d ito r].
Description:
D e s c r i p t i o n : London
London ; N Newe w York,
Y o rk , N NY Y :: Routledge,
R o u t le d g e , Taylor
T a y lo r & & Francis
F ra n c is
Group,
G r o u p , 2022.2 0 2 2 . || Series:
S e r ie s : Routledge
R o u t le d g e Studies
S t u d i e s in
i n South
S o u t h Asian
A s i a n Politics
P o l i t i c s ||
Includes
I n c l u d e s bbibliographical
i b l i o g r a p h i c a l rreferences
e f e r e n c e s anda n d index.
in d e x .
Identifiers:
I d e n t i f i e r s : LCCN
L C C N 2022002531
2 0 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 1 (print)( p r i n t ) || LCCN
L C C N 2022002532
2 0 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 2 (ebook)
( e b o o k ) ||
ISBN
I S B N 9781032169057
9 7 8 1 0 3 2 1 6 9 0 5 7 (hardback)
( h a r d b a c k ) | ISBNI S B N 9781032169071
9 7 8 1 0 3 2 1 6 9 0 7 1 (paperback)
( p a p e r b a c k ) ||
ISBN
I S B N 9781003250920
9 7 8 1 0 0 3 2 5 0 9 2 0 (ebook) (e b o o k )
Subjects:
S u b j e c t s : LCSH:
L C S H : Pakistan—Foreign
P a k i s t a n — F o r e i g n rrelations—1971–
e la tio n s — 1 9 7 1 -
Classification:
C l a s s i f ic a t i o n : LCC
L C C DS383.5.A2
D S 3 8 3 . 5 . A 2 P375 P 3 7 5 2022 2 0 2 2 (print)
( p r i n t ) || LCC
L C C DS383.5.A2
D S 3 8 3 .5 .A 2
(ebook)
( e b o o k ) | DDC D D C 327.5491—dc23/eng/20220405
3 2 7 .5 4 9 1 — d c 2 3 /e n g /2 0 2 2 0 4 0 5
LC
L C record
r e c o r d available
a v a i l a b l e at
a t hhttps://lccn.loc.gov/2022002531
ttp s ://lc c n .lo c .g o v /2 0 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 1
LC
L C ebooke b o o k rrecord
e c o r d available
a v a i l a b l e at
a t https://lccn.loc.gov/2022002532
h ttp s ://lc c n .lo c .g o v /2 0 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 2

ISBN:
I S B N : 978-1-032-16905-7
9 7 8 - 1 - 0 3 2 - 1 6 9 0 5 - 7 (hbk)
(h b k )
ISBN:
I S B N : 978-1-032-16907-1
9 7 8 - 1 - 0 3 2 - 1 6 9 0 7 - 1 (pbk)
(p b k )
ISBN:
I S B N : 978-1-003-25092-0
9 7 8 - 1 - 0 0 3 - 2 5 0 9 2 - 0 (ebk)
(e b k )

DOI:
D O I : 10.4324/9781003250920
1 0 .4 3 2 4 /9 7 8 1 0 0 3 2 5 0 9 2 0

Typeset
T y p e s e t in
i n Times
T im e s N Newe w Roman
R om an
by
b y Apex
A p e x CoVantage,
C o V a n ta g e , LLC
LLC
Contents

List of Figures vii

List of Contributors viii

PART I
Foundation 1

1 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan: An Overview 3

GHULAM ALI

2 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 18

SYED ALI ZIA JAFFERY

3 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 44

SAMEE LASHARI

4 The Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan: An Analysis 63

EJAZ HUSSAIN

PART II
Operationalization 83

5 China–Pakistan: A Decade of Transformation in Diplomacy,

2010–2020 85
GUL-I-HINA SHAHZAD-VAN DER ZWAN AND RABBIYA
KAMAL NAGRA

6 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations: From Uncertainty and

Confrontation to Optimism 99
MUHAMMAD AZAM
vi Contents
7 Indian Factor in Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 111
SHAHZAD AKHTAR AND ARSHAD ALI

8 Geopolitics, the Thucydides Trap, and the China–Pakistan–

India Trilateral 128
RIZWAN ZEB

9 Conservative Administration in Iran and Future of

Pakistan–Iran Relations 142
KHURRAM ABBAS

10 Pakistan–U.S. Relations: Is Past the Prologue? 159

RABIA AKHTAR

11 The Contours of Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 181

ADEELA AHMED

12 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations: A Critique

of Strategic Engagement Plan 193
NAJIMDEEN BAKARE

Index 208
Figures

9.1 A Brief Comparison of Pakistan–Iran Trade During Conservative

and Moderates’ Era (USD in Million) 150
Contributors

Khurram Abbas is Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research Institute. He

has earned his PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies (PCS) from Centre for Inter-
national Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST, Islamabad. His area of interest
includes Geo-politics of Persian Gulf and Arab Peninsula and Foreign Policy of
India and Pakistan towards Middle East. Dr Abbas regularly delivers lectures
in international and national universities as well as participates in national and
international conferences. He has one book chapter, 11 peer-reviewed research
articles and more than hundred newspaper articles to his credit. Dr Abbas
undertakes extensive research and regularly contributes in academic research
journals and national/international dailies. Currently, Dr Abbas is at the review
panel of globally renowned academic journals including Asian Survey and
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3895-0434
Adeela Ahmed is a Ph.D. scholar in International Relations at the University of
Lahore’s School of Integrated Social Sciences (SISS) in Lahore. She did her
MPhil in Defence and Strategic Studies from Quaid e Azam University, Islam-
abad. She is working as Research Fellow with Pakistan Institute of Conflict
and Strategic Studies (PICSS), Islamabad. Her area of research is Pakistan’s
Foreign Policy and Deterrence Stability in South Asia.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2414-5373
Rabia Akhtar is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, Uni-
versity of Lahore. She is an Associate Professor and Director, School of Inte-
grated Social Sciences at University of Lahore. She holds a PhD in Security
Studies from Kansas State University. She is a Fulbright alumna (2010–2015).
Dr Akhtar received her master’s in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad, and her master’s in Political Science from Eastern Illi-
nois University, USA. She has written extensively on South Asian nuclear
security and deterrence dynamics. She is the author of the book titled The
Blind Eye: U.S. Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan from Ford to Clin-
ton. Dr Akhtar is also Editor of Pakistan Politico, Pakistan’s first strategic and
foreign affairs magazine. Dr Akhtar is a member of Prime Minister’s Advisory
 Contributors ix
C o n t r i b u t o r s ZYXWVUTSRQPO
ix

Council
C o u n c i l on
on FForeign
o r e i g n Affairs.
A f f a i r s . Dr
D r Akhtar
A k h t a r is
is aa NNonresident
o n r e s i d e n t Senior Fellow
S e n io r F e l l o w at
a t the
th e
South
S o u t h Asia
A s i a Center,
C e n t e r , Atlantic
A t l a n t i c Council,
C o u n c i l , Washington
W a s h in g to n DDC.C.
ORCID:
O R C I D : 0000-0002-1556-6096
0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 2 -1 5 5 6 -6 0 9 6

Shahzad Akhtar is i s Assistant

A s s i s t a n t Professor
P r o f e s s o r in
i n School
S c h o o l of
o f Integrated
I n t e g r a t e d Social
S o c i a l Sciences
S c ie n c e s
at
a t University
U n i v e r s i t y ofo f Lahore,
L a h o re , L Lahore,
a h o re , P Pakistan.
a k ista n . H Hee holds
h o ld s a a PhD
P h D in i n Politics
P o l i t i c s and
and
International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations
R e l a t i o n s ffrom
r o m tthe
h e University
U n i v e r s i t y of
o f Auckland,
A u c k la n d , N New e w Zealand.
Z e a l a n d . HeHe
researches
r e s e a r c h e s ono n conflict
c o n f l i c t and
a n d tterrorism.
e rro ris m . H Hee has
h a s published
p u b l i s h e d articles
a r t i c l e s in
i n tthe
h e Third
T h ir d
World Q u a r t e r l y and
W o r l d Quarterly and A Asian
s ia n S u n ’e y and
Survey a n d contributed
c o n trib u te d b book
o o k chapters
c h a p t e r s in
i n edited
e d ite d
bbooks.
o o k s.
ORCID:
O R C I D : 0000-0002-5299-1964
0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 2 -5 2 9 9 -1 9 6 4

Arshad Ali is
i s Assistant
A s s i s t a n t Professor
P r o f e s s o r at
a t tthe Department
he D e p a r t m e n t of Political
of P o l i t i c a l Science
S c i e n c e and
and
International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l relations,
r e la tio n s . U University
n i v e r s i t y of
o f Management
M a n a g e m e n t and a n d Technology,
T e c h n o lo g y , L Lahore,
a h o re ,
P a k i s t a n . H e h o l d s a P h D i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s f r o m t h e U n i v e r s i t y of
Pakistan. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of
Otago,
O ta g o , D Dunedin,
u n e d i n , New
N ew Z Zealand.
e a la n d . H Hee is i s the
t h e author
a u t h o r of Pakistan’s
of P a k i s t a n .V N National Secu-
a tio n a l S ecu­
rrity
ity A Approach
p p r o a c h anda n d Post-Cold
P o s t - C o l d War
W a r Security:
S e c u r i t y : Uneasy C o - e x i s t e n c e (London
U n e a s y Co-existence ( L o n d o n and
and
NNewe w York:
Y o rk : R Routledge,
o u t l e d g e , 2021).
2 0 2 1 ).

Ghulam Ali is i s Associate

A s s o c i a t e Professor
P r o f e s s o r at
a t School
S c h o o l of of M Marxism,
a r x i s m , Department
D e p a r t m e n t ofo f Political
P o litic a l
Science,
S c i e n c e , Sichuan
S i c h u a n University
U n i v e r s i t y ofo f Science
S c i e n c e and a n d Engineering,
E n g in e e rin g , Z Zigong,
i g o n g , PR
P R China.
C h in a .
Hee obtained
H o b ta in e d P PhD
h D fromfro m M Monash
o n ash U University,
n i v e r s i t y , Australia,
A u s t r a l i a , and
a n d his
M s postdoc
p o s t d o c from
fro m
Peking
P e k i n g University,
U m v e r s i t y , Beijing.
B e i j i n g . He H e is i s the
t h e author
a u t h o r of o f China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k ista n R Relations:
e la tio n s :
AA Historical
H isto ric a l A n a l y s i s (2017)
Analysis ( 2 0 1 7 ) and
a n d co-editor
c o - e d i t o r ofof P Perspectives
e r s p e c t i v e s on
o n Contemporary
C o n te m p o r a r y
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Governance,
G overnance, D Development
e v e l o p m e n t and and E n v i r o n m e n t (London
Environment ( L o n d o n anda n d New
N e w York:
Y o rk :
Routledge,
R o u t l e d g e , 2020)2 0 2 0 ) and
a n d Crossing
C r o s s i n g thet h e Himalayas:
H im a la y a s : B Buddhist
u d d h i s t Ties,
T ie s , RRegional
e g i o n a l IInte-
n te ­
ggration
r a t i o n and a n d Great-Power
G r e a t- P o w e r R i v a l r y (Singapore:
Rivalry ( S i n g a p o r e : Springer,
S p r i n g e r , 2022).
2 0 2 2 ) . His
H i s articles
a r tic le s
have
h a v e bbeen een p published
u b l i s h e d ini n The
The P Pacific
a c ific R Review,
e v ie w , P Pacific
a c ific F o c u s , and
Focus, a n d IIssues
ssues & & S Stud-
tu d ­
i e s among
ies a m o n g others. o th e rs .
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1803-0905
h t t p s : / / o r c i d .o r g / 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 - 1 8 0 3 - 0 9 0 5

Muhammad Azam is i s Assistant

A s s ista n t P Professor
r o f e s s o r in i n the
th e D Department
e p a r t m e n t of o f Politics
P o l i t i c s and
and
International
I n te rn a tio n a l R e la tio n s , U n iv e r s ity o f S a r g o d h a , P a k is ta n . H e h a s a
Relations, University of Sargodha, Pakistan. He has a PhDP h D in in
International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relations
R e l a t i o n s from
f r o m thet h e International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Islamic
I s l a m i c University,
U n i v e r s i t y , Islamabad.
Is la m a b a d .
HHee wasw a s Visiting
V i s i t i n g Fellow
F e l l o w at a t tthe
h e Gulf
G u l f Research
R e s e a r c h Center
C e n t e r (GRC),
(G R C ), D Dubai,
u b a i , UAE,
U A E , in in
2010.
2 0 1 0 . H e h a s a l s o p r e s e n t e d r e s e a r c h p a p e r s i n s e v e r a l n a t i o n a l a n d interna-
He has also presented research papers in several national and in te r n a ­
ttional
i o n a l conferences.
c o n f e r e n c e s . As As R Research
e s e a r c h Officer,
O f f i c e r , he
h e has
h a s served
s e r v e d at
a t tthe
h e National
N a t i o n a l Assem-
A sse m ­
b l y S e c r e t a r i a t , P a r l i a m e n t H o u s e , I s l a m a b a d , a n d a s R e s e a r c h Analyst
bly Secretariat, Parliament House, Islamabad, and as Research A n a l y s t and and
Associate
A s s o c i a t e Editor
E d i t o r of o f Conflict
C o n f l i c t and
and P Peace
eace S Studies.
tu d ie s. H Hisi s most
m o s t recent
r e c e n t research
re se a rc h
ppaper
a p e r “Provincial
“ P ro v in c ia l F Finance
i n a n c e Commissions
C o m m i s s i o n s in i n the
t h e Punjab:
P u n j a b : Implications
I m p l i c a t i o n s fforo r Gov-
G ov­
ernance and Development” has appeared in Ghulam
e r n a n c e a n d D e v e lo p m e n t” h a s a p p e a r e d i n G h u la m A li a n d E ja z H u s s a i n Ali and Ejaz Hussain
(eds.),
( e d s .) , Perspectives
P e r s p e c t i v e s on o n Contemporary
C o n te m p o r a r y P Pakistan:
a k i s t a n : Governance,
G overnance, D Development
e v e lo p m e n t
a n d E n v i r o n m e n t ( R o u t l e d g e , 2 0 2 0 ) . H e h a s a p p e a r e d i n s e v e r a l T V and
and Environment (Routledge, 2020). He has appeared in several TV a n d radio
r a d io
programmes and has contributed columns to several newspapers
p r o g r a m m e s a n d h a s c o n tr ib u te d c o lu m n s to s e v e r a l n e w s p a p e r s in c lu d in g including
PPakistan
a k i s t a n Observer,
O b s e n ’e r , F Frontier
r o n tie r P o s t , and
Post, a n d Daily
D a i l y Times.
T im e s .
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8818-0311
h ttp s ://o r c id .o r g /0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 2 - 8 8 1 8 - 0 3 1 1
x Contributors
Najimdeen Bakare teaches e a c h e s and a n d also
a l s o heads
tZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA h e a d s tthe
h e Department
D e p a r t m e n t of of P Peace
e a c e anda n d Conflict
C o n f lic t
Studies at the Centre for International Peace & Stability
S tu d ie s a t th e C e n tr e f o r I n te r n a tio n a l P e a c e & S ta b ility ( C I P S ) , N a tio n a l U (CIPS), National Uni-
n i­
v e r s i t y o f S c i e n c e s & T e c h n o l o g y ( N U S T ) , I s l a m a b a d , P a k i s t a n . H i s a r e a s of
versity of Sciences & Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan. His areas of
interest
i n t e r e s t largely
l a r g e l y revolves
r e v o l v e s around
a r o u n d the t h e EU
EU P Politics,
o l i t i c s , global
g lo b a l p politics,
o l i t i c s , African
A f r i c a n Poli-
P o li­
tics,
t i c s , Issues
I s s u e s ofo f European
E u r o p e a n Muslims,
M u s l i m s , Regionalism,
R e g io n a lis m , D Developmental
e v e l o p m e n t a l Studies,S t u d i e s , Theo-
T heo­
ries
r i e s o f I R , M i n o r i t y I s s u e s , a n d ( I s l a m i c a n d W e s t e r n ) P h i l o s o p h y . Najimdeen
of IR, Minority Issues, and (Islamic and Western) Philosophy. N a jim d e e n
is
i s also
a l s o particularly
p a r t i c u l a r l y interested
i n t e r e s t e d ini n tthe
h e dynamics
d y n a m i c s of o f conflict,
c o n f l i c t , and,
a n d , overo v e r ttheh e years,
y e a rs,
he has been investigating the relevance of Islamic peace
h e h a s b e e n in v e s tig a tin g th e r e le v a n c e o f I s la m ic p e a c e p a r a d ig m a s th e w paradigm as the world
o rld
grapples with violent conflicts. Additionally, Najimdeen
g r a p p le s w ith v io le n t c o n f lic ts . A d d itio n a lly , N a jim d e e n h a s e x te n s iv e ly p has extensively pub-
ub­
lished
l i s h e d on o n EU E U politics
p o l i t i c s and
a n d itsi t s ramifications
r a m i f i c a t i o n s for
f o r thet h e diaspora
d i a s p o r a communities
c o m m u n i t i e s across a c ro ss
Europe,
E u r o p e , particularly
p a r t i c u l a r l y ttheh e Muslim
M u s l i m community.
c o m m u n ity .
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3257-9718
h t t p s : / / o r c i d .o r g / 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 3 - 3 2 5 7 - 9 7 1 8

Ejaz Hussain did d i d his

h i s PhD
P h D in i n Political
P o l i t i c a l Science
S c i e n c e ffromro m H Heidelberg
e i d e l b e r g University
U n i v e r s i t y (2010)
(2 0 1 0 )
and
and p postdoc
o s t d o c ffromro m U UC C Berkeley
B e r k e l e y (2017).
( 2 0 1 7 ) . He H e has
h a s authored
a u th o re d M Military
i l i t a r y AAgency,
KJIHGFEDCBA gency, P Poli-
o li­
tics
t i c s and
a n d thet h e State
S t a t e in
in P a k i s t a n (2013)
Pakistan ( 2 0 1 3 ) and a n d coedited
c o e d ite d P Perspectives
e r s p e c t i v e s on o n Contemporary
C o n te m p o ra ry
Pakistan:
P a k i s t a n : Governance,
G overnance, D Development
e v e l o p m e n t and and E n v i r o n m e n t (Routledge,
Environment ( R o u t l e d g e , 2020). 2 0 2 0 ) . In
In

addition,
a d d itio n , h hee hash a s contributed
c o n t r i b u t e d to t o peer-reviewed
p e e r - r e v i e w e d jjournals
o u r n a l s such
s u c h as as A Armed
rm ed F Forces
orces & &
S o c i e t y and
Society a n d Chinese
C h in e s e P Political
o l i t i c a l Science
S c ie n c e R Review.
e v ie w . D Drr Hussain
H u s sa in w was a s Visiting
V i s i t i n g Fellow
F e llo w
at
a t Fudan
F u d a n University
U n i v e r s i t y in i n 2016.
2 0 1 6 . He H e is is D DAAD,A A D , FDDI,F D D I , and a n d Fulbright
F u l b r i g h t fellow.
f e l lo w . More-
M o re­
over,
o v e r , he h e taught
t a u g h t at a t COMSATS
COM SATS U University,
n i v e r s i t y , Islamabad;
I s l a m a b a d ; FC F C College
C o lle g e U University,
n iv e r s ity ,
Lahore;
L a h o r e ; and a n d Shanghai
S h a n g h a i International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies
S t u d i e s University
U n i v e r s i t y (SISU),
( S I S U ) , Shanghai,
S h a n g h a i , China.
C h in a .
Besides,
B e s id e s , h hisi s commentaries
c o m m e n t a r i e s have h a v e appeared
a p p e a r e d in in BBBC B C (Urdu),
(U rd u ), E Express
x p r e s s Tribune,
T r i b u n e , The
The
First
F irst P Post,
o s t , The
T h e Friday
F r i d a y Times,
T i m e s , Global
G l o b a l Times,T i m e s , South
S o u t h China
C h i n a Morning
M o rn in g P Post,
o s t , The
The
News,
N ew s, D Daily
a i l y Times,
T i m e s , Naya
N a y a Daur,D a u r , and a n d CGTN.
C G T N . Currently,
C u r r e n t l y , heh e is i s Associate
A s s o c i a t e Profes-
P ro fe s­
sor,
so r, D Department
e p a r t m e n t of o f Social
S o c i a l Sciences,
S c i e n c e s , Iqra Iq ra U University,
n i v e r s i t y , Islamabad,
I s l a m a b a d , and a n d Invited
In v ite d
Researcher,
R e s e a r c h e r , FudanFudan D Development
e v e l o p m e n t Institute
I n s t i t u t e (FDDI),
(F D D I), F Fudan
udan U University,
n i v e r s i t y , Shanghai.
S h a n g h a i.
ORCID:
O R C I D : 0000-0003-3117-1649
0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 3 -3 1 1 7 -1 6 4 9

Syed Ali Zia

Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
Jaffery is i s Associate
A s so c ia te E Editor
d i t o r of of P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Politico
P o l i t i c o and
and R Research
e s e a r c h Asso-
A sso­
ciate
c i a t e a t t h e C e n t e r f o r S e c u r i t y , S t r a t e g y a n d P o l i c y R e s e a r c h , University
at the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, U n i v e r s i t y ofof
Lahore.
L a h o r e . Ali
A li w was a s Visiting
V i s i t i n g Fellow
F e l l o w at a t tthe
h e Stimson
S t i m s o n Center,
C e n t e r , Washington
W a s h i n g t o n D.C. D . C . Ali
A li
regularly
re g u la rly w writes
r i t e s on
o n strategic
s t r a t e g i c issues
i s s u e s for
f o r national
n a t i o n a l and
a n d international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l publications
p u b lic a tio n s
to
t o i n c l u d e R o u t l e d g e , S o u t h A s i a n V o i c e s , T h e N a t i o n a l Interest,
include Routledge, South Asian Voices, The National In te re s t, D Daily
a i l y Times,
T im e s ,
and
a n d T h e N e w s a m o n g o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s . H i s r e s e a r c h i n t e r e s t s l i e i n the
The News among other publications. His research interests lie in t h e ffields
ie ld s
of
o f nuclear
n u c l e a r deterrence,
d e t e r r e n c e , strategic
s t r a t e g i c stability,
s t a b i l i t y , and
a n d geopolitics.
g e o p o l i t i c s . He
H e is i s teaching
t e a c h i n g under-
u n d e r­
graduate
g r a d u a t e level
l e v e l courses
c o u r s e s on o n foreign
f o r e i g n ppolicy,
o l i c y , national
n a t i o n a l security,
s e c u r i t y , arms
a r m s control
c o n t r o l and
and
disarmament,
d i s a r m a m e n t , and a n d non-proliferation,
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n , since s i n c e 2018.
2018.
ORCID:
O R C I D : 0000-0003-3903-8658
0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 3 -3 9 0 3 -8 6 5 8

Samee Lashari is is aa recipient

r e c i p i e n t ofo f tthe
h e Fulbright
F u l b r i g h t Doctoral
D o c t o r a l Scholarship.
S c h o l a r s h i p . He
H e received
re c e iv e d
his
h i s doctorate
d o c t o r a t e ffromro m N Northern
o r t h e r n Arizona
A r i z o n a University
U n i v e r s i t y in
i n 2017.
2 0 1 7 . Currently,
C u r r e n t l y , he
h e is
is LLec-
ec­
turer,
tu re r, D Department
e p a r t m e n t ofo f Political
P o l i t i c a l Science,
S c i e n c e , South
S o u t h Texas
T e x a s College,
C o l l e g e , Texas,
T exas, U USA.
SA. H Hee
is
i s Visiting
V i s i t i n g Faculty
F a c u l t y Member
M e m b e r at a t Lone
L o n e Star
S t a r College
C o l l e g e and
a n d the
t h e University
U n i v e r s i t y of
o f Texas
T exas
Rio
R i o Grande
G r a n d e Valley.
V a l le y .
ORCID:
O R C I D : 0000-0001-7245-398X
0 0 0 0 -0 0 0 1 -7 2 4 5 -3 9 8 X
 Contributors xi
Rabbiya Kamal Nagra holds a BSc (high honors) in Economics and Political
Science from LUMS. She received a full scholarship to complete her MSc in
Economics from the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing,
China. Her academic excellence and high-quality work led her to be at the top
of her class and in her graduation in 2016. She went on to the corporate world to
work as a top employee at Standard Chartered Bank heading the talent acquisi-
tion team in the Central region from Multan to Swat. Moving back to Pakistan,
she led the China–Pakistan Management Initiative (CPMI) in LUMS and worked
as faculty in LGS University. She has various case studies and publications under
her belt. In 2019, she moved to Chicago and is currently Faculty at DePaul Uni-
versity and is conducting research as part of her thinktank – Poli-C Lab.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8232-3553
Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan is Research Fellow at the International Insti-
tute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, Netherlands, working on the New Silk
Roads programme directed by Dr Richard Griffiths. She is currently working
on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project at the institute while
pursuing her doctoral research in Political Studies programme at the University
of Milan, part of the Network for the Advancement of Social and Political Stud-
ies (NASP) in Italy. Gul-i-Hina’s research is aimed at analysing China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) and its domestic political implications in the partici-
pating BRI countries, focusing on two specific aspects, namely its impact on
the processes of democratization and regime change in the countries involved.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1327-5145
Rizwan Zeb is Associate Professor and Directing Staff Research at the Air War
College Institute Karachi. Prior to joining AWCI, he was Head of the Depart-
ment of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is Associate Editor,
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (Sage). His area of aca-
demic interest includes South Asian Strategic Stability Issues with particular
focus on Pakistan’s Security. He is a former Benjamin Meaker Professor, Insti-
tute of Advanced Studies, University of Bristol, UK; Charles Wallace Visit-
ing Research Fellow, Governance Research Center, Department of Politics,
University of Bristol, UK (2006–07) and Visiting Scholar, South Asia Project,
Foreign Policy Program, Brookings Institution. He was RCSS Mahbub-ul-Haq
Fellow, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. From 2003
to 2010, he was Research Fellow, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad,
where he was dealing with nuclear stability in South Asia. He has taught and
tutored at National Defense University, Quaid-e-Azam University, Air Univer-
sity, Fatima Jinnah University, Murdoch University, and University of West-
ern Australia. He was educated at University of Western Australia, Uppsala
University Sweden, Quaid-e-Azam University, and Gordon College and is the
alumnus of Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Summer workshop
on Defense, Technology and Cooperative Security in South Asia.
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1017-291X
Taylor St Francis
Taylor & Francis CroupZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCB
h ttp y V ta y lo r a n d f r a n c i s .c o m
Part I

Foundation
Taylor St Francis
Taylor & Francis CroupZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCB
h ttp y V ta y lo r a n d f r a n c i s .c o m
1 Foreign Policy of
Contemporary Pakistan
An Overview
Ghulam Ali

Introduction
Foreign policy is a key method through which a state interacts with others to
pursue its interests. A successful foreign policy can bring economic, political,
and strategic gains and can help a state to raise its stature regionally and even
globally. Foreign policy of any state is shaped by various internal and external
factors. Pakistan has pursued complex foreign policy since its independence in
August 1947. The Islamic identity, disputes with India, and the geostrategic loca-
tion played a key role in shaping its foreign policy.
Pakistan was the first modern Muslim state that was created in the name of
Islam. At that time, it was the largest Muslim-populated country and maintained
this status until its dismemberment in 1971.1 This religious identity impacted its
internal and external politics. The bloody partition of the Indian subcontinent
with the British’s hasty departure, leaving behind unresolved territorial disputes
mainly Kashmir, Junagadh, and Sir Creek proved to be permanent sources of ten-
sion between India and Pakistan. Among them, Kashmir proved to be the most
dangerous issue which not only caused wars between the two neighbors but also
became one of the reasons behind the nuclearization of the subcontinent. The
intensity of Indo-Pakistan hostility could be measured from the fact that both
fought their first war within a year of gaining their independence. Now well over
seven decades, Indo-Pakistan relations remained hostile.
For Pakistan, territorial disputes coupled with India’s bigger size, military supe-
riority at least in numbers, occasional claims of the Indian leadership to ultimately
render the 1947 partition undue to merge Pakistan with India, created a deep sense
of insecurity. This, along with Pakistan’s narrow lines of communications and
two wings separated from each other by a thousand miles of Indian territories,
added to its anxiety.2 The “fear” from India dominated the mindset of Pakistani
policy makers throughout the decades and led the country to do a “balancing act”
by seeking support from other powers. There is a consensus among scholars that
the India factors created a lasting impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy and in the
choice of partnerships which it made.3 Thus, the Indian factor has been playing
most important role in Pakistan’s foreign policy since its birth. This volume also
elaborates it.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-2
44 Ghulam
KJIHGFEDCBA
G Ali
h u la m A li

Third,
T h i r d , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c location
lo c a tio n p played
la y e d a a keyk e y roler o l e in i n shaping
s h a p i n g its i t s fforeign
o re ig n
policy.
p o l i c y . P a k i s t a n i s l o c a t e d a t t h e j u n c t u r e o f i m p o r t a n t r e g i o n s o f S o u t h , West,
Pakistan is located at the juncture of important regions of South, W e s t,
4
and
a n d Central
C e n t r a l AsiaA s i a on o n ttheh e oneo n e handh a n d and a n d tthe h e energy-rich
e n e rg y -ric h M Middle
i d d l e EastE a s t on o n thet h e other.
o th e r.4
In the east of Pakistan is India, the second-most populated
I n th e e a s t o f P a k is ta n is I n d ia , th e s e c o n d - m o s t p o p u la te d c o u n try ; in its n o r th is country; in its north is
China
C h in a w withith w world’s
o r l d ’ s largest
la rg e st p population
o p u l a t i o n and and a a p permanent
e r m a n e n t member m e m b e r of of U UNSC;
N S C ; in i n its
its
north-west is Afghanistan that is one of the most troubled
n o r th - w e s t is A f g h a n is ta n th a t is o n e o f th e m o s t tr o u b le d c o u n trie s o f th e w o r ld ; countries of the world;
and
a n d in i n tthe
h e west
w e s t is i s Iran
I r a n which
w h i c h has h a s acrimonious
a c r i m o n i o u s ties tie s w withi t h many
m a n y WesternW e s t e r n capitals,
c a p ita ls,
especially
e s p e c i a l l y w i t h W a s h i n g t o n . I n t h e s o u t h o f P a k i s t a n i s t h e I n d i a n Ocean.
with Washington. In the south of Pakistan is the Indian O c e a n . Paki- P a k i­
stan
s t a n isi s tthe
h e tthird-largest
h i r d - l a r g e s t Indian
I n d i a n Ocean
O c e a n littoral
l i t t o r a l state,
s ta te , w withith a a 1,046-km-long
1 , 0 4 6 - k m - l o n g coastline c o a s tlin e
and
and a a 290,000
2 9 0 ,0 0 0 E Exclusive
x c lu siv e E Economic
c o n o m i c Zone Z o n e (EEZ). ( E E Z ) . It I t isi s ranked
r a n k e d 74th 7 4 t h among
a m o n g the th e
5
142
1 4 2 c o a s t a l s t a t e s o f t h e w o r l d . 5 B e i n g a n I n d i a n O c e a n l i t t o r a l s t a t e a d d e d tto
coastal states of the world. Being an Indian Ocean littoral state added o its
its
strategic
s t r a t e g i c significance.
s i g n i f i c a n c e . The T h e geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c location
l o c a t i o n coupled
c o u p l e d with w i t h tthe h e “middle
“ m i d d l e power” p o w e r”
status
s ta tu s u underlined
n d e r lin e d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s roler o l e in
i n the
t h e region
r e g i o n and a n d drew
d r e w the t h e attention
a t t e n t i o n ofof b bigi g pow-
pow ­
ers
e r s r i g h t f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g . P a k i s t a n ’ s r o l e i n r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l p o l i t i c s during
right from the beginning. Pakistan’s role in regional and global politics d u r in g
the
t h e Cold
C o l d War,
W a r , in i n post-Cold
p o s t - C o l d War, W a r , in in p post-9/11,
o s t - 9 / 1 1 , and a n d in i n the
t h e agea g e of of B Belt
e l t and
a n d RoadR o a d Ini- In i­
tiative (BRI) was largely based on its geostrategic
tia tiv e ( B R I ) w a s la r g e ly b a s e d o n its g e o s tra te g ic lo c a tio n a n d th e m id d le p location and the middle power
ow er
status.
s ta tu s .
Going
G o in g b backa c k to t o theth e p post-independence
o s t-in d e p e n d e n c e p period,
e r i o d , tthe h e United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s and a n d other o th e r
states
s t a t e s d e v e l o p e d r e l a t i o n s w i t h P a k i s t a n a g a i n s t t h e b a c k d r o p o f t h e Cold
developed relations with Pakistan against the backdrop of the C o l d War W ar
which
w h i c h had h a d sharply
s h a r p l y divided
d i v i d e d the t h e world
w o r l d into i n t o two
t w o bblocks.
l o c k s . The T h e US U S policy
p o l i c y makers
m a k e rs
realized
r e a l i z e d that
th a t P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s strategic
s t r a t e g i c location
l o c a t i o n could c o u l d act
a c t as as a a b bulwark
u l w a r k againsta g a i n s t tthe h e so-so-
called
c a l l e d e x p a n s i o n i s m o f c o m m u n i s m ( o f t h e U S S R a n d C h i n a ) t o w a r d t h e warm
expansionism of communism (of the USSR and China) toward the w a rm
waters
w a t e r s of o f tthe
h e Indian
I n d i a n Ocean.
O c e a n . Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , tthe he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s bbrought
ro u g h t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n intoi n t o its
its
anti-communist
a n t i - c o m m u n i s t a l l i a n c e s y s t e m . I n 1 9 5 4 , P a k i s t a n j o i n e d S o u t h e a s t A s i a Treaty
alliance system. In 1954, Pakistan joined Southeast Asia T re a ty
Organization
O r g a n i z a t i o n (SEATO) ( S E A T O ) or or M Manilaa n ila P Pact
a c t to t o bbecome
ecom e a a formal
f o r m a l military
m i l i t a r y ally
a l l y with
w i t h the th e
United States. By the end of the 1950s, the number
U n ite d S ta te s . B y th e e n d o f th e 1 9 5 0 s , th e n u m b e r o f m ilita r y p a c ts s ig n e d w of military pacts signed withith
the
t h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s had h a d reached
r e a c h e d four.
f o u r . Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s jjoining
o i n i n g these
t h e s e defense
d e f e n s e pactsp a c ts b brought
ro u g h t
much-required
m u c h - r e q u i r e d economic e c o n o m i c and a n d military
m i l i t a r y assistance
a s s i s t a n c e to t o tthe
h e country.
c o u n t r y . At A t ttheh e same
s a m e ttime, im e ,
these agreements placed Pakistan in the US sphere
th e s e a g r e e m e n ts p la c e d P a k is ta n in th e U S s p h e r e o f in f lu e n c e a n d e s ta b lis h e dof influence and established
the
th e b base
a s e ofof b bilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship
r e la tio n s h ip w which
h i c h continued
c o n t i n u e d in i n ensuing
e n s u i n g decades
d e c a d e s (this( t h i s is i s dis-
d is­
cussed
c u s s e d i n d e t a i l i n C h a p t e r 1 0 o f t h i s v o l u m e ) . I t w a s u n d e r t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of
in detail in Chapter 10 of this volume). It was under the obligations of
these
t h e s e pacts
p a c t s tthat h a t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n agreed
a g r e e d tto o tthe he U US S demand
d e m a n d to t o establish
e s ta b lis h a a secret
s e c r e t intelli-
in te lli­
gence
g e n c e facility
f a c i l i t y in i n Peshawar
P e s h a w a r ffor o r tthe
he U U-2 - 2 spys p y plane
p l a n e tto o gather
g a t h e r military
m i l i t a r y information
i n f o r m a t i o n of of
the
t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . I n 1 9 6 0 , o n e o f s u c h p l a n s w a s h i t b y t h e S o v i e t d e f e n s e system,
Soviet Union. In 1960, one of such plans was hit by the Soviet defense s y ste m ,
and
a n d theth e p pilot
i l o t of o f thet h e spy
s p y plane
p la n e w was a s captured.
c a p t u r e d . This T h i s angered
a n g e r e d the t h e Soviet
S o v ie t U Union
n i o n whichw h ic h
threatened
t h r e a t e n e d P a k i s t a n o f d i r e c o n s e q u e n c e s . I n t h o s e d a y s , P a k i s t a n o w i n g tto
Pakistan of dire consequences. In those days, Pakistan owing o its
i t s loy-
lo y ­
alty
a l t y was
w a s described
d e s c r i b e d as as b being
e i n g oneo n e of o f Washington’s
W a s h i n g t o n ’s closest c l o s e s t allies
a l l i e s ini n Asia.
A s ia . H Highlight-
ig h lig h t­
ing
i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s commitment
c o m m i t m e n t to t o the
t h e United
U n i t e d States, S ta te s , P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s military
m i l i t a r y ruler
r u l e r General
G e n e ra l
Ayub Khan once
A y u b K h a n o n c e s ta te d : stated:

Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has
h a s openly
o p e n l y and
a n d unequivocally
u n e q u i v o c a l l y cast
c a s t its
i t s lot
l o t with
w i t h tthe
h e West,
W e s t , and
and u unlike
n lik e
several
s e v e r a l o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a r o u n d u s , w e h a v e s h u t o u r s e l v e s o f f a l m o s t com-
other countries around us, we have shut ourselves off almost com ­
pletely
p l e t e l y ffrom
r o m tthe
h e possibility
p o s s i b i l i t y of
o f any
a n y major
m a j o r assistance
a s s i s t a n c e from
f r o m the
t h e Communist
C o m m u n ist
b l o c . W e d o n o t b e l i e v e i n h u n t i n g w i t h t h e h o u n d a n d r u n n i n g with
bloc. We do not believe in hunting with the hound and running w i t h the
t h e hare.
h a re .
6
We wish to follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguous
W e w is h to f o llo w , a n d a re f o llo w in g , a c le a r a n d u n a m b ig u o u s p a th .6 path.
 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 5
The pattern of regional alignment during the 1950s was in a manner in which
Pakistan consolidated an alliance relationship with the United States and West-
ern powers. Pakistan’s relationship with the communist block, especially China
and the USSR, remained limited. On the other hand, China developed closer ties
with India and the USSR. The Sino-Indian relationship during this period was
described as Hindi-Chini bhai bhai (Chinese and Indians are brothers). This pat-
tern of regional alliances existed till the late 1950s when they began to change
format on new lines.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, some interrelated developments led to the
readjustment of regional alliances. China’s relations with its Communist comrade,
the USSR (that was also the main source of techno-military assistance and politi-
cal support to China), as well as with India changed from amity to enmity. For
Sino-Soviet relations, their ideological differences became a source of contention,
while for the Sino-Indian relations, the ill-defined boundary, Tibetan issue, Dalai
Lama and his thousands of followers’ escape to India, and the contest for the role
of regional leadership proved to be the main sources of conflict. This Sino-Indian
hostility culminated at a short but bitter war in 1962, which changed the dynamics
of their relationship permanently. The Sino-Indian hostility also impacted upon
US–Pakistan relationship in some ways.
In the backdrop of the deterioration of Sino-Indian tension, the United States –
then Pakistan’s main source of military hardware – began giving a large-scale eco-
nomic and military assistance to “non-aligned” India. Despite Pakistan’s “protest”
that the assistance could be used against US ally – Pakistan – the aid continued till
the late 1960s.7 The rift in the US–Pakistan relations further widened as President
Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration placed an arms embargo on the subcontinent
before the outbreak of the 1965 war. The embargo, which remained in place until
1975, affected Pakistan severely which had a near-complete dependence on the
United States for arms procurement. India, on the other hand, continued to receive
arms from the USSR, New Delhi’s chief supplier throughout the Cold War. Paki-
stan’s disappointment with the United States led it to review its foreign policy to
expand its foreign policy options by reaching out to communist world than mere
depending exclusively on the West. Under this new approach, Pakistan began to
strengthen its ties with countries from both blocks of the Cold War, with Afro-
Asian nations and the Islamic world.8
An important and an enduring outcome of the reorientation of Pakistan’s for-
eign policy during the 1960s was the strengthening of its relationship with China.
In fact, both Beijing and Islamabad had lost their key allies. This led them to
search for new ones. Both gave a fresh look to their existing ties and found com-
monalities of interests. To further their newly emerging partnership, China and
Pakistan settled their unresolved boundary and signed the border agreement in
March 1963. Leaving behind no territorial dispute ushered in a new era in their
bilateral ties. As a result of this bonhomie, China left its traditional neutrality on
the Indo-Pakistan dispute and started supporting Pakistan. This was evident dur-
ing the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 and 1971 and on the Kashmir issue. The most
important outcome of this partnership was the emergence of Sino-Pakistan defense
6 Ghulam Ali
cooperation. In 1966, China for the first time supplied arms to Pakistan. Even
though Chinese arms were not of high quality, in the face of US arms embargo on
Pakistan, China proved to be an alternative. Since then, Chinese arms to Pakistan
never ceased and became a permanent feature of their bilateral cooperation. At
times, China emerged to be the largest arms supplier to Pakistan.9 The partnership
with China built during the 1960s further strengthened in the following years with
China becoming a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
Another outcome of the review of Pakistan’s foreign policy during the 1960s
was an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. In April 1965, Pakistani
President Ayub Khan made the first ever visit to Moscow by any head of state or
the head of government. Premier Alexei Kosygin termed the visit as “a momen-
tous event in the history of Soviet–Pakistan relations” and expressed the hope that
it would contribute to further strengthening of mutual understanding and good
neighborliness between the two countries.10 As a result of this rapprochement,
the USSR, which had an outright support of India, slightly modified its position
toward the subcontinent and began to play the role of a balancer. This was evi-
dent during the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965. Moscow offered its good
offices to settle post-war issues between India and Pakistan which signed USSR-
brokered Tashkent Declaration in January 1966.
Under the sharply divided world politics, Pakistan–USSR rapprochement was
only short-lived. Before the outbreak of the next Indo-Pakistan war in 1971,
Moscow moved closer to New Delhi. In August 1971, Moscow and New Delhi
signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with a mili-
tary clause, which enabled India to directly intervene in Pakistan’s civil war and
dismember it. The dismemberment changed Pakistan’s geography thus ending its
role in the Bay of Bengal and the Southeast Asia. The debacle of East Pakistan
proved to be the most traumatic event for Pakistan as a nation. As Malik stated,

After the loss of East Pakistan to the Indian forces, Pakistan was not merely
a defeated country; it was a thoroughly demoralized state, whose population
for the first time lost faith in its military’s defensive capability. Pakistanis also
lost a sense of national direction, and confidence in their allies.11

Pakistan’s new leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed Pakistan’s presidency on

20 December 1971 (he later became the Prime Minister and remained so till
July 1977 when his government was toppled in a military coup). Bhutto reviewed
the foreign policy of the country. Instead of relying on a few Western sources,
Bhutto attempted to expand country’s options by strengthening relations with the
Islamic world, the USSR (once again), and the developing world. Immediately
after the 1971 war, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO and few years later from
CENTO too. After leaving US-led military pacts, Islamabad formally joined the
Non-alignment Movement.
Pakistan’s defeat and dismemberment at the hands of India in the 1971 war and
India’s “peaceful” nuclear test 3 years later became the main reasons behind the
development of Pakistan’s nuclear program which was continued by successive
 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 7
military and political leadership. Islamabad’s pursuit for nuclear program emerged
as the major irritant in relations with the United States and various Western capi-
tals. In April 1979, the United States that had already imposed arms sanctions
also cut off economic assistance, except for food assistance. In the backdrop of
punitive US and Western sanctions, China proved to be the main source of arms
supplies and assistance. China also played a role in the development of Pakistan’s
nuclear and missile program.12
Pakistan’s relations with the United States would have further deteriorated had
the Soviet Union not invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979 opened a new chapter of Pakistan–US cooperation. Due to
Pakistan’s strategic location, being the next door neighbor of Afghanistan, Paki-
stan became a crucial state in any strategy to force the Soviets to roll back from
Afghanistan. In the face of US inducement, Pakistan’s military ruler General Zia-
ul-Haq weighed different options. The factors such as the desire to help the neigh-
boring Afghanistan, to get an access to the sophisticated US military hardware,
and to get legitimacy for his military regime led him to join the US alliance against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan emerged as a frontline
state in anti-Soviet collation during the 1980s. With the help of the United States
and Saudi assistance, Pakistan trained anti-Soviet guerilla forces called Mujahi-
deen who were brought from different Islamic countries. It is noteworthy to state
that in a rare policy move, China also joined the anti-Soviet alliance and provided
economic and military assistance which was channeled through Pakistan. Beijing
reportedly sent some Uyghurs to fight along with Mujahideen.13 During the 1980s,
the United States, Pakistani, and Chinese interests converged on Afghanistan.14
Moreover, under the shadows of Afghan War, the United States turned a blind eye
to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan took the advantage and accelerated the
speed of implementation of its program. By the end of Afghan War, Pakistan had
reached or even crossed the nuclear threshold. Pakistan could not have acquired
nuclear capabilities – at least that early – had the United States not overlooked it
in the backdrop of the Afghan War.
The Soviet Union completed its withdrawal process from Afghanistan in 1989,
and the next year the United States imposed arms sanctions on Pakistan over
the pretext of Islamabad’s clandestinely developing nuclear and missile program.
Islamabad remained under US sanctions for well over a decade until the War
on Terror (WoT), which once again revived the two-way relationship. During
the 1990s, Pakistan’s domestic politics overshadowed its foreign policy. Tussle
between the two mainstream political parties, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and
Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) with frequent change of governments with-
out completing their tenure, diverted attention from external relations. Political
disputes among mainstream parties provided the military greater space to control
various aspects of foreign and security policies especially relating to Afghanistan,
India and the Kashmir. On the other hand, the military establishment continued
supporting Mujahideen in Afghanistan even after the Soviet withdrawal. With
Pakistan’s help, Mujahideen turned into the Taliban and established their gov-
ernment in Kabul (1996–2001). Pakistan’s continued support to different Islamic
8 Ghulam Ali
groups
g r o u p s drew d r e w international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l criticism.
c r i t i c i s m . ThisT h i s also a l s o impacted
i m p a c t e d on o n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
re la tio n s
with
w i t h C h i n a w h i c h h a d g r o w i n g c o n c e r n s o v e r t h e s e p a r a t i s t s . China
China which had growing concerns over the separatists. C h i n a reportedly
re p o rte d ly
conveyed
c o n v e y e d its i t s concerns
c o n c e r n s tto o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n over o v e r tthe he p potential
o t e n t i a l nexusnexus b between
e t w e e n Islamist
I s la m is t
groups
g r o u p s a n d s e p a r a t i s t s t h e f i r s t t i m e d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 0 s . O n t h e o t h e r hand,
and separatists the first time during the 1990s. On the other hand, a a tussle
tu s sle
b e t w e e n t h e P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r y a n d t h e g o v e r n m e n t r e s u l t e d i n t h e m i l i t a r y coup
between the Pakistan military and the government resulted in the military c o u p in in
October
O c t o b e r 1999 1 9 9 9 in i n which
w h i c h the t h e then
t h e n ChiefC h i e f of o f Army
A r m y Staff, S t a f f , General
G e n e r a l Pervez
P e rv e z M Musharraf,
u sh a rra f,
toppled
t o p p l e d the t h e elected
e l e c t e d government
g o v e r n m e n t of o f Prime
P rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r Nawaz
N a w a z Sharif, S h a r i f , took
t o o k power
p o w e r in in
his own hands, and ruled the country
h is o w n h a n d s , a n d r u le d th e c o u n tr y u n til 2 0 0 8 . until 2008.
In
I n tthe
he w wakea k e of o f 9/11,
9 /1 1 , P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s military
m i l i t a r y ruler
r u l e r decided
d e c i d e d to t o jjoin
o i n tthe he U US S WoT.
W o T . In In
2004,
2 0 0 4 , the t h e United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s granted
g ra n te d P Pakistan
a k i s t a n tthe he M Major a jo r N Non-NATO
o n - N A T O Ally A l l y (MNNA)
(M N N A )

status.
s t a t u s . This
T h i s onceo n c e again a g a i n revived
r e v i v e d two-way
t w o - w a y relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p with w ith U US S military
m i l i t a r y and a n d eco-
eco­
nomic assistance coming to Pakistan. China was reportedly
n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e c o m i n g t o P a k i s t a n . C h i n a w a s r e p o r t e d l y b e h i n d P a k i s t a n ’s behind Pakistan’s
decision
d e c i s i o n to t o side
s i d e withw i t h the t h e United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s anda n d jjoin o i n the t h e WoT.
W o T . The T h e repercussions
r e p e r c u s s i o n s of of
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s s u p p o r t t o I s l a m i c g r o u p s b e g a n t o m a n i f e s t i n t h e n e w century
support to Islamic groups began to manifest in the new c e n t u r y with w ith
rapid
r a p i d increase
i n c r e a s e of o f terrorism
t e r r o r i s m in i n tthe
h e country.
c o u n t r y . ThisT h i s policy
p o l i c y alsoa lso b became
ecam e a a major
m a j o r source
s o u rc e
of
o f t e n s i o n i n I s l a m a b a d ’ s r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . I n d i a p r o p a g a t e d Paki-
tension in Islamabad’s relations with other countries. India propagated P a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s links
lin k s w with i t h extremist
e x t r e m i s t groups
g r o u p s at a t different
d i f f e r e n t international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l fforums.
o r u m s . In I n part
p a r t due
due
to
t o international
in te rn a tio n a l p pressure
r e s s u r e and a n d in in p part
a r t due
d u e to t o itsi t s own
o w n realization
r e a l i z a t i o n about
a b o u t tthe h e conse-
conse­
quences
q u e n c e s of o f this
t h i s policy,
p o lic y , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n bbannedanned a a number
n u m b e r of o f organizations.
o r g a n i z a t i o n s . From F r o m around a ro u n d
mid-2000s,
m i d - 2 0 0 0 s , m o s t o f P a k i s t a n ’ s t i m e a n d a t t e n t i o n w a s f o c u s e d o n c o m b a t i n g the
most of Pakistan’s time and attention was focused on combating th e
internal
in te rn a l w wavea v e of o f terrorism
t e r r o r i s m and a n d extremism.
e x tre m ism .
In
I n 2008,
2008, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n held h e l d general
g e n e r a l elections,
e l e c t i o n s , and
a n d underu n d e r mounting
m o u n t i n g domestic
d o m e s t i c pressure
p re ssu re
General
G e n e r a l M u s h a r r a f r e s i g n e d f r o m t h e p o s t o f p r e s i d e n t . S i n c e t h e n , power
Musharraf resigned from the post of president. Since then, p o w e r ttransi-
ra n si­
tion
t i o n smoothly
s m o o t h l y took t o o k place
p l a c e among
a m o n g tthree h r e e politically
p o l i t i c a l l y elected
e l e c t e d governments
g o v e r n m e n t s in i n Pakistan.
P a k ista n .
In
I n ttheh e ffollowing
o l l o w i n g decade,d e c a d e , the t h e PPP
P P P and a n d PML-N
P M L - N each e a c h completed
c o m p l e t e d their t h e i r 5-year
5 - y e a r terms.
te rm s.
As
A s a r e s u l t o f J u l y 2 0 1 8 e l e c t i o n s , P T I f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e f o r m e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t at
a result of July 2018 elections, PTI for the first time formed the government at
the
t h e center
c e n t e r anda n d in i n tthree
h re e p provinces.
r o v i n c e s . In I n August
A u g u s t 2018, 2 0 1 8 , tthe h e cricketer-turned
c r ic k e te r - tu r n e d p politician
o litic ia n
Imran
I m r a n KhanK h a n bbecame e c a m e the t h e 22nd
2 2 n d PrimeP rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r of o f thet h e country.
c o u n try .
Against
A g a i n s t t h i s b a c k d r o p , t h i s v o l u m e s t u d i e s c o n t e m p o r a r y dynamics
this backdrop, this volume studies contemporary d y n a m i c s of o f Paki-
P a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . W h i l e t h e r e i s n o e x a c t p o i n t t o d e f i n e c o n t e m p o r a r y , most
foreign policy. While there is no exact point to define contemporary, m o st
contributors
c o n t r i b u t o r s covered
c o v e r e d developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s in i n the
t h e past
p a s t decade
decade – - thet h e 2010s.
2 0 1 0 s . SomeS o m e of o f tthem
hem
also
a l s o provided
p r o v i d e d rich r i c h historical
h i s t o r i c a l bbackground
a c k g r o u n d tto o develop
d e v e l o p the t h e context.
c o n t e x t . This
T h is v volume
o l u m e is is
divided
d i v i d e d into
i n t o ttwowo p parts.
a rts . P Part
a r t II consists
c o n s i s t s of o f four
f o u r chapters
c h a p t e r s (including
( i n c l u d i n g this t h i s chapter)
c h a p t e r ) andand
broadly
b r o a d l y covers
c o v e r s conceptual
c o n c e p t u a l aspects
a s p e c t s of of P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s foreign
f o r e i g n policy.
p o lic y . P Parta r t II
I I consists
c o n s i s t s of
of
eight
e i g h t c h a p t e r s a n d d e a l s w i t h P a k i s t a n ’ s r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s i m m e d i a t e neighbors
chapters and deals with Pakistan’s relations with its immediate n e ig h b o rs
and
a n d some
s o m e othero t h e r important
i m p o r t a n t countries.
c o u n trie s .
I n C h a p t e r 2 , Syed
In Chapter 2, S y e d Ali A l i ZiaZ i a Jaffery
J a f f e r y examined
e x a m i n e d the t h e foreign
f o r e i g n policies
p o l i c i e s ofo f Prime
P rim e M Min-
in ­
ister
i s t e r Imran
Im ra n K Khan han w whoh o assumed
a s s u m e d power p o w e r in i n August
A u g u s t 2018 2 0 1 8 as a s ttheh e 22nd
22nd P Prime
rim e M Minister
in is te r
of
o f ttheh e country.
c o u n t r y . It It w was as a a major
m a j o r change
c h a n g e in in P Pakistani
a k ista n i p politics
o l i t i c s which
w h i c h in i n tthehe p past
a s t was
w as
dominated by two mainstream political parties PPP
d o m in a te d b y tw o m a in s t r e a m p o l it ic a l p a r tie s P P P a n d P M L - N a n d th e m ilita r y . and PML-N and the military.
The
T h e PTI P T I bbroker o k e tthis h i s cycle
c y c l e and a n d fformedo r m e d tthe h e government
g o v e r n m e n t at a t ttheh e center
c e n t e r ffor o r ttheh e first
first
time. Second, Khan did not represent traditional politics,
tim e . S e c o n d , K h a n d id n o t r e p r e s e n t tr a d itio n a l p o litic s , a s h e h a ile d n e ith e r f r o m as he hailed neither from
dynastic
d y n a s tic p politics
o l i t i c s norn o r from
fro m a a ffeudal
e u d a l bbackground.
a c k g ro u n d . H Hee entered
e n t e r e d iinto n to p politics
o l i t i c s to
t o ffight
ig h t
what
w h a t h e t e r m e d a s c o r r u p t a n d “ p o l i t i c a l m a f i a . ” I n t h e r e a l m o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y , he
he termed as corrupt and “political mafia.” In the realm of foreign policy, he
held
h e l d vviews
i e w s different
d i f f e r e n t ffrom r o m othero t h e r politicians.
p o litic ia n s . F For o r example,
e x a m p l e , from f r o m thet h e early
e a r l y days
d a y s of of
 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 9
the WoT, he staunchly opposed the use of force in Afghanistan and stressed upon
the need of a political solution. He was critical of Pakistan’s uneven relationship
with the United States. As a cricket star, he was well known in India and therefore
wanted to develop good neighborly ties with New Delhi.
Jaffery identifies that as Khan assumed office, he faced four key challenges.
First, the simmering, internecine war in Afghanistan compounded Pakistan’s
security problems. India’s continued violence in the India-held Kashmir followed
by revocation of the special status of the valley took the Indo-Pakistan ties to
the lowest ebb. Three, Pakistan’s deepening ties with China undergirded by the
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) brought it right in the middle of
Sino-Indian and Sino-US rivalry. Four, the conflagration between Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf states on the one hand and Iran on the other made it hard for Paki-
stan to balance its relations. Jaffery divided his chapter into five sections. In the
first section, he delves into Khan’s views on Pakistan’s key foreign policy issues
by sifting through his preelection writings, speeches, interviews, his party’s 2018
manifesto, and his victory speech. The second section deals with Pakistan’s rela-
tions with India especially with reference to the Kashmir. The third section evalu-
ates Pakistan’s ties with the United States and Afghanistan. The fourth section
examines Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China. The final section appraises
the instruments of articulation, institutional arrangements, and other outreach
initiatives. Jaffery concludes that Pakistan under Imran Khan has found a new
anchor in economic security, which cannot be achieved without regional connec-
tivity and conflict-resolution. The author also explains government’s engagement
with friends and foes. Pakistan solidified partnerships with countries that helped
it and showed resolve to those harming its interests. The author elaborated Paki-
stan’s response to Indian airspace violation in 2019 and Khan’s encounter with
former President Donald Trump on Twitter. On the whole, the conduct of foreign
policy underwent changes as evidenced by enhanced publicity; the establishment
of interactive conduits; civil–military synchronization; and a newfound interest in
long-term, strategic thinking. Jaffery ends with an optimistic note. The changes
introduced by Khan’s government signal an end of torpor that had long stifled
Pakistan’s ability to maneuver its way so as to advance its vital interests. The
change in Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan from interference to the promotion of
Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process was its vivid example. According to the
author, Khan’s own views have been determining country’s (new) foreign policy
direction.
In Chapter 3, Samee Lashari probes Pakistan’s middle power status. This is a
new topic as hardly any existing study has covered it. Given Pakistan’s role in
regional and, to some extent, international politics, examining Pakistan’s status as
a middle power at the beginning of this book provides a framework for the subse-
quent chapters. Lashari sets two aims of his chapter. One, he provides a theoreti-
cal understanding of the concept of the middle power from its origin till recent
debates. In the absence of a consensus on the definition of the term, he takes the
“self-identification” and “material capabilities” as two key determining factors of
a middle power. Two, he applies this model on Pakistan as a case study. He stated
10 Ghulam Ali
that
th a t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n has h a s deeply
d e e p l y embedded
e m b e d d e d ideological
i d e o l o g i c a l standpoint
s t a n d p o i n t (self-identification),
( s e lf -id e n tif ic a tio n ) ,
plenty
p l e n t y o f n a t u r a l a n d h u m a n r e s o u r c e s , a c o m m u n i c a t i o n network,
of natural and human resources, a communication n e t w o r k , raw r a w industrial
in d u s tria l
b a s e , a n d m i l i t a r y p r o w e s s . T h e s e , t a k e n t o g e t h e r , c o n s t i t u t e d i t s m a t e r i a l capa-
base, and military prowess. These, taken together, constituted its material capa­
bilities
b i l i t i e s which
w h i c h Pakistan
P a k i s t a n (successfully)
( s u c c e s s f u lly ) u used
s e d tto o advance
a d v a n c e its i t s national
n a t i o n a l interests.
i n t e r e s t s . On
O n theth e
basis
b a s i s of o f tthese
h e s e capabilities
c a p a b i l i t i e s and a n d geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c location,
l o c a t i o n , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n fairlyf a i r l y manipulated
m a n ip u la te d
its
i t s external
e x t e r n a l environment.
e n v i r o n m e n t . As A s mentioned
m e n t i o n e d bbefore, e f o r e , during
d u r i n g the t h e ColdC o l d War, W a r, P Pakistan
a k ista n
allied
a l l i e d w i t h W e s t e r n w o r l d a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n m i l i t a r y a g r e e m e n t s w h i l e simulta-
with Western world and participated in military agreements while s im u lta ­
neously
n e o u s l y maintaining
m a i n t a i n i n g closer c lo se r p partnership
a r t n e r s h i p withw i t h China.C h i n a . During
D u r i n g the t h e 1980s,
1 9 8 0 s , it it p partici-
a r tic i­
pated in the hot war of Afghanistan, facilitated
p a te d in th e h o t w a r o f A f g h a n is ta n , f a c ilita te d U S S R d is in te g r a tio n , a n d bUSSR disintegration, and bought
ought
time
t i m e to t o bbuild
u i l d its
i t s nuclear
n u c l e a r weapons.
w e a p o n s . In I n ttheh e 1990s,
1 9 9 0 s , as a s iti t faced
f a c e d economic
e c o n o m i c sanctions,
s a n c tio n s,
it
i t developed
d e v e l o p e d an a n indigenous
i n d i g e n o u s “second
“ s e c o n d defense
d e f e n s e line” l i n e ” of of M Mujahideen
u j a h i d e e n tto o replicate
r e p l i c a t e itsits
experience of Afghanistan in Kashmir to engage
e x p e r ie n c e o f A f g h a n is ta n in K a s h m ir to e n g a g e I n d ia in a lo w s c a le b India in a low scale butu t costly
c o s tly
violence.
v i o l e n c e . In I n ttheh e wakew a k e of o f 9/11,
9 / 1 1 , Pakistan
P a k ista n b became
ecam e a a ffrontline
r o n t l i n e states t a t e in i n tthe
h e US U S WoT. W oT.
As a result, it gained the status of MNNA and reaped
A s a r e s u lt, it g a in e d th e s ta tu s o f M N N A a n d r e a p e d th e b e n e f its o f in c r e a s e d the benefits of increased
military
m i l i t a r y cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n with w i t h the th e U United
n i t e d States.
S t a t e s . Since
S i n c e 2013,
2 0 1 3 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s bbroadened
ro a d e n ed
its multilateral strategic engagement with China
its m u ltila te r a l s tr a te g ic e n g a g e m e n t w ith C h in a b y in itia tin g C P E C to u by initiating CPEC to upgrade
p g ra d e
infrastructure,
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , t o m o d e r n i z e i t s i n d u s t r y a n d a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d t o b e c o m e a consid-
to modernize its industry and agriculture, and to become a c o n s id ­
erably
e r a b l y significant
s ig n if ic a n t p player
l a y e r in i n emerging
e m e r g i n g Sino-American
S i n o - A m e r i c a n great-power g r e a t - p o w e r competition.
c o m p e titio n .
Lashari
L a s h a r i c o n c l u d e s t h a t P a k i s t a n “ i s a M i d d l e P o w e r i n i t s e l f a n d i s r e c o g n i z e d as
concludes that Pakistan “is a Middle Power in itself and is recognized as
such
s u c h bby y the
t h e decision
d e c i s i o n makers
m a k e r s in i n the
t h e most
m o s t powerful
p o w e r f u l countries
c o u n t r i e s around
a r o u n d the th e w world.”
o r ld .”
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s powerful
p o w e r f u l military
m i l i t a r y ruled
r u l e d thet h e country
c o u n t r y for f o r about
a b o u t 30 3 0 yyearse a r s directly
d i r e c t l y andand
remained
r e m a i n e d i n f l u e n t i a l f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g p e r i o d . A m o n g o t h e r a r e a s of
influential for the remaining period. Among other areas o f national
n a tio n a l
policy,
p o l i c y , military
m ilita r y p played
l a y e d an a n important
i m p o r t a n t role r o l e in i n country’s
c o u n t r y ’ s fforeign
o re ig n p policy
o l i c y decision-
d e c isio n ­
making.
m a k i n g . A g a i n s t t h i s b a c k d r o p , E j a z H u s s a i n e x a m i n e s t h e r o l e o f military
Against this backdrop, Ejaz Hussain examines the role of m i l i t a r y in i n the
th e
formulation
f o r m u l a t i o n and a n d operationalization
o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of of P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y in i n Chapter
C h a p t e r 4. 4. H Hee
argues that foreign policy in advanced democracies is
a r g u e s th a t f o r e ig n p o lic y in a d v a n c e d d e m o c r a c ie s is f r a m e d b y d e m o c ra tic in s ti­framed by democratic insti-
tutions
t u t i o n s such s u c h as a s tthe h e Parliament,
P a r l i a m e n t , while w h i l e in i n “defective”
“ d e f e c t i v e ” democracies
d e m o c r a c i e s and a n d autocratic
a u to c r a tic
regimes
r e g i m e s i t i s f r a m e d d u b i o u s l y b y s u p r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s such
it is framed dubiously by supra-parliamentary institutions s u c h as a s mili-
m ili­
tary, bureaucracy, or monarchies. He puts Pakistan in the
ta r y , b u r e a u c r a c y , o r m o n a r c h ie s . H e p u ts P a k is ta n in th e c a te g o r y o f a “ d e f e c tiv e ” category of a “defective”
democracy
d e m o c r a c y in i n which
w h i c h foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y is i s tthough
h o u g h ttheoretically
h e o r e t i c a l l y madem a d e bby y P Parliament
a r l i a m e n t bbut ut
is
i s o p e r a t i o n a l l y i n f l u e n c e d b y s u p r a - p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s . W h i l e his
operationally influenced by supra-parliamentary institutions. While h i s major
m a jo r
focus
f o c u s is i s ono n theth e p post-Musharraf
o s t - M u s h a r r a f period p e r i o d (since
( s i n c e 2008),2 0 0 8 ) , he h e also
a l s o traces
t r a c e s tthe h e roots
r o o t s of of
military’s influence since independence. During the 1950s,
m i li ta r y ’s in f lu e n c e s in c e in d e p e n d e n c e . D u r in g th e 1 9 5 0 s , th e c iv il b u r e a u c r a c y the civil bureaucracy
controlled
c o n tro lle d p politics
o l i t i c s and
a n d fforeign
o re ig n p policy
o lic y w withi t h thet h e military
m i l i t a r y as as a a jjunior
u n i o r partner.
p a r t n e r . On On
the
t h e w h o l e , t h e ( f o r e i g n ) - p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n , n a m e l y , t h e P a r l i a m e n t , was
whole, the (foreign)-policy-making institution, namely, the Parliament, w as
cornered
c o r n e r e d bby y non-elective
n o n - e l e c t i v e institutions
i n s t i t u t i o n s such
s u c h as a s civil
c i v i l bbureaucracy
u r e a u c r a c y and a n d thet h e military
m i l i t a r y in in
the last 75
th e la s t 7 5 y e a rs .years.
Hussain
H u s s a i n stated
s t a t e d that
t h a t security
s e c u r i t y threat
t h r e a t ffrom
r o m India,
I n d i a , right
r i g h t from
f r o m tthe h e bbeginning,
e g i n n i n g , led l e d mil-
m il­
itary to play a greater role not only in security but also
ita r y to p la y a g r e a te r r o le n o t o n ly in s e c u rity b u t a ls o in f o r e ig n p o lic y d e c is io n ­ in foreign policy decision-
making.
m a k i n g . This T h i s was
w a s also a l s o tthe h e main
m a i n reason
re a so n b behind
e h in d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s tiltt i l t ttoward
o w a r d tthe he U United
n ite d
States for military and economic assistance. While
S ta te s f o r m ilita r y a n d e c o n o m ic a s s is ta n c e . W h ile in v o k in g its a g e n c y , G e n e r a linvoking its agency, General
Ayub
A y u b Khan-ledK h a n - l e d militarym i l i t a r y regime
r e g i m e bbecame e c a m e the t h e principal
p r i n c i p a l actor a c t o r since
s i n c e tthe h e ffirst
irs t M Mar- a r­
tial Law imposed in October 1958. On the whole,
tia l L a w im p o s e d in O c to b e r 1 9 5 8 . O n th e w h o le , th e m ilita r y a g e n c y p r e v a ile d the military agency prevailed
in
in P Pakistan
a k i s t a n overo v e r politics,
p o l i t i c s , administration,
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and a n d fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y during
d u r i n g much m u c h of o f the
th e
1960s,
1 9 6 0 s , 1 9 8 0 s , a n d 2 0 0 0 s . I n t h e i n t e r m i t t e n t p e r i o d s , P a k i s t a n t h e o r e t i c a l l y had
1980s, and 2000s. In the intermittent periods, Pakistan theoretically had
 Foreign
F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y of
o f Contemporary Pakistan
C o n te m p o r a r y P a k is ta n 11
11

civilian
c i v i l i a n dispensations.
d i s p e n s a t i o n s . Practically,
P r a c t i c a l l y , however,
h o w e v e r, a a civil
c i v i l government
g o v e r n m e n t either e i t h e r ffumbled
u m b l e d at at
or
o r f a i l e d t o m a r k i t s a g e n c y t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e m i l i t a r y v i s - a - v i s f o r e i g n ppolicy.
failed to mark its agency to counterbalance the military vis-à-vis foreign o lic y .
Consequently,
C o n s e q u e n t l y , tthe h e military
m ilita r y p prevailed
r e v a i l e d over o v e r fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y making
m a k i n g and a n d operation-
o p e r a tio n ­
alization.
a l i z a t i o n . I n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n t e x t , t o o , t h e m i l i t a r y h a s , w h i l e marking
In the contemporary context, too, the military has, while m a r k i n g its its
agency,
a g e n c y , controlled
c o n t r o l l e d tthe h e contours
c o n t o u r s of o f foreign
f o r e i g n policy.
p o lic y .
Hussain
H u s s a i n explained
e x p l a i n e d tthe h e role r o l e of o f military
m i l i t a r y duringd u r i n g threet h r e e periods:
p e r i o d s : Pakistan
P a k ista n P Peo-
eo­
pple’s
l e ’s Party
P a r t y (2008–2013);
( 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 3 ) ; Pakistan P a k ista n M Muslim u s lim L League-N
e a g u e - N (2013–2018);
( 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 8 ) ; and and P Paki-
a k i­
stan
s t a n Tehrek-e-Insaf
T e h r e k - e - I n s a f (2018 ( 2 0 1 8 to t o present).
p r e s e n t ) . Generally,
G e n e r a lly , p political
o l i t i c a l leaders
l e a d e r s ttriedr i e d tto o assert
a sse rt
t h e i r r o l e o n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Z a r d a r i ’s v i s i t t o A f g h a n i s t a n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and
their role on foreign policy. Zardari’s visit to Afghanistan, the United States, and
China
C h i n a reflected
r e f l e c t e d his h i s “interest
“ i n t e r e s t in, i n , ifi f not
n o t control
c o n t r o l over,
o v e r, P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o re ig n p policy.”
o l i c y . ” The
The
KKerry–Lugar-Berman
e r r y - L u g a r - B e r m a n Act A c t passed
p a s s e d bby y thet h e US U S legislature
l e g i s l a t u r e reflected
r e f l e c t e d US US p preference
re fe re n c e
f o r p o l i t i c a l g o v e r n m e n t o v e r m i l i t a r y . T h i s w a s c o n s i d e r e d a s P P P ’ s s u c c e s s over
for political government over military. This was considered as PPP’s success over
military
m i l i t a r y in i n the
t h e domain
d o m a i n of o f foreign
f o r e i g n ppolicy.o lic y . B But u t such
such a a success
s u c c e s s did d i d not n o t long
l o n g lost.
lo s t.
Soon,
S o o n , the th e M Memogate
e m o g a t e scandals c a n d a l in i n which
w h ic h P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s Ambassador
A m b a s s a d o r to t o the
th e U United
n i t e d States
S ta te s
wwrote
r o te a a letter
l e t t e r tot o the
th e U US S president
p r e s i d e n t tto o curtail
c u r t a i l the t h e role
r o l e ofo f military
m i l i t a r y in i n political
p o l i t i c a l affairs,
a ffa irs,
R a y m o n d D a v i s c a s e , S a l a l a a t t a c k s , a n d m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t local
Raymond Davis case, Salala attacks, and military operations against l o c a l extrem-
e x tre m ­
ist
i s t groups
g r o u p s droved ro v e a a wedge
w edge b between
e t w e e n tthe h e PPP P P P and a n d the t h e military.
m ilita r y .
The
T h e P M L - N d u r i n g i t s t h i r d s t i n t ( 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 3 ) initially
PML-N during its third stint (2008–2013) i n i t i a l l y ledl e d bby y Prime
P r i m e Minister
M in is te r
N a w a z S h a r i f ( w h o w a s l a t e r d i s q u a l i f i e d b y t h e c o u r t v e r d i c t ) t r i e d tto
Nawaz Sharif (who was later disqualified by the court verdict) tried o assert
a s s e r t his
h is
agency
a g e n c y over o v e r military.
m ilita r y . H Hee kkept e p t tthe h e portfolio
p o r t f o l i o of o f ttheh e Foreign
F o r e i g n Minister
M in is te r u under
n d e r his h i s per-
p e r­
sonal
s o n a l control.
c o n t r o l . Sharif’s
S h a r i f ’ s desire
d e s i r e ffor o r closer
c l o s e r tties i e s with
w i t h India
I n d i a (without
( w i t h o u t ttakinga k i n g military
m i l i t a r y onon
bboard)
o a r d ) and a n d the th e p participation
a r t i c i p a t i o n in i n Indian
In d ia n P Prime
r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r Modi’s
M o d i ’ s inauguration
i n a u g u r a t i o n cer- c e r­
emony
e m o n y and a n d expansion
e x p a n s i o n of o f trade
t r a d e tties ie s p proved
r o v e d tto o b bee some
s o m e of o f tthe h e reasons
re a so n s b behind
e h i n d hish is
growing
g r o w i n g d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y . L a t e r , t h e D a w n L e a k a n d P a n a m a Papers
differences with the military. Later, the Dawn Leak and Panama P a p e rs
ffurther
u r t h e r destabilized
d e s t a b i l i z e d PML-N’s
P M L - N ’ s ties tie s w with i t h military.
m i l i t a r y . As As H Hussain
u s s a i n noted,
n o t e d , “the “ t h e military
m ilita ry
assumes
a s s u m e s i t s e l f a s a m a j o r s t a k e h o l d e r a s f a r P a k i s t a n ’ s f o r e i g n p o l i c y was
itself as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy w a s con-con­
cerned.
c e r n e d . It, I t , thus,
t h u s , distrusts
d i s t r u s t s thet h e civilc i v i l government(s)
g o v e r n m e n t ( s ) normalisingn o rm a lisin g w withi t h India
I n d i a and/or
a n d /o r
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and and p pursuing
u r s u i n g ties t i e s with,
w i t h , for f o r example,
e x a m p l e , tthe he U US S w when
h e n tthe h e institution
in s titu tio n
thinks otherwise.”
th in k s o th e r w is e .”
Unlike
U n l i k e Sharif, S h a r i f , tthe h e government
g o v e r n m e n t of of P Prime
r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r Imran Im ra n K Khanh a n (since( s in c e
August 2018) has maintained closer ties with the
A u g u s t 2 0 1 8 ) h a s m a in ta in e d c lo s e r tie s w ith th e m ilita r y . B o th th e P a r lia m e n t military. Both the Parliament
and
a n d tthe h e military
m i l i t a r y seemingly
s e e m i n g l y are a r e on o n the t h e samesam e p page
a g e on o n major
m a j o r fforeigno r e i g n policy
p o l i c y issues.
is su e s .
Hussain explained that how the military helped
H u s s a in e x p la in e d th a t h o w th e m ilita r y h e lp e d th e g o v e r n m e n t o f P the government of Prime
r i m e Minis-
M in is ­
tter
er K Khan
h a n to t o repair
r e p a i r tties
ie s w withi t h China
C h i n a and a n d Gulf G u l f states
s t a t e s ini n its
i t s initial
i n i t i a l period.
p e r i o d . The T h e author
a u th o r
argues
a r g u e s t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s s u c h a s F i n a n c i a l A c t i o n T a s k F o r c e (FATF)
that international constraints such as Financial Action Task Force (F A T F )
pputut a a limit
l i m i t on o n military’s
m i l i t a r y ’ s role.
r o l e . On O n the th e w whole,
h o l e , the t h e synchronization
s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n of o f political
p o l i t i c a l and
and
military
m i l i t a r y v i s i o n s o n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s a s i s s e e n u n d e r t h e c u r r e n t government
visions on foreign policy issues as is seen under the current g o v e rn m en t
wwilli l l bbenefit
e n e f i t thet h e country.
c o u n t r y . TheT h e author a u t h o r concludes
c o n c l u d e s tthat h a t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n military
m i l i t a r y hash a s asserted
a s s e rte d
its agency in foreign policy decision-making
its a g e n c y in f o r e ig n p o lic y d e c is io n - m a k in g th r o u g h o u t th e h is to r y . throughout the history.
Part
P a r t II II b begins
e g in s w withi t h analyzing
a n a l y z i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e la tio n s w withi t h its
i t s “all-weather”
“ a l l - w e a t h e f f ’ friend,
frie n d ,
China. Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan
C h in a . G u l-i-H in a S h a h z a d -v a n d e r Z w a n a n d R a b b iy a K a m a l N and Rabbiya Kamal Nagraa g r a in i n Chapter
C h a p te r 5 5
argue
a r g u e thatt h a t since
s i n c e the
t h e establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o f entente c o r d i a l in
n t e n t e cordial
eKJIHGFEDCBA i n thet h e mid-1960s,
m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , relations
r e la tio n s
wwithi t h China
C h i n a have h a v e bbecomeecom e a a cornerstone
c o r n e r s t o n e of of P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s fforeigno r e i g n policy,
p o l i c y , bbe e itit p politi-
o liti­
cal
c a l l e a d e r s h i p o r m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t . I n r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p h a s trans-
leadership or military government. In recent years, the relationship has tra n s ­
fformed
o r m e d into i n t o economics,
e c o n o m ic s , p politics,
o l i t i c s , and a n d diplomacy.
d i p l o m a c y . More M o r e Chinese C h i n e s e professionals,
p r o f e s s io n a ls ,
12 Ghulam Ali
projects,
p r o j e c t s , and and p products
r o d u c t s are a r e increasingly
in c re a sin g ly b being
e i n g seen s e e n in i n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n and a n d vvice i c e vversa.
e rsa .
The
T h e c h a p t e r d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p h a s e s : S o w i n g t h e S e e d u n d e r P P P , 2008–13;
chapter divided into three phases: Sowing the Seed under PPP, 2 0 0 8 -1 3 ;
Accelerated
A c c e l e r a t e d Growth G r o w t h under u n d e r the t h e PML-N,
P M L - N , 2013–18; 2 0 1 3 - 1 8 ; and and R Reaping
e a p i n g tthe he B Benefits
e n e f i t s under
under
the PTI since 2018. The authors have examined the various
th e P T I s in c e 2 0 1 8 . T h e a u th o r s h a v e e x a m in e d th e v a r io u s a s p e c ts o f d ip lo m a c y aspects of diplomacy
with
w ith a a focus
f o c u s on o n howh o w Chinese
C h i n e s e investment
i n v e s t m e n t and a n d ffinancial
i n a n c i a l assistance
a s s is ta n c e u under
n d e r the
t h e CPEC
CPEC
evolved to become the focal point of the diplomatic
e v o lv e d to b e c o m e th e fo c a l p o in t o f th e d ip lo m a tic tie s . C h in e s e in v e s tm e n t p ties. Chinese investment pro-
ro ­
vided a much-needed relief to Pakistan’s struggling economy.
v i d e d a m u c h - n e e d e d r e l i e f t o P a k i s t a n ’ s s t r u g g l i n g e c o n o m y . M o r e o v e r , C h i n a ’s Moreover, China’s
presence
p r e s e n c e and a n d support
s u p p o r t as a s bbeing
e in g a a strong
s t r o n g and a n d reliable
r e l i a b l e partner
p a r t n e r enhanced
e n h a n c e d Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s
leverage
le v e r a g e r e g io n a lly a n d in te r n a tio n a lly . F o r C h in a , P a k is ta n p la y e d a
regionally and internationally. For China, Pakistan played a crucial
c r u c i a l role
ro le
in
i n the
t h e implementation
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of o f BRIB R I and a n d provided
p r o v i d e d it i t ana n access
a c c e s s to t o thet h e Indian
I n d i a n Ocean
O cean v via
ia
Gwadar
G w a d a r P o r t . O n c e f u l l y f u n c t i o n a l , t h i s r o u t e w i l l p r o v i d e C h i n a a n a l t e r n a t i v e tto
Port. Once fully functional, this route will provide China an alternative o
the
t h e Strait
S t r a i t of o f Malacca.
M a l a c c a . Despite
D e s p i t e some s o m e setbacks
s e t b a c k s such s u c h as a s the
t h e renegotiation
r e n e g o t i a t i o n of o f terms
t e r m s of of
some
s o m e of o f thet h e agreements,
a g r e e m e n t s , change c h a n g e of o f governments,
g o v e r n m e n t s , and and a a global
g l o b a l pandemic,
p a n d e m i c , the t h e rela-
r e la ­
tionship
t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d P a k i s t a n h a s e v o l v e d f u r t h e r . T h e c o n t i n u a t i o n and
between China and Pakistan has evolved further. The continuation and
the
t h e implementation
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of o f tthe
h e CPECC P E C projects
p r o j e c t s stand
s t a n d as as a a testament
t e s t a m e n t tto o ttheh e fact
f a c t that
th a t b both
o th
countries
c o u n t r i e s are a r e determined
d e t e r m i n e d tto o further
f u r t h e r expande x p a n d tthe h e relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p with w ith a a greater
g r e a t e r ffocus
ocus
on
o n geoeconomics.
g e o e c o n o m i c s . The T h e chapter
c h a p t e r concludes
c o n c l u d e s that t h a t ttheh e netn e t gains
g a i n s ffor or b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s area re
positive and anticipate even deeper cooperation
p o s itiv e a n d a n tic ip a te e v e n d e e p e r c o o p e r a tio n in th e f u tu r e . in the future.
In
I n Chapter
C h a p t e r 6, 6, M Muhammad
u h a m m a d Azam A z a m examines e x a m i n e s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h Afghani-
A fg h a n i­
stan
s t a n b y t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t s o u r c e s o f c o n f l i c t a n d c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e chapter
by taking into account sources of conflict and cooperation. The c h a p t e r dis-d is­
cusses
c u s s e s the t h e dispute
d i s p u t e overo v e r the t h e Durand
D u r a n d Line; L i n e ; thet h e concepts
c o n c e p t s of of P Pashtunistan,
a s h t u n i s t a n , the t h e idea
id e a
of
o f Pakistan–Afghanistan
P a k i s t a n - A f g h a n i s t a n confederation;
c o n f e d e r a t i o n ; tthe h e impact
i m p a c t of o f Soviet
S o v i e t invasion
i n v a s i o n during
d u r i n g the th e
1980s; the Taliban factor; implications of 9/11; the
1 9 8 0 s ; th e T a lib a n f a c to r ; im p lic a tio n s o f 9 /1 1 ; th e s ta te o f in tr a - A f g h a n p e a c estate of intra-Afghan peace
process;
p r o c e s s ; and a n d thet h e prospects
p r o s p e c t s of of b bilateral
i l a t e r a l trade.
t r a d e . The T h e analysis
a n a l y s i s covers
c o v e r s political
p o l i t i c a l and
and
security aspects of the relations and identifies
s e c u r ity a s p e c ts o f th e r e la tio n s a n d id e n tif ie s th e lo w e s t a n d h ig h e s t p the lowest and highest points
o i n t s iinn
the
t h e trajectory
t r a j e c t o r y of o f this
t h i s relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p over o v e r thet h e decades.
d e c a d e s . The T h e author
a u t h o r argues
a r g u e s tthath a t bbeing
e in g
neighbors
n e i g h b o r s it i t is
i s ini n the
t h e core
c o r e interests
i n t e r e s t s of of P Pakistan
a k i s t a n and a n d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n tto o sort
s o r t out
o u t ttheir
h e ir
differences and develop a cooperative relationship
d if f e r e n c e s a n d d e v e lo p a c o o p e r a tiv e r e la tio n s h ip in th e a g e o f g lo b a liz a tio n . in the age of globalization.
Landlocked
L a n d l o c k e d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n is i s dependent
d e p e n d e n t on on P Pakistan
a k i s t a n for f o r itsi t s ttrade,
ra d e , w while
h ile P Pakistan
a k ista n
needs
n e e d s A f g h a n i s t a n t o g e t a n a c c e s s t o t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n R e p u b l i c s . A z a m stresses
Afghanistan to get an access to the Central Asian Republics. Azam s tre ss e s
upon
u p o n the t h e needn e e d of o f the
t h e settlement
s e t t l e m e n t of o f tthe he D Durand
u r a n d Line, L i n e , increased
i n c r e a s e d trade,tra d e , p prevention
r e v e n tio n
of
o f t h e u s e o f t e r r i t o r y b y o t h e r e l e m e n t s , a n d e f f o r t s t o r e b u i l d t r u s t . T h e recent
the use of territory by other elements, and efforts to rebuild trust. The re c en t
developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s in in w which
h ic h P Pakistan
a k ista n p played
l a y e d an a n important
i m p o r t a n t role r o l e fforo r Afghan
A fg h a n p peace
eace p pro-
ro ­
cess leading to the signing of the Doha Agreement (also
c e s s le a d in g to th e s ig n in g o f th e D o h a A g r e e m e n t ( a ls o k n o w n a s th e A g r e e m e n t known as the Agreement
for
f o r Bringing
B r i n g i n g Peace P e a c e tto o Afghanistan)
A f g h a n i s t a n ) bbetween e t w e e n the th e U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s anda n d tthe h e Taliban
T a lib a n
in
i n F e b r u a r y 2 0 2 0 w a s d u l y a c k n o w l e d g e d b y A f g h a n a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l actors.
February 2020 was duly acknowledged by Afghan and international a c to rs.
This
T h is w was as a a shift
s h i f t in
i n Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’ s approach
a p p r o a c h ttoward o w a r d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n ffrom r o m geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c tto o
geoeconomics
g e o e c o n o m i c s and a n d indicates
i n d i c a t e s bbettere t t e r ties
t i e s in
i n the
t h e ffuture.
u t u r e . What
W hat w would
o u l d bbe e tthe
h e impact
i m p a c t of of
the
t h e advent
a d v e n t of o f the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n in i n August
A u g u s t 2021 2 0 2 1 on on b bilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship
r e la tio n s h ip
is yet to be
is y e t to b e s e e n . seen.
As
A s mentioned
m e n t i o n e d in i n tthe he b beginning,
e g i n n i n g , tthe h e hostility
h o s t i l i t y bbetween
e t w e e n India I n d i a and and P Pakistan
a k is ta n
moves
m o v e s b e y o n d t h e i r b o r d e r s . B o t h c o u n t r i e s c o m p e t e f o r a s p h e r e o f influ-
beyond their borders. Both countries compete for a sphere of in f lu ­
ence
e n c e in i n other
o t h e r countries
c o u n t r i e s and a n d regions
r e g i o n s to t o use
u s e against
a g a i n s t each
e a c h other.o t h e r . Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n has has
become
b ecom e a a newn e w ttheater
h e a t e r of o f Indo-Pakistan
I n d o - P a k i s t a n rivalry.r i v a l r y . Shahzad
S h a h z a d Akhtar A k h t a r and a n d Arshad
A r s h a d Ali A li
in Chapter 7 argue that the attitudes and policies of
in C h a p te r 7 a r g u e th a t th e a ttitu d e s a n d p o lic ie s o f P a k is ta n i d e c is io n - m a k e r s Pakistani decision-makers
 Foreign
F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y of
o f Contemporary Pakistan
C o n te m p o ra r y P a k is ta n 13
13

concerning
c o n c e r n i n g Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n have h a v e historically
h isto ric a lly b been
e e n conditioned
c o n d i t i o n e d bby y apprehensions
a p p re h e n s io n s
about
a b o u t I n d i a n h o s t i l i t y t o w a r d P a k i s t a n a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f close
Indian hostility toward Pakistan and the development of c l o s e relations
r e la tio n s
bbetween
e t w e e n India I n d i a anda n d Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . The T h e removal
r e m o v a l of o f the t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n regime r e g i m e after a f t e r 9/119 /1 1
deprived
d e p riv e d P Pakistan
a k i s t a n of of a a pro-Pakistan
p r o - P a k i s t a n regimer e g i m e in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . Moreover,M o r e o v e r , the t h e emer-
e m e r­
gence
g e n c e of o f unfriendly
u n f r i e n d l y regime
r e g i m e in in K Kabul
a b u l and a n d the t h e increasing
i n c r e a s i n g involvement
i n v o l v e m e n t of o f India
I n d i a inin
Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , e s p e c i a l l y o p e n i n g o f n e w c o n s u l a t e s , a d d e d t o I s l a m a b a d ’s inse-
especially opening of new consulates, added to Islamabad’s in se ­
curities.
c u r i t i e s . Pakistan
P a k i s t a n perceived
p e r c e i v e d iitt as a s bbeing
e i n g encircled
e n c i r c l e d ffrom ro m b both
o t h eastern
e a s t e r n and and w western
e s te r n
15
fronts. According to Akhtar and Ali, many analysts concurred
f r o n t s .1 5 A c c o r d i n g t o A k h t a r a n d A l i , m a n y a n a l y s t s c o n c u r r e d t h a t P a k i s t a n ’ s that Pakistan’s
continued
c o n t i n u e d support
s u p p o r t tto o ttheh e Taliban
T a l i b a n (the( t h e support
su p p o rt w which
h i c h invoked
i n v o k e d huge h u g e criticism)
c r itic is m ) w was as
mainly
m a in ly d r iv e n b y its s tra te g ic c a lc u la tio n s a b o u t I n d ia . T h is c o n te x t p r o v id e s a
driven by its strategic calculations about India. This context provides a
clear
c le a r u understating
n d e r s ta tin g w why h y Pakistan
P a k i s t a n did d i d notn o t taket a k e decisive
d e c i s i v e actions
a c t i o n s againsta g a i n s t the t h e Tali-
T a li­
bban, a n , even
e v e n tthough
h o u g h it it w was as a a U US S ally
a l l y ini n thet h e WoT.
W oT. L Later,
a t e r , tthe he U United
n i t e d States’
S t a t e s ’ plan
p l a n tto o
p u l l o u t o f A f g h a n i s t a n a s a r e s u l t o f t h e D o h a A g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d a n oppor-
pull out of Afghanistan as a result of the Doha Agreement provided an o p p o r­
ttunity
u n i t y to t o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto o secure
se c u re a a political
p o l i t i c a l setup
s e tu p w with i t h ttheh e inclusion
i n c l u s i o n of o f ttheh e Afghan
A fg h a n
Taliban
T a l i b a n t o p r o t e c t i t s s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s w h i l e m i n i m i z i n g t h e I n d i a n i n f l u e n c e in
to protect its security interests while minimizing the Indian influence in
Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . According
A c c o r d i n g to t o the
t h e authors,
a u th o rs, w whileh i l e ttheh e Taliban
T a l i b a n has h a s already
a l r e a d y taken t a k e n tthe he
control
c o n t r o l of o f the
t h e country,
c o u n t r y , Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n w willi l l remain
r e m a in a a security
s e c u r i t y concern
c o n c e r n for f o r Pakistan
P a k is ta n
for the foreseeable
f o r th e f o r e s e e a b le f u tu r e . future.
In
I n Chapter
C h a p t e r 8, 8 , Rizwan
R i z w a n Zeb Z e b examines
e x a m i n e s tthe h e ttriangular
r i a n g u l a r relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p of o f China–
C h in a -
P a k i s t a n - I n d i a f r o m T h u c y d i d e s ’ i d e a . A c c o r d i n g t o A t h e n i a n h i s t o r i a n w h o wrote
Pakistan–India from Thucydides’ idea. According to Athenian historian who w ro te
tthe
he H History
i s t o r y of
KJIHGFEDCBA o f the
th e P e l o p o n n e s i a n , whenever
Peloponnesian, w h e n e v e r an a n existing
e x i s t i n g greatg r e a t power
p o w e r felt f e l t tthreatened
h re a te n e d
ttoo bbe e displaced
d i s p l a c e d bby y an a n emerging
e m e r g i n g one, o n e , iitt w would
o u l d result
r e s u l t in in a a w war.a r . Zeb
Z e b linkedl i n k e d tthis h i s logic
lo g ic
t o t h e S i n o - I n d i a n a n d t h e S i n o - U S r e l a t i o n s w h i c h a r e i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r l i n k e d to
to the Sino-Indian and the Sino-US relations which are increasingly interlinked to
each
e a c h other.
o th e r. H Hee maintained
m a i n t a i n e d tthat h a t India
I n d i a wasw a s an a n emerging
e m e r g i n g regionalr e g i o n a l and, a n d , as as p pere r some,
som e,
aa global
g l o b a l player.
p l a y e r . ForF o r well
w e l l overover a a decade,
d e c a d e , tthe he U United
n i t e d StatesS t a t e s projected
p r o j e c t e d India I n d i a as as a a
balancer to the rising Chinese power in the region.
b a la n c e r to th e r is in g C h in e s e p o w e r in th e r e g io n . A m e ric a n s tr a te g ic p la n n e r s American strategic planners
envisaged
e n v is a g e d a a role
r o l e for
f o r India
I n d i a in i n monitoring
m o n i t o r i n g and and p policing
o l i c i n g iin n thet h e arca r c stretching
s t r e t c h i n g from fro m
Aden,
A d e n , S i n g a p o r e , t o c e n t r a l A s i a . G r o w i n g I n d o - U S s t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p and
Singapore, to central Asia. Growing Indo-US strategic partnership a n d theth e
recent
r e c e n t renaming
r e n a m i n g of o f the
th e P Pacific
a c i f i c command
c o m m a n d to t o the
t h e Indo-Pacific
I n d o - P a c i f i c command c o m m a n d were w e r e indi- in d i­
cations
c a t i o n s of o f Washington’s
W a s h i n g t o n ’ s confidence
c o n f i d e n c e in in N New e w Delhi’s
D e l h i ’ s ability
a b i l i t y as a s its
i t s strategic
s t r a t e g i c allya l l y and
and
t o d o i t s b i d d i n g i n a n d a r o u n d t h e r e g i o n . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e c h a l l e n g e of
to do its bidding in and around the region. At the same time, the challenge of a a
rising
r i s i n g China
C h in a w wasa s getting
g e t t i n g stronger
s t r o n g e r ffor o r Washington
W a s h i n g t o n as a s whenever
w h e n e v e r an a n existing
e x i s t i n g greatg re a t
ppower
o w e r ffeels e e l s tthreatened
h r e a t e n e d to t o bbe e displaced
d i s p l a c e d bby y an a n emerging
e m e r g i n g one, one, a a war
w ar w would
o u l d inevita-
in e v ita ­
b l y h a p p e n . T h e a u t h o r a r g u e d t h a t i n t h i s c o m i n g c l a s h , S o u t h A s i a would
bly happen. The author argued that in this coming clash, South Asia w o u ld p play
la y
the most pivotal
th e m o s t p iv o ta l ro le . role.
The
T h e author
a u th o r p posits
o s i t s that
t h a t apparently
a p p a r e n tly b both
o t h tthe h e United
U n i t e d StatesS t a t e s and a n d China
C h i n a have h a v e picked
p ic k e d
their partners in this theater: India was moving
th e ir p a rtn e rs in th is th e a te r: In d ia w a s m o v in g to w a rd th e U n ite d S ta te s, w toward the United States, while
h ile
PPakistan
a k i s t a n established
e s t a b l i s h e d an a n “all-weather”
“ a ll- w e a th e r ” p partnership
a rtn e rsh ip w withi t h China.
C h i n a . China C h i n a and and P Paki-
a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s geographic
g e o g ra p h ic p proximity
r o x im ity w withi t h each
e a c h other
o t h e r as a s well
w e l l as as w withi t h their
t h e i r common
c o m m o n enemy, enem y,
India,
I n d i a , w a s t h e i r a d v a n t a g e . I n t h e c o n t e x t o f r e c e n t P u l w a m a / B a l a k o t crises
was their advantage. In the context of recent Pulwama/Balakot c r is e s
b e t w e e n Pakistan
between P a k i s t a n anda n d India
I n d i a andand D Doklam
o k l a m and a n d Galwan
G a l w a n bbetween e t w e e n India I n d i a and a n d China,
C h in a ,
ZZeb e b questioned
q u e s t i o n e d India’s
I n d i a ’ s ttwo-frontal
w o - f r o n t a l war w a r strategy.
s t r a t e g y . The T h e chapter
c h a p t e r also a l s o evaluated
e v a l u a t e d tthe he
i m p a c t o f I n d i a ’s p r o b l e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r S o u t h A s i a n n e i g h b o r s and
impact of India’s problematic relations with other South Asian neighbors and
analyzed
a n a l y z e d how h o w tthathat w willi l l adversely
a d v e r s e l y affect
a f f e c t India’s
I n d i a ’s regional
r e g i o n a l strategy.
s t r a t e g y . India’s
I n d i a ’ s absence
absence
f r o m S o u t h A s i a , a c c o r d i n g t o Z e b , p r o v i d e d C h i n a a n o p p o r t u n i t y to
from South Asia, according to Zeb, provided China an opportunity t o engage
e n g a g e and and
14 Ghulam Ali
enhance
e n h a n c e its i t s influence.
i n f l u e n c e . Zed Z e d concluded
c o n c l u d e d that t h a t India’s
I n d i a ’s further
f u r t h e r role
r o l e will
w i l l greatly
g r e a t l y depend
depend
upon
u p o n h o w i t m a n a g e s i t s t i e s w i t h P a k i s t a n , C h i n a , a n d o t h e r r e g i o n a l countries.
how it manages its ties with Pakistan, China, and other regional c o u n trie s.
Iran
I r a n is i s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s tthird h i r d largest
l a r g e s t neighbor
n e i g h b o r in i n terms
t e r m s of o f the
t h e length
l e n g t h of o f jjoint
o i n t bborder.
o rd e r.
In spite of common historical, cultural, and religious
I n s p ite o f c o m m o n h is to r ic a l, c u ltu ra l, a n d r e lig io u s b o n d s , th e r e la tio n s b bonds, the relations between
e tw e e n
the
t h e twot w o have
h a v e ffaced a c e d manym a n y ttroubles.
r o u b l e s . In I n Chapter
C h a p t e r 9, 9, K Khurram
h u r r a m Abbas A b b a s ffocused
o c u s e d on o n recent
re c e n t
political transformation in Iran and its impact on bilateral
p o litic a l tr a n s f o r m a tio n i n I r a n a n d its im p a c t o n b ila te r a l r e la tio n s w ith P a k is ta n . relations with Pakistan.
After
A fte r 7 7 y years
e a r s of of P President
r e s i d e n t Hassan
H a ssa n R Rouhani’s
o u h a n i ’ s tenure
t e n u r e and and a a moderate
m o d e r a t e Parliament,
P a r lia m e n t,
Iranian
I r a n i a n p o l i t i c a l l a n d s c a p e h a s c h a n g e d r e c e n t l y . T h e 1 1 t h P a r l i a m e n t a r y elections
political landscape has changed recently. The 11th Parliamentary e le c tio n s
of
o f Iran
I r a n were
w e r e held h e l d on o n February
F e b r u a r y 21, 2 1 , 2020.
2020. R Results
e s u l t s were
w e r e surprising
s u r p r i s i n g as a s conservatives
c o n s e r v a tiv e s
achieved
a c h ie v e d a a landslide
l a n d s l i d e vvictory
i c t o r y bby y winning
w i n n i n g 221 2 2 1 out o u t of o f 290
2 9 0 seats,
s e a t s , while
w h i l e tthe h e moderates
m o d e r a te s
could
c o u l d g e t o n l y 3 0 s e a t s . T h e e l e c t i o n o f M o h a m m a d G h a l i b a f a s a S p e a k e r of
get only 30 seats. The election of Mohammad Ghalibaf as a Speaker o f theth e
Parliament
P a r l i a m e n t d e n o t e s e x t r a o r d i n a r y i n f l u e n c e o f u l t r a - c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n i n the
denotes extraordinary influence of ultra-conservative faction in th e
newly
n e w l y electede le c te d P Parliament
a r l i a m e n t committee.
c o m m i t t e e . The T h e chapter
c h a p t e r discusses
d is c u ss e s P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s relations
re la tio n s
with
w i t h IranI r a n under
u n d e r tthe h e conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e government
g o v e r n m e n t in i n Tehran
T e h r a n especially
e s p e c i a l l y on o n tthe h e issues
i s s u e s of of
bilateral security and regional geopolitical matrix. According
b ila te r a l s e c u r ity a n d r e g io n a l g e o p o litic a l m a tr ix . A c c o r d in g to A b b a s , c o n s e r v a ­ to Abbas, conserva-
tives
t i v e s have
h a v e historically
h i s t o r i c a l l y maintained
m a i n t a i n e d an a n inflexible
i n f l e x i b l e attitude
a t t i t u d e ttowards
o w a r d s various
v a r i o u s bbilateral
ila te r a l
issues
i s s u e s w i t h P a k i s t a n . B o r d e r m a n a g e m e n t m e c h a n i s m s , b i l a t e r a l ttrade,
with Pakistan. Border management mechanisms, bilateral r a d e , Afghan
A fg h a n
peace
p e a c e process,
p r o c e s s , and a n d Pakistan–Gulf
P a k i s t a n - G u l f Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n CouncilC o u n c i l relations
r e l a t i o n s often
o fte n w witnessed
itn e s s e d
tough scrutiny by the conservative political leadership
to u g h s c r u tin y b y th e c o n s e r v a tiv e p o litic a l le a d e r s h ip o f I r a n . A b b a s c o n c lu d e d of Iran. Abbas concluded
that
t h a t tthe h e ffuture
u t u r e of o f bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p will w i l l largely
l a r g e l y relyr e l y upon
u p o n domestic
d o m e s tic p politics
o l i t i c s ofof
Iran
I r a n a s I s l a m a b a d ’ s e a g e r n e s s t o d e v e l o p a c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h T e h r a n was
as Islamabad’s eagerness to develop a cordial relationship with Tehran w as
too
t o o strong
s t r o n g to to b bee ignored.
i g n o r e d . Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , the th e b behavior
e h a v i o r of o f thet h e conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e government
g o v e rn m e n t
of
o f I r a n w i l l b e a s t r o n g e r v a r i a b l e b e t w e e n b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s of
Iran will be a stronger variable between bilateral relations o f the
t h e ttwow o countries.
c o u n trie s.
While
W h i l e history
h i s t o r y suggested
s u g g e s t e d thatt h a t conservatives
c o n s e r v a t i v e s were w e r e good g o o d at a t making
m a k i n g enemies
e n e m i e s tthroughh ro u g h
outrageous
o u t r a g e o u s statements
s t a t e m e n t s and a n d supporting
s u p p o r t i n g of o f religious
r e l i g i o u s groups
g r o u p s in i n other
o t h e r countries
c o u n t r i e s (Shi- ( S h i­
ite
i t e community
c o m m u n i t y iin n Pakistan),
P a k i s t a n ) , diplomats
d i p l o m a t s and a n d scholars
s c h o l a r s were w e r e optimistic
o p t i m i s t i c tthat h a t ttwow o sidess id e s
might
m i g h t bbe e ablea b l e tto o overcome
o v e r c o m e irritants
i r r i t a n t s tto o develop
d e v e l o p good g o o d tties i e s ini n ttheh e face
f a c e of o f regional
re g io n a l
and
a n d global
g l o b a l changes.
c h a n g e s . According
A c c o r d i n g to t o Abbas,
A b b a s , bbesides
e s i d e s mutual
m u t u a l desires
d e s i r e s of o f Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d and and
Tehran
T e h r a n f o r g o o d n e i g h b o r l y r e l a t i o n s , P a k i s t a n ’s b a l a n c e d r o l e i n G u l f - I r a n con-
for good neighborly relations, Pakistan’s balanced role in Gulf–Iran con­
flict
f l i c t and
a n d Iran’s
I r a n ’ s deepening
d e e p e n i n g tties ie s w with i t h China
C h in a w which
h i c h will
w i l l minimize
m i n i m i z e India’sI n d i a ’ s influence
in f lu e n c e
omen well for
o m e n w e ll f o r fu tu re tie s. future ties.
In
I n Chapter
C h a p t e r 10, 1 0 , Rabia
R a b i a Akhtar
A k h t a r has h a s examined
e x a m in e d P Pakistan–US
a k i s t a n - U S relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p which
w h i c h she she
termed as a unique experience of Pakistan’s foreign policy.
te r m e d a s a u n iq u e e x p e r ie n c e o f P a k is ta n ’s f o r e ig n p o lic y . T h is r e la tio n s h ip h a s This relationship has
centered
c e n t e r e d around a r o u n d fforeign o r e i g n aid a i d and a n d economic
e c o n o m i c sanctions,
s a n c t i o n s , with w i t h strong
s t r o n g narratives
n a r r a t i v e s of of
mutual
m u t u a l g r i e v a n c e s a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a b o u t e a c h o t h e r ’ s m o t i v e s and
grievances and misunderstandings about each other’s motives a n d inten-
in te n ­
tions.
t i o n s . Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s choicec h o i c e of o f partnership
p a rtn e rs h ip w withi t h tthe
he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s since
s i n c e thet h e early
e a r l y yyearse a rs
of the Cold War led it to understand the inner workings
o f th e C o ld W a r le d it to u n d e r s ta n d th e in n e r w o r k in g s o f b o th th e R e p u b lic a n s of both the Republicans
and
a n d the th e D Democratic
e m o c r a t i c administrations.
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . The T h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s alsoa l s o hadh a d iits t s ffair
a i r share
s h a r e of of
frustrations in attempting to understand Pakistan
f r u s tr a tio n s in a tte m p tin g to u n d e r s ta n d P a k is ta n in r e tu r n . R a b ia A k h ta r u in return. Rabia Akhtar used
sed
historical
h i s t o r i c a l lenses
l e n s e s tto o analyze
a n a l y z e the t h e relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p and a n d divided
d i v i d e d her h e r chapter
c h a p t e r into i n t o different
d iffe re n t
phases
p h a s e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . S h e c h a r t s t h e p e r i o d s of
according to the nature of the relationship. She charts the periods o f mutual
m u tu a l
affinity
a f f i n i t y and
a n d bbilateral
i l a t e r a l ffrustrations
r u s t r a t i o n s through
t h r o u g h the th e p post-Cold
o s t - C o l d War W a r period
p e r i o d to t o theth e p post
o s t 9/11
9 /1 1
period
p e r i o d tto o u understand
n d e r s t a n d iiff the t h e past
p ast w wouldo u ld b bee aa pprologue.
r o l o g u e . This T h i s is i s particularly
p a r t i c u l a r l y impor-
im p o r­
tant
t a n t tto o assess
a s s e s s as a s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s newn e w fforeign o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y is i s anchored
a n c h o r e d on o n economic
e c o n o m i c security.s e c u rity .
She
S h e f o u n d t h a t c o n t e m p o r a r y c h a l l e n g e s i n P a k i s t a n - U S b i l a t e r a l relations
found that contemporary challenges in Pakistan–US bilateral r e l a t i o n s werew e re
 Foreign
F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y of
o f Contemporary Pakistan
C o n te m p o ra r y P a k is ta n 15
15

not
n o t entirely
e n t i r e l y different
d i f f e r e n t than
t h a n those
t h o s e ffaced
a c e d during
d u r i n g tthe
h e Cold
C o l d War.
W a r . Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d was w as b bring-
rin g ­
ing
i n g m a n y g h o s t s f r o m t h e p a s t t o t h i s c u r r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . S h e i d e n t i f i e d three
many ghosts from the past to this current relationship. She identified th re e
key
k e y challenges
c h a l l e n g e s in i n ttheh e relationship.
r e la tio n s h ip . F First
i r s t was
w a s the t h e unfolding
u n f o l d i n g situation
s i t u a t i o n iin n Afghani-
A f g h a n i­
stan
s t a n e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e w a k e o f U S w i t h d r a w a l i n A u g u s t 2 0 2 1 . S h e c a u t i o n e d tthat
especially in the wake of US withdrawal in August 2021. She cautioned hat
under
u n d e r tthe h e changing
c h a n g i n g geopolitical
g e o p o l i t i c a l environment,
e n v i r o n m e n t , tthe he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s should
s h o u l d not n o t vview
ie w
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n ffrom r o m thet h e same
s a m e lensl e n s of o f Af-Pak,
A f-P a k , a a neologism
n e o l o g i s m the t h e USU S fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y circles
c ir c le s
b e g a n t o u s e i n 2 0 0 8 t o d e s i g n a t e A f g h a n i s t a n a n d P a k i s t a n a s a s i n g l e theater
began to use in 2008 to designate Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single t h e a t e r of
of
operations.
o p e r a t i o n s . TheT h e second
s e c o n d challenge
c h a l l e n g e iis s how
h o w Pakistan
P a k i s t a n would
w o u ld b balance
a l a n c e its i t s relationship
r e la tio n s h ip
with
w i t h China
C h i n a and a n d tthe h e United
U n i t e d States.
S t a t e s . Akhtar
A k h t a r anticipated
a n t i c i p a t e d ana n intensification
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n in i n Sino-
S in o -
US
U S r i v a l r y w i t h i t s d i r e c t i m p a c t o n P a k i s t a n . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n r e c o r d raised
rivalry with its direct impact on Pakistan. The United States on record r a is e d
its
i t s concerns
c o n c e r n s on o n the t h e BRIB R I and a n d CPEC.
C P E C . She S h e argued
a r g u e d that
t h a t Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d should s h o u l d reassure
re a ssu re
to
t o W a s h i n g t o n t h a t C P E C w a s n o t a z e r o - s u m g a m e - r a t h e r i t w o u l d bbring
Washington that CPEC was not a zero-sum game – rather it would r i n g eco-
eco­
nomic
n o m i c development
d e v e l o p m e n t which w h i c h would w o u l d create
c re a te a a positive
p o s i t i v e impact
i m p a c t on o n regional
r e g i o n a l stability.
s ta b ility .
The
T h e third
t h i r d major
m a j o r challenge
c h a l l e n g e is i s tthe
h e bburgeoning
u r g e o n i n g ttiesi e s ofo f the
t h e United
U n i t e d StatesS t a t e s withw i t h India.
In d ia .
The
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s g r o o m i n g I n d i a i n t h e b a c k d r o p o f S i n o - U S r i v a l r y . Rabia
United States is grooming India in the backdrop of Sino-US rivalry. R a b ia
Akhtar
A k h t a r elaborated
e la b o r a te d a a series
s e r i e s of o f agreements
a g r e e m e n t s such s u c h as a s the
t h e nuclear
n u c l e a r deal,
d e a l , thet h e strategic
s tr a te g ic
communication
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a g r e e m e n t , a n d t h e B a s i c E x c h a n g e a n d C o o p e r a t i o n Agreement
agreement, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation A g re e m e n t
which
w h i c h highlighted
h i g h l i g h t e d India’s
I n d i a ’s central
c e n t r a l role
r o l e ini n tthe
h e Indo-Pacific
I n d o - P a c i f i c strategy
s t r a t e g y of o f tthe
he U United
n ite d
States. Under these agreements, India will get access to sophisticated
S ta te s . U n d e r th e s e a g r e e m e n ts , I n d ia w ill g e t a c c e s s to s o p h is tic a te d U S w e a p o n s US weapons
and
a n d defense
d e f e n s e ttechnology.
e c h n o l o g y . This T h is w willi l l naturally
n a tu r a lly p perturb
e r t u r b Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . As A s shes h e argued,
a rg u e d ,

If
I f the
th e U U.S.
. S . continues
c o n t i n u e s to
t o bbee tthe
h e highest
h i g h e s t exporter
e x p o r t e r of
o f arms
a r m s ini n tthe
he w world
o r l d and
a n d India
In d ia
t a k i n g t h e s e c o n d s l o t a s w o r l d ’s h i g h e s t a r m s i m p o r t e r , t h e s t r a t e g i c stability
taking the second slot as world’s highest arms importer, the strategic s ta b ility
in
i n South
S o u t h Asia
A s i a which
w h i c h is i s already
a l r e a d y ffragile
r a g i l e bbetween
e t w e e n the
t h e three
t h r e e nuclear
n u c l e a r armed
a r m e d states
s ta te s
sharing disputed borders with each other [China, India and
s h a r in g d is p u te d b o r d e r s w ith e a c h o th e r [ C h in a , I n d ia a n d P a k is ta n ] , w Pakistan], will
ill
become more precarious.
b e c o m e m o re p re c a rio u s .

How
H o w and
a n d will
w i l l the United
th e U n i t e d States
S t a t e s address
a d d r e s s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s concerns
c o n c e r n s is
i s not
n o t clear.
c l e a r . She
S h e is
i s of
of
tthe view
he v i e w tthat
h a t new
n e w conversation between
c o n v e r s a tio n b e t w e e n tthe
h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s and
a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has
h a s started
s ta rte d
and
a n d that
t h a t tthere
h e r e iis s enough
e n o u g h space s p a c e tto o discuss
d i s c u s s each
e a c h other’s
o t h e r ’s expectations
e x p e c t a t i o n s and a n d deliver-
d e liv e r ­
ances,
a n c e s , given
g i v e n tthe h e rich
r i c h history
h i s t o r y ofo f ttheir
h e i r shared
s h a r e d past
past w which
h i c h allows
a l l o w s them t h e m tto o learn
l e a r n ffromro m
w h a t w o r k e d f o r b o t h . I f P a k i s t a n p l a y s i t s c a r d s r i g h t , w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g on
what worked for both. If Pakistan plays its cards right, without compromising on
iits
t s core
c o r e national
n a t i o n a l security
s e c u r i t y anda n d fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y interests,
i n t e r e s t s , tthis
h i s relationship
r e la tio n s h ip w willi l l sur-
su r­
vvive
i v e the
t h e rough
r o u g h waters.
w a t e r s . The T h e history
h i s t o r y ttells
e l l s that
t h a t tthe
h e US–Pakistan
U S - P a k i s t a n relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p hash a s tthehe
potential to come back with much more force and vigor
p o te n tia l to c o m e b a c k w ith m u c h m o r e f o r c e a n d v ig o r th a n b e f o r e . T h e r e fo r e , than before. Therefore,
tthe
he p past
ast w willi l l definitely
d e f in ite ly b bee tthe
he p prologue
r o l o g u e ffor o r tthis
h is u uneasy
neasy b butu t essential
e s s e n t i a l relationship.
r e l a t i o n s h i p . ItIt
w i l l o n l y s e t t h e c o n t e x t i f t h e r i g h t l e s s o n s a r e l e a r n e d b y b o t h s i d e s . She
will only set the context if the right lessons are learned by both sides. S h e reminds
r e m in d s
tthat
h a t even
e v e n after
a f t e r the
th e U US S withdrawal
w i t h d r a w a l ffrom r o m Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , iitt w will i l l remain
r e m a i n an a n important
im p o rta n t
pplayer
l a y e r in
i n South
S o u t h Asia
A s i a region.
re g io n .
Adeela
A d e e l a Ahmed,
A h m e d , in i n Chapter
C h a p t e r 11,1 1 , has
h a s discussed
d i s c u s s e d recent
r e c e n t developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s in i n Pakistan–
P a k ista n -
R u s s i a ( S o v i e t U n i o n u n t i l 1 9 9 1 ) r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h w e r e i n t r o u b l e s ffor
Russia (Soviet Union until 1991) relationship which were in troubles o r tthe
h e mostm o st
p a r t o f t h e C o l d W a r . S h e a r g u e s t h a t b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s h a v e g i v e n a f r e s h look
part of the Cold War. She argues that both the countries have given a fresh lo o k
tto
o ttheir
h e ir b bilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship
r e la tio n s h ip w which
h i c h iis s now
n o w entering
e n t e r i n g iinto
n to a a newnew p phase
h a s e especially
e s p e c ia lly
ffrom
r o m tthe h e 2010s.
2 0 1 0 s . In I n fact,
f a c t , iinternal
n t e r n a l and
a n d external
e x t e r n a l factors
f a c t o r s have
have b beene e n driving
d riv in g b both
o t h sides
s id e s
tto
o come
c o m e closer
c l o s e r tto o each
e a c h other.
o th e r. P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y is i s undergoing
u n d e r g o i n g changesc h a n g e s with w i t h KJIHGFEDCB
16 Ghulam Ali
a focus on economic, trade, and connectivity with regions. Likewise, Russia is
searching for new allies and economic opportunities. This changing environment
is bringing new opportunities of cooperation for Islamabad and Moscow such
as coordination on the peace process in Afghanistan, economic and security dia-
logues, and an interaction at military and political levels. For Pakistan, Russia can
potentially be an arms supplier in the wake of an unstable US–Pakistan relation-
ship which is likely to witness further dip once the US objectives in Afghanistan
are met. Russia intends to minimize the spillover of terrorism into its periphery,
which could impact potential Russian economic projects in the region. Pakistan
can play an important role to this end. The author argues that although the level of
cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow in the existing geostrategic milieu is
still fragile, however, various initiatives have been taken, and the ice has started
to melt. She has highlighted various opportunities and made various recommen-
dations including an emphasis on increased joint trade activities, building of the
North–South Gas Pipeline projects, and cooperation on counterterrorism and
security matters. The bilateral cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow will
help in bringing stability and prosperity to the region besides serving their mutual
interests.
In Chapter 12, Najimdeen Bakare has examined the European Union (EU)-
Pakistan relationship which stretched back to the 1960s. He argued that this equa-
tion has witnessed periods of oscillation, agreement, disagreement, negotiation,
and compromise over the decades. In spite of long historical contacts, the existing
literature on the EU–Pakistan relations primarily focused on how the EU became
the largest donor as well as the trading partner of Pakistan. It also covered the
nature of Islamabad’s cooperation with Brussel in the areas of democracy, peace
and security, counterterrorism, development, governance, human rights, and
humanitarian assistance. The author points out the scarcity of the literature per-
taining to the dynamics of power relations between the EU and Pakistan, espe-
cially against the backdrop of EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan signed
in June 2019. The plan was considered as another watershed in a relationship
that stretched back to the 1960s. As a result, the two sides agreed to hold the first
meeting of the new EU–Pakistan Security Dialogue in 2021, including on the
fight against terrorism.16 The author argues that the EU–Pakistan relationship does
not portray a transactional diplomatic intercourse, given the imbalance of power
and dependency contour. While the EU might apparently appear more influential
than Pakistan, it does not discount the ability of Islamabad to influence Brussels.
For the EU, its influence over Islamabad is ever more glaring and deeper, and
for Islamabad, the relations draw it closer to the most powerful economic Union,
having accessibility to the EU market, but at some cost. Islamabad has to fulfil the
demands of the EU and trade-off some of its sovereign rights and integrity in order
to achieve a greater good. Though not entirely like the CEE, yet, Islamabad had
to initiate internal reforms, not because of its own volition, but upon the demand
of a foreign entity. Najimdeen Bakare concludes that the EU–Pakistan relation is
not truly transactional but is rather based on power relations predicated on com-
promise, persuasion, reward, and threat.
 Foreign Policy of Contemporary Pakistan 17
NotesZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
11 Muhammad
M u h a m m a d Qasim Q a s im Z a m a n , KJIHGFEDCBA
Zaman, IIslam
s l a m in in P Pakistan:
a k ista n : A A HHistoryi s t o r y (Princeton:
(P rin c e to n : P Princeton
r i n c e t o n Univer-
U n iv e r­
sity
s ity P Press,
r e s s , 22018).0 1 8 ).
22 A Att tthe h e ttimei m e of o f its
i t s creation
c r e a t i o n in in A August
u g u s t 1947,1947, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n consisted
c o n s i s t e d of o f ttwow o parts,
p a rts , E East
a s t Paki-
P a k i­
stan
s t a n anda n d WestW est P Pakistan.
a k is ta n . D During
u r i n g tthe h e Indo-Pakistan
In d o -P a k ista n w war a r ini n 1971,
1971, E Eastast P Pakistan
a k i s t a n declared
d e c la re d
separation
s e p a r a t i o n from f r o m West W e s t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n and a n d became
b e c a m e an a n independent
i n d e p e n d e n t country, c o u n try , B Bangladesh.
a n g la d e s h .
33 Samina
S a m i n a Yasmeen,Y a s m e e n , “Pakistan’s“ P a k i s t a n ’ s Cautious
C a u tio u s F Foreign
o r e i g n Policy,” u r v i v a l 36,
P o l i c y , ” SSurvival 3 6 , no.
n o . 22 (1994):
(1 9 9 4 ):
115;
115; K Khalid
h a lid B Bin i n Sayeed,
S a y e e d , “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s Foreign
F o re ig n P Policy:
o lic y : A Ann AAnalysisn a l y s i s ofo f Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Fears
F e ars
and
a n d Interests,”
I n t e r e s t s ,” AAsian s i a n SSurveyu r v e y 4, 4, n no.o. 3 3 (1964):
( 1 9 6 4 ) : 746.
746.
44 ‘East
‘E a s t P Pakistan’
a k is ta n ’ m made ade P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s claims
c l a i m s in i n tthe
h e Bay
B a y of ofB Bengal
e n g a l and a n d in i n Southeast
S o u th e a s t A Asias i a ppos-
os­
sible.
s i b l e . TheT h e separation
s e p a r a t i o n of o f East
E ast P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n 1971
1 9 7 1 reduced
re d u c ed P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c scopescope
to
t o South
S o u th A Asia s i a alone.
a lo n e . T Thish i s chapter
c h a p t e r refers
r e f e r s tto o geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c location
l o c a t i o n of o f thet h e present-day
p re s e n t-d a y
Pakistan.
P a k is ta n .
55 Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,l i , “China
“ C h in a - – PPakistan
a k is ta n M Maritime
a r i t i m e Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n in i n the
t h e Indian
I n d i a n Ocean,”
O c e a n , ” IIssuesssu es & &
t u d i e s 55,
SStudies 5 5 , nno. o. 3 3 (September
( S e p t e m b e r 22019). 0 1 9 ).
66 Mohammed
M oham m ed A Ayub
y u b Khan,K h a n , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Perspective,”
P e r s p e c t i v e ,” F Foreign
o r e ig n A Affairs
f f a i r s 38,
3 8 , no.
no. 4 4 (July
( J u l y 1960):
1 9 6 0 ):
555.
555.
77 For
F o r details
d e t a i l s of o f these
t h e s e developments,
d e v e l o p m e n t s , see s e e Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,l i , China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n R Relations:
e la tio n s : A A HHis- is ­
torical
to r ic a l A n a l y s i s (Karachi:
Analysis ( K a r a c h i : Oxford O x fo rd U University
n iv e rs ity P Press,
r e s s , 2017),
2 0 1 7 ) , 34–8.3 4 -8 .
88 Vladimir
V l a d i m i r Moskalenko,
M o s k a l e n k o , “Pakistan’s“ P a k i s t a n ’ s Foreign
F o re ig n P Policy,”
o l i c y , ” AAsian u r v e y 14,
s i a n SSurvey 1 4 , no.
no. 3 3 (1974):
( 1 9 7 4 ) : 2267.67.
99 For
For a a comprehensive
c o m p r e h e n s i v e study s t u d y of o f ttheh e arms
a r m s ttrader a d e between
b e t w e e n tthe h e two t w o countries
c o u n t r i e s from
f r o m its i t s start
s ta rt
ttill
i l l recent,
r e c e n t , see,s e e , Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,l i , “China
“ C h in a – - P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Conventional
C o n v e n tio n a l A Armsr m s Trade:
T rad e : A Ann AAppraisal
p p ra is a l
of
o f Supplier’s
S u p p l i e r ’ s and and R Recipient’s
e c i p i e n t ’ s Motives,”
M o tiv e s ,” P Pacific
a c ific F Focus
o c u s 35, 3 5 , no.
no. 3 3 (2020).
(2 0 2 0 ).
10
10 D Dawn,aw n, A April
p r i l 5, 5 , 1965,
1 9 6 5 , www.dawn.com/news/1173970.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 1 7 3 9 7 0 .
11
1 1 Hafeez
H a f e e z Malik,M a l i k , SSoviet–Pakistan
o v ie t-P a k is ta n R Relations
e l a t i o n s and and P Post-Soviet
o s t-S o v ie t D Dynamies, 1 9 4 7 - 9 2 (London:
y n a m i e s , 1947–92 (L o n d o n :
MMacmillan,
a c m i l l a n , 1994),1 9 9 4 ) , 226. 226.
12
1 2 HarshH a r s h V. V . Pant,
P a n t , “The “ T h e Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Thorn T h o r n in i n China–India–U.S.
C h in a -I n d ia -U .S . R Relations,”
e l a t i o n s , ” The
T h e Washington
W a s h in g to n
Q u a r t e r l y 35,
Quarterly 3 5 , no.
no. 1 1 (2012).
(2 0 1 2 ).
13
1 3 John J o h n K. K . Cooley,
C o o l e y , Unholy U n h o l y Wars: W a r s : AAfghanistan,
fg h a n is ta n , A America
m e r ic a a andn d IInternational
n t e r n a t i o n a l Terrorism,
T e r r o r is m ,
3rd
3 r d ed. e d . (London:
( L o n d o n : Pluto P l u t o Press,
P r e s s , 22002).
0 0 2 ).
14
1 4 For F o r an a n excellent
e x c e l l e n t account a c c o u n t of o f the
t h e details
d e t a i l s of o f tthe
he A Afghan
f g h a n War W a r and a n d tthe h e role
r o l e ofo f tthese
h e s e three
th re e
countries,
c o u n t r i e s , see s e e ibid.
ib id .
15
1 5 The The U US S invasion
i n v a s i o n in in A Afghanistan
f g h a n i s t a n post-9/11
p o s t - 9 / 1 1 uuprooted
p ro o te d A Afghan
f g h a n Taliban.
T a l i b a n . The
The U US-installed
S -in s ta lle d
new
n e w administrations
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s in i n Kabul
K a b u l did d id n noto t hholdo l d friendly
f r i e n d l y viewsv i e w s ttowardo w a r d Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . IIndia
n d i a ttookook
the
t h e advantage
a d v a n t a g e of o f the t h e situation
s i t u a t i o n and a n d madem ade a a bold
b o l d rreentry
e e n t r y in in A Afghanistan.
f g h a n i s t a n . It I t spent
s p e n t about
about
UUS$3 S $ 3 bbillion
i l l i o n in i n the t h e form
f o r m of o f economic
e c o n o m i c and a n d military
m i l i t a r y assistance,
a s s i s t a n c e , signed
s ig n e d A Agreement
g r e e m e n t on on
Strategic
S tr a te g ic P Partnership
a r t n e r s h i p in i n 22011,0 1 1 , trained
tra in e d A Afghan
f g h a n security
s e c u r i t y personnel,
p e r s o n n e l , and a n d provided
p r o v i d e d smalls m a ll
arms
a r m s including
i n c l u d i n g attack a t t a c k hhelicopters.
e l i c o p t e r s . India
I n d i a alsoa l s o sent
s e n t pparamilitary
a r a m i l i t a r y forces
f o r c e s tot o ‘protect’
‘ p r o t e c t ’ IIndian
n d ia n
citizens
c i t i z e n s and a n d projects
p r o j e c t s in in A Afghanistan.
f g h a n i s t a n . See S e e Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,l i , “China
“ C h in a - – PPakistan
a k i s t a n Cooperation
C o o p e ra tio n
on
on A Afghanistan:
fg h a n is ta n : A Assessing
s s e s s i n g Key K e y Interests
I n t e r e s t s and a n d IImplementing S t r a t e g i e s ,” The
m p l e m e n t i n g Strategies,” The P Pacific
a c ific
R e v i e w (2020):
Review ( 2 0 2 0 ) : 8. 8.
16
1 6 European
E u r o p e a n Union U n i o n ExternalE x te rn a l A Action
c t i o n Service,
S e r v i c e , Joint
J o i n t PressP ress R Release,
e le a se , N November
o v e m b e r 44,, 22020, 020,
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/88122/european-union-
h ttp s ://e e a s .e u r o p a .e u /h e a d q u a r te r s /h e a d q u a r te r s - h o m e p a g e /8 8 1 2 2 /e u ro p e a n - u n io n -
pakistan-strategic-dialogue-5th-round-joint-press-release_en.
p a k is ta n -s tra te g ic -d ia lo g u e -5 th -ro u n d -jo in t-p re s s -re le a s e _ e n .
2 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy
Under Imran Khan
Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

Introduction
Located at the crossroads of Central Asia and South Asia, Pakistan occupies a cen-
tral position in regional and global geopolitics. Bordering its nemesis, India, to the
east, an unstable Afghanistan and a beleaguered Iran to the west, China to the north,
and the Arabian Sea to the south, the country cannot elude the fallout of events
taking place in its hood. Given unresolved territorial disputes, the irredentist pro-
clivities of neighbors, and the role of extra-regional forces, Pakistan’s foreign policy
direction and discourse have reflected and prioritized the country’s quest for security
and survival. According to Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmad
Khan, “Pakistan’s foreign policy has been determined by its volatile geo-political
environment and an exceptionally hostile neighbourhood, leaving it with inescapa-
ble compulsions of preserving its sovereign independence and territorial integrity.”1
It is noteworthy to state that while Pakistan’s geographical location is an asset,
it has inextricably tied the country to events that are beyond its control. This struc-
tural reality, in effect, has inhibited Islamabad’s foreign policy choices, forcing it
to think tactically and be reactive, instead of focusing on eking out strategic gains
and being proactive. This phenomenon has meant that circumstances outside of its
borders go on to determine the state of its relations with other countries, especially
the United States.
When cricket-legend-turned politician, Imran Khan, assumed office as the 22nd
Prime Minister of Pakistan in August 2018, this peculiar environment had given
shape to four factors that complicated Pakistan’s foreign policy landscape. One
was that the simmering, internecine war in Afghanistan had not only added to
Pakistan’s security concerns and threats but also ruptured its relations with the
United States, who saw the country purely through the prism of Afghanistan. Two,
India’s unremitting violence and continued occupation of Indian Illegally Occu-
pied Kashmir (IIOJK) had regenerated Kashmiris’ struggle to get their right to
self-determination. Unable to win over and cower the Kashmiris, India ramped
up its tirade against Pakistan while also showing military belligerence to punish
and coerce that country. Taken together, the events in Kabul and Kashmir were
used to accuse Islamabad of fomenting terrorism in the region. Three, Pakistan’s
growing strategic partnership with China, undergirded by the China–Pakistan

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-3
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 19
Economic Corridor (CPEC), brought Pakistan right in the middle of the Sino-Indo
rivalry while also drawing U.S. attention to China’s geoeconomic juggernaut in
the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This implied that Islamabad had to contend with
yet another dangerous dimension in its acrimonious relations with New Delhi.
Also, Islamabad had to deal with a Washington that might look at it through a Bei-
jing lens going forward. Four, the conflagrations between Riyadh and Tehran, and
those within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), made it harder for Pakistan to
balance its relations with the Muslim world. Walking a tightrope was a real chal-
lenge that the country faced, especially because of its reliance on oil, financial and
diplomatic support, and remittances from its diaspora.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section delves into Khan’s
views on Pakistan’s key foreign policy issues by sifting through his pre-election
writings, speeches, interviews, his party’s 2018 manifesto, and his victory speech.
The second section deals with Pakistan’s relations with India and its fight for
Kashmir. The third section evaluates Pakistan’s ties with the United States and
Afghanistan. The fourth examines Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China.
The fifth and final section appraises the instruments of articulation, institutional
arrangements, and other outreach initiatives.

Imran Khan: Different Background, Different Outlook

Born and raised in Lahore, Imran Khan’s background is very dissimilar to that of
any other Pakistani politician.2 After successfully ending his legendary 21-year-
long cricket career as a World-Cup-winning captain, Khan entered the world of
philanthropy and education, establishing a world-class cancer hospital3 for the
needy and a university near his hometown.4 Khan did not belong to a feudal fam-
ily and was not part of the established, entrenched political dynasties that had
ruled Pakistan. In fact, Khan entered into politics to fight what he called a political
mafia. In his book, Pakistan: A Personal History, Imran Khan writes as to what
compelled him to join politics. Calling both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
corrupt, he said that the only route to challenge the old political order was for
him to formally join politics.5 His views on the political leadership in the country
also affected his thinking on foreign policy. A careful analysis of Khan’s thoughts
helps establish a connection between how he viewed Pakistan’s sovereignty,
Pakistan–U.S. relations, and the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Commenting on what
he called the capitulation of the Pakistani leadership, due to the pressure of the
United States, he writes:

Pakistan had recognized the Taliban regime since 1996; the alacrity with
which Musharraf capitulated amazed even Washington, dismayed the Paki-
stani military and shocked the public. He took us into the “war on terror”
when no Pakistani had been involved in the 9/11 attacks and Al-Qaeda was a
CIA-trained militant group based in Afghanistan, and there were no militant
Taliban in Pakistan. He also gave US intelligence agencies a free hand to pick
up any Pakistani citizen or foreigner suspected of terrorism.6
20
20 Syed Ali
Syed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

Khan
K h a n had had b beene e n vvociferous
o c i f e r o u s iin n calling
c a l l i n g outo u t Washington
W a s h i n g t o n and a n d thet h e lopsided
l o p s i d e d nature
n a t u r e of
of
Pak–U.S. relations. Talking about how Washington humiliated
P a k - U .S . r e la tio n s . T a lk in g a b o u t h o w W a s h in g to n h u m ilia te d a n d d is tr u s te d and distrusted
Islamabad,
I s l a m a b a d , despite
d e s p i t e ttheh e latter’s
l a t t e r ’ s sacrifices
s a c r i f i c e s in
i n the
th e wwar a r on
o n tterror,
e r r o r , in
i n ana n interview
i n t e r v i e w ttoo
CNN,
C N N , K h a n s a i d P a k i s t a n m u s t d i s s o c i a t e f r o m a U . S .- l e d w a r o n t e r r o r and
Khan said Pakistan must dissociate from a U.S.-led war on terror a n d reject
re je c t
S t a t e s . 7 In
I n an
a n appearance
a p p e a r a n c e in BBCB C HARD H A R D talk, Khanh a n flayed
7
aid
a i d from
f r o m tthehe U United
n i t e d States. in B ta lk , K fla y e d
the United States for conducting airstrikes in Abbottabad
th e U n ite d S ta te s f o r c o n d u c tin g a ir s tr ik e s in A b b o tta b a d th a t k ille d O s a m a B that killed Osama Binin
Laden, terming the act as an indication of how Washington
L a d e n , te r m in g th e a c t a s a n in d ic a tio n o f h o w W a s h in g to n d is r e s p e c te d I s la m a ­ disrespected Islama-
bbad.
a d . “Does
“ D o e s tthe h e Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i government
g o v e r n m e n t not n o t have
h a v e any
a n y semblance
s e m b l a n c e of o f sovereignty,”
s o v e r e ig n ty ,”
questioned
q u e s t i o n e d K h a n ? H e v o w e d t o f i g h t t h e w a r o n t e r r o r i f h e w e r e to
Khan? He vowed to fight the war on terror if he were to b become
e c o m e the th e
8
Prime Minister, without being perceived as a lackey of the United
P r i m e M i n i s t e r , w i t h o u t b e i n g p e r c e i v e d a s a l a c k e y o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .8 States.
In
I n an a n interview
i n t e r v i e w to t o The G u a r d i a n in
h e Guardian
KJIHGFEDCBA
T i n 2011,
2011, K Khan
h a n maintained
m a i n t a i n e d how how u unfair
n f a i r the
th e
United
U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d b e e n t o P a k i s t a n . H e s a i d : “ T h e y ’ r e t a l k i n g a b o u t a c o u n t r y in
States had been to Pakistan. He said: “They’re talking about a country in
which
w h i c h 35,000
3 5 ,0 0 0 p people
e o p l e have
h a v e died
d i e d during
d u rin g a a war
w a r that
t h a t had
h a d nothing
n o t h i n g tto o dodo w with
i t h us.
u s . Ours
O u rs
is
i s perhaps
p e r h a p s ttheh e only
o n l y country
c o u n t r y iin n history
h i s t o r y tthath a t keeps
k e e p s getting
g e t t i n g bbombed,
o m b e d , through
t h r o u g h drone
d ro n e
9
attacks,
a t t a c k s , b y o u r a l l y . ” 9 L a m b a s t i n g s u c c e s s i v e P a k i s t a n i g o v e r n m e n t s ffor
by our ally.” Lambasting successive Pakistani governments o r not
n o t ena-
ena­
bbling
l i n g Pakistan
P a k i s t a n ttoo stand
s t a n d ono n itsi t s own,
ow n, K Khan
h a n said:
s a id :

According
A c c o r d i n g tot o tthe
h e government
g o v e r n m e n t economic
e c o n o m i c survey
s u r v e y ini n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , $70bn
$ 7 0 b n has
has b been
een
lost
l o s t t o t h e e c o n o m y b e c a u s e o f t h i s w a r . T o t a l a i d h a s b e e n b a r e l y $ 2 0 b n . Aid
to the economy because of this war. Total aid has been barely $20bn. A id
has
h a s gone
g o n e tto
o thet h e ruling
r u l i n g elite,
e l i t e , while
w h i l e the people
th e p e o p l e have
h a v e lost
l o s t $70bn.
$ 7 0 b n . We
W e have
h a v e lost
lo s t
35,000
3 5 , 0 0 0 l i v e s a n d a s m a n y m a i m e d - a n d t h e n t o b e s a i d t o b e c o m p l i c i t . The
lives and as many maimed – and then to be said to be complicit. The
10
shame
s h a m e of o f it!
it! 10

Khan
K h a n had
had b been
e e n and
a n d still
s t i l l is
is aa staunch
s t a u n c h critic
c r i t i c ofo f U.S.
U . S . war
w a r in i n Afghanistan,
A fg h a n ista n , v vehe-
ehe­
mently
m e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e i s n o m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n t o t h e A f g h a n i m b r o g l i o . In
maintaining that there is no military solution to the Afghan imbroglio. In
his
h i s conversations
c o n v e rsa tio n s w withith U U.S.. S . lawmakers
l a w m a k e r s and and U U.S. . S . tthink
h i n k ttanks,
an k s, K Khan
h a n explained
e x p l a i n e d how
how
little
l i t t l e tthe
he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s understood
u n d e r s t o o d the t h e history
h i s t o r y of o f tthat
h a t region,
r e g i o n , something
s o m e t h i n g tthat
h a t was
w as
11
one of the reasons why its strategy was faulty. Addressing
o n e o f th e r e a s o n s w h y its s tr a te g y w a s f a u lty .11 A d d r e s s in g th e t h e n U .S . P the then U.S. Presi-
re s i­
dent,
d e n t , Barack
B a r a c k Obama,
O b a m a , in in a a 2009
2 0 0 9 article
a r t i c l e iin
n Forbes,
F o rb e s, K Khanh a n argued
a r g u e d ffor
o r dialogue
d i a l o g u e with
w ith
militants
m i l i t a n t s iinn Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n . H Hee contended:
c o n te n d e d :

The
T h e new new U U.S.
. S . administration
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n should
s h o u l d have
h a v e no
n o doubt
d o u b t tthat
h a t there
t h e r e isi s no
n o military
m ilita ry
solution
s o l u t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . A s m o r e i n n o c e n t P u s h t u n s a r e k i l l e d , m o r e space
in Afghanistan. As more innocent Pushtuns are killed, more space
is
i s created
c r e a t e d for
f o r new
n e w Taliban
T a l i b a n anda n d even
e v e n Al-Qaida
A l - Q a i d a recruits
re c ru its – - revenge
r e v e n g e bbeing
e i n g an
an
integral
i n t e g r a l part
p a r t of
o f tthe
h e Pushtun
P u s h t u n character.
c h a r a c t e r . So,
S o , as
a s with
w i t h Iraq,
I r a q , the
t h e U.S.
U . S . should
s h o u l d give
g iv e
aa time
t i m e ttable
a b l e for
f o r withdrawal
w i t h d r a w a l ffromr o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and
a n d replace
re p la c e N NATO
A T O and and U U.S.
.S .
12
forces with U.N. troops during the interim
f o r c e s w ith U .N . tr o o p s d u r in g th e in te r im p e r io d .12 period.

In
I n the
t h e same
s a m e article, Khan
a r tic le , K h a n called
c a l l e d ffor
or a a reappraisal
r e a p p r a i s a l of
o f Washington’s
W a s h i n g t o n ’s policy
p o l i c y toward
to w a rd
Islamabad.
I s l a m a b a d . H e c a u t i o n e d P r e s i d e n t O b a m a a g a i n s t r e p e a t i n g h i s predecessor’s
He cautioned President Obama against repeating his p r e d e c e s s o r ’s
“do
“ d o more”
m o r e ” mantra
m a n t r a while
w h i l e advising
a d v i s i n g Washington
W a s h i n g t o n tto o make
m a k e realistic,
r e a l i s t i c , doable
d o a b l e asks
a s k s of
of
13
Islamabad.
I s la m a b a d .13
The
T h e gist
g i s t of
o f Khan’s
K h a n ’ s analyses
a n a l y s e s ofof PPakistan–U.S.
a k i s t a n - U . S . relations,
re la tio n s, UU.S. . S . war
w a r in
i n Afghani-
A fg h a n i­
stan, and Pakistan’s engagements with the United States could
s ta n , a n d P a k is ta n ’s e n g a g e m e n ts w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s c o u ld b e s u m m a r iz e d be summarized
in
i n three
t h r e e points.
p o i n t s . One,
O n e , the
t h e nature
n a t u r e ofo f Islamabad–Washington
I s l a m a b a d - W a s h i n g t o n ttiesi e s needed
needed a a change.
change.
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 21
Two, Pakistan must not compromise on its sovereignty. Three, terrorism and radi-
calization in this region have emanated from U.S. muscular policy in Afghanistan.
It is noteworthy to state that Khan was fiercely berated for ostensibly being soft
on the Taliban. Analysts have also criticized his views on the presence of U.S.
troops in Afghanistan. U.S. scholar, Daniel S. Markey, in his book No Exit from
Pakistan, critiques Khan’s refrain that links Islamabad’s security troubles with
Washington’s continued deployment of troops in Afghanistan. He writes: “Imran
Khan and his fellow travelers suffer from wishful thinking when they suggest that
an American military withdrawal from the region would in itself bring a quick end
to Pakistan’s security troubles.”14
After this backgrounder, it is important to assess how Khan’s takes on these
issues were expressed through his party’s 2018 manifesto and his victory speech.
The manifesto of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was a 61-page document
released before the 2018 general election that laid out Khan’s vision and plan
of action on a full spectrum of issues. An elaborate set of ideals, principles, and
priorities was presented in the manifesto. Lamenting the inability to leverage
the country’s geostrategic location, the manifesto noted that “over the years we
(Pakistani leaders) have allowed this to become a source of weakness and exploi-
tation especially by Extra Regional Powers.”15 The manifesto called for course
correction in this regard while stressing that “PTI’s guiding principles will be of
reciprocity, mutual interests and international norms that will govern Pakistan’s
relations at the bilateral and multilateral levels.”16 All this resonated with Khan’s
emphasis on how Pakistan had been hard done by in its relations with power-
ful global actors, especially the United States. The manifesto articulated, in clear
terms, Khan’s desire to reset Pak–U.S. relations. According to the manifesto:”
With the United States, reciprocity and mutuality of interest will be the deter-
minants of our relationship.”17 Interestingly, the manifesto made no mention of
the situation in Afghanistan, which lies at the heart of Pakistan–United States.
relations, and a subject that elicited Khan’s attention since the start of the war on
terror.
The need to recalibrate Islamabad–Washington relations, as envisaged by Khan
in his writings, speeches, and party’s manifesto, was reiterated by him in his vic-
tory speech. Accentuating the unequal and uneven trajectory of Pak–U.S. rela-
tions, Khan said:

With the US, we want to have a mutually beneficial relationship . . . up until

now, that has been one way, the US thinks it gives us aid to fight their war . . .
we want both countries to benefit, we want a balanced relationship.18

Linked to that were Khan’s enunciations on Afghanistan, and how Pakistan,

under him, would leave no stone unturned to achieve lasting peace in that country.19
The foregoing discussion shows a great degree of consistency in Khan’s view-
point on Pak–U.S. relations and the Afghan conundrum. It also indicates that,
with Khan at the helm, Islamabad would have likely engaged with Washington in
a different manner altogether.
22 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
In a bid to fully understand Khan’s drift on foreign policy, it is imperative to
scrutinize how he thought about Pakistan’s main adversary, India, and its strate-
gic partner, China. By virtue of being a cricket star, Khan was a household name
in India. Also, his visits to India garnered attention of the Indian press. Before
becoming the Prime Minister, Khan appeared in television interviews and spoke
at conferences, stressing the benefits of peace and the costs of continued acri-
mony. Terming the Kashmir dispute as the core issue between the two countries,
Khan highlighted how resolving that was critical to creating an environment in
which both countries could prosper and fight common threats. In his keynote
address at the 2013 Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, Khan said that the
biggest challenge for India and Pakistan was taking millions out of poverty.20
In an interview with Karan Thapar in 2015, Khan welcomed the resumption of
the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, underscoring why peace
between the two neighbors was critical to eradicating poverty. He added that all
Indo-Pak tensions sprout from the Kashmir conflict.21 To put it succinctly, for
Khan, peace and prosperity in the region were dependent on conflict-resolution
between New Delhi and Islamabad. These thoughts percolated in PTI’s 2018
manifesto. Upfront, the manifesto dubbed the resolution of the Kashmir issue as
one of the country’s vital interests. India was mentioned in the context of improv-
ing relations by adopting a conflict-resolution approach.22 Predictably, Khan was
quick to offer a peace overture to India, after winning the 2018 election. It is note-
worthy to state that Khan dedicated a major portion of his post-election speech to
discussing peace with India. He assured that if India took one step toward peace,
Pakistan will take two steps in that direction.23 With a singular focus on uproot-
ing poverty and fighting multiple, dangerous non-traditional security threats, it
was reasonable to expect that Khan would vigorously try to resuscitate a peace
process with India.
As for China, Khan’s line of thinking revolved around his appreciation of how
it took millions of people out of poverty and put a lid on corruption. Besides, the
thrust of opinions on China pertained to how he analyzed the China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC). The stand of his party on CPEC reflected cautious
optimism. While Khan’s party was supportive of CPEC as a general concept, it
was apprehensive about how it was being implemented.24 Khan was skeptical
about the ways in which the PML-N was taking CPEC forward, questioning the
level of alleged corruption associated with the mega-project.25 Doubts over the
trajectory of CPEC fed into PTI’s manifesto, for the document laid bare how
the party intends to turn it into a real game-changer. While terming CPEC as a
golden opportunity, the manifesto laid emphasis on creating a “solid and transpar-
ent foundation for a truly empowering corridor with two-way linkages.”26 The
manifesto attributed Pakistan drawing less benefits from the project to insufficient
transfer of knowledge and capabilities, lesser partnerships with local businesses,
and “our(Pakistan’s) high dependence on imports of goods and services from
China.” It is against this backdrop that the manifesto outlined the need for involv-
ing Pakistani businesses in CPEC by weaving together partnerships and learning
from China.27
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 23
The manifesto categorically mentioned the significance of bolstering the stra-
tegic bonhomie with China. According to the manifesto, “PTI’s focus will be on
moves to expand the existing strategic partnership with China.”28 That China was
the first country Khan talked about in his victory speech is emblematic of where
that country is placed in the pecking order for Khan. In his victory speech, Khan
evinced a willingness to take Sino-Pak ties to the next level. Terming CPEC as
a conduit for Pakistan’s economic recovery, Khan again committed himself to
learning from the Chinese model of poverty-alleviation and anti-corruption.29
Broadly, Khan’s discourse on Pakistan’s relations with key countries correctly
and lucidly identified some of the glaring challenges facing Pakistan with respect
to its dealings with them. Going by pre-election positioning of Khan and his party,
three overarching anchors and objectives come to the fore: ensuring sovereignty,
enhancing economic security, and advancing the case for dispute resolution. Taken
together, this set of factors has determined and shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy
since 2018. The nature of Pakistan’s relations with other countries since 2018 has
been predicated on these three objectives. Relations with countries that have and
are likely to impede these end-goals, have either deteriorated, or been marred by
tensions. Ties with countries that offered help on these counts have solidified.
The ensuing sections will parse Pakistan’s foreign relations with India, the United
States, Afghanistan, and China in light of these broad, core aims and concerns.

Pakistan, India, and the Kashmir Issue: A Flashpoint

Pakistan’s relations with India, halfway into Imran Khan’s premiership, have dete-
riorated precipitously. A glimmer of hope that might have stemmed from Imran
Khan’s star value in India, his offer for dialogue, a gift from the Indian cricket
team,30 Indian Prime Minister’s call31, and a letter32 to Khan ended in no time. Ties
between the two countries are at an all-time low. Relations have plummeted not
only because the two countries were embroiled in a deadly, nuclear-tinged crisis in
201933 but also due to India’s revocation of Articles 370 and 35-A,34 coupled with
ramped up violence in Indian Illegally Occupied Kashmir (IIOJK)35 and threats to
capture Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.36 The only silver lining in the midst
of tensions was the inauguration of the Kartarpur Corridor for Indian Sikhs.37 That
said, in February 2021, India and Pakistan agreed to uphold the 2003 ceasefire
agreement on the Line of Control (LoC).38 The announcement was followed by
speculations about a backchannel dialogue-led thaw between the two countries.39
However, relations between the two countries have been marked by hostile
rhetoric. Pakistan has vehemently called out India for its annexation of, and atroc-
ities in, IIOJK. Led by Khan himself, Pakistan has tasked itself with exposing
India, globally.40 While keeping the world abreast of India’s sledgehammering in
Kashmir, Pakistan has ramped up efforts to ascribe instability in the region to what
it calls India’s intransigence, war-mongering, and revisionist tendencies. Islama-
bad has time and again reminded the world about the catastrophic consequences
of militarized, jingoistic, and religious nationalism in a nuclearized environment.
In November 2020, the Government of Pakistan released a dossier, which entailed
24
24 Syed Ali
KJIHGFEDCBA
S yed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

41
aa pplethora
l e t h o r a of o f evidence
e v i d e n c e of o f India’s
I n d i a ’s direct
d i r e c t espousal
e s p o u s a l of o f tterrorism
e r r o r i s m in in P Pakistan.
a k is ta n .41 P Prime
rim e
Minister Khan has also gone public in outlining India’s
M i n i s t e r K h a n h a s a l s o g o n e p u b l i c i n o u t l i n i n g I n d i a ’s i n v o l v e m e n t i n s t o k i n g involvement in stoking
42
sectarian
s e c t a r i a n tensions
t e n s i o n s in in P Pakistan.
a k i s t a n . 4 2 Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d has h a s also
a lso w warned
a r n e d the t h e world
w o r l d that t h a t NewN ew
Delhi,
D e l h i , e n s n a r e d i n d o m e s t i c c r i s e s a n d a b o r d e r s t a n d o f f w i t h B e i j i n g , w i l l launch
ensnared in domestic crises and a border standoff with Beijing, will la u n c h
aa false-flag
f a l s e - f l a g attacka t t a c k and and p pini n the
th e b blame
l a m e on on P Pakistan. 43
a k i s t a n . 4 3 InI n response
r e s p o n s e tto o questions
q u e s t i o n s and and
concerns
c o n c e r n s a b o u t t h e h i g h l y t o u t e d b a c k c h a n n e l d i p l o m a c y , K h a n h a s assured
about the highly touted backchannel diplomacy, Khan has a s s u r e d mul- m u l­
tiple
t i p l e audiences
a u d i e n c e s tthat h a t iimproving
m p r o v i n g economice c o n o m i c relations
r e la tio n s w with i t h India
I n d i a at at a a time
t i m e when w h e n iitt
continues with its current maximalist position
c o n tin u e s w ith its c u r r e n t m a x im a lis t p o s itio n o n K a s h m ir is a k in to b e tra y in gon Kashmir is akin to betraying
44
the
th e K Kashmiris.
a s h m i r i s . 4 4 Also, A ls o , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n has h a s made
m a d e talks ta lk s w withi t h India
I n d i a contingent
c o n t i n g e n t upon u p o n the th e
45
latter
l a t t e r reversing
r e v e r s i n g its i t s August
A ugust 5 5 decisions
d e c i s i o n s on on K Kashmir.
a s h m ir .45 F Fromr o m tthe h e conciliatory
c o n c i l i a t o r y tone to n e
in
i n his h i s vvictory
i c t o r y speech
s p e e c h tto o ana n aggressive
a g g r e s s i v e ttone o n e and a n d tenor
t e n o r on o n India,
In d ia , K Khan’s
h a n ’ s refrain
r e f r a i n on
on
India
I n d i a h a s c h a n g e d d r a s t i c a l l y . T h u s , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w f a r tthe
has changed drastically. Thus, it is important to understand how far h e tthree
h re e
principal
p r i n c i p a l objectives
o b j e c t i v e s gleanedg l e a n e d earlier
e a r l i e r have
h a v e influenced
i n f l u e n c e d tthis h i s shift.
s h i f t . As
A s mentioned
m e n tio n e d p pre-
re ­
viously, a country that challenged and threatened Islamabad’s
v io u s ly , a c o u n tr y th a t c h a lle n g e d a n d th r e a te n e d I s la m a b a d ’s s o v e r e ig n ty , s u b ­ sovereignty, sub-
verted
v e r t e d its i t s economic
e c o n o m i c security,s e c u r i t y , anda n d dented
d e n t e d tthe h e prospect
p r o s p e c t of o f conflict-resolution
c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n has has
fractured
f r a c t u r e d i t s t i e s w i t h t h e l a t t e r . T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t a r i s e s i s whether
its ties with the latter. The question that arises is w h e t h e r or o r notn o t India
In d ia
posed
posed a a fformidable
o r m i d a b l e tthreat h r e a t to t o Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s endeavors
e n d e a v o r s tto o perpetuate
p e r p e t u a t e iits t s sovereignty,
s o v e r e ig n ty ,
increase its economic security, and
in c r e a s e its e c o n o m ic s e c u r ity , a n d r e s o lv e d is p u te s . resolve disputes.
Since
S i n c e 2018,2 0 1 8 , IndiaI n d i a has h a s directly
d ire c tly b breached
re a c h e d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s territorial
t e r r i t o r i a l integrity
i n t e g r i t y and a n d abet-
a b e t­
ted
t e d s u b c o n v e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s i n P a k i s t a n w h i l e t h r e a t e n i n g t o i n v a d e a n d capture
subconventional activities in Pakistan while threatening to invade and c a p tu re
territories
t e r r i t o r i e s under u n d e r tthe h e control
c o n t r o l of o f Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . Warning
W a r n i n g India I n d i a aftera f t e r an a n attack
a t t a c k on o n Indian
In d ia n
paramilitary
p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n P u l w a m a , I I O J K , K h a n s a i d P a k i s t a n w i l l r e t a l i a t e , if
forces in Pulwama, IIOJK, Khan said Pakistan will retaliate, i f India
In d ia
46
aggresses
a g g r e s s e s against a g a i n s t it, i t , for
f o r it it w was as a a redr e d line
l i n e tthat
h a t could
c o u l d not not b bee crossed.
c r o s s e d .46 H However,
o w e v e r,
paying
p a y i n g little l i t t l e heed,
h e e d , India I n d i a launched
l a u n c h e d airstrikes
a i r s t r i k e s iinside
n s i d e mainland
m a i n l a n d Pakistan.P a k i s t a n . Addressing
A d d re ss in g
the
t h e n a t i o n a f t e r P a k i s t a n r e t a l i a t e d w i t h a i r s t r i k e s c o n d u c t e d b y its
nation after Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes conducted by i t s air
a i r force,
fo rc e , K Khan
han
said there was no other option for a sovereign country than
s a i d t h e r e w a s n o o t h e r o p t i o n f o r a s o v e r e i g n c o u n t r y t h a n r e s p o n d i n g t o I n d i a ’s responding to India’s
47
belligerence.
b e l l i g e r e n c e .4 7 Ever E v e r since s i n c e the th e P Pulwama–Balakot
u l w a m a - B a l a k o t crisis c r i s i s hash a s happened,
h a p p e n e d , Pakistan,P a k is ta n ,
while
w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t w a r i s n o t t h e p a n a c e a f o r K a s h m i r , has
acknowledging that war is not the panacea for Kashmir, h a s categorically
c a te g o ric a lly
48
stated
s t a t e d tthat h a t it will
it w i l l leave
l e a v e no n o stone
s to n e u unturned
n t u r n e d tto o defend
d e f e n d its i t s tterritorial
e r r i t o r i a l integrity.
i n t e g r i t y .4 8 Paki-
P a k i­
stan
s t a n h a s , u n d e r s t a n d a b l y s o , m a t c h e d I n d i a ’ s w a r h y s t e r i a w i t h v o w s t o g i v e the
has, understandably so, matched India’s war hysteria with vows to give th e
latter
la tte r a a b befitting
e f i t t i n g response,
r e s p o n s e , if i f tthe
h e push
p u s h comes
c o m e s to t o shove.
shove.
India
I n d i a has has b been
e e n foundf o u n d guilty
g u i l t y ofof v violating
io la tin g P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s sovereignty
s o v e r e i g n t y tthroughh r o u g h its i t s out-
o u t-
and-out
a n d - o u t s u c c o r t o a n t i - P a k i s t a n m i l i t a n t s . A s r e v e a l e d i n t h e d o s s i e r r e l e a s e d bby
succor to anti-Pakistan militants. As revealed in the dossier released y
the
t h e Government
G o v e r n m e n t of ofP Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , India
I n d i a hash a s funded,
f u n d e d , ttrained,
r a i n e d , and a n d armed
a r m e d outfits
o u t f i t s that
t h a t have
have
wreaked
w r e a k e d havoc h a v o c iinside n s i d e Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . As As p per
e r thet h e dossier,
d o s s i e r , Indian
I n d i a n intelligence
i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies
a g e n c ie s
49
were
w e r e running
r u n n i n g 87 8 7 tterrorists
e r r o r i s t s camps,
c a m p s , 66 6 6 of o f which
w h ic h w were
e r e operating
o p e r a t i n g out o u t of o f Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .49
India’s patronage and sponsorship of terrorism against
I n d ia ’s p a tr o n a g e a n d s p o n s o r s h ip o f te r r o r is m a g a in s t P a k is ta n h a s h a r d e n e d th e Pakistan has hardened the
latter’s
l a t te r ’s p position.
o s itio n . K Khan h a n has h a s spearheaded
s p e a r h e a d e d Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s charge
c h a r g e againsta g a i n s t India-funded
In d ia -fu n d e d
terrorism,
t e r r o r i s m , d e m a n d i n g o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y t o h o l d India
demanding of the international community to hold I n d i a tto o account
a c c o u n t ffor or
50
its
i t s s u b v e r s i v e a c t i v i t i e s a i m e d a t d e s t a b i l i z i n g P a k i s t a n . 5 0 I s l a m a b a d has
subversive activities aimed at destabilizing Pakistan. Islamabad h a s seem-
seem ­
ingly
i n g l y convinced
c o n v i n c e d itself i t s e l f that
t h a t the
t h e record
r e c o r d on o n terrorism
t e r r o r i s m needs
n e e d s to to b bee set s e t straight.
s t r a i g h t . Paki-
P a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s o f f i c i a l d o m h a s i n t e n s i f i e d i t s b a t t l e t o s w i n g t h e n a r r a t i v e on
officialdom has intensified its battle to swing the narrative o n tterrorism,
e rro rism ,
51
which
w h i c h is i s skewed
s k e w e d in i n ffavor
a v o r of o f India.
I n d i a . 5 1 Thus,
T h u s , it i t is
i s quite
q u i t e clear
c l e a r tthat h a t India’s
I n d i a ’ s attempts
a t t e m p t s tto o
erode
e r o d e P a k i s t a n ’ s s o v e r e i g n t y h a v e s i g n i f i c a n t l y s h a p e d t h e l a t t e r ’s c h a n g e of
Pakistan’s sovereignty have significantly shaped the latter’s change o f ttack
ack
as
a s farf a r asa s dealing
d e a l i n g with w i t h tthe h e fformer
o r m e r is i s concerned.
c o n c e rn e d .
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 25
25

Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i officials
o f f i c i a l s have
h a v e framed
f r a m e d Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’s N New e w DelhiD e lh i p problem
r o b l e m in i n theth e b broader
ro a d e r
context
c o n t e x t o f e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y . S e n i o r P a k i s t a n i g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s h a v e time
of economic security. Senior Pakistani government officials have tim e
and
a n d again
a g a i n saids a i d tthat,
h a t, w with i t h India
I n d i a fast f a s t bbecoming
e c o m in g a a rogue
r o g u e state,
s ta te , P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s ability
a b i l i t y toto
obtain
o b t a i n higher
h i g h e r levels
l e v e l s of o f economic
e c o n o m i c security s e c u r i t y and and b become
ecom e a a ffulcrum
u l c r u m of o f connectivity
c o n n e c tiv ity
52
isi s greatly
g r e a t l y attenuated.
a t t e n u a t e d . 5 2 In I n addition
a d d i t i o n tto o that,
th a t, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n has h a s reiterated
r e i t e r a t e d how h o w India I n d i a is is
53
bbente n t ono n pushing
p u s h i n g it i t ini n tthe he b black
l a c k list l i s t ofo f the
th e F Financial
i n a n c i a l Action
A c t i o n Task T a s k ForceF o r c e (FATF),
( F A T F ) ,5 3
something that was corroborated when India’s Minister for
s o m e t h i n g t h a t w a s c o r r o b o r a t e d w h e n I n d i a ’s M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , S u b - External Affairs, Sub-
rahmanyam
r a h m a n y a m Jaishankar,J a i s h a n k a r , admitteda d m i t t e d to t o having
h a v i n g played
p la y e d a a major
m a j o r role r o l e in i n ttheh e vvery e ry b body
ody
a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . 5 4 B e s i d e s , I n d i a ’ s d i s c o m f i t u r e w i t h C P E C h a s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o an
Besides, India’s discomfiture with CPEC has translated into
54
against Pakistan. an
economic
e c o n o m i c security
s e c u r i t y tthreat
h r e a t ffor o r Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . The T h e comprehensive
c o m p r e h e n s i v e dossier d o s s i e r made
m a d e publicp u b l i c bby y
C P E C ,5 5 amply a m p l y testifies
t e s t i f i e s tthat
55
Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , coupled
c o u p le d w with i t h India’s
I n d i a ’ s outright
o u t r i g h t opposition
o p p o s i t i o n of o f CPEC, hat
India
I n d i a is i s the
th e p primary
r i m a r y tthreat h r e a t tto o CPEC.
C P E C . That T hat P Pakistan
a k i s t a n attaches
a t t a c h e s greatg r e a t importance
i m p o r t a n c e tto o
CPEC
C P E C a n d i t s s t r o n g , d e e p t i e s w i t h C h i n a a r e a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e s t a k e s involved.
and its strong, deep ties with China are a reflection of the stakes in v o lv e d .
This
T h i s iimplies
m p l i e s tthat h a t Pakistan
P a k ista n w will i l l bbe e willing
w i l l i n g to t o increase
i n c r e a s e tthe h e costs
c o s t s forf o r India
I n d i a should
s h o u l d it it
seriously make efforts to derail CPEC. Hence, it
s e r io u s ly m a k e e f f o rts to d e r a il C P E C . H e n c e , it is r e a s o n a b le to a r g u e th a t, Nis reasonable to argue that, Newew
DDelhie lh i p presents
re s e n ts a a dangerous
d a n g e r o u s package p a c k a g e of o f tthreats
h r e a t s to t o Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’ s economic
e c o n o m i c security,s e c u r ity ,
fforcing
o r c i n g thet h e latter
l a t t e r ttoo talk
t a l k tough
t o u g h tto o thet h e fformer.
o rm e r.
As
A s mentioned
m e n tio n e d p previously,
re v io u sly , K Khan,
h a n , much m u c h like l i k e his h is p predecessors,
r e d e c e s s o r s , considers
c o n s i d e r s tthe he
resolution
r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e K a s h m i r i s s u e i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o p e a c e a n d s t a b i l i t y in
of the Kashmir issue indispensable to peace and stability i n ttheh e region
re g io n
and
a n d bbeyond.
eyond. B Before
e f o r e and a n d after a f t e r winning
w i n n i n g tthe h e election,
e le c tio n , K Khanh a n had h a d stressed
s t r e s s e d how h o w South S o u th
Asia’s development is tied to the amicable resolution
A s ia ’s d e v e lo p m e n t is tie d to th e a m ic a b le r e s o lu tio n o f th e d e c a d e s - lo n g K of the decades-long Kash-
ash­
mir
m i r dispute.
d i s p u t e . In I n other
o t h e r words,
w o r d s , the th e K Kashmir
a s h m i r issueiss u e w was a s anda n d iis s ttheh e make
m a k e or or b break
r e a k fforor
Indo-Pak
I n d o - P a k ties. t i e s . India’s
I n d i a ’ s unilateral,
u n i l a t e r a l , illegal
i l l e g a l revocation
r e v o c a t i o n of o f Articles
A r t i c l e s 370 3 7 0 and a n d 35-A 3 5 -A w wasas
aa bblatant
l a t a n t vviolation
i o l a t i o n of o f not n o t onlyo n ly U United
n ite d N Nations
a t i o n s Security
S e c u r i t y Council
C o u n c il R Resolutions
e s o l u t i o n s on on
K a s h m i r b u t a l s o w a s a g a i n s t t h e s p i r i t o f t h e S i m l a A g r e e m e n t s i g n e d bbetween
Kashmir but also was against the spirit of the Simla Agreement signed e tw e e n
India
I n d i a and and P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n 1972.1 9 7 2 . All A l l tthis, h i s , coupled
c o u p le d w with i t h India’s
I n d i a ’ s obduracy
o b d u r a c y in i n calling
c a llin g
K a s h m i r i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r , h a s s h r u n k s p a c e f o r d i a l o g u e . A b r u t a l m i l i t a r y siege,
Kashmir its internal affair, has shrunk space for dialogue. A brutal military s ie g e ,
uunder
n d e r which
w h ic h K Kashmiris
a s h m i r i s are a re w wilting,
i l t i n g , hash a s compelled
c o m p e l l e d Pakistan P a k i s t a n to t o step
s t e p bback a c k and a n d putput
certain
c e r t a i n conditions
c o n d i t i o n s in i n front
f r o n t of o f India.
I n d i a . Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i officials
o f f i c i a l s have
h a v e said s a i d tthath a t forf o r talks
t a l k s tto
o
resume,
r e s u m e , IndiaI n d i a mustm u s t lift l i f t ttheh e military
m i l i t a r y siege s i e g e in i n IIOJK
I I O J K and a n d reverse
r e v e r s e domicile
d o m i c i l e laws l a w s tthathat
56
are
a r e changing
c h a n g i n g tthe h e demography
d e m o g r a p h y of o f Kashmir.
K a s h m ir .56
In
I n l i g h t o f a l l t h i s , P a k i s t a n ’ s f i r m n e s s i n dealing
light of all this, Pakistan’s firmness in d e a l i n g with w i t h its i t s eastern
e a s t e r n neighbor
n e i g h b o r can can
b e a s c r i b e d t o t h e l a t t e r ’ s d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k s o n t h e c o u n t r y ’s s o v e r e i g n t y and
be ascribed to the latter’s deliberate attacks on the country’s sovereignty a n d eco-eco­
nomic
n o m i c security
s e c u r i t y and a n d tthe h e constant
c o n s t a n t rejection
r e j e c t i o n of o f resolving
r e s o l v i n g the th e K Kashmir
a s h m i r dispute,
d i s p u t e , as as
enshrined in the UN Charter. Analysts and experts
e n s h r in e d in th e U N C h a r te r . A n a ly s ts a n d e x p e r ts h a v e , h o w e v e r , w a r n e d P have, however, warned Paki-
a k i­
stan
s t a n against
a g a i n s t giving
g i v i n g mixed
m i x e d signals s i g n a l s and a n d reading
r e a d i n g IndiaI n d i a iincorrectly.
n c o rre c tly . F Former
o r m e r Pakistani
P a k ista n i
envoy to the United Nations, the United States,
e n v o y to th e U n ite d N a tio n s , th e U n ite d S ta te s , a n d th e U n ite d K in g d o m , M and the United Kingdom, Maleeha
a le e h a
L o d h i a r g u e s t h a t , “ P a k i s t a n m u s t m a i n t a i n i t s r e d l i n e s o n i t s p r i n c i p l e d position
Lodhi argues that, “Pakistan must maintain its red lines on its principled p o s itio n
on
o n Kashmir
K a s h m i r especially
e s p e c i a l l y as a s Indian
I n d i a n media m e d i a reports
r e p o r t s suggest
s u g g e s t tthat hat D Delhi’s
e l h i ’ s expectation
e x p e c t a t i o n is is
57
fforo r Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto o cease
c e a s e insisting
i n s i s t i n g on o n reversal
r e v e r s a l of o f ttheh e illegal
i l l e g a l annexation
a n n e x a t i o n of of K Kashmir.”
a s h m ir .” 57
The Khan government’s Kashmir policy has also been criticized
T h e K h a n g o v e r n m e n t ’s K a s h m i r p o l i c y h a s a l s o b e e n c r i t i c i z e d b y k e e n I n d o - P a k by keen Indo-Pak
wwatchers,
a t c h e r s , to t o include
i n c l u d e fformer o r m e r officials.
o f f i c i a l s . In I n hish is b book
o o k entitled
e n title d H o s t i l i t y , fformer
Hostility,
KJIHGFEDCBA o rm e r P Paki-
a k i­
stani High Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit,
s ta n i H ig h C o m m is s io n e r to I n d ia , A b d u l B a s it, w r ite s : “ S im p ly p u t, th e r e p o r t writes: “Simply put, the report
card
c a r d of o f tthehe P PTIT I government
g o v e r n m e n t on o n Kashmir
K a s h m ir u under
n d e r ImranIm ra n K Khan h a n is i s dismayingly
d i s m a y i n g l y ppoor. o o r.
58
Their
T h e i r ffailures
a i l u r e s on on K Kashmir
a s h m i r will w i l l haunt
h a u n t ImranI m r a n Khan K h a n for f o r yyears
e a r s to t o come.”
c o m e .” 58 H However,
o w e v e r,
26 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
as identified earlier, hostility and recalcitrance continue to plague Indo-Pak rela-
tions. With the aforementioned factors affecting and shaping Pakistan’s India
policy, it is difficult to witness a thaw between the two neighbors going forward.

Partners in Peace, Not War: Islamabad, Washington, and

Kabul
Relations with Afghanistan and the United States have been accorded priority
status by the Khan government. The common agenda item that has guided Islama-
bad’s bilateral relations with Kabul and Washington is the Afghan peace process.
With the United States, the Khan government has engaged on three broad issues:
the Afghan peace process, trade, and the Kashmir issue. With Afghanistan, the
Khan government has focused on the facilitation of trade and connectivity, bor-
der security and counterterrorism, and the Afghan peace process. Let’s succinctly
look at the trajectories of these all-important relations that directly affect Paki-
stan’s fundamental interests.
The on-again-off-again Pak–U.S. relations have seen visible improvements.
Since 2018, they have been marked by interactions at the highest levels. After
indirectly sparring on Twitter over Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror, erstwhile
U.S. President, Donald Trump, and Khan developed a friendly, cordial link with
each other. Trump and Khan had direct, candid conversations on six occasions
that included three in-person meetings.59 While both countries committed them-
selves to increasing economic relations, discussions were geared toward keeping
the Afghan peace process on track. As a facilitator of direct negotiations between
Washington and the Afghan Taliban, Islamabad’s role in concluding the Doha
agreement was instrumental, to say the least. Contacts between Khan and Trump
were followed by frequent exchange of views and close coordination between
civil and military interlocutors from both sides. The stand around which Pakistan
pivoted its conversations with the United States was how continued violence in
Afghanistan is an anathema to peace, stability, and the economic well-being of the
region.60 Pakistan, thus, used the economic security lens to persuade the United
States and other parties to take concrete steps toward peace in Afghanistan. The
same framework was used by Khan to seek Washington’s help in resolving the
Kashmir imbroglio.61
How did the United States respond to Pakistan’s asks and redlines? The United
States did not, directly or indirectly, threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty. That the
United States has not carried out a drone strike inside Pakistan since 2018 is reflec-
tive of its acknowledgement of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty.62 Additionally,
by designating the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorists (SDGTs), the U.S. stamped on Pakistan’s sovereign right to con-
front the separatist group.63 All this is a welcome change from the recent past,
when the United States through numerous drone attacks, the military operation in
Abbottabad, the Raymond Davis saga,64 and the Salala incident, which resulted in
the deaths of 26 Pakistani troops,65 derided the sacrosanctity of Pakistan’s sover-
eignty. Due to all that, relations were hit by an ever-widening trust-deficit. With
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 27
27

tthe
h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s respecting
r e s p e c t i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s sovereignty
s o v e r e i g n t y more
m o r e than
t h a n it
i t did
d i d bbefore,
e f o r e , much
m uch
of
o f ttheh e suspicion
s u s p i c i o n has h a s dissipated,
d i s s i p a t e d , making
m a k in g w way a y ffor o r mending
m e n d i n g ffences. en ces.
In
I n i t s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , P a k i s t a n has
its conversations with the United States, Pakistan h a s increasingly
i n c r e a s i n g l y stresseds tr e s s e d
th e n e e d f o r c h a n g in g th e n a tu r e o f P a k -- U .S . r e la tio n s f r o m a
the need for changing the nature of Pak–-U.S. relations from a security-centric
s e c u r ity - c e n tr ic
66
one
o n e tto o oneo n e that t h a t is i s driven
d r i v e n bby y ttrade
r a d e anda n d investment.
i n v e s t m e n t . 6 6 In I n hish i s congratulatory
c o n g r a t u l a t o r y tweet tw e e t
addressing
a d d r e s s i n g U . S . P r e s i d e n t J o e B i d e n , K h a n e x p r e s s e d h i s d e s i r e to
U.S. President Joe Biden, Khan expressed his desire t o solidify
s o l i d i f y Pak–Pak-
UU.S.. S . relations
r e l a t i o n s through
t h r o u g h ttrade r a d e and a n d economic
e c o n o m i c engagement,
e n g a g e m e n t , somethings o m e t h i n g that t h a t he h e hadhad
67
accentuated
a c c e n t u a t e d in i n his
h i s 2020
2 0 2 0 article
a r t i c l e ini n The h e Washington
KJIHGFEDCBA
T W a s h in g to n P o s t . 6 1 Outlining
Post. O u t l i n i n g tthe h e contours
c o n to u r s
of
o f hish i s vvision,
i s i o n , KhanK han w wrote
r o t e thatth a t P Pakistan
a k ista n w wants
a n t s to t o achieve
a c h i e v e development
d e v e l o p m e n t and and p pros-
ro s­
perity through connectivity and economic diplomacy.
p e r ity th r o u g h c o n n e c tiv ity a n d e c o n o m ic d ip lo m a c y . H e a d d e d th a t d is c u s s io n s He added that discussions
with
w i t h “the “ t h e U.S.U . S . International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development
D e v e lo p m e n t F Finance
i n a n c e Corporation
C o r p o r a t i o n on o n these
t h e s e issues
iss u e s
68
have
h a v e b e e n e n c o u r a g i n g .” 6 8 T h a t P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d a p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e ffrom
been encouraging.” That Pakistan received a positive response r o m the th e
UUnited
n i t e d States
S t a t e s on o n shoring
s h o r i n g up u p ttrade
r a d e is i s indicative
i n d i c a t i v e of o f tthe
h e fact
f a c t tthat,
h a t , ini n tthehe p pastast 2 2 y years,
e a rs,
tthe
h e latter
l a t t e r hash a s not n o t discredited
d i s c r e d i t e d Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s insistence
i n s i s t e n c e on o n iimproving
m p r o v i n g iits t s economic
e c o n o m ic
security
s e c u r i t y p r o f i l e . I s l a m a b a d , h o w e v e r , s n u b b e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w h e n it
profile. Islamabad, however, snubbed the United States, when i t criticized
c r itic iz e d
69
tthe
h e cornerstone
c o r n e r s t o n e of o f economic
e c o n o m i c security,s e c u r i t y , CPEC.
C P E C .69
In
I n terms
t e r m s of o f conflict-resolution
c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and a n d bbetween
e t w e e n IndiaI n d i a and and P Pakistan,
a k is ta n ,
the United States has extended cooperation to
th e U n ite d S ta te s h a s e x te n d e d c o o p e r a tio n to P a k is ta n . B y a g r e e in g to u Pakistan. By agreeing to usese a a
Pakistan-facilitated reconciliation process to bring about
P a k is ta n - f a c ilita te d r e c o n c ilia tio n p r o c e s s to b r in g a b o u t a n e n d to th e d e s tr u c tiv e an end to the destructive
wwar a r ini n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , tthe h e United
U n i t e d StatesS t a t e s considerably
c o n s i d e r a b l y lessened
l e s s e n e d tthe h e mistrust
m i s t r u s t bbetweene tw e e n
t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . T e n s i o n s i n P a k - U . S . r e l a t i o n s , o v e r t h e p a s t d e c a d e or
the two countries. Tensions in Pak–U.S. relations, over the past decade o r so,s o , had
had
stemmed
s t e m m e d f r o m d i s a g r e e m e n t a n d b i c k e r i n g o v e r h o w t o t a c k l e t h e c o n u n d r u m iin
from disagreement and bickering over how to tackle the conundrum n
Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . This T h i s positive
p o s i t i v e tturn u r n hash a s bbrought
r o u g h t bback ack a a degree
d e g r e e of o f calmness
c a l m n e s s into i n t o Pak–
Pak-
UU.S.. S . engagements.
e n g a g e m e n t s . Though T h o u g h tties i e s have
h a v e not n o t seen
seen a a dramatic
d r a m a t i c tturnaround,
u r n a r o u n d , they t h e y havehave
not
n o t h i t r o c k b o t t o m . T h i s i s p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e b o t h c o u n t r i e s a r e m o r e or
hit rock bottom. This is primarily because both countries are more o r less
l e s s onon
tthe
h e same
sam e p page
a g e whenw h e n it i t comes
c o m e s tto o tterminating
e r m i n a t i n g tthe he w war a r ini n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . Other O t h e r tthan han
getting
g e ttin g a a U.S.
U .S . b buy-in
u y - i n on o n the t h e Afghan
A f g h a n peace p e a c e process,
p ro c e ss, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n has,
h a s , despite
d e s p i t e Wash- W ash­
ington’s
i n g t o n ’ s strategic
s tra te g ic p partnership
a r t n e r s h i p with w i t h NewN e w Delhi,D e lh i, b been
e e n able
a b l e tto o garner
g a r n e r U.S.U .S . attention
a tte n tio n
on
o n tthehe b boiling
o i l i n g situation
s i t u a t i o n in i n IIOJK.
I I O J K . Former
F o rm e r U U.S.. S . President,
P r e s i d e n t , in i n his
h i s conversations
c o n v e r s a t i o n s with w ith
Khan, offered to mediate between India and Pakistan
K h a n , o f f e r e d to m e d ia te b e tw e e n I n d ia a n d P a k is ta n to p u t o u t f ir e s in K a s h m ir . to put out fires in Kashmir.
Ties
T ie s w with i t h tthehe U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s haveh a v e steadily
s t e a d i l y ameliorated.
a m e l i o r a t e d . It It w would
o u l d not not b bee wwrong ro n g
t o c r e d i t t h i s t o W a s h i n g t o n r e s p e c t i n g P a k i s t a n ’ s s o v e r e i g n t y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g the
to credit this to Washington respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, understanding th e
vitality
v i t a l i t y of o f economic
e c o n o m i c security,s e c u r i t y , and a n d helping
h e l p i n g in i n resolving
r e s o l v i n g conflicts.
c o n f l i c t s . That
T h a t said, s a i d , with
w ith
Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d looking l o o k i n g to t o fundamentally
f u n d a m e n t a l l y reset r e s e t the
t h e entire
e n t i r e gamut
g a m u t of o f its
i t s ties
t i e s with
w i t h Wash-W ash­
ington,
i n g t o n , i t w o u l d t a k e s e r i o u s e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e I n d o - U . S . s t r a t e g i c e m b r a c e , if
it would take serious exceptions to the Indo-U.S. strategic embrace, i f it,
it,
i n a n y m a n n e r , i m p i n g e s o n i t s s o v e r e i g n t y a n d e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y . P a k i s t a n has
in any manner, impinges on its sovereignty and economic security. Pakistan has
raised
r a i s e d itsi t s concerns
c o n c e r n s over o v e r tthe h e negative
n e g a t i v e effects
e f f e c t s ono n strategic
s t r a t e g i c stability
s t a b i l i t y ofo f India’s
I n d i a ’ s access
access
70
t o a d v a n c e d m i l i t a r y h a r d w a r e , t e c h n o l o g i e s , a n d k n o w l e d g e .7 0 F o r Islamabad,
to advanced military hardware, technologies, and knowledge. For Is la m a b a d , a a
bbuoyant
u o y a n t and a n d reckless
r e c k l e s s India,
I n d i a , oneo n e tthath a t is i s laced
l a c e d with
w i t h U.S.U . S . weapons,
w e a p o n s , presentsp re s e n ts a a ffor-
o r­
midable
m i d a b l e threat.
th re a t. P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i officials
o f f i c i a l s have
h a v e communicated
c o m m u n i c a t e d this t h i s ttoo ttheir
h e i r counterparts
c o u n t e r p a r t s in in
the United
th e U n ite d S ta te s . States.
However,
H o w e v e r , the t h e relative
r e l a t i v e improvement
i m p r o v e m e n t iin n tties
ie s b between
e t w e e n tthe h e twot w o countries
c o u n t r i e s during d u rin g
t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f P r e s i d e n t T r u m p ’ s t e n u r e h a s n o t g i v e n i m p e t u s tto
the latter part of President Trump’s tenure has not given impetus o their
t h e i r equation
e q u a tio n
during
d u r i n g President
P r e s i d e n t Biden.B i d e n . As A s opposed
o p p o s e d tto o direct
d i r e c t lines
l i n e s of o f communications
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s bbetween e tw e e n
K h a n a n d T r u m p , K h a n a n d B i d e n h a v e n o t i n t e r a c t e d yyet,
Khan and Trump, Khan and Biden have not interacted e t , despite
d e s p i t e the t h e ffact a c t tthat
hat
28
28 Syed Ali
Syed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

the
th e w withdrawal
i t h d r a w a l of o f U.S.
U . S . forces
f o r c e s ffromr o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n requires
re q u ire s a a closer
c l o s e r coordination
c o o rd in a tio n
b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . B y n o t i n v i t i n g K h a n t o a c l i m a t e change
between the two countries. By not inviting Khan to a climate c h a n g e confer-
c o n fer-
e n c e 7 1 and a n d ostensibly
o s t e n s i b l y llimiting
i m i t i n g official
o f f i c i a l interactions
i n t e r a c t i o n s ttoo discussing
d i s c u s s i n g the t h e situation
s i t u a t i o n in
71
ence in
Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , tthe he B Biden
i d e n Administration
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n has h a s shown
s h o w n its its u unwillingness
n w i l l i n g n e s s tto o sees e e Paki-
P a k i­
72
stan
s t a n tthrough
h ro u g h a a lens
l e n s other
o t h e r tthan
h a n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . 7 2 That T h a t said,
s a i d , though
t h o u g h focused
f o c u s e d on o n theth e
Afghan imbroglio, parleys between the National Security Advisors
A f g h a n im b r o g lio , p a r le y s b e tw e e n th e N a tio n a l S e c u r ity A d v is o r s a n d s p y c h ie f s and spy chiefs
73
have
have b been
e e n dubbed
dubbed p positive
o s i t i v e bby y b both
o t h sides.
s id e s .73
That
T h a t s a i d , a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s l e a v e s A f g h a n i s t a n , tties
said, as the United States leaves Afghanistan, ie s bbetween
e t w e e n the t h e two
t w o coun-coun­
tries
t r i e s a r e a g a i n b e i n g i m p e d e d b y s y s t e m i c a n d s t r u c t u r a l i m p e d i m e n t s . With
are again being impeded by systemic and structural impediments. W i t h theth e
United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s wanting
w a n t i n g morem o r e out o u t ofof P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n Afghanistan,
A fg h a n ista n , b both
o t h ini n tterms
e r m s of o f pull-
p u ll­
74
ing
i n g theth e p plug
l u g on o n ttheh e Taliban
T a l i b a n 7 4 andand p providing
r o v i d i n g thatt h a t country
c o u n t r y support
s u p p o r t iin n maintaining
m a in ta in in g
75
Over-the-Horizon
O v e r - t h e - H o r i z o n (OTH) ( O T H ) counterterrorism
c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m capabilities,
c a p a b ilitie s ,75 P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s again
a g a i n ffaced
aced
with choices. So far, Islamabad’s response has been directed
w i th c h o ic e s . S o f a r , I s la m a b a d ’s r e s p o n s e h a s b e e n d ir e c te d b y K h a n ’s c o n s is te n tby Khan’s consistent
views
v i e w s on o n Pak–U.S.
P a k - U . S . relations,
r e la tio n s , w which
h ic h p place
la c e P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s sovereignty
s o v e r e i g n t y at a t ttheir
h e i r center.
c e n te r .
In
I n a f l u r r y o f i n t e r v i e w s , a r t i c l e s , a n d s p e e c h e s , K h a n h a s r e i t e r a t e d h i s stand
a flurry of interviews, articles, and speeches, Khan has reiterated his s t a n d that,
th a t,
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n will w ill b bee aa ppartner
a r t n e r iin n peace,
p e a c e , notn o t war,
w a r , andand w willi l l not
n o t bbe e a a hired
h i r e d gun g u n of o f the
th e
United
U n i t e d States.
S t a t e s . Speaking
S p e a k i n g in i n tthe
h e National
N a t i o n a l Assembly,
A s s e m b ly , K Khan h a n said:
s a i d : “I
“ I asked
a s k e d tthath a t did
d id
they
t h e y evene v e n acknowledge
a c k n o w l e d g e our o u r losses?
l o s s e s ? Instead,
I n s t e a d , tthey
hey b blamed
l a m e d everything
e v e r y t h i n g on o n uus.s . II want
w ant
to
t o a s s u r e t h a t w e w o u l d n e v e r c o m p r o m i s e o n o u r n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y a n d integ-
assure that we would never compromise on our national sovereignty and in te g ­
76
rity
r i t y fforo r anyone
a n y o n e or o r any
a n y country.”
c o u n t r y . ” 7 6 This
T h i s remark
re m a rk w was a s made
m a d e apropos
a p r o p o s of o f tthe
h e debate
d e b a te
on
o n P a k i s t a n g i v i n g b a s i n g r i g h t s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . R e s p o n d i n g t o a question
Pakistan giving basing rights to the United States. Responding to a q u e s tio n
on
on b basing
a s i n g rights
r i g h t s in
i n his
h i s Axios
A x i o s interview,
in te rv ie w , K Khanh a n emphatically
e m p h a t i c a l l y said:
s a i d : “Absolutely
“ A b s o l u t e l y not. n o t.
There
T h e r e i s n o w a y w e a r e g o i n g t o a l l o w a n y b a s e s , a n y s o r t o f a c t i o n ffrom
is no way we are going to allow any bases, any sort of action r o m Pakistani
P a k ista n i
77
territory
t e r r i t o r y into
i n t o Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . Absolutely
A b s o l u t e l y not.”n o t . ” 7 7 Khan
K h a n doubled-down
d o u b l e d - d o w n on o n hish i s outright
o u trig h t
refusal to grant basing rights to the United
r e f u s a l to g r a n t b a s in g r ig h ts to th e U n ite d S ta te s . I n a W States. In a a s h i n g t o n P o s t piece
Washington
KJIHGFEDCBA Post p ie c e
entitled
e n t i t l e d IImran
m ran K Khan:
han: P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s ready
r e a d y to t o be
be a a ppartner
a r t n e r ffor o r ppeace
e a c e in in A Afghanistan,
fg h a n is ta n ,
but
b u t we we w willill n not
ot h host
o s t U.S. b a s e s , Khan
U . S . bases, K h a n linked
l i n k e d tthe h e decision
d e c i s i o n tto o disallow
d i s a l l o w tthe he U United
n ite d
States from having bases in Pakistan with the country
S ta te s f r o m h a v in g b a s e s i n P a k is ta n w i th th e c o u n tr y h a v in g lo s t h e a v ily i n b having lost heavily in both
o th
men and material by partnering that country in conflict
m e n a n d m a te r ia l b y p a r tn e rin g th a t c o u n tr y in c o n f lic t b e f o r e . H e c o n te n d e d before. He contended

If
If P Pakistan
a k i s t a n werew e r e to
t o agree
a g r e e tto
o host
h o s t U.S.
U . S . bbases,
a s e s , ffrom
ro m w which
h i c h tto
o bbomb
o m b Afghani-
A fg h a n i­
stan,
s t a n , a n d a n A f g h a n c i v i l w a r e n s u e d , P a k i s t a n w o u l d b e t a r g e t e d for
and an Afghan civil war ensued, Pakistan would be targeted f o r revenge
re v e n g e
by
b y terrorists
t e r r o r i s t s again.
a g a i n . We
W e simply
s i m p l y cannot
c a n n o t afford
a f f o r d tthis.
h i s . We
W e have
h a v e already
a lre a d y ppaid
a i d ttoo
oo
78
heavy a price.
h e a v y a p r i c e .7 8

All
A l l tthese
h e s e have
h a v e bbrought
r o u g h t ttoo tthe
h e fforeo r e inherent
i n h e r e n t issues
i s s u e s that
t h a t underlie
u n d e rlie P Pak–U.S.
a k - U . S . rela-
r e la ­
79
tions
t i o n s w h i l e e x p l a i n i n g t h e i r l i m i t e d s c o p e . 7 9 T h u s , i t i s r e a s o n a b l e to
while explaining their limited scope. Thus, it is reasonable t o argue
a r g u e tthat
hat
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s b bid
i d ttoo change
c h a n g e tthe
h e ttrajectory
r a j e c t o r y ofo f this
t h i s important,
i m p o r t a n t , old
o l d relationship
r e la tio n s h ip w will
i l l bbe
e
challenged
c h a l l e n g e d bby y ttactical
a c t i c a l as
as w well
e l l as
a s systemic
s y s t e m i c snags,
s n a g s , especially
e s p e c i a l l y in
i n ttheh e context
c o n t e x t of
o f the
th e
ongoing
o n g o i n g mayhem
m a y h e m in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and
a n d thet h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s wanting
w a n t i n g Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto
o fur-
fu r­
80
ther help in ensuring that the Taliban do not militarily seize
t h e r h e lp i n e n s u r in g th a t th e T a lib a n d o n o t m ilita r ily s e iz e c o n tr o l o f K a b u l.80control of Kabul.
Related
R e l a t e d to
t o all
a l l this,
t h i s , tthe
he KKhan
h a n government
g o v e r n m e n t has h a s highlighted
h i g h l i g h t e d the
t h e importance
i m p o r t a n c e ofo f peace
peace
in Afghanistan in the context of economic connectivity. The economic
in A f g h a n is ta n in th e c o n te x t o f e c o n o m ic c o n n e c tiv ity . T h e e c o n o m ic c o n n e c tiv ­ connectiv-
ity
i t y and
a n d security
s e c u r i t y angle
a n g l e has
h a s resulted
r e s u l t e d ini n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n laying
l a y i n g more
m o r e emphasis
e m p h a s i s on o n opening
o p e n in g
conduits for trade with Afghanistan. Since the opening
c o n d u its f o r tr a d e w ith A f g h a n is ta n . S in c e th e o p e n in g o f th e T o r k h a m b of the Torkham border
o rd er
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 29
29

crossing
c r o s s i n g in i n 2019,
2 0 1 9 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s taken
t a k e n further
f u r t h e r steps
s t e p s tto o ffacilitate
a c i l i t a t e trade
tra d e b between
e t w e e n the th e
two countries. The establishment of small markets on
tw o c o u n tr ie s . T h e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f s m a ll m a rk e ts o n th e P a k - A f g h a n b o r d e r a n d the Pak–Afghan border and
ttheh e allowance
a l l o w a n c e of o f trade
t r a d e tthrough
h r o u g h tthe h e Chaman
C h a m a n bborder, o r d e r , evene v e n duringd u r i n g the t h e height
h e i g h t of o f theth e
COVID-19
C O V I D - 1 9 p a n d e m i c , a r e s o m e o f t h e e x a m p l e s t h a t p o i n t t o P a k i s t a n ’ s p u s h tto
pandemic, are some of the examples that point to Pakistan’s push o
81
alter
a l t e r tthe
h e dynamics
d y n a m i c s of ofP Pak–Afghan
a k - A f g h a n relations.
r e la tio n s .81 M Moreover,
o r e o v e r , in i n 2020,
2 0 2 0 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n alloweda llo w e d
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n to to u use
s e Gwadar
G w a d a r port p o r t for f o r ttransit
r a n s i t trade.
t r a d e . In I n July
J u l y 2020,2 0 2 0 , thet h e ffirst i r s t consign-
c o n s ig n ­
ment of goods docked at Gwadar port and later was
m e n t o f g o o d s d o c k e d a t G w a d a r p o r t a n d la te r w a s tr a n s p o r te d to A f g h a n is ta n .transported to Afghanistan.
82
PPakistan
a k i s t a n termed
t e r m e d it i t as
as a a milestone.
m ile s to n e .82 P Pivoted
i v o t e d around
a r o u n d the t h e need
n e e d for f o r pouncing
p o u n c i n g on o n the th e
connectivity bonanza, Pakistan has intensified its efforts
c o n n e c tiv ity b o n a n z a , P a k is ta n h a s in te n s if ie d its e f f o rts to p u s h w a r r in g p a r tie s to push warring parties
to
t o chalkc h a l k out o u t an a n Afghan-led
A f g h a n - l e d and a n d Afghan-owned
A f g h a n - o w n e d modus m odus v vivendi
i v e n d i ffor o r Afghanistan.
A fg h a n ista n .
Engagements
E n g a g e m e n t s w i t h t h e A f g h a n T a l i b a n h a v e b e e n s u p p l e m e n t e d bby
with the Afghan Taliban have been supplemented y those
t h o s e with w ith
the Afghan government and other factions in Afghanistan.
th e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d o th e r f a c tio n s i n A f g h a n is ta n . I n h is m a id e n v In his maiden visit
i s i t tto
o
Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , Khan K han p pledged
l e d g e d all-out
a l l - o u t support
s u p p o r t to t o the
t h e Afghan
A fg h a n p peace
e a c e process
p ro c e ss w whileh ile u urg-
rg ­
83
ing
i n g all a ll pparties
a r t i e s to
t o end
e n d vviolence
i o l e n c e in i n ttheh e war-torn
w a r - t o r n country.
c o u n t r y . 8 3 Thus,T h u s , economic
e c o n o m i c security s e c u rity
i s t h e p r i s m t h a t P a k i s t a n w a n t s t o l o o k A f g h a n i s t a n t h r o u g h . With
is the prism that Pakistan wants to look Afghanistan through. W i t h Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n
having
h a v i n g not not p presented
r e s e n te d a a serious
s e r i o u s challenge
c h a l l e n g e tto o P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s economic
e c o n o m i c security, s e c u r i t y , roomro o m
has
h a s b e e n c r e a t e d f o r c o n s t r u c t i v e d i s c u s s i o n s o n i m p o r t a n t b i l a t e r a l issues.
been created for constructive discussions on important bilateral i s s u e s . ThatT hat
said,
s a i d , Afghanistan’s
A f g h a n i s t a n ’ s inability
i n a b i l i t y ttoo p pull
u l l the
t h e plug
p l u g on o n inimical
i n i m i c a l elements
e l e m e n t s that, t h a t , ffromr o m theirth e ir
safe
s a f e havens
h a v e n s in i n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , are a r e targeting
t a r g e t i n g Pakistan
P a k i s t a n bbrings r i n g s to t o the
t h e ffore o r e threats
t h r e a t s to to
b o t h s o v e r e i g n t y a n d e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y . I n a j o i n t d o c u m e n t r e l e a s e d a f t e r Khan’s
both sovereignty and economic security. In a joint document released after K h a n ’s
vvisit
i s i t tto
o K Kabul,
a b u l, b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s committed
c o m m i t t e d themselves
t h e m s e l v e s tto o disallowing
d i s a l l o w i n g ttheir h e i r tterrito-
e r rito ­
84
ries
r i e s ffrom
ro m b being
e i n g used
u s e d ffor o r tterrorism.
e r r o r i s m . 8 4 However,
H o w e v e r , ttensions e n sio n s b between
e t w e e n tthe h e ttwo w o countries
c o u n tr ie s
have
h a v e exacerbated
e x a c e r b a t e d due d u e tto o skirmishes
s k i r m i s h e s on o n the t h e Pak–Afghan
P a k - A f g h a n bborder, o r d e r , outlining
o u t l i n i n g tthe h e vvalue
a lu e
85
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n a t t a c h e s t o t h e i n v i o l a b i l i t y o f i t s b o r d e r s . 8 5 A i m e d a t s a f e g u a r d i n g its
attaches to the inviolability of its borders. Aimed at safeguarding its
sovereignty
s o v e r e i g n t y and a n d integrity
i n t e g r i t y ono n itsi t s territory
t e r r i t o r y bbordering
o r d e r i n g Afghanistan,
A fg h a n ista n , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s rap-
ra p ­
idly
i d l y completing
c o m p l e t i n g the t h e process
p r o c e s s of o f fencing
f e n c i n g the t h e Pak–Afghan
P a k - A f g h a n bborder. o r d e r . According
A c c o r d i n g to t o tthehe
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Army, A r m y , tthe h e fencing
f e n c i n g project
p r o j e c t was w a s in i n its
i t s ffinishing
i n i s h i n g stages
s t a g e s as a s ofo f October
O c t o b e r 2020. 2020.
Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d has h a s dubbed
d u b b e d ffencing
e n c i n g of o f tthehe b border
o rd e r w withi t h Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n necessaryn e c e s s a r y tto o reduc-
re d u c­
ing
i n g t h e b i g g e s t c a t a l y s t o f t e r r o r i s m i n P a k i s t a n . T h e p r o j e c t h a s g a i n e d more
the biggest catalyst of terrorism in Pakistan. The project has gained m o re
86
traction,
t r a c t i o n , given
g i v e n an an u upsurge
p s u r g e of o f tterror-related
e r r o r - r e l a t e d incidents.
i n c i d e n t s . 8 6 Though
T h o u g h Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s taken
ta k e n
aa series
s e r i e s ofo f measures
m e a s u r e s tto o make
m a k e the th e P Pak–Afghan
a k -A fg h a n b border
o rd er a a gateway
g a t e w a y for f o r peace,
peace, p pros-
ro s­
p e r i t y , a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , i t h a s r e m a i n e d f o c u s e d o n i t s e f f e c t i v e m a n a g e m e n t and
perity, and development, it has remained focused on its effective management and
control
c o n t r o l so s o as a s ttoo put
put a a lid
l i d ono n tterrorism
e r r o r i s m and a n d other
o t h e r subversive
s u b v e r s i v e activities.
a c tiv itie s .
Thus,
T h u s , it i t is
i s quite
q u i t e noticeable
n o t i c e a b l e tthat h a t Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e la tio n s w with i t h the
t h e United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s and and
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n h a v e b e e n s e n s i t i v e t o s o v e r e i g n t y , e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y , a n d tthe
have been sensitive to sovereignty, economic security, and h e vvalue
a lu e
of
o f conflict-resolution.
c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n . All A l l this
t h i s portends
p o r t e n d s volatility
v o l a t i l i t y in i n Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’s tties i e s with
w ith b both
o th
Washington and Kabul. In fact, ties between Kabul and
W a s h in g to n a n d K a b u l. I n f a c t, tie s b e tw e e n K a b u l a n d I s la m a b a d h a v e v itia te d . Islamabad have vitiated.
The
T h e Afghan
A f g h a n government
g o v e r n m e n t has h a s whipped
w h ip p e d u up p its
i t s criticism
c r i t i c i s m of of P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , accusing
a c c u s i n g it i t of
of
being behind Taliban’s relentless surge toward Kabul. At
b e i n g b e h i n d T a l i b a n ’s r e l e n t l e s s s u r g e t o w a r d K a b u l . A t a r e g i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e a regional conference
iin n U Uzbekistan,
z b e k i s t a n , Afghan
A f g h a n President
P r e s i d e n t Ashraf
A s h r a f Ghani G h a n i lashed l a s h e d out o u t at a t Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , bblaming l a m i n g it it
f o r e x t e n d i n g a l l - o u t s u p p o r t t o t h e A f g h a n T a l i b a n . I n t h e v e r y c o n f e r e n c e , Khan
for extending all-out support to the Afghan Taliban. In the very conference, K han
snapped
snapped b backa c k anda n d expressed
e x p r e s s e d his h i s disappointment
d i s a p p o i n t m e n t over o v e r Ghani’s
G h a n i ’s remarks,
r e m a r k s , arguing a rg u in g
t h a t P a k i s t a n s t a n d s t o l o s e s h o u l d A f g h a n d e s c e n d i n t o c h a o s a n d that
that Pakistan stands to lose should Afghan descend into chaos and t h a t it i t has
h a s tried
tr ie d
iitsts b best
e s t to
t o help
h e l p reduce
re d u c e v violence
i o l e n c e and and p push
u s h tthe h e Taliban
T a l i b a n ttoward
o w a rd a a ppolitical
o l i t i c a l settlement
s e ttle m e n t
87
in
i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . 8 7 While
W h ile P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , with
w ith K Khanh a n in i n ttheh e lead,
l e a d , frames
f r a m e s its i t s Afghan
A f g h a n policy p o l i c y KJIHGFEDCBA
30
30 Syed Ali
Syed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

88 89
as
a s one
o n e ofo f neutrality,
n e u t r a l i t y , 8 8 rising
r i s i n g levels
l e v e l s of
o f vviolence
i o l e n c e in
i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n 8 9 will
w ill b but
u t strain
s tra in
Pak–Afghan relations while also affecting Pak–U.S. relations. Most of Pakistan’s
P a k - A f g h a n r e l a t i o n s w h i l e a l s o a f f e c t i n g P a k - U . S . r e l a t i o n s . M o s t o f P a k i s t a n ’s
concerns
c o n c e r n s will
w i l l germinate
g e r m i n a t e from f r o m Afghan
A f g h a n soils o il b becoming
e c o m i n g more
m o r e ffertile
e r t i l e for
f o r elements
e le m e n ts
inimical
i n i m i c a l t o t h e c o u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g a r e i n v i g o r a t e d T e h r e e k - i - T a l i b a n Pakistan
to the country, including a reinvigorated Tehreek-i-Taliban P a k ista n
( T T P ) . 9 0 Violence
V i o l e n c e on o n Pakistan western
e s t e r n flank
f l a n k would undermine Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s sover-
90
(TTP). P a k ista n w w o u ld u n d e r m in e P so v e r­
eignty and economic security, protection of which lies at the heart of
e i g n t y a n d e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y , p r o t e c t i o n o f w h i c h l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f P a k i s t a n ’sPakistan’s
foreign
f o r e i g n and
a n d security
s e c u r ity p policy
o l i c y framework.
fra m e w o rk .

The Sino-Pakistan Entente

Under
U n d e r Khan, K h a n , Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’ s relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h itsi t s neighbor
n e i g h b o r and a n d strategic
s t r a t e g i c partner,
p a r t n e r , Bei-
B e i­
j i n g , h a v e g o n e f r o m s t r e n g t h t o s t r e n g t h . T h e e q u a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o countries
jing, have gone from strength to strength. The equation between the two c o u n tr ie s
has
has b been
e e n marked
m a rk e d b byy higher
h i g h e r levels
l e v e l s ofo f cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n and a n d diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c support.
s u p p o r t . TheseT hese
two
t w o e l e m e n t s h a v e a l i g n e d w e l l w i t h t h e s a c r o s a n c t i t y o f P a k i s t a n ’ s sovereignty
elements have aligned well with the sacrosanctity of Pakistan’s s o v e r e ig n ty
and
a n d the t h e centrality
c e n t r a l i t y ofo f economic
e c o n o m i c security.
s e c u r i t y . China’s
C h i n a ’s outright
o u t r i g h t diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c support
s u p p o r t tto o
Pakistan in international fora has complemented Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n in in te rn a tio n a l f o r a h a s c o m p le m e n te d P a k is ta n ’s c o n f lic t- re s o lu tio n conflict-resolution
initiatives.
i n i t i a t i v e s . This
T h i s has h a s deepened
d e e p e n e d the t h e even-otherwise
e v e n - o t h e r w i s e friendly
f r i e n d l y relations
r e la tio n s b between
e t w e e n the th e
two
t w o c o u n t r i e s . I t i s p e r t i n e n t t o b r i e f l y e l u c i d a t e h o w B e i j i n g h a s a i d e d P a k i s t a n in
countries. It is pertinent to briefly elucidate how Beijing has aided Pakistan in
advancing
a d v a n c i n g each e a c h of o f tthese
h e s e objectives.
o b je c tiv e s .
China
C h i n a has has p provided
r o v i d e d cushion
c u s h i o n tto o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n as a s ffar a r asa s economic
e c o n o m i c security s e c u r i t y is i s con-
con­
cerned
c e r n e d i n a n u m b e r o f w a y s . U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , C P E C h a s b e e n t h e b i g g e s t exem-
in a number of ways. Unsurprisingly, CPEC has been the biggest exem ­
plar
p l a r of o f the
t h e economy-led
e c o n o m y - l e d strategic
s tr a te g ic b brotherhood
r o th e r h o o d b between
e t w e e n China C h i n a and a n d Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . After
A fte r
91
highly
h i g h l y t o u t e d h i c c u p s , c o n t r o v e r s i e s , a n d s l o w d o w n s ,9 1 d u r i n g t h e start
touted hiccups, controversies, and slowdowns, during the s t a r t ofof K Khan’s
h a n ’s
tenure,
t e n u r e , CPEC C P E C picked p ic k e d u upp theth e p pace
a c e in i n 2020.
2020. N Not o t only
o n ly b back-to-back
a c k - t o - b a c k deals d e a l s were w e re
92
signed
s i g n e d and a n d Special
S p e c ia l E Economic
c o n o m i c Zones Z o n e s opened,
o p e n e d , 9 2 the t h e mega-project
m e g a - p r o j e c t entered e n t e r e d phase
p h ase 2 2
93
as
as w well e l l and
a n d tthath a t too,
t o o , despite
d e s p i t e tthe h e COVID-19-induced
C O V I D - 1 9 - i n d u c e d crises c r i s e s and
a n d constraints.
c o n s t r a i n t s . 9 3 Pri-
P r i­
oritizing
o r i t i z i n g tthe h e creation
c r e a t i o n anda n d facilitation
f a c i l i t a t i o n ofo f SEZs,
S E Z s , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s looking
l o o k i n g up u p tto o CPEC
C P E C tto o
rekindle industrialization and job creation, something that
r e k in d le in d u s tr ia liz a tio n a n d j o b c r e a tio n , s o m e th in g th a t K h a n h a s la id e m p h a ­ Khan has laid empha-
94
sis
s i s ono n since
s in c e b becoming
e c o m i n g the th e P Prime
r i m e Minister.
M i n i s t e r .9 4 China
C h i n a has h a s alsoa l s o stepped
s t e p p e d up u p to t o the
th e p plate
la te
95
in
i n b a i l i n g o u t P a k i s t a n , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n t h e l a t t e r w a s s t a r i n g a t d e f a u l t . 9 5 Bei-
bailing out Pakistan, especially when the latter was staring at default. B e i­
jjing’s
i n g ’s timely
t i m e l y deposit
d e p o s i t of o f money
m o n e y in i n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s State
S t a t e Bank
B a n k saved s a v e d tthe h e day
d a y ffor or a a gov-
gov­
ernment
e r n m e n t t h a t w a s i n t h e g r i p s o f e x t e r n a l a c c o u n t d e f i c i t . K h a n h a s t i m e a n d again
that was in the grips of external account deficit. Khan has time and a g a in
96
appreciated
a p p r e c i a t e d China C h i n a ffor o r saving
s a v i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s economy
e c o n o m y in i n ttheh e midst
m i d s t of of a a crisis.
c r i s i s .9 6 China
C h in a
has, as a harbinger of economic and diplomatic backing,
h a s , a s a h a r b in g e r o f e c o n o m ic a n d d ip lo m a tic b a c k in g , c o m p e n s a te d P a k is ta n compensated Pakistan
at
at a a ttimeim e w when
h e n tthe h e latter
l a t t e r had
h a d tto o repay
r e p a y US$1
U S$1 b billion
i l l i o n out
o u t of o f the
th e U US$3S$3 b billion
i l l i o n dollar
d o lla r
97
loan
l o a n t o S a u d i A r a b i a .9 7 T h a t B e i j i n g e x t r i c a t e d P a k i s t a n w h e n t h e l a t t e r apparently
to Saudi Arabia. That Beijing extricated Pakistan when the latter a p p a r e n tly
landed
l a n d e d itselfi t s e l f in
in a a diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c row r o w withw i t h Saudi
S a u d i Arabia
A r a b i a is is y yete t another
a n o t h e r corroboration
c o r r o b o r a tio n
of
o f t h e f o r m e r ’ s c o m m i t m e n t t o t a k i n g t i e s w i t h t h e l a t t e r fforward.
the former’s commitment to taking ties with the latter o r w a r d . In I n addition
a d d itio n
to
t o that,
t h a t , tthe h e entry
e n t r y of o f the
th e P Protocol
r o t o c o l to
KJIHGFEDCBA to A Amend
m e n d the th e F Free
r e e Trade
T rade A Agreement
g r e e m e n t betweenb e tw e e n
C h i n a a n d P a k i s t a n i n t o f o r c e h a s p a v e d t h e w a y f o r g r e a t e r m a r k e t a c c e s s , ttrade
China and Pakistan into force has paved the way for greater market access, ra d e
98
liberalization,
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , anda n d protection
p r o t e c t i o n of o f local
l o c a l industries.
i n d u s t r i e s . 9 8 InI n consonance
consonance w withi t h PTI’s
P T I ’ s 2018 2018
manifesto
m a n i f e s t o and and K Khan’s
h a n ’ s own
o w n inclination,
i n c l i n a t i o n , the
t h e second
second p phase
h a s e of o f ttheh e FTAFTA b between
e t w e e n the th e
two
t w o c o u n t r i e s i s b e i n g t e r m e d a s a m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t i n t e r m s o f increasing
countries is being termed as a marked improvement in terms of in c r e a s in g
access
a c c e s s for fo r P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i exporters.
e x p o r t e r s . According
A c c o r d i n g tto o aa study
s t u d y commissioned
c o m m i s s i o n e d bby y theth e P Paki-
a k i­
stan Business Council, the CPFTA2 offers substantial improvements
s t a n B u s i n e s s C o u n c i l , t h e C P F T A 2 o f f e r s s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t s i n P a k i s t a n ’s in Pakistan’s
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 31
31

ttariff
a r i f f access
a c c e s s to
t o China.
C h i n a . As
A s an
a n analyst
a n a l y s t noted,
n o t e d , “In
“ I n order
o r d e r tto
o capitalize
c a p i t a l i z e on
o n tthis
h i s oppor-
o p p o r­
ttunity,
u n i t y , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n will
w i l l need
n e e d tto
o ensure
e n s u r e tthat
h a t iits
t s exporters
e x p o r t e r s can
c a n compete
c o m p e t e with
w i t h China’s
C h in a ’s
C h i n a .” 9 9 As A s per Pakistani
a k i s t a n i officials,
o f f i c i a l s , phase
99
other
o t h e r trade
tra d e p partners
a r t n e r s for
f o r market
m a r k e t shares h a r e in i n China.” per P phase
22 of the FTA has doubled the trade volume between
o f th e F T A h a s d o u b le d th e tra d e v o lu m e b e tw e e n th e tw o c o u n trie s , w the two countries, withith P Paki-
a k i­
100
stan all set to increase and diversify its exports. All this, coupled
s t a n a l l s e t t o i n c r e a s e a n d d i v e r s i f y i t s e x p o r t s .1 0 0 A l l t h i s , c o u p l e d w i t h r i s i n g with rising
101
Chinese
C h i n e s e investments
i n v e s t m e n t s in i n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , 1 0 1 augurs
a u g u r s well w e l l for fo r P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s economic
e c o n o m i c security
s e c u r ity
p r o f i l e , u n d e r l i n i n g b o t h t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y a n d d u r a b i l i t y o f S i n o - P a k relations
profile, underlining both the predictability and durability of Sino-Pak r e la tio n s
going
g o i n g forward.
fo rw a rd .
China
C h i n a has has b batted
a t t e d fforo r Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s sovereignty
s o v e r e i g n t y while w h i l e lending
l e n d i n g helph e l p in i n ttheh e latter’s
la tte r ’s
b i d t o r e s o l v e t h e K a s h m i r d i s p u t e . N o t o n l y h a s C h i n a c a s t i g a t e d I n d i a for
bid to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Not only has China castigated India f o r its
its
August
A u g u s t 5 g a m b i t a n d u r g e d b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n e n d t o t h e K a s h m i r d i s p u t e in
5 gambit and urged bringing about an end to the Kashmir dispute in
accordance
a c c o r d a n c e with w i t h UNSC U N S C resolutions
r e s o lu tio n s b butu t also
a l s o helped
h e l p e d arrange
a rra n g e U UNSCN S C meetings
m e e t i n g s on on
Kashmir,
K a s h m i r , after a fte r a a long
l o n g hiatus.
h i a t u s . China,
C h i n a , with w i t h its i t s stakes
s t a k e s in i n the
th e K Kashmir
a s h m i r conflict,
c o n f l i c t , has
has
b e r a t e d I n d i a f o r t i n k e r i n g w i t h t h e s t a t u s o f L a d a k h . I t i s b e l i e v e d that
berated India for tinkering with the status of Ladakh. It is believed t h a t India’s
I n d ia ’s
August
A ugust 5 5 assaults
a s s a u l t s on o n Kashmir’s
K a s h m i r ’s autonomy a u t o n o m y and a n d territorial
t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements
a r r a n g e m e n t s are a r e the
th e
casus belli of the ongoing Sino-Indo standoff in Ladakh.
c a s u s b e lli o f th e o n g o in g S in o -I n d o s ta n d o f f in L a d a k h . W ith C h in a c o n s id e r ­ With China consider-
ing
i n g changes
c h a n g e s iin n thet h e status
s t a t u s ofof L Ladakh
a d a k h as a s ana n infringement
i n f r i n g e m e n t of o f its
i t s sovereignty,
s o v e r e i g n t y , iitt iis s
likely
l i k e l y t h a t i t w i l l e x t e n d c o n s i s t e n t , v o c a l d i p l o m a t i c a s s i s t a n c e to
that it will extend consistent, vocal diplomatic assistance t o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n over over
102
Kashmir.
K a s h m i r . 1 0 2 At At a a time
tim e w when h e n Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d is i s rallying
r a l l y i n g support
s u p p o r t for f o r its
its b bout
o u t ffor o r Kashmir,
K a s h m ir,
B e i j i n g ’s u n f l i n c h i n g a d v o c a c y i s n o t o n l y i n s t r u m e n t a l b u t a l s o e p i t o m i z i n g the
Beijing’s unflinching advocacy is not only instrumental but also epitomizing th e
iinherent
n h e r e n t strength
s t r e n g t h of o f Sino-Pak
S i n o - P a k relations.
r e l a t i o n s . Concomitantly,
C o n c o m i t a n t l y , China C h i n a has h a s created
c r e a t e d ffur-u r­
tther
h e r diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c spaces p a c e for f o r Pakistan
P a k i s t a n bby y officially
o f f i c i a l l y accepting
a c c e p t i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s stand
s t a n d on o n the
th e
r o c e s s 1 0 3 and
a n d its i t s meritorious
m e r i t o r i o u s sacrifices
s a c r i f i c e s in i n fighting
f i g h t i n g thet h e scourge
s c o u r g e of
103
Afghan
A fg h a n p peace
eace p process of
104
terrorism. Beijing has also encouraged Islamabad to
t e r r o r is m .104 B e ijin g h a s a ls o e n c o u r a g e d I s la m a b a d to t r e a d a n in d e p e n d e n t p tread an independent path
a th
in
i n protecting
p r o t e c t i n g itsi t s national
n a t i o n a l interests.
in te re sts .
China
C h i n a h a s c o n t i n u e d to
has continued to b bee Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s b best
est b bet,
e t , as
a s evidenced
e v i d e n c e d bby y taking
ta k in g a a cursory
c u rso ry
look
l o o k a t C h i n a ’s c o n d u c t w i t h P a k i s t a n . I t w o u l d n o t b e w r o n g t o s a y t h a t , as
at China’s conduct with Pakistan. It would not be wrong to say that, a s tthe
he
state galvanizing CPEC, China lies at the heart of Pakistan’s
s t a t e g a l v a n i z i n g C P E C , C h i n a l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f P a k i s t a n ’s e c o n o m i c s e c u r i t y economic security
pparadigm.
a r a d i g m . Its I t s growing
g r o w i n g iinterests
n t e r e s t s in in p peace,
e a c e , stability,
s t a b i l i t y , and
a n d prosperity
p r o s p e r i t y ini n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n havehave
made
m a d e i t a s t a k e h o l d e r i n u p h o l d i n g t h e c o u n t r y ’s s o v e r e i g n t y w h i l e also
it a stakeholder in upholding the country’s sovereignty while a l s o compel-
c o m p e l­
lling
i n g iti t to
t o help
h e l p Islamabad
Is la m a b a d m makea k e headways
h e a d w a y s in i n mitigating
m i t i g a t i n g and a n d terminating
t e r m i n a t i n g conflicts.
c o n flic ts .
These reasons have likely led Pakistani policy
T h e s e r e a s o n s h a v e lik e ly le d P a k is ta n i p o lic y m a k e r s , in c lu d in g K makers, including Khan,h a n , tto o repose
re p o se
confidence
c o n f i d e n c e i n t h i s e n d u r i n g , t i m e - t e s t e d , a n d a l l - w e a t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h China,
in this enduring, time-tested, and all-weather relationship with C h in a ,
one
o n e tthat,
h a t , according
a c c o r d i n g to to K Khan,
h a n , is i s ttheh e road
r o a d tto o Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s economic
e c o n o m i c redemption
r e d e m p t i o n and and
s u c c e s s .105
success. 105

A Change in Conduct and Approach

After
A f t e r surveying
s u rv e y in g P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h key
k e y regional
r e g i o n a l and
a n d international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l actors,
a c to rs,
it
i t i s b e f i t t i n g t o a s s e s s a s t o h o w t h e K h a n - l e d g o v e r n m e n t has
is befitting to assess as to how the Khan-led government h a s conducted
c o n d u c t e d ffor-o r­
eign
e ig n p policy
o l i c y since
s i n c e 2018.
2 0 1 8 . This
T h i s section
s e c t i o n deals
d e a ls wwith
i t h four
f o u r aspects:
a s p e c ts: p publicity,
u b l i c i t y , interac-
in te r a c ­
tive
t i v e mechanisms,
m e c h a n i s m s , civil–military
c i v i l - m i l i t a r y relations,
r e l a t i o n s , and
a n d outreach
o u t r e a c h initiatives.
i n i t i a t i v e s . Taken
T a k e n together,
to g e th e r,
these facets have changed the way Islamabad conducts
th e s e fa c e ts h a v e c h a n g e d th e w a y Is la m a b a d c o n d u c ts its fo re ig n p its foreign policy,
o l i c y , with
w i t h itit
b e c o m i n g m o r e r o b u s t , d y n a m i c , a n d f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g . A c a r e f u l s t u d y o f tthese
becoming more robust, dynamic, and forward-looking. A careful study of hese
four
f o u r planks
p l a n k s iis s tthe
h e needful.
n e e d f u l . KJIHGFEDCBA
32
32 Syed Ali
KJIHGFEDCBA
S yed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

PublicityZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Publicity
Since
S i n c e 2018,
2 0 1 8 , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y actions
a c t i o n s haveh a v e gained
g a in e d a a ffair
a i r degree
d e g r e e of o f public-
p u b lic ­
ity
i t y and
a n d attention.
a t t e n t i o n . In I n other
o t h e r words,
w o r d s , Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d has, h a s , through
t h r o u g h officialo f f i c i a l channels,
c h a n n e l s , done done
more
m o r e to t o putp u t iits ts v version
e r s i o n out o u t ffor o r theth e w world
o r l d tto o see.
s e e . Three
T h r e e reasonsr e a s o n s have h a v e driven
d r i v e n tthis h is
positive,
p o s i t i v e , all-important
a l l - i m p o r t a n t change.
c h a n g e . One, O n e , in i n sharp
s h a r p contrast
c o n t r a s t to t o hish is p predecessor(s),
r e d e c e s s o r ( s ) , Imran Im ra n
Khan
K h a n has h a s eloquently
e l o q u e n t l y presented
p re s e n te d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s stands t a n d and a n d foreign
fo re ig n p policy
o lic y p priorities
r i o r i t i e s tto
o
the
th e w world.
o r l d . ApartA p a r t fromf r o m tthe h e usual
u s u a l practice
p r a c t i c e of o f meeting
m e e t i n g foreign f o r e i g n leaders,
le a d e rs , K Khanh a n has has
regularly
r e g u l a r l y engaged
e n g a g e d with w i t h fforeign
o r e i g n media,
m e d i a , thinkt h i n k tanks,
t a n k s , and a n d bbusiness
u s i n e s s communities
c o m m u n i t i e s and and
used
u s e d Twitter
T w i t t e r tto o good
g o o d effect.
e f f e c t . That
T h a t the t h e Prime
P r im e M Minister
i n i s t e r has h a s ttakena k e n upon u p o n himself
h i m s e l f tto o
periodically
p e r io d ic a lly u update
p d a t e tthe he w worldo r l d about
about w what h a t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s to t o offer
o f f e r anda n d whatw h a t chal- c h a l­
lenges
l e n g e s it i t encounters
e n c o u n t e r s is is b butut a a conspicuous
c o n s p i c u o u s departure
d e p a r t u r e from f r o m the t h e past.
p a s t . Two
T w o examples
e x a m p le s
underscore
u n d e r s c o r e tthis h i s vveritable
e r i t a b l e difference.
d i f f e r e n c e . The T h e ffirst i r s t is
i s the
t h e roler o l e of o f the
t h e Prime
P r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r in in
the
th e P Pulwama–Balakot
u l w a m a - B a l a k o t crisis c r i s i s with
w i t h India
I n d i a in i n 2019.
2019. K Khan’s
h a n ’ s public
p u b l i c appearances
a p p e a r a n c e s during d u r in g
critical
c r itic a l p phases
h a s e s of o f the
t h e crisis,
c r i s i s , coupled
c o u p l e d with w i t h his h i s releasing
r e l e a s i n g the t h e captured
c a p t u r e d pilot,
p i l o t , helped
h e lp e d
106
terminate a deadly crisis.
t e r m i n a t e a d e a d l y c r i s i s . 1 0 6 T h e s e c o n d i s h o w K h a n ’ s t w o c a m p a i g n s in
The second is how Khan’s two campaigns i n the
th e
United
U n ite d N Nations
a t i o n s General
G e n e r a l Assembly
A s s e m b l y comprisedc o m p r i s e d speakings p e a k i n g commitments
c o m m i t m e n t s on o n multiple
m u ltip le
panels
p a n e l s and a n d interactions
in te ra c tio n s w with i t h ana n array
a r r a y of o f leaders,
l e a d e r s , jjournalists,
o u r n a l i s t s , and a n d bbusinessmen.
u s i n e s s m e n . The The
dominant
d o m i n a n t ttheme h e m e acrossa c r o s s alla l l official
o f f i c i a l parleys
p a r l e y s with w i t h tthe h e world
w o r l d lleaders,e a d e r s , interviews,
i n t e r v i e w s , and and
keynote
k e y n o t e addresses
a d d r e s s e s has has b been
e e n tthis:
h i s : Pakistan
P a k ista n w wantsa n t s tto o attract
a t t r a c t thet h e world
w o r l d for f o r economic
e c o n o m ic
connectivity,
c o n n e c t i v i t y , investments,
i n v e s t m e n t s , and a n d tourism.
t o u r i s m . However,
H o w e v e r , ffor o r tthat,
h a t, p peace
e a c e in i n tthe
h e region
r e g i o n is is
107
of
o f import.
i m p o r t . 1 0 7 It I t is
i s noteworthy
n o t e w o r t h y to t o state
s t a t e that
t h a t KhanK h a n has h a s frequently
f r e q u e n t l y ttaken a k e n to t o Twitter
T w itte r
to
t o apprise
a p p r i s e the th e w world
o r l d of o f the
t h e ffestering
e s t e r i n g situation
s i t u a t i o n in i n IIOJK
I I O J K and a n d has h a s adroitly
a d r o i t l y drawn
d ra w n
108
comparisons
c o m p a ris o n s b between
e t w e e n Indian
I n d i a n PrimeP r i m e Minister
M in is te r N Narendra
a r e n d r a Modi M o d i and a n d Adolf
A d o lf H Hitler.
itle r .108
Two,
T w o , as a s opposed
o p p o s e d to t o the
th e p previous
r e v i o u s government’s
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s refusal r e f u s a l and a n d reticence
r e t i c e n c e to t o appoint
a p p o in t
aa ffull-time
u l l - t i m e fforeign
o r e i g n minister,
m i n i s t e r , KhanK h a n appointed
a p p o i n t e d his h i s second-in-command
s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d in i n his
h i s party
p a r ty
and
a n d fformer
o rm e r F Foreign
o re ig n M Minister,
i n i s t e r , Shah
S h a h Mehmood
M e h m o o d Qureshi, Q u r e s h i , as a s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s ttop o p diplomat.
d ip lo m a t.
Qureshi,
Q u r e s h i , an a n experienced
e x p e r i e n c e d foreign f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y practitioner,
p r a c t i t i o n e r , has has b beene e n at a t tthe
h e forefront
f o r e f r o n t in in
communicating
c o m m u n i c a t i n g Pakistan’s P a k i s t a n ’s p perspectives
e r s p e c t i v e s to t o hish i s fforeign
o r e i g n counterparts.
c o u n t e r p a r t s . Given G i v e n how how
critical
c r itic a l a a fully
f u l l y functional
f u n c t i o n a l foreign
f o r e i g n office
o f f i c e is i s ttoo having
h a v in g a a vibrant
v i b r a n t and a n d dynamic
d y n a m i c fforeign o re ig n
policy,
p o l i c y , it i t is
i s bbelieved
e l i e v e d that
t h a t it i t should
s h o u ld b bee ledl e d bby y a a ffull-time,
u l l - t i m e , dedicated
d e d i c a t e d fforeigno r e i g n minister.
m in is te r .
Three,
T h r e e , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has has b beene e n morem o r e open o p e n and a n d consistent
c o n s i s t e n t in i n laying
la y in g b bare
a r e where
w h e r e iitt
is
i s right
r i g h t now,n o w , what w h a t direction
d i r e c t i o n it i t wants
w a n t s to t o ttake,
a k e , and and w whath a t are a r e thet h e most
m o s t iinveterate
n v e te ra te
roadblocks
r o a d b l o c k s that t h a t iitt iis s navigating.
n a v i g a t i n g . As A s tthe h e country’s
c o u n t r y ’s N National
a t i o n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Advisor,
A d v is o r, D Dr.r.
Moeed
M oeed Y Yusuf
u s u f has h a s added
added a a scholarly
s c h o l a r l y flair
f l a i r ttoo P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s publicity
p u b l i c i t y endeavors.
e n d e a v o rs. F From
ro m
giving
g i v i n g an a n interview
i n t e r v i e w to t o Indian
I n d i a n jjournalist,
o u r n a lis t, K Karan
a r a n Thapar,
T h a p a r , tto o addressing
a d d r e s s i n g U.S. U . S . thinkth in k
tanks,
t a n k s , Dr. D r . Yusuf
Y u s u f has has p publicized
u b l i c i z e d how h o w Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s adjusting
a d j u s t i n g itself i t s e l f ini n response
r e s p o n s e tto o
aa ffast-evolving
a s t - e v o l v i n g global g l o b a l order
o r d e r tthat h a t is i s full
f u l l of o f newn e w threats
t h r e a t s and a n d lucrative
l u c r a t i v e avenues
a v e n u e s of of
development.
d e v e lo p m e n t.

Engaging the Experts, Looking to the Future

Owing to its strategic location, Pakistan is not impervious to the vagaries of geo-
politics. Over the past seven decades, Pakistan has been embroiled in firefighting.
Resultantly, planning for the future has suffered. That said, the Khan government
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 33
has taken a series of steps that indicate its willingness to think strategically and
big so as to recalibrate the course of its foreign policy commensurate with chang-
ing regional and global environments. With a view to seeking scholarly, research-
laden advice on the country’s foreign policy, the Prime Minister constituted an
Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs in 2018. Headed by the foreign minister,
the Council comprises retired diplomats and some of Pakistan’s foremost experts
on foreign, security, and strategic affairs. Meetings of the Council take place on a
regular basis, allowing a candid exchange of views between scholars and practi-
tioners, something that was never done in the past.
Commenting on the utility of PM’s Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, ace
nuclear scholar and one of the members of the Council, Rabia Akhtar, says:

Surrounded by acrimonious neighbours and located in a strategically-

important position, Pakistani policymakers are forced to resort to firefighting
at the cost of spending the required time, effort, and bandwidth on long-term,
strategic planning. The Advisory Council was constituted in a bid to expand
the basket of options for the government. Experts like the ones part of the
Council, free from official constrictions, can think big and out of the box on
a host of issues and challenges that Pakistan faces and is likely to face going
forward. Liaison between policymakers and academicians is critical to chalk-
ing out coherent, forward-looking policies. It is important to devise a robust
mechanism through which our ideas, inputs, and recommendations travel all
the way up and down the decision-making hierarchy. Initiatives and bodies
like this will promote policy-driven research on Pakistan’s foreign relations
while enabling the government to look beyond the horizon to counter threats
and pounce on opportunities.109

Initiatives like this are emblematic of the fact that the government is cognizant
of the need to bridge the gulf between policy makers and scholars. This has been
a problem that, over the years, has contributed toward stasis and inflexibility
in meeting complex foreign policy predicaments. In addition to that the divide
between policy makers and the public was glaring. In order to involve people
from diverse backgrounds and take their ideas in a global landscape dictated by
the information revolution, Foreign Minister Qureshi launched FM Connect. The
first of its kind, direct channel of communication paved the way for direct com-
munications between the foreign minister and members of the academia, busi-
ness community, media, entertainment industry, and the civil society.110 All this
is ostensibly being done to provide the government with a host of ideas, both
conventional and unconventional, to navigate myriad quandaries in a globalized
and technologically advanced world.
The establishment of the Strategic Policy Planning Cell (SPPC) is another man-
ifestation of the government’s intent to bring in intellectual rigor in the process of
policy formulation. The SPPC is the intellectual hub and acts as a think tank for the
Prime Minister. It is mandated to provide the Prime Minister with evidence-based
policy input on beyond-the-horizon issues.111 The National Security Division,
34 Syed Ali Zia Jaffery
under which the SPPC works, is the body that has created a symbiotic policy
connection between all things related to security and the country’s foreign policy.
That the SPPC deals with a compendium of security challenges that require an
effective foreign policy is one of the reasons why its place within the country’s
foreign policy apparatus is crucial.

Civil–Military Coordination
In his interactions with think tanks112 and the media, Khan has repeatedly and
vociferously stated that the military has stood by his decisions, and all steps that
he has taken are in-line with his party’s manifesto.113 Analyzing Khan’s tenure so
far, one finds no instance where the government and the military clashed with each
other. Healthy civil–military relations have led to a consensus on decision-making
during crucial moments. For instance, close, real-time coordination between the
military and the government gave shape to a firm, restrained, and responsible cri-
sis behavior by Islamabad during the Pulwama–Balakot crisis. The response was
dictated by Khan’s concerns about unbridled escalation and the unanimous desire
to terminate a nuclear-tinged crisis.114 The message from both the government and
the military during and after the crisis was unambiguous and without contradic-
tions. What is discernible is the unified stand of the military and the government
over ways to deal with the boiling Kashmir issue after India’s August 5 gambit.
An expected rift over what course of action to take after India’s brazenness in
Kashmir has, so far, not afflicted civil–military relations under Khan. Moreover,
Khan was able to extend an olive branch to India and, without any resistance,
went ahead with opening the Kartarpur Corridor for Sikhs living in India and
around the world. Rather than be plagued by fissures and mounting tensions,
civil–military ties under Khan have been typified by an increased reliance on
expertise and institutional memory and the realization that security dimensions
are attached to foreign policy issues. This arrangement has been and will be vital
in enabling Khan and his government to take strides in the foreign policy domain
going forward. Experts, however, observe that the balance is shifting in favor of
the military.115 They argue that there is no such thing as civil–military harmony,
when the civilian government is subservient to, and sidelined by, the all-powerful
military.116 However, a reexamination of PTI’s manifesto, Khan’s own opinions
on foreign relations, and the direction that his government has taken reveals no
aberration. In the absence of concrete evidence, it is difficult to argue that the
military, especially the Pakistan Army, has cajoled Khan into taking decisions that
he did not want to take.

Economic Outreach and the Look Africa Initiative

One of the distinguishing features of the current government’s foreign policy has
been a commitment to strengthening economic security. In that regard, economic
diplomacy has become a lynchpin, something which is in-line with the ruling par-
ty’s manifesto.117 The idea behind vigorously pursuing economic diplomacy is to
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 35
leverage Pakistan’s diplomatic relations to advance its economic interests.118 Start-
ing in 2020, three envoys’ meetings on economic diplomacy have been chaired by
Foreign Minister Qureshi. Addressing the third envoys’ meeting, Qureshi noted
the shift from geopolitics to geoeconomics and stressed “the importance of eco-
nomic diplomacy as a key component of modern diplomatic practice.”119
In a bid to further streamline and boost economic diplomacy, PM Khan
launched the Economic Outreach Initiative. Comprising the Economic Outreach
Apex Committee and the Economic Outreach Coordination Group, the initiative
aims to synergize inter-ministerial tasks with a view to optimizing resource utili-
zation, exploring comparative advantages in key countries, and meeting economic
diplomacy-related targets.120 The success of the Economic Outreach Initiative is
contingent upon the cohesiveness and continued coordination between key minis-
tries. According to Khan, one of the objectives of this body is to identify export-
propellants and tap into them in order to tread the path toward self-reliance.121
It is apparent that the Khan government is convinced that there exists a two-way
connection between the state of the economy and the country’s diplomatic clout.
Since 2018, the complementarity between economics and diplomacy has been
used as an essential cog in this government’s schemas on foreign policy. It is
in this context that Islamabad has once and for all decided to wade into Africa.
According to Khan, the African continent would be a priority area in Pakistan’s
foreign policy while lamenting the country’s lackluster ties with the very conti-
nent in yesteryears.122 Pakistan’s push in Africa is economics and trade-driven.
Launched in 2017, the Look Africa Initiative has been given impetus by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. Aimed at expanding
trade and building connectivity between Pakistan and African countries, the Look
Africa Policy Initiative has taken center stage in Pakistan’s economic diplomacy
campaign. Dubbed the “Continent of the Future,” Africa has elicited the attention
of Pakistani policy makers. In 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized
an Envoys’ Conference in Africa. Bringing together Pakistani envoys posted in
Africa, officials of relevant ministries, and traders, the conference explored ways
to deepen economic, political, social, and cultural ties with African countries.123
Reflective of the government’s urgency in gaining a foothold in Africa, the Min-
istries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce jointly hosted the Pakistan–Africa Trade
Development Conference in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference brought together
hundreds of participants from 21 African countries, business delegations from
Pakistan, and government officials, allowing them the opportunity to discuss the
potential for taking business-to-business and government-to-government rela-
tions to the next level.124 Sharing his thoughts on Pakistan’s initiatives in Africa,
Honorary Consul of Uganda in Pakistan, Awais Raoof said:

Pakistan’s decision to strengthen ties with African countries and increase its
footprint in Africa is a step in the right direction, and one that will open up a
big basket of opportunities for the country. With its rich resources and strate-
gic location, Africa provides Pakistan multiple conduits for strategic and eco-
nomic connectivity. I would like to see the government seriously follow-up
36
36 Syed Ali
KJIHGFEDCBA
S yed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

on
o n ttwo
w o tthings
h i n g s in
i n the
t h e short-term:
s h o r t - t e r m : healthcare
h e a l t h c a r e diplomacy
d i p l o m a c y and
a n d education
e d u c a t i o n so
s o asa s tto
o
leave
l e a v e a s o f t i m p r i n t i n A f r i c a . A t t h e s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , P a k i s t a n ’ s b e s t b e t is
a soft imprint in Africa. At the strategic level, Pakistan’s best bet i s tto
o
work
w o r k in i n ttandem
a n d e m with
w i t h China,
C h in a , w which
h i c h already
a l r e a d y is
i s in
i n the
t h e African
A f r i c a n ttheatre
h e a tre b big
i g ttime.
im e .
Policy
P o l i c y consistency
c o n s is te n c y w would
o u l d bbe e ofo f tthis
h i s essence,
e s s e n c e , if
i f Pakistan
P a k is ta n w wants
a n t s tto
o fully
f u l l y ttake
ake
125
advantage of Africa’s potential.
a d v a n ta g e o f A f r ic a ’s p o te n tia l.125

Two
T w o subsequent
s u b s e q u e n t developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s bbode o d e well w e l l for f o r Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s relations
r e la tio n s w with
i t h African
A fric a n
countries. One, despite the devastation wrought
c o u n tr ie s . O n e , d e s p ite th e d e v a s ta tio n w r o u g h t u p o n b y C O V I D - 1 9 , P upon by COVID-19, Pakistan–
a k ista n -
126
Africa
A f r i c a ttrader a d e vvolume
o l u m e increased.
i n c r e a s e d . 1 2 6 Two,Tw o, P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , ffollowing
o l l o w i n g up u p on o n its
i t s decisions
d e c i s i o n s ttoo
open
o p e n m i s s i o n s i n s i x A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s i n 2 0 1 9 , d e c i d e d t o o p e n a r e s i d e n t mission
missions in six African countries in 2019, decided to open a resident m is s io n
127
in
i n the
t h e strategically
s t r a t e g i c a l l y located
l o c a t e d Djibouti.
D jib o u ti.127
To
T o s u m i t u p , P a k i s t a n h a s p l u c k e d out
sum it up, Pakistan has plucked out a a new
new p paradigm
a r a d i g m tthat h a t is
i s guiding
g u i d i n g itsi t s for-
fo r­
eign policy: economic security. The lens has germinated
e ig n p o lic y : e c o n o m ic s e c u r ity . T h e le n s h a s g e r m in a te d th e n e e d f o r s tr a te g ic a lly the need for strategically
aligning
a l i g n i n g economics
e c o n o m i c s with w i t h diplomacy
d i p l o m a c y and a n d changing
c h a n g i n g tthe h e way w a y the t h e country’s
c o u n t r y ’ s fforeign
o re ig n
policy
p o l i c y i s c o n d u c t e d . T h e K h a n g o v e r n m e n t , m i n d f u l o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of
is conducted. The Khan government, mindful of the significance o f schol-
s c h o l­
arly
a r l y input,
i n p u t , research,
r e s e a r c h , and
a n d institutional
i n s t i t u t i o n a l harmony,
h a r m o n y , has h a s devised
d e v is e d a awwhole-of-government
h o le -o f-g o v e rn m e n t
approach
a p p r o a c h in i n order
o r d e r tot o effectively
e f f e c t i v e l y grapple
g ra p p le w with i t h foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y challenges.
c h a lle n g e s .
That
T h a t s a i d , e x p e r t s a r e s k e p t i c a l a b o u t P a k i s t a n ’ s a b i l i t y tto
said, experts are skeptical about Pakistan’s ability o bbecome
ecom e a a geoeconomic
g e o e c o n o m ic
power.
p o w e r . W r i t i n g o n t h e s t a t e o f P a k i s t a n ’ s p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y a s a r e a l hurdle
Writing on the state of Pakistan’s political economy as a real h u r d l e ini n the
th e
country’s push toward geoeconomics, Arif Rafiq argues:
c o u n tr y ’s p u s h to w a r d g e o e c o n o m ic s , A r if R a f iq a r g u e s : “ G iv e n th e ir p r e d a to r y “Given their predatory
bbehavior,
e h a v i o r , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s elite
e l i t e are
a r e likely
l i k e l y tot o cannibalize
c a n n i b a l i z e ttheh e gains
g a i n s ffromro m a a modest
m o d e s t economic
e c o n o m ic
opening,
o p e n i n g , p r e v e n t i n g t h e m f r o m r e a c h i n g c o m m o n P a k i s t a n i s . E l i t e capture
preventing them from reaching common Pakistanis. Elite c a p t u r e could
c o u ld
128
even
e v e n render
re n d e r P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s geoeconomic
g e o e c o n o m ic p pivot
iv o t a a non-starter.”
n o n - s t a r t e r . ” 1 2 8 On
O n tthe h e other
o t h e r hand,
h a n d , for-
fo r­
mer diplomat Maleeha Lodhi asserts that “if Pakistan wants
m e r d ip lo m a t M a le e h a L o d h i a s s e r ts th a t “ i f P a k is ta n w a n ts to p u r s u e a g e o e c o n o m ­ to pursue a geoeconom-
ics
ic s p policy
o l i c y iin n any
a n y meaningful
m e a n in g fu l w waya y iitt has h a s ttoo transform
t r a n s f o r m its i t s economy,
e c o n o m y , ensure
e n su re a a stable
s ta b le
129
political environment and reorder its internal priorities and budget allocations.”
p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d r e o r d e r i t s i n t e r n a l p r i o r i t i e s a n d b u d g e t a l l o c a t i o n s .” 1 2 9
Quite
Q u i t e r i g h t l y , t h e r e a l c h a l l e n g e f o r t h e K h a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d b e tto
rightly, the real challenge for the Khan government would be o
ensure
e n s u r e that t h a t tthe h e country’s
c o u n t r y ’s economic
e c o n o m i c profile p r o f i l e is i s ffilled
ille d w with i t h tthe
h e requirements
r e q u i r e m e n t s of of a a
geoeconomics-heavy
g e o e c o n o m i c s - h e a v y fforeign o re ig n p policy
o l i c y ttoolkit.
o o l k i t . Indeed,
I n d e e d , tthe h e KhanK h a n government
g o v e r n m e n t can can
rightly
rig h tly b boast
o a s t an a n economic
e c o n o m i c turnaround,
t u r n a r o u n d , as a s widely
w i d e l y acknowledged
a c k n o w l e d g e d bby y international
in te rn a tio n a l
financial
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y a t a t i m e w h e n t h e C O V I D - 1 9 p a n d e m i c has
institutions, especially at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic h a s rav-
ra v ­
a g e d e c o n o m i e s . 1 3 0 H o w e v e r , t h e e c o n o m y c a n i l l - a f f o r d b o o m a n d b u s t c y c l e s if
However, the economy can ill-afford boom and bust cycles
130
aged economies. if
it
it w wants
a n t s to to b bee uused
s e d as a s tthe h e ffactor
a c t o r critical
c r i t i c a l to
t o creating
c r e a t i n g more
m o r e space s p a c e fforo r Pakistan
P a k i s t a n in i n the
th e
foreign
fo re ig n p policy
o l i c y domain.
d o m a in .

Conclusion
This
T h i s chapter
c h a p t e r has
h a s carefully
c a r e f u l l y delved
d e l v e d into
i n t o Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s fforeign
o re ig n p policy
o lic y u under
n d e r ttheh e govern-
g o v e rn ­
ment of Imran Khan. It has been observed that the country’s
m e n t o f I m r a n K h a n . I t h a s b e e n o b s e rv e d th a t th e c o u n try ’s f o r e ig n p foreign policy
o lic y ppri-
ri­
orities have found a new anchor in economic security, which
o r itie s h a v e f o u n d a n e w a n c h o r in e c o n o m ic s e c u r ity , w h ic h c a n n o t b e a c h ie v e d cannot be achieved
without
w i t h o u t regional
r e g i o n a l connectivity
c o n n e c t i v i t y and
a n d conflict-resolution.
c o n f l i c t - r e s o l u t i o n . The
T h e latter
l a t t e r is
i s critical
c r i t i c a l to
t o peace
peace
and stability. With these objectives in mind, the Khan government
a n d s ta b ility . W ith th e s e o b je c tiv e s i n m in d , th e K h a n g o v e r n m e n t h a s e n g a g e d has engaged
with
w i t h ffriends
r i e n d s anda n d foes,
f o e s , solidifying
s o l i d i f y i n g partnerships
p a rtn e rs h ip s w with i t h countries
c o u n t r i e s tthat
h a t helped
h e l p e d or o r are
a re
likely to help Islamabad realize these goals. The Khan-led government
lik e ly to h e lp I s la m a b a d r e a liz e th e s e g o a ls . T h e K h a n - le d g o v e r n m e n t h a s s h o w n has shown
the
t h e capacity
c a p a c i t y tto o draw
d r a w redlines
r e d l i n e s with
w i t h countries
c o u n t r i e s tthat
h a t area r e harming
h a r m i n g tthe he p prospect
r o s p e c t ofo f or
or
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 37
outright subverting efforts aimed at ushering in peace and harmony to lay the
groundwork for economic connectivity and integration. Besides, the conduct of
foreign policy has undergone a change, as evidenced by enhanced publicity; the
establishment of interactive conduits; civil–military synchronization; and a new-
found interest in long-term, strategic thinking. All these signal an end to torpor
that had long stifled Pakistan’s ability to maneuver its way so as to advance its
vital interests. With all this echoing Khan’s party manifesto and his own predilec-
tions on foreign relations, it is noteworthy to state that the leadership variable is
an important determinant of Pakistan’s evolving foreign policy. All this does not
mean that the minefields for the Khan government are being removed. Turmoil
in Afghanistan will have a direct, deleterious effect on Pakistan’s commitment
to increasing its economic security while also deteriorating its even otherwise
tumultuous ties with Afghanistan and the United States. An inflexible India is a
big elephant in the room that Pakistan has to deal with. Last but not least, a weak
economy would continue to throw a plethora of problems at the Khan govern-
ment, especially given that it looks forward to establishing an inexorable, positive
connection between foreign policy and the economy.

NotesZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
11 “Oral
“ O r a l History
H i s t o r y Interview
In te rv ie w w with
ith A Ambassador
m b a s s a d o r Shamshad
S ham shad A Ahmad
hm ad K Khan,
h a n , Former
F o r m e r For-F o r­
eign
e i g n Secretary
S e c r e t a r y of P a k i s t a n , ” KJIHGFEDCBA
o f Pakistan,” PPakistan
a k is ta n P Politico,
o litic o , A April
p r i l 5,
5 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , hhttp://pakistanpolitico.
ttp ://p a k is ta n p o litic o .
com/__sakinterview/.
c o m / _ _ s a k i n t e r v i e w /.
22 “Cricketer
“ C r i c k e t e r of o f ttheh e Year-1983:
Y e a r - 1 9 8 3 : ImranIm ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,” E s p n c r i c i n f o , www.espncricinfo.com/wis
Espncricinfo, w w w .e s p n c ric in f o .c o m /w is
denalmanack/content/story/154467.html.
d e n a lm a n a c k /c o n te n t/s to ry /1 5 4 4 6 7 .h tm l.
33 “How
“ H o w IImran m ra n K Khan’s
h a n ’ s Mission
M i s s i o n to to B Build
u i l d Cancer
C a n c e r Hospital
H o s p i t a l IInspired
n s p ire d a a South
S o u th A African
f r i c a n Boy,”
B o y ,”
The
The N News,
ew s, A August
u g u s t 21, 2 1 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.thenews.com.pk/latest/703830-how-imran-khans-
w w w .th e n e w s .c o m .p k /la te s t/1 0 3 8 3 0 - h o w - im r a n - k h a n s -
mission-to-build-cancer-hospital-inspired-a-south-african-boy.
m is s io n -to -b u ild -c a n c e r-h o s p ita l-in s p ire d -a -s o u th -a fric a n -b o y .
44 “Namal
“ N a m a l College:
C o l l e g e : Shaping
S h a p i n g Those T hose W Who h o Shape
S h a p e the t h e Future,”
F u t u r e ,” IImran
m ran K Khan
han F Foundation,
o u n d a tio n ,
www.imrankhanfoundation.org.pk/about-ikf/namal-college/.
w w w .im r a n k h a n f o u n d a tio n .o rg .p k /a b o u t-ik f /n a m a l-c o lle g e /.
55 Imran
Im ra n K Khan,
han, P Pakistan:
a k is ta n : A A PPersonal
ersonal H i s t o r y (London:
History (L o n d o n : B Bantam
a n ta m P Press,
r e s s , 22011),
0 1 1 ) , 84.
84.
66 Ibid.,
I b i d . , 113.
113.
77 “Khan:
“ K h a n : Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Should
S h o u ld R Reject
e j e c t U.S.
U .S . A Aid,” C N N , May
i d , ” CNN, M a y 14, 1 4 , 2011,
2011, w www.youtube.com/
w w .y o u tu b e .c o m /
watch?v=YhHGlI7Dspk.
w a tc h ? v = Y h H G lI1 D s p k .
88 “Imran
“ I m r a n KhanK h a n to t o US:
US: W Wee D Don’to n ’ t Want
W a n t Your
Y o u r Money,”
M o n e y ,” H S e p t e m b e r 226,
A R D t a l k , September
HARDtalk, 6 , 2011,
2011,
hhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9600544.stm.
ttp ://n e w s .b b c .c o .u k /2 /h i/p r o g r a m m e s /h a r d ta lk /9 6 0 0 5 4 4 .s tm .
99 Staurt
S t a u r t Jeffries,
J e f f r i e s , “Interview:
“ I n t e r v i e w : Imran
I m r a n Khan:
K h a n : ‘America
‘ A m e r i c a Is I s Destroying
D e s tro y in g P Pakistan.
a k i s t a n . We’re
W e ’r e U Using
s in g
Our
O u r Army
A r m y to t o Kill
K i l l Our
O u r OwnO w n People
P e o p l e with
w i t h Their
T h e i r Money,”
M o n e y , ” The G u a r d i a n , September
T h e Guardian, S e p t e m b e r 18, 1 8 , 2011,
2011,
wwww.theguardian.com/global/2011/sep/18/imran-khan-america-destroying-pakistan.
w w .th e g u a rd ia n .c o m /g lo b a l/2 0 1 1 /s e p /1 8 /im r a n -k h a n - a m e r ic a - d e s tro y in g - p a k is ta n .
10
1 0 Ibid.
Ib id .
11
1 1 “A “A D Discussion
is c u s s io n w withi t h Imran
Im ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,” Center
C e n t e r fforo r SStrategic
tr a te g ic & & IInternational t u d i e s , Janu-
n t e r n a t i o n a l SStudies, Janu­
ary
a r y 24,
2 4 , 2008,
2 0 0 8 , www.csis.org/events/discussion-imran-khan.
w w w .c s is .o r g /e v e n ts /d is c u s s io n - im r a n - k h a n .
12
1 2 Imran
Im ra n K Khan,
h a n , “An “ A n Open O pen L Letter–From
e tte r-F ro m P Pakistan–To
a k is ta n -T o P President
r e s i d e n t Obama,”
O b a m a ,” F o r b e s , Janu-
Forbes, Janu­
ary
a r y 229, 9 , 22009,
009, w www.forbes.com/2009/01/29/obama-afghanistan-taliban-opinions-con
w w .fo r b e s .c o m /2 0 0 9 /0 1 /2 9 /o b a m a -a fg h a n is ta n - ta lib a n -o p in io n s -c o n
ttributors_0129_imran_khan.html?sh=2639ef036a6c.
r ib u to r s _ 0 1 2 9 _ im r a n _ k h a n .h tm l? s h = 2 6 3 9 e f 0 3 6 a 6 c.
13
1 3 Ibid.
Ib id .
14
1 4 Daniel
D a n i e l S. S. M Markey,
a rk ey , N No o EExitx i t ffrom
rom P Pakistan
a k is ta n A America’s
m e r i c a ’s Tortured
T o r t u r e d Relationship
R e l a t i o n s h i p with
w i t h Islama-
Is la m a ­
b a d (New
bad ( N e w York:Y o r k : Cambridge
C a m b r i d g e University
U n iv e rs ity P Press,
r e s s , 22013),
0 1 3 ) , 16.
16.
1 5 Prime
15 P rim e M Minister’s
i n i s t e r ’ s Office,
O f f i c e , “The
“T he R Road
o a d to to N Nayaa y a Pakistan:
P a k is ta n : P PTI
T I Manifesto
M a n i f e s t o 2018,”
2 0 1 8 , ” 55,
55,
hhttps://pmo.gov.pk/documents/manifesto-pti.pdf.
ttp s ://p m o .g o v .p k /d o c u m e n ts /m a n ife s to - p ti.p d f .
38
38 Syed Ali Zia
KJIHGFEDCBA
S yedA li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe ry

16
1 6 IIbid.
b id .
17
1 7 IIbid.
b id .
18
1 8 “Imran
“ I m r a n Khan’s K h a n ’ s Speech S p e e c h in in F Full,”
u ll,” A a z e e r a , July
All JJazeera, J u l y 26, 2 6 , 22018,
0 1 8 , www.aljazeera.com/
w w w .a lja z e e ra .c o m /
nnews/2018/7/26/imran-khans-speech-in-full.
e w s /2 0 1 8 /7 /2 6 /im ra n -k h a n s -s p e e c h -m -fu ll.
19
1 9 IIbid.
b id .
20
2 0 “Imran
“ Im ra n K Khan, h a n , Smriti
S m r i t i Irani
Iran i & & A Anoushka
n o u s h k a Shankar:
S h a n k a r: H HT T L Leadership
e a d e r s h i p Summit
S u m m i t 2013,”2 0 1 3 ,” D Dai-
a i-
lymotion,
ly m o tio n , D December
e c e m b e r 7, 7 , 22013,
0 1 3 , www.dailymotion.com/video/x1asfxk.
w w w .d a ily m o tio n .c o m /v id e o /x 1 a s f x k .
21
2 1 “To
“ T o The The P Point:
o in t: K Karan
a r a n Thapar
T h a p a r Exclusive
E x c l u s i v e Interview
I n t e r v i e w With W ith P Pak a k Cricketer
C r i c k e t e r Imran
Im ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,”
IIndia T o d a y , December
n d i a Today, D e c e m b e r 12, 1 2 , 22015,
015, w www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJB1S6mcp-E.
w w .y o u tu b e .c o m /w a tc h ? v = O J B 1 S 6 m c p - E .
22
22 P Prime
rim e M Minister’s
i n i s t e r ’ s Office,
O f f i c e , “PTI
“P T I M Manifesto
a n i f e s t o 2018,”
2 0 1 8 , ” 54–55.
5 4 -5 5 .
23
2 3 “Imran
“ I m r a n Khan’s
K h a n ’ s Speech,”
S p e e c h ,” A All JJazeera.
azeera.
24
24 K Khawar
h a w a r Ghumman,
G h u m m a n , “Protests“ P ro te s ts N Not ot A Against
g a i n s t CPEC,
CPEC, P PTIT I Chief
C h ie f A Assures
s s u r e s Chinese
C h in e s e E Envoy,”
n v o y ,”
D a w n , June
Dawn, J u n e 221, 1 , 22017,
017, w www.dawn.com/news/1290877/protests-not-against-cpec-pti-
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 2 9 0 8 7 7 /p r o te s ts - n o t-a g a in s t- c p e c - p ti-
chief-assures-chinese-envoy.
c h ie f-a s s u re s -c h in e s e -e n v o y .
25
25 A Andrew
n d r e w Small, S m a l l , “Returning
“ R e t u r n i n g to t o the
t h e Shadows:
S h a d o w s : China,
C h in a , P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , and
a n d the
t h e Fate
F a t e of o f CPEC,”
C P E C ,”
The
T h e German
G erm an M Marshall
a r s h a ll F Fund
u n d of o f thet h e United t a t e s , September
U n i t e d SStates, S e p t e m b e r 23, 2 3 , 22020,
0 2 0 , 42, 42, w www.
ww.
gmfus.org/publications/returning-shadows-china-pakistan-and-fate-cpec.
g m f u s .o r g /p u b lic a tio n s /r e tu r n in g - s h a d o w s - c h in a - p a k is ta n - a n d - f a te - c p e c .
26
26 P Prime
rim e M Minister’s
i n i s t e r ’ s Office,
O f f i c e , “PTI
“P T I M Manifesto
a n i f e s t o 2018,”
2 0 1 8 , ” 32. 32.
27
2 7 IIbid.
b id .
28
2 8 IIbid.,
b i d . , 55.
55.
29
2 9 “Imran
“ I m r a n Khan’s
K h a n ’ s Speech,”
S p e e c h ,” A All JJazeera.
azeera.
30
3 0 “Envoy
“Envoy A Ajay ja y B Bisaria
is a ria M Meets
e e t s Imran
I m r a n Khan, K h a n , Gifts
G ifts H Himi m Cricket
C r i c k e t Bat
B a t Signed
S i g n e d byb y Indian
I n d i a n Team,”
T e a m ,”
IIndia
n d i a Today,Today, A August
u g u s t 10, 1 0 , 22018,018, w www.indiatoday.in/india/story/envoy-ajay-bisaria-
w w .in d ia to d a y .in /in d ia /s to r y /e n v o y - a ja y - b is a r ia -
mmeets-imran-khan-gifts-him-cricket-bat-signed-by-indian-team-1311183-2018-08-10.
e e ts -im ra n -k h a n -g ifts -h im -c ric k e t-b a t-s ig n e d -b y -in d ia n -te a m -1 3 1 1 1 8 3 -2 0 1 8 -0 8 -1 0 .
31
3 1 “Modi
“ M o d i PhonesP h o n e s IImran m ra n K Khan,
h a n , Says
S a y s ‘Ready‘ R e a d y tto o E Enter
n te r N New e w EraE r a of o f Ties
T ie s w withi t h Pakistan’:
P a k is ta n ’:
PPTI,”
T I ,” D a w n , July
Dawn, J u l y 30,3 0 , 22018,
018, w www.dawn.com/news/1423857.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 2 3 8 5 7 .
32
3 2 “PM
“ P M Khan K h a n Responds
R e s p o n d s tto o M Modi o d i ‘in
‘ i n Positive
P o s i t i v e Spirit’
S p i r i t ’ tto
o Resume
R e s u m e Talks,T a l k s , Resolve
R e s o lv e A Alll l Issues,”
I s s u e s ,”
D a w n , September
Dawn, S e p t e m b e r 220, 0 , 2018,
2018, w www.dawn.com/news/1434062.
w w .d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 1 4 3 4 0 6 2 .
33
3 3 Sana
S ana A Ali,l i , “Timeline:
“ T im e lin e : E Events
v e n ts L Leading
e a d i n g Up U p tto o ttheh e FebF e b 22019 019 P Pak-India
a k -In d ia A Aerial
e r i a l Combat,”
C o m b a t,”
D a w n , February
Dawn, F e b r u a r y 227, 7 , 2020,
2020, w www.dawn.com/news/1536224.
w w .d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 1 5 3 6 2 2 4 .
3 4 “Article
34 “ A r t i c l e 370: 3 7 0 : What
W hat H appened w
Happened with i t h Kashmir
K a s h m i r and a n d Why W h y IItt M a tte rs ,” B
Matters,” BC, A
BBC, u g u s t 5,
August 5,
22019,
019, w www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708.
w w .b b c .c o m /n e w s /w o rld - a s ia -in d ia - 4 9 2 3 4 7 0 8 .
3 5 Syed
35 Syed A Ali li Z Ziai a Jaffery,
J a f f e r y , “What
“ W h a t Happens
H appens A After
f t e r IIndia
n d i a and and P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Clash
C l a s h Over O ver K Kash-
ash ­
mmir?”
i r ? ” TheThe N National n t e r e s t , October
a t i o n a l IInterest, O c t o b e r 228, 8 , 2019,
2 0 1 9 , https://nationalinterest.org/feature/
h ttp s ://n a tio n a lin te re s t.o rg /f e a tu re /
wwhat-happens-after-india-and-pakistan-clash-over-kashmir-91681.
h a t-h a p p e n s -a fte r-in d ia -a n d -p a k is ta n -c la s h -o v e r-k a s h m ir-9 1 6 8 1 .
36
3 6 “Watch:
“ W a t c h : ‘If ‘ I f We
W e Get G e t Orders
O r d e r s from
fro m P Parliament
a r l i a m e n t .. . .’:
.’ : A Army
r m y Chief
C h i e f Gen
G en N Naravane
a r a v a n e on o n PoK,”
P o K ,”
H Hindustan
i n d u s t a n Times, T i m e s , January
J a n u a r y 11,1 1 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZDf1qGtH3Oo.
w w w .y o u tu b e .c o m /w a tc h ? v = Z D f 1 q G tH 3 O o .
37
37 “ “ ‘This
‘ T h i s IIs s theth e B Beginning’:
e g i n n i n g ’ : PM P M Imran
I m r a n Inaugurates
In a u g u ra te s K Kartarpur
a r t a r p u r Corridor
C o r r i d o r onon H Historic
i s t o r i c Day’,”
D a y ’ ,”
D Dawn,
aw n, N November
o v e m b e r 9, 9 , 2019,
2019, w www.dawn.com/news/1515830.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 1 5 8 3 0 .
38
38 B Baqir
a q i r Sajjad
S a j j a d Syed,
S y e d , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , India
In d ia A Agree
g r e e on on L LoC o C Ceasefire,”
C e a s e f i r e ,” D Dawn,
aw n, F February
e b r u a r y 26, 26,
22021,
021, w www.dawn.com/news/1609468.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 6 0 9 4 6 8 .
39
39 K Kallol
a l l o l Bhattacherjee
B h a t t a c h e r j e e and a n d Suhasini
S u h a s i n i Haider,
H a i d e r , “Analysis
“ A n a ly s is | B Backchannel
ackchannel D Diplomacy
i p l o m a c y PlayedP la y e d
IIts
ts P Part
a r t in
i n India,
I n d i a , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Decision
D e c i s i o n to t o Cease
C ease F Fire
ire A Along
l o n g LoC,”
L o C , ” TheThe H Hindu,
in d u , F February
e b r u a r y 26,26,
22021,
021, w www.thehindu.com/news/national/analysis-indications-that-india-and-pakistan-
w w .th e h in d u .c o m /n e w s /n a tio n a l/a n a ly s is -in d ic a tio n s - th a t- in d ia - a n d - p a k is ta n -
hhave-been-in-back-channel-talks/article33935351.ece.
a v e - b e e n - in - b a c k - c h a n n e l- ta lk s /a r tic le 3 3 9 3 5 3 5 1 .e c e .
40
4 0 “Balakot
“ B a l a k o t IIncident
n c i d e n t ‘Dangerous
‘D a n g e ro u s M Military
i l i t a r y Adventurism
A d v e n t u r i s m to t o Win
W i n Polls’,”
P o l l s ’ ,” The
The E Express
x p r e s s Tribune,
T r ib u n e ,
January
J a n u a r y 18, 1 8 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/2280399/will-continue-exposing-indias-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /2 2 8 0 3 9 9 /w ill- c o n tin u e - e x p o s in g -in d ia s -
bbelligerent-designs-for-pakistan-says-pm-imran.
e llig e re n t-d e s ig n s -fo r-p a k is ta n -s a y s -p m -im ra n.
41
41 “ “ ‘Irrefutable
‘ I r r e f u t a b l e Evidence’:
E v i d e n c e ’ : Dossier
D o s s i e r on o n India’s
I n d i a ’ s Sponsorship
S p o n s o r s h i p of o f State
S t a t e Terrorism
T e r r o r i s m in in P Pakistan
a k is ta n
Presented,”
P r e s e n t e d ,” D Dawn,
aw n, N November
o v e m b e r 14, 1 4 , 2020,
2020, w www.dawn.com/news/1590333.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 9 0 3 3 3 .
42
4 2 “India
“ I n d i a IIs sB Backing
a c k i n g ISI S ttoo Stir
S t i r Sectarianism
S e c t a r i a n i s m in in PPakistan:
a k is ta n : P PM M Imran
Im ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,” The
T h e Correspond-
C orrespond-
e n t . p k , January
ent.pk, J a n u a r y 11, 1 1 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , www.thecorrespondent.pk/2021/01/11/india-is-backing-
w w w .th e c o r r e s p o n d e n t.p k /2 0 2 1 /0 1 /1 1 /in d ia - is - b a c k in g -
is-to-stir-sectarianism-in-pakistan-pm-imran-khan/.
is -to - s tir -s e c ta r ia n is m - in - p a k is ta n - p m -im r a n - k h a n / .
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 39
39

443
3 “Pakistan Warns
“ P a k is ta n W a r n s India Against
In d ia A g a i n s t ‘False
‘ F a l s e Flag’ Attacks
F la g ’ A t t a c k s in Kashmir,”
in K a s h m i r , ” Voice
V o i c e of
o f AAmerica,
m e r ic a , KJIHGFEDCBA
December
D ecem ber 221,
1, 2020,
2020, w www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-warns-india-
w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /s o u th -c e n tr a l- a s ia /p a k is ta n -w a r n s -in d ia -
against-false-flag-attacks-kashmir.
a g a in s t- fa ls e - f la g -a tta c k s -k a s h m ir .
444
4 AAyazy a z Gul, G u l , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n P PM:
M: N Normalizing
o r m a l i z i n g Ties T i e s withw i t h India
In d ia W Wouldo u l d BeB e ‘Betrayal’
‘ B e t r a y a l ’ tto o K Kash-
ash ­
mmiri,”
i r i , ” Voice
V o i c e of of A m e r i c a , May
America, M a y 30, 3 0 , 2021,
2021, w www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/
w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /s o u th - c e n tra l-a s ia /
pakistan-pm-normalizing-ties-india-would-be-betrayal-kashmiris.
p a k is ta n -p m -n o rm a liz in g -tie s -in d ia -w o u ld -b e -b e tra y a l-k a s h m iris .
445
5 “Pak
“ P a k WouldW o u ld N Not o t Restore
R e s t o r e Ties
T ie s w withi t h IIndia
n d i a Until
U n til D Delhi
e l h i Reverses
R e v e r s e s IIts ts D Decision
e c i s i o n on on K Kash-
ash ­
mir:
m i r : ImranI m r a n Khan,”
K h a n ,” The T r i b u n e , June
T h e Tribune, J u n e 30,
3 0 , 22021,021, w www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/
w w .trib u n e in d ia .c o m /n e w s /n a tio n /
ppak-would-not-restore-ties-with-india-until-delhi-reverses-its-decision-on-kashmir-
a k -w o u ld -n o t-re s to re -tie s -w ith -in d ia -u n til-d e lh i-re v e rs e s -its -d e c is io n -o n -k a s h m ir-
imran-khan-276353?ref=epaper.
im r a n - k h a n - 2 7 6 3 5 3 ? r e f = e p a p e r.
446
6 AAmy my K Kazmin
a z m i n and a n d Farhan
F a rh an B Bokhari,
o k h a r i , “Imran
“Im ran K Khanhan W Warnsa r n s Pakistan
P a k is ta n W Wouldo u ld R Retali-
e ta li­
ate
a te A Against
g a i n s t IIndian
n d ia n A Attack,”
tta c k ,” F Financial
i n a n c i a l Times,T im e s , F February
e b r u a r y 19, 1 9 , 22019,
019, w www.ft.com/
w w .f t.c o m /
content/0ef7d9c0-3436-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5.
c o n te n t/0 e f7 d 9 c 0 -3 4 3 6 -1 1 e 9 -b d 3 a -8 b 2 a 2 1 1 d 9 0 d 5 .
477
4 “All
“A ll W Warsa rs A Are re M Miscalculated,
is c a lc u la te d , N No o OneO ne K Knows now s W Whereh e r e They
T hey L Lead:
e a d : PMPM K Khan,”
h a n ,” D Dawn,
aw n,
FFebruary
e b r u a r y 227, 7 , 22019,
019, w www.dawn.com/news/1466364.
w w .d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 1 4 6 6 3 6 4 .
448
8 ““ ‘Make
‘M a k e N No o Mistake’:
M i s t a k e ’ : India
In d ia W Will i l l Get
G et B Befitting
e f i t t i n g Response
R e s p o n s e If I f It
I t Conducts
C o n d u c t s False-Flag
F a l s e - F l a g Oper-
O p er­
ation,
a tio n , P PMM ImranI m r a n Says,”
S a y s ,” D Dawn,
aw n, D December
e c e m b e r 20, 2 0 , 22020,
0 2 0 , www.dawn.com/news/1596882.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 9 6 8 8 2 .
449
9 “Dossier
“ D o s s i e r on o n Indian
I n d i a n Sponsorship
S p o n s o r s h i p of o f Terrorism.”
T e r ro r is m .”
50
50 AAamira m ir L Latif,
a t i f , “Pakistani
“ P a k i s t a n i PM:
P M : IIndian d ia M Must
ust F Face a c e Justice
J u s t i c e for
f o r ‘Terrorism’,”
‘ T e r r o r i s m ’ ,” A Anadolu
n a d o l u AAgency,
gency,
N November
o v e m b e r 14, 1 4 , 22020,0 2 0 , www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistani-pm-india-must-face-
w w w .a a .c o m .tr /e n /a s ia - p a c if ic /p a k is ta n i- p m - in d ia - m u s t- fa c e -
jjustice-for-terrorism/2043990#.
u s tic e -fo r-te rro ris m /2 0 4 3 9 9 0 # .
51
51 “World
“ W o rld N No o L Longer
onger B Buying
u y i n g IIndia’s
n d i a ’ s Terrorism
T e rro ris m N Narrative
a r r a t i v e ono n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n ‘Blindly’:
‘ B l i n d l y ’ : Qureshi,”
Q u re s h i,”
D a w n , October
Dawn, O c t o b e r 12, 1 2 , 22020,
0 2 0 , www.dawn.com/news/1584683.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 8 4 6 8 3 .
52
52 Karan
K a r a n Thapar,
T h a p a r , “Full “ F u l l Text:
T e x t : Interview
I n t e r v i e w with w i t h Imran
I m r a n Khan’s
K h a n ’s N NSA S A on on K Kashmir,
a s h m i r , Uighurs,
U ig h u rs ,
Jadhav,
J a d h a v , Terror
T e r r o r and a n d Talks,”
T a l k s , ” TheT h e Wire, W i r e , October
O c t o b e r 15, 1 5 , 22020,
0 2 0 , https://thewire.in/south-asia/
h ttp s ://th e w ir e .in /s o u th - a s ia /
interview-imran-khan-nsa-moeed-yusuf-pakistan.
in te rv ie w -im ra n -k h a n -n s a -m o e e d -y u s u f-p a k is ta n .
53
53 “Dossier
“ D o s s i e r on o n Indian
I n d i a n Sponsorship
S p o n s o r s h i p of o f Terrorism.”
T e r ro r is m .”
54
54 Kunal
K u n a l Gaurav,
G a u r a v , “Modi “ M o d i Govt G o v t Ensured
E n s u r e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Is I s Retained
R e t a i n e d on o n FATF
F A T F Grey G r e y List, L i s t , Says
Says
Jaishankar,”
J a is h a n k a r ,” H Hindustan T i m e s , July
i n d u s t a n Times, J u l y 18,
1 8 , 22021, 021, w www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/
w w .h in d u s ta n tim e s .c o m /in d ia - n e w s /
modi-govt-ensured-pakistan-remained-on-fatf-grey-list-says-jaishankar-10162660
m o d i-g o v t-e n s u re d -p a k is ta n -re m a in e d -o n -fa tf-g re y -list-s a y s -ja is h a n k a r-1 0 1 6 2 6 6 0
8739423.html.
8 7 3 9 4 2 3 .h tm l .
55
55 “India
“ I n d i a Opposes
O p p o s e s CPEC C P E C as a s IItt E
Encroaches
n c r o a c h e s on o n Territorial
T e r r i t o r i a l IIntegrity,
n t e g r i t y , Says
S a y s Official,”
O ff ic ia l,” B Business
u s in e s s
t a n d a r d , June
SStandard, J u n e 27, 2 7 , 22018,
0 1 8 , www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-
w w w .b u s in e s s - s ta n d a r d .c o m /a r tic le /e c o n o m y - p o lic y /in d ia -
opposes-cpec-as-it-encroaches-on-territorial-integrity-says-official-118062700319_1.
o p p o s e s -c p e c -a s -it-e n c ro a c h e s -o n -te rrito ria l-in te g rity -s a y s -o ffic ia l-1 1 8 0 6 2 7 0 0 3 1 9 _ 1 .
hhtml.
tm l.
56
56 “Interview
“ In te rv ie w w withi t h IImran
m ra n K Khan’s
h a n ’s N NSA S A on o n Kashmir.”
K a s h m ir .”
57
57 Maleeha
M a l e e h a Lodhi, L o d h i , “Terms“ T e r m s of o f Engagement,”
E n g a g e m e n t,” D a w n , May
Dawn, M a y 3, 3 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , www.dawn.com/
w w w .d a w n .c o m /
nnews/1621681/terms-of-engagement.
e w s / 1 6 2 1 6 8 1 / t e r m s - o f - e n g a g e m e n t.
58
58 AAbdulb d u l Basit,
B a s it, H Hostility:
o s tility : A A DDiplomat’s
i p l o m a t ’s D Diaryi a r y on on P Pakistan-India
a k is ta n -In d ia R Relations
e l a t i o n s and and M More
ore
(Karachi:
(K a ra c h i: L Lightstone
ig h ts to n e P Publishers,
u b l i s h e r s , 22021),
0 2 1 ) , 280.
280.
59
59 AAyazy a z Gul, G u l , “Trump
“ T ru m p H Hails
a i l s Growing
G ro w in g U US-Pakistan
S - P a k i s t a n Ties T ie s D During
u rin g K Khan
han M Meeting,”
e e t i n g , ” Voice
V o i c e of
of
m e r i c a , January
AAmerica, Ja n u ary 2 21,1 , 22020,
0 2 0 , www.voanews.com/usa/trump-hails-growing-us-pakistan-
w w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /u s a /tr u m p -h a ils - g ro w in g - u s -p a k is ta n -
ties-during-khan-meeting.
tie s -d u rin g -k h a n -m e e tin g .
60
60 “Text
“ T e x t of of R Remarks
e m a r k s bby y President
P re s id e n t D Donald
o n a l d Trump
T r u m p and a n d Prime
P r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r IImran
m ran K Khanh a n at at
WWhite h ite H o u s e ,” The
House,” The N J u l y 23,
e w s , July
News, 2 3 , 2019,
2 0 1 9 , www.thenews.com.pk/latest/502379-text-of-
w w w .th e n e w s .c o m .p k /la te s t/5 0 2 3 7 9 - te x t- o f -
rremarks-by-president-trump-and-prime-minister-imran-khan-at-white-house.
e m a rk s -b y -p re s id e n t-tru m p -a n d -p rim e -m in is te r-im ra n -k h a n -a t-w h ite -h o u s e .
61
61 Ibid.
Ib id .
62
62 David
D a v i d Sterman,
S t e r m a n , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n SetS e t to t o Mark
M a r k One O n e Year Y e a r withw ith N No o U U.S.
.S . D Drone
r o n e Strikes:
S t r i k e s : IsI s the
th e
WWar a r Over?”
O v e r? ” N New ew A m e r i c a , July
America, J u l y 3, 3 , 2019,
2019, w www.newamerica.org/international-security/
w w .n e w a m e ric a .o r g /in te m a tio n a l-s e c u r ity /
bblog/pakistan-set-mark-one-year-no-us-drone-strikes-war-over/#:~:text=July%20
lo g /p a k is ta n -s e t-m a rk -o n e -y e a r-n o -u s -d ro n e -s trik e s -w a r-o v e r/# :~ :te x t= J u ly % 2 0
3%2C%202019,the%20campaign%20began%20in%202004.
3 % 2 C % 2 0 2 0 1 9 ,th e % 2 0 c a m p a ig n % 2 0 b e g a n % 2 0 in % 2 0 2 0 0 4 .
63
63 Kamran
K a m r a n Yousaf, Y o u s a f , “US “ U S Declares
D e c l a r e s Balochistan
B a l o c h i s t a n Liberation
L ib e ra tio n A Armyr m y a Terrorist
T e r r o r i s t Group,”
G r o u p , ” The The
E Express T r i b u n e , July
x p r e s s Tribune, J u l y 2, 2 , 2019,
2 0 1 9 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/2004785/1-us-declares-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to ry /2 0 0 4 7 8 5 /1 - u s -d e c la r e s -
bla-terrorist-outfit.
b la - te r r o r is t- o u tf it .
40
40 Syed Ali
Syed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

64
64 D Declan
e c l a n Walsh,
W a l s h , “A “ A CIAC I A Spy, Spy, a a Hail
H a i l ofofB Bullets,
u l l e t s , Three
T h r e e Killed
K i l l e d and and a a US-Pakistan
U S - P a k i s t a n Diplo-
D ip lo ­
matic
m a tic R Row,”
o w , ” The KJIHGFEDCBA
T h e Guardian,
G u a r d ia n , F February
e b r u a r y 20, 2 0 , 22011,
011, w www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
w w .th e g u a r d ia n .c o m /w o rld /2 0 1 1 /
feb/20/cia-agent-lahore-civilian-deaths.
f e b /2 0 /c ia - a g e n t- la h o r e - c iv ilia n -d e a th s.
65
65 N Nicki c k Paton
P a t o n Walsh,
W a l s h , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Official: NATO
O f f ic i a l : N ATO A Attack
t t a c k Kills
K i l l s 26 2 6 Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Soldiers,”
S o l d i e r s ,” CNN,
CNN,
N November
o v e m b e r 226, 6 , 2011,
2 0 1 1 , https://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/26/world/meast/pakistan-attack/
h ttp s ://e d itio n .c n n .c o m /2 0 1 1 /1 1 /2 6 /w o r ld /m e a s t/p a k is ta n - a tta c k /
index.html.
in d e x .h tm l.
66
6 6 “U.S.–Pakistan
“ U .S .-P a k is ta n R Relations
e l a t i o n s in i n tthe
h e Biden
B id e n E Era:
ra : A A Conversation
C o n v e rs a tio n w with
i t h Moeed
M o e e d Yusuf,”
Y u s u f ,” The The
Wilson C e n t e r , January
W i l s o n Center, J a n u a r y 221, 1 , 22021,
021, w www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-pakistan-relations-
w w .w ils o n c e n te r .o r g /e v e n t/u s - p a k is ta n - re la tio n s -
bbiden-era-conversation-moeed-yusuf.
i d e n - e r a - c o n v e r s a t i o n - m o e e d - y u s u f.
67
6 7 “Inauguration
“ In a u g u ra tio n D Day:a y : Pakistan
P a k i s t a n PM P M ImranI m r a n Khan
K han W Wishes
i s h e s US US P President
r e s i d e n t Biden,”
B id e n ,” K Khaleej
h a le e j
T i m e s , January
Times, J a n u a ry 20,
2 0 , 22021, 0 2 1 , www.khaleejtimes.com/world/americas/inauguration-
w w w .k h a le e jtim e s .c o m /w o r ld /a m e r ic a s /in a u g u r a tio n -
day-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-wishes-us-president-biden.
d a y -p a k is ta n -p m -im ra n -k h a n -w is h e s -u s -p re s id e n t-b id e n .
68
6 8 IImran
m ran K Khan,
h a n , “Imran
“Im ran K Khan:
h a n : Peace
P e a c e Is I s Within
W i t h i n Reach
R e a c h in in A Afghanistan.
fg h a n is ta n . A A Hasty
H a s t y Interna-
In te rn a ­
ttional
i o n a l Withdrawal
W ith d ra w a l W Would o u ld B Bee Unwise,”
U n w i s e , ” The T h e Washington
W a s h in g to n P o s t , September
Post, S e p t e m b e r 226, 6 , 22020,
020,
wwww.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/26/imran-khan-peace-is-within-reach-
w w .w a s h in g to n p o s t.c o m /o p in io n s /2 0 2 0 /0 9 /2 6 /im r a n - k h a n - p e a c e - is - w ith in - r e a c h -
afghanistan-hasty-international-withdrawal-would-be-unwise/.
a f g h a n i s t a n - h a s t y - i n t e r n a t i o n a l - w i t h d r a w a l - w o u l d - b e - u n w i s e /.
69
69 B Baqir
a q i r Sajjad
S a j j a d Syed,
S y e d , “FO“ F O Defends
D e f e n d s CPEC CPEC A After
fte r A Alicelic e W Wells’e l l s ’ Criticism,”
C r itic is m ,” D Dawn,
aw n, M May a y 23,
23,
22020,
020, w www.dawn.com/news/1559080.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 5 9 0 8 0 .
70
70 A Adnan
dnan A Aamir,
a m i r , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n A Alarmed
l a r m e d bby y U US-India
S - I n d i a IInformation
n f o r m a t i o n Sharing S h a r i n g Pact,”
P a c t ,” N Nikkei
ik k e i
A Asia,
s ia , N November
o v e m b e r 2, 2 , 22020, 0 2 0 , https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/
h ttp s ://a s ia .n ik k e i.c o m /P o litic s /I n te rn a tio n a l- re la tio n s /
Pakistan-alarmed-by-US-India-information-sharing-pact.
P a k is ta n -a la rm e d -b y -U S -In d ia -in fo rm a tio n -s h a rin g -p a c t.
71
7 1 Sana
S a n a Jamal,
J a m a l , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Responds
R e s p o n d s to to U US S Climate
C l i m a t e SummitS u m m i t Snub S n u b with w i t h Commitment
C o m m i t m e n t tto o
EEnvironment,”
n v i r o n m e n t , ” Gulf G u lf N e w s , March
News, M a r c h 29, 2 9 , 22021,
0 2 1 , hhttps://gulfnews.com/world/asia/paki-
ttp s ://g u lfn e w s .c o m /w o rld /a s ia /p a k i-
stan/pakistan-responds-to-us-climate-summit-snub-with-commitment-to-environ
s ta n /p a k is ta n - re s p o n d s - to - u s - c lim a te - s u m m it- s n u b - w ith - c o m m itm e n t-to - e n v iro n
mment-1.78194822.
e n t- 1 .7 8 1 9 4 8 2 2 .
72
72 A Anwar
n w a r IIqbal, q b a l , “Blinken,
“ B l i n k e n , Qureshi
Q u r e s h i discuss
d is c u s s A Afghan
f g h a n situation,”
s i t u a t i o n ,” D a w n , July
Dawn, J u l y 10,1 0 , 22021,
021,
wwww.dawn.com/news/1634193.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 6 3 4 1 9 3 .
73
73 A Anwar
n w a r Iqbal,
I q b a l , “Pakistan,
“ P a k is ta n , U US S A Agree
g r e e tto o Sustain
S u s t a i n PaceP a c e in in B Bilateral
i l a t e r a l Cooperation,”
C o o p e ra tio n ,” D Dawn,
aw n,
July
J u l y 31,3 1 , 22021,
021, w www.dawn.com/news/1637887.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 6 3 7 8 8 7 .
74
7 4 “Remarks
“ R e m a r k s bby y President
P r e s id e n t B Biden
i d e n on o n thet h e Way
W a y Forward
F o r w a r d in in A Afghanistan,”
f g h a n i s t a n , ” The T h e White
W h ite H House,
o u se,
A April
p r i l 14,1 4 , 22021,0 2 1 , www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/
w w w .w h ite h o u s e .g o v /b r ie fin g - r o o m /s p e e c h e s - r e m a r k s /2 0 2 1 /0 4 /1 4 /
rremarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/.
e m a r k s - b y - p r e s i d e n t - b i d e n - o n - t h e - w a y - f o r w a r d - i n - a f g h a n i s t a n /.
75
75 M Mark a r k Mazzetti
M a z z e t t i anda n d Julian
J u l i a n E.E. B Barnes,
a r n e s , “C.I.A.
“ C . I . A . Scrambles
S c r a m b l e s for fo r N New ew A Approach
p p r o a c h in in AAfghani-
fg h a n i­
stan,”
s t a n , ” TheThe N Newe w York T i m e s , June
Y o r k Times, J u n e 6, 6 , 2021,
2021, w www.nytimes.com/2021/06/06/us/politics/
w w .n y tim e s .c o m /2 0 2 1 /0 6 /0 6 /u s /p o litic s /
cia-afghanistan-pakistan.html.
c ia -a f g h a n is ta n - p a k is ta n .h tm l.
76
76 A Aisha
i s h a Mahmood,
M a h m o o d , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n W Will Never
ill N e v e r Compromise
C o m p r o m i s e on o n ItsI t s Sovereignty
S o v e r e i g n t y for fo rAAny n y Country:
C o u n try :
PPM M IImran,”
m ra n ,” B Business
u s in e s s R e c o r d e r , June
Recorder, J u n e 30,
3 0 , 22021,
021, w www.brecorder.com/news/40104025/
w w .b r e c o rd e r .c o m /n e w s /4 0 1 0 4 0 2 5 /
ppakistan-will-never-compromise-on-its-sovereignty-for-any-country-pm-imran.
a k is ta n -w ill-n e v e r-c o m p ro m is e -o n -its -s o v e re ig n ty -fo r-a n y -c o u n try -p m -im ra n .
77
7 7 “Pakistan’s
“ P a k is ta n ’s K Khanhan F Fears
e a r s ‘Civil
‘ C i v i l War’
W a r ’ If If N No o P Peace
eace D Deale a l in in A Afghanistan,”
fg h a n is ta n ,” A All JJazeera,
a zeera ,
June
J u n e 21, 2 1 , 22021,
021, w www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/21/pakistan-imran-khan-axios-afgha
w w .a lja z e e r a .c o m /n e w s /2 0 2 1 /6 /2 1 /p a k is ta n - im r a n - k h a n - a x io s -a fg h a
nnistan-uighurs.
is ta n -u ig h u rs.
78
7 8 IImran
m r a n Khan,K h a n , “Imran
“ I m r a n Khan:K h a n : Pakistan
P a k i s t a n IIs s Ready
R e a d y to to B Bee aa Partner
P a r t n e r for f o r Peace
P e a c e inin A Afghani-
fg h a n i­
stan,
s t a n , but b u t We W e WillW ill N Not ot H Host o s t U.S.
U .S . B Bases,”
a s e s , ” The T h e Washington
W a s h in g to n P o s t , June
Post, J u n e 21,2 1 , 22021,021,
wwww.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/21/afghanistan-pakistan-imran-khan-
w w .w a s h in g to n p o s t.c o m /o p in io n s /2 0 2 1 /0 6 /2 1 /a f g h a n is ta n -p a k is ta n -im ra n - k h a n -
ppeace-security-cooperation-us/.
e a c e - s e c u r i t y - c o o p e r a t i o n - u s /.
79
79 E Ejaz
j a z Haider,
H a i d e r , “Dealing
“ D e a lin g w withi t h tthe
h e Biden
B id e n A Administration,”
d m i n i s t r a t i o n , ” The The F Friday
r i d a y Times,
T im e s , A April
p r i l 30,
30,
22021,
021, w www.thefridaytimes.com/dealing-with-the-biden-administration/.
w w th e fr id a y tim e s .c o m /d e a lm g - w i1 h - th e -b id e n - a d m m is tr a tio n / .
80
80 Z Zalmay
a l m a y Khalilzad,
K h a l i l z a d , “Full
“ F u l l Committee
C o m m itte e H Hearing:
e a rin g : U U.S.
.S . P Policy
o l i c y on on A Afghanistan,”
f g h a n i s t a n , ” United
U n ite d
SStates
t a t e s SSenate
e n a t e Committee
C o m m i t t e e on on F Foreign
o r e ig n R Relations,
e la tio n s , A April
p r i l 27,
2 7 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , www.foreign.senate.
w w w .fo r e ig n .s e n a te .
gov/hearings/us-policy-on-afghanistan-042721.
g o v /h e a rin g s /u s -p o lic y -o n -a fg h a n is ta n -0 4 2 7 2 1 .
8 1 Syed
81 Syed A Alil i Zia
Z i a Jaffery,
J a f f e r y , “The
“ T h e Intra-Afghan
In tra -A fg h a n D Dialogue
i a l o g u e IIs s Good
G ood N Newse w s for fo r P Pakistan-US
a k is ta n -U S
RRelations,”
e l a t i o n s , ” TheThe D i p l o m a t , September
Diplomat, S e p te m b e r 2 21,1 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/
h ttp s ://th e d ip lo m a t.c o m /2 0 2 0 /0 9 /
tthe-intra-afghan-dialogue-is-good-news-for-pakistan-us-relations/.
h e -in tra -a fg h a n -d ia lo g u e -is -g o o d -n e w s -fo r-p a k is ta n -u s -re la tio n s /.
 Pakistan’s
P Foreign
a k i s t a n ’s F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y Under
U n d e r IImran Khan
m ran K han 41
41

82
8 2 “Afghan
“ A f g h a n Transit T r a n s i t Trade
T r a d e Via V ia P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s Gwadar
G w a d a r Port P o r t Begins,”
B e g i n s , ” TheKJIHGFEDCBA
The N a t i o n , July
Nation, J u l y 27,
27,
22020,
0 2 0 , hhttps://nation.com.pk/27-Jul-2020/afghan-transit-trade-via-pakistan-s-gwadar-
ttp s ://n a tio n .c o m .p k /2 7 - J u l- 2 0 2 0 /a f g h a n -tr a n s it- tra d e -v ia - p a k is ta n -s - g w a d a r -
pport-begins.
o rt-b e g in s .
83
83 N Naveed
a v e e d Siddiqui,
S i d d i q u i , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Will W i l l Do Do E Everything
v e r y t h i n g Possible
P o s s i b l e tto o R Reduce
e d u c e Violence
V i o l e n c e in in
AAfghanistan,
f g h a n i s t a n , SaysS a y s PM P M Imran I m r a n on on M Maidena i d e n Kabul
K a b u l Visit,”
V is it,” D Dawn,
aw n, N November
o v e m b e r 19, 1 9 , 22020,
020,
wwww.dawn.com/news/1591240.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 9 1 2 4 0 .
84
84 M Ministry
i n i s t r y ofo f Foreign
F o re ig n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , “Shared
“ S h a r e d Vision V is io n B Between
e t w e e n Islamic
I s l a m i c Republic
R e p u b l i c of of A Afghani-
fg h a n i­
stan
s t a n and a n d Islamic
Is la m ic R Republic
e p u b l i c of o f Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , to t o Support
S u p p o r t PeaceP e a c e and a n d Stability
S t a b i l i t y inin B Both
o th
Countries
C o u n t r i e s and a n d theth e W Wider id e r R Region,”
e g io n ,” N November
o v e m b e r 19, 1 9 , 22020,
0 2 0 , hhttp://mofa.gov.pk/shared-
ttp ://m o f a .g o v .p k /s h a re d -
vision-between-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-and-islamic-republic-of-pakistan-
v is io n -b e tw e e n -is la m ic -re p u b lic -o f-a fg h a n is ta n -a n d -is la m ic -re p u b lic -o f-p a k is ta n -
tto-support-peace-and-stability-in-both-countries-and-the-wider-region/.
o -s u p p o rt-p e a c e -a n d -s ta b ility -in -b o th -c o u n trie s -a n d -th e -w id e r-re g io n /.
85
85 N Naveed
a v e e d Siddiqui,
S i d d i q u i , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Says S a y s Troops
T r o o p s Responded
R e s p o n d e d tto o A Afghan
fg h an F Firei r e at
a t Chaman
C ham an B Bor-
o r­
der
d e r ‘Only
‘ O n l y in i n Self-Defence’,”
S e lf- D e f e n c e ’,” D a w n , July
Dawn, J u l y 31,
3 1 , 22020,
020, w www.dawn.com/news/1572170/
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 7 2 1 7 0 /
ppakistan-says-troops-responded-to-afghan-fire-at-chaman-border-only-in-self-
a k is ta n -s a y s -tro o p s -re s p o n d e d -to -a fg h a n -fire -a t-c h a m a n -b o rd e r-o n ly -in -s e lf-
defence.
d e fen c e.
86
86 A Ayazy a z Gul,
G u l , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n SaysSays A Afghan
fg h a n B Border
o rd er F Fence
ence N Nearly
e a r l y Complete,”
C o m p l e t e , ” Voice V o i c e ofo f America,
A m e r ic a ,
DDecember,
e c e m b e r ,4, 4 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-says-afghan-border-
w w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /s o u th - c e n tr a l- a s ia /p a k is ta n -s a y s -a f g h a n - b o r d e r-
fence-nearly-complete.
fe n c e -n e a rly -c o m p le te .
87
87 N Najibullah
a j i b u l l a h Lalzoy,
L a l z o y , “Ghani,
“ G h a n i, K Khanh a n Confrontation
C o n f r o n t a t i o n OverO v e r Taliban
T a l i b a n ini n Tashkent,”
T a s h k e n t ,” The TheK Khaama
haam a
P r e s s , July
Press, J u l y 17,1 7 , 22021,
021, w www.khaama.com/ghani-khan-confrontation-over-taliban-in-
w w .k h a a m a .c o m /g h a n i-k h a n - c o n f r o n ta tio n - o v e r- ta lib a n - in -
ttashkent-46346/.
a s h k e n t-4 6 3 4 6 /.
88
8 8 “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n N Neither
e ith e r R Responsible
e s p o n s i b l e for f o r Taliban,
T a lib a n , N Noror A Are re W Wee Their T h e i r Spokespersons:
S p o k e s p e r s o n s : PM PM
IImran,”
m ra n ,” D a w n , July
Dawn, J u l y 229, 9 , 2021,
2021, w www.dawn.com/news/1637578.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 6 3 7 5 7 8 .
89
8 9 “Afghanistan:
“ A f g h a n i s t a n : Taliban
T a l i b a n Continue
C o n tin u e A Attacks
t t a c k s on o n Three
T h re e M Majora j o r Cities,”
C itie s ,” B BBC,
BC, A August
u g u s t 1, 1,
22021,
021, w www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58040141.
w w .b b c .c o m /n e w s /w o r ld - a s ia - 5 8 0 4 0 1 4 1 .
90
90 A Amira
m i r a Jadoon,
J a d o o n , “The
“ T h e Evolution
E v o l u t i o n and a n d Potential
P o te n tia l R Resurgence
e s u r g e n c e of o f ttheh e Tehrik-i-Taliban
T e h rik -i-T a lib a n
PPakistan,”
a k i s t a n , ” TheT h e United
U n i t e d SStates t a t e s IInstitute
n s t i t u t e ofo fP Peace,
eace, M May a y 12,1 2 , 22021,
021, w www.usip.org/publi
w w .u s ip .o r g /p u b li
cations/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan.
c a tio n s /2 0 2 1 /0 5 /e v o lu tio n -a n d - p o te n tia l- re s u r g e n c e -te h r ik -i- ta lib a n - p a k is ta n .
91
9 1 Small,
S m a l l , “Returning
“ R e t u r n i n g to t o tthe
h e Shadows,”
S h a d o w s ,” 442. 2.
92
92 R Rabia
a b ia A Akhtar,
k h t a r , “Review
“ R e v i e w Report:R e p o r t : CPEC,C P E C , a Transformation
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n in in M Motion,”
o tio n ,” P Pakistan
a k is ta n P Polit-
o lit­
i c o , September
ico, S e p t e m b e r 26, 2 6 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , http://pakistanpolitico.com/review-report-cpec-a-transfor
h ttp ://p a k is ta n p o litic o .c o m /r e v ie w - re p o r t-c p e c -a -tr a n s fo r
mmation-in-motion/.
a tio n -in -m o tio n /.
93
9 3 “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , China
C h i n a Committed
C o m m i t t e d to t o Taking
T a k i n g CPECC P E C tto New
o N ew H Heights:
e ig h ts : A Asad
s a d Umar,”
U m a r ,” The The N News,
ew s,
DDecember
e c e m b e r 13, 1 3 , 22020,
020, w www.thenews.com.pk/print/757910-pakistan-china-committed-
w w .th e n e w s .c o m .p k /p r in t/7 5 7 9 1 0 -p a k is ta n -c h in a -c o m m itte d -
tto-taking-cpec-to-new-heights-asad-umar.
o -ta k in g -c p e c -to -n e w -h e ig h ts -a s a d -u m a r.
94
9 4 Syed
S y e d IIrfan r f a n Raza,
R a z a , “CPEC
“ C P E C Focus Focus M Mustust B Bee on o n JobJ o b Creation,
C re a tio n , A Agriculture:
g r i c u l t u r e : Imran,”
I m ra n ,” D Dawn,
aw n,
October
O c t o b e r 9, 9 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , www.dawn.com/news/1437770.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 3 7 7 7 0 .
95
9 5 “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n H Has a s Taken
T a k e n $6.5 $ 6 .5 B Billion
i l l i o n Loan
L o a n from f r o m China
C h i n a in i n July-April:
J u ly -A p ril: R Report,”
e p o r t ,” B Business
u s in e s s
T o d a y , May
Today, M a y 223, 3 , 22019,
019, w www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/pakistan-has-
w w .b u s in e s s to d a y .in /c u r re n t/e c o n o m y - p o litic s /p a k is ta n - h a s -
ttaken-65-billion-loan-from-china-in-july-april-report/story/349611.html.
a k e n -6 5 - b illio n - lo a n -f ro m - c h in a -m - ju ly -a p r il- re p o r t/s to r y /3 4 9 6 1 1 .h tm l.
96
9 6 “A
“ A Conversation
C o n v e rs a tio n w withi t h Prime
P r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r IImranm r a n KhanK h a n of o f Pakistan,”
P a k i s t a n , ” Council
C o u n c i l on on F Foreign
o r e ig n
R e l a t i o n s , September
Relations, S e p t e m b e r 23, 2 3 , 2019,
2 0 1 9 , www.cfr.org/event/conversation-prime-minister-
w w w .c fr .o r g /e v e n t/c o n v e r s a tio n - p r im e - m in is te r -
imran-khan-pakistan-0.
im ra n -k h a n -p a k is ta n -0 .
97
9 7 Shahbaz
Shahbaz R Rana,
a n a , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n P Pays
ays B Back
a c k $1b$ 1 b Saudi
Saudi L Loan,”
o a n , ” The
The E Express
x p r e s s Tribune,
T r ib u n e , A August
u g u s t 6,
6,
22020,
020, h https://tribune.com.pk/story/2258238/pakistan-pays-back-1b-saudi-loan.
ttp s ://trib u n e .c o m .p k /s to ry /2 2 5 8 2 3 8 /p a k is ta n -p a y s -b a c k - 1 b - s a u d i- lo a n .
98
98 M Mehtabe h t a b Haider,
H a i d e r , “Pak-China
“ P a k - C h i n a FTA F T A Phase-II
P h a s e - I I Comes
C o m e s intoi n t o Effect,”
E f f e c t , ” Geo
G eo N e w s , January
News, J a n u a r y 1,1,
0 2 0 , www.geo.tv/latest/264968-pak-china-fta-phase-ii-comes-into-effect.
22020, w w w .g e o .tv /la te s t/2 6 4 9 6 8 - p a k - c h in a - fta -p h a s e -ii- c o m e s -in to -e ff e c t .
99
99 N Nazish
a z is h A Afraz
f r a z and
and N Nadiaa d i a Mukhtar,
M u k h t a r , “China“ C h i n a Pakistan
P a k is ta n F Free
r e e Trade
T rad e A Agreement
g r e e m e n t Phase P h a s e 2:2:
AA PPreliminary
re lim in a ry A Analysis,”
n a l y s i s , ” The The P Pakistan
a k is ta n B Business
u s i n e s s Council
C o u n c i l anda n d Consortium
C o n s o r t i u m ffor orD Develop-
e v e lo p ­
mment ent P Policy
o lic y R e s e a r c h , 2020,
Research, 2 0 2 0 , www.pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/Preliminary-Anal
w w w .p b c .o r g .p k /w p - c o n te n t/u p lo a d s /P r e lim in a r y -A n a l
yysis-of-Pak-China-FTA-Phase-II.pdf.
s is - o f - P a k - C h in a - F T A - P h a s e - II .p d f .
100
1 0 0 “Pak-China
“ P a k - C h i n a Bilateral
B i l a t e r a l Trade
T r a d e VolumeV o lu m e D Doubled
o u b l e d Under
U n d e r ((CPFTA-II),”
C P F T A - I I ) ,” Cpecinfo.com,
C p e c in fo .c o m ,
January
J a n u a r y 2, 2 , 22020,
0 2 0 , accessed
a c c e s s e d January
J a n u a r y 24, 2 4 , 22021,
0 2 1 , hhttp://cpecinfo.com/pak-china-bilateral-
ttp ://c p e c in f o .c o m /p a k -c h in a - b ila te ra l-
ttrade-volume-doubled-under-cpfta-ii/.
r a d e - v o l u m e - d o u b l e d - u n d e r - c p f t a - i i /.
42
42 Syed Ali
Syed A Zia
li Z i a JJaffery
a ffe r y

101
1 0 1 “China
“ C h i n a IIs s Main
M a i n Contributor
C o n t r i b u t o r of o f FDI
F D I in i n Pakistan,
P a k is ta n , M Mainly
a i n l y Under
U n d e r CPEC,” KJIHGFEDCB
C P E C , ” Cpecinfo.
C p e c in fo .
com,
com , A August
u g u s t 221, 1 , 22020,
0 2 0 , hhttp://cpecinfo.com/china-is-main-contributor-of-fdi-in-paki
ttp ://c p e c in f o .c o m /c h in a - is -m a in -c o n tr ib u to r -o f -f d i-in - p a k i
stan-mainly-under-cpec/#:~:text=China's%20foreign%20direct%20investment%20
s t a n - m a m l y - u n d e r - c p e c / # : ~ : t e x t = C h i n a 's % 2 0 f o r e i g n % 2 0 d i r e c t % 2 0 i n v e s t m e n t % 2 0
in,respectively%20during%20the%20July%202020.
in ,r e s p e c tiv e ly % 2 0 d u rin g % 2 0 th e % 2 0 J u ly % 2 0 2 0 2 0 .
1 0 2 Syed
102 Syed A Ali l i ZiaZ i a Jaffery,
J a f f e r y , “Making
“ M a k i n g Sense S e n s e of o f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s Change
C h a n g e of o f ToneT o n e withw ith
Saudi
Saudi A Arabia,”
r a b i a , ” The The N National n t e r e s t , September
a t i o n a l IInterest, S e p t e m b e r 14, 1 4 , 22020, 0 2 0 , https://national
h ttp s ://n a tio n a l
interest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/making-sense-pakistan%E2%80%99s-change-tone-
in te r e s t.o r g /b lo g /m id d le - e a s t- w a tc h /m a k in g - s e n s e - p a k is ta n % E 2 % 8 0 % 9 9 s - c h a n g e -to n e -
saudi-arabia-168877.
s a u d i-a ra b ia -1 6 8 8 7 7 .
1 0 3 IIslamuddin
103 s l a m u d d i n Sajid, S a j i d , “China,
“ C h in a , P Pakistan
a k is ta n P Praise
r a i s e Kabul,
K a b u l , Taliban
T a lib a n E Efforts
f f o r t s for
f o r Talks,”
T a lk s ,”
AAnadolu
n a d o lu A Agency,
gency, A August
u g u s t 22, 2 0 2 0 , www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-pakis
2 2 , 2020, w w w .a a .c o m .tr /e n /a s ia - p a c if ic /c h in a - p a k is
tan-praise-kabul-taliban-efforts-for-talks/1949621.
ta n -p r a is e - k a b u l-ta lib a n - e flb r ts - fo r -ta lk s /1 9 4 9 6 2 1 .
1 0 4 “China
104 “ C h i n a Hails H a ils P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s Efforts
E ffo rts A Against
g a i n s t Terrorism,”
T e r ro r is m ,” D Daily
a ily P a k i s t a n , September
Pakistan, S e p t e m b e r 11,11,
22020,
020, hhttps://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/11-Sep-2020/china-hails-pakistan-s-efforts-
ttp s ://e n .d a ily p a k is ta n .c o m .p k /n -S e p -2 0 2 0 /c h in a -h a ils -p a k is ta n -s - e f f o r ts -
against-terrorism.
a g a in s t-te rro ris m .
105
1 0 5 “Pakistan’s
“ P a k is ta n ’s E Economic
c o n o m i c Future F u t u r e IIs s NNow ow L Linked
i n k e d tto o China,
C h i n a , Says
S a y s IImranm ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,” B Business
u s in e s s
t a n d a r d , September
SStandard, S e p t e m b e r 4, 4 , 22020,
0 2 0 , www.business-standard.com/article/international/paki
w w w .b u s in e s s - s ta n d a rd .c o m /a r tic le /in te r n a tio n a l/p a k i
stan-s-economic-future-is-now-linked-to-china-says-imran-khan-120090400055_1.
s ta n -s -e c o n o m ic -fu tu re -is -n o w -lin k e d -to -c h in a -s a y s -im ra n -k h a n -1 2 0 0 9 0 4 0 0 0 5 5 _ 1 .
html.
h tm l.
106
106 R Rabia
a b ia A Akhtar,
k h t a r , “Kashmir:
“ K a s h m ir: A A NNuclear
u c l e a r Flashpoint,”
F la s h p o in t,” P Pakistan
a k is ta n H o r i z o n , 73,
Horizon, 7 3 , no.
no. 1 1 (2020).
(2 0 2 0 ).
107
1 0 7 “Navigating
“ N a v ig a tin g P Pakistan’s
a k is ta n ’s N National
a t i o n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Challenges,”
C h a l l e n g e s , ” AAtlantic
t l a n t i c Council,
C o u n c il, A August
u g u s t 10,
10,
2020,
2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/navigating-pakistans-national-security-chal
w w w .a tla n tic c o u n c il.o r g /e v e n t/n a v ig a tin g -p a k is ta n s - n a tio n a l- s e c u r ity -c h a l
lenges/.
le n g e s /.
108
1 0 8 “RSS
“ R S S Ideology
I d e o l o g y of o f Hindu
H i n d u Supremacy
S u p rem a cy W Will i l l Lead
L e a d tto o Suppression
S u p p r e s s i o n of o f Muslims
M u s l i m s in i n IIndia
n d i a and
and
to
t o Targeting
T a r g e t i n g of of P Pakistan,”
a k is ta n ,” D Dawn,
aw n, A August
u g u s t 11, 1 1 , 2019,
2019, w www.dawn.com/news/1499293.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 9 9 2 9 3 .
109
109 R Rabia
a b ia A Akhtar,
k h t a r , IInterview
n t e r v i e w bby y A Author,
u t h o r , January
J a n u a r y 14, 1 4 , 2021.
2021.
110
1 1 0 “Qureshi
“ Q u r e s h i IIntroduces
n t r o d u c e s ‘FM ‘ F M Connect’,”
C o n n e c t ’ ,” B Business
u s in e s s R Recorder,
ecorder, N November
o v e m b e r 19, 1 9 , 22019,
019, w www.
ww.
brecorder.com/news/545611.
b r e c o r d e r.c o m /n e w s /5 4 5 6 1 1 .
111
1 1 1 “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n P Politico
o l i t i c o IInterview
n te rv ie w w with
ith M Moeedo e e d Yusuf,”
Y u s u f ,” P Pakistan
a k is ta n P Politico,
o litic o , D December
e c e m b e r 21, 21,
2019,
2 0 1 9 , http://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistan-politico-interview-with-moeed-yusuf/.
h ttp ://p a k is ta n p o litic o .c o m /p a k is ta n -p o litic o -in te rv ie w -w ith -m o e e d - y u s u f / .
112
1 1 2 “One
“ O n e Year Y e a r In: In : A A Conversation
C o n v e r s a t i o n with w ith P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i Prime
P rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r IImran
m ra n K Khan,”
h a n ,”
United
U n i t e d SStates t a t e s IInstitute
n s t i t u t e of of P e a c e , July
Peace, J u l y 223, 3 , 22019,0 1 9 , www.usip.org/events/one-year-
w w w .u s ip .o r g /e v e n ts /o n e - y e a r -
conversation-pakistani-prime-minister-imran-khan.
c o n v e rs a tio n - p a k is ta n i-p r im e - m in is te r- im ra n -k h a n .
113
113 A Amirm ir W Wasim,
a s i m , “Army
“A rm y N Never
ever P Putu t Pressure
P r e s s u r e Over O v e r Foreign
F o re ig n P Policy,
o lic y , A Appointments:
p p o in tm e n ts : P PM,”
M ,”
DDawn,
aw n, N November
o v e m b e r 2020, 2 0 2 0 , www.dawn.com/news/1592997.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 9 2 9 9 7 .
114
1 1 4 “All
“ A ll W Wars a rs A Are re M Miscalculated.”
is c a lc u la te d .”
115
115 A Arif Rafiq,
r if R a f i q , “The
“T heP Pakistan
a k i s t a n Army’s
A r m y ’ s Belt
B e l t aand
ndR Road
oadP Putsch,”
u t s c h , ” Foreign P o l i c y ,August
F o r e i g w Policy, A u g u s t 26,
2 6 , 22020,
020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/26/the-pakistan-armys-belt-and-road-putsch/.
h ttp s ://f o re ig n p o lic y .c o m /2 0 2 0 /0 8 /2 6 /th e -p a k is ta n -a r m y s -b e lt- a n d - r o a d - p u ts c h / .
116
1 1 6 Stephanie
S te p h a n ie F Findlay
i n d l a y and and F Farhan
a rh a n B Bokhari,
o k h a r i , “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s IImran
m ra n K Khanh a n Sidelined
S i d e l i n e d bby y M Mili-
ili­
tary
ta ry D During
u r i n g Coronavirus
C o r o n a v i r u s Outbreak,”
O u tb r e a k ,” F Financial
i n a n c i a l Times,
T im e s , A April
p r i l 225, 5 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.ft.com/
w w w .f t.c o m /
content/686714d7-ae05-431d-a13d-1966153be151.
c o n te n t/6 8 6 7 1 4 d 7 -a e 0 5 -4 3 1 d -a 1 3 d -1 9 6 6 1 5 3 b e 1 5 1 .
117
117 P Prime
rim e M Minister’s
i n i s t e r ’ s Office,
O f f i c e , “PTI
“PTI M Manifesto
a n i f e s t o 22018,”
0 1 8 , ” 55.55.
118
118 M Ministry
i n i s t r y of of F Foreign
o re ig n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , “Press
“ P r e s s Release,”
R e l e a s e ,” October
O c t o b e r 1, 1 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , hhttp://mofa.gov.pk/
ttp ://m o f a .g o v .p k /
press-release-346/.
p re s s -re le a s e -3 4 6 /.
119
119 M Ministry
i n i s t r y ofo f Foreign
F o re ig n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , “Foreign
“ F o r e i g n Minister’s
M i n i s t e r ’ s Virtual
V irtu a l M Meeting
e e t i n g ono n Economic
E c o n o m i c Diplo-
D ip lo ­
macy
m a c y with w i t h Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Envoys
E n v o y s in in A African
f r i c a n Countries,”
C o u n tr ie s ,” P Press
ress R e l e a s e , January
Release, J a n u a r y 66,, 22021,
021,
http://mofa.gov.pk/foreign-ministers-virtual-meeting-on-economic-diplomacy-with-
h ttp ://m o f a .g o v .p k /f o r e ig n - m in is te r s - v ir tu a l-m e e tin g - o n - e c o n o m ic - d ip lo m a c y - w ith -
pakistani-envoys-in-african-countries/.
p a k i s t a n i - e n v o y s - i n - a f r i c a n - c o u n t r i e s /.
1 2 0 “PM’s
120 “ P M ’s E Economic
c o n o m i c OutreachO u t r e a c h Initiative
I n itia tiv e K Kicks
i c k s Off,”
O ff ,” B Business
u s in e s s R e c o r d e r , October
Recorder, O c t o b e r 3, 3 , 22020,
020,
www.brecorder.com/news/40023406/pms-economic-outreach-initiative-kicks-off.
w w w .b r e c o r d e r.c o m /n e w s /4 0 0 2 3 4 0 6 /p m s - e c o n o m ic -o u tr e a c h - in itia tiv e -k ic k s - o ff .
121
1 2 1 “Prime
“ P rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r Imran
Im ra n K Khanh a n Chaired
C h a i r e d Meeting
M e e t i n g of o f tthe
he A Apexp e x Committee
C o m m i t t e e on on E Economic
c o n o m ic
Outreach
O u t r e a c h at a t IIslamabad,”
s la m a b a d ,” M Media T o d a y , January
e d i a Today, J a n u a r y 7, 7 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , www.mediaonlinetoday.com/
w w w .m e d ia o n lin e to d a y .c o m /
prime-minister-imran-khan-chaired-meeting-of-the-apex-committee-on-economic-
p rim e -m in is te r-im ra n -k h a n -c h a ire d -m e e tin g -o f-th e -a p e x -c o m m itte e -o n -e c o n o m ic -
outreach-at-islamabad/.
o u tr e a c h - a t- is la m a b a d /.
 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Under Imran Khan 43
122 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Africa to Be New Focus of Foreign Policy: Imran,” Dawn,
November 29, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1519460.
123 Ibid.
124 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister’s Visit to Kenya,” Press Release, Feb-
ruary 1, 2020, http://mofa.gov.pk/foreign-ministers-visit-to-kenya/.
125 Awais Raoof, Interview by Author, January 15, 2021.
126 “Pakistan’s Trade with Africa Reaches $4.18bn in 2020: Razak Dawood,” The
Nation, December 27, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/27-Dec-2020/pakistan-s-trade-
with-africa-reaches-dollar-4-18bn-in-2020-razak-dawood.
127 Sana Jamal, “Pakistan to Open Diplomatic Mission in Djibouti,” Gulf News,
December 31, 2020, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-to-open-
diplomatic-mission-in-djibouti-1.76208693.
128 Arif Rafiq, “Pakistan’s Geoeconomic Delusions,” Foreign Policy, April 5, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/05/pakistans-geoeconomic-delusions/.
129 Maleeha Lodhi, “Not by Words Alone,” Dawn, June 14, 2021, www.dawn.com/
news/1629274/not-by-words-alone.
130 “IMF Revises Up Pakistan’s Real GDP Growth Rate to 3.9%,” The Express Trib-
une, July 28, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2312600/imf-revises-up-pakistans-
real-gdp-growth-rate-to-39.
3 Is Pakistan a Middle Power?
Samee Lashari

Introduction
The shift in international politics is a glaring reality. American century being over
and a sprinting rush to the twenty-first century great power competition shows the
shaking up of the structure of international order. Such a competition has been
intensified by the erstwhile weaker but now rising powers in regions across the
globe. Indicators, such as the growing use of state-patronized violence on the one
hand and large-scale mass resistance to it on the other, decentralization of global
processes of production, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction and mili-
tary technology, show that the world politics is transforming quickly to embrace
new alliances and blocks. The rise of new powers in international relations trans-
forms the dynamics of bargaining rules wherein states find new opportunities to
accumulate further power and exhibit their desired roles in international relations.
The notion of the rise and fall of powers in world politics has an essential
reference to nation-states. The nation-state, I argue, remains the principal actor
of world politics. The glare of contemporary globalization could not diminish its
stature since it could not offer a tenable alternative to the principality of the state
as a constituent factor in the making of their own existence acceptable. It remains
the pillar of social engineering, generator of identity, builder of nationhood, archi-
tect of economic prosperity, and regulator of interclass relations. Whereas globali-
zation did affect its exclusivity in international economy, it could not, and perhaps
would never, seize political control over an individual.
Whereas the shift in power at great power level is not paradigmatic, such trans-
formation is much conspicuous at the Middle Power level. The rise of China
has become a cliché in contemporary international politics discourse. In fact, it
has been argued that “An era of unprecedented unipolarity has come to an end
as China’s rise has changed the underlying distribution of power in the interna-
tional system.”1 Broadening this transformation beyond China has produced an
organizational term named as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa).2 The democratization of G-7/G-8 has led to G20, a more inclusive and
welcoming group of both the established industrialized economies and military
powers.3 Simultaneously, the rise of China and its various economic and secu-
rity ventures in Asia and Africa have pushed the need for counter-initiatives such

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-4
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 45
as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad – an informal dialogue mechanism
between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – with an apparent push to
convert it into an alliance.4 In the case of South Asia, Indian economy has mod-
ernized, and it is increasingly becoming a new economic epicenter. The nuclear
proliferation has been unstoppable as India, Pakistan, and North Korea have suc-
cessfully tested nuclear weapons. These and several other political, strategic, and
economic transformations have provided an ample opportunity to several erst-
while poor or developing countries to claim a higher Middle Power status in inter-
national politics.

Defining Middle Power

The idea of Middle Power in international politics is a product of post-war inter-
national institutional arrangements. Right after the end of the World War II, in
1946, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King demanded a role of what he
called “Middle Powers” like Canada in international order. Since then, the con-
cept has become a part of IR lexicon though we are still far away from having any
widely accepted definition of the concept. Various scholars have tried to define
it using arbitrary and, to an extent, auxiliary indicators. In doing so, the concept
has been termed as “small state” and “medium power” as well. The dearth of a
definitional consensus is indicated by the fact that almost every research work
spends a considerable effort trying to define the concept. More than three decades
ago, Mares (1988) defined a global hierarchical structure based on distribution
of resources and divided the countries into great, secondary, middle, and small
powers. Middle Powers, according to him, were countries possessing “enough
resources so that in an alliance with a small enough number of other states that
they are not merely “price takers,” they can affect the system.”5 About two-and-
a-half decades later, Wang and French use the literal interpretation of “middle”
when they argue that Middle Powers are “countries that are neither at the apex
nor the bottom of the international power structure.” It means that their power
is not definitive enough to “exert decisive influence on major issues of interna-
tional security and economy.” However, they are not weak enough “to be unable
to protect themselves from the undesirable impacts of other countries’ actions.”
They conclude that Middle Powers “have considerable resources and capabilities
but are not dominant in international relations.”6 Similarly, Jordaan defines it as a
country that is “neither great nor small in terms of their power, capacity and influ-
ence and exhibits the capability to create cohesion and obstruction toward global
order and governance.”7
Andrew Carr argues that there are three definitional categories of a Middle
Power: position (material or quantifiable factors such as population, human
development index, gross domestic product, military strength, geographic loca-
tion, strategic significance, and so on), behavior, and identity (the assertion of
the policy makers and leadership to demand a significant role in international
affairs).8 In terms of behavioral dimension, Carr relies on the definition pro-
vided by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal who argue that that Middle Powers are
46 Samee Lashari
countries exhibiting “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international
problems, . . . to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and to
embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy.”9
Carr, however, accepts the shortcomings of these definitional parameters. For
example, while he claims Australia as being one of the Middle Powers, he agrees
that it does not meet some of the conditions of position as it lacks formidable
population. He also claims that only top 20 countries of the world can be included
in this club of Middle Powers, something that can easily be challenged. In the next
pages, I try to refine this definition.
Lack of a definitional consensus promotes self-serving list of countries to be
included in the category of Middle Powers. Over the years, Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (BRICS) have been mentioned as a new group of rising
powers in the world system. Another set of countries includes Mexico, Indone-
sia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA).10 In some studies, countries compris-
ing G20 minus great powers are considered as the Middle Powers.11 M. Islam
discusses new Emerging Global Organizations and Groups (EGOs/EGGs) that
include, beyond BRICS and MIKTA, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) or Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa (CIVETs).12 The countries mentioned in these
lists indicate the apparent changes in the distribution of power beyond Europe
on the one hand and institutionalized approaches to reform global governance
structure on the other.
Given that scholars have used arbitrarily defined criteria to identify and expli-
cate the concept of Middle Power in International Relations (IR), it is entirely
difficult to use anyone or to create a new criterion without a controversy. This
chapter, nevertheless, adopts the second approach by creating a rather encom-
passing criterion to define the concept of Middle Power in international system.
It relies on two basic principles. The first principle is that self-identification as a
Middle Power is an important prerequisite in any country’s foreign policy behav-
ior. Identity formation, with its realization, in turn, is a conscious process through
which a country’s leadership and political class evaluate various factors, both his-
torical and contemporary, to reach a conclusion claiming a much more visible
position in international system. Such an identification is necessary to embrace
the nature of the new role the state in question is demanding and is confidently
willing to play. It may also require evaluation and advocacy of expectations from
the global system and a pursuit of recognition, elaboration of such responsibili-
ties, and an explicit willingness to fulfill these tasks in international politics.
Identity as a variable in international politics relies on explanations provided by
revisionist approaches. Revisionist theories are the ones that question the “given”
nature of contemporary structure of IR, yearn to peer into historical processes
that contributed to this structure, and ask for a critical evaluation of this struc-
ture by looking into historical processes and exposing its genesis. These theories
include, among others, Marxist Tradition, Social Constructivism, Postcolonial-
ism, Feminism, and Green Theory. Any effort to explain the difference in behav-
iors of states based on self-identification, therefore, requires peering into national
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 47
ideational-cum-evolutionary factors, domestic historical–political resources, his-
torical geo-political features, and opportunities created through self-projection
or generated by the dynamic transformations in regional as well as international
institutional structures, among others. A country behaves like a Middle Power
because its representative leadership believes being a Middle Power. Robert W.
Cox, for example, agrees that there is no one criterion to label a country as Middle
Power, though he counts middle-range material capabilities as an essential factor.
He argues that a country may be considered a Middle Power if it has an ability
to stand a certain distance from direct involvement in major conflicts, a sufficient
degree of autonomy in relation to major powers, a commitment to orderliness
and security in interstate relations and to the facilitation of orderly change in the
world system.
Additionally, he argues that such a country needs a behavioral input as well;
a country may be considered Middle Power when its political leadership start
perceiving it as such and start portraying it at the international level. It happens
most when hegemonic world orders dwindle, thus paving ways for the rise of
new global economic relations. A Middle Power is, he argues, “a role in search
of an actor.”13 This role, in other words, is fulfilled by those actors who aspire for
such understanding of a country and yearn for such acknowledgement in inter-
national politics. Andrew Cooper, for example, argues that “Middle Power iden-
tity is enhanced by domestic political incentives to both elevate and nuance their
location in the global system.”14 Similarly, Wang and French argue that a country
believing in itself as a Middle Power behaves differently than others who do not,
especially when it comes to aspiring much more and visible participation in global
governance.15
For Middle Powers, part of the quest for identity and a desire for its acknowl-
edgement is driven by a willingness to become a “good international citizen.”
Gareth J. Evans, the former Australian foreign minister (1988–1996), advocated
the idea of “good international citizenship” based on blending various elements
of idealism and realism and converted them into a central pillar of his foreign
policy approach.16 A good international citizen, according to Evans and Grant, is
a Middle Power country that plays a cementing and facilitating role strengthening
international order set by the great powers, promotes harmony among the states,
and reforms international system to turn it into a more representative and demo-
cratic. Middle Powers, they argue, however, develop, maintain, and must exercise
their leverage over the great powers to refine international system serving their
own national interests. Importantly, they believe that Middle Powers do not com-
mand hard power but must rely and increase their soft power to persistently pur-
sue their narrowly defined “like-minded” interests.17 Linklater believes that there
are various dimensions of good international citizenship: collective responsibility
for the maintenance of international order, respecting the equal sovereignty of
other states, permitting the growth of global cosmopolitanism, and the right of
self-determination.18 In other words, countries claiming Middle Power status must
exhibit a good citizenship record based on these indicators. A benevolent Mid-
dle Power is the one that embraces role extended to it by the powers that are in
48 Samee Lashari
international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l system
s y s t e m and a n d therefore
t h e r e f o r e claims
c l a i m s greater
g r e a t e r acknowledgement
a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t and a n d symbolic
s y m b o lic
recognition.
r e c o g n itio n .
Andrew
A n d r e w Carr’s C a r r ’ s definitional
d e f in itio n a l u understanding
n d e r s t a n d i n g of o f Middle
M id d le P Power
o w e r wherein
w h e r e i n he h e men-
m en­
tions
t i o n s three
t h r e e ffactors
a c to rs – - p position,
o s i t i o n , bbehavior,
e h a v i o r , and a n d identity
id e n tity - – isi s an
a n encompassing
e n c o m p a s s i n g defini- d e fin i­
ttion
i o n since
s i n c e it,i t , without
w i t h o u t any a n y regard
r e g a r d tto o ttheoretical
h e o r e t i c a l ffoundations
o u n d a t i o n s of o f IR,
I R , combines
c o m b in e s b both
o th
realist and constructivist approaches. 19
However, I disagree
r e a lis t a n d c o n s tr u c tiv is t a p p r o a c h e s .19 H o w e v e r , I d is a g r e e w ith th is d e f in itio n with this definition
in
i n one
o n e crucial
c r u c i a l manner.
m a n n e r . The T h e sources
s o u r c e s of o f construction
c o n s t r u c t i o n of o f identity
i d e n t i t y of o f any
a n y country
c o u n t r y are a re
bbotho t h iideational
d e a t i o n a l and a n d material.
m a t e r i a l . Behavioral
B e h a v i o r a l ttransformations,
r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , arguably,a r g u a b l y , are a r e tthe he b by-y­

product
p r o d u c t of of a a v varying
a r y i n g combination
c o m b i n a t i o n of o f tthese
h e s e ttwo w o ffactors.
a c t o r s . In I n similar
s i m i l a r circumstances,
c ir c u m s ta n c e s ,

one
o n e country
c o u n t r y behaves e h a v e s differently
KJIHGFEDCBA
b d i f f e r e n t l y thant h a n others
o t h e r s bbecause
e c a u s e of o f itsi t s identity
i d e n t i t y and
a n d material
m a te ria l
capability. The first and foremost important factor is the
c a p a b ility . T h e f ir s t a n d f o r e m o s t im p o r ta n t f a c to r is th e id e a tio n a l u n d e r s ta n d in g ideational understanding
of
o f bbeing
e in g a a Middle
M i d d l e Power.P o w e r . Second,S e c o n d , tthe h e sources
s o u r c e s of o f tthe h e material
m a t e r i a l capabilities
c a p a b i l i t i e s maym ay
v a r y i m m e n s e l y ; s o m e c o u n t r i e s a r e t h e c e n t e r o f g l o b a l p o l i t i c s merely
vary immensely; some countries are the center of global politics m e r e l y bbecauseecause
of
o f ttheir
h e i r strategic
s t r a t e g i c locations
l o c a t i o n s whereas
w h e r e a s otherso t h e r s may m a y carry
c a r r y significance
s i g n i f i c a n c e bbecausee c a u s e of o f ttheir
h e ir
immensely valuable resources such as geographic size,
im m e n s e ly v a lu a b le r e s o u r c e s s u c h a s g e o g r a p h ic s iz e , p o p u la tio n s iz e , a g r ic u l­ population size, agricul-
ttural
u r a l sector,
s e c t o r , natural
n a t u r a l resources,
r e s o u r c e s , iindustrial
n d u s t r i a l production,
p r o d u c t i o n , and a n d so s o on.o n . All
A l l tthese
h e s e factors,
fa c to rs ,

put
p u t ttogether,
o g e t h e r , matterm a t t e r tto o p position
o s itio n a a country
c o u n t r y iin n global
g l o b a l political
p o l i t i c a l structure.
s t r u c t u r e . When
W hen a a

country perceives to be a Middle Power and its indicators

c o u n tr y p e r c e iv e s to b e a M id d le P o w e r a n d its in d ic a to r s o f m a te r ia l p o w e r s u b ­ of material power sub-
stantiate
s t a n t i a t e tthese
h e s e claims,
c l a i m s , it i t bbecomes
e c o m e s relatively
r e l a t i v e l y easy
e a s y tto o advance
a d v a n c e global g l o b a l objectives
o b j e c t i v e s of of
widespread
w i d e s p r e a d acknowledgement.
a c k n o w le d g e m e n t.

The
T h e second
s e c o n d principle,
p r i n c i p l e , ttherefore,
h e r e f o r e , is i s tthat
hat a a country
c o u n t r y claims
c la im s a a M Middle
i d d l e Power
P o w e r statuss ta tu s
primarily
p r i m a r i l y w h e n i t s i d e n t i t y c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h i t s n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s of
when its identity corresponds with its national resources o f material
m a te ria l
power.
p o w e r. A A moral
m o r a l claim
c l a i m of of M Middle
i d d l e Power
P o w e r status s ta tu s p per
e r se s e is i s unsustainable
u n s u s t a i n a b l e iin n tthe h e long
lo n g

run
r u n if i f tthere
h e r e iis s no
n o material
m a t e r i a l support
s u p p o r t tto o substantiate
s u b s t a n t i a t e it.i t . Realist/neo-realist
R e a l i s t / n e o - r e a l i s t as a s well
w e l l asas

idealist/neoliberal scholars have emphasized the role of

id e a lis t/n e o lib e r a l s c h o la r s h a v e e m p h a s iz e d th e r o le o f m a te r ia l p o w e r c a p a b ili­ material power capabili-
tties
i e s in
i n ttheh e fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y bbehavior
e h a v i o r of of a a country.
c o u n try . E E.. H H.. CarrC a r r argues
a r g u e s tthat h a t “morality
“ m o ra lity

is
i s t h e p r o d u c t o f p o w e r , ” “ p o l i t i c s c a n n o t b e d i v o r c e d f r o m p o w e r , ” “ p o w e r is
the product of power,” “politics cannot be divorced from power,” “power is
always
a l w a y s an a n essential
e s s e n t i a l element
e l e m e n t of o f politics,”
p o l i t i c s ,” anda n d “no “ n o ethical
e t h i c a l standards
s t a n d a r d s are a r e applicable
a p p lic a b le
20
to
t o relations
r e l a t i o n s bbetween
e t w e e n states.”
s ta te s .” 20 H Hans
ans M Morgenthau
o r g e n t h a u stateds t a t e d tthathat p power
ow er w was a s the
t h e imme-
im m e ­
diate
d i a t e a i m a n d a n e n d i n i t s e l f f o r a l l t h e s t a t e s . H e a r g u e s t h a t s i n c e t h e desire
aim and an end in itself for all the states. He argues that since the d e s i r e ttoo
attain
a tta in a a maximum
m a x i m u m of o f power
p o w e r iis s universal,
u n i v e r s a l , all a l l nations
n a t i o n s must m u s t alwaysa l w a y s bbe e afraid
a f r a i d tthat
hat
their
t h e i r own
o w n miscalculations
m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s and a n d tthe h e power
p o w e r increases
i n c r e a s e s of o f other
o t h e r nations
n a t i o n s might
m i g h t add a d d upup
to
t o a n i n f e r i o r i t y f o r t h e m s e l v e s w h i c h t h e y m u s t a t a l l c o s t s t r y t o a v o i d ( p . 192).
an inferiority for themselves which they must at all costs try to avoid (p. 1 9 2 ).
According
A c c o r d i n g tto o John
J o h n Mearsheimer,
M e a r s h e i m e r , “Realists“ R e a l i s t s bbelieve
e l i e v e that th a t p power
o w e r is i s the
t h e currency
c u rren c y
21
of
o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .” 2 1 N e o r e a l i s t s p a y p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e relative
international politics.” Neorealists pay particular attention to the r e l a t i v e sig-
s ig ­
nificance
n i f i c a n c e of o f determinants
d e t e r m i n a n t s influencing
i n f l u e n c i n g states’
s t a t e s ’ fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y bbehaviors.
e h a v i o r s . The T h e mostm o st
significant
s i g n i f i c a n t among
a m o n g them t h e m is i s ttheh e distribution
d i s t r i b u t i o n of o f capabilities.
c a p a b ilitie s . L Layne, 22
a y n e , 2 2 Waltz,
23
W a l t z , 2 3 andand
24
Mearsheimer
M e a r s h e i m e r 2 4 a r g u e t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c a p a b i l i t i e s c r e a t e s h i e r a r c h i c a l struc-
argue that the distribution of capabilities creates hierarchical s tr u c ­
ture
t u r e ini n international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics
p o litic s b based
a s e d on o n relative
r e l a t i v e power
p o w e r of o f the
t h e states.
s ta te s . F Fromro m a a neolib-
n e o lib ­
eral perspective, power is an essential element to establish
e r a l p e r s p e c tiv e , p o w e r is a n e s s e n tia l e le m e n t to e s ta b lis h K a n tia n “ d e m o c ra tic Kantian “democratic
peace”;
p e a c e ” ; liberal
l i b e r a l states
s t a t e s have
h a v e tto o prepare
p r e p a r e for f o r successful
s u c c e s s f u l (and ( a n d many
m any a a ttimes
i m e s collective)
c o lle c tiv e )
defense
d e f e n s e a g a i n s t n o n - l i b e r a l a g g r e s s o r s . E v e n i n c a s e s w h e r e h e g e m o n i c wars
against non-liberal aggressors. Even in cases where hegemonic w a r s may m ay
b e s e e n a s r a r e s t i n c i d e n t s , s m a l l - s c a l e w a r s i n t h e p e r i p h e r y a r e a r e c u r r e n t phe-
be seen as rarest incidents, small-scale wars in the periphery are a recurrent phe­
25
nomenon
n o m e n o n for f o r which
w h i c h liberal
l i b e r a l states
s t a t e s must
m u s t remain
r e m a i n readyr e a d y to t o deal
d e a l with.
w i t h . 2 5 They,
T h e y , therefore,
th e re fo re ,
are
a r e n o t o b l i v i o u s o f t h e d y n a m i c s o f p o w e r p o l i t i c s i n t h e w o r l d a n d “maintain
not oblivious of the dynamics of power politics in the world and “ m a in ta in a a
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 49
healthy
h e a l t h y appetite
a p p e t i t e fforo r conflicts
c o n f lic ts w with
i t h authoritarian
a u t h o r i t a r i a n states.”
26
s t a t e s .” 2 6 In I n other
o t h e r words,
w o rd s, w whereas
h e rea s
realists/neorealists
r e a l i s t s / n e o r e a l i s t s a r e p e s s i m i s t i c a b o u t t h e p r o s p e c t s o f c o o p e r a t i o n bbecause
are pessimistic about the prospects of cooperation ecause
states
s t a t e s have
h a v e primary
p r i m a r y interest
i n t e r e s t in i n survival
s u r v i v a l and a n d security
s e c u r i t y in i n ana n environment
e n v i r o n m e n t of o f anarchy,
a n a rc h y ,
suspicion,
s u s p i c i o n , a n d m i s t r u s t , n e o l i b e r a l s a g r e e w i t h t h e r o l e p o w e r p l a y s i n iinterstate
and mistrust, neoliberals agree with the role power plays in n te r s ta te
relations
r e la tio n s b but
u t are
a r e optimistic
o p t i m i s t i c tthat h a t economic
e c o n o m i c vventures,e n t u r e s , starting
s t a r t i n g from f r o m ttechnical
e c h n i c a l coop- coop­
eration,
e r a t i o n , c a n b u i l d t r u s t a m o n g t h e s t a t e s , a n d t h e y c a n c o o p e r a t e o n security
can build trust among the states, and they can cooperate on s e c u r i t y issues
iss u e s
as
as w well.
e ll. N Neoliberal
e o l i b e r a l iinstitutionalists
n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s argue
a r g u e tthat
h a t international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions
i n s t i t u t i o n s can can p play
la y a a

significantly important role in facilitating cooperation

s ig n if ic a n tly im p o r ta n t r o le in f a c ilita tin g c o o p e r a tio n in a r e a s w h e r e s ta te s f in d in areas where states find
substantial
s u b s t a n t i a l absolute
a b s o l u t e interests.
in te r e s ts .27 R
27
Realists
e a l i s t s argue
a r g u e that
t h a t international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions
i n s t i t u t i o n s reflect
re fle c t
tthe
h e dynamics
d y n a m i c s of o f power
pow er p politics
o l i t i c s and
a n d act a c t as as ppolicy
o l i c y ttool o o l forf o r great
g r e a t powers.
p o w e rs.

The
The p preoccupation
r e o c c u p a t i o n of o f neo-versions
n e o - v e r s i o n s of of b both
o t h status-quo
s t a t u s - q u o theoriest h e o r i e s of o f IR I R with
w i t h sys- sy s­
t e m f a c t o r s a s i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g f o r e i g n p o l i c y c h o i c e s o f states,
tem factors as independent variables affecting foreign policy choices of s ta te s,
however,
h o w e v e r , ffaces a c e s some
s o m e limitations.
lim ita tio n s . N Neoclassical
e o c l a s s i c a l realists,
r e a l i s t s , forf o r example,
e x a m p le , w whileh i l e agree-
a g re e­
ing
i n g t o n e o r e a l i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i n t e r s t a t e s y s t e m , a d d d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s as
to neorealist understanding of interstate system, add domestic factors as p plau-
la u ­
sible determinants of foreign policy behavior of states.
s ib le d e te rm in a n ts o f f o r e ig n p o lic y b e h a v io r o f s ta te s . T h e y a r g u e th a t w h e n They argue that when
facing
f a c i n g foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o l i c y choices
c h o ic e s – - bboth
o t h constraints
c o n s t r a i n t s and a n d opportunities
o p p o rtu n itie s – - states
s t a t e s do d o ttakeake
into
i n t o a c c o u n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . H o w e v e r , t h e i r c h o i c e s d o r e f l e c t u n i t - l e v e l ffac-
account international system. However, their choices do reflect unit-level ac­
ttors
o r s suchs u c h as a s domestic
d o m e s t i c political
p o l i t i c a l structure,
s t r u c t u r e , state–society
s t a t e - s o c i e t y relation,
r e l a t i o n , strategic
s t r a t e g i c culture,
c u ltu r e ,
28
and
a n d roler o l e ofo f history
h i s t o r y in i n tthe
h e making
m a k i n g of of p perceptions
e r c e p t i o n s of o f political
p o l i t i c a l leadership.
l e a d e r s h i p . 2 8 Whereas
W h e re a s
t h e y d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f d o m e s t i c f a c t o r s i n s h a p i n g foreign
they disagree about the relative significance of domestic factors in shaping fo re ig n
ppolicy
o l i c y of of a a country,
c o u n t r y , theyt h e y do d o agreea g r e e tthath a t these
t h e s e ffactors
a c t o r s are a r e important
i m p o r t a n t and a n d should
s h o u l d not not
bbe e ignored
ig n o re d p particularly
a r t i c u l a r l y when
w h e n explaining
e x p l a i n i n g tthe h e vvariance
a r i a n c e in i n response
r e s p o n s e tto o iinternational
n te rn a tio n a l
challenges.
c h a lle n g e s .

Neoliberal
N e o l i b e r a l ttheorists
h e o r i s t s agree
a g r e e tthat h a t states
s t a t e s are
a re p principal
r i n c i p a l ffounding
o u n d i n g stones s t o n e s of o f iinterna-
n te r n a ­
t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m a n d a r e i n d e e d r a t i o n a l a c t o r s s e e k i n g m a x i m i z a t i o n of
tional political system and are indeed rational actors seeking maximization of
ttheir
h e i r interests.
in te re s ts. H However,
o w e v e r, w whereas
h e r e a s neorealists
n e o r e a l i s t s emphasize
e m p h a s i z e relative r e l a t i v e gains
g a i n s as a s the
t h e most
m o st
important
i m p o r t a n t area a r e a ofo f focus,
f o c u s , neoliberals
n e o l i b e r a l s bbelievee l i e v e tthat
h a t state
s t a t e looks
l o o k s ttowardo w a r d absolute
a b s o l u t e gains:
g a in s :
29
they are more concerned with
t h e y a r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h w h a t tKJIHGFEDCBA what they are getting out
h e y a r e g e ttin g o u t o f a d e a l.29 F of a deal. Foro r Middle
M id d le
Power
P o w e r countries,
c o u n t r i e s , tthen,
h e n , international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions
in s titu tio n s p provide
ro v id e a a utilitarian
u t i l i t a r i a n support
s u p p o r t tto o
facilitate,
f a c i l i t a t e , bbuild,
u i l d , and
a n d cement
c e m e n t cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n among a m o n g tthe h e states.
s t a t e s . Though
T h o u g h ttheir h e i r focus
fo c u s

is
i s economic
e c o n o m i c and a n d ttrade
r a d e cooperation,
c o o p e r a t i o n , states s t a t e s dod o look l o o k intoi n t o how h o w such s u c h maneuverings
m a n e u v e r in g s
elevate
e l e v a t e t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s r e a s o n a b l e to
their position in international system. Therefore, it is reasonable t o claim
c la im
that
t h a t a f a s t - d e v e l o p i n g s t a t e m a y s t i l l c l a i m M i d d l e P o w e r s t a t u s i f i t h a s a n organic
a fast-developing state may still claim Middle Power status if it has an o r g a n ic
indigenous
i n d i g e n o u s iidentity,
d e n tity , p possesses
o s s e s s e s considerable
c o n s i d e r a b l e leverage
l e v e r a g e in i n outstanding
o u t s t a n d i n g regionalr e g i o n a l and and
global
g l o b a l e c o n o m i c a n d s e c u r i t y i s s u e s , a n d c a n e x h i b i t e x c e l l e n t d i p l o m a t i c and
economic and security issues, and can exhibit excellent diplomatic and
negotiating
n e g o t i a t i n g skills
s k i l l s ttoo get
g e t acknowledgement
a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of of a a responsible
re s p o n s ib le p player
l a y e r in i n thet h e system.
s y ste m .
Whereas
W h e re a s w wee can c a n indicate
in d ic a te a a v variety
a r i e t y of o f characteristics
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s contributing
c o n t r i b u t i n g into i n t o the
t h e reali-
r e a li­
zation
z a t i o n o f a M i d d l e P o w e r s t a t u s , i t n e v e r t h e l e s s i s r e a s o n a b l e t o a r g u e tthat
of a Middle Power status, it nevertheless is reasonable to argue h a t notnot
every
e v e r y country
c o u n t r y maym ay b bee able
a b l e to t o satisfactorily
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y meet
m e e t all a l l such
s u c h characteristics.
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Carr, C a r r , fforor
example, acknowledges that whereas Australia meets some
e x a m p le , a c k n o w le d g e s th a t w h e r e a s A u s tr a lia m e e ts s o m e o f th e c r u c ia l p r e r e q ­ of the crucial prereq-
uisite
u i s i t e indicators
i n d i c a t o r s ofo f national
n a t i o n a l powerpow er - – GDP,
G D P , military
m i l i t a r y size,s i z e , anda n d defense
d e f e n s e spending
s p e n d in g - – it
it
30
does lack population size; several other countries have
d o e s la c k p o p u la tio n s iz e ; s e v e r a l o th e r c o u n trie s h a v e la r g e r p o p u la tio n s iz e s .30 larger population sizes.
Spero
S p e r o arguesa r g u e s tthat
h a t tthough
hough M Middle id d le P Powers
o w e r s may m a y exhibit e x h i b i t lowerl o w e r capacity
c a p a c i t y of o f tthe h e useuse
of force as compared to great powers, they still matter
o f f o r c e a s c o m p a r e d to g r e a t p o w e r s , th e y s till m a tte r a lo t in th e s y s te m b e c a u s e a lot in the system because
“the
“ t h e challenges
c h a l l e n g e s ffacing
a c i n g Middle
M i d d l e Power P o w e r leaderships
l e a d e r s h i p s play p l a y an a n integral
i n t e g r a l roler o l e within
w i t h i n tthe he
50 Samee Lashari
international system for utilizing capabilities and influencing great power security
dilemmas.”31 In an anarchic international political structure, struggle to maintain
a formidable power causes several tensions between the rising Middle Powers and
established great powers, which, grappling with an ever-prevalent concern about
their status, may perceive any rising power as an exacerbated threat. Therefore,
we can argue that the ranking of countries along the lines of power as measured
in terms of material capability and resources is an essential prerequisite in estab-
lishing interstate identities and their acknowledgement by their allies as well as
adversaries. Simultaneously, it is more about self-realization of such status and
an earnest effort to get such a claim acknowledged in a wider manner to justly
become a Middle Power country in international system.

Pakistan as a Middle Power Country

Studying Pakistan as a Middle Power country is a relatively new topic. Though
the country has been a major regional power during the Cold War, it neverthe-
less faced several setbacks impeding its rise in the ranking of Middle Powers.
Writing in 1988, Bernard Wood included Pakistan as one of the Middle Power
countries not because of its economic performance but because of its “special
regional or global importance.”32 The Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2020, an
index using eight indicators of power – economic resources, military capability,
resilience, future trends, diplomatic influence, economic relationships, defense
networks, and cultural influence – ranks Pakistan as the 15th power in Asia.
However, the index emphasizes that the country is “underachiever” and “exerts
less influence in the region than expected given its available resources.”33 Mid-
dle Power Initiative, a project of Basel Peace Office, does not consider Pakistan
and India as the Middle Power countries because they have armed themselves
with nuclear weapons, a factor that, when evaluated through leading theories of
International Relations, nullifies the whole effort.34 Pakistan is also a member of
the G24, a sub-group of the G77 group created in the early 1970s, to represent
and safeguard interests of the developing world in international monetary, devel-
opment, and financial governance fora. In 2005, Goldman Sachs coined a term
“Next 11” or N-11, a list of countries including Pakistan that “could potentially
have a BRIC-like impact in rivalling the G7.”35 However, this report shows Paki-
stan lagging behind than other countries of comparatively smaller population
size, geographic size, natural resources, or military capacity. Moreover, various
scholars have also included Pakistan as a Middle Power country. Vandamme
argues that

while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current categories of middlepowerman-
ship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is one of the
nine nuclear states and is – at least – in the top 20 armies of the world. Con-
sequently, the military factor in Pakistan places the country into the category
of middle powers, while its economic capacities and weight would rather
identify it as a small power.36
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 51
Ebert and Blarel consider Pakistan as a “secondary regional power” in South
Asia.37 This categorization follows Ebert and Flemes’s definition that maintains
that secondary regional powers are countries “that are most capable to compete
for regional leadership, and thus their (non-)followership is critical for regional
cooperation.”38 While one may disagree with this categorization, it certainly is an
indicative of the comparative power dynamics in South Asia.
These and other endeavors of ranking countries rely, primarily, upon the mate-
rial capabilities, a factor that this study considers significant but ranks it after the
first and foremost factor: self-identification. Material indicators of power, both
military and economic, are important and cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, when
we look at the foreign policy behavior of countries from Middle Power point of
view, we see that many countries do not claim such status despite having higher
rankings on indicators such as the ones mentioned by the Lowy Institute. Some
other countries, while performing low on these indicators, claim Middle Power
status and strive to be acknowledged as such. The reason, I argue, is based in their
self-identification that, in turn, is embedded in an organic worldview that claims a
powerful presence in international political affairs.
The identity of being an un-ignorable power in international community was
embedded deep in the state ideology of Pakistan even before the country itself
came into being. According to this official perspective, Muslims of Indian Sub-
Continent, despite being just little over one-fifth of the whole population, secured
a separate homeland because they were a nation even before they had a country.
Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, built upon the loose yet inspiring iden-
tity of religion and demanded a separate homeland. Addressing All India Muslim
League annual meeting in Lahore in 1940, he rejected the idea of Muslims being
a minority in India, claimed that they in fact were “a nation by any definition” and
that peaceful coexistence among the “major nations in India” was possible only
through “dividing India into autonomous national states.”39 Later on, this meeting
was called as being a decisive milestone in the history of the region – it led to the
partition of India.
According to Hussain,

Muslim cultural nationalism, with Islam as the central core of its socio-
cultural reality, had a religious and not a secular base. Jinnah used the force
of Islam to mobilize the Muslim community, and as the elites and masses
could identify with Islam, the state-to-be could not have come into exist-
ence without it. The creation of a Muslim nation was necessary in theory to
perverse Islam, but in actuality it could only be done through the creation of
Pakistan for the Muslim minority. Jinnah negotiated Pakistan by identifying
Islam with Pakistan.
(p. 29)

Therefore, he argues further, “the process of Islamicization [of the struggle] was
the key to the Pakistanization of the ideological state” (emphasis added).40 Zia
ul-Haq, Pakistan’s military dictator in the 1980s and the strongest official force so
52 Samee Lashari
far to Islamize the judicio-political system of the country, stated in an interview in
1981 with The Economist that “Pakistan is, like Israel, an ideological state. Take
out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out
of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.”41 Indicating greater
similarities between Israel and Pakistan as two religiously inspired ideological
states, Faisal Devji called Pakistan a “Muslim Zion state.”42 Zia’s comments are
important even today because Pakistan falls back on its official ideological posi-
tions whenever it refers to the politics of the Greater Middle East.
One of the corollaries of adopting a universal understanding of religion as the
basis of national identity was adopting a sense of belongingness to the whole
Muslim population living anywhere in the world. Alan Waites argues that “This
ideology of the ‘Two Nation Theory’ from its inception was more compelling as
a determinant of ‘external’ relations for Muslims than it was for internal issues.”43
After independence, Jinnah referred to territorial and political issues being faced
by the Muslim countries. This included rejecting the strong rejection of the estab-
lishment of Israel; Pakistan supported Palestinians in their quest for a just and
honorable two-state solution. Being the first post-war Muslim majority country,
Pakistan supported independence movements of Indonesia, Libya, Morocco,
Sudan, Tunisia, and other countries.44 It was one of the reasons that the country
was able to establish cordial relations with these post-colonial countries. In doing
so, it relied upon the principality of religion as its individual cultural specificity
and rejected, or at least relegated, any notion of secularism as the foundation of
its identity.
This official ideological perspective is not widely accepted though. Ayesha
Jalal argued that Islam was not the driving force for the creation of Pakistan. She,
rather, called Jinnah as the “sole spokesman,” someone who personified the idea
of Pakistan – a country that he “in fact did not really want” – without explaining
it and the territorial limits of the proposed sovereign state to anyone else includ-
ing his party leaders, workers, and even the masses.45 This later on created several
issues as competing identities such as ethnicity and economic interests intervened
to weaken and eventually disintegrate the state. Critics argue that Jinnah was a
secular politician, and he “often said different things to different audiences,”46
thus leaving his successors “uncertain about, or hostile to, his understanding of
the role of Islam in defining the nation’s constitutional foundations.”47 Arguments
have also been made questioning the role of Islam in the making of Pakistan.48
Nevertheless, the state embraced religion as the foundational stone and a guide to
its conduct in international politics. The first constitutional document – the Objec-
tive Resolution – idealized Islam and Islamic political principles such as sover-
eignty belonging to Allah, the power being exercised by the constituent assembly
as a delegated one, and a pledge to establish an Islamic society. The constitutions
of 1956 and 1962, while declaring Islam as the religion of the state, kept this reso-
lution as the preamble and a guiding document. The 1973 constitution has been
extensively Islamized. For example, it “defines” Muslim and forbids any non-
Muslim to become the head of the state. It guarantees provision of “Islamic way
of life” as the responsibility of the state, enforces compulsory Islamic education
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 53
in schools, promotion of “fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on
Islamic unity,” and declares that “no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to
such Injunctions.” The state officially celebrates all religious holidays, festivals,
and mournings. The state tangibly espouses religious education schools, enforces
religious code of conduct over non-Muslims, and many a times fails to implement
the safety and security of religious minorities. The collective outcome of these
steps is that Islam in Pakistan is the most powerful social and cultural identity.
Though it has rarely converted into political power, it has had mobilized the
massive support power to claim significant legal victories. The state co-opts this
support to achieve its domestic as well as foreign policy objectives.
Domestically, Pakistan utilizes this ideological foundation to counter diver-
gent ethnic, sectarian, and racial identities. Externally, Pakistan turns it into a
springboard to claim to be a so-called fort of Islam, thus a true global repre-
sentative of Middle Eastern, Central Asian, Southeast Asian, and North African
Muslim majority countries. Following this ideological approach, of which the
military establishment believed itself to be a champion, Pakistan developed an
aggressive and resilient posture to its regional competitor India. Albeit several
setbacks, including, most significantly, the disintegration of the country in 1971
and increasing gap between the two economies, Pakistan claims parity with India
and rejects any great-power-politics to belittle its status in the region and beyond.
Pakistan utilized its Islamic identity to aggrandize its role in international poli-
tics by aggressively promoting its defense and foreign policy in the region and
beyond. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the country disintegrated but survived
because of global interests in the region.49 Starting in the 1980s, with the help of
the United States, Pakistan utilized its Islamic identity to play a frontline role in a
full-scale proxy war in Afghanistan against the-then Soviet Union.50 Taking into
consideration its India fear factor and its claim of political-strategic parity with
its archrival, coupled with a self-proclaimed role model posture of the Muslim
world, Pakistan flouted international pressure and tested nuclear weapons in 1998.
After few years, it exported nuclear technology to other countries including Iran
and North Korea.51 In the 1990s, when the country was slapped with sanctions
from Washington, it promoted a low-scale yet continuous violence in Kashmir
to engage and entrap Indian strategic power there. Simultaneously, it promoted
Jihadi organizations as a second defense line abetting national security in the case
of any external aggression, primarily from India.
Perhaps the most significant reflection of Pakistan’s self-proclaimed identity of
a major player in international politics is evident in its demand of an equal treat-
ment as extended to India. Though Pakistan acknowledges that India is bigger
in geographic and population size and possesses stronger and robust economic
base, it still is least willing to accept a relegated positional standing in the region.
Starting with the 1980s, using educational indoctrination of pan-Islamism and its
practical application in Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and in Kashmir in the 1990s,
Pakistan tried to ossify its ideological approach toward its position in the world.
During this process, the state propagated to the domestic audience a national iden-
tity as of a pluralistic young society, credible regional power, and a leader of
54 Samee Lashari
the Muslim world. The volatile nature of regional strategic maneuvering enabled
Pakistan to justify its ideological understanding to the world; world peace could
not have been achieved without acknowledging the crucial geostrategic power of
Islamabad.
However, it needs to be reminded that the social construction of religion-based
national identity of Pakistan, considered imperative to checkmate divergent eth-
nic and regional identities, required Islamabad to play a vital role in regional and
global politics, arguably beyond its rational capacity. In this quest, the state rele-
gated national significance of industrialization and economic growth; condoned its
short-term political stability; sacrificed socioeconomic modernization; tolerated
an increasingly deficient and corrupt bureaucratic structure; propitiated political
corruption; and reneged from ensuring educational, health, business, and income
securities to its burgeoning young population. The state focused on its external
existential challenges and diverted its meager fiscal resources to strengthen its
national defense. To the decision-makers in Islamabad, the practical manifestation
of this socially and consciously constructed ideological approach meant to push
the country to adopt a realist approach to regional and global politics: the country
must possess an indispensable and impregnable national defense structure.
One of the consequences of this approach can be seen in the fact that Pakistan
is a major reason Indian status in international political, economic, and military
ranking is eclipsed and relegated. From a realist perspective, Pakistan’s foreign
policy behavior can be explained as an effort to balance its power with that of
Indian power by calculating its gains and losses in a relative manner. Though
Pakistan does acknowledge the mammoth size and power of India as compared to
its own, it has shown a resilience to sacrifice every other interest to keep compet-
ing against India and dragging it into regional problems, thus frustrating its aspi-
rations of a supra-regional power and its global acknowledgment. For example,
throughout the 1990s, when India restructured and liberalized its economy on neo-
liberal capitalist lines to achieve much higher growth rates, Pakistan kept Indian
military of almost its own size – about 700,000–900,000 personnel – entrapped
in a low-profile yet active conflict of Kashmir. A slow bleeding of Indian army,
killing almost 4,600 soldiers during 1989–2002, was meant for more financial
than human losses, and the total killings reached above 40,000 according to
Indian official estimates and above 80,000 according to nonofficial estimates.52 In
Afghanistan, during the 1990s, Pakistan remained adamant to international pres-
sure and pursued its policy options almost independently; it supported the rise of
Taliban and lobbied for their acknowledgement in the world.53 In May 1998, the
country rejected unprecedented international pressure and conducted a success-
ful test of its nuclear weapons, citing it as a befitting response to Indian nuclear
tests conducted two weeks earlier. The political leadership across the spectrum
highlighted the fact that the milestone made Pakistan the first Muslim country to
possess nuclear weapons.
It, however, does not mean that the endeavor to prioritize territorial security and
integrity as the most significant national objective and promoting and patronizing
religious radicalism and militancy as a strategy went unaccounted. The state paid
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 55
quite a heavy price of its relying upon Islamist and militant groups as a tool of
“second defense line.” The corollary of promoting Jihad as an ideological out-
fit of global Islamism – despite the fact that it fit well with the state-sponsored
identity – emerged in the form of sectarian violence, rise of non-state actors,
introduction of drug culture, weaponization of society, and overall palpable deci-
mation of social fabric. During the 1980s, a mushroom growth of Madrassahs
provided a mass recruiting opportunity of the state-sponsored non-state Jihadi
actors involved in Afghan Jihad. In the 1990s, Pakistan used these outfits to cor-
ner India in Kashmir. Simultaneously, the country did become a breeding ground
of Taliban fighting in Afghanistan and an epicenter of global terrorism providing
sanctuaries and training opportunities to international non-state actors. Therefore,
after 9/11, when the country had to rescind its open support to Jihadi organiza-
tions and to reverse proxy engagement in Kashmir, the consequences were a mass
resistance to de-radicalization.
After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan adopted a pragmatic approach wherein it did not
rip apart the legacy of religious ideology as a base of its existence. Rather, it has
adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, it distinguished between extremely radi-
calized and open anti-state actors and went on a war against them. The defense
establishment received heavy losses including attacks on its top leadership. How-
ever, the state showed its resilience to curb their power, eliminate them from pop-
ulation centers, and establish its writ in areas such as Swat. Second, it streamlined
state-allied religious elements by brokering a formula of sharing political power
with an objective to assuage their sociopolitical concerns. It soothed radical reli-
gious elements by rejecting international pressure to amend or eliminate blas-
phemy laws, protesting caricaturing of Prophet Muhammad, and denying any link
between Islam as a religion and terrorism as its political tool. It also sponsored
efforts to modernize proliferating madrassahs or religious schools by instilling
contents of science and technology in their syllabus. Third, there is an apparent
persistent effort to modernize the idea and identity of Pakistan through plural-
izing the concept. The changing realities of post-9/11 global politics were taken
quite seriously in Islamabad. The state actors in Islamabad are fast reaching a
conclusion to pragmatically reevaluate the role of Islam in Pakistan’s national
identity. Lately, the state has endeavored to broaden its interpretation of Islam as a
key converging factor by emphasizing its sociocultural dimensions. The state has
patronized minority religious tourism by constructing and improving infrastruc-
tural projects of Hindus and Sikhs. There has been a visible effort to condemn and
confront religious bigotry, especially against minorities including Ahmadis. The
notion of religious purity has increasingly been diverted to social services. The
periphery and peripheral issues have streamlined, with an increasing emphasis
on the part of the state and its institutions to celebrate ethnic, social, cultural, and
religious diversity.
Internationally, though Pakistan addressed concerns of its role in regional con-
flicts by renouncing terrorism as well as cross-border terrorism, undergrounding
its support to Afghan Taliban, and cooperating with Washington and interna-
tional forces to fight against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it did not compromise on
56 Samee Lashari
its national interests such as keeping India out of Afghan conflict, advancing its
nuclear and missile program, staying strong during almost a year-long India–
Pakistan military standoff in 2001–02, signing a very crucial friendship treaty
with China in 2005, and initiating a multi-billion dollar investment project called
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan’s efforts to maintain a rela-
tively robust, people-based, and ideological outlook could not be stalled in the
wake of changing regional and global political dynamics.
Pakistan and Indicators of Material Power:

I argue that a self-realized and self-proclaimed middle power status needs to

be substantiated through material capabilities and their utilization at regional
and international levels to secure perceived interests in a successful manner.
A middle power may not have an exceptionally successful policy execution
rate because even great powers such as the United States have failures on
their record. Middle powers, however, do possess maneuvering power; they
define their interests, adopt various strategies including alliances, and per-
form better than several other states whenever challenged. While measuring
state power, a 2005 RAND corporation study looked at three levels: “(1)
resources or capabilities, or power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted
through national processes; (3) and power in outcomes, or which state pre-
vails in particular circumstances.” It argues further those states are “capabil-
ity containers” but they “need to convert material resources into more usable
instruments, such as combat proficiency.” It, however, emphasizes that policy
makers are most concerned about the power in outcomes.54 They, in other
words, are concerned about the utilitarian value of power as a tool in foreign
policymaking.

The leading statistical indicators of Pakistan are appreciable by any given

standard. The country has a population of 212 million people, almost nine times
more than the population of Australia, Canada, Norway, and several other coun-
tries ranked as Middle Powers. Almost 75 percent of the population is below
40 years.55 In terms of natural resources, Pakistan possesses world’s second larg-
est salt mines. It has world’s fifth largest copper and gold reserves; second largest
coal deposits; and other mineral deposits such as of marble, granite, zinc, and
bauxite worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Pakistan estimates to possess about
20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves and another 100 trillion cubic feet
of shale gas reserves. These estimates have been calculated based on evaluation
of only 4 percent of country’s landmass.56 Moreover, according to a 2013 report
by the US Energy Information Administration, Pakistan has more than 9 billion
barrel of shale oil recoverable through available technology.57 Additionally, the
country is a site of one of the oldest human civilizations, Indus Valley, and is
part of Indo-Gangetic Plain, one of the most fertile farming regions in the world.
Primarily it is because of an immense carrying capacity of this fertile landmass
that Indian Subcontinent, despite being a half of the size of the United States, is
home to world’s 20 percent population. Additionally, Pakistan’s industrial output
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 57
ini n 2018
2 0 1 8 was w as w worth
o r t h $38.33
$ 3 8 . 3 3 bbillion, i l l i o n , an a n increase
i n c r e a s e of o f about
a b o u t 4.884 . 8 8 percent
p e r c e n t as a s compared
c o m p a re d
to
t o 2 0 1 7 e c o n o m i c y e a r . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e W o r l d B a n k , t h e p e r c a p i t a i n c o m e went
2017 economic year. According to the World Bank, the per capita income w ent
58
upp ffrom
u r o m $576$ 5 7 6 in i n 2000
2 0 0 0 to t o $1,482
$ 1 , 4 8 2 in i n 2018.
2 0 1 8 .58
Having
H a v i n g said s a i d tthat,
h a t , iitt is i s ttrue
r u e tthat h a t Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s economic
e c o n o m i c indicators
i n d i c a t o r s are a r e notn o t compa-
com pa­
rable to European or Southeast Asian countries.
r a b le to E u r o p e a n o r S o u th e a s t A s ia n c o u n tr ie s . A s m e n tio n e d e a r lie r , P As mentioned earlier, Pakistan
a k i s t a n is is
considered
c o n s id e re d u underperforming
n d e r p e r f o r m i n g as a s compared
c o m p a r e d tto o its
its p potential.
o t e n t i a l . For
F o r example,
e x a m p l e , the t h e coun-
coun­
ttryr y has h a s failed
f a i l e d tto o invest
i n v e s t iin n human
h u m a n development.
d e v e l o p m e n t . It I t has
h a s bbeene e n unable
u n a b l e tto o educate
e d u c a t e iits ts
growing
g r o w i n g h u m a n r e s o u r c e . L i t e r a c y r a t e i s l e s s t h a n 5 0 p e r c e n t , a n d a v a s t majority
human resource. Literacy rate is less than 50 percent, and a vast m a jo rity
ofo f young
y o u n g so-called
s o - c a l l e d literate
l i t e r a t e people
p e o p l e is i s vvirtually
i r t u a l l y unskilled.
u n s k i l l e d . According
A c c o r d i n g tto o U UNICEF,
N IC E F ,
about
a b o u t 22.8 2 2 . 8 million
m i l l i o n children
c h i l d r e n aged a g e d 5–16, 5 - 1 6 , abouta b o u t 44 4 4 percent
p e r c e n t of o f theth e p population
o p u l a t i o n of of
59
this age group, are out of school; it is the second highest
th is a g e g r o u p , a r e o u t o f s c h o o l; i t is th e s e c o n d h ig h e s t n u m b e r i n th e w o r ld .59 number in the world.
Similarly, the 2017 estimates by the World Bank
S im ila r ly , th e 2 0 1 7 e s tim a te s b y th e W o r ld B a n k s h o w th a t in f a n t m o r ta lity r a te show that infant mortality rate
in
in P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s 52.10,
5 2 . 1 0 , 26th 2 6 t h in i n the th e w world
o r l d and and w worse
o r s e than
t h a n several
s e v e r a l least-developed
le a st-d e v e lo p e d
60
countries
c o u n t r i e s o f A f r i c a a n d S o u t h A m e r i c a . 6 0 A d d i t i o n a l l y , P a k i s t a n has
of Africa and South America. Additionally, Pakistan h a s eighth
e i g h t h highest
h ig h e s t
stunted
s t u n t e d growth
g r o w t h rate r a t e ofo f under-5
u n d e r-5 y years
e a r s oldo l d children,
c h ild r e n , w worseo r s e tthan
h a n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , Ethio-E th io ­
61
p i a , a n d R w a n d a . 6 1 O v e r a l l , H e a l t h c a r e A c c e s s a n d Q u a l i t y ( H A Q ) I n d e x ranks
pia, and Rwanda. Overall, Healthcare Access and Quality (HAQ) Index ra n k s
62
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n at a t 154th
1 5 4 t h outo u t of o f 1951 9 5 countries.
c o u n tr ie s .62
The
T h e origins
o r i g i n s of o f contradictions
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s bbetween e tw e e n P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s natural
n a t u r a l resources,
r e s o u r c e s , economic
e c o n o m ic
p o t e n t i a l o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d d i s m a y i n g s o c i a l s e c t o r p e r f o r m a n c e on
potential on the one hand and dismaying social sector performance o n tthe h e other
o th e r
hand
h a n d a n d i t s c l a i m o f b e i n g a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e M i d d l e P o w e r o f t h e w o r l d lie,
and its claim of being an indispensable Middle Power of the world l i e , pri-
p ri­
marily,
m a r i l y , iin n ttwo w o ffactors:
a c t o r s : geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c location,
l o c a t i o n , and a n d military
m i l i t a r y capabilities.
c a p a b i l i t i e s . Pakistan
P a k ista n
iis s located
l o c a t e d iin n ttheh e mostm o s t geostrategically
g e o s t r a t e g i c a l l y mobile m o b i l e area a r e a of o f tthehe w world.
o r l d . It I t iiss ttheh e gate-
g a te ­
w a y t o C e n t r a l A s i a , t h e h o m e o f s o - c a l l e d G r e a t G a m e . I t i s t h e f r o n t l i n e state
way to Central Asia, the home of so-called Great Game. It is the frontline s ta te
in
i n ana n active
a c t i v e great-power
g r e a t - p o w e r militarym i l i t a r y conflict
c o n f l i c t in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n since s i n c e the t h e last
l a s t 45
4 5 yyears,e a rs,
including
i n c l u d i n g tthe h e US U S War W a r on o n Terror
T e r r o r since s i n c e tthe h e lastl a s t two
t w o decades.
d e c a d e s . It I t is
i s adjacent
a d j a c e n t tto o ttwowo
nuclear
n u c l e a r r i v a l p o w e r s , I n d i a a n d C h i n a . T h e c h a n g i n g d y n a m i c s i n t h e p o l i t i c s of
rival powers, India and China. The changing dynamics in the politics of
Indian
I n d i a n Ocean,
O c e a n , US–China
U S - C h i n a ttensions e n s i o n s iin n South
S o u t h ChinaC h i n a Sea S e a and and b beyond
e y o n d resulting
r e s u l t i n g iin n
ttheh e so-called
s o - c a l l e d “return
“ r e t u r n of of b bipolarity”
i p o l a r i t y ” iin n international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics,
p o l i t i c s , anda n d China–Pakistan
C h in a - P a k is ta n
relations
r e l a t i o n s in i n ttheh e wake
w a k e of o f CPEC
C P E C elevate e l e v a t e the t h e geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c significance
s i g n i f i c a n c e of o f tthe
h e country
c o u n try
i n a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d m a n n e r . A d d i t i o n a l l y , a d j a c e n t t o P a k i s t a n i s I r a n , one
in an unprecedented manner. Additionally, adjacent to Pakistan is Iran, o n e of of
the most important players in Middle Eastern
th e m o s t im p o r ta n t p la y e r s in M id d le E a s te r n p o litic s o f o il, id e o lo g y , a n d w politics of oil, ideology, and war.
a r.
This
T h i s geographic
g e o g r a p h i c link l i n k and and P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s strategic
s t r a t e g i c roler o l e ini n tthe
h e defense
d e f e n s e of o f Saudi
S a u d i Arabia
A ra b ia
add
a d d a n o t h e r c o m p l e x d i m e n s i o n a n d t h u s p r o v i d e a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o m i n e n c e in
another complex dimension and thus provide a significant prominence i n the
th e
region. There is perhaps no other country in the world
r e g io n . T h e r e is p e r h a p s n o o th e r c o u n tr y in th e w o r ld w ith s u c h c o n s p ic u o u s ly with such conspicuously
pprecarious
r e c a r i o u s geostrategic
g e o s t r a t e g i c significance.
s i g n i f i c a n c e . Arguably,
A rg u a b ly , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s inevitably
i n e v i t a b l y dragged
d r a g g e d into in to
aa strategic
s t r a t e g i c c o m p e t i t i o n i n v o l v i n g g l o b a l p o w e r s a n d t h e i r i m m e n s e l y significant
competition involving global powers and their immensely s ig n ific a n t
iinterests.
n te re s ts .
It
I t is i s primarily
p r i m a r i l y Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s vvolatile o l a t i l e strategic
s t r a t e g i c location,
l o c a t i o n , coupled
c o u p le d w with
i t h active
a c tiv e
regional
r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s a n d a n e t e r n a l a n i m o s i t y t o I n d i a , w h i c h l e f t I s l a m a b a d with
conflicts and an eternal animosity to India, which left Islamabad w ith
no
n o choice
c h o ic e b butu t tto o excel
e x c e l more m o r e iin n developing
d e v e l o p i n g iits t s own
o w n defensive
d e f e n s i v e military
m i l i t a r y capabili-
c a p a b ili­
tties
i e s tthan
h a n catering
c a t e r i n g tto o ttheh e needs
n e e d s of o f its
i t s yyoung
oung p population
o p u l a t i o n and a n d decaying
d e c a y i n g socials o c i a l sector.
s e c to r.
Global Firepower Index, a ranking system that does not
G lo b a l F ir e p o w e r I n d e x , a r a n k in g s y s te m th a t d o e s n o t ta k e in to a c c o u n t n u c le a r take into account nuclear
capability,
c a p a b i l i t y , ranks
r a n k s Pakistan
P a k i s t a n as a s tthe h e 10th 1 0 t h most
m o s t powerful
p o w e r f u l military
m i l i t a r y power
p o w e r iin n tthehe w world,
o rld ,
b better
e t t e r than
t h a n Turkey
T u r k e y (11th),
( 1 1 t h ) , Italy
I t a l y (12th),
( 1 2 t h ) , Germany
G e r m a n y (15th), ( 1 5 t h ) , Indonesia
I n d o n e s i a (16th),
( 1 6 t h ) , Spain
S p a in
63
(18th),
( 1 8 t h ) , Australia
A u s t r a l i a (19th),
( 1 9 t h ) , Israel
I s r a e l (20th),
( 2 0 t h ) , and a n d Canada
C a n a d a (21st).
( 2 1 s t ) . 6 3 TheT h e country
c o u n tr y p possesses
o ssesses
58 Samee Lashari
the sixth largest standing military force of over 900,000 personnel out of which
around 637,000 are on active duty.64 According to Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan possesses 100–120 nuclear weapons.65 The
country is considered to be the fastest growing nuclear capability state in the
world, expanding its production capacity at such a scale that “may lead to sig-
nificant increases in the size of their nuclear weapon inventories over the next
decade.”66 In response to India’s “Cold Start Doctrine,” Pakistan developed tacti-
cal nuclear weapons, a move that has brought the chances of nuclear war in South
Asia to a significantly low threshold level.67 Pakistan possesses a large number of
indigenously produced as well as China-made tanks, armored fighting vehicles,
long-range multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), frigates, submarines, and coastal
defense crafts. It has recently been modernizing its military capabilities. With the
help of China, and in response to the Pressler Amendment from the United States
in the 1990s, it developed its own fighting lightweight multirole combat aircraft
named jet JF-17 Thunder. Pakistan currently has included about 120 Block-1 JF-
17s. It has also inducted double-seated JF-17 Block II aircraft designed specifi-
cally for training purposes. The Block-III version of JF-17 is said to be compatible
with French-made Rafael recently obtained by India.68
Despite economic challenges, Pakistan has consistently prioritized military
modernization to be the most vital national interest. Lacking a conventional capa-
bility to deliver nuclear weapons, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan
started developing its own missile program. Currently, Pakistan has an array of
short- and medium-range nuclear warhead carrying ballistic missiles with ranges
varying between 60 kilometers (Nasr) to 2,750 kilometers (Shaheen-III), cover-
ing all of India, Middle East including Red Sea, Central Asia, and some parts of
Russia and Eastern Europe. Pakistan also developed land-based and air-launched
nuclear-capable cruise missiles with range between 350 and 700 kilometers. How-
ever, in 2017, Pakistan tested first submarine-launched nuclear-capable missile
Babur III with a range of 450 kilometers, thus defying lack of strategic-depth and
achieving nuclear triad and a survivable “second-strike capability” in the event
of any nuclear war in South Asia. Defense officials in Pakistan, however, do not
share news about the undergoing missile modernization projects. Arguably, there
is a lot more going on behind the scenes than is known officially.
Keeping in context the discourse of identity and material capabilities, when
we look at the foreign policy behavior of Pakistan, we see it as a country that
takes pride in being an important player in international politics, more than its
due share. This behavior is understandable since a part of behavioral indicators
of Middle Power countries is that they “typically adopt an activist style in that
they interfere in global issues beyond their immediate concern” (Jordaan, 2003:
167). Throughout its history of over 70 years, Pakistan faced an apparently insur-
mountable challenge of defending itself against an adversarial power, India. Put
together, three factors – self-perceived identity as the most significant country
in the Muslim world, a nuclear power and formidable strategic player in inter-
national politics, and dealing with Indian challenge – produce a foreign policy
decision-making structure in the country where national defense and territorial
 Is Pakistan a Middle Power? 59
integrity displace every other consideration, including socioeconomic develop-
ment and industrialization. Therefore, when explaining Pakistan’s behavior as a
Middle Power, it is important to keep the drivers of behavior in context. In the
case of other Middle Powers such as Australia, Canada, and European countries,
they include economic development, socio-political stability, and infrastructural
maturity. In the case of non-European countries, such as South Korea and South
Africa, indicators include fast developing economies. In the case of Pakistan,
however, it is ideology, geography, military power, young population, and natural
resource potential. Gen. (R) Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s former Chief of Army
Staff, explained the role of strategic considerations in foreign policy behavior as
follows:

Pakistan’s military strategy is, of course, a part of its integrated national strat-
egy. It is basically a response to its threat perception. There is, however, the
additional consideration of military power as a prestige factor in the region,
in relations with the Muslim world, and as an active participant in world-
wide coalition and peacekeeping arrangements. Pakistan’s threat perception
is based on a consideration of the evolving situation in Afghanistan, Iran’s
military power, offensive political and military pressures from India, and
extremism and terrorism (emphasis added).69

This is an example of how identity and material capabilities merge to produce a

distinct foreign policy behavior affecting regional and extra-regional peace and
crisis resolution.

Conclusion
This chapter analyzed theoretical discourse pertaining to Middle Powers in the
world. There is no general consensus as to which factors, and in what percentage,
must be put together to measure the power of a country to label it as a Middle
Power. I have also mentioned that there are two essential indicators that can turn
a country into a Middle Power: its identity or self-realization of being a Middle
Power, supported by its material capabilities. Together, they must produce a for-
eign policy behavior that shows that the country behaves like a Middle Power and
has the capability to act as a Middle Power. A review analyzing Pakistan on these
basic indicators helps us understand the country and its ranking in international
system better.
Pakistan is a Middle Power because of two principal reasons: it has a strong
identity and ideological standpoint that helps it to view itself as a strong regional
power with indispensable value to great powers. Using its ideological founda-
tions and its geostrategic significance, Pakistan built a formidable military power
and used it to successfully advance its national interests. During the Cold War, it
allied with Western world and participated in military agreements such as SEATO
and CENTO. During the 1980s, it participated in the hot war of Afghanistan,
facilitated USSR disintegration, and bought time to build its nuclear weapons.
60 Samee Lashari
In the 1990s, when it faced economic sanctions, it developed an indigenous “second
defense line” of Mujahideen to replicate its experience of Afghanistan in Kashmir
to engage India in a low scale but costly violence. In the wake of September 11
attacks, it became a frontline state, non-NATO major ally and reaped the benefits
of increased military cooperation with the United States. Since 2013, Pakistan has
broadened its multilateral strategic engagement with China by initiating CPEC
to build its communication infrastructure, modernize its industry and agriculture,
and become a considerably significant player in emerging Sino-American great-
power competition. It is a Middle Power in itself and is recognized as such by the
decision makers in the most powerful countries around the world.

Notes
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62 Samee Lashari
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y e s h a Jalal, KJIHGFEDCBA
J a l a l , The
T h e SSole o l e SSpokesman:
p o k e s m a n : JJinnah, i n n a h , the th e M Muslim
u s lim L League
eague a andn d the
th e D Demand
e m a n d ffor or
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4 6 Christine
C h r i s t i n e C. C. F Fair,
a ir, F Fighting
i g h t i n g to t o the
th e E End:n d : The The P Pakistan
a k is ta n A Army’s
r m y ’s Way W a y of W a r (New
o f War ( N e w York: Y o rk :
Oxford
O x f o r d University
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a r z a n a Sheikh,
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a k i n g SSense e n s e of of P a k i s t a n (New
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48 H Hamza
am za A Alavi,
l a v i , “Social
“ S o c ia l F Forces
o r c e s and a n d Ideology
I d e o l o g y in i n tthe
he M Making
a k i n g of o f Pakistan,”
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P Political W e e k l y 37,
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( 2 0 0 2 ) : 5119–24.
5 1 1 9 -2 4 .
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U n i t e d SStates ta te s a andnd P Pakistan,
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1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 0 : D Disenchanted
is e n c h a n te d A l l i e s (Balti-
Allies ( B a lti­
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1 9 9 -2 0 6 .
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S t e v e Coll,C o l l , Ghost
G h o s t Wars: W a r s : The T h e SSecretecret H History
i s t o r y ofo f the
t h e CIA,
C I A , AAfghanistan,
f g h a n i s t a n , andand B Bin i n LLaden,
aden,
F From
r o m the t h e SSoviet
o v i e t IInvasion
n v a s i o n to t o SSeptember
e p t e m b e r 10, 2 0 0 1 (New
1 0 , 2001 ( N e w York:Y o rk : P Penguin
e n g u i n Books,
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e ro z H Hassan
a s s a n Khan,
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a k i n g of o f the
th e P Pakistani
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a s h m ir : R Roots
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a t h s toto P Peace
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h m e d Rashid,R a s h i d , Taliban:
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5 4 Gregory
G r e g o r y Treverton
T r e v e r t o n and a n d SethS e t h Jones,
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e a s u r in g N National
a tio n a l P o w e r (Santa
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55 N National
a t i o n a l IInstitute
n s t i t u t e of o f Population
P o p u l a t i o n Studies,
S tu d ie s , P Pakistan
a k is ta n D Demographic
e m o g r a p h i c and and H Health
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56
56 D Drazen
r a z e n Jorgic,
J o r g i c , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n to t o Offer
O f f e r Gas G a s Fields
F i e l d s to to F Foreign
o re ig n E Explorers,
x p l o r e r s , IInvestors:
n v e s t o r s : Offi-
O ffi­
cial,”
c i a l ,” R e u t e r s , March
Reuters, M a r c h 11, 1 1 , 22019,
019, w www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-energy-gas/pakis
w w .re u te r s .c o m /a rtic le /u s - p a k is ta n -e n e r g y -g a s /p a k is
ttan-to-offer-gas-fields-to-foreign-explorers-investors-official-idUSKBN1QT0D0.
a n -to -o ffe r-g a s -fie ld s -to -fo re ig n -e x p lo re rs -in v e s to rs -o ffic ia l-id U S K B N 1 Q T 0 D 0 .
57
57 U U.S.. S . Energy
E n e r g y IInformation
n fo rm a tio n A Administration,
d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Technically
T e c h n ic a lly R Recoverable
e c o v e r a b l e SShale h a l e OilO il a and n d SShale
h a le
Gas
G as R Resources:
esources: A An n A Assessment
s s e s s m e n t of o f 137
1 3 7 SShaleh a le F Formations
o r m a t i o n s in i n 41 4 1 Countries
C o u n t r i e s Outside
O u t s i d e the th e
United
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C o u n t r y Ranking,”
R a n k in g ,” w www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SH.STA.STNT.ZS/rankings.
w w .in d e x m u n d i.c o m /f a c ts /in d ic a to r s /S H .S T A .S T N T .Z S /r a n k in g s .
62
62 N Nancy
a n c y Fullman
F u l l m a n et e t al.,
a l . , “Measuring
“ M e a s u r i n g Performance
P e r f o r m a n c e on o n tthe h e Healthcare
H e a lth c a re A Access
c c e s s and
a n d Quality
Q u a lity
IIndex
n d e x for f o r 195 1 9 5 Countries
C o u n t r i e s and a n d Territories
T e r r i t o r i e s and
a n d Selected
S e l e c t e d Subnational
S u b n a tio n a l L Locations:
o c a tio n s : A A Sys-
S ys­
ttematic
e m a tic A Analysis
n a l y s i s fromf r o m tthe h e Global
G l o b a l Burden
B u r d e n of of D Disease
i s e a s e Study
S tu d y 2 2016,”
0 1 6 , ” The T h e LLanceta n c e t 391 391
(June
( J u n e 2, 2 , 22018):
0 1 8 ) : 2245.
2245.
63
6 3 Global
G lo b a l F Firepower
i r e p o w e r IIndex, n d e x , www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
w w w .g lo b a lf ire p o w e r .c o m /c o u n tr ie s -lis tin g .a s p .
64
64 A Alfred
l f r e d Joyner,
J o y n e r , “How“ H o w Strong S t r o n g Is I s Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s M Military?”
ilita ry ? ” N Newsweek,
ew sw eek, N November
o v e m b e r 28, 2 8 , 22018,
018,
wwww.newsweek.com/how-strong-pakistans-military-1235091.
w w .n e w s w e e k .c o m /h o w - s tr o n g -p a k is ta n s -m ilita r y -1 2 3 5 0 9 1 .
6 5 SIPRI
65 S I P R I Country
C o u n try P Profile,
ro file , w www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclear-
w w .s ip ri.o r g /re s e a r c h /a r m a m e n ts - a n d - d is a r m a m e n t/n u c le a r-
wweapons/world-nuclear-forces/pakistan.
e a p o n s /w o rld -n u c le a r-fo rc e s /p a k is ta n .
66
6 6 SIPRI,
S I P R I , “SIPRI“ S I P R I Yearbook
Y e a r b o o k 22019: 019: A Armaments,
rm a m e n ts , D Disarmament
i s a r m a m e n t and a n d International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Security:
S e c u rity :
Summary,”
S u m m a ry ,” w www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf,
w w . s i p r i . o r g / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / 2 0 1 9 - 0 8 / y b 1 9 _ s u m m a r y _ e n g _ 1 .p d f , 10. 10.
67
6 7 Tughral
T u g h r a l Yamin,
Y a m i n , “Tactical
“ T a c tic a l N Nuclear
u c le a r W Weapons
e a p o n s (TNW)
(T N W ) - – The
The P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i Perspective,”
P e r s p e c t i v e ,” IIPRI PRI
o u r n a l XV,
JJournal X V , nno. o. 2 2 (Summer
( S u m m e r 22015): 0 1 5 ) : 28–43.
2 8 - 4 3 . See S e e alsoa l s o Jaganath
J a g a n a t h Shankran,
S h a n k r a n , “Pakistan’s
“ P a k is ta n ’s
BBattlefield
a ttle fie ld N Nuclear
u c le a r P Policy:
o lic y : A A Risky
R i s k y Solution
S o l u t i o n to t o ana n Exaggerated
E x a g g e r a t e d Threat,”T h r e a t , ” IInternational
n te r n a tio n a l
e c u r i t y 39,
SSecurity 3 9 , no.
no. 3 3 (Winter
( W i n t e r 22014/15):
0 1 4 / 1 5 ) : 118–51.
1 1 8 -5 1 .
68
68 F Franz-Stefan
r a n z - S t e f a n Gady, G a d y , “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s JF-17 JF -1 7 B Block
l o c k IIII II F Fighter
i g h t e r Jet Jet M Makesa k e s Maiden
M a i d e n Flight,”F lig h t,”
The
The D i p l o m a t , January
Diplomat, J a n u a r y 6, 6 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/pakistans-jf-17-
h ttp s ://th e d ip lo m a t.c o m /2 0 2 0 /0 1 /p a k is ta n s - jf -1 7 -
bblock-iii-fighter-jet-makes-maiden-flight/.
lo c k -iii-fig h te r-je t-m a k e s -m a id e n -flig h t/ .
69
6 9 Jehangir
J e h a n g ir K Karamat,
a r a m a t , “Missile
“ M is s ile A Acquisition
c q u i s i t i o n bby y Pakistan:
P a k is ta n : M Military
i l i t a r y Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Imperatives,”
I m p e r a t i v e s ,”
SSouth
o u th A Asian u r v e y 11,
s i a n SSurvey 1 1 , nno. o. 2 2 (2004):
( 2 0 0 4 ) : 170.
170.
4 The Military and Foreign
Policy in Pakistan
An Analysis
Ejaz Hussain

Overview
Foreign policy is a core component of a country’s grand strategy through which
“national interests” are disseminated and, to an extent, realised internationally.1
Regardless of the territorial and demographic size of a country, no nation-state
can survive sans foreign policy. Nonetheless, there is a considerable variance in
the nature, character, and conduct of foreign policy comparatively. For instance,
the foreign policy determination and implementation are democratically oriented
in liberal democracies such as the United States (US) and Germany whereas for-
eign policy contours are dubiously determined in “defective democracies” and
“autocracies.”2 Put differently, foreign relations of industrially and democratically
advanced countries are deliberated in parliament which, as per democratic theory,
is institutionally regarded as a supreme body with the legal and normative pre-
rogative to legislative for and, on the behalf of, society whose input on a given
foreign policy issue is usually taken into account.
To the contrary, however, foreign policy is though theoretically made by parlia-
ment in a “defective” democracy such as Pakistan, it is operationally influenced
by supra-parliamentary institutions.3 Moreover, in autocracies, the role, if any, of
parliament is rendered irrelevant by non-parliamentary institutions such as mili-
taries and monarchies ─ which dominate such states both institutionally as well as
structurally. Pakistan’s case is very peculiar in the sense that it has never been a
liberal democracy. It rather oscillates between being defective democracy and an
autocracy. In the immediate context of Independence (August 1947), Pakistan was
dominated by a supra-parliamentary institution, namely, the civil bureaucracy,
which appointed its rank and file on topmost positions such as governor-general.
Having controlled the country politically and administratively, the civil bureau-
cracy also shaped Pakistan’s foreign policy particularly towards the United States.
Though the early political leadership had already hinted at preferring the capi-
talist over the communist bloc,4 the political class miserably failed to invoke its
agency vis-à-vis the civil bureaucracy which ruled the roost till late 1950s. Impor-
tantly, the military, another bureaucratic organisation, remained a junior partner, to
say the least, with its civil counterpart because by mid-1950s, the then Commander-
in-Chief (C-in-C) of Pakistan army, General Ayub Khan, got appointed as the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-5
64 Ejaz Hussain
minister of defence on account of his cordial relations with Iskander Mirza. The
latter had served in the British military and civil bureaucracy and, post-Partition,
assumed powerful positions such as minister of defence, governor-general, and,
after the 1956 Constitution, the country’s first president.5 Ayub’s input and role
were crucial in Pakistan’s decision to sign Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
with the United States in May 1954. A few months later, Pakistan joined the US-
led Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and, a year later, the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO). Ayub became absolutely powerful on account of
1958 martial law. After the toppling of a tutelar civil government along with dis-
graceful exit of Iskander Mirza from presidency, the Ayub-led military assumed
direct control of politics, administration, and foreign policy of Pakistan.6
Little wonder, Khan visited the United States and made his country a closer
partner of the United States vis-à-vis communist USSR. Consequently, Paki-
stan received American military aid and hardware which helped with military
modernisation. However, Pakistan’s war with India in 1965 impacted bilateral
relations since the United States did not rescue the former as per its expecta-
tions. Thus, in the post-war period, the Ayub regime started tilting towards China
whose relations had already deteriorated with India owing to the 1962 war.7 China
remained relevant during the Yahya years when Pakistan played a crucial role in
the US–China rapprochement. Pakistan, it seems, focused to balance its ties with
the United States by cultivating close defence partnership with China. Hence,
China–Pakistan defence and military cooperation strengthened under the civilian
government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whereas US–Pakistan relations were at its low
ebb ─ Pakistan quit both SEATO and CENTO by the 1970s. Besides, Pakistan’s
relations with India and Afghanistan in the said period remained very hostile,
while its relations with key Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia gained strate-
gic confidence.8
Nonetheless, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 invited American
wrath coupled with the Saudi money and ideology and Pakistan’s logistical sup-
port. Contextually, US–Pakistan relations saw an upward curve tactically. Stra-
tegically, however, Islamabad remained a close partner of Beijing whose role
though was miniscule in the Afghan War. Moreover, Pakistan remained preoc-
cupied with India in the 1980s, that is Siachen Glacier. However, the Geneva
Accords (1988) paved a way for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Con-
sequently, US–Pakistan transactional partnership was over, and bilateral relations
witnessed a downward trend in the immediate post-Cold War period. For example
Pakistan faced “nuclear sanctions” during the 1990s.9 On the other hand, China–
Pakistan relations flourished in military-strategic terms. Though during this dec-
ade of defective democracy, the civil leadership, particularly Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif, attempted to control the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis India,
Afghanistan, and the United States. However, they remained constrained due to
political instability, institutional imbalance, and lack of vision to deal with a pow-
erful military.10
Ironically, Sharif had a tussle with the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen-
eral Pervez Musharraf, who topped his government in a coup in October 1999.11
 Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 65
Under Musharraf, the military played a pivotal role in making Pakistan’s foreign
policy. Tactically, US–Pakistan relations improved once again. Moreover, China–
Pakistan relations remained intact strategically. However, India remained a top
security threat in military calculations. In addition, Afghanistan was linked with
India where the latter’s influence increased in the post-Taliban period. Besides,
Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Malaysia remained cordial.
However, Iran–Pakistan ties could not improve owing largely to mutual mistrust.12
What can be deduced from the foregoing is that Pakistan’s foreign policy had
clearly tilted towards the United States in 1950s. However, in mid-1960s, Paki-
stan pursued close strategic relations with China in order to balance out the United
States. With the latter, Pakistan though cooperated in the 1980s and 2000s, the
scale of such interaction was military in character and transactional in nature.
Overall, US–Pakistan relations can be termed tactical whereas China–Pakistan
relations are strategic in orientation. In the last 75 years, Pakistan’s topmost for-
eign policy agenda centred around Indian security threat. The former tried to
counter India through its bilateral relations with the United States, China, and
other countries such as Saudi Arabia. Even in multilateral organisational arrange-
ments such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and
even the United Nations, Pakistan remained preoccupied with India. As far as the
Muslim world is concerned, Pakistan projected itself as a leading Muslim state
with comparative strength in military capability and human resources. Indeed,
Pakistan has taken a pro-Palestine stance since 1948 whereas more Arab countries
normalised relations with the latter in 2020.13
How does Pakistan conduct its foreign policy in the contemporary context
(post-Musharraf period)? What role does the military have in the formulation and
operationalisation of foreign policy? What role do the non-military institutions
such as parliament play in this respect? What are the main foreign policy objec-
tives of Pakistan in the current context, and which sort of strategies are being
adopted to pursue it? These are crucial questions which this study is focusing on
theoretically and empirically. However, before theoretical considerations are out-
lined, it is pertinent to review the existing literature on the subject in order to find
missing links and gaps in theory and practice.

Existing Works and Its Weaknesses

There is an abundance of work done on Pakistan’s foreign policy. The majority
of the literature falls under, what this study has termed, the geostrategic accounts.
Geostrategic scholars ─ from within the country, region, and beyond ─ take a
security-centric view of Pakistan’s foreign policy. They argue that Pakistan
assumed a significant military role in the (post-)Cold War period due to its geo-
graphical location. Moreover, India is highlighted as being a major threat to the
country’s existence. The Kashmir issue remains a bone of contention between
India and Pakistan. Unless it is resolved, Pakistan geostrategically remains vul-
nerable to India. Despite its emphasis on geostrategy and its impact on foreign
policy, the geostrategic accounts have overlooked domestic variables and the way
66 Ejaz Hussain
they
t h e y influence
i n f l u e n c e foreignf o r e i g n policymaking.
p o lic y m a k in g . M Moreover,
o r e o v e r , tthey h e y make m a k e no n o clearc l e a r distinction
d is tin c tio n
b e t w e e n d e f e n c e a n d f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e a c t o r s w h i c h m a k e fforeign
between defence and foreign policy. In addition, the actors which make o re ig n
14
policy
p o l i c y are a r e notn o t comprehensively
c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y singled s i n g l e d out o u t in i n terms
t e r m s of o f their
t h e i r agency.
a g e n c y .14
The
T h e structural
s t r u c t u r a l studies
s t u d i e s have,
h a v e , on o n ttheir
h e i r part,
p a r t , highlighted
h i g h l i g h t e d historical
h i s t o r i c a l events
e v e n t s in i n the
th e
making and operationalisation of foreign policy. The
m a k in g a n d o p e r a tio n a lis a tio n o f f o r e ig n p o lic y . T h e s c h o la r s in th is c a te g o r y scholars in this category
argue
a r g u e thatt h a t iti t is
i s the
t h e structure
s t r u c t u r e of o f ttheh e state
s t a t e of
o f Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tthat h a t determines
d e t e r m i n e s tthe h e course
c o u r s e of o f its
its
foreign relations. Pakistan inherited structural elements
f o r e ig n r e la tio n s . P a k is ta n in h e r ite d s tr u c tu r a l e le m e n ts s u c h a s lo w - p e r f o r m in g such as low-performing
parliament,
p a rlia m e n t, a a well-organised
w e l l - o r g a n i s e d civil c i v i l bbureaucracy,
u re a u c ra cy , a a disciplined
d i s c i p l i n e d military,
m i l i t a r y , and a n d socio-
s o c io ­
economic classes ─ that shape up foreign policymaking.
e c o n o m i c c l a s s e s — t h a t s h a p e u p f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a k i n g . 1 5 N e v e r t h e l e s s , despite
15
Nevertheless, d e s p ite
its
i t s significance
s i g n i f i c a n c e to t o explain
e x p l a i n states t a t e formation
f o r m a t i o n and a n d implication
i m p l i c a t i o n of o f post-colonial
p o s t - c o l o n i a l politi-p o liti­
cal
c a l e c o n o m y , t h e s e s t u d i e s h a v e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d a c t o r s , a g e n c y , and
economy, these studies have underestimated actors, agency, a n d context.
c o n te x t.
In
I n another
a n o t h e r study s t u d y grounded
g r o u n d e d in i n “systems”
“ s y s t e m s ” approach,
a p p ro a c h , w which
h ic h w was a s quite
q u ite p popular
o p u la r
in
i n c o m p a r a t i v e p o l i t i c s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e 1 9 5 0 s a n d 1 9 6 0 s , P a t n a i k has
comparative politics in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, Patnaik has
applied
a p p l i e d thist h i s approach
a p p r o a c h tto o tthe
h e case
c a s e of o f Pakistan
P a k ista n w where
h e r e he h e ttested
e s t e d hypotheses
h y p o t h e s e s at a t five
f i v e lev-
le v ­
els
e l s of o f aggregation:
a g g r e g a t i o n : idiosyncratic,
i d i o s y n c r a t i c , societal,
s o c i e t a l , governmental,
g o v e r n m e n t a l , regional r e g i o n a l systemic,
s y s t e m i c , and and
systemic. The collective decisions makers in his
s y s te m ic . T h e c o lle c tiv e d e c is io n s m a k e r s in h is m o d e l a r e th e p r e s id e n t, p model are the president, prime
rim e
minister,
m i n i s t e r , and a n d the t h e foreign
f o r e i g n minister.
m i n i s t e r . Moreover,
M o r e o v e r , cognition
c o g n i t i o n style s t y l e anda n d the t h e bbeliefs
e l i e f s sys-
sy s­
16
tems of the foreign policy decision makers are also given
t e m s o f t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n m a k e r s a r e a l s o g i v e n i m p o r t a n c e .1 6 N o n e t h e ­importance. Nonethe-
less,
l e s s , despite
d e s p i t e systemic
s y s t e m i c analysis
a n a l y s i s of o f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o re ig n p policy,
o l i c y , this
t h i s study,
s t u d y , it i t is
i s posited,
p o s ite d ,
has ignored the very political system of Pakistan.
h a s ig n o r e d th e v e r y p o litic a l s y s te m o f P a k is ta n . T h e d e n o m in a tio n s o f p The denominations of president,
r e s id e n t,
prime
p r i m e minister,
m i n i s t e r , and a n d fforeign
o r e i g n minister
m i n i s t e r as a s real
r e a l decision
d e c i s i o n makersm a k e r s in i n thet h e context
c o n t e x t of of
Pakistani politics are partly true, to say the least;
P a k is ta n i p o litic s a r e p a r tly tr u e , to s a y th e le a s t; th e f o r e ig n m in is te r d e n o m i­ the foreign minister denomi-
nation
n a tio n w was a s merely
m e r e l y instrumental.
i n s t r u m e n t a l . Moreover,
M o r e o v e r , tthe h e role
r o l e of o f ttheh e governor-general
g o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l in in
the
t h e e a r l y p e r i o d i s n o t a n a l y s e d a t a l l . I m p o r t a n t l y , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l roles
early period is not analysed at all. Importantly, the institutional r o l e s of o f civil
c iv il
bbureaucracy,
u r e a u c r a c y , military,
m i l i t a r y , andand p parliament
a r l i a m e n t are a r e ignored
i g n o r e d in i n terms
t e r m s of o f their
t h e i r impact
i m p a c t on o n for-
fo r­
eign policy. Also, the analysis is empirically limited
e ig n p o lic y . A ls o , th e a n a ly s is is e m p iric a lly lim ite d to th e 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 7 1 p e r io d . to the 1947–1971 period.
Another
A n o t h e r category
c a t e g o r y of o f literature,
lite r a tu r e , w which
h i c h is i s ttermed
e r m e d as a s Islamicist
I s l a m i c i s t works,
w o r k s , has h a s solely
s o le ly
focused
f o c u s e d o n t h e “ I s l a m ” f a c t o r i n t h e m a k i n g n o t o n l y o f P a k i s t a n b u t a l s o of
on the “Islam” factor in the making not only of Pakistan but also o f its
its
foreign policy. Thus, examples are cited from the post-independence
f o r e ig n p o lic y . T h u s , e x a m p le s a re c ite d f r o m th e p o s t- in d e p e n d e n c e p e r io d w h e r e period where
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n not n o t only o n l y established
e s t a b l i s h e d bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relations
r e l a t i o n s withw i t h Islamic
I s l a m i c Iran,I r a n , Turkey,
T u r k e y , Saudi Saudi
Arabia,
A r a b i a , a n d I n d o n e s i a b u t a l s o s u p p o r t e d a f e w M u s l i m c o u n t r i e s ffrom
and Indonesia but also supported a few Muslim countries ro m N North
o rth
17
Africa
A f r i c a diplomatically.
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y .1 7 One O ne w wonders
o n d e r s if i f Islam/religion
I s l a m / r e l i g i o n was w a s the t h e mainm a i n factorf a c t o r in in
determining
d e t e r m i n i n g Pakistan’sP a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o r e i g n policy,
p o lic y , w why h y did d i d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n fail f a i l tto o maintain
m a i n t a i n good good
ties
t i e s with
w i t h Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n in i n 1947
1 9 4 7 and a n d laterl a t e r ini n the
t h e 1970s
1 9 7 0 s and a n d 2000s?
2000s? E Evenv e n currently,
c u r r e n tly ,
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s t i l t e d t o w a r d s S a u d i A r a b i a t h a n T u r k e y , Malaysia,
foreign policy is tilted towards Saudi Arabia than Turkey, M a l a y s i a , or or
Iran
I r a n owing
o w i n g to t o material
m a t e r i a l than t h a n religious
r e l i g i o u s considerations.
c o n s id e r a tio n s .
Similarly,
S i m i l a r l y , the t h e identity
id e n tity p perspective
e r s p e c t i v e has h a s emphasised
e m p h a s i s e d on o n tthe h e ‘identity
‘ i d e n t i t y construction’
c o n s tr u c tio n ’
projects
p r o j e c t s b a s e d o n t h e s e c u l a r a n d t h e s a c r e d , i n I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n , respectively.
based on the secular and the sacred, in India and Pakistan, r e s p e c tiv e ly .
In
I n this
t h i s respect,
re sp e c t, b both
o t h countries’
c o u n t r i e s ’ ruling
r u l i n g elites
e lite s p perceived,
e r c e i v e d , duringd u r i n g 1989–99,
1 9 8 9 - 9 9 , securitys e c u r ity
threat
t h r e a t tthrough
h r o u g h the th e p prism
r i s m of of K Kashmir
a s h m i r owing o w i n g tto o ttheir
h e i r emotive
e m o tiv e p preoccupations
r e o c c u p a tio n s w withith
18
respective ideologies grounded in secularism and religiosity.
r e s p e c tiv e id e o lo g ie s g r o u n d e d i n s e c u la r is m a n d r e lig io s ity .18 D e s p ite th e a p p l i­ Despite the appli-
cation
c a t i o n of o f post-structuralist
p o s t - s t r u c t u r a l i s t methodology
m e t h o d o l o g y tto o conduct
c o n d u c t comparative
c o m p a r a t i v e analysis a n a l y s i s of o f the
th e
perceptions
p e r c e p t i o n s o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y e l i t e o f I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n , t h e s e s t u d i e s p a i d little
of foreign policy elite of India and Pakistan, these studies paid little
attention
a t t e n t i o n tto o historical
h i s t o r i c a l facts.
f a c t s . The
T h e ffact a c t ofo f tthe
h e matter
m a t t e r is i s since
s i n c e partition,
p a r t i t i o n , tthe h e Pakistani
P a k ista n i
elite instrumentalised religion in order to pursue
e lite in s tr u m e n ta lis e d r e lig io n in o r d e r to p u r s u e n o n - e m o tiv e in te r e s ts . Mnon-emotive interests. Moreover,
o re o v er,
 Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 67
the Pakistani elite, arguably, carries a more liberal-secular than religious outlook
as far as foreign policy formulation is concerned. This is the reason the county has
established diplomatic relations with major powers such as the United States and
China which are regarded as non-Muslim and secular countries.
Last but not the least, Pakistan’s foreign policy has been analysed from a legal
perspective as well. In this respect, Kashmir issue and Indus Waters Treaty (1960)
are discussed at length in light of international law.19 However, these works have
not touched upon internal variables in the making and implementation of foreign
policy in Pakistan. Similarly, an ethnic account has oversimplified the complexi-
ties of politics, state, and foreign policy in Pakistan. The simple argument put
forth is that the Punjabis, being a large ethnicity, are makers and shakers of for-
eign policy.20 Empirically, no effort is made to identify actors such as political
parties, civil bureaucracy, and the military that might have a role in foreign policy-
making. Ironically, this account has also overlooked the institutional composition
and internal dynamics of, for example, the military where non-Punjabis such as
Pashtuns have also dominated the officer cadre in a given context.
Having reviewed the existing literature on Pakistan’s foreign policy, the fol-
lowing weaknesses are identified. First, the majority of the studies are security-
centric. It though makes sense since the Pakistani elite would have felt insecure
from India which is larger in size, resources, and conventional military capability.
However, doing so, these studies have ignored economic and cultural dimen-
sions of foreign policy. Second, with a minor exception of only two studies ─
one by Patnaik and the other by this author21 ─ all other works are of empirical
nature where theory is neglected. Third, the majority of these existing accounts
have privileged structure/culture and have, thus, demoted actors, agency, material
interests, and context. At the end, none of these studies has analysed the role of the
military vis-à-vis foreign policy in Pakistan. The present study is, thus, an attempt
to fill the identified gaps both theoretically and empirically. The conceptual and
methodological considerations of the study are outlined in the following section.

Conceptual and Methodological Considerations

Theory is a higher form of knowledge which helps explain empirical puzzles.
There are different theoretical and methodological traditions in social sciences
such as historicism, positivism, and post-positivism. Epistemologically, political
science, as a discipline, has broadly been influenced by studies centred around
comparative politics, political economy, and International Relations (IR).22 As a
subfield of IR, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) evolved in the wake of Second
Word War and gained further academic currency in the 1980s onward. Currently,
FPA has consolidated itself in terms of having its own “ground,” models, and
theories ─ which are applied by researchers and, to an extent, decision-makers,
for gaining useful insights of otherwise complex empirical facts.23
Moreover, various levels/unit of analysis have been postulated by scholars
where a certain model/theory is applied to measure foreign policy behaviour of
decision-makers. At the individual level, personality analysis of, for example, a
68 Ejaz Hussain
world leader such as an American and/or Chinese president is conducted through
various techniques. Similarly, at the group level, small and large group dynamics
are analysed with a focus on highlighting the intricacies of bureaucratic politics
which influence foreign policymaking particularly in a crisis situation. Cultural,
national identity and domestic politics are other levels to measure their effects on
actors that make foreign policy. In pure theoretical terms, FPA has embraced and
empirically enriched mainstream IR theory which epistemologically is contested
in terms of structure–agency debate.24 Hence, structure-oriented theories such as
neorealism have overemphasised the structure of international system which con-
straints state behaviour. From a Marxist perspective, capitalist structures shape
the very formation of a state and its operational mechanism. Overall, the structural
accounts are historicist, holistic, and generic in orientation and analysis.25 Conse-
quently, actors, agency, and context are compromised in foreign policy analysis.
Importantly, non-structural theories such as social constructivism analyse foreign
policy in terms of its preoccupation with ideas, identities, and discourses; these
have also demoted agency and materially oriented preferences of stakeholders.26
The present study, grounded in Hudsonian view of actors and agency, con-
ducts an actor-specific analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy in the contempo-
rary context.27 It, thus, assumes actors to be human decision-makers and not the
abstraction of states as such ─ though, indubitably, states exist as abstract catego-
ries which are established, promoted, and referred to by decision-makers while
making and implementing foreign policy. Moreover, taking useful conceptual
clues from rational choice institutionalism, institutions, such as the military, are
assumed to be rational actors having an inherent conception of cost–benefit anal-
ysis.28 In other words, decision-makers assumed as actors possess both agency
(make things happen) and rationality (utility maximisation).
While applying these assumptions to foreign policy decision-makers in Paki-
stan, it is posited that the military along with other actors/stakeholders such as
civil bureaucracy, that is Foreign Office, and parliament invokes its agency in
foreign policymaking and implementation. Nonetheless, the military’s preference
prevails in a given political and strategic context where non-military actors fum-
ble or fail to mark their agencies. Conceptually, thus, this study conducts, in the
following sections, a theory-guided analysis of the military and foreign policy in
contemporary Pakistan. Methodologically, this research is qualitative in nature.
In terms of data sources, both primary sources, that is interviews, and secondary
sources, that is books, journals articles etc., are collected and analysed for a con-
ceptually and empirically rigorous analysis.29

The Military and Foreign Policy During 2008–2013

As discussed earlier in the chapter, Pakistan’s politics was dominated by the
Musharraf-led military since October 1999. Having being engulfed with the conse-
quences of arbitrary actions, he imposed the so-called “emergency” on 3 Novem-
ber 2007 to reshuffle political set-up for his political survival but in vain.30 Later
in the year, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani became the COAS. With the preceding
 Military
M i l i t a r y and Foreign
and F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y in Pakistan
in P 69
a k i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
69

as
as a a point
p o i n t of o f reference,
r e f e r e n c e , tthe h e study
s t u d y now n o w turnst u r n s to t o explain
e x p l a i n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s foreign
f o r e i g n policyp o lic y
during
d u r i n g 2 0 0 8 - 2 0 1 3 i n l i g h t o f t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k grounded
2008–2013 in light of the proposed conceptual framework g r o u n d e d in in
agency
a g e n c y ttheoryh e o r y of o f FPA.
F P A . Empirically,
E m p i r i c a l l y , however,
h o w e v e r , major m a j o r political
p o l i t i c a l developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s are a re
cited
c i t e d ini n order
o r d e r ttoo set
s e t the
t h e strategic
s t r a t e g i c context
c o n t e x t in i n which
w h i c h tthe h e actors
a c t o r s especially
e s p e c i a l l y tthe h e military
m ilita ry
frames
f r a m e s i t s p r e f e r e n c e s a n d i n v o k e s a g e n c y t o i m p a c t t h e c o u n t r y ’ s f o r e i g n policy
its preferences and invokes agency to impact the country’s foreign p o lic y
in
i n various
v a r i o u s ways.
w ays.
To
To b begin
e g i n with,
w i t h , ono n account
a c c o u n t of o f tthe
h e 2008
2 0 0 8 election,
e l e c t i o n , Pakistan
P a k ista n P People’s
e o p l e ’s P Party
a r t y (PPP)
(P P P )
and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) formed
a n d P a k is ta n M u s lim L e a g u e - N a w a z ( P M L - N ) f o r m e d a c o a litio n g o v e r n m e n t a coalition government
at
a t ttheh e ffederal
e d e r a l level.
le v e l. B Both o t h thet h e parties
p a r t i e s acted
a c t e d in i n ttandem
a n d e m tto o replace
re p la c e P Pervez
e r v e z Mushar-
M u sh ar­
raf,
r a f , w h o h a d a l r e a d y l o s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s u p p o r t a s t h e p r e s i d e n t o f P a k i s t a n . Hav-
who had already lost institutional support as the president of Pakistan. H av­
ing
i n g assumed
a ssu m e d p powers
o w e r s of of p president
r e s i d e n t inin a a changed
changed p political
o l i t i c a l context,
c o n t e x t , Asif
A s i f AliA l i Zardari,
Z a rd a ri,
31
while
w h i l e invoking
i n v o k i n g his h i s agency,
a g e n c y , held h e ld M Musharraf
u s h a r r a f responsible
r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r his
h is w wife’s
i f e ’ s death.
d e a th .31
Moreover, he started exposing the political role of the military.
M o r e o v e r , h e s ta r te d e x p o s in g th e p o litic a l r o le o f th e m ilita r y . I n th is r e s p e c t, h is In this respect, his
video-conference
v id e o -c o n fe re n c e w with
i t h an a n Indian
I n d i a n jjournalist
o u r n a l i s t in i n November
N o v e m b e r 2008, 2 0 0 8 , where
w h e r e he h e vowed
vow ed
32
to curtail the military role in the country’s foreign
to c u r ta il th e m ilita r y r o le i n th e c o u n t r y ’s f o r e i g n p o lic y , is a c a s e i n p o in t.32 policy, is a case in point.
Moreover, he met with his counterpart, President Hamid
M o r e o v e r , h e m e t w ith h is c o u n te r p a r t, P r e s id e n t H a m id K a r z a i, in K a b u l in J a n u ­ Karzai, in Kabul in Janu-
ary
a r y 2009,
2009, w where
h e r e the
t h e two
t w o sidess i d e s reflected
r e f l e c t e d willingness
w i l l i n g n e s s to t o enhance
enhance b bilateral
i l a t e r a l coopera-
c o o p e ra­
33
ttion
i o n fforo r counterterrorism.
c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m .3 3 Importantly,
I m p o r t a n t l y , withinw ith in a a ffew e w months,
m o n th s, b both
o t h Zardari
Z a r d a r i and and
K a r z a i h a d a d e t a i l e d m e e t i n g w i t h t h e t h e n U S P r e s i d e n t B a r a c k O b a m a i n tthe
Karzai had a detailed meeting with the then US President Barack Obama in he
34
White
W h i t e HouseH ouse w where
h e re p peace
eace p prospects
r o s p e c t s in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n were w e r e discussed
d i s c u s s e d ttrilaterally.
r i l a t e r a l l y .3 4
Noticeably, President Zardari seemed to have reflected his
N o tic e a b ly , P r e s id e n t Z a r d a r i s e e m e d to h a v e r e f le c te d h is in te r e s t in , i f n o t c o n ­ interest in, if not con-
ttrol
r o l over,
o v e r, P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y tthrough
h r o u g h such such v visits
i s i t s and
a n d meetings
m e e tin g s w with i t h regional
re g io n a l
and
a n d g l o b a l l e a d e r s w h i c h s e e m i n g l y p r e f e r r e d c i v i l i a n t h a n m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p of
global leaders which seemingly preferred civilian than military leadership of
PPakistan
a k i s t a n ini n tthe
h e post-Musharraf
p o s t- M u s h a r r a f p period.
e rio d .
Little
L ittle w wonder
o n d e r that
t h a t the
t h e American
A m e r i c a n military
m i l i t a r y and a n d civilian
c i v i l i a n officials
o f f i c i a l s including
i n c l u d i n g Presi- P r e s i­
dent Obama strongly urged, in various policy pronouncements,
d e n t O b a m a s tr o n g ly u r g e d , in v a r io u s p o lic y p r o n o u n c e m e n ts , th e P a k is ta n i the Pakistani
military
m i l i t a r y to t o “do
“ d o more”
m o r e ” in i n the
t h e global
g l o b a l “war
“ w a r on o n terror.”
t e r r o r .” Contextually,
C o n t e x t u a l l y , the t h e Enhanced
E nhanced
PPartnership
a r tn e r s h ip w withith P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Act A c t of o f 2009
2009 — ─w whichh i c h is i s commonly
c o m m o n l y called c a l l e d tthe he K Kerry–
e rry -
L u g a r - B e r m a n A c t — w a s e n a c t e d w h i c h c o m m i t t e d t o p r o v i d e 7 . 5 b i l l i o n U S $ in
Lugar-Berman Act ─ was enacted which committed to provide 7.5 billion US$ in
non-military
n o n - m i l i t a r y aid a i d tto o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n over over a a 5-year
5 - y e a r period.
p e rio d .

The
T h e Kerry–Lugar-[Berman]
K e r r y - L u g a r - [ B e r m a n ] law la w w was a s made
m a d e ttoo pressurise
p r e s s u r i s e theth e P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i army
a rm y
[military]
[ m i l i t a r y ] t o d e l i v e r m o r e f o r t h e U S i n i t s w a r a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s t outfits
to deliver more for the US in its war against terrorist o u t f i t s in
in
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n .. .. .. It I t obviously
o b v i o u s l y rreflected
e f l e c t e d the
t h e mistrust
m is tr u s t b between
e t w e e n [the]
[th e ] U US S and and
Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . The
T h e Obama
O b a m a Administration
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n wanted
w a n t e d tot o directly
d i r e c t l y communicate
c o m m u n i c a t e with w ith
[President]
[ P r e s i d e n t ] Z a r d a r i a n d t h e c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h w a s c o n t r o l l e d bby
Zardari and the civil government which was controlled y him,
h im ,
regarding
r e g a r d i n g AfPak
A f P a k [Afghanistan-Pakistan]
[A fg h a n ista n -P a k ista n ] w where
h e r e thet h e military
m i l i t a r y remained
r e m a i n e d on o n theth e
fforefront
o r e f r o n t ofo f [foreign]
[fo re ig n ] p policy
o l i c y making
m a k i n g .. .. .. TheT h e military
m i l i t a r y was w a s ttargeted
a r g e t e d bby y cur-c u r­
ttailing
a i l i n g tthe
h e military
m i l i t a r y aid
a i d .. .. .. and
a n d Zardari
Z a r d a r i had
had a a role
r o l e ini n tthis
h i s [respect].
[re sp e c t]. H Hee had had
visited
v i s i t e d A f g h a n i s t a n a n d t h e U S a n d d e v e l o p e d p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h people
Afghanistan and the US and developed personal relations with p e o p le
35
in
i n power
p o w e r over
o v e r there.
t h e r e .3 5

The
T h e Kerry–Lugar-Berman
K e r r y - L u g a r - B e r m a n Act
A ct bbecame
ecam e a a ttalk
a l k of
o f tthe
h e town
t o w n in in PPakistan.
a k i s t a n . The
T h e major-
m a jo r­
ity of the media houses termed it anti-military. The political opposition
ity o f th e m e d ia h o u s e s te r m e d it a n ti- m ilita r y . T h e p o litic a l o p p o s itio n m a lig n e d maligned
tthe
h e civil
c i v i l government
g o v e r n m e n t ffor
o r harming Pakistan’s
h a r m in g P a k i s t a n ’ s interests
i n t e r e s t s tthrough
h r o u g h such
s u c h legislation.
le g is la tio n .
70 Ejaz Hussain
The
T h e popular
p o p u l a r opinion
o p i n i o n seemed
s e e m e d divided
d i v i d e d too.
t o o . Nonetheless,
N o n e t h e l e s s , Zardari
Z a r d a r i and
a n d associates
a s s o c ia te s
took it differently.
to o k it d iffe re n tly .

They
T h e y vviewedi e w e d it
i t solely
s o l e l y as
a s an
a n acta c t of
o f tthe
h e Obama
O b a m a Administration
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n tot o ffulfill
u l f i l l the
th e
American
A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s i n t h e [ S o u t h A s i a n ] r e g i o n . . . P a k i s t a n i poli-
strategic objectives in the [South Asian] region . . . Pakistani p o li­
ticians
t i c i a n s cannot
c a n n o t influence
in f lu e n c e p policy
o l i c y making
m a k i n g in
i n tthe
h e USU S which
w h i c h isi s regarded
r e g a r d e d as a s the
th e
superpower of the day. However, since the law favoured civilian
s u p e rp o w e r o f th e d a y . H o w e v e r, s in c e th e la w fa v o u re d c iv ilia n e c o n o m ic economic
assistance
a s s i s t a n c e and
a n d democracy,
d e m o c r a c y , itit p provided
r o v i d e d the
t h e pretext
p r e t e x t to
t o anti-PPP
a n ti-P P P p parties
a r t i e s andand
36
media groups to malign it for ulterior motives.
m e d ia g r o u p s to m a lig n it f o r u lte r io r m o tiv e s .36

On
O n his h i s part,
p a rt, P President
r e s id e n t Z Zardari
a r d a r i projected
p r o j e c t e d himself
h i m s e l f as as a a democrat,
d e m o c ra t, w working
o r k i n g ffor o r the
th e
larger
l a r g e r i n t e r e s t o f t h e c o u n t r y , a n d n o t p u r s u i n g p e r s o n a l g o a l s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , he
interest of the country, and not pursuing personal goals. In this respect, he
often
o f t e n cited
c i t e d the
t h e repeal
r e p e a l of o f the
t h e infamous
i n f a m o u s Article
A r t i c l e 58(2)(b)
5 8 ( 2 ) ( b ) of o f thet h e 1973
1 9 7 3 Constitution
C o n s titu tio n
by
b y the
t h e parliament
p a r l i a m e n t in i n 2010,
2010, w whichh i c h reduced
r e d u c e d tthe h e presidential
p r e s id e n tia l p powers
o w e r s including
i n c l u d i n g theth e
37
appointment
a p p o i n t m e n t o f s e r v i c e c h i e f s . 3 7 T h e p a s s a g e o f t h e 1 8 t h C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Amend-
of service chiefs. The passage of the 18th Constitutional A m end­
ment
m e n t sent sent a a strategic
s t r a t e g i c signal
s i g n a l tto o the
t h e military
m i l i t a r y thatt h a t its i t s role
r o l e ini n politics
p o l i t i c s is
i s not
n o t needed.
needed.
The
T h e P P P a n d t h e P M L - N w e r e o n t h e s a m e p a g e d e s p i t e t h e i r p o l i t i c a l differ-
PPP and the PML-N were on the same page despite their political d iffe r­
ences
e n c e s in i n ttheh e past.
p a s t . TheT h e military
m i l i t a r y leadership
l e a d e r s h i p tookt o o k it i t seriously
s e r io u s ly b but u t did
d i d not
n o t express
e x p r e s s its
its
resentment
r e s e n t m e n t in in a a reactive
r e a c t i v e manner.
m a n n e r . Rather
R a t h e r under
u n d e r [those]
[th o s e ] p peculiar
e c u l i a r circumstances,
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the th e
institution
i n s t i t u t i o n preferred
p r e f e r r e d tto o focus
f o c u s on o n other
o t h e r tthings
h i n g s such s u c h as a s governance
g o v e r n a n c e and a n d mitigating
m itig a tin g
38
security
s e c u r i t y challenges
c h a l l e n g e s emanating
e m a n a t i n g ffrom r o m the t h e Western
W e s te r n b border
o rd e r w with i t h Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .38
As
A s f a r a s t h e s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s w e r e c o n c e r n e d , t h e c i v i l g o v e r n m e n t a n d the
far as the security matters were concerned, the civil government and th e
military
m i l i t a r y had had a a different
d i f f e r e n t vvision
i s i o n to t o counter
c o u n t e r insurgency
i n s u r g e n c y in i n thet h e fformer
o rm er F Federally
e d e ra lly
39
Administered
A d m i n i s t e r e d Tribal T r i b a l Area
A r e a (FATA).
( F A T A ) .3 9 However,
H o w e v e r , given g i v e n ttensed
e n s e d relations
r e la tio n s b between
e t w e e n theth e
government and the military, and in a bid to internationally
g o v e r n m e n t a n d th e m ilita ry , a n d in a b id to in te r n a tio n a lly b e s e e n a s a p be seen as a pro-peace
ro -p e a c e
party,
p a r t y , thet h e PPPP P P opted,o p t e d , tthough
h o u g h reluctantly,
r e l u c t a n t l y , tto o cooperate
c o o p e r a t e with w i t h tthe h e military
m i l i t a r y in i n tthis
h is
40
respect. Importantly, to further appease the institution, the
r e s p e c t.40 I m p o r ta n tly , to f u r th e r a p p e a s e th e in s titu tio n , th e g o v e r n m e n t e x te n d e d government extended
41
the
t h e ttenure
e n u r e of o f General
G e n e r a l Kayani
K a y a n i as a s COAS
C O A S tthe h e sames a m e yyear. e a r .41
H o w e v e r , b e f o r e t h e P P P g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d f o c u s o n its
However, before the PPP government could focus on i t s development
d e v e l o p m e n t agenda,a g e n d a , itit
tussled
t u s s l e d a g a i n w i t h t h e K a y a n i - l e d m i l i t a r y o v e r t h e f a l l o u t o f t h e A b b o t t a b a d Oper-
again with the Kayani-led military over the fallout of the Abbottabad O p e r­
42
ation
a t i o n tthat
hat k killed
i l l e d Osama
O sam a b bin in L Laden
a d e n on on 2 2 M May a y 2011.2 0 1 1 . 4 2 Contextually,
C o n t e x t u a l l y , tthe h e (in)famous
(in )fa m o u s
43
Memogate
M e m o g a t e s c a n d a l 4 3 s u r f a c e d w h i c h w i d e n e d t h e c h a s m b e t w e e n t h e government
scandal surfaced which widened the chasm between the g o v e rn m e n t
and
a n d the t h e military.
m i l i t a r y . The T h e latter
l a t t e r held
h e l d that
th a t P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s ambassador
a m b a s s a d o r to t o tthe
he U United
n i t e d States,
S ta te s ,
Husain
H u s a i n H a q q a n i w h o w a s a P P P m a n , w r o t e t h e m e m o t o t h e O b a m a Administra-
Haqqani who was a PPP man, wrote the memo to the Obama A d m in is tr a ­
tion
t i o n tto o rescue
r e s c u e the t h e civil
c i v i l government
g o v e r n m e n t against a g a in s t a a looming
l o o m i n g coup. c o u p . The T h e government,
g o v e r n m e n t , on on
its
i t s p a r t , p o s i t e d t h a t i t w a s e n g u l f e d i n t h e c r i s i s b y M a n s o o r I j a z w h o m the
part, posited that it was engulfed in the crisis by Mansoor Ijaz whom t h e fformer
o rm e r
termed
t e r m e d as a s anti-Zardari.
a n t i - Z a r d a r i . The T h e matter
m a tte r w wasa s ttaken
a k e n to t o tthe h e Supreme
S u p r e m e Court C o u r t bby y Zardari’s
Z a r d a r i ’s
archrival,
a r c h r i v a l , N a w a z S h a r i f . C o n s e q u e n t l y , o n 1 2 J u n e 2 0 1 2 , t h e M e m o g a t e Commis-
Nawaz Sharif. Consequently, on 12 June 2012, the Memogate C o m m is­
sion
s i o n submitted
s u b m i t t e d its i t s report
r e p o r t tto o tthe
h e Supreme
S u p r e m e Court,C o u r t , holdingh o l d i n g Haqqani
H a q q a n i responsible
r e s p o n s i b l e ffor or
44
authoring
a u t h o r i n g t h e m e m o . 4 4 T h o u g h t h e Z a r d a r i t e a m s u r v i v e d t h e M e m o g a t e scandal,
the memo. Though the Zardari team survived the Memogate s c a n d a l,
it
i t surely
s u r e l y exposed
e x p o s e d its its w weaknesses
e a k n e s s e s bboth o th p politically
o l i t i c a l l y and a n d institutionally.
in s titu tio n a lly . F Foro r instance
in s ta n c e
the
t h e j u d i c i a r y a n d , t o a n e x t e n t t h e m i l i t a r y , p r e f e r e n c e s s t a r t e d p r e v a i l i n g vvis-à-vis
judiciary and, to an extent the military, preferences started prevailing is-a -v is
governance
g o v e r n a n c e and a n d security.
s e c u rity .
Two
T w o other o t h e r issues,
i s s u e s , in i n 2011,
2 0 1 1 , ttoo o o preoccupied
p r e o c c u p i e d the t h e civil
c i v i l government
g o v e r n m e n t and a n d thet h e mili-
m ili­
tary domestically and internationally. First being,
ta r y d o m e s tic a lly a n d in te r n a tio n a lly . F ir s t b e in g , in J a n u a ry 2 0 1 1 , R a y m o n d in January 2011, Raymond
 Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 71
Davis, an American official, shot two Pakistanis dead in Lahore. The incident
went viral extra-regionally. Raymond was arrested and remanded by the police on
the instructions of local courts. Initially, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani and
the Interior Minister Rehman Malik doubted Raymond enjoyed diplomatic immu-
nity. On its part, the US government through its embassy in Islamabad claimed the
accused held diplomatic protection. The matter further reflected on the disturbed
ties, on the one hand, between the Pakistani military and the United States and, on
the other, between the two countries despite civil government’s’ efforts to keep it
warm. Nonetheless, with the involvement of high-level US officials including the
Secretary of State who urged the Pakistani military to play its part, the matter was
resolved through negotiations in terms of payment of blood money of 2.3 million
US$ to the deceased’s families.45
The second issue occurred on 26 November 2011 at Salala, a Pakistani army
check post on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border where 24 security personnel were
killed and 12 injured in a US-led NATO attack. “This is an attack on Pakistan’s
territorial sovereignty,” said the governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.46 The incident
worsened US–-Pakistan relations which already stood at its lowest ebb in recent
history. The Pakistani military, while invoking its agency, prevailed over the civil-
ian actors including the civil government and ensured an end to NATO supply
lines to Afghanistan that passed through Pakistan.
If US–Pakistan relations were off the hook, China–Pakistan relations remained
on the track. President Zardari paid multiple visits to China in his 5-year tenure.
From the Chinese side, Premier Li Keqiang visited Pakistan in May 2013, when
the Zardari-led government was about to complete its tenure.47 China–Pakistan
relations have realised “factors of durability” over the seven decades.48 The con-
temporary warmth in bilateral relations was witnessed under Pervez Musharraf
and carried over by Zardari in tandem with the military leadership since unlike
US–Pakistan relations, there was no irritants involved in Islamabad–Beijing rela-
tions. Thus, both the sides signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to
enhance bilateral trade and strategic cooperation.49 Besides, Pakistan’s relations
with key Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates remained
stable where civil and military leadership paid official visits. Indeed, Pakistan–
Saudi relations are defence-oriented, where the wide-ranging role of the Pakistani
military is manifested through close defence cooperation.50 However, Pakistan–
Iran relations during this period gained some limelight with visits of President
Zardari to resume discussions on the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline. Operationally,
however, the two countries could not get over mutual misgivings grounded in
strategic mistrust.51
In a nutshell, though the Zardari-led political dispensation tried to control the
country’s foreign policies towards India, Iran, Afghanistan, and, above all, the
United States, the military’s powerful position could not be replaced with civilian
decision-making. Indeed, being weaker politically and administratively, the civil
government opted to appease the military in the matters of foreign policy too.
After the PPP tenure was completed, an interim government run the government
affairs including the conduct of general election held in May 2013. Resultantly,
72 Ejaz Hussain
the PML-N formed government in the Centre and Punjab. Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI), the political party of cricket-turned-politician Imran Khan, could only
form provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The PPP was relegated to
Sindh only ─ and it formed a coalition government in Balochistan much later.52
The following section analyses Pakistan’s foreign policy during 2013–18 with a
focus on the military in terms of assessing its role in the making and implementa-
tion of foreign policy.

The Military and Foreign Policy During 2013–2018

Nawaz Sharif, for the third time, assumed the office of prime minister of Pakistan
in June 2013. As per his governance style of the 1990s, Sharif acted confidently
and smartly vis-à-vis the military. He, on the one hand, desired to control the
military and, on the other, treated it in a way that reflects non-interference in
the military’s internal matters. Empirically, then, in the context of India–Pakistan
skirmishes at the Line of Control (LoC) since early 2013, Sharif did not disagree
with the military’s old idea of establishing a national security council. Unsurpris-
ingly, the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) was established in
August 2013.53 Interestingly, in the past, both the PPP and the PML-N confronted
such proposals.
On the other hand, however, Prime Minister Sharif kept the portfolio of foreign
minister with himself in order to operationalise his foreign policy ideas. For exam-
ple, during his previous slots as prime minister, he attempted to make peace with
India despite the military’s disapproval. Such a mindset was expressly manifested
during Sharif’s participation in the inaugural ceremony of India’s newly elected
right-wing politician, Narendra Modi. “The military certainly did not like the idea
of appeasing India which has fought with Pakistan, and confronted the country
diplomatically and economically, for example, in recent years in Afghanistan.”54
Arguably, Sharif desired to commercially normalise Pakistan’s relations with
India for a number of factors. First, being a businessman, trade linkage with a
neighbouring country, which is less than 30 kilometers from Sharif’s business
center located in and around Lahore, looked rational. Second, trade relations as
such provide business and investment incentives to other stakeholders too, includ-
ing the military.55 Third, since the prime minister intended not to organisation-
ally meddle with the military, the latter was not expected to outmaneuver the
civil government through, for example, threat of a coup. Moreover, to win over
the military’s trust for ensuring his political survival, Nawaz Sharif along with
other parliamentarians legislated the military courts for counterterrorism in Janu-
ary 2015. Moreover, under the National Action Plan (NAP), apex committees,
which included top representatives from the civil–military divide, were estab-
lished which institutionally enhanced the military’s role in governance.56
As regards Pakistan’s relations with China, the latter’s President Xi Jinping paid
an extraordinary visit to Pakistan in April 2015 where the two countries signed
the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).57 The CPEC is part of China’s
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Regarding CPEC’s concept, the civil and military
 Military
M i l i t a r y and Foreign
and F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y in Pakistan
in P 73
a k i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
73

leadership
l e a d e r s h i p were w e r e on o n tthe h e sames a m e page p a g e since
s i n c e China
C h i n a is i s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s strategic
s t r a t e g i c partner.
p a r tn e r .
However,
H o w e v e r , a s f a r a s C P E C ’ s e c o n o m i c a n d s e c u r i t y d i m e n s i o n s were
as far as CPEC’s economic and security dimensions w e r e concerned,
c o n c e rn ed ,
their
t h e i r choices
c h o i c e s diverged.
d i v e r g e d . The T h e fformer
o r m e r desired
d e s i r e d tto o deploy
d e p l o y civil
c i v i l law
l a w enforcement
e n f o r c e m e n t insti- in s ti­
tutions
t u t i o n s s u c h a s t h e p o l i c e t o e n s u r e l a w a n d o r d e r i n t h e r e g i o n s which
such as the police to ensure law and order in the regions w h i c h hostedh o s te d
different
d i f f e r e n t CPEC
C P E C projects
p ro je c ts w whereas
h e r e a s the t h e latter
l a t t e r opposed
o p p o s e d such such a a strategy,
s t r a t e g y , given
g i v e n tterror-
e rro r­
ism
i s m i n c i d e n c e s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n B a l o c h i s t a n a n d , h e n c e , p r e f e r r e d m i l i t a r y security
incidences particularly in Balochistan and, hence, preferred military s e c u rity
for
f o r ttheh e CPEC.
C P E C . Nonetheless,
N o n e t h e l e s s , tthe h e military
m i l i t a r y agency
a g e n c y prevailed
p r e v a i l e d in i n strategic
s t r a t e g i c interaction
in te r a c tio n
with
w i t h t h e c i v i l i a n s , a n d t h e f e d e r a l a n d p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n m e n t s agreed
the civilians, and the federal and provincial governments a g r e e d to t o accord
a c c o r d an an
58
institutional role to the military along with civil
in s titu tio n a l r o le to th e m ilita r y a lo n g w ith c iv il la w e n f o r c e m e n t.58 law enforcement.
China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n relations
r e l a t i o n s were
w e r e consolidated
c o n s o l i d a t e d bby y ttheh e military
m i l i t a r y in i n thet h e 1960s.
1 9 6 0 s . The The
relations
r e l a t i o n s w e r e n o u r i s h e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e s w i t h m i l i t a r y ’s input
were nourished in the subsequent decades with military’s i n p u t and and
efforts.
e f f o r t s . When
W h e n tthe he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s ditched
d i t c h e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n in i n thet h e Cold
C o l d War W a r and a n d later
l a t e r ini n the
th e
1990s,
1 9 9 0 s , it it wwas a s China
C h i n a tthat h a t helped
h e l p e d Pakistan
P a k ista n w withi t h military
m i l i t a r y hardware
h a r d w a r e and a n d economic
e c o n o m ic
assistance
a s s i s t a n c e .. .. .. ChinaC h i n a is i s ana n emerging
e m e r g i n g [super][su p er] p power.
o w e r . Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s part
p a r t of o f China’s
C h in a ’s
OBOR
O B O R [ O n e B e l t , O n e R o a d ] t h r o u g h C P E C . I t s s e c u r i t y c a n o n l y b e e n s u r e d bby
[One Belt, One Road] through CPEC. Its security can only be ensured y
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s armeda r m e d fforces
o r c e s since
s i n c e CPECC P E C bboarderso a rd e rs w with
i t h Afghanistan,
A f g h a n is ta n , w which
h i c h is is u unsta-
n s ta ­
bblel e .. .. .. [And]
[ A n d ] IranI r a n isi s suspicious
s u s p i c i o u s of o f CPEC
C P E C due d u e tto o its
i t s Chabahar
C habahar P Porto r t project
p ro je c t w where
h e re
India
I n d i a hash a s invested
i n v e s t e d ttoo.o o . 59
59
What
W h a t can c a n bbe e posited
p o s i t e d in i n vview
i e w of o f the
t h e aforementioned
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d is i s that
t h a t tthe
h e military
m i l i t a r y assumes
a ssu m e s
itself
i t s e l f a s a m a j o r s t a k e h o l d e r a s f a r P a k i s t a n ’s f o r e i g n p o l i c y is
as a major stakeholder as far Pakistan’s foreign policy i s concerned.
c o n c e r n e d . It, It,
thus,
t h u s , distrusts
d i s t r u s t s ttheh e civil
c i v i l government(s)
g o v e r n m e n t ( s ) normalising
n o rm a lisin g w withi t h India
I n d i a and/or
a n d / o r Afghani-
A f g h a n i­
stan
s t a n andand p pursuing
u r s u i n g ttiesi e s with,
w i t h , forf o r example,
e x a m p l e , the th e U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s whenw h e n the t h e institution
in s titu tio n
thinks
t h i n k s o t h e r w i s e . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , P r i m e M i n i s t e r N a w a z S h a r i f t h o u g h visited
otherwise. Interestingly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif though v i s i t e d the
th e
United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s multiple
m u l t i p l e times
t i m e s during
d u r i n g 2013–2017
2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 7 could c o u l d not n o t ensure
e n su re a a b breakthrough
r e a k th r o u g h
60
in
i n the
t h e tensed
t e n s e d US–Pakistan
U S - P a k i s t a n relations.
r e l a t i o n s . 6 0 To
T o the t h e contrary,
c o n tra ry , a a w week-long
e e k - lo n g v visit
i s i t of
o f COAS
COAS
General
G e n e r a l R a h e e l S h a r i f t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 5 m e l t e d tthe
Raheel Sharif to the United States in November 2015 melted h e ice,
ic e ,
and
a n d tthe h e twot w o sides
s i d e s reassured
r e a s s u r e d bbilateral
i l a t e r a l confidence
c o n f i d e n c e and a n d cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n especially
e s p e c i a l l y over over
61
Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .61
Similarly,
S i m i l a r l y , tthough
h o u g h SharifS h a r i f enjoyed
e n j o y e d closec lo s e p personal
e r s o n a l relations
r e la tio n s w with i t h tthe h e Saudi
S a u d i mon- m on-
archs,
a r c h s , i t w a s t h e R a h e e l - l e d m i l i t a r y w h i c h d e c i d e d o n t h e k e y a r e a s of
it was the Raheel-led military which decided on the key areas o f bbilateral
ila te r a l
engagement.
e n g a g e m e n t. H Here,
e r e , iti t bbecomes
e c o m e s pertinent
p e r t i n e n t to t o mention
m e n tio n P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s disagreement
d i s a g r e e m e n t with w ith
Saudi Arabia over the
S a u d i A ra b ia o v e r th e Y e m e n w a r.Yemen war.

Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s armed
a r m e d forces were
fo rc e s w e r e already
a l r e a d y deployed
d e p l o y e d on
o n its
i t s Western
W e s t e r n bborder.
o r d e r . From
F ro m a
a
military
m i l i t a r y perspective,
p e r s p e c t i v e , iti t was
w a s notn o t in
in a
a p position
o s i t i o n tot o fight
f i g h t another
a n o th e r wwara r and,
a n d , that
t h a t ttoo,
oo,
outside
o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y . M o r e o v e r , s i n c e 9 / 1 1 P a k i s t a n i s i n c r e m e n t a l l y improv-
the country. Moreover, since 9/11 Pakistan is incrementally im p ro v ­
ing
i n g itsi t s [defense]
[ d e f e n s e ] ties
t i e s with
w i t h Turkey
T u r k e y .. .. .. IranI r a n is i s also
a l s o another
a n o t h e r kkey
e y country
c o u n t r y in
in
tthe
h e rregion.
e g i o n . ByB y fighting
f i g h t i n g fforeign
o re ig n w wars,
a r s , we
w e will w i l l only
o n l y make
m a k e more
m o r e enemies
e n e m i e s tthan
han
ffriends.
r i e n d s . [However],
[ H o w e v e r ] , despite
d e s p i t e lowering
l o w e r i n g ofo f relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h the
t h e Saudis
S a u d i s and
a n d tthehe
62
Emiratis in that context, military-to- military ties remained intact.
E m i r a t i s i n t h a t c o n t e x t , m i l i t a r y - t o - m i l i t a r y t i e s r e m a i n e d i n t a c t .6 2

The
T h e fforegoing
o r e g o i n g reflects
r e f l e c t s vvividly
i v i d l y on
o n tthe
h e military
m i l i t a r y agency
a g e n c y and
a n d institutional
i n s t i t u t i o n a l ration-
r a tio n ­
ality
a l i t y a s f a r P a k i s t a n ’ s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s c o n c e r n e d . T h e n o n - m i l i t a r y intuitions
as far Pakistan’s foreign policy is concerned. The non-military in tu itio n s
including
i n c l u d i n g the
t h e Foreign
F o r e i g n Office
O f f i c e could
c o u l d not
n o t invoke
i n v o k e its i t s agencies
a g e n c i e s and
a n d ffailed
a i l e d ttoo device
d e v ic e
any
a n y s t r a t e g y t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e m i l i t a r y a g e n c y . R a t h e r t h a n n e u t r a l i s i n g the
strategy to counterbalance military agency. Rather than neutralising th e
74 Ejaz Hussain
military’s influence in foreign policy as Nawaz Sharif reflected in his initial days,
he remained in hot waters on account of Dawn Leak and Panama Papers.63 These
episodes destroyed the little bit trust the military might have in his person. After
all, he was able to survive as a person and family in the 1999 coup when he
secretly negotiated his exit from Pakistan to Riyadh, and later, to London.
Moreover, his peace overtures to India further antagonized the institution. Thus,
without a coup which Sharif tried to prevent through appeasement as discussed
earlier, he was dismissed from office on charges of moral misconduct through a
judicial verdict in 2016.64 His political pick, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, became the
premier to complete the PML-N’s tenure in office. In the following section, the
military and foreign policies are analysed in the current context (2018-present),
conceptually and empirically.

The Military and Foreign Policy in the Current Context

General elections were held in Pakistan in July 2018. Resultantly, Imran Khan’s
PTI formed a simple-majority government in the Centre, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
and Punjab. In Balochistan, the PTI made a coalition government with the Balo-
chistan Awami Party (BAP). However, in Sindh, Pakistan People’s Party formed
the government with a simple majority. Khan, through his various statements and
actions in office, generated an impression of his being on the same page with the
military on politics and foreign policy.65 As far as foreign policy is concerned, the
civil–military leadership is apparently on the same page. However, the Bajwa-led
military took the lead, as will be analysed in this section, to determine the con-
tours of Pakistan’s foreign affairs towards, for example, China, Turkey, England,
Saudi Arabia, and, above all, the United States.
To begin with, an economic element was added into China–Pakistan relations
through CPEC. However, the Khan government initially fumbled at managing
foreign policy with Beijing. On 10 September 2018, the Financial Times (Lon-
don) published a report on CPEC in which Razak Dawood, advisor for commerce
and investment to the federal government, quoted to having said that the:

[C]hinese companies received tax breaks, many breaks and have an undue
advantage in Pakistan; this is one of the things we’re looking at because it’s
not fair that Pakistan companies should be disadvantaged . . . I think we
should put everything on hold for a year so we can get our act together . . .
Perhaps we can stretch CPEC out over another five years or so.66

The aforementioned statement impacted China–Pakistan relations vis-à-vis

CPEC in the short run. Dawood would have expressed his opinion for political
point-scoring by criticising the PML-N, which is archrival of the PTI. Nonethe-
less, the anti-CPEC/BRI lobbies, from within the region and beyond, twisted it
to suit their own designs. Contextually, the Khan government engaged with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), too, for obtaining loans. Such anti-BRI lob-
bies, while relying on conspiracy theories, hinted at the deteriorating effects of
 Military
M i l i t a r y and Foreign
and F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y in Pakistan
in P 75
a k i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
75

CPEC
C P E C ffor o r socioeconomic
s o c i o e c o n o m i c development d e v e l o p m e n t in i n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n and,
a n d , instead,
i n s t e a d , projected
p r o j e c t e d tthe he
rosy
r o s y r o l e o f t h e I M F w h o s e b a i l o u t p a c k a g e s w e r e c o n d i t i o n a l t o the
role of the IMF whose bailout packages were conditional to th e U US S sup-
sup-
67
port.
p o r t . 6 7 In I n other
o th e r w words,
o r d s , such
such v voices
o ic e s p predicted
re d ic te d a a fallout
f a l l o u t in
i n China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n relations r e la tio n s
and further improvement in US–Pakistan
a n d f u r th e r im p r o v e m e n t in U S - P a k is ta n r e la tio n s . relations.
On
O n its i t s part,
p a r t , tthe h e Chinese
C h i n e s e side s i d e wouldw o u l d have have b been
e e n resentful
r e s e n t f u l due d u e tto o ttheh e factf a c t tthat
hat
Dawood’s
D a w o o d ’ s c r i t i c a l t a k e o n C P E C a f f e c t e d t h e B R I n e g a t i v e l y . A s a c r u c i a l com-
critical take on CPEC affected the BRI negatively. As a crucial com ­
ponent
p o n e n t of o f ttheh e BRI B R I framework,
f r a m e w o r k , CPEC C P E C carried c a r r i e d high
h ig h v value
a l u e economically
e c o n o m i c a l l y as a s well
w e l l asas
discursively. Any public displeasure on CPEC would
d is c u r s iv e ly . A n y p u b lic d is p le a s u r e o n C P E C w o u ld m e a n a c r itic is m o f th e B mean a criticism of the Belt
e lt
and
a n d RoadR o a d Initiative
I n i t i a t i v e ffor o r China.
C h i n a . For F o r damage
d a m a g e control,
c o n t r o l , COAS
C O A S General G e n e r a l Qamar Q a m a r Javed Javed
Bajwa
B a j w a p a i d a v i s i t t o C h i n a t o d i f f u s e a n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n one
paid a visit to China to diffuse any misunderstanding within o n e weekw e e k of of
the
t h e saids a i d statement.
s ta te m e n t. L Later
a t e r in i n the
t h e yyear, e a r , Prime
P r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r Imran
I m r a n Khan K h a n himselfh i m s e l f met m et
with
w i t h tthe h e Chinese
C h i n e s e authorities
a u t h o r i t i e s and a n d tried t r i e d tto o clear
c l e a r away
a w a y any a n y negativity
n e g a t i v i t y generated
g e n e r a t e d in in
the
t h e p r e c e d i n g m o n t h s . M o r e o v e r , K h a n v i s i t e d C h i n a f o r t w o m o r e ttimes,
preceding months. Moreover, Khan visited China for two more i m e s , thus,
th u s ,
bbuilding
u i l d i n g on o n mutual
m u t u a l confidence,
c o n f i d e n c e , economice c o n o m i c cooperation,
c o o p e r a t i o n , and a n d strategic
s tr a te g ic p partnership
a rtn e rs h ip
68
b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s .6 8 O n i t s p a r t , t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p h a s b e e n interact-
between the two countries. On its part, the military leadership has been i n t e r a c t­
ing
in g w withi t h its
i t s Chinese
C h i n e s e counterpart
c o u n t e r p a r t regularly.
r e g u l a r l y . TheT h e former,
f o r m e r , while
w h i l e marking
m a r k i n g its i t s agency,
agency,
has
h a s attained
a t t a i n e d an a n institutional
i n s t i t u t i o n a l roler o l e in i n CPEC
C P E C throught h r o u g h tthe h e establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o f CPEC
CPEC
Authority
A u t h o r i t y bby y theth e K Khanh a n government
g o v e r n m e n t in i n strategic
s t r a t e g i c collaboration
c o lla b o r a tio n w withi t h other
o t h e r civilian
c iv ilia n
69
stakeholders
s t a k e h o l d e r s including
i n c l u d i n g elements
e l e m e n t s of o f ttheh e PML-N
P M L - N and a n d ttheh e PPP.
P P P .6 9
As
A s f a r a s P a k i s t a n ’ s f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is
far as Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the United States i s concerned,
c o n c e r n e d , tthe he
Trump Administration pronounced to cut off military aid
T r u m p A d m i n i s t r a t i o n p r o n o u n c e d t o c u t o f f m i l i t a r y a i d f o r P a k i s t a n . 7 0 This for Pakistan. 70
T h i s might
m ig h t
have
h a v e shocked
s h o c k e d the t h e civil–military
c i v i l - m i l i t a r y leadership
l e a d e r s h i p in in P Pakistan.
a k is ta n . H However,
o w e v e r , if i f seen
s e e n globally,
g lo b a lly ,
this looked like a common feature of the US
th is lo o k e d lik e a c o m m o n f e a tu r e o f th e U S f o r e ig n p o lic y u n d e r T r u m p w foreign policy under Trump where
h e re
relations
r e l a t i o n s w i t h , f o r e x a m p l e , N A T O c o u n t r i e s w e r e a n t a g o n i s e d , t o o , o n a c c o u n t of
with, for example, NATO countries were antagonised, too, on account of
preferring
p r e f e r r i n g tthe h e American
A m e r i c a n interestsi n t e r e s t s above
a b o v e any a n y other
o t h e r considerations.
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . However,
H o w e v e r , since s in c e
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is is a a kkey e y stakeholder
s t a k e h o l d e r in i n ensuring
e n s u r i n g peace p e a c e and a n d stability
s t a b i l i t y in i n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , tthe he
U S o f f i c i a l s e n g a g e d w i t h t h e P a k i s t a n i a u t h o r i t i e s e s p e c i a l l y t h e military.
US officials engaged with the Pakistani authorities especially the m i l i t a r y . Little
L ittle
wonder
w o n d e r that t h a t in i n July
J u l y 2019,2 0 1 9 , COAS C O A S General G e n e r a l BajwaB a j w a accompanied
a c c o m p a n ie d P Prime
r i m e Minister
M in is te r
Khan
K h a n t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e f o r m e r m e t w i t h k e y o f f i c i a l s o f t h e T r u m p Admin-
to the United States. The former met with key officials of the Trump A d m in ­
istration
i s t r a t i o n anda n d discussed
d i s c u s s e d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n affairs a f f a i r s ata t length.
l e n g t h . Unsurprisingly,
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , then, t h e n , Paki-
P a k i­
71
stan
s t a n has
has b been
een a a key
k e y member
m e m b e r of o f thet h e quadrilateral
q u a d r i l a t e r a l group
g r o u p ono n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . 7 1 Since S i n c e theth e
United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s has h a s militarily
m ilita r ily w withdrawn
i t h d r a w n ffrom r o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n in i n September
S e p t e m b e r 2021, 2 0 2 1 , it it
urged Pakistan to work with the former to ensure a negotiated
u r g e d P a k is ta n to w o r k w ith th e f o r m e r to e n s u r e a n e g o tia te d s e ttle m e n t o f p o liti­ settlement of politi-
cal
c a l authority
a u t h o r i t y in i n Afghanistan
A fg h a n is ta n p post-withdrawal.
o s t - w i t h d r a w a l . Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , ffor o r its
i t s own
o w n interests,
in te r e s ts , w was as
72
in agreement with the United States
in a g r e e m e n t w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s in th is r e s p e c t.72 in this respect.
Besides
B e s i d e s the th e U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s and a n d China, C h i n a , another
a n o t h e r kkey e y country
c o u n t r y with w ith w whomhom b both
o th
the civil government and the military pursued warm
th e c iv il g o v e r n m e n t a n d th e m ilita r y p u r s u e d w a r m r e la tio n s w a s S a u d i A ra b ia . relations was Saudi Arabia.
Little
L i t t l e wonder
w o n d e r tthat h a t Crown
C r o w n Prince P r i n c e Mohammed
M oham m ed B Bin i n Salman
S a l m a n (MBS) (M B S ) w was a s accorded
a c c o rd e d
aa w warma r m w e l c o m e i n F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 9 . B o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s s i g n e d a n M o U to
welcome in February 2019. Both the countries signed an MoU t o pro-
p ro ­
mote
m o t e t r a d e a n d i n v e s t m e n t . T h e S a u d i s h i n t e d a t i n v e s t i n g a b o u t 2 0 b i l l i o n US$
trade and investment. The Saudis hinted at investing about 20 billion US$
73
in
i n Pakistan.
P a k is ta n .73 H However,
o w e v e r , situational
s i t u a t i o n a l shockss h o c k s jjolted
o l t e d ttheh e bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relations
r e l a t i o n s in i n recent
re c e n t
y e a r s . I n D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 9 , P r i m e M i n i s t e r K h a n w a s a b o u t t o t a k e p a r t in
years. In December 2019, Prime Minister Khan was about to take part in K Kuala
u a la
Lumpur Summit on the invitation of his Malaysian
L u m p u r S u m m it o n th e in v ita tio n o f h is M a la y s ia n c o u n te r p a r t, D r M a h a th ir counterpart, Dr Mahathir
Mohammad.
M o h a m m a d . Khan K han w was a s supposed
s u p p o s e d tto o sees e e Turkish
T u r k i s h President
P r e s i d e n t Recep
R e c e p TayyipT a y y i p Erdogan
E rd o g a n
who
w h o h a d r e g u l a r l y v i s i t e d P a k i s t a n i n t h e r e c e n t p a s t . H o w e v e r , a t eleventh
had regularly visited Pakistan in the recent past. However, at e l e v e n t h hour,h o u r,
76 Ejaz Hussain
Khan postponed his Malaysia visit to please MBS-led Saudi Arabia.74 Second, in
August 2020, Saudi Arabia, as per media reports, pressurised Pakistan to pay back
1 billion US$ Saudi loan on a short notice. Reactively, Pakistani Foreign Minister
Shah Mahmood Qureshi issued a sharply worded statement. He said,

I am once again respectfully telling the OIC that a meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers is our expectation. If you cannot convene it, then I’ll be
compelled to ask the PM [Prime Minister Imran Khan] to call a meeting of
the Islamic countries that are ready to stand with us on the issue of Kashmir
and support the oppressed Kashmiris.75

However, before bilateral relations were jeopardised, the military authorities

prevented it from further deterioration through institutional engagement with its
Saudi counterpart since military-to-military relations have been very cordial over
the decades. Importantly, COAS General Bajwa visited the Kingdom ahead of
Khan’s visit in May 2021.76 Arguably, this highlights military agency in shap-
ing Pakistan’s foreign policy even in the current context. In the aftermath of this
crucial visit of the COAS, a former general, Bilal Akbar, has been appointed as
Pakistan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia. This further reflects on the weak agency
of the civil government as well as civil bureaucracy, that is Foreign Office. Argu-
ably, even the role of foreign minister has been overshadowed by the portfolio of
National Security Advisor (NSA), currently held by Moeed Yusuf, who is argu-
ably more dynamic and carries the confidence of the military.
Last but not the least, under the Khan government, Pakistan’s relations with
India remained confrontational in character. Since India’s unilateral revocation
of Article 370 and 35A in August 2019, Kashmir issue has assumed centrality
in Pakistan’s extra-regional diplomacy.77 Since the country is constrained by
international obligations of, for example, Financial Action Task Force (FATF),
it is rationally avoiding a military solution.78 Besides, the current civil–military
leadership seems not in a mood to establish formal ties with Israel outrightly
despite the recent spree of Arab countries which established diplomatic relations
with Tel Aviv in 2020. Nonetheless, in order to counter India and its regional
allies, it is probable that the military may think of ways to engage with Israel
informally.79

Notes
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
7th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw-Hill
Education), 3–17.
2 Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no.
5 (2004): 33–58.
3 Aurel Croissant, “From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian Democra-
tization,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 156–78.
4 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019: A Concise History, 5th ed. (Kara-
chi: Oxford University Press, 2020), 12–16.
 Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 77
5 Humayun Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan: The Family History of Iskander Mirza,
the First President of Pakistan (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1999),
139–83.
6 Mirza, From Plassey to Pakistan, 219–38.
7 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1967), 118–85.
8 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 3rd ed. (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2021), 94–98.
9 Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23,
no. 4 (1999): 178–204.
10 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019, 256–58.
11 Ejaz Hussain, Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sam-
skriti, 2013), 290–328.
12 Alex Vatanka, Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence (New
York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd), 195–225.
13 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 218.
14 See Mushtaq Ahmad, “Kashmir in the United Nations,” Pakistan Horizon 4, no. 4
(1951): 217–32; Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Paki-
stani Fears and Interests,” Asian Survey 4, no. 3 (1964): 746–56; W. Norman Brown,
The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1972), 179–86; Rasul Bux Rais, China and Pakistan: A Political
Analysis of Mutual Relations (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1977), 21–40; Shirin
Tahir Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relation-
ship (New York: Prager Publishers, 1982), 1–26; M. S. Venkataramani, The American
Role in Pakistan: 1947–1958 (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), 64–90; Raghunath
Ram, “Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan: From Tashkent to Bangladesh War,” Interna-
tional Studies 23, no. 1 (1986): 39–62; Robert J. Mcmahon, “United States Cold War
Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954,” The
Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (1988): 812–40; S. M. Burke and Lawrence
Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 210–15; Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrate-
gic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993),
1–19; Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruc-
tion (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 2–22; Satyabrat Sinha, “The Strategic Tri-
angle: India-China-Pakistan,” China Report 40, no. 2 (2004): 221–25; A. Z. Hilali,
US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Burlington: Ashgate Pub-
lishing Company, 2005), 1–9; Ijaz Khan, “Pakistan’s Post September 11 2001 Afghan
Policy Shift: Impact on Pak-India-Afghan Geopolitics,” Journal of Asian and African
Studies 42, no. 5 (2007): 461–75; Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: Ameri-
ca’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 169–99; Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s
Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 77–86; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan
Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–25; Talat
Farooq, US-Pakistan Relations: Pakistan’s Strategic Choices in the 1990s (New York:
Routledge, 2016), 1–4; Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, vii, 9–19; see Sattar, Paki-
stan’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2019, xi, 17–18.
15 Feroz Ahmed, Aijaz Ahmad, and Eqbal Ahmad, “Pakistan, Bangladesh, India: 1970–
1973,” MERIP Reports 16 (1973): 6–11; Vladimir Moskalenko, “Pakistan’s Foreign
Policy,” Asian Survey 14, no. 3 (1974): 267–78; Iftikhar H. Malik, “The Afghanistan
Crisis and the Rediscovery of the Frontline State,” Asian Survey 42, no. 1 (2002): 204–12;
Rizwan Hussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan
(Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), 1–50.
78 Ejaz Hussain
16 Sudhansu Kumar Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications,
2005), 13–74.
17 S. A. M. Pasha, Islam in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Global Media Publica-
tions, 2005), 11–50.
18 Smruti S. Pattanaik, Elite Perceptions in Foreign Policy: Role of Print Media in Influ-
encing India-Pakistan Relations, 1989–1999 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 168–78.
19 Ijaz Hussain, Issues in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An International Law Perspective
(Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 1–50; Ijaz Hussain, Dimensions of Pakistan-
India Relations (Lahore: Heritage Publications, 2006), 227–73; see also, Ijaz Hussain,
Indus Waters Treaty: Political and Legal Dimensions (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 215–72.
20 Mehtab Ali Shah, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy,
1947–1994 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 121–57.
21 Patnaik, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 13–74; see also, Ejaz Hussain, “Politics and For-
eign Policy in Pakistan,” in State and Foreign Policy in South Asia, eds. Jivanta Schöt-
tli and Siegfried O. Wolf (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2010), 271–301. The latter study
developed a rational choice model to analyse Pakistan’s foreign policy from 1947
till 2010. However, its empirical thrust revolved around domestic politics in which
the military intervened (in)directly. The current study, to the contrary, takes an actor-
centric view of foreign policy in contemporary Pakistan which was not covered by the
previous account.
22 Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm
Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2018), 55–76.
23 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, 2nd
ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 3–35.
24 Ibid.
25 Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, Thomas Diez, and Imad El-Anis, An Introduction to Inter-
national Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes, 3rd ed. (Harlow: Pearson Educa-
tion Limited, 2010), 76–98.
26 Ibid., 184–99.
27 Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3–35.
28 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Political Institutions, eds. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 23–38.
29 Ariadne Vromen, “Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches,” in
Theory and Methods in Political Science, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, 3rd ed.
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 249–66.
30 Hussain, “Politics and Foreign Policy in Pakistan,” 290–328.
31 Asad Hashim, “Bilawal Bhutto blames Musharraf for Benazir’s Death,” Aljazeera,
December 29, 2017, accessed May 15, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/bila
wal-bhutto-blames-musharraf-benazir-death-171228072102606.html.
32 Sanjeev Miglani, “Pakistan’s Zardari: A Little Bit Pakistani and a Little Bit Indian,”
Reuters, November 26, 2008, accessed April 25, 2018, http://blogs.reuters.com/
pakistan/2008/11/26/pakistans-zardari-a-little-bit-pakistani-and-a-little-bit-indian/.
33 “Zardari Goes to Kabul Today,” Dawn, January 6, 2009, accessed May 28, 2021, www.
dawn.com/news/337545/zardari-goes-to-kabul-today.
34 Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, “Pakistani President Tries to Assure U.S. on
Taliban,” The New York Times, May 5, 2009, accessed June 1, 2021, www.nytimes.
com/2009/05/06/world/asia/06policy.html.
35 Interview with a serving officer of Pakistan Army, January 18, 2021, Islamabad.
36 Interview with a PPP member, May 13, 2021, Lahore.
37 “18th Amendment and Education,” Dawn, October 11, 2010, accessed June 2, 2021,
www.dawn.com/news/570524.
 Military
M i l i t a r y and Foreign
and F Policy
o r e ig n P o l i c y in Pakistan
in P 79
a k i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
79

38
3 8 Conversion
C o n v e r s i o n with w ith a a retired
r e t i r e d colonel
c o l o n e l of o f Pakistan
P a k is ta n A Army,
r m y , March
M a r c h 6, 6 , 22021,
0 2 1 , IIslamabad.
s la m a b a d .
39
3 9 Shahzad
S hahzad A Akhtar,
k h t a r , “Fighting
“ F i g h t i n g for f o r tthe
h e FFATA:A T A : Military
M ilita ry A Action
c t i o n anda n d Governance
G o v e r n a n c e in i n tthe
h e Tribal
T rib a l
A Areas
r e a s of
ofP Pakistan,”
a k i s t a n , ” in in P Perspectives
e r s p e c t i v e s on o n Contemporary
C o n te m p o r a r y P Pakistan:
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4400 Raza
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“ C h a r tin g P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s IInternal
n t e r n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Policy,”
P o l i c y , ” Unites
U n i t e s SStates
t a t e s IInstitute
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“ G e n [e ra l] K Kayani
a y a n i GetsG e t s ThreeT h r e e Year
Y ear E Extension,”
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x p r e s s Tribune, J u l y 222,2 , 22010,
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y e a r-e x te n s io n /.
4422 Hannah
H a n n a h Strange,
S t r a n g e , “US“ U S Raid R a i d That
T hat K Killed
ille d B Bin i n Laden
L a d e n Was W a s ‘an ‘a n A Act c t of
ofW War’,
a r ’ , Says
Says P Pakistani
a k is ta n i
RReport,”
e p o r t ,” The T e l e g r a p h , July
T h e Telegraph, J u l y 9, 9 , 2013,
2 0 1 3 , accessed
a c c e s s e d JuneJ u n e 12, 1 2 , 2021,
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4444 Sidrah
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M o i z Khan, K h a n , “Memogate:
“ M e m o g a t e : Commission’s
C o m m is s io n ’s R Report
e p o r t SaysSays H Haqqani
aqqaniA Authored
u t h o r e d Memo,”
M e m o ,”
The
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4455 Josh
Josh R Rogin,
o g i n , “Who
“ W h o Paid P a i d the t h e ‘Blood
‘ B l o o d Money’
M o n e y ’ to t o Set
S e t Raymond
R a y m o n d Davis D a v i s Free?”
F ree ?” F Foreign
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o l­
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h o -p a id -th e -b lo o d -m o n e y -to -s e t-ra y m o n d -d a v is -fre e / .
4466 Iftikhar
Iftik h a r F Firdous,
i r d o u s , “24 “ 2 4 Soldiers
S o ld ie rs K Killed
i l l e d inin N NATO ATO A Attack
t t a c k on on P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Check
C h e c k Post,”
P o s t , ” TheThe
E Express
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s to r y /2 9 7 9 7 9 /n a to -je ts -a tta c k -c h e c k p o s t- o n -p a k -a fg h a n -b o r d e r .
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“ C h i n e s e Premier
P r e m i e r in i n Pakistan,
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P r a i s e s Ties,”
T ie s ,” D Dawn,
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4488 Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,
l i , China-Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n R Relations:
e la tio n s : A A HHistorical n a l y s i s (Karachi:
i s t o r i c a l AAnalysis ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x fo rd U Uni-n i­
versity
v e r s i t y Press,
P r e s s , 2017),
2 0 1 7 ), 2 213–35.
1 3 -3 5 .
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“ C h in e s e P Premier
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T ie s .”
50
5 0 Zahid
Z a h i d Shahab
S hahab A Ahmed
h m e d and a n d Shahram
S h a h ra m A Akbarzadeh,
k b a r z a d e h , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Caught
C aught B Between
e t w e e n IranI r a n and and
Saudi
Saudi A Arabia,”
r a b i a , ” Contemporary
C o n t e m p o r a r y SSouth o u th A s i a 28,
Asia 2 8 , nno. o. 3 3 (2020):
( 2 0 2 0 ) : 336–50.
3 3 6 -5 0 .
51
5 1 Ibid.
Ib id .
52
5 2 Syed
Syed A Ali l i Shah,
S h a h , “2018,
“2018, a a Troubled
T r o u b l e d Year Y e a r for f o r Balochistan’s
B a l o c h i s t a n ’ s Politics,”
P o litic s ,” D Dawn,
aw n, D Decem-
ecem ­
bber
e r 31,
3 1 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , accessed
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021, w www.dawn.com/news/1454671.
w w .d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 1 4 5 4 6 7 1 .
53
5 3 “DCC
“ D C C tto o B Bee Reconstituted
R e c o n s t i t u t e d as a s Committee
C o m m i t t e e on on N National
a t i o n a l Security,”
S e c u r ity ,” D Dawn,
aw n, A August
u g u s t 222, 2,
22013,
0 1 3 , accessed
a c c e s s e d JulyJ u l y 15, 1 5 , 22021,
0 2 1 , www.dawn.com/news/1037613/dcc-to-be-reconstituted-
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 0 3 7 6 1 3 /d c c - to - b e - r e c o n s titu te d -
as-committee-on-national-security.
a s -c o m m itte e -o n -n a tio n a l-s e c u rity .
5 4 Interview
54 I n t e r v i e w withw ith a a serving
s e rv in g A Army
r m y officer,
o f f i c e r , June
J u n e 12, 1 2 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , Islamabad.
Is la m a b a d .
55
55 A Ayesha
y e s h a Siddiqa,
S id d iq a , M Military
i l i t a r y IInc.:
n c . : IInside
n s id e P Pakistan’s
a k is ta n 's M Military
ilita r y E Economy,
conom y, 2 2ndn d ed.e d . (London:
(L o n d o n :
Pluto
P lu to P Press,
r e s s , 22017),
0 1 7 ) , 131–49.
1 3 1 -4 9 .
56
56 A Amirm i r Wasim,
W a s i m , “Military
“ M i l i t a r y CourtsC o u r t s Cease
C e a s e tto o Function
F u n c t i o n Today,”
T o d a y ,” D Dawn,
aw n, M Marcha r c h 31,3 1 , 22019,
019,
accessed
a c c e s s e d JulyJ u l y 18,1 8 , 22021,
0 2 1 , www.dawn.com/news/1472947.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 7 2 9 4 7 .
57
5 7 Ejaz
E j a z Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “China–Pakistan
“ C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Economic E c o n o m i c Corridor: C o r r i d o r : Will W i l l It I t Sustain
S u s t a i n Itself?”
Its e lf? ” F Fudan
udan
JJournal
o u r n a l of o f the
th e H Humanities
u m a n itie s a andn d SSocial c i e n c e s 10,
o c i a l SSciences 1 0 , nno. o . 22 (2017):
( 2 0 1 7 ) : 145–59.
1 4 5 -5 9 . F For
or a a detailed
d e ta ile d
analysis
a n a l y s i s of o f China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n rrelations,e l a t i o n s , see s e e Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,l i , China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n R Relations:
e la tio n s :
A A HHistorical
is to r ic a l A n a l y s i s (Karachi:
Analysis ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x f o r d University
U n i v e r s i t y Press,P r e s s , 2017).
2 0 1 7 ).
58
5 8 Ejaz
E j a z Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “CPEC:
“ C P E C : Governance
G o v e r n a n c e and a n d Security
S e c u r i t y Challenges
C h a lle n g e s – - Implications
I m p l i c a t i o n s forf o r the
th e B Belt
e lt
and
a n d Road
R o a d Initiative,”
I n i t i a t i v e , ” Chinese
C h in e s e P Political
o l i t i c a l SScience
c ie n c e R e v i e w 4,
Review 4 , nno.o. 1 1 (2019):
( 2 0 1 9 ) : 135–47.
1 3 5 -4 7 .
5 9 Conversation
59 C o n v e r s a t i o n with w ith a a retired
r e t i r e d officer
o f f i c e r ofofP Pakistan
a k is ta n A Air ir F Force,
o r c e , July
J u l y 17,
1 7 , 22018,
0 1 8 , IIslamabad.
s la m a b a d .
60
6 0 “Nawaz
“N aw az A Arrives
r r i v e s inin U US S on o n Four-Day
F o u r - D a y Visit,”
V is it,” D a w n , October
Dawn, O c to b e r 2 21,1 , 22015,
0 1 5 , accessed
a c c e s s e d July
J u l y 222, 2,
22021,
021, w www.dawn.com/news/1214403.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 2 1 4 4 0 3 .
80 Ejaz Hussain
61 Anwar Iqbal, “Pentagon ‘Grateful’ for Army Chief’s Visit,” Dawn, November 17,
2015, accessed July 24, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1220253.
62 Conversation with a retired Army officer, May 15, 2021, Islamabad.
63 For a detailed academic analysis of Dawn Leak and Panama Papers, see Ejaz Hus-
sain, “Duality, Dynamism and Deterioration: Civil-Military Relations and Governance
in Contemporary Pakistan,” in Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan: Governance,
Development and Environment, eds. Ghulam Ali and Ejaz Hussain (London: Rout-
ledge, 2020), 73–94.
64 Haseeb Bhatti, “Nawaz Sharif Steps Down as PM After SC’s Disqualification Verdict,”
Dawn, July 28, 2017, accessed July 28, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1348191.
65 Ismail Dilawar and Iain Marlow, “Imran Khan Says Pakistan [Civil] Govt and Military
Are on Same Page, Want to Mend Ties with India,” The Print, November 28, 2018,
accessed August 2, 2021, https://theprint.in/politics/imran-khan-says-pakistan-govt-
and-military-are-on-same-page-want-to-mend-ties-with-india/156145/.
66 “Pakistan Rethinks Its Role in Xi’s Belt and Road Plan,” Financial Times, Septem-
ber 9, 2018, accessed August 6, 2021, www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-
99ca-68cf89602132.
67 Ejaz Hussain, “Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan Economic Cor-
ridor? The BRI, CPEC and the Khan Government: An Analysis,” Chinese Journal of
International Review 1, no. 2 (2019): 1–19.
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Daur, October 7, 2019, accessed August 10, 2021, https://nayadaur.tv/2019/10/heres-
what-to-expect-from-pm-khans-third-visit-to-china/.
69 Waqas Ahmed, “Senate Passes CPEC Authority Bill,” The Express Tribune, May 28,
2021, accessed August 12, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2302115/senate-passes-
cpec-authority-bill.
70 Memphis Barker, “US Military Confirms $300 Million Cut in Aid to Pakistan,” The
Guardian, September 2, 2018, accessed August 15, 2021, www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/sep/02/us-military-confirms-300m-cut-in-aid-to-pakistan.
71 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Imran Khan’s US Visit Is for Home Audience. Bajwa’s Army Will
Do the Real Talking,” The Print, July 16, 2019, accessed August 18, 2021, https://
theprint.in/opinion/imran-khans-us-visit-is-for-home-audience-bajwas-army-will-do-
the-real-talking/263450/.
72 “On Afghanistan, Pakistan Walks Tightrope of Optimism and Caution,” Aljazeera,
August 28, 2021, accessed August 9, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/28/
on-afghanistan-pakistan-walks-tightrope-of-optimism-and-caution.
73 Abid Hussain, “Pakistan Rolls Out Red Carpet for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed,”
BBC, February 17, 2019, accessed August 29, 2021, www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-47255560.
74 “PM Imran Khan Cancels Malaysia Trip After Saudi Arabia Visit,” The News,
December 17, 2019, accessed August 30, 2021, www.thenews.com.pk/print/
584675-pm-imran-khan-cancels-malaysia-trip-after-saudi-arabia-visit.
75 Ejaz Hussain, “Jolted, but not in jeopardy: Are Pakistan-Saudi Arabia ties entering a
new phase?,” The News, August 16, 2020, accessed August 31, 2021, www.thenews.
com.pk/tns/detail/700521-jolted-but-not-in-jeopardy.
76 Arwa Ibrahim, “Pakistani Prime Minister Khan Visits Saudi Arabia to Reset Ties,” Alja-
zeera, May 7, 2021, accessed September 1, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/7/
hld-pakistani-premiers-visit-to-saudi-to-reset-bilateral-ties.
77 Ejaz Hussain, “Indian Unilateralism in Kashmir: Regional (in)stability and Options for
Pakistan,” Naya Daur, August 6, 2019, accessed September 2, 2021, https://nayadaur.
tv/2019/08/indian-unilateralism-in-kashmir-regional-instability-and-options-for-paki
stan/.
 Military and Foreign Policy in Pakistan 81
78 “Pakistan to Remain on FATF Grey List,” Dawn, June 25, 2021, accessed Septem-
ber 4, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1631409.
79 Michael Kugelman, “Will Pakistan Capitalize on a New Opportunity to Work with Israel?”
The National Interest, January 20, 2021, accessed September 7, 2021, https://national
interest.org/feature/will-pakistan-capitalize-new-opportunity-work-israel-176738.
Taylor St Francis
Taylor & Francis CroupZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCB
h ttp y V ta y lo r a n d f r a n c i s .c o m
Part II

Operationalization
Taylor St Francis
Taylor & Francis CroupZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCB
h ttp y V ta y lo r a n d f r a n c i s .c o m
5 China–Pakistan
A Decade of Transformation in
Diplomacy, 2010–2020
Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan and Rabbiya
Kamal Nagra

Introduction
Pakistan–China diplomatic ties have deepened significantly over the last decade.
There has been a multi-faceted transformation in the Sino-Pakistani relations
across economic, political, and diplomatic fronts. More Chinese professionals,
projects, and products are seen in Pakistan and vice versa. This chapter is an
in-depth analysis of the socio-political aspects of the relationship over the past
decade. It examines three phases of this relationship, organized according to the
ruling political parties of Pakistan: Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Mus-
lim League-N (PML-N), and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The various aspects
of diplomacy are examined with a focus on how Chinese investment and financial
assistance evolved to become the focal point of the diplomatic ties. The chapter
aims to examine both sides of the coin and gather rhetoric from the Chinese and
Pakistani perspectives to provide a more holistic view of the evolution of Sino-
Pakistani diplomacy.
The three phases of Sowing the Seed (PPP), Accelerated Growth (PML-N), and
Reaping the Benefits (PTI) are discussed at length. Both political and economic
aspects of these different phases are discussed to analyse the way forward. To
conclude, a synopsis of the net result for both the countries is given – termed as a
positive or negative handprint of the Sino-Pakistani diplomatic relations.
Pakistan, being a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party system, has the
following major political parties: Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim
League-N (PML-N), Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI), Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, Awami National Party, Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam (F), and Muttahida Qaumi Movement, among others. In the PPP regime,
from 2008 to 2013, the Pakistan–China relationship flourished as multiple eco-
nomic and military deals were signed. Both governments had a mutually benefi-
cial agenda in mind to enhance economic development and trade ties. Although
this strengthening of the diplomatic relationship came with great benefits, there
were some hesitations and criticisms as well. The complex security situation
in Pakistan and gaining the trust of the Chinese investors were a few of them.
Overall, the period of the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy under the PPP leadership
laid the groundwork for the great boom in the diplomatic relationship which was

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-7
86
86 Gul-i-Hina
KJIHGFEDCBA
G Shahzad
u l- i- H in a S h a h z a d and Rabbiya
and R Kamal
a b b iy a K Nagra
am al N agra

manifested
m a n i f e s t e d in i n tthe h e later
l a t e r yyears.
e a r s . The
T h e new
n e w multidimensional
m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l phase p h a s e of o f ttheh e Pakistan–
P a k is ta n -
China
C h i n a partnership
p a rtn e rsh ip w was a s on o n the
t h e horizon,
h o r i z o n , offering
o f f e r i n g more
m o r e depthd e p t h andand b breadth
r e a d t h tto o the
th e
diplomatic relations.
d ip lo m a tic r e la tio n s .
In
I n tthe
h e second
second p phase,
h a s e , with
w i t h the
t h e PML-N
P M L - N leadership
l e a d e r s h i p ffrom r o m 20132 0 1 3 to t o 2018,
2 0 1 8 , tthe h e Sino-
S in o -
Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i t i e s d e e p e n e d e v e n f u r t h e r . T h e i c o n i c M o U f o r C P E C w a s s i g n e d , and
ties deepened even further. The iconic MoU for CPEC was signed, and
many
m a n y other o th e r p plans
la n s w weree r e envisioned
e n v is io n e d u under
n d e r tthe h e Chinese
C h i n e s e global
g lo b a l v vision
i s i o n of o f the
th e B Belt
e lt
and
a n d Road
R o a d Initiative
I n i t i a t i v e (BRI).
( B R I ) . Throughout
T h r o u g h o u t 2013–2014,
2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4 , b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s expanded
e x p a n d e d ttheirh e ir
cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n on on a a vvariety
a r i e t y ofo f energy
e n e r g y anda n d infrastructure
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e projects.
p r o j e c t s . These
T h e s e develop-
d e v e lo p ­
ments
m e n t s a l s o c a m e w i t h t h e i r o w n s e t s o f c r i t i c i s m s a n d c o n t r o v e r s i e s , especially
also came with their own sets of criticisms and controversies, e s p e c i a l l y on
on
the
t h e question
q u e s t i o n of o f transparency
t r a n s p a r e n c y and a n d equitable
e q u i t a b l e distribution
d i s t r i b u t i o n of
o f resources
r e s o u r c e s for f o r tthe
h e CPEC
CPEC
projects.
p r o j e c t s . InI n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , many m a n y questioned
q u e s t i o n e d the t h e uneven
u n e v e n allocation
a l l o c a t i o n of
o f tthe h e developmen-
d e v e lo p m e n ­
tal benefits of the CPEC projects among the least developed
ta l b e n e f its o f th e C P E C p r o je c ts a m o n g th e le a s t d e v e lo p e d p r o v in c e s . provinces.
In
I n 2018,
2018, w with i t h thet h e newly-elected
n e w ly -e le c te d P PTIT I government,
g o v e r n m e n t , the t h e scales
s c a l e s of o f thet h e Sino-
S in o -
Pakistani diplomacy also witnessed a shift. Some of
P a k is ta n i d ip lo m a c y a ls o w itn e s s e d a s h ift. S o m e o f th e C P E C p r o je c ts o f P the CPEC projects of Phase
h a s e I,
I,
as
a s initiated
i n i t i a t e d bby y the th e p previous
re v io u s P PML-N
M L - N government,
g o v e r n m e n t , moved m o v e d to t o the
t h e bbackack b burner
u r n e r while
w h ile
the
t h e new
n e w government
g o v e r n m e n t renegotiated
r e n e g o t i a t e d ttheh e terms
t e r m s and a n d conditions
c o n d i t i o n s ofo f tthe
h e CPECCPEC p projects.
r o je c ts .
Later
L a t e r in i n 2019,
2 0 1 9 , tthe h e Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i relations
r e l a t i o n s ffound
ound a a new
n e w ffooting
o o t i n g withw i t h numerous
n u m e ro u s
projects
p r o j e c t s bbeing
e i n g resumed
r e s u m e d and a n d proceeded
p r o c e e d e d under
u n d e r tthe h e CPEC
CPEC P Phase
h a s e II.
I I . The
T h e start
s t a r t of
o f 2020
2020
had
h a d e c o n o m i e s w o r l d w i d e g r a p p l i n g w i t h t h e C O V I D - 1 9 p a n d e m i c , a n d some
economies worldwide grappling with the COVID-19 pandemic, and som e
of
o f the
t h e CPECC P E C projects
p r o j e c t s werew e r e on on a a halt.
h a lt. B Both o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s had h a d tto o ffind
in d w waysa y s tto o resume
re su m e
operations
o p e r a t i o n s a n d r e s c a l e t h e d y n a m i c s . T h e n e x t s e c t i o n d e a l s w i t h t h e a n a l y s i s of
and rescale the dynamics. The next section deals with the analysis of
the
t h e Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i diplomacy
d i p l o m a c y underu n d e r ttheh e PPP P P P leadership.
le a d e r s h ip .

Part I: Sowing the Seed: The Politics and Economics of

Pak–China
Pak-China Diplomacy under Pakistan People’s Party (PPP):
2010-2013
2010–2013
At
A t tthe h e start
s t a r t ofo f ttheh e decade
d e c a d e in i n 2010,
2 0 1 0 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Peoples
P e o p l e s Party
P a r t y (PPP),
(P P P ), a a center-left
c e n te r-le ft
political
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , h a d t h e r e i g n s l e d b y A s i f A l i Z a r d a r i a s t h e P r e s i d e n t of
party, had the reigns led by Asif Ali Zardari as the President o f Pakistan.
P a k ista n .
Zardari
Z a r d a r i came
c a m e into i n t o power
p o w e r on o n September
S e p t e m b e r 9, 9 , 2008,
2 0 0 8 , ffollowing
o l l o w i n g tthe h e assassination
a s s a s s i n a t i o n of
of
his
h i s wife
w i f e anda n d thet h e fformer
o r m e r ttwice
w ic e P Prime
rim e M Minister
in is te r B Benazir
e n a z i r Bhutto
B h u t t o in i n 2007
2 0 0 7 during
d u r i n g her
her
1
political
p o l i t i c a l rally
r a l l y ahead
a h e a d of o f tthe
h e 2008
2 0 0 8 General
G e n e r a l Elections.
E le c tio n s .1
Bhutto’s democratic political agenda had
B h u t t o ’s d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l a g e n d a h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e pconsiderable public
u b l i c support,
s u p p o r t , andand
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n c o u l d m o v e b e y o n d t h e e i g h t y e a r s o f m i l i t a r y r u l e u n d e r G e n e r a l Mush-
could move beyond the eight years of military rule under General M ush­
arraf.
a rra f. H However,
o w e v e r, B Benazir’s
e n a z i r ’ s tragic
t r a g i c assassination
a s s a s s i n a t i o n led
l e d the
t h e country
c o u n t r y to to a a pperiod
e r i o d of o f chaos,
ch ao s,
uncertainty,
u n c e r t a i n t y , a n d p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l . T h e P P P , n o w l e d b y Z a r d a r i , w o n t h e majority
and political turmoil. The PPP, now led by Zardari, won the m a jo r ity
seats
s e a t s ini n the
th e N National
a t i o n a l Assembly,
A s s e m b l y , and a n d formed
f o r m e d the t h e coalition
c o a l i t i o n government.
g o v e r n m e n t . This T h i s elec-
e le c ­
toral outcome brought defeat to Musharraf’s
to r a l o u tc o m e b r o u g h t d e f e a t to M u s h a r r a f ’s r u le . rule.
With
W i t h this th is p political
o l i t i c a l bbackdrop,
a c k d r o p , tthe h e newly
n e w l y elected
e l e c t e d PPP
P P P leaderl e a d e r Asif
A s i f AliA li Z Zardari
a rd ari
b e c a m e t h e p r e s i d e n t a n d m a d e h i s f i r s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t e v i s i t t o C h i n a i n Octo-
became the president and made his first international state visit to China in O c to ­
2
ber
b e r 2008.
2 0 0 8 . 2 Although
A l t h o u g h China C h i n a and a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n have
h a v e enjoyed
e n j o y e d strong
s tr o n g b bilateral
i l a t e r a l ties
t i e s histori-
h is to r i­
cally,
c a l l y , Zardari’s
Z a r d a r i ’ s discussions
d is c u s s io n s w withi t h ttheh e Chinese
C h i n e s e President
P re sid e n t H Huu Jintao
J i n t a o heralded
h e ra ld e d a a new
new
3
era
e r a anda n d sowed
s o w e d the t h e seeds
s e e d s for
fo r a a stronger
s t r o n g e r Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i partnership.
p a r t n e r s h i p . 3 During
D u r i n g tthish is
visit, 11 agreements were signed on economic cooperation,
v is it, 1 1 a g r e e m e n ts w e r e s ig n e d o n e c o n o m ic c o o p e r a tio n , in f r a s tr u c tu r e p r o ­ infrastructure pro-
jjects,
e c t s , agriculture,
a g r i c u l t u r e , and a n d ttelecommunications
e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with w ith a a ffocus
o c u s on o n enhancing
e n h a n c i n g bbilateral
ila te r a l
 China–Pakistan 87
trade, which was around $7 billion aiming to be around $15 billion by 2010.4
These agreements signalled China’s increased interest in Pakistan and its eco-
nomic growth.
The bilateral benefits of these agreements were enormous. While China looked
at Pakistan as a gateway to the Arabian Sea, Pakistan took it as an economic
opportunity. This deepening of ties with China came at a critical time for Pakistan
amidst its flailing economy, increasing inflation, looming debt repayments, and
flared up relations with the United States in the aftermath of the air raids.5 China’s
support and enhanced development cooperation helped Pakistan to open up invest-
ment opportunities for potential Chinese investors which could not only boost the
economy but also reduce the trade deficits. At the economic level, although Paki-
stan’s GDP growth rate stood at 4.99 percent in 2008,6 the bilateral trade volume
for both countries rose to $6.98 billion ushering in a new height for the trade
relations. China became Pakistan’s first import and eighth export market.7 Moreo-
ver, according to the Economic and Commercial Office of the Chinese Embassy
in Islamabad, by 2008, the Chinese companies’ contract value in Pakistan was
$16.5 billion whereas the Chinese investment in Pakistan was up to $1.07 billion.
The economic uplift allowed both countries to expand their economic coopera-
tion further, enabling the Chinese businesses to work in diverse fields in Pakistan,
more job creation, and better infrastructure for Pakistan to develop more indus-
tries. This contributed towards a positive impact in the Sino-Pakistani diplomacy
with mutually benefitting agreements and the presence of political will in Pakistan
as well as in China.
Nevertheless, these agreements came with concerns and worries from both
sides. Security was a key point of discussion. Pakistan was newly emerging from
tackling the extremist threats, and China was seeing signs of militant groups and
extremism in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Hence, China emphasized
enhancing joint efforts on combating counterterrorism, especially after the bomb
blasts by the militant groups in 2009 in Xinjiang.8 China was grappling with its
fight against ‘three forces’ (三个势力) of ‘separatism, extremism and terrorism
and finding ways to curb the activities of Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. As some
links of these activities were also found in the restive border areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan, the Pakistani government geared its efforts to conduct joint military
exercises, share intelligence, and deepen its relations with China on countering
terrorism.9 These events solidified the joint military cooperation between the two
countries even more. It was partially due to the deteriorating security situation
with the U.S. air raids and the capture of Osama bin Laden in 2011.10 Also, partly
because China and Pakistan were facing the same threat of terrorism in their
regions hence, the urgency of fighting against the militancy provided them the
united front to increase their diplomatic engagement. Thus, contemporary Sino-
Pakistani relations are multifaceted and comprehended as an intertwined maze of
various aspects including politics, economics, and security.
Given this economic and geopolitical landscape, the PPP leadership was faced
with the challenge of reassuring the Chinese about business feasibility and invest-
ment in Pakistan while tackling the internal instabilities of the nation. In 2010,
88 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra
Zardari attempted to address the provincial disparities by adopting the 18th
Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan along with the ‘7th National Financial
Commission (NFC) Award’ which provided more autonomy to the provinces.11
The removal of the concurrent list, abrogation of the presidential powers to dis-
solve parliament, and greater provincial autonomy were a few of the significant
changes. This NFC Award allowed the federal government to allocate 10 percent
more revenue to the provinces and allowed the revenue distribution formula to
include other factors rather than just based on population.12 The new horizontal
distribution of resources formula included 82 percent population, 10.3 percent
poverty, 5 percent revenue collection efforts, and 2.7 percent inverse popula-
tion density13 catering to relatively fair distribution. This constitutional amend-
ment also paved a path towards more decentralization and fiscal federalism in
Pakistan.14
This domestic political environment allowed economic ties with China to grow
as Zardari frequently visited China and the PPP forged new levels of diplomacy
in their subsequent years. Besides the Sino-Pakistan nuclear program and mutual
defense and military cooperation to fight terrorism,15 six new deals were signed16
covering areas such as telecommunications, energy, agriculture, infrastructure,
engineering, IT, mining, hydroelectric dam projects, and the upgradation of the
Karakoram Highway.17 With the Chinese constructing the Gwadar Port in Balo-
chistan, the plans for progressing on the National Trade Corridor (NTC) were
also on the table. This corridor included a 4,000-km network of highways includ-
ing the Karakoram Highway linking China through the Khunjerab Pass down to
Gwadar Port in Balochistan.18 These plans indicated China’s long-term interests
in Pakistan and subsequently aided the relation to flourish into an economic and
strategic partnership.
This period of diplomacy also saw the Gwadar Port to be a vital dimension.
Gwadar, being the largest deep-sea port, situated on the Arabian Sea, near to the
Strait of Hormuz serves as an ideal gateway for energy, oil, and trade supplies
linking China to the rest of the region.19 The Gwadar Port construction was com-
pleted by the Chinese in 2007 during the Musharraf period, but the Port of Sin-
gapore Authority (PSA) won the bidding for its management.20 However, later,
PSA withdrew from the agreement in 2013, and the contract for the construction
and operation of the port was given to China’s Overseas Port Holding Company
(COPHC).21 Thus, Gwadar Port became a focal force shaping the trajectory of the
Pakistan–China relations.
Alongside this emergent strategic partnership, the economic cooperation was
also strengthened by signing thirty-five new MoUs and inaugurating the Pakistan–
China Friendship Centre. The year 2011 was declared to be the ‘Pakistan–China
Friendship Year’ marking 60 years of diplomatic relations. From the grand wel-
come of Zardari at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to continue the legacy of
China–Pakistan friendship as started by the Bhutto family, the PPP turned every
stone to maintain the ‘all-weather’ friendship and cement the old ties with China.22
The endurance of the diplomatic ties has been observed during the consequent
years at various levels of engagement between the two countries.
 China–Pakistan 89
Overall,
O v e r a l l , tthe
h e period
p e r i o d of
o f tthe
h e Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i diplomacy
d i p l o m a c y under
u n d e r tthe
he P PPP
P P (2010–2013)
(2 0 1 0 -2 0 1 3 )
laid
l a i d g r o u n d s f o r t h e g r e a t b o o m i n t h e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h manifested
grounds for the great boom in the diplomatic relationship which m a n i f e s t e d in
in
tthe
h e later
l a t e r yyears.
e a r s . The
T h e new n e w multidimensional
m u ltid im e n s io n a l p phase
h a s e of
o f the Pakistan–China
th e P a k i s t a n - C h i n a partner-
p a r tn e r ­
ship
s h i p was
w a s on o n thet h e horizon.
h o r i z o n . The
T h e next
n e x t section
s e c t i o n examines
e x a m i n e s tthe
h e Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i relations
r e la tio n s
under the leadership of a newly elected PML-N
u n d e r th e le a d e rs h ip o f a n e w ly e le c te d P M L - N g o v e r n m e n t. government.

Part II: Accelerated Growth: The Politics and Economics of

Pak-China Diplomacy under Pakistan Muslim League (N)
(PML-N): 2013–2018
2013-2018
Pakistan
P Muslim
a k ista n M League
u s lim L e a g u e (N)
(N ) –
- a
a center-right political
c e n te r-rig h t p o l i t i c a l party’s
p a r t y ’ s sweeping
s w e e p i n g vvictory
ic to r y
23
in
i n the
t h e 2013
2 0 1 3 General
G e n e ra l E Elections
l e c t i o n s bbrought
ro u g h t N Nawaz
a w a z Sharif
S h a r i f as a s the
t h e new
n e w PrimeP rim e M Minister.
in is te r .23
The new regime of the Sharif brothers – Nawaz Sharif
T h e n e w r e g im e o f th e S h a r if b r o th e r s - N a w a z S h a r if a s th e P r im e M in is te r a n d as the Prime Minister and
24
Shehbaz
S h e h b a z Sharif S h a r i f as a s the
t h e Chief
C h ie f M Minister
i n i s t e r of
of P Punjab
u n ja b 24 - – readily
r e a d i l y took
t o o k tthe h e lead
l e a d on o n scal-
s c a l­
ing
in g u upp ttheh e economy.
e c o n o m y . The T h e PML-N
P M L - N leadership
l e a d e r s h i p had h a d ttwo w o agendas
a g e n d a s in i n mind:
m i n d : economy
econom y
25
and
a n d energy
e n e r g y crisis
c r i s i s asa s per
p e r their
t h e i r political
p o l i t i c a l manifesto.
m a n i f e s t o . 2 5 TheT h e Sharif
S h a r i f government
g o v e r n m e n t tturned u rn e d
t o t h e ‘ a l l - w e a t h e r f r i e n d ’ C h i n a f o r f u r t h e r i n g t h e i n v e s t m e n t opportunities
to the ‘all-weather friend’ China for furthering the investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s andand
26
infrastructure
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e development.
d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 6 The T h e newsn e w s of o f Sharif’s
S h a r i f ’s electoral
e l e c t o r a l vvictory
i c t o r y was
w as p promis-
ro m is ­
ing
i n g ffor o r Beijing
B e i j i n g as a s they
t h e y saw saw a a trusted
t r u s t e d bbusiness-oriented
u s i n e s s - o r i e n t e d leaderl e a d e r with
w ith a a v vigour
i g o u r to to
27
deliver
d e l i v e r a n d w h o m t h e y c a n t r u s t . 2 7 T h i s i n t r o d u c e d a n e w d y n a m i c i n t h e Sino-
and whom they can trust. This introduced a new dynamic in the S in o -
PPakistani
a k i s t a n i relations
r e l a t i o n s andand a a further
f u r t h e r deepening
d e e p e n i n g of o f tthe
h e economic
e c o n o m i c ties. tie s.
During
D u r i n g tthe he v visit
i s i t of
o f Chinese
C h in e se P Premier
re m ie r L Lii Keqiang
K e q i a n g to t o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n on o n MayM a y 24, 2 4 , 2013,
2013, a a
joint statement was issued on deepening the comprehensive
jo in t s ta te m e n t w a s is s u e d o n d e e p e n in g th e c o m p r e h e n s iv e s tr a te g ic c o o p e r a tio n strategic cooperation
28
between
b e t w e e n the t h e twot w o countries.
c o u n t r i e s .2 8 This
T h i s laidl a i d ttheh e bbasis
a s i s for
f o r tthe
h e China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n EconomicE c o n o m ic
Corridor (CPEC). This plan was further
C o r r id o r ( C P E C ) . T h is p la n w a s f u r th e r s o lid if ie d d u r in g N solidified during Nawaz
a w a z Sharif’s
S h a r i f ’ s state
s ta te
visit
v i s i t tto
o China
C h i n a in i n July
J u l y 2013.
2013. B Botho t h countries
c o u n t r i e s signed
s i g n e d an an M MoU o U on o n ‘Cooperation
‘ C o o p e r a t i o n for f o r tthe
he
29
Long-term
L o n g - te r m P Planl a n on o n thet h e CPEC.’
C P E C . ’ 2 9 The T h e Sharif-led
S h a r i f - l e d government
g o v e r n m e n t regardedr e g a r d e d tthe h e CPEC
CPEC
ttoo bbe e a a ‘game
‘ g a m e changer’
c h a n g e r ’ for fo r P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s development
d e v e l o p m e n t and, a n d , hence,
h e n c e , established
e s ta b lis h e d a a new
new
China cell in the office to monitor progress. 30
This aligned
C h in a c e ll i n th e o f f ic e to m o n i to r p r o g r e s s .30 T h is a lig n e d w i th C h i n a ’s g lo b a l with China’s global
pplans,
la n s, p pivoting
i v o t i n g ttowards
o w a r d s heavyh e a v y investment
i n v e s t m e n t in i n infrastructure
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of o f Asia
A s i a anda n d abroad
a b r o a d and and
31
charting
c h a r t i n g o u t a r e g i o n a l c o n n e c t i v i t y r o a d m a p l a t e r t o b e k n o w n a s t h e BRI.
out a regional connectivity roadmap later to be known as the B R I . 3 1 TheThe
BRI
B R I outreach
o u t r e a c h has has b been
e e n evolving
e v o l v i n g acrossa c r o s s Asia,
A s ia , E Europe,
u r o p e , anda n d Africa,
A f r i c a , anda n d more
m o r e coun-coun­
tries
t r i e s h a v e s i g n e d o n s i n c e i t s l a u n c h i n 2 0 1 3 . U n d e r C h i n a ’ s B R I , P a k i s t a n has
have signed on since its launch in 2013. Under China’s BRI, Pakistan has
been
b een a a vvital
i t a l component.
c o m p o n e n t . The T h e initial
i n i t i a l CPEC
C P E C investment
i n v e s t m e n t of o f ana n estimated
e s t i m a t e d $46 $46 b billion
illio n
32
in
i n cost
c o s t has
has b beene e n tthe h e largest
l a r g e s t infrastructure
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e package
p a c k a g e ffor or P Pakistan.
a k i s t a n . 3 2 This
T h i s depicted
d e p ic te d
t h e e s s e n c e a n d p e r m a n e n c e o f t h e S i n o - P a k i s t a n i r e l a t i o n s a n d l e d tto
the essence and permanence of the Sino-Pakistani relations and led o an a n erae r a of
of
accelerated growth for Pakistan with
a c c e le r a te d g r o w th f o r P a k is ta n w ith C h in e s e s u p p o r t. Chinese support.
The
T h e CPECC P E C iis s defined
d e f i n e d as a s the
t h e rregional
e g i o n a l connectivity
c o n n e c t i v i t y fframework
r a m e w o r k coveringc o v e r i n g over over a a
3000-km
3 0 0 0 - k m network n e t w o r k of o f infrastructure
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and a n d energy
e n e rg y p projects
r o j e c t s connecting
c o n n e c tin g K Kashgar
a s h g a r in in
33
XXinjiang,
i n j i a n g , China,
C h i n a , to t o Gwadar
G w a d a r in in B Balochistan,
a l o c h i s t a n , Pakistan,
P a k ista n , v viai a the
t h e Khunjerab
K h u n je ra b P Pass.
a s s .33
This corridor aims to establish energy and logistic hubs
T h is c o r r id o r a im s to e s ta b lis h e n e r g y a n d lo g is tic h u b s a n d e n h a n c e th e tr a d e , and enhance the trade,
industrial,
i n d u s t r i a l , anda n d agricultural
a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperation
c o o p e r a tio n b between
e t w e e n China C h i n a and and P Pakistan.
a k ista n . F Foror P Paki-
a k i­
stan, this corridor not only provided the country with
s ta n , th is c o r r id o r n o t o n ly p r o v id e d th e c o u n tr y w ith a m u c h -n e e d e d s tim u lu s a much-needed stimulus
ffor
o r economic
e c o n o m i c development
d e v e lo p m e n t b butu t also
a l s o allowed
a l l o w e d ffor o r the
t h e ‘regional
‘ r e g i o n a l integration,
i n t e g r a t i o n , socio-
s o c io ­
economic
e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , i n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y , h a r m o n i z e d d e v e l o p m e n t and
development, interoperability, harmonized development a n d effective
e f f e c tiv e
90 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra
management of its resources.’34 As the official narrative regards CPEC to be a
‘win-win cooperation,’ this corridor also aims to benefit China’s energy secu-
rity significantly by providing an alternate and relatively shorter land trade route
than its existing 12,900 km sea route from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of
Malacca to China’s eastern ports.35
The solid economic foundation provided by CPEC enabled both countries
to expand their cooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects
throughout 2013–2014. For CPEC projects, a Joint Cooperation Committee
(JCC) was established to review the progress with its secretariats in Beijing and
Islamabad.36 The Sino-Pakistani diplomacy strengthened further with President
Xi Jinping’s state visit to Pakistan on April 20–21, 2015, where he was warmly
welcomed at Rawalpindi airbase upon his arrival. Later in the Joint Session of
Parliament, Prime Minister Sharif’s speech reinforced this friendship further
when he described it as: ‘[. . .]good neighbours, close friends, dear brothers, and
trusted partners.’37 This partnership yielded the signing of 51 MoUs38 and the
official launch of CPEC with a ‘1 + 4’ pattern of economic cooperation in four
areas namely, energy, infrastructure, Gwadar port, and industrial cooperation.39
The CPEC Phase I was kicked off with some ‘Early Harvest’ projects focusing
on the energy sector due to Pakistan’s pressing energy deficit. The initial projects
with an estimated cost of $34 billion were decided on including the construction
of coal-fired power plants, hydropower plants, and solar and wind-power plants.
The remaining CPEC investment was allocated towards infrastructure projects,
railways, and Gwadar Port construction.40
During 2016–2017, most of the ‘fast-track’ energy priority projects reached
their financial close by 2016, some even before their expected date, while oth-
ers were initiated or nearing their completion. The enthusiasm for heightened
Sino-Pakistani relations was also well-received by the public. At the launch of
CPEC, 82 percent of Pakistanis had a favourable opinion of China according to
the Pew Research Centre poll.41 However, some controversies arose regarding the
proposed CPEC ‘routes’ and its different alignments: Northern, Western, Cen-
tral, and Eastern routes.42 Some distributive concerns were raised regarding the
Western route as it passes through impoverished regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
and Balochistan that need the development benefits of the Chinese investment.
However, more emphasis was given to the Eastern route passing through already
developed Punjab areas.43 The political leaders from other provinces criticized the
Punjab-favoured alignment and allocation and demanded the routes to be rede-
signed to benefit the smaller provinces and neglected communities.44 Nonetheless,
the Sharif government was able to mitigate the issues by bringing all concerned
political parties to discuss at the All Parties Conference (APC) and generate politi-
cal consensus.45 Additionally, the inclusion of the provincial Chief Ministers in
the JCC46 catered to some of those provincial concerns.47
The long-term plan for CPEC signed in 2017 had three 5-year phases. The Phase
I ‘Early harvest’ projects were indicated to be completed by 2018, while other
short-term projects were to be completed by 2020. The next two phases included
medium-term and long-term projects aimed for 2025 and 2030, respectively. The
 China–Pakistan 91
energy and infrastructure developments were at the core of the CPEC Phase I pro-
jects, whereas the Phase II projects focused more on establishing the industrial
cooperation and socioeconomic development in Pakistan. The domestic politi-
cal change especially with the change in government in 2018 and the partisan
dynamics primarily contributed towards the determination of the second phase
projects among other things. The final CPEC phase would build upon this variety
of cooperation frameworks including agriculture, technology, and tourism. By
April 2017, the total CPEC portfolio was estimated to be $62 billion,48 and by
2018, the initiated and completed CPEC projects already reached $18.9 billion
in cost.49
This post-CPEC period of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy showed signs of an eco-
nomic boost for Pakistan. Within the first 5 years, CPEC projects created 51,000
direct jobs in the road infrastructure sector, out of which 48,000 jobs were specifi-
cally for local Pakistanis.50 In 2017–2018, Pakistan’s GDP increased by 5.8 per-
cent, the highest rate recorded in the past 13 years, the annual FDI grew from
$650 million to $2.2 billion, and per capita annual income rose from $1,334 to
$1,641.51 Furthermore, this phase brought an influx of Chinese expatriates in Paki-
stan as well as cross-border mobility for students and workers traveling to China
and vice versa.52
Under PML-N’s leadership, the CPEC continued to thrive as planned with
some delays, which is to be expected for such a vast scale megaproject. From
attending the BRI Forum in 2017 to collaborating with the Chinese counterparts,
the PML-N government manifested closer ties with China than any other prede-
cessors.53 However, Nawaz Sharif’s resignation after the Supreme Court’s dis-
qualification due to the Panama corruption case charges and the rising opposition
from the PTI leader moved the country into uncertain territory. Beijing too was
wary of how the situation will unfold.54 A prospective change in government made
China reluctant to agree to new projects as those would have to be renegotiated
with the new administration55 Although 2018 began with good news of Gwadar
Free Zone completion, the future direction of the Pakistan–China relations and the
CPEC relied heavily on the upcoming elections of July 2018.56

Part III: Reaping the Benefit: Politics and Economics of

Pak-China Diplomacy under Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI):
2018–2020
The General Elections of 2018 brought Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)’s leader
Imran Khan on the political scene as he took office as the prime minister on
August 18.57 The success of a cricketer-turned-politician heralded a new direction
for the country. On a promise of providing a clean government while rejecting the
status quo and dynastic politics, Khan rose to power on an anti-corruption plat-
form and to bring social justice and accountability to Pakistani politics. With Sha-
rif behind bars and the new leader with Naya (new) Pakistan agenda, the CPEC
priorities did not align well with the PTI’s primary token of the electoral victory
of transforming governance and social services, etc.58 The CPEC priorities of
92 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra
energy and infrastructure development were evidently low on PTI’s agenda. This
had implications for the Sino-Pakistani future partnership trajectory: China had to
navigate new dynamics with the PTI-led government which took the form of the
military being the main interlocutor of the China–Pakistan relationship.59
The vast level of Chinese engagement during CPEC’s early years indicated that
both countries could harness this mega-scale economic development plan; how-
ever, with the new PTI regime, the initial expectation of grand change happening
in Pakistan started to fade relatively. Consequently, the Sino-Pakistani relations
levelled back to where they were before the launch of CPEC.60 Another reason
is that the CPEC was closely knitted with the developmental vision of Sharif’s
government, but it seemed to have slowed down with Khan’s political agendas.
In late 2018, anti-CPEC rhetoric emerged within the government. The com-
merce advisor Adbul Razak Dawood raised concerns regarding the unfair tax
breaks given to the Chinese companies under CPEC and proposed a year-off and
to renegotiate the terms of CPEC.61 This did not sit well with the anti-PTI parties
within Pakistani as well as in the Chinese circles.62 On the one hand, Khan had
to maintain the popular legitimacy by keeping his anti-corruption narrative and,
hence, the reluctance in proceeding with the CPEC speed. On the other hand, his
administration lacked experience in policy implementation at this vast level and
did not fathom the long-term perspective of the Pakistan–China relations.63
The Chinese counterparts were uncertain about the deliverables on the conti-
nuity of CPEC. As CPEC is tied to the broader BRI global plan, it could not be
stalled when immense geopolitical and strategic considerations were at stake.
This also coincided with Pakistan’s decision to negotiate the IMF loan with the
United States for its international debt payments.64 According to the State Bank
of Pakistan, the country had a $10 billion financing gap, and it required the IMF
bailout package.65 The critics of the BRI and CPEC spun this under the ‘debt-
trap’ diplomacy highlighting that Pakistan, in the face of excruciating debt, had
to borrow money from the United States for its repayments. Although Dawood’s
early anti-CPEC statement and ensuing BRI criticism in general, created resent-
ment in Beijing, the military being a strong stakeholder attempted to neutral-
ize the negative effects in due time. The Chief of Army Staff visited China and
reassured the continuation of CPEC projects.66 Later, in November 2018, Khan’s
participation in the China International Import Expo (CIIE) ahead of the 8th JCC
meeting eased the relationship and reinforced the new government’s commitment
to CPEC.67
The Sino-Pakistani relations found a new footing when Khan visited China for
the Second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in April 2019 and met with the Chinese
leadership. The second phase of China–Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
the upgradation of the Mainline-1 railway, and the construction of Rashakai SEZ
were the highlights of the discussion among other things.68 Enhancing trade ties
also gave an impetus to both sides for maintaining the existing momentum of
Sino-Pakistani diplomacy.
With the establishment of the CPEC Authority in Islamabad through the Presi-
dential Ordinance in October 2019, it became the vital institution to navigate the
 China–Pakistan 93
CPEC trajectory, oversee the effective implementation, and find new drivers of
growth.69 However, it also provided more space for the military in the decision-
making as the CPEC Authority was initially chaired by a retired Army general.70
These evolving dynamics suggest that Pakistan is transitioning to a weak-civilian
and strong military-state hybrid regime type.71
At the economic level, the Sino-Pakistani collaboration on CPEC brought
significant progress with its second phase. During the 9th JCC meeting, both
sides highlighted the CPEC achievements. As the Phase I projects were aimed
at removing major economic bottlenecks in the infrastructure and energy sector,
the deliverables can be regarded as being substantial. Out of the total projects, ten
Gwadar-related projects worth $1.37 billion were completed. A total of 17,045
MW of electricity was generated with nine projects completed and generating
5,320 MW of electricity, whereas eight projects are under construction for pro-
ducing 4,470 MW energy, and four are planned projects with a production capac-
ity of 2,544 MW. Moving into the CPEC Phase II, the aim is to focus on industrial
cooperation which centres upon the construction and operationalization of the
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Three out of the total nine SEZs have already
been under process as Rashakai, M3 Faisalabad, and Dhabeji Special Economic
Zone are in the final stages. For the socioeconomic development, the projects
catered to the provisions of drinking water, medical equipment for hospitals, agri-
culture tools and equipment, vocational school upgradation, and smart classroom
project to name a few.72 Though for absorbing the benefits of the CPEC industri-
alization to a fuller extent, Pakistan would need to improve various dimensions
of ‘human capital, rural connectivity, and business environment to attract foreign
direct investment’73 and to bring about the reforms needed.
At the political level, all these new developments under PTI leadership seem
to suggest that it was time for Khan’s government to tap on to the full potential of
CPEC and to reap the benefits of its predecessor’s development efforts – an exam-
ple of moving in this direction was Khan’s support for the single-party state and
the Chinese government’s handling of the Uyghur issue. However, the geopoliti-
cal dynamics vis-à-vis the United States and India and the economic fallout due to
the Coronavirus outbreak had serious implications on finding a new equilibrium
in the China–Pakistan relations.74 During Pakistan’s initial wave of COVID-19
infections in March and April 2020, China not only provided immense support to
Pakistan in terms of healthcare equipment, teams of medical doctors, and training
assistance but also helped in combating the locust attack in Pakistan. The initial
Chinese support included 30,000 masks, 1,000 protective goggles, long shoes,
and 1,000 protective suits for fighting against the locust attack in Pakistan dur-
ing the pandemic.75 Later on, during Pakistan’s second and third waves, China
was the first nation to donate an initial 1.2 million doses of vaccines.76 Although
Pakistan has continued to purchase and receive COVID-19 vaccinations through
the COVAX program, China has continuously supplemented this by donating and
prioritizing Pakistan with multiple batches of vaccines.77 China also committed
to supporting Pakistan to develop its mechanisms of producing the COVID-19
vaccines at scale.78
94 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra
Thus, Pakistan’s President Arif Alvi’s visit to Beijing in March 2020 amidst
the coronavirus outbreak stood as a sign of solidarity between the two nations. As
Pakistan’s economy was hit hard by the coronavirus pandemic, it hoped to revisit
some of the terms of its purchasing agreements with the independent power pro-
ducers for two CPEC projects – Sahiwal and Port Qasim.79
Regarding the CPEC continuity, despite some delays in its progress due to the
coronavirus outbreak, the CPEC projects have been resumed. Gwadar is reaching
its final stages; the Lahore Metro Orange Line reached completion and started
its operation; the motorway upgrades connecting Quetta to the Karakoram High-
way, the ML-1 railway line upgrades, and some hydroelectric power projects are
also progressing well.80 The timely completion of the projects under the CPEC
Phase II is a top priority for both countries as the CPEC progress can also enable
Pakistan to overcome the impact of the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic.81 How-
ever, it must also be understood that Pakistan’s fiscal crisis and account deficit do
not allow for the full-scale version of CPEC, as previously envisioned under the
PML-N government, to be financially feasible under the current circumstances.82
Thus, the ‘rescaling’ or ‘recalibration’ of the CPEC is necessary. Only time can
tell how adeptly the current PTI government will be able to manage the long-term
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economic growth, the CPEC-
induced process of industrialization, and the foreign debt repayments. Besides
the pandemic recovery fallout, the significant task for the PTI regime will be to
maintain the reconfigured equilibrium for the CPEC projects and continue this
established pace of the deepened Sino-Pakistani diplomacy.

Conclusion
An analysis conducted in this chapter allows us to trace the progression of the
Pakistan–China relationship over the past decade. While chalking out various
phases of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy, this analysis enables us to understand the
evolving dynamics of the relationship concerning the three ruling parties in Paki-
stan. The three phases – Sowing the Seed (PPP), Accelerated Growth (PML-N),
and Reaping the Benefits (PTI) – depicted that each Pakistani government had
demonstrated the political will to boost the relationship with China. Despite its
tumultuous path and numerous challenges, the net gains for both countries have
been positive. On the Pakistani side, the growth and investment projects have pro-
vided much-needed relief to the struggling economy. Moreover, China’s presence
and support as a strong and reliable partner have allowed Pakistan to leverage its
position at the geopolitical and the international front. For China, Pakistan has
also played a crucial role to help realize the BRI by paving new trade routes as
well as providing open market access for Chinese products.
In conclusion, an overall positive handprint on the economic and political
dimensions of Sino-Pakistani diplomacy has been observed. The aspects which
contributed to this positive handprint have been a significant improvement in the
economic development of Pakistan, an enhanced investment portfolio for Paki-
stan with diverse business opportunities, increased consumer choice for products
 China–Pakistan 95
and services in both countries, and a new nexus of power in Asia rooted in the
mutually beneficial relationship between China and Pakistan. Despite myriad
hurdles and setbacks – such as the renegotiation of terms, a change in govern-
ment, and a global pandemic – the relationship between China and Pakistan has
continued to grow. There is evidence of the Sino-Pakistani solidarity on both
the political fronts – with China publicly backing Pakistan, as well as on the
economic front with the CPEC projects resuming its operations, and a multi-
billion-dollar loan to Pakistan. The continuation and the implementation of the
CPEC projects stand as a testament to the fact that both countries are determined
to continue this pace of the relationship and to flourish the Sino-Pakistani diplo-
macy further.

NotesZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
11 Yasir
Y a s ir H Hussain,
u s s a i n , The KJIHGFEDCBA
The A Assassination
s s a s s i n a t i o n of of B Benazir
e n a z ir B h u t t o (New
Bhutto ( N e w Delhi:
D e l h i : Epitome
E p i t o m e Books, B ooks,
2008).
2 0 0 8 ).
22 Rizwan
R i z w a n Zeb, Z e b , “Pakistan–China
“ P a k i s t a n - C h i n a Relations:
R e l a t i o n s : Where
W h e r e They T h e y Go G o fromfro m H Here?”
e r e ? ” UNISCI
U N IS C I D Dis-
is ­
cussion
c u s s io n P a p e r s , nno.
Papers, o . 29
2 9 (May
( M a y 22012):0 1 2 ): 4 45–58.
5 -5 8 .
33 For
F o r hhistorical
i s t o r i c a l account
a c c o u n t of o f the
t h e relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p see
s e e Ghulam
G h u la m A Ali,
l i , China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n R Relations:
e la tio n s :
A A HHistorical
is to r ic a l A n a l y s i s (Karachi:
Analysis ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x f o r d University
U n i v e r s i t y Press,
P r e s s , 2017).
2 0 1 7 ).
44 “President
“ P re s id e n t Z Zardari’s
a r d a r i ’ s State
S t a t e Visit
V i s i t to
t o China
C h i n a to t o Open
O p e n up up N Newe w Horizons
H o r i z o n s for
fo r B Bilateral
i l a t e r a l Strategic
S tra te g ic
PPartnership,”
a r t n e r s h i p , ” Chinese
C h in e s e E m b a s s y , accessed
Embassy, a c c e s s e d January
J a n u a r y 4, 4 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , http://pk.chineseembassy.
h ttp ://p k .c h in e s e e m b a s s y .
org/eng/zbgx/t517674.htm.
o r g /e n g /z b g x /t5 1 7 6 7 4 .h tm .
55 Ishaan
I s h a a n Tharoor,
T h a r o o r , “Why “ W h y Pakistan's
P a k i s t a n 's Z Zardari
a r d a r i IIs
s Cozying
C o z y i n g Up U p tto o China,” T i m e , October
C h i n a , ” Time, O c t o b e r 17,17,
22008,
0 0 8 , hhttp://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1851332,00.html.
ttp ://c o n te n t.tim e .c o m /tim e /w o r ld /a rtic le /0 ,8 5 9 9 ,1 8 5 1 3 3 2 ,0 0 .h tm l .
66 “Real
“ R e a l Growth
G r o w t h Rates R a t e s of o f GDP
G D P at a t Constant
C o n s t a n t Basic
B a s ic P Prices
r i c e s of
o f2 2005–06,”
0 0 5 -0 6 ,” P Pakistan
a k is ta n B Bureau
u r e a u of
of
t a t i s t i c s (Government
SStatistics ( G o v e r n m e n t of of P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , nn.d.),
.d .) , w www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//tables/
w w .p b s .g o v .p k /s ite s /d e f a u lt/f ile s //ta b le s /
nnational-accounts/Table-6.pdf.
a tio n a l- a c c o u n ts /T a b le - 6 .p d f .
77 “Briefings
“ B r i e f i n g s on o n China-Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Bilateral
B i l a t e r a l Economic
E c o n o m i c and a n d Trade
T r a d e Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n in i n 2017,”
2 0 1 7 ,”
M Ministry
i n i s t r y of o f Commerce
C om m erce P Peoples
e o p le s R Republic
e p u b l i c of C h i n a , October
o f China, O c t o b e r 12, 1 2 , 22018,
0 1 8 , http://english.
h ttp ://e n g lis h .
m o f c o m .g o v .c n /a r tic le /s ta tis tic /la n m u b b /A S E A N /2 0 1 8 1 0 /2 0 1 8 1 0 0 2 7 9 5 3 3 1 .s h tm l .
mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201810/20181002795331.shtml.
88 Jian
J i a n Yang
Y a n g and a n d Rashid
R a s h id A Ahmed
h m e d Siddiqi,
S i d d i q i , “About
“ A b o u t an a n ‘All-Weather’
‘A ll-W e a th e r’ R Relationship:
e l a t i o n s h i p : Security
S e c u rity
FFoundations
o u n d a t i o n s of o f Sino-Pakistan
S i n o - P a k i s t a n Relations
R e l a t i o n s Since
S i n c e 9/11,”
9 / 1 1 , ” JJournal
o u r n a l ofo f Contemporary
C o n t e m p o r a r y China C h in a
220,0 , no.
n o . 71 7 1 (2011):
( 2 0 1 1 ) : 563–79.
5 6 3 -7 9 .
99 Rashid
R a s h id A Ahmad
hm ad K Khan,
h a n , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n anda n d China:
C h i n a : Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n in i n Counter-Terrorism,”
C o u n t e r - T e r r o r i s m , ” SStra- tr a ­
tegic t u d i e s 32/33
t e g i c SStudies 3 2 / 3 3 (2012):
( 2 0 1 2 ) : 70–78.
7 0 -7 8 .
10
1 0 Rosheen
R osheen K Kabraji,
a b r a j i , The
T h e China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n A Alliance:
llia n c e : R Rhetoric
h e to r ic a and i m i t a t i o n s (Chatham
n d LLimitations (C h a th a m
HHouse,
o u s e , 2012),2 0 1 2 ), w www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1212
w w .c h a th a m h o u s e .o r g /s ite s /d e fa u lt/f ile s /p u b lic /R e s e a r c h /A s ia /1 2 1 2
ppp_kabraji.pdf.
p _ k a b r a ji.p d f.
11
1 1 Mohammad
M o h a m m a d Waseem, W a s e e m , “Pakistan:
“ P a k is ta n : A A Majority-Constraining
M a j o r i t y - C o n s t r a i n i n g Federalism,”
F e d e r a l i s m , ” IIndia n d i a Quar-
Q u a r­
t e r l y 67,
terly 6 7 , no.
no. 3 3 (2011):
( 2 0 1 1 ) : 213–28.
2 1 3 -2 8 .
12
1 2 IramIram K Khalid
h a l i d andand N Nusrat
u s r a t Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “Financial
“ F in a n c ia l F Federalism
e d e r a l i s m in in P Pakistan:
a k i s t a n : Implications
I m p l i c a t i o n s forfo r
Centre-Province
C e n t r e - P r o v i n c e Relations,”
R e l a t i o n s , ” JJournal
o u r n a l of o fP Political S t u d i e s 25,
o l i t i c a l Studies 2 5 , no.
no. 1 1 (2018).
(2 0 1 8 ).
13
1 3 Ibid.
Ib id .
14
1 4 For F o r further
f u r t h e r detailed
d e t a i l e d analysis
a n a l y s i s of
o f the
t h e 18th
1 8 th A Amendment
m e n d m e n t of o f the
t h e Constitution
C o n s t i t u t i o n of of P Pakistan,
a k is ta n ,
see
s e e Mohammad
M o h a m m a d Waseem, W aseem , F Federalism
e d e r a l i s m in in P a k i s t a n (Lahore:
Pakistan (L ah o re: F Forum
o r u m of of F Federations,
e d e ra tio n s ,
22010);
0 1 0 ); K Katharine
a th a rin e A Adeney,
d e n e y , “A “ A StepS t e p Towards
T o w a r d s IInclusive
n c l u s i v e Federalism
F e d e r a l i s m in i n Pakistan?
P a k i s t a n ? The The
P o l i t i c s of
Politics o f tthe
h e 18th
1 8 th A m e n d m e n t , ” The
Amendment,” T h e JJournal
o u r n a l of F e d e r a l i s m 42,
o f Federalism 4 2 , no.
no. 4 4 (2012):
( 2 0 1 2 ) : 539–65.
5 3 9 -6 5 .
15
1 5 “President
“ P re s id e n t Z Zardari’s.”
a rd a r i’s .”
16
1 6 “China,
“ C h in a , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Ink In k 6 6 Deals,”
D e a l s ,” B Beijing
e ijin g R e v i e w , July
Review, J u l y 8,
8 , 22010,
0 1 0 , www.bjreview.com/head
w w w .b jr e v ie w .c o m /h e a d
line/txt/2010-07/08/content_283814.htm.
lin e /tx t/2 0 1 0 - 0 7 /0 8 /c o n te n t 2 8 3 8 1 4 .h tm .
96
96 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad
G u l- i- H in a S h a h z a d and Rabbiya
and R Kamal
a b b iy a K Nagra
am al N agra

17
1 7 Vilani
V i l a n i Peiris,
P e i r i s , “Zardari’s
“ Z a r d a r i ’ s VisitV i s i t Strengthens
S t r e n g t h e n s Pakistan-China
P a k i s t a n - C h i n a Relations,” KJIHGFEDCBA
R e l a t i o n s , ” World
W o r l d SSocialist
o c ia lis t
Web
W e b SSite, i t e , July
J u l y 22,2 2 , 2010,
2 0 1 0 , www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/07/paki-j22.html.
w w w .w s w s .o r g /e n /a rtic le s /2 0 1 0 /0 7 /p a k i-j2 2 .h tm l .
18
1 8 IIbid.
b id .
19
19 F Filippo
i l i p p o Boni,
B o n i , “Civil–Military
“ C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations
R e l a t i o n s in in P Pakistan:
a k is ta n : A A Case C a s e Study
S t u d y of o f Sino-Pakistani
S in o -P a k is ta n i
RRelations
e l a t i o n s anda n d tthe he P Port
o r t of o f Gwadar,”
G w a d a r , ” Commonwealth
C o m m o n w e a lth & & Comparative
C o m p a r a tiv e P o l i t i c s 54,
Politics 5 4 , no.
no. 4 4
(2016):
( 2 0 1 6 ) : 498–517.
4 9 8 -5 1 7 .
20
2 0 IIbid.
b id .
21
2 1 Syed
S y e d IrfanI r f a n Raza,
R a z a , “China
“ C h i n a GivenG i v e n Contract
C o n t r a c t to t o Operate
O p e r a t e GwadarG w a d a r Port,”P o r t,” D a w n , February
Dawn, F e b r u a r y 18,18,
22013,
013, w www.dawn.com/news/786992/china-given-contract-to-operate-gwadar-port.
w w .d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 7 8 6 9 9 2 / c h i n a - g i v e n - c o n t r a c t - t o - o p e r a t e - g w a d a r - p o r t .
22
2 2 Shahid
S h a h i d Javed J a v e d Burki,
B u rk i, P President
r e s id e n t Z Zardari
a r d a r i in i n China:
C h i n a : Cementing
C e m e n t i n g Old T i e s , July
O l d Ties, J u l y 10,
1 0 , 22010,
010,
wwww.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/media/isas_papers/ISAS%20Insights%20
w w .is a s .n u s .e d u .s g /w p - c o n te n t/u p lo a d s /m e d ia /is a s _ p a p e r s /I S A S % 2 0 I n s ig h ts % 2 0
107%20-%20Email%20-%20President%20Zardari%20in%20China%20-%20
1 0 7 % 2 0 -% 2 0 E m a il% 2 0 -% 2 0 P re s id e n t% 2 0 Z a rd a ri% 2 0 in % 2 0 C h in a % 2 0 -% 2 0
Cementing%20Old%20Ties.pdf.
C e m e n tin g % 2 0 O ld % 2 0 T ie s .p d f .
23
23 M Mahama h a m Hameed,H a m e e d , “Correction:
“ C o r r e c t i o n : The The P Politics
o l i t i c s of o f thet h e China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Economic
E c o n o m i c Corri- C o rri­
dor,”
d o r ,” P Palgrave C o m m u n i c a t i o n s 44,, nno.
a l g r a v e Communications o. 1 1 (July
( J u l y 2018).
2 0 1 8 ).
24
24 P PML-N’s
M L - N ’ s bbiggest i g g e s t voter
v o t e r bbase a s e isi s from
f r o m the th e P Province
r o v i n c e of o f Punjab.
P u n ja b .
25
2 5 “Manifesto,”
“ M a n ife s to ,” P M L - N , last
PML-N, l a s t modified
m o d i f i e d 2018, 2 0 1 8 , hhttps://pmln.org/delivery/manifesto/.
ttp s ://p m ln .o rg /d e liv e ry /m a n if e s to /.
26
26 B Boni,
o n i , “Civil–Military
“ C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations
R e l a t i o n s in in P Pakistan,”
a k i s t a n , ” 499. 499.
27
27 A Andrew
n d r e w Small, S m a l l , “Returning
“ R e t u r n i n g to t o the
t h e Shadows:
S h a d o w s : China, C h in a , P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , and
a n d the
t h e Fate
F a t e of o f CPEC,”
C P E C ,”
The
T h e German
G erm a n M Marshall
a r s h a ll F Fundu n d of o f the
t h e United t a t e s , September
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u b lic a tio n s /r e tu r n in g - s h a d o w s - c h in a - p a k is ta n -a n d - fa te - c p e c .
28
2 8 “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n and a n d ChinaC h i n a Diplomatic
D i p l o m a t i c Relations,”
R e la tio n s ,” M Ministry
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29
29 M Ministry
i n i s t r y of ofF Foreign
o r e ig n A Affairs
f f a i r s of o f theth e P People’s
e o p le S R Republic
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30
3 0 Javed
Javed M Malik,
a l i k , “Nawaz
“ N a w a z Sharif’s
S h a r i f ’ s Landmark
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w w .p a k i s t a n t o d a y .c o m . p k / 2 0 1 3 / 0 7 / 1 5 / n a w a z - s h a r i f s - l a n d m a r k - v i s i t - t o - c h i n a / .
31
31 F Foro r further
f u r t h e r details
d e t a i l s on o n thet h e Belt
B e l t and a n d RoadR o a d IInitiative
n i t i a t i v e (BRI),
( B R I ) , see,s e e , “Vision
“ V i s i o n andand A Actions
c t i o n s on
on
Jointly
J o in tly B Building
u i l d i n g SilkS ilk R Roado a d Economic
E c o n o m i c Belt B e l t and a n d 21st-Century
2 1 s t - C e n t u r y Maritime
M a r i t i m e SilkS ilk R Road,”
o a d , ” The
The
N National
a tio n a l D Development
e v e lo p m e n t a and nd R Reform
e f o r m Commission,
C o m m is s io n , P People’s
e o p l e ’s R Republic
e p u b l i c of o f China,
C h in a , h https://
ttp s ://
e n .n d r c .g o v .c n /n e w s r e le a s e _ 8 2 3 2 /2 0 2 0 0 2 /P 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 8 3 5 0 1 2 2 3 1 8 5 2 7 .p d f . h ttp ://e n g
en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/202002/P020200228350122318527.pdf.http://eng
lis h .w w w .g o v .c n /a r c h iv e /p u b lic a tio n s /2 0 1 5 /0 3 /3 0 /c o n te n t_ 2 8 1 4 7 5 0 8 0 2 4 9 0 3 5 .h tm .
lish.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm.
BBelte l t and
a n d RoadR oad P Portal:
o r t a l : hhttps://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.html.
ttp s ://e n g .y id a iy ilu .g o v .c n /z c h j/q w fb /8 6 7 3 9 .h tm l .
32
3 2 Saeed
S a e e d Shah S h a h and a n d Jeremy
J e r e m y Page, P a g e , “China
“ C h i n a Readies
R e a d i e s $46 $46 B Billion
i l l i o n for
fo r P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Trade
T rad e R Route,”
o u te ,”
The
T h e Wall W a l l SStreet t r e e t JJournal,
o u r n a l, A April
p r i l 17, 1 7 , 22015, 0 1 5 , www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveil-
w w w .w s j.c o m /a rtic le s /c h in a - to - u n v e il-
bbillions-of-dollars-in-pakistan-investment-1429214705.
illio n s -o f-d o lla rs -in -p a k is ta n -in v e s tm e n t-1 4 2 9 2 1 4 7 0 5 .
33
3 3 “Long-Term
“L o n g -T e rm P Plan
l a n for f o r CPEC C P E C (2017–2030),”
( 2 0 1 7 - 2 0 3 0 ) , ” China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n E Economic
c o n o m i c CorridorC o rrid o r
(CPEC)
( C P E C ) Official O ffic ia l W Website
e b s i t e (Ministry
( M i n i s t r y of of P Planning,
l a n n i n g , 2017),2 0 1 7 ) , accessed
a c c e s s e d January
J a n u a r y 7, 7 , 22021,
021,
hhttp://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec.
ttp ://c p e c .g o v .p k /lo n g - te r m - p la n - c p e c .
3 4 China–Pakistan
34 C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Economic E c o n o m i c Corridor C o r r i d o r (CPEC)( C P E C ) Official O f f i c i a l Website,
W e b s i t e , accessed
a c c e s s e d January
J a n u a r y 7,7,
22021,
021, h http://cpec.gov.pk/messages/10.
ttp ://c p e c .g o v .p k /m e s s a g e s /1 0 .
35
3 5 “Pakistani
“ P a k i s t a n i President
P re s id e n t A Asif s if A Ali li Z Zardari’s
a r d a r i’s A Another
n o t h e r SojournS o j o u r n tto o China,”
C h i n a , ” Vivekananda
V iv e k a n a n d a
IInternational
n te rn a tio n a l F o u n d a t i o n , accessed
Foundation, a c c e s s e d JanuaryJ a n u a r y 4, 2 0 2 1 , www.vifindia.org/Pakistani-
4 , 2021, w w w .v if in d ia .o r g /P a k is ta n i-
PPresident-Asif-Ali-Zardari-another-Sojourn-to-China.
r e s id e n t- A s if- A li- Z a r d a ri- a n o th e r - S o jo u rn - to - C h in a .
36
36 H Hasan
asan A Askari
s k a r i Rizvi,
R i z v i , “The“ T h e China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Economic E c o n o m i c Corridor: C o rrid o r: R Regional
e g i o n a l Cooperation
C o o p e ra tio n
and
a n d Socio-Economic
S o c io -E c o n o m ic D Development,”
e v e l o p m e n t ,” SStrategic t u d i e s 34/35,
t r a t e g i c SStudies 3 4 / 3 5 , no.
n o . 4/1
4 / 1 (Winter
( W i n t e r 20142 0 1 4 and
and
Spring
S p r i n g 2015).
2 0 1 5 ).
37
37 F Foro r tthe h e fullf u l l textt e x t of of N Nawaz
a w a z Sharif’s
S h a r i f ’ s speech,
s p e e c h , see see w www.dawn.com/news/1177312/
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 1 7 7 3 1 2 /
full-text-of-pm-nawaz-speech-at-joint-session-of-parliament-during-xi-jinping-visit.
fu ll-te x t-o f-p m -n a w a z -s p e e c h -a t-jo in t-s e s s io n -o f-p a rlia m e n t-d u rin g -x i-jin p in g -v is it .
38
3 8 IIrfan
r f a n Haider
H a i d e r and and M Mateen
a te e n H Haider,
a i d e r , “Economic
“ E c o n o m i c Corridor C o r r i d o r in i n Focus
F o c u s asa s Pakistan
P a k i s t a n China
C h i n a Sign
S ig n
51
51 M MoUs,”
o U s ,” D a w n , June
Dawn, J u n e 21, 2 1 , 22017,
0 1 7 , www.dawn.com/news/1177109.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 1 7 7 1 0 9 .
39
3 9 “Long-Term
“ L o n g -T erm P Plan
l a n forf o r CPEC
C P E C (2017–2030),”
( 2 0 1 7 - 2 0 3 0 ) , ” CPEC, C P E C , OfficialO f f i c i a l Website,
W e b s i t e , accessed
a c c e s s e d Janu-
Janu­
ary
a r y 7, 7 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , http://cpec.gov.pk/long-term-plan-cpec.
h ttp ://c p e c .g o v .p k /lo n g - te rm - p la n - c p e c .
 China–Pakistan 97
440
0 For
F o r detailed
d e t a i l e d overview
o v e r v i e w of
o f the
t h e CPEC
C P E C projects,
p r o j e c t s , see
s e e tthe
h e Ministry
M i n i s t r y of Planning
of P Develop-
la n n in g D e v e lo p ­
ment
m e n t and
a n d Special
S p e c i a l Initiatives
I n i t i a t i v e s Commission,
C o m m i s s i o n , Government
G o v e r n m e n t of
o f Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , CPEC
C P E C Portal,
P o r ta l,
hhttp://cpec.gov.pk/.
ttp ://c p e c .g o v .p k /.
441
1 “Global
“ G l o b a l IIndicators
n d i c a t o r s Database,” Pew
D a ta b a s e ,” P Research
ew R KJIHGFEDCBA
e s e a r c h Center's
C e n t e r ' s Global Attitudes
G lo b a l A r o j e c t (Pew
Project
ttitu d e s P (P e w
Research
R e s e a r c h Centre,
C e n t r e , March
M a r c h 223,
3 , 22020),
0 2 0 ) , last
l a s t modified March
m o d ifie d M a r c h 223,
3 , 22020,
0 2 0 , accessed
a c c e s s e d January
J a n u a r y 7,
7,
22021, www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/pk.
021, w w w .p e w r e s e a r c h . o r g / g l o b a l / d a t a b a s e / i n d i c a t o r / 2 4 / c o u n t r y / p k .
442
2 The Northern
The N o r t h e r n route
r o u t e starts
s t a r t s via
v i a the Khunjerab
th e K h u n j e r a b ppass.
a s s . The Western
The W e s t e r n route
r o u t e enters
e n t e r s Balochistan
B a lo c h ista n
via
v i a Dera
D e r a IIsmail
s m a i l Khan
K h a n to t o Gwadar.
G w a d a r . The T h e Central
C e n t r a l rroute o u t e passes
p a s s e s from
f r o m Dera
D e r a IIsmail
s m a i l Khan
K h a n to to
Gwadar.
G w a d a r . The T h e Eastern
E a s t e r n rroute
o u t e ppassesa s s e s through
t h r o u g h central
c e n tr a l P Punjab
u n j a b anda n d Sindh
S in d h p provinces.
ro v in c e s . A Also
ls o
see
s e e Rizvi,
R i z v i , “The
“ T h e China–-Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n E Economic
c o n o m i c Corridor,”
C o r r i d o r , ” 11. 11.
443
3 AArifrif R Rafiq,
a f i q , “The“ T h e China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n E Economic
c o n o m i c Corridor,”
C o r r i d o r , ” UnitedU n i t e d SStates
t a t e s IInstitute
n s t i t u t e ofof
PPeace,
eace, N November
o v e m b e r 13, 1 3 , 22017,0 1 7 , www.usip.org/publications/2017/10/china-pakistan-eco
w w w .u s ip .o r g /p u b lic a tio n s /2 0 1 7 /1 0 /c h in a - p a k is ta n - e c o
nnomic-corridor.
o m ic - c o r r id o r.
444
4 Ejaz
E j a z Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “Will
“ W i l l Change
C h a n g e in i n Government
G o v e rn m e n t A Affect
f f e c t China–Pakistan
C h in a -P a k is ta n E Economic
c o n o m i c Cor- C o r­
ridor?
r i d o r ? The
The B BRI,R I , CPEC
C P E C and a n d tthe h e Khan
K h a n Government:
G o v e rn m e n t: A Ann AAnalysis,”
n a l y s i s , ” Chinese
C h i n e s e JJournal
o u r n a l of of
IInternational
n te r n a tio n a l R e v i e w 1,
Review 1 , nno. o . 22 (2019).
(2 0 1 9 ).
445
5 Irfan
Irfan H Haider,
a i d e r , “Nawaz
“ N a w a z Chairs
C h a irs A APC P C to to A Allay
l l a y China-Pak
C h i n a - P a k Corridor
C o r r i d o r Fears,”
F e a rs ,” D Dawn,
aw n, M May a y 13,
13,
22015,
015, w www.dawn.com/news/1181714.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 1 8 1 7 1 4 .
446
6 The
T h e Joint
J o i n t Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n Committee
C o m m i t t e e (JCC) (JC C ) w was a s established
e s t a b l i s h e d in i n 2013
2013 w withi t h its
i t s secretariats
s e c re ta ria ts
in
i n tthe
he N National
a t i o n a l Development
D e v e l o p m e n t and a n d Reform
R e f o r m Commission
C o m m i s s i o n (NDRC) ( N D R C ) in in BBeijing,
e i j i n g , China,
C h i n a , andand
tthe
h e Ministry
M i n i s t r y of o f Planning,
P la n n in g , D Development,
e v e l o p m e n t , and and R Reforms
e f o r m s in i n IIslamabad,
s la m a b a d , P Pakistan.
a k is ta n .
477
4 Boni,
B o n i , “Civil–Military
“ C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations
R e l a t i o n s in i n Pakistan,”
P a k i s t a n , ” 500. 500.
448
8 Salman
S a l m a n Sidiqqui,
S i d i q q u i , “CPEC
“ C P E C Investment
I n v e s t m e n t Pushed
P u s h e d from f r o m $55b $ 5 5 b to t o $62b,”
$ 6 2 b , ” TheThe E Express
x p r e s s Trib-
T r ib ­
une,
une, A April
p r i l 12, 1 2 , 22017,
0 1 7 , hhttps://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpec-investment-pushed-
ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /1 3 8 1 7 3 3 /c p e c - in v e s tm e n t- p u s h e d -
55b-62b.
5 5 b -6 2 b .
449
9 “Embassy
“ E m b a s s y of o f People’s
P e o p l e ’ s Republic
R e p u b l i c of o f China
C h i n a in i n Islamabad,”
I s l a m a b a d ,” Chinese C h in e s e E m b a s s y , hhttp://
Embassy, ttp ://
ppk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/CPEC/t1625940.htm.
k .c h in e s e e m b a s s y .o rg /e n g /z b g x /C P E C /t1 6 2 5 9 4 0 .h tm .
50
50 Tang
T a n g Mengsheng,
M e n g s h e n g , “Past “P ast F Fivei v e Years
Y e a r s ofo f CPEC
C P E C in in R Review,”
e v i e w , ” The The E Express
x p r e s s Tribune,
T r ib u n e , M May a y 5,5,
0 1 9 , hhttps://tribune.com.pk/story/1966455/past-five-years-cpec-review-2.
22019, ttp s ://trib u n e .c o m .p k /s to ry /1 9 6 6 4 5 5 /p a s t- fiv e -y e a r s -c p e c -r e v ie w -2 .
51
51 Ibid.
Ib id .
52
52 AAfshan
f s h a n Subohi,
S u b o h i , “Chinese
“ C h i n e s e IInfluence
n f l u e n c e Outpaces
O u t p a c e s Influx,”
I n f lu x ,” D a w n , January
Dawn, J a n u a r y 22,2 2 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , www.www.
dawn.com/news/1384511.
d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 3 8 4 5 1 1 .
53
53 “PM,
“ P M , Chief
C h i e f Ministers
M i n i s t e r s Travel
T r a v e l tto o China
C h i n a tto o A Attend
tte n d B Belt e l t and
a n d Road
R oad F Forum,”
o r u m ,” D Dawn,a w n , MayM a y 12, 12,
22017,
017, w www.dawn.com/news/1332660.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 3 3 2 6 6 0 .
54
54 “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n PM PM N Nawaz
a w a z Sharif
S h a rif R Resigns
e s ig n s A After
f te r P Panama
anam a P Papers
a p e r s Verdict,”
V e r d i c t ,” B BBCBC N News,
ew s,
July
J u l y 228,8 , 2017,
2017, w www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40750671.
w w .b b c . c o m / n e w s / w o r l d - a s i a - 4 0 7 5 0 6 7 1 .
55
55 Small,
S m a l l , Returning
R e t u r n i n g tto o the
t h e Shadows:
S h a d o w s : China,C h in a , P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , and
a n d theth e F Fate
a t e of
o f CPEC.
CPEC.
56
56 Mengsheng,
M e n g s h e n g , “Past “ P a s t Five
F i v e Years
Y e a r s of o f CPEC
C P E C in i n Review.”
R e v ie w .”
57
57 AAsads a d Hashim,
H a s h i m , “Imran “Im ra n K Khan h a n Elected
E l e c t e d as a s Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s Prime P r i m e Minister,”
M in is te r,” A All JJazeera,
a zeera ,
AAugust
u g u s t 17, 1 7 , 22018,018, w www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/17/imran-khan-elected-as-paki
w w .a lja z e e r a .c o m /n e w s /2 0 1 8 /0 8 /1 7 /im ra n -k h a n -e le c te d - a s - p a k i
stans-prime-minister.
s ta n s -p r im e - m in is te r .
58
58 “ P T I Manifesto,”
“PTI M a n ife s to ,” H t t p s : / / P m o . g o v . p k / D o c u m e n t s / M a n i f e s t o - P t i . p d f (PTI,
Https://Pmo.gov.pk/Documents/Manifesto-Pti.pdf ( P T I , 2018).
2 0 1 8 ).
59
59 S m a l l , Returning
Small, R e t u r n i n g tto o the
t h e Shadows:
S h a d o w s : China,C h in a , P a k i s t a n , and
Pakistan, a n d theth e F a t e of
Fate c Pe C.
o f CPEC.
60
60 Ibid.
Ib id .
61
61 Farhan
F a rh a n B Bokhari,
o k h a r i , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n R Rethinks
e t h i n k s IIts Role
ts R o l e inin X Xi’si’s B Belte l t and
a n d Road
R oad P Plan,”
la n ,” F Financial
i n a n c i a l Times,
T im e s ,
September
S e p t e m b e r 9, 9 , 2018,
2018, w www.ft.com/content/d4a3e7f8-b282-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132.
w w .ft.c o m /c o n te n t/d 4 a 3 e 7 f8 - b 2 8 2 - 1 1 e 8 -9 9 c a - 6 8 c f 8 9 6 0 2 1 3 2 .
62
62 Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “Will
“ W i l l Change
C h a n g e in i n Government
G o v e rn m e n t A Affect
f f e c t China
C h in a - – Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Economic
E c o n o m i c Corridor?”
C o rrid o r? ”
12.
12.
63
63 Ibid.
Ib id .
64
64 Shahbaz
Shahbaz R Rana,
a n a , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Knocks
K n o c k s at a t IMF
IM F D Dooro o r tto o A Avoid
v o i d Default,”
D e f a u l t ,” TheThe E Express
x p r e s s Trib-
T r ib ­
u n e , October
une, O c t o b e r 8, 8 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/1821091/2-much-drama-pti-govt-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to ry /1 8 2 1 0 9 1 /2 - m u c h - d ra m a - p ti-g o v t-
announces-approach-imf-
a n n o u n c e s - a p p r o a c h - im f - b bailout-package/.
a i l o u t - p a c k a g e /.
65
65 Ibid.
Ib id .
98 Gul-i-Hina Shahzad and Rabbiya Kamal Nagra
66 Hussain, “Will Change in Government Affect China–Pakistan Economic Corridor?” 12.
67 “PM Arrives in Shanghai to Attend China International Import Expo (CIIE),” The
News, November 4, 2018, www.thenews.com.pk/latest/389613-pm-arrives-in-
shanghai-to-attend-china-international-import-expo-ciie.
68 Ibid.
69 Mariana Baabar, “CPEC Authority Established Through Presidential Ordinance,”
Geo News, October 8, 2019, www.geo.tv/latest/250407-cpec-authority-established-
through-ordinance.
70 Siegfried O. Wolf, “Development Versus Democracy? The CPEC and Civil–Military
Relations in Pakistan,” in The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor of the Belt and
Road Initiative. Contemporary South Asian Studies (Cham: Springer, 2020).
71 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Hybrid ‘Civilian–Military’ Government Weakens Democ-
racy,” East Asia Forum, January 21, 2020, www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/01/21/
pakistans-hybrid-civilian-military-government-weakens-democracy/.
72 “Energy: China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Official Website,” China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Ministry of Planning, 2019), http://cpec.gov.
pk/energy.
73 Nasir Iqbal, “CPEC: Phases and Challenges,” The News, January 3, 2020, www.the
news.com.pk/print/592658-cpec-phases-and-challenges.
74 “Pakistan’s Khan Backs China on Uighurs, Praises One-Party System,” Al Jazeera,
July 21, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/2/pakistan-imran-khan-china-uighurs.
75 Shafqat Ali, “Imran Khan Has Stabilised Economy, Outgoing Chinese Envoy,” The
Nation, September 18, 2020, https://nation.com.pk/19-Sep-2020/imran-khan-has-
stabilised-economy-outgoing-chinese-envoy.
76 “China Gifts Pakistan 1.2 Million COVID-19 Vaccine Doses,” The Diplomat, Febru-
ary 4, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/china-gifts-pakistan-1-2-million-covid-
19-vaccine-doses.
77 Asif Shahzad, “Pakistan Receives 500,000 Vaccine Doses from China, Doubling
Available Supply,” Reuters, March 17, 2021, www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-pakistan-vaccine-idUSKBN2B925F.
78 “Pakistan, China Stand Together in Fight Against COVID-19,” Global Times, June 25,
2021, www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1227070.shtml.
79 Khaleeq Kiani, “Pakistan Urges China to Soften Terms for Power Deals,” Dawn,
April 16, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1549299.
80 Small, Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC.
81 Muhammad Akbar Notezai, “CPEC 2.0: Full Speed Ahead,” The Diplomat, Septem-
ber 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/cpec-2-0-full-speed-ahead/.
82 Small, Returning to the Shadows: China, Pakistan, and the Fate of CPEC.
6 Afghanistan–Pakistan
Relations
From Uncertainty and
Confrontation to Optimism
Muhammad Azam

Although Afghanistan and Pakistan often claim to have friendly relations, an

undercurrent of irreconcilable differences has persisted and resulted in periods of
conflicts and cooperation. The historical origin of this friction lies in the Durand
Line – that is the 2,611-kilometre long boundary that separates the two countries.
It was demarcated in 1893 between the then Afghan ruler Amir Abd al-Rahman
Khan and the British India.1 After the British left the Indian subcontinent in 1947,
Afghanistan refused to accept it as an international border with Pakistan. This
study endeavours to analyse the various aspects of the Pakistan–Afghanistan rela-
tionship, including differences; sources of conflict and cooperation; the cultural,
historic and ethnic bonds, the impact of the role of regional and global political
factors and the security challenges.
A common religion and a large number of Pashtuns living on the both sides of
the Durand Line are the basic factors that create a sense of brotherhood among the
people of the two countries. However, as Pakistan applied for the UN member-
ship as a new member, Hosayn Aziz, the then Afghan representative to the United
Nations, on 30 September 1947 cast the only vote against Pakistan’s application.
Nevertheless, barely 1 month later, on 20 October, the vote was rescinded, and it
was hoped that bilateral discussions would lead to an understanding between the
two countries.2 Officials of both sides held talks in Karachi and exchanged ambas-
sadors in February 1948.3
Finding no favourable reception to its territorial claims, Afghanistan brought
forth the idea of ‘Pashtunistan,’ comprising the Pakistani territories: the frontier
states of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Baluchistan and the Baluchistan states of Kalat,
Kharan, Makran and Las Bela.4 Some analysts also ascribe Afghanistan’s espousal
of Pashtunistan to its domestic or national considerations.5
Another reason of conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan was their join-
ing the opposite security blocks during the 1950s in the backdrop of the Cold
War. Pakistan joined the US-led capitalist block and signed defence pacts with
the United States. Afghanistan, on the other hand, sided with the USSR and India.
Both Moscow and New Delhi backed Kabul on its dispute with Pakistan via-a-vis
the Durand Line issue.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-8
100 Muhammad Azam
The Idea of Pak–Afghan Confederation
It is interesting to note that parallel with differences, there were discussions
for the confederation of Pakistan and Afghanistan. There were different views
about the origin and the development of the idea. It was first raised by the leader
of the Ismaili sect, Agha Khan (1877–1957), the first president of All India Mus-
lim League.6 The idea gained some momentum in the mid-1950s. Afghanistan
showed even an interest in a defence pact with Pakistan. The idea of confederation
gained momentum when at times the adverse propaganda of the Afghan media
against Pakistan on the subject of Pashtunistan was lessened.7 Later, emphasis for
the confederation came from Afghanistan. It had a rationale. At that time Pakistan
was a close ally of the United States, so perhaps this might have been a proposal
aired in Afghanistan based on the rationale that a close union with Pakistan was a
way to acquire US aid to counteract Soviet influence in Afghanistan.8 On the other
hand, according to some analysts, the idea of confederation was pushed forward
by Colonel A.S.B. Shah, Pakistani ambassador to Kabul. He was a staunch sup-
porter of closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.9
Among the promoters of the idea of a confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan
were Agha Khan, Afghan Foreign Minister Naim Khan (1953–1955), and Paki-
stan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Aslam Khattak. Reportedly, Afghan ambassa-
dor to the United States, Naim Khan, solicited American support to advance the
idea. Aslam Khattak, a leading Pakistani diplomat and politician, had discussed
the proposal with Afghan leader and Prime Minister Sardar Daoud Khan. Regard-
ing Pakistan’s reaction, Khattak stated that he followed up the idea with the Prime
Minister Husseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy and his successor Firoz Khan Noon. As
stated by Khattak, Noon responded, ‘We should have no difficulty accepting King
Zahir Shah as the constitutional Head of State’ and President Iskandar Mirza ‘con-
curred with this.’10
The idea of confederation was expanded to include Iran. Delivering a speech
in Quetta in August 1962, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, for the first time
publicly spoke about a confederation of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.11 He
showed his willingness of binding three Muslim countries into a larger political
system.12 He stated, ‘I will welcome a possible confederation of Afghanistan, Iran
and Pakistan.’13 However, in the same speech he made a few caustic references
about Afghanistan’s refusal to accept the Durand Line as international frontier.
This was probably to forestall any prompt and consequential deliberations on the
proposal.14 Thus, the plan lingered with an outward show of goodwill. As subse-
quent events showed, there was no confirmation that it was seriously taken up by
any of the governments involved.15
To understand what led to the idea of confederation, three key factors prompted
were geographic proximity; religion; and history of linguistic, ethnic, cultural and
political links. Generally, there was a tendency of compliance to political author-
ity in these three nations. This increased the prospects of its acceptance. A similar
tendency in the three countries’ world view towards the developed nations made
them want to project a positive, cooperative image of themselves to potential
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 101
donor nations. Likewise, common religion and historically long ethnic linkages
further increased the prospects of unity.
Parallel to this, there were several centrifugal forces which ultimately domi-
nated and prevented any sort of confederation. Acting against the federation were
tribal, regional, cultural, political, geographic and international factors. Intense
particularistic attitudes are connected to regionalism, tribalism or ethnocentrism.
‘Pashtunistan’ was a manifestation of the pre-eminent ethnocentric trait.16 Fur-
thermore, the contrasting ruling structures of a monarchy in Afghanistan and a
quasi-presidential system in Pakistan presented political obstacles. There were at
least two geographic factors that also stood in the way of any such confederation:
the ‘empty triangle,’ that is the area lying between Karachi, Meshed and Khor-
ramshahr, was ‘a zone of inaccessibility’ due to it being backwards with a lack of
infrastructure; different levels of political, social and economic development in
Pakistan and Iran vis-à-vis Afghanistan created an imbalance, and the remoteness
of East Pakistan (which declared independence in 1971 and became Bangladesh)
perturbed some Bengalis on the thought of a confederation in the west wing.17
Furthermore, global considerations, like Soviet interests in Afghanistan and
Indian opposition, were other obstacles to any scheme that would ensure a stable
relationship between the neighbouring countries.18 The fact that Afghanistan was
receiving political, economic and military assistance from the USSR and Pakistan
was getting the same from the United States put both countries in opposing camps.
Moreover, Kabul’s hostility towards Pakistan was a serious impediment19 that
had to be overcome for a confederation to eventuate. On the basis of these facts,
some top leaders such as Chaudhry Mohammed Ali and Ayub Khan expressed
their reservations about the idea of confederation. Country’s leading daily, Dawn,
published editorials criticizing the plan.20 Pakistani leaders were suspicious why
Afghanistan, which did not accept Pakistan’s boundary with it, readily accepted
the idea of a confederation. The idea disappeared in the following decades.

Daoud Presidency and Détente

Detente with PakistanZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
During
D u r i n g ZahirZ a h i r Shah’s
S h a h ’ s rule
r u l e in
i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n in i n the
t h e 1960s,
1 9 6 0 s , ttwow o contracting
c o n t r a c t i n g ttrends
r e n d s were
w e re
noticed in its relations with Pakistan. Officially, Afghanistan
n o tic e d in its r e la tio n s w ith P a k is ta n . O f f ic ia lly , A f g h a n is ta n g o v e r n m e n t m is s e d government missed
no
n o opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y of o f avowing
a v o w i n g support
s u p p o r t forf o r Pashtunistan
P a s h t u n i s t a n and a n d officially
o f f i c i a l l y rejecting
r e j e c t i n g the
th e
Durand
D u r a n d L i n e . I n p r a c t i c e , h o w e v e r , r e l a t i o n s r e m a i n e d n o r m a l . I t w a s obvious
Line. In practice, however, relations remained normal. It was o b v io u s
from
f r o m tthe h e ffacta c t that
t h a t tthere
h e r e were
w e r e no no v visa
i s a restrictions
r e s t r i c t i o n s bbetween
e t w e e n tthe h e ttwo w o countries
c o u n t r i e s and
and
that there was free movement of people across
th a t th e re w a s fre e m o v e m e n t o f p e o p le a c ro ss th e b o rd e r. the border.
A
A shift
s h i f t in
i n relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p ttook
o o k place
p l a c e asa s ini n July
J u l y 1973,
1973, D Daouda o u d overthrew
o v e r t h r e w tthe h e mon-
m on­
archy and took power in his hands. This perturbed Pakistan
a rc h y a n d to o k p o w e r in h is h a n d s . T h is p e rtu rb e d P a k is ta n b e c a u s e D a o u d w because Daoud wasas
21 22
an
a n avowed
a v o w e d ‘Pakistan-baiter’
‘ P a k i s t a n - b a i t e r ’ 2 1 and
a n d ‘champion
‘ c h a m p i o n of o f the
t h e Pashtunistan
P a s h t u n i s t a n cause.’
c a u s e .’ 2 2 Given
G iv e n
his
h i s anti-Pakistan
a n t i - P a k i s t a n ttone,
o n e , Daoud
D a o u d did d i d not
n o t even
e v e n attend
a t t e n d ttheh e Islamic
I s l a m i c summit
s u m m i t in i n Lahore
L a h o r e inin
November
N o v e m b e r 1 9 7 4 . T h e m a n t r a o f P a s h t u n i s t a n w a s a m p l i f i e d d u r i n g t h i s ttenure.
1974. The mantra of Pashtunistan was amplified during this 23
e n u r e .23
However, the confrontational policy with Pakistan was
H o w e v e r , th e c o n f r o n ta tio n a l p o lic y w ith P a k is ta n w a s e c o n o m ic a lly d a m a g in geconomically damaging
ffor
o r thet h e land-locked
l a n d - l o c k e d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n whose
w h o s e ttrade ra d e d depended
e p e n d e d on on P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to to a a great
g re a t
extent.
e x te n t.
102 Muhammad Azam
In the later years of Daoud’s presidency, Pakistan–Afghan relations began to
improve. This change resulted due to changes in Daoud’s policy towards Paki-
stan. In fact, Afghan economy was rapidly deteriorating. Country’s reliance on the
Soviet Union multiplied latter’s influence in the country. Daoud decided to reori-
ent his foreign policy away from the USSR and mend fences with Pakistan. On
the other hand, Soviets were also not happy with many of Daoud’s policies, espe-
cially his consolidation of power and independent foreign policy. In 1976, Daoud
invited Zulfikar Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan for a 5-day visit (7–11
June). The tour was reciprocated by Daoud in August the same year. In June 1977,
when returning from a visit to Iran, Bhutto made a stopover in Kabul. In spite of
drastic changes in Pakistan in the form of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup on
5 July 1977, the détente between Islamabad and Kabul remained intact. General
Zia paid a visit to Kabul in October the same year. Daoud reciprocated it. Both
sides scheduled a second meeting in 1978 in Kabul to finalize matters pertaining
to their bilateral relations. In the course of his interactions with Pakistani leaders,
Daoud had indicated that he had altered his stand on the issue of Pashtunistan and
was willing to negotiate adjustments in it.24 However, this second meeting never
transpired. The communist Parcham Party led by Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah
Amin, who was the Head of the Khalq faction that had infiltrated the Afghan
army, staged a coup on 27 April 1978 (Karmal had earlier escaped to Russia, and
Amin was under house arrest at the time). In what was called the Saur Revolution,
Daoud and his family were arrested and assassinated on 28 April.
However, in-fighting among the communist leaders of Afghanistan and the
instability of the regime necessitated the USSR to send troops to occupy the coun-
try, oust Hafizullah Amin and install Babrak Karmal as president. On 26 Decem-
ber 1979, Russian tanks entered Kabul.

Soviet Invasion, Civil War and the Taliban

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1988), Pakistan played an indis-
pensable role in helping the Mujahideen (the Afghan resistance) to oust the Soviet
troops. Pakistan’s response to the Soviet invasion was instinctive, expressing the
‘gravest concerns.’25 Its reaction to the invasion was two-fold. First, it enhanced
pressure on the USSR on the diplomatic front. Second, it aided the Mujahideen
on the battlefield. On the diplomatic front, Pakistan, with the support of several
other countries, engaged the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the
United Nations. A special session of the foreign ministers of the OIC member
states in Islamabad was held on 29 January 1980 that suspended Afghanistan’s
membership of the organization. Under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ banner, the UN
General Assembly passed a resolution on 14 January 1980 seeking instant depar-
ture of the Soviet forces. Pakistan’s role in the conduct of Geneva talks – 12
sessions in total – and the conclusion of the Geneva Accords in April 1988 were
crucial. Pakistan’s resolve to buttress the Afghan resistance ‘was not only morally
right but based on enlightened self-interest.’26 The Geneva Accords led to a (a)
departure of Soviet troops, (b) ended US involvement without however any final
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 103
settle and (c) the metamorphosis of the international war into a civil war which
lasted for another decade. An unending civil war ensued. The Mujahideen fought
against Najibullah’s communist regime which took over after Soviet departure
and fell in April 1992. Thereafter, a struggle for power among the various armed
factions that had fought the Soviets started. Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek factions of
the Mujahideen, along with the groups of veterans like Hekmatyar and Rabbani,
began fighting with each other to gain power.
Due to the American disengagement, Pakistan had to deal with the refugee
crisis on one hand and with the unfolding developments of the civil war in war-
ravaged country on the other. Pakistan kept on backing the Afghan Mujahideen,
particularly when they refused to join the communist regime in Kabul. In this sce-
nario, regional powers including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and India assumed
a greater role in Afghanistan. Regional politics, particularly the hostile relations
between India–Pakistan, further complicated the Afghan imbroglio.
In collaboration with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan attempted to bring peace
to the embattled country. They facilitated two accords among the Afghan Muja-
hideen leaders in 1992 and 1994 which came to nothing due to fierce rivalry
between them. A US-initiated peace process equally failed in 1998 despite having
started with ‘spectacular momentum.’27 The process brought five Taliban and nine
Northern Alliance members across the negotiation table in Pakistan. But, then,
suddenly, the Taliban attacked Takhar Province aborting the peace process.28
The civil war among the various factions can be said to have lasted from 1992
to 2001. From 1996 to 2001, there was a period of comparatively less uncertainty
when the Taliban took over and ruled Kabul and other Pashtun areas. The North-
ern Alliance comprising mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks held the Panjshir Valley. This
was not anywhere near an ideal situation for Pak–Afghan ties, but at least some
form of governance began to function again.
Pakistan is widely believed to have supported the Taliban in their speedy
advances against the rival Mujahideen groups. The Rabbani regime (that the
mediators managed to install for a short while), America and other critics held
Pakistan responsible for Taliban’s victories, and they did not give due considera-
tion to the other Mujahideen, as is asserted by former foreign minister of Pakistan,
Abdul Sattar.29
After the Taliban captured Kabul in May 1997, Pakistan immediately recog-
nized their government. Pakistan considered it necessary on the following reasons:
(a) In order to manage the everyday affairs in the war-torn country; (b) to process
visas for travelers and (c) to open transit trade for land-locked Afghanistan.30
Unlike other governments in Afghanistan, the Taliban regime did not provoke
Pakistan. No special benefit, however, accrued to Pakistan during the Taliban
rule – even on the issue of the Durand Line. The policy of de-recognition of the
Durand Line as the international boundary was never reviewed by them therefore
tacitly the Taliban did not renounce Afghan claims on Pakistani territories. The
extent of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban may be gauged by the fact
that they forthrightly turned down Pakistan’s request not to harm the Bamiyan
Buddha statues and refused to sever their ties with al-Qaeda – that is they ‘paid
104 Muhammad Azam
little heed to Pakistan’s suggestions.’31 Pakistan restricted formal relations with
the Taliban regime and closed the Afghan banks when they were penalized by
the UN Security Council in December 2000 for destroying historical monuments.
Former foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, once stated that developments since the
1990s have demonstrated that a Pakistani Minister’s inference that the Taliban
were ‘our boys’ was a misconception and the notion of the Americans that the Tal-
iban were Pakistan’s surrogates was a glaring gaffe.32 In Pakistan, many believe
the Afghan Taliban were not any strategic asset.
After their recapture of Kabul and other main cities in August 2021, Pakistan
has lucidly and publicly affirmed that it is not going to recognize the Taliban
government unilaterally.33 After fleeing from Kabul, Ghani averred that approxi-
mately 15,000 fighters joined the Afghan Taliban from Pakistan, but both Pakistan
and the United States repudiated it.34

9/11, Peace Efforts and Interference

The 9/11 and the US War on Terror transformed Pakistan–Afghan ties in a dra-
matic way. The US invasion caused a repetition of several of the same issues that
Pakistan as a neighbouring and frontline state faced at the time of the Soviet inva-
sion during the 1980s such as a fresh influx of Afghan refugees; a security threat
to its western boundary and a resultant huge pressure on its military to maintain
law and order situation and pressure on its economy. At the time of the invasion,
Pakistan had to make a ‘pivotal and courageous turn toward the United States.’35
It had to abandon the Taliban regime when the United States decided to bring
them down for sheltering and shielding al-Qaeda leaders. As Pakistan’s military
ruler accepted WoT (partially to gain Western legitimacy to his military regime),
the country allowed the US forces to use its ports and air bases for logistics and
supplies for the US-led coalition forces of NATO fighting in Afghanistan. As the
United Nations initiated the process of setting up another government in Decem-
ber 2001, Pakistan recommended ‘a fair representation’ for Pushtuns, Tajiks,
Hazaras and Uzbeks.36 In 2000s, several mechanisms for cooperation involving
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) were instituted. These included meetings of foreign ministers, a
Joint Economic Commission, the jirga peace process, a tripartite commission on
refugees together with the UNHCR to oversee border security and cross-border
violations.37
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan during the early years of Karzai regime
(2001 to 2014) were relatively less unpleasant. In 2004, for example, ‘a positive
thrust’ was apparent at the time of Musharraf’s visit to extend felicitations on Kar-
zai’s electoral success. Similarly, the start of the next year ‘marked a high point’
of the mutual relations on the occasion of Pakistan’s invitation to Karzai to be the
guest of honour at the Pakistan Day parade on 23rd of March.38 Hamid Karzai
referred to Pakistan as a ‘twin brother,’ ‘conjoined twins,’ ‘brother country,’ and
‘great friend.’39 However, in foreign relations, traditional attitudes have a habit
of lingering and re-emerging when stakeholders perceive the need to reassert
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 105
them. It did not take long for the ties to start becoming sour again. Karzai govern-
ment banned Pakistani newspapers and websites alleging that they indulged in
anti-Afghan propaganda. In reaction, Pakistan disallowed Afghan TV channels.
In September 2006, Karzai and Musharraf had a rancorous summit in President
Bush’s presence. The extent of resentment ‘reached such alarming proportions’
that the Group of Eight (G-8) extended invitations to both of these countries to
attend the foreign ministers’ meeting in Potsdam on 30 May 2007 in order to
bring them together.40 Taliban attacks in Afghanistan allegedly from safe havens
in Pakistan and the hideouts of the Haqqani network hindered efforts for ‘trust
building’ between the two states. Ashraf Ghani made positive gestures during his
visit to Islamabad after securing his first term as the president, but these obstacles
continued to mar relations.41 Operations carried out by Pakistan’s armed forces
to clean out terrorists together with a rising number of American drone attacks in
2005 could not stop Taliban activities.42
Kabul and Islamabad had to continue efforts for years and years to bring
the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Before the formation of the High
Peace Council, views on its composition were exchanged with Islamabad. In
March 2010, Karzai promised Pakistan a role in the proposal for ‘reconciliation
and reintegration’ of the Afghan Taliban and pledged to take Pakistan into confi-
dence in connection with any political arrangement with the Taliban. Radio Free
Europe revealed that a Pakistani delegation had participated in the negotiations
between the Afghan government and Taliban delegates in Kabul in 2010.43
In 2010, Karzai felt it was important to have peace negotiations with the Tal-
iban. The Taliban had two conditions: an immediate evacuation of all foreign
troops and release of all Taliban prisoners. In 2012, Pakistan and Afghanistan con-
curred to set up a combined peace commission to make contact with the Afghan
Taliban leaders in North Waziristan.44 Pakistan hosted the High Peace Council
Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani in November 2012 in Islamabad and thereafter set
free several senior Taliban leaders held in Pakistan, because the Karzai govern-
ment had been striving to obtain their release. According to media reports, on 30
December 2012, four more Afghan Taliban prisoners were released, including for-
mer justice minister Mullah Nooruddin Turabi and former governor of Helmand
Province, Abdul Bari. Twenty-six detainees were freed in two batches in 2012.
However, relations between the Karzai government and Pakistan were filled
with suspicion, and the United States kept asking the latter to ‘do more’ and get
rid of safe havens in its territory. In fact, both the United States and Afghanistan
had initially burned their boats as far as relations with the Taliban were concerned
and now depended on Pakistan to bring them to the negotiating table. Karzai was
not able to make any headway in talks with the Taliban, as the latter refused to
recognize the government. As Ashraf Ghani became the president, Karzai was
made Chairman of the High Peace Conference.
In June 2015, Pakistan brought the Afghan Taliban to Murree (a hill resort in
Pakistan) to hold negotiations with the representatives of the Ghani regime. How-
ever, Kabul’s revelation that Taliban chief Mullah Omar had breathed his last
in 2013 turned out to be a stumbling block for these negotiations, and the next
106 Muhammad Azam
meeting that was to be held on 31 July 2015 was cancelled. Pakistan warned
that they would banish the Quetta Shura (the council of elders of the Taliban in
Quetta, Pakistan) if they did not consent to restore the peace talks.45 Friends of
Afghanistan backed up endeavours for ceasefire and settlement. A gathering of 22
countries on the platform of the Heart of Asia (HoA) met on 8 December 2015 in
Islamabad and laid stress on the vital importance of termination of hostilities in
Afghanistan. The Afghan ambassador in Islamabad acknowledged Pakistan’s role
in the ceasefire on the occasion of the religious holiday of Eid al-Fitr in 2018.46
Russia also stepped into the picture. On 9 November 2018, a peace confer-
ence was arranged in Moscow that was attended by the Taliban, all the regional
countries and the Central Asian Republics. This was the first time the Taliban sent
a delegation to an international conference. The delegation was led by Stanikzai,
and the Taliban conceded that there should be peace but insisted on the precondi-
tion of complete withdrawal of foreign troops.
The Taliban did not recognize the US-backed Kabul regime, and their main
demand was the US withdrawal. In 2019, the US opened direct negotiations with
the Taliban in Doha. Pakistan was very much instrumental in arranging these
talks. At the end, on 29 February 2020, the United States concluded a watershed
agreement with the Afghan Taliban. However, these were to be followed up with
intra-Afghan peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government
to arrive at a permanent settlement.
During Karzai and Ghani regimes, Kabul and Islamabad continued to com-
plain of interference by the other in their internal affairs despite their policy of
non-interference. Afghanistan accused Pakistan of abetting the Afghan Taliban,
and the latter held the former responsible for allowing India to fan insurgency
in Balochistan, for planning other terrorist and sabotage activities and support-
ing Pakistani Taliban. Pakistan is vulnerable to attacks by militant organizations,
including the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, having sanctuaries in Afghanistan.47 Moreover,
four suspected agents of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghan-
istan’s secret agency, were captured from Pishin (near Quetta, Balochistan) in
February 2018.48
Troubles continued to hamper cooperation. Alleging ‘undue interference’ by
the governor of Nangarhar Province, Pakistan closed its Jalalabad consulate in
September 2018. Afghan officials made allegations in August 2018 that the Tali-
ban’s attack on Ghazni was supported by Pakistani citizens. Two months later,
Ghani contended that the latest assault in Kandahar was planned in Pakistan.
Pakistan rejected the allegations.49 Such accusations and rejections were a routine
matter. In March 2019, Khan angered Ghani by proposing ‘an impartial interim
government’ to hold free and fair elections, as he asserted that peace cannot return
to the country otherwise.50
Violent activities along the border also continued. For example Pakistan
claimed that it eliminated 50 Afghan soldiers on 7 May 2017 in a cross-border
exchange of fire, accusing Afghan border police for starting the skirmish. Eleven
people lost their lives in border clashes on 15 July 2018. Four Pakistani soldiers
were slain in militant fire from Afghanistan on 14 September 2019. A Pakistani
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 107
soldier was killed by Afghan gunfire on 22 September 2020. Afghanistan accused
the Pakistan armed forces of firing a rocket into their territory that caused civilian
casualties on 16 July 2020.
Border violence did not end in 2021, too, and several Pakistani troops were
martyred in firing from across the border. Islamabad accused that over 5,000
anti-Pakistan militants was present in Afghanistan.51 There was danger even after
Taliban’s taking control of Kabul, hence Islamabad was contemplating to close
down the Chaman border in the early days of September 2021.52 The Pak–Afghan
boundary is regarded among the most dangerous ones in the world.53
In the run-up to Taliban’s recapture of Kabul on 15 August 2021, a number of
Afghan soldiers took refuge in Pakistan to escape the onslaught of Taliban.54 In
the wake of the fall of Kabul, Pakistan rolled out historic evacuation operations in
which hundreds of flights (400 till 28 August) took part bringing around 12,000
evacuees to Pakistan, including ISAF and NATO troops and Afghan and foreign
civilians from 38 countries.55

Conclusion
Cooperative relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are vitally important for
both sides. Pakistan depends upon Afghanistan for access to Central Asia and
Russia, while the latter is landlocked and critically depends upon the former for
its trade. Several factors contribute towards friendly relations between the two
countries. Both sides have historic, cultural, religious and ethnic bonds. The two
nations had mutual struggle against imperialism first against the British Empire
and later against the Soviet imperialism. The idea of Pakistan–Afghan confedera-
tion in fact reflected the desire of unity, although it could not be materialized. Both
countries have mutual economic and trade interests vital to progress and devel-
opment of their people. Pakistan believes that its support of the Afghans against
Soviet occupation, its efforts for a peaceful transition at the time of the overthrow
of the communist regime, its endeavours and cooperation with Karzai and Ghani
administrations for bringing peace and stability and, above all, its opening up
of the border for millions of Afghan refugees have been in line with the inter-
ests of the international community as well as for the goodwill of the Afghan
people. While UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation of 4.4 million Afghan
refugees from 2002 to 2021, Pakistan still hosts well over 1.4 million registered
and many more unregistered Afghan refugees, residing in more than 0.2 million
households.56 A spectre of refugees looms large once again after the withdrawal
of US armed forces as the UN has warned of around 0.5 million more Afghan
refugees by the end of 2021.57
It is in the core interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan not to allow their territo-
ries to be used by militants or to serve the interests of imperialist states. It will also
benefit the two nations to keep the border peaceful and favourable for interna-
tional trade, conducted mainly through the Khyber and Chaman passes. Contrary
to this, adverse and hostile relations between the two neighbours will negatively
impact trade and the Afghan peace process. A number of factors are responsible
108 Muhammad Azam
for this unwanted situation, including a huge trust deficit. Restoring the trust is
not an easy task. The cardinal reason, however, behind these unfriendly relations
between Afghanistan and Pakistan is the former’s perpetual refusal to accept the
Durand Line as the Pakistan–Afghan border and claim on some Pakistani terri-
tories. The settlement of these issues is important for trouble-free relations. With
dramatic changes with the advent of Taliban, it remains to be seen if the Taliban
regime musters up enough strength to put a full stop to sparring over the Durand
Line that has marred Pakistan–Afghan relations since the outset and driven the
region into war and violence for decades. If done with, the two neighbours will
benefit tremendously in the shape of materialization of multinational projects like
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Pipeline and Central Asia
South Asia Electricity Transmission Project (CASA-1000) and enhancement of
international trade with Central Asian states and beyond.

NotesZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
11 KJIHGFEDCBA
P Pakistan:
a k is ta n : M Map a p SShowing
h o w i n g LLengthe n g t h of ofB Borders
orders w with
ith N Neighbouring
e i g h b o u r i n g Countries
C o u n tr ie s & & Coastal
C o a s ta l
i n e (Survey
LLine ( S u r v e y of o f Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , nn.d.),
.d .) , w www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/SiteImage/Downloads/
w w .s u r v e y o f p a k is ta n .g o v .p k /S ite I m a g e /D o w n lo a d s /
ppakistan_showing_border_length.pdf.
a k is ta n _ s h o w in g _ b o r d e r _ le n g th .p d f.
22 “General
“ G e n e ra l A Assembly
s s e m b l y Official
O f fic ia l R Records,
e c o r d s , 92nd
9 2 n d Plenary
P le n a ry M Meeting,”
e e t i n g , ” September
S e p t e m b e r 30, 3 0 , 1947.
1947.
Cited
C i t e d ini n S.
S . M.
M . Burke,
B u rk e, P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s F Foreign
o r e ig n P Policy:
o lic y : A Ann H Historical
is to r ic a l A n a l y s i s (London:
Analysis (L o n d o n : E Elyly
HHouse,
o u s e , 1973),
1 9 7 3 ) , 73.
73.
33 AArwin
rw in R Rahi,
a h i , “Afghanistan
“ A f g h a n i s t a n and a n d Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s Oft-Ignored
O ft-Ig n o re d H History
i s t o r y (1947–1978),”
( 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 7 8 ) , ” TheThe
E Express T r i b u n e , September
x p r e s s Tribune, S e p t e m b e r 10, 1 0 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , http://tribune.com.pk/article/97165/afghanistan-
h ttp ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /a r tic le /9 7 1 6 5 /a f g h a n is ta n -
and-pakistans-oft-ignored-history-1947–1978.
a n d -p a k is ta n s -o ft-ig n o re d -h is to ry -1 9 4 7 -1 9 7 8 .
44 BBurke,
u rk e , P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s F Foreign
o r e ig n P o l i c y , 68–69.
Policy, 6 8 -6 9 .
55 K Khurshid
h u rs h id H Hasan,
a s a n , “Pakistan–Afghanistan
“ P a k i s t a n - A f g h a n i s t a n Relations,”
R e la tio n s ,” A Asian
s i a n SSurveyu r v e y 22,, nno. o. 7 7 (1962):
(1 9 6 2 ):
14–15,
1 4 - 1 5 , https://doi.org/10.2307/3023688.
h ttp s ://d o i.o rg /1 0 .2 3 0 7 /3 0 2 3 6 8 8 .
66 D Department
e p a r t m e n t of o f State,
S t a t e , “Outlook
“ O u t l o o k for fo r A Afghanistan,”
f g h a n i s t a n , ” inin F Foreign
o r e ig n R Relations
e l a t i o n s of
o f the
t h e United
U n ite d
SStates:
ta te s : D Diplomatic
ip lo m a tic P a p e r s , vol.
Papers, v o l . 11,
11, N NIE IE – - 53–54
5 3 - 5 4 (Washington,
( W a s h i n g t o n , DC, D C , 1954).
1 9 5 4 ).
77 “Report
“ R e p o r t ofo fA Afghan–Pakistani
f g h a n - P a k i s t a n i Confederation
C o n f e d e r a t i o n Plans,”
P la n s ,” N NSC SC B Briefing
r i e f i n g (Central
( C e n t r a l Intelligence
I n te llig e n c e
A Agency,
gency, A April
p r i l 13,
1 3 , 1954),
1 9 5 4 ) , www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R0089
w w w .c ia .g o v /lib r a r y /r e a d in g r o o m /d o c s /C IA - R D P 7 9 R 0 0 8 9
0A000300010019-3.pdf.
0 A 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 9 - 3 .p d f.
88 “Foreign
“ F o r e i g n Relations
R e l a t i o n s ofo f the
t h e United
U n i t e d States,”
S t a t e s , ” 1493.
1493.
99 “Report
“ R e p o r t of ofA Afghan-Pakistani
f g h a n - P a k i s t a n i Confederation
C o n f e d e r a t i o n Plans.”
P la n s .”
10
10 M Muhammad
uham m ad A Aslam
s l a m KhanK h a n Khattak,
K h a tta k , A A PPathan O d y s s e y (Karachi:
a t h a n Odyssey ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x fo rd U University
n iv e rs ity
PPress,
r e s s , 2004),
2 0 0 4 ) , 100–03
1 0 0 - 0 3 cited i n Khurshid
c i t e d in K h u rs h id M Mahmud
a h m u d Kasuri,
K a s u ri, N Neither
e ith e r a a H Hawkaw k N Nor or a a DDove:
ove:
A Ann IInsider’s
n s i d e r ’s A Account
c c o u n t ofo f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s Foreign P o l i c y , 1st
F o r e i g n Policy, 1 s t ed.
e d . (Karachi:
( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x f o r d University
U n iv e rs ity
PPress,
r e s s , 2015),
2 0 1 5 ) , 502.
502.
11
11 L Louis
o u i s Dupree,
D u p r e e , “A “ A Suggested
S u g g e s t e d Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran
P a k is ta n -A fg h a n is ta n -Ira n F Federation,”
e d e r a t i o n ,” M Middle
id d le E East
ast
o u r n a l 17,
JJournal 1 7 , nno.o. 4 4 (Autumn
( A u t u m n 1963): 1 9 6 3 ) : 394–95.
3 9 4 -9 5 .
12
12 A Associated
s s o c ia te d P Press
r e s s of
of P Pakistan
a k i s t a n cited
c i t e d in
in D Dupree,
u p r e e , 395.395.
13
13 D Dupree,
u p r e e , “A“ A Suggested
S u g g e s t e d Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran
P a k is ta n -A fg h a n is ta n -Ira n F Federation,”
e d e r a t i o n ,” 395.395.
14
1 4 IIbid.,
b i d . , 394–95.
3 9 4 -9 5 .
15
1 5 “Foreign
“ F o r e i g n Relations
R e l a t i o n s ofo f the
t h e United
U n i t e d States,”
S t a t e s , ” 1493.
1493.
16
16 D Dupree,
u p r e e , “A“ A Suggested
S u g g e s t e d Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran
P a k i s t a n - A f g h a n i s t a n - I r a n Federation,”
F e d e r a t i o n , ” 385–98.
3 8 5 -9 8 .
17
1 7 IIbid.
b id .
18
1 8 “Afghanistan–Pakistan
“ A f g h a n i s t a n - P a k i s t a n Merger,”
M e r g e r ,” N NSCSC B Briefing
r i e f i n g (Central
( C e n t r a l Intelligence
In te llig e n c e A Agency,
g e n c y , Octo-
O c to ­
b e r 14,
ber 1 4 , 1954),
1 9 5 4 ), w w w .c ia .g o v /lib r a ry /r e a d in g r o o m /d o c s /C I A -R D P 8 0 R 0 1 4 4 3 R 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01443R0003000
80015-6.pdf.
8 0 0 1 5 - 6 .p d f.
 Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations 109
19 “Report of Afghan–Pakistani Confederation Plans.”
20 Dupree, “A Suggested Pakistan–Afghanistan–Iran Federation,” 395.
21 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016): A Concise History, 4th ed.
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017), 180.
22 Nirode Mohanty, America, Pakistan, and the India Factor (New York: Palgrave,
2013), 104.
23 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 498.
24 Rahi, “Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Oft-Ignored History.”
25 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 182.
26 Ibid., 214.
27 Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave,
2002), 203.
28 Ibid.
29 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 209.
30 Ibid., 251.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 208.
33 Anwar Iqbal, “No Unilateral Recognition, Pakistan Assures US, Others,” Dawn,
August 19, 2021.
34 Anwar Iqbal, “US Refuses to Endorse Ghani’s Claim of Pakistan’s Role,” Dawn, Sep-
tember 3, 2021.
35 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation
Enduring Freedom (Arlington: RAND and National Defence Research Institute,
2005), 161.
36 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 297.
37 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 540–41.
38 Ibid.
39 “India ‘Close Friend’ but Pak ‘Conjoined Twin’ Says Afghanistan,” The Times of India,
March 11, 2010, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/india-close-
friend-but-pak-conjoined-twin-says-afghanistan/articleshow/5672129.cms.
40 Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, 535.
41 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 301.
42 Harrison Akins, “Mashar Versus Kashar in Pakistan’s FATA: Intra-Tribal Conflict and
the Obstacles to Reform,” Asian Survey 58, no. 6 (2018): 1136–59.
43 Dawn, October 16, 2010.
44 “Dialogue with Taliban: Joint Commission for Afghan Peace,” The Express Tribune,
July 31, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/415279/dialogue-with-taliban-joint-com
mission-for-afghan-peace.
45 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (1947–2016), 303.
46 “Afghan Envoy Acknowledges Pakistan’s Role in Eid Ceasefire,” Dawn, July 6, 2018,
www.dawn.com/news/1418300.
47 Michael Kugelman, “Pakistan in 2016: Tensions with Neighbors, Turmoil at Home,”
Asian Survey 57, no. 1 (February 2017): 33–42.
48 “Security Forces Arrest Four Suspected NDS Operatives in Pishin,” Pakistan Today,
February 5, 2018, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/02/05/security-forces-arrest-sus
pected-nds-operatives-in-pishin/.
49 “Kandahar Attack: Pakistan Rejects Baseless Allegations of Afghanistan,” The
News, October 25, 2018, www.thenews.com.pk/print/385111-kandahar-attack-pakis
tan-rejects-baseless-allegations-of-afghanistan.
50 Hasib Danish, “Afghanistan Recalls Envoy Over Khan Remark,” Voice of America,
March 27, 2019, www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/afghanistan-recalls-envoy-
over-khan-remark.
51 “5,000 Terrorists Posing Threat to Pakistan’s Security from Afghanistan: FO,” Dawn,
June 29, 2021.
110 Muhammad Azam
52 Munawer Azeem, “Chaman Border Being Closed Due to Threats: Minister,” Dawn,
September 3, 2021.
53 Philip Walker, “The World’s Most Dangerous Borders,” Foreign Policy, June 24, 2011,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/24/the-worlds-most-dangerous-borders/.
54 Iftikhar A. Khan, “Pakistan Grants Refuge to 46 More Afghan Soldiers,” Dawn,
July 27, 2021.
55 Mohammad Asghar, “400 Flights Take Part in Evacuation from Afghanistan,” Dawn,
August 28, 2021, www.dawn.com/news/1643039.
56 “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan” (United Nations High Commission for Refugees),
accessed September 4, 2021, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/pak.
57 AFP, “UN Warns of up to 500,000 More Afghan Refugees by Year-End,” Dawn,
August 28, 2021.
7 Indian Factor in Pakistan’s
Policy Towards Afghanistan
Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali

Introduction
Since its independence in August 1947, the dominant agenda of Pakistan’s foreign
policy was overshadowed by its quest for security from its archrival India, com-
paratively a superior economic and military power. There is a strong perception
among the Pakistani ruling elites that India has never truly reconciled with the
idea of the creation of Pakistan. This perception was further reinforced when India
played a significant role in the separation of the Eastern part of Pakistan in 1971
that is now Bangladesh. Pakistan’s fixation on India has largely shaped Pakistan’s
foreign relations, particularly towards its neighbour Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s
irredentist claims on Pakistan’s north-western part and its close relations with
India intensified Pakistan’s security apprehensions. Therefore, Islamabad has
always sought a friendly regime in Kabul in order to avoid a situation of being
sandwiched between the eastern and western neighbours.
Pakistan has largely viewed Afghanistan from the Indian prism. This is per-
haps due to Indian attempts to exploit Afghanistan’s long-held hostility towards
Pakistan to its benefits. From 1947 to 1992, India provided unstinted support to
every Afghan government that demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan. However,
the situation changed in Pakistan’s favour when the Taliban assumed power in
Afghanistan and ruled it from 1996 to 2001. Islamabad’s support to the Taliban in
turn helped alleviate its security concerns to a certain degree.
The 9/11 terrorist events followed by American decision to invade Afghanistan
dramatically changed the regional situation. Pakistan had to join the American-
sponsored alliance formed to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and
to eliminate Al-Qaeda. Pakistan supported the US efforts in routing out the Tali-
ban from Afghanistan but remained reluctant to provide wholehearted support in
completely defeating the Taliban forces due to heavy Indian involvement in the
post-9//11 settings in Afghanistan which Islamabad regarded as detrimental to
its security. However, Pakistan’s cooperation was forthcoming when the United
States started dialogues with the Afghan Taliban starting in the late 2010s. The
Taliban inclusion in any governmental setup would significantly assuage Islama-
bad’s security concerns. Therefore, Pakistan has played a crucial role in facilitat-
ing the recent direct peace dialogue between the Afghan Taliban and the United

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-9
112 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
States. Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process has gained much international
appreciation.

Pakistan’s Perennial Security Threat from India

There is a common saying in international relations that you can choose your
friends but not your neighbours. Pakistan and India share a long common border
along with common history and cultural practices. However, most of their rela-
tions have been fraught with mistrust and hostility. A number of factors high-
light the enduring rivalry between Islamabad and New Delhi. The ideological
rivalry is vividly manifested in the poles-apart philosophical structure of Islam
and Hinduism. As pointed out by S. M. Burke, “Centuries of dedication to such
diametrically opposed systems as Islam and Hinduism could not but nurture an
utterly different outlook on the outside world among their respective followers.”1
Therefore, the Pakistan security establishment has framed its rivalry with India as
a civilizational one.2
Another cause of tension between the two countries is related with Pakistan’s
fear of being inferior to India’s strategic and economic strength. As noted by
Howard Wriggins, “However unjustified Indian leaders may have thought it,
Pakistan’s overriding concern vis-à-vis India” is the “fear of India’s size, the size
of its army . . . and fear compounded out of not infrequent public statements by
prominent Indians regarding the tragedy of partition and reiterating the inherent
unity of the subcontinent.”3
The partition process created a legacy of misperceptions and culture of dis-
trust that added further complications to the relation between the two countries.
Leo Rose and Richard Sisson pointed out, “Most of the political and social con-
cepts that dominated the ideology and psychology of the narrow élites that con-
trolled these two movements survived into the independence period and have not
disappeared.”4
The persistence of the Kashmir dispute led to three major wars, a limited Kar-
gil war in 1999, and three crises (Brass Tacks (1987), Kashmir uprising (1990)
and a military standoff (2001–2) between India and Pakistan.5 The 1990 Kashmir
uprising increased the tension between the two countries, which made Kashmir
a nuclear flashpoint creating potential serious security threats for the region and
internationally as well, as both were de-facto nuclear power states.6 Because of the
long-standing hostility between the two countries, both pursued security policies
with zero-sum attitude. The Kashmir conflict remains the stumbling block in the
normalization of relations between the two countries.7 The Kashmir dispute owes
its origin in the partition process, and the first war between both countries started
over Kashmir in 1948. India’s occupation of Kashmir and its consistent refusals to
honour United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to resolve the issue
of Kashmir further augmented mistrust and hostility.8 Later in 1998, the Kashmir
issue once again gained world-wide attention after two countries went nuclear as
Kashmir emerged as the nuclear flash point creating real prospects of Pakistan–
India tensions to rise with the possibility of nuclear use. To an expert on Kashmir
 Pakistan’s
P Policy
a k i s t a n ’s P o l i c y Towards Afghanistan
T ow ards A 113
f g h a n i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
113

conflict,
c o n f l i c t , “there
“ t h e r e is i s no
n o guarantee
g u a r a n t e e tthat
h a t it
i t will
w i l l not n o t lead
l e a d tto o w wara r oro r military
m i l i t a r y adventures
a d v e n tu re s
9
involving
i n v o l v i n g nuclear
n u c l e a r deployment
d e p l o y m e n t and a n d possibly
p o s s i b l y tthe h e useu s e ofof a a nuclear
n u c l e a r weapon.”
w e a p o n .” 9
Pakistan’s threat perception from India intensified rivalry between
P a k i s t a n ’s t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n f r o m I n d i a i n t e n s i f i e d r i v a l r y b e t w e e n P a k i s t a n Pakistan
and
a n d India
I n d i a in i n tthe
h e post-September
p o s t - S e p t e m b e r 11 11 p period
e r i o d whenw h e n India In d ia b blamed
l a m e d the t h e Pakistan-based
P a k ista n -b a s e d
a s h k a r - e - T a y y a b a and
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
L a i s h - e - M o h a m m a d for
a n d JJaish-e-Mohammad f o r carrying
c a r r y i n g out out a a terrorist
t e r r o r i s t attack
a t t a c k on
on
10
its parliament on December 13, 2001. Subsequently, India
its p a r lia m e n t o n D e c e m b e r 1 3 , 2 0 0 1 .10 S u b s e q u e n tly , I n d ia c a lle d b a c k its H ig h called back its High
Commissioner
C o m m i s s i o n e r ffrom r o m Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , bbroke
r o k e air
a i r and
a n d ground
g r o u n d ttransport
r a n s p o r t links
lin k s w withi t h Pakistan
P a k ista n

and
a n d putp u t its
i t s military
m i l i t a r y on
o n high
h i g h alert
a l e r t while
w h i l e deploying
d e p l o y i n g 750,0007 5 0 , 0 0 0 troops
t r o o p s along
a l o n g the t h e bborder
o rd e r
11
with
w i t h P a k i s t a n . 1 1 I n d i a n P r i m e M i n i s t e r V a j p a y e e s a i d , “ W e c a n n o t t o l e r a t e such
Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said, “We cannot tolerate such
12
attacks
a t t a c k s anya n y more.m o r e . We W e have h a v e reached
r e a c h e d thet h e limits
l i m i t s of o f our
o u r ttolerance.”
o l e r a n c e . ” 1 2 In I n response,
re sp o n se,
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n also
a l s o deployed
d e p l o y e d its i t s ground
g r o u n d anda n d air
a i r fforces
o r c e s along
a l o n g itsi t s eastern
e a s te r n b border
o r d e r anda n d alerted
a le rte d
13
its
i t s n a v a l f o r c e s i n t h e A r a b i a n S e a . 1 3 G e n e r a l M u s h a r r a f i n a n i n t e r v i e w stated,
naval forces in the Arabian Sea. General Musharraf in an interview s ta te d ,
“I
“ I would
w o u l d like l i k e to
t o warn
w a r n ((NewN e w Delhi)
D e l h i ) against
a g a i n s t any a n y precipitous
p r e c i p i t o u s action
a c t i o n bby y tthe h e Indian
In d ia n
14
government
g o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . T h i s w o u l d l e a d t o v e r y s e r i o u s r e p e r c u s s i o n s . ” 1 4 In
against Pakistan. This would lead to very serious repercussions.” In
addition,
a d d i t i o n , P a k i s t a n d e n i e d a n y i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e t e r r o r i s t a t t a c k s a n d p l e d g e d not
Pakistan denied any involvement in the terrorist attacks and pledged not
15
to
t o allow
a l l o w anya n y tterrorism
e r r o r i s m originating
o r i g i n a t i n g ffrom
r o m its i t s tterritory.
e r r i t o r y . 1 5 While
W h i l e addressing
a d d r e s s i n g tthe h e nation
n a tio n
on
o n 12 1 2 JJanuary
a n u a r y 2002, 2002, M Musharraf
u s h a r r a f condemned
c o n d e m n e d attacks a t t a c k s on o n thet h e Indian
In d ia n p parliament
a r l i a m e n t andand

vowed to take action against the violent groups such as

v o w e d to ta k e a c tio n a g a in s t th e v io le n t g r o u p s s u c h a s th e L a s h k a r - e - T a y y a b a the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba
and
a n d the a i s h - e - M o h a m m a d . Musharaf
t h e JJaish-e-Mohammad. M u s h a r a f said s a i d that:
th a t:

Pakistan
P a k i s t a n rejects
r e j e c t s and
a n d condemns
c o n d e m n s terrorism
t e r r o r i s m in
i n all
a l l its
i t s fforms
o r m s and
a n d manifestations.
m a n if e s ta tio n s .
Pakistan
P will
a k ista n w i l l not
n o t allow
a l l o w its
i t s tterritory
e r r i t o r y ttoo bbe
e used
u s e d ffor
o r terrorist
t e r r o r i s t activity
a c t i v i t y anywhere
a n y w h e re
in
i n tthe
he wworld.
o rld . N No o organisation
o r g a n is a tio n w willi l l bbe
e allowed
a l l o w e d tot o indulge
i n d u l g e in i n tterrorism
e r r o r i s m in
i n tthe
he
16
name
n a m e of
o f Kashmir.
K a s h m ir .16

Amid
A m i d tthe h e ongoing
o n g o i n g hostility,
h o s t i l i t y , another
a n o t h e r attack
a t t a c k ttooko o k place
p l a c e on o n the
t h e residential
r e s i d e n t i a l quarters
q u a rte rs
of
o f an
a n Indian
I n d i a n army
a r m y camp
c a m p at at K Kaluchuk
a l u c h u k in i n Jammu
J a m m u on o n 1414 M May a y 2002,
2 0 0 2 , only
o n l y intensifying
in te n s ify in g
17
tthe
h e already
a l r e a d y estranged
e s t r a n g e d relations.
r e l a t i o n s . 1 7 Indian
In d ia n P Prime
r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r Vajpayee
V a j p a y e e warned,
w a r n e d , “We“W e
w i l l t e a c h t h e p e r p e t r a t o r s o f t h e p r o x y w a r a l e s s o n . O u r f o r c e s a r e standing
will teach the perpetrators of the proxy war a lesson. Our forces are s t a n d i n g like
lik e
18
rocks
r o c k s ono n the
t h e bborders.”
o r d e r s .” 1 8 In
I n response,
re sp o n se , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n not n o t only
o n l y removed
r e m o v e d more m o r e tthanh a n 50,000
5 0 ,0 0 0
ttroops
r o o p s ffromr o m its its b border
o rd er w withi t h Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n to t o deploy
d e p l o y alonga l o n g its i t s Eastern
E a s te r n b border
o r d e r with
w ith

India
I n d i a b u t a l s o t h r e a t e n e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o v a c a t e s o m e o f t h e a i r f i e l d s g i v e n tto
but also threatened the United States to vacate some of the air fields given o
A f g h a n i s t a n . 1 9 The T h e standoff
19
the
th e U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s ffor
o r launching
l a u n c h i n g military
m i l i t a r y operations
o p e r a t i o n s in i n Afghanistan. s ta n d o ff
bbetween
e t w e e n IndiaI n d i a andand P Pakistan
a k i s t a n could
c o u ld p potentially
o t e n t i a l l y affect
a f f e c t Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s role r o l e ini n tthe
h e War
W ar
on
o n T e r r o r i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i s p a t c h e d U S D e p u t y S e c r e t a r y of
Terror in Afghanistan. The United States dispatched US Deputy Secretary of
State,
S t a t e , Richard
R i c h a r d Armitage,
A r m i t a g e , to t o India
I n d i a anda n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n in i n June
J u n e 20022 0 0 2 to to u urge
rg e b both
o t h countries
c o u n tr ie s
20
tto
o put
put a a restraint
r e s t r a i n t tto
o tthe
h e deteriorating
d e t e r i o r a t i n g situation.
s i t u a t i o n . 2 0 Armitage’s
A r m ita g e ’s v visit
i s i t helped
h e l p e d normalize
n o r m a liz e
the relations between the two
th e r e la tio n s b e tw e e n th e tw o c o u n tr ie s . countries.
President
P r e s i d e n t Musharraf’s
M u s h a r r a f ’s actions
a c t i o n s tto o stop
s t o p support
s u p p o r t for f o r militancy
m i l i t a n c y in in K Kashmir
a s h m i r were
w e re
w e l c o m e d b y N e w D e l h i . F o r e x a m p l e a f t e r t h e M a y 2 0 0 2 s t a n d o f f , tthe
welcomed by New Delhi. For example after the May 2002 standoff, h e Paki-
P a k i­
stani
s t a n i government,
g o v e r n m e n t , as as ppart
a r t ofo f restraining
r e s t r a i n i n g thet h e Jihadi
J i h a d i forces
f o r c e s operating
o p e r a t i n g ffrom ro m P Pakistan,
a k ista n ,
p u t r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e U n i t e d J i h a d C o u n c i l , a n u m b r e l l a g r o u p o f K a s h m i r i and
put restrictions on the United Jihad Council, an umbrella group of Kashmiri and
non-Kashmiri
n o n - K a s h m i r i Mujahideen
M u j a h i d e e n factions,
f a c t i o n s , including
i n c l u d i n g ttwo w o leading
l e a d i n g Jihadi
J i h a d i organizations,
o rg a n iz a tio n s,
21
H e z b - u l - M u j a h i d e e n and
Hezb-ul-Mujahideen and H a r k a t - u l - M u j a h i d e e n . 2 1 Responding
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. R e s p o n d i n g to t o Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s
moves,
m o v e s , P r i m e M i n i s t e r V a j p a y e e t o o k t h e I n d i a n p a r l i a m e n t i n t o c o n f i d e n c e on
Prime Minister Vajpayee took the Indian parliament into confidence on
114 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
2 May 2003 to launch his “third and final” peace offering to Pakistan to hold
“decisive talks” to resolve outstanding disputes between the two countries.22 On 6
January 2004, President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met during the
SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) summit in Islama-
bad and pledged to resume the talks aimed at normalizing relations between the
two countries. Both leaders demonstrated optimism about “the resumption of the
‘Composite Dialogue’ that will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues,
including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.”23 A number of
important Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) took place since both countries
engaged in a peace process since January 2004, but it was void of any progress on
Kashmir dispute because Indian policies largely used the pretexts of the War on
Terror to stifle and discredit the Kashmir’s movement for self-determination in the
eyes of the international community.24 Both India and Pakistan pursued conflict-
ing interests over the issue of War on Terror in the region as well as the future of
Afghanistan. With no significant progress on resolving the Kashmir conflict, there
has always been estranged relations between both countries.

Indo-Afghan Close Ties and Pakistan’s Security

Apprehensions
Because of the hostile relations between India and Pakistan, both countries
have had a fierce competition to enhance their respective influence in Afghani-
stan. Excluding the Taliban rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, Afghani-
stan has largely displayed hostility towards Pakistan. The only state that had
opposed Pakistan’s membership of the United Nations in 1947 was none other
than Afghanistan. Hostility between the two countries further flared up when
Afghanistan put forward its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory, in particu-
lar some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KPK) and Baluchistan. Because of its
enmity and particularly dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, India extended its
wholehearted support to Afghanistan over Pashtunistan issue.25 It is important to
mention that Pakistani Pashtun nationalists supported the Indian National Con-
gress against the British Imperial rule. In addition, Pakistan’s Pashtun national-
ists have invariably supported Afghan rulers. Pashtun’s historical cordiality with
Afghanistan and the Indian National Congress made Pakistan suspicious of their
intentions.
India has always sought friendly relations with Afghanistan which is demon-
strated with the signing of the “Friendship Treaty” in 1950. In addition, India had
signed various agreements and protocols with pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan
to promote mutual co-operation in an attempt to enhance its influence. Indian
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, once said:

Ever since India’s independence, we have grown closer to each other, for a
variety of reasons. The long memory of our past was there, and the moment it
was possible to renew them, we renewed them. And then came mutual inter-
est, (our common hostility towards Pakistan) which is a powerful factor.26
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 115
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had provided Pakistan a unique oppor-
tunity to increase its influence in Afghanistan. With the Soviet intervention, Paki-
stan became a frontline state and served as a conduit for international arms and aid
heading to the Mujahideen engaged in fighting the Soviets. India continued their
unstinted support to the Soviet Union throughout its intervention in Afghanistan.
With the support of Pakistan, the Mujahideen offered severe resistance ultimately
forcing the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988. In opposition to
Pakistan’s support for the Mujahideen fighters, India supported the Communist
government, until its demise in 1992. Even after the removal of Najibullah from
power, India supported the first Mujahideen government, predominantly non-
Pashtun, and extended humanitarian and technical assistance.
Pakistan, on the other hand, backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami
whose inability to capture Kabul led Pakistan to shift its support to the newly
emerged force known as the Taliban who proclaimed to end the ongoing civil
strife in the country. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and established Islamic
Emirates of Afghanistan in most parts of the country. India opposed the Taliban
regime because of its association with Pakistan and closed its embassy in Sep-
tember 1996. In the meanwhile, the non-Pashtun groups opposed to the Taliban
regime united to form the Northern Alliance and exercised their control over areas
in the north of Afghanistan, adjacent to the Central Asian States of Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. The Taliban and the Northern Alliance remained engaged in fighting
even after the fall of Kabul to the former.
Afghanistan became a theatre of a proxy war between Pakistan and India. In
opposition to Pakistan’s support to the Taliban regime, India extended its sup-
port to the Northern Alliance by providing high-altitude warfare equipment worth
$10 million through its Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and technical advice
to the Northern Alliance.27 During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996–2001),
India encouraged and supported the groups engaged in fighting against the Tali-
ban. Moreover, India also developed close ties with the anti-Taliban countries
such as Russia and Iran and also developed links with Central Asian States.

Pakistan’s Afghan Challenge in the Post-9/11 Security

Environment
The removal of the Taliban from power after the US invasion of Afghanistan
offered India an opportunity to develop close ties with Afghanistan as during
the Taliban rule India was completely out of its role in Afghanistan. Mr Jaswant
Singh, the then Indian Foreign Affairs Minister, in his visit to the United States in
October 2001, marked the Taliban regime as illegitimate and conferred legitimacy
on the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In his television interview in Washington
on 2 October 2001, Mr Singh said,

India has never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate regime. We have con-
tinued to recognize the government of Afghanistan as represented by Presi-
dent Rabbani. They have formed the Northern Alliance . . . it should be the
116 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
effort of the international community now to strengthen the legitimate gov-
ernment of Afghanistan.28

Indian leaders perceived that the removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
has served Indian strategic objectives because the Taliban regime not only denied
India any role in Afghanistan but also facilitated militants fighting against the
Indian forces in India-held Kashmir.29 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
announced, “We are ready to work with the government and people of Afghani-
stan to ensure that Afghanistan will never again be hostage to, or become a haven
for, terrorists.”30 Therefore, India not only wanted a friendly regime in Afghani-
stan to limit Pakistan’s influence but also wanted to retain a diplomatic and intel-
ligence presence in order to monitor Pakistan’s activities within Afghanistan.
India’s desire to build strategic and economic ties with the energy- rich states of
Central Asia motivated cordial relations with Afghanistan, preferably a pro-Indian
regime. In what Stephen Blank characterizes as a “great game” strategy, “India’s
goals reflect the desire to control overland routes to maritime ports for Central
Asian resources by denying both China and Pakistan the ability to threaten Indian
assets in the region.”31
Navtej Sarna, spokesman for the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said, “We
have strong bilateral relations with Afghanistan, and we want to help them rebuild
their country. India also sees Afghanistan as a route to Central Asia.”32 Afghani-
stan would provide India access to Central Asian oil and gas resources and also
to marginalize establishing a foothold in Pakistan’s neighbourhood.33 This posed
a serious challenge for Pakistani security elites who invariably aimed at limiting
Indian power in the region. Christine Fair testifies Pakistan’s security concerns,
“Militarily and strategically, Central Asia is an important theatre for India. While
India’s objectives in the region reflect interests that reach far beyond Pakistan, the
fact remains that India is interested in countering Pakistan in this region.”34
India closely watched the removal of the Taliban regime in order to grasp any
opportunity to make inroads in Afghanistan. India extended recognition to the
interim government led by Hamid Karzai that was established as a result of the
Bonn Conference held in December 2001. The Karzai government was dispropor-
tionally represented by the Northern Alliance. Members of the Northern Alliance
enjoyed a close relationship with India as the families of many Northern Alli-
ance elites sought shelter in New Delhi during the Taliban rule. India reopened its
embassy in Kabul and established consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar
and Jalalabad.
To support to the new political administration in Afghanistan, India provided
US$100 million of reconstruction aid and established Indira Gandhi Children’s
Hospital in Kabul.35 Afghanistan responded positively to the Indian moves – for
example Masood Khalili, Afghanistan’s ambassador to India, said, “People in
Afghanistan have long memories. They will not forget who was a friend and oth-
ers, who supported and propped up the Taliban.” He added, “It’s natural that we
will turn to India for assistance.”36 The new Afghan government largely viewed
India as a natural ally. Since then, India has spent billions of dollars in various
 Pakistan’s
P Policy
a k ista n s P o l i c y Towards Afghanistan
T ow ards A 117
f g h a n i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
117

infrastructural
i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l and
a n d developmental
d e v e l o p m e n t a l projects
p r o j e c t s in
i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , India,
I n d i a , in
i n its
its
attempt
a t t e m p t t o c r e a t e a s o f t i m a g e , l a u n c h e d t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m m e s a n d e x t e n d e d sup-
to create a soft image, launched training programmes and extended sup­
port
p o r t in
i n health
h e a l t h and
a n d developmental
d e v e l o p m e n t a l sectors.
s e c t o r s . This
T h i s enabled
e n a b l e d India
I n d i a tto
o deepen
d e e p e n itsi t s roots
r o o t s in
in
Afghanistan, a development Pakistan was seriously concerned
A f g h a n is ta n , a d e v e lo p m e n t P a k is ta n w a s s e r io u s ly c o n c e r n e d w ith . with.

Pakistan’s Policy Responses Towards Afghanistan

India
I n d i a has h a s remained
re m a in e d a a significant
s i g n i f i c a n t ffactor
a c t o r in in P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s policy
p o l i c y towards
t o w a r d s Afghanistan.
A fg h a n ista n .
P a k i s t a n ’ s d e c i s i o n t o b e c o m e a p a r t o f t h e w a r a g a i n s t t e r r o r i s m had
Pakistan’s decision to become a part of the war against terrorism had b been
e e n greatly
g re a tly
influenced
i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e I n d i a n f a c t o r . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e t h e n P r e s i d e n t G e n e r a l Mush-
by the Indian factor. For example, the then President General M u sh ­
arraf
a r r a f cited
c i t e d India
I n d i a as as a a major
m a j o r reasonr e a s o n for fo r P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s decision
d e c i s i o n tto o jjoining
o in in g U US S WarW a r on on
37
Terror
T e r r o r against
a g a i n s t tthe
h e Taliban,
T a l i b a n , its i t s fformer
o r m e r allies.a llie s .37
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s strategy
s t r a t e g y was w a s to t o counter
c o u n t e r Indian I n d i a n iinfluence
n f l u e n c e and a n d maintain
m a i n t a i n iits t s own
o w n iin n
Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n . P a k is ta n ’s m o tiv e s in A f g h a n is ta n h a v e la r g e ly b e e n g e o s tr a te g ic –
Pakistan’s motives in Afghanistan have largely been geostrategic -
ttoo counter
c o u n t e r security
s e c u r i t y threat
t h r e a t from
f r o m India I n d i a and a n d tto o establish
e s ta b lis h a a ffoothold
o o t h o l d in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .
P a k i s t a n i f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t G e n e r a l Z i a - u l - H a q o n c e d i r e c t e d t o t h e head
Pakistani former President General Zia-ul-Haq once directed to the h e a d of o f the
th e
military
m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n , I S I , G e n e r a l A k h t a r A b d u l R e h m a n , t h a t “the
intelligence organization, ISI, General Akhtar Abdul Rehman, that “ th e
38
wwatera t e r [in
[ i n Afghanistan]
A f g h a n i s t a n ] must m u s t bboil o i l at a t the
t h e right
r i g h t ttemperature.”
e m p e r a t u r e . ” 3 8 Traditionally,
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , Paki-
P a k i­
stan
s t a n v i e w e d A f g h a n i s t a n p r o v i d i n g “ s t r a t e g i c d e p t h ” - t h a t i t could
viewed Afghanistan providing “strategic depth” – that it c o u l d withdraw
w i t h d r a w its its
forces
f o r c e s intoi n t o Afghan
A f g h a n territory
t e r r i t o r y in i n the
t h e case
c a s e of o f an a n Indian
I n d i a n military
m i l i t a r y advance.
a d v a n c e . The T h e Taliban
T a lib a n
rule
r u l e in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n helped h e lp e d P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to t o achieve
a c h i e v e thatt h a t strategic
s t r a t e g i c depth.
d e p t h . According
A c c o r d i n g to to
former chief of ISI, General Hameed Gul, “Pakistan’s
f o r m e r c h ie f o f I S I , G e n e r a l H a m e e d G u l, “ P a k is ta n ’s m ilita r y le a d e r s s u p p o r te dmilitary leaders supported
the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n to t o attain
a t t a i n ttheir
h e i r goal
g o a l of o f strategic
s t r a t e g i c depth
d e p t h in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n bby y squeezing
s q u e e z i n g out out
the
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o t h e r r e g i o n a l r i v a l s i n c l u d i n g I r a n a n d I n d i a a n d t h e f o r c e s o f the
interests of other regional rivals including Iran and India and the forces of th e
39
Northern
N o r t h e r n Alliance.”
A l l i a n c e . ” 3 9 Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s strategic
s t r a t e g i c circles
c i r c l e s have
h a v e always
a l w a y s desired
d e s i r e d tto o avoid
a v o id a a
situation
s i t u a t i o n of of b being
e i n g sandwiched
s a n d w i c h e d bbetween e t w e e n its i t s ttwo
w o hostile
h o s t i l e neighbours
n e ig h b o u rs - – Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n
on
o n itsi t s western
w e s te r n b border
o r d e r anda n d India
I n d i a on o n itsi t s eastern
e a s t e r n bborder.
o rd e r.
For
F o r t h e s e s t r a t e g i c r e a s o n s , P a k i s t a n a l w a y s wanted
these strategic reasons, Pakistan always w a n te d a a ffriendly
r i e n d l y regime
r e g i m e in in
Afghanistan that could protect Islamabad interests. In the post-Soviet
A f g h a n is ta n th a t c o u ld p r o te c t I s la m a b a d in te re s ts . I n th e p o s t-S o v ie t A f g h a n is ta n , Afghanistan,
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n continued
c o n t i n u e d tto o meddle
m e d d l e in i n Afghan
A f g h a n affairs a f f a i r s iin
n order
o r d e r tto o achieve
a c h i e v e its i t s interests
i n t e r e s t s iin
n
the
t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e m a n n e r . A c i v i l w a r b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t M u j a h i d e e n f a c t i o n s , ffol-
best possible manner. A civil war between different Mujahideen factions, o l­
lowed
lo w e d b by y tthe
he w withdrawal
i t h d r a w a l of o f Soviet
S o v i e t forces
f o r c e s ffrom r o m Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , seriously
s e r i o u s l y tthreatened
h r e a te n e d
P a k i s t a n ’ s i n t e r e s t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n . E m e r g e n c e o f t h e T a l i b a n in
Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Emergence of the Taliban i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n w who ho
proclaimed to end the civil strife provided solace to
p r o c la im e d to e n d th e c iv il s tr if e p r o v id e d s o la c e to P a k is ta n ’s s tr a te g ic c ir c le s .Pakistan’s strategic circles.
Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d decidedd e c i d e d to t o support
s u p p o r t the t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n against
a g a i n s t groups
g r o u p s who w h o “established
“ e s t a b l i s h e d close
c lo s e
links
l i n k s w i t h t h e I n d i a n s ” b e c a u s e t h e T a l i b a n s h o w e d a r e m a r k a b l e “success
with the Indians” because the Taliban showed a remarkable “ s u c c e s s in in
suppressing
s u p p r e s s i n g unrulyu n r u ly M Mujahideen
u j a h i d e e n commanders
c o m m a n d e r s and a n d imposing
im p o s in g p peace
e a c e in i n and
a n d around
a ro u n d
K a n d a h a r . ” 40
Kandahar.” 40
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s strategic
s t r a t e g i c circles
c irc le s b believed
e l i e v e d that t h a t ttheh e Taliban
T a lib a n w would
o u l d serve
se rv e b best
e s t country’s
c o u n try ’s
interests.
i n t e r e s t s . T h i s l e d t o a c t i o n s - f o r e x a m p l e a n A f g h a n c e l l w a s e s t a b l i s h e d in
This led to actions – for example an Afghan cell was established in
the
t h e Interior
I n t e r i o r Ministry
M i n i s t r y in i n 1994
1 9 9 4 tto o provide
p r o v i d e assistance
a s s i s t a n c e to t o the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n movement.
m o v e m e n t . The The
interior
i n t e r i o r minister,
m i n i s t e r , General
G e n e r a l Babar,
B a b a r , oversaw
o v e r s a w tthe h e ISII S I tot o provide
p r o v i d e “transportation,
“ t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , fuel,
fu e l,
41
communications equipment and advice” to the Taliban
c o m m u n ic a tio n s e q u ip m e n t a n d a d v ic e ” to th e T a lib a n m o v e m e n t.41 P a k is ta n ’s movement. Pakistan’s
support
s u p p o r t to t o tthe
h e Taliban
T a lib a n w was a s reinforced
re in fo rc e d b by y several
s e v e r a l considerations.
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . First, F i r s t , bbyy helping
h e lp in g
the
t h e T a l i b a n t o g a i n c o n t r o l o f A f g h a n i s t a n , I s l a m a b a d e x p e c t e d t o g e t access
Taliban to gain control of Afghanistan, Islamabad expected to get a c c e s s tto o
118 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
Central
C e n t r a l Asia A s i a tot o establish
e s t a b l i s h ttrade
r a d e links.
l i n k s . Second,
S e c o n d , PakistanP a k i s t a n perceived
p e r c e i v e d tthe h e Taliban
T a l i b a n as as
an
a n a n t i - s e c u l a r a n d a n a n t i - I n d i a n f o r c e b e c a u s e o f t h e i r r i g i d I s l a m i c b e l i e f s , and
anti-secular and an anti-Indian force because of their rigid Islamic beliefs, and
that
th a t w wouldo u l d help
h e l p Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto o diminish
d i m i n i s h security
s e c u r i t y tthreats
h r e a t s ffrom r o m its i t s western
w e s t e r n bborders.
o rd e rs.
42
Third,
T h i r d , a T a l i b a n - r u l e d A f g h a n i s t a n w o u l d p r o v i d e P a k i s t a n t h e “ s t r a t e g i c depth”
a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would provide Pakistan the “strategic d e p th ” 42
in
i n order
o r d e r tto o protect
p r o t e c t from
f r o m Indian
I n d i a n military
m i l i t a r y advances
a d v a n c e s from f r o m the t h e eastern
e a s t e r n bborder.
o r d e r . Fourth,
F o u rth ,
aa Taliban-controlled
T a l i b a n - c o n t r o l l e d ffriendly
r i e n d l y Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n could c o u l d provide
p ro v id e a a “base
“base w where
h e re K Kash-
ash ­
43
miri
m i r i m i l i t a n t s c o u l d b e t r a i n e d . ” 4 3 M o s t o f P a k i s t a n ’ s s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s were
militants could be trained.” Most of Pakistan’s strategic objectives w e re
well-served
w e l l - s e r v e d underu n d e r tthe h e Taliban
T a l i b a n regime
r e g i m e as a s tterritorial
e r r i t o r i a l claims
c l a i m s fromf r o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n were w e re
largely
l a r g e l y w i t h e r e d , a n d I n d i a ’ s i n f l u e n c e w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e c r e a s e d . It
withered, and India’s influence was significantly decreased. I t is
i s important
im p o rta n t
44
to
t o mention
m e n t i o n tthat h a t tthe
h e Taliban
T a l i b a n did d i d not
n o t recognize
r e c o g n i z e tthe h e Durand
D u ra n d L Line.
in e .44
The
T h e A m e r i c a n i n v a s i o n o f A f g h a n i s t a n f o l l o w e d b y t h e o v e r t h r o w of
American invasion of Afghanistan followed by the overthrow o f tthe
h e Taliban
T a lib a n
government
g o v e r n m e n t d e p r i v e d P a k i s t a n o f a f r i e n d l y r e g i m e i n K a b u l . A f t e r t h e removal
deprived Pakistan of a friendly regime in Kabul. After the re m o v a l
of
o f tthe
h e Taliban
T a l i b a n regime
r e g i m e ffrom ro m p power,
o w e r , an a n anti-Pakistan
a n t i - P a k i s t a n group g r o u p known
k n o w n as a s the
th e N Northern
o r th e r n
Alliance got hold of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital,
A llia n c e g o t h o ld o f K a b u l, A f g h a n is ta n ’s c a p ita l, w ith th e s u p p o r t o f th e U with the support of the US S
military. This was called worst nightmare for Pakistan.
m ilita r y . T h is w a s c a lle d w o r s t n ig h tm a r e f o r P a k is ta n . O n e P a k is ta n i n e w s p a ­ One Pakistani newspa-
per
p e r called
c a l l e d iti t “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’s w worst
o r s t nightmare
n i g h t m a r e has h a s comec o m e ttrue r u e with
w ith N Northern
o r t h e r n Alliance
A llia n c e
45
control
c o n t r o l o f K a b u l , ” w h e r e a s o t h e r m e n t i o n e d “ a s t r a t e g i c d e b a c l e for
of Kabul,” whereas other mentioned “a strategic debacle f o r the
t h e army.”
a r m y .” 4 5
Pakistan perceived the Northern Alliance control of
P a k is ta n p e r c e iv e d th e N o r th e r n A llia n c e c o n tr o l o f p o w e r in K a b u l n e g a tiv e ly power in Kabul negatively
and
a n d considered
c o n s i d e r e d it it a a vviolation
i o l a t i o n ofo f tthehe U US S promises
p r o m i s e s tto o protect
p r o t e c t Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’ s interests
in te r e s ts
in Afghanistan.
in A f g h a n is ta n .
Furthermore,
F u r t h e r m o r e , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s security
s e c u r i t y apprehensions
a p p r e h e n s i o n s iintensified n t e n s i f i e d after a f t e r iincreasing
n c r e a s in g
Indian
I n d i a n involvement
i n v o l v e m e n t in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n in i n ttheh e post-9/11
p o s t - 9 / 1 1 ttime i m e period.
p e rio d . P Pakistan
a k i s t a n felt
fe lt
46
encircled, given cooperation and close ties between
e n c irc le d , g iv e n c o o p e r a tio n a n d c lo s e tie s b e tw e e n I n d ia a n d A f g h a n is ta n .46 India and Afghanistan.
While talking about Indian presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan
W h ile ta lk in g a b o u t I n d ia n p r e s e n c e in A f g h a n is ta n , P a k is ta n P r e s id e n t P e r v e z President Pervez
Musharraf
M u s h a r r a f said: s a i d : “India’s
“ I n d i a ’s motivation
m o t i v a t i o n in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n is i s vvery
e r y clear;
c l e a r ; nothing
n o t h i n g ffurther
u rth e r
than upsetting Pakistan. Why should they (India) have
th a n u p s e ttin g P a k is ta n . W h y s h o u ld th e y ( I n d ia ) h a v e c o n s u la te s in J a la la b a d consulates in Jalalabad
and
and K Kandahar?
a n d a h a r ? WhatW h a t is i s ttheir
h e i r interest?
i n t e r e s t ? There
T h e r e is i s non o interest
i n t e r e s t other
o t h e r tthan h a n disturbing
d is tu r b in g
47
Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , doing
d o i n g something
s o m e t h i n g against
a g a i n s t Pakistan.”
P a k is ta n .” 47
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n alsoa l s o alleged
a l l e g e d IndiaI n d i a ffor o r creating
c r e a t i n g troubles
t r o u b l e s insidei n s i d e its i t s tterritory
e rrito ry u using
s in g
Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . On O n 16 1 6 October
O c t o b e r 2003,2003, P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s interior
i n t e r i o r minister
m i n i s t e r accused
a c c u s e d India
I n d i a for
fo r
48
sponsoring
s p o n s o r i n g terrorism
t e r r o r i s m in i n Pakistan
P a k ista n u using
s i n g ttheir
h e i r intelligence
i n t e l l i g e n c e presence
p r e s e n c e in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .48
Pakistani security officials expressed their apprehensions over
P a k is ta n i s e c u r ity o f f ic ia ls e x p r e s s e d th e ir a p p r e h e n s io n s o v e r I n d ia n in te llig e n c e Indian intelligence
presence
p r e s e n c e in i n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , “India’s
“ I n d i a ’s activities
a c t i v i t i e s have
h a v e less l e s s to t o dod o with w i t h humanitarian
h u m a n ita ria n
aid
a i d a n d m o r e t o d o w i t h I n d i a ’ s t o p s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c y , tthe
and more to do with India’s top secret intelligence agency, h e Research
R e s e a r c h and and
49
Analysis
A n a l y s i s Wing W i n g (RAW).”
( R A W ) .” 49 P Pakistan
a k i s t a n consistently
c o n s is te n tly b blamed
l a m e d that t h a t Indian
I n d i a n intelligence
in te llig e n c e
officials
o f f i c i a l s used
u s e d Afghans
A f g h a n s to t o carry
c a r r y out
o u t tterrorist
e r r o r i s t acts
a c t s in i n Pakistan.
P a k ista n .
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n also
a l s o alleged
a l l e g e d India
I n d i a ffor
o r establishing
e s ta b lis h in g a a network
n e t w o r k of o f tterrorist
e r r o r i s t ttraining
r a i n i n g camps
cam ps
at different parts of Afghanistan, such as at the Afghan
a t d if f e r e n t p a r ts o f A f g h a n is ta n , s u c h a s a t th e A f g h a n m ilita r y b a s e o f Q u s h ila military base of Qushila
Jadid
J a d i d located
l o c a t e d north
n o r t h of of K Kabul,
a b u l , ata t Gereshk
G e r e s h k in i n southern
s o u t h e r n Helmand
H e l m a n d province, p r o v i n c e , in i n the
th e
50
Panjshir
P a n j s h i r Valley,
V a l l e y , and
a n d at a t Khahak
K h a h a k and a n d Hassan
H a s s a n Killies
K i l l i e s in i n western
w e s t e r n Nimroz
N i m r o z Province.
P r o v i n c e .5 0
In May 2003, Pakistan accused India for sponsoring the local
I n M a y 2 0 0 3 , P a k is ta n a c c u s e d I n d ia f o r s p o n s o r in g th e lo c a l m ilita n ts a ls o k n o w n militants also known
as
a s Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Taliban
T a l i b a n and a n d Al-Qaeda
A l - Q a e d a militants
m i l i t a n t s ini n Waziristan,
W a z i r i s t a n , an a n agency
a g e n c y which w h i c h is i s part
p a rt
of erstwhile known as Federally Administered Tribal
o f e r s tw h ile k n o w n a s F e d e r a lly A d m in is te r e d T r ib a l A r e a s ( F A T A ) w h o s ta g e d Areas (FATA) who staged
51
attacks
a t t a c k s against
a g a i n s t the
t h e Pakistan
P a k i s t a n army.a r m y . 5 1 According
A c c o r d i n g tto o Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s mediam e d i a reports,
r e p o r t s , tthere
h e re
was
w a s a m p l e e v i d e n c e o f I n d i a ’ s i n v o l v e m e n t t h r o u g h i t s c o n s u l a t e s i n Afghanistan
ample evidence of India’s involvement through its consulates in A fg h a n is ta n
 Pakistan’s
P Policy
a k ista n s P o l i c y Towards Afghanistan
T ow ards A 119
f g h a n i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPO
119

ffor
o r creating
c r e a t i n g troubles
t r o u b l e s in
i n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s South-western province
S o u th - w e s te r n p r o v i n c e of
o f Baluchistan.
B a l u c h i s t a n . On
On
13
1 3 August
A u g u s t 2004, 2 0 0 4 , ChiefC h ie f M Minister
i n i s t e r ofo f Baluchistan,
B a l u c h i s t a n , Jam Jam M Muhammad
uham m ad Y Yousaf,
o u s a f , stated
s ta te d
t h a t I n d i a e s t a b l i s h e d a n d p r o v i d e d s u p p o r t t o 4 0 t e r r o r i s t c a m p s a l l over
that India established and provided support to 40 terrorist camps all o v e r Baluch
B a lu c h
52
tterritory
e r r i t o r y tthrough
h r o u g h its i t s intelligence
i n t e l l i g e n c e network
n e t w o r k in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . 5 2 In I n another
a n o t h e r statement,
s ta te m e n t,
Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s M Minister
i n i s t e r of o f State
S t a t e ffor o r Information
I n f o r m a t i o n Senator,S e n a t o r , Tariq
T a r i q Azeem,
A z e e m , ttalked a l k e d aboutabout
the evidence of India providing arms to Akbar
th e e v id e n c e o f In d ia p ro v id in g a rm s to A k b a r B u g ti a n d S a rd a r K h a ir B a k h s h Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh
Marri,
M a r r i , ttwo w o locall o c a l leaders
l e a d e r s of of B Baluchistan,
a l u c h i s t a n , to t o engage
e n g a g e in i n attacks
a t t a c k s against
a g a i n s t the th e P Pakistani
a k ista n i
53
security forces in the province.
s e c u r i t y f o r c e s i n t h e p r o v i n c e .5 3
Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i officials
o f f ic ia ls b believed
e l i e v e d that t h a t India
I n d i a in i n collaboration
c o l l a b o r a t i o n with w i t h Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n
involved
i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d i n g s u b s t a n t i a l s u p p o r t t o t h e o n g o i n g s e p a r a t i s t movement
in providing substantial support to the ongoing separatist m o v e m e n t in in
BBaluchistan.
a l u c h i s t a n . Adviser
A d v i s e r to t o the
t h e Prime
P rim e M Minister
i n i s t e r ono n Interior
I n t e r i o r Affairs,
A f f a i r s , Rehman
R e h m a n Malik, M a lik ,
bbriefed
r i e f e d ttheh e Senate
S e n a t e (Upper
( U p p e r House H o u s e of o f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s P Parliament)
a r l i a m e n t ) about a b o u t Indian
I n d i a n support
su p p o rt
ttoo the
th e B Baluch
a l u c h Liberation
L i b e r a t i o n Army A r m y (BLA), ( B L A ) , which w h i c h has has b been
e e n engaged
e n g a g e d in i n ffighting
i g h t i n g since s in c e
t h e 1 9 7 0 s f o r t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f B a l u c h i s t a n . H e n o t e d , “ I n d i a i s n o w f u n d i n g the
the 1970s for the liberation of Baluchistan. He noted, “India is now funding th e
BBLA L A and a n d its
i t s activities,”
a c t i v i t i e s , ” adding
a d d i n g further
f u r t h e r that
t h a t some
s o m e 4,0004 , 0 0 0 to t o 5,000
5 ,0 0 0 B Baluch
a l u c h terrorists
te r r o ris ts
received
r e c e i v e d their
t h e i r ttraining
r a i n i n g established
e s t a b l i s h e d in i n camps
c a m p s located
l o c a t e d in i n vvarious
a r i o u s partsp a r t s of o f Afghan-
A fg h a n ­
54
istan.
is ta n .54 R Rehman
e h m a n Malik M a l i k also a l s o presented
p r e s e n t e d the t h e Senate
S e n a te w with i t h “documentary
“ d o c u m e n t a r y proof” p r o o f ’ of of
India and Afghanistan’s involvement in supporting terrorism
I n d i a a n d A f g h a n i s t a n ’s i n v o l v e m e n t i n s u p p o r t i n g t e r r o r i s m i n B a l u c h i s t a n a n d in Baluchistan and
55
the
t h e fformer
o rm e r F FATA.
A T A .5 5
In addition, Pakistan
I n a d d itio n , P a k is ta n p perceived
e r c e i v e d tthat h a t tthehe U US–India
S - I n d i a strategic
s t r a t e g i c relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p enhanced
enhanced
in
i n t h e p o s t - 9 / 1 1 s e t t i n g s w o u l d u n d e r m i n e i t s r e g i o n a l s t r a t e g i c interests
the post-9/11 settings would undermine its regional strategic i n t e r e s t s ini n South
S o u th
Asia. In October 2008, India and the United States signed
A s ia . I n O c to b e r 2 0 0 8 , I n d ia a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s s ig n e d a c iv il n u c le a r s tr a te g ic a civil nuclear strategic
deal
d e a l thatt h a t shifted
s h i f t e d tthe h e power
p o w e r bbalance a l a n c e entirely
e n t i r e l y ini n ffavour
a v o u r of o f India
I n d i a in i n ttheh e South
S o u t h Asian A s ia n
56
region.
r e g i o n . 5 6 Earlier
E a r l i e r in i n 2006,
2 0 0 6 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n requested
r e q u e s t e d for fo r a a similar
s i m i l a r strategic
s t r a t e g i c dealdeal w with i t h the
th e
United States earlier in 2006, but it was declined. Therefore,
U n ite d S ta te s e a r lie r in 2 0 0 6 , b u t it w a s d e c lin e d . T h e r e fo r e , th e P a k is ta n i s e c u r ity the Pakistani security
establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t realized
r e a l i z e d that t h a t the
t h e United
U n i t e d StatesS t a t e s has
h a s shifted
s h i f t e d itsi t s regional
r e g i o n a l strategic
s t r a t e g i c con-con­
57
sideration in favour of India. In addition, Pakistan’s
s id e r a tio n i n f a v o u r o f I n d ia .5 7 I n a d d itio n , P a k is t a n ’s v ie w o f U S a b a n d o n m e n t view of US abandonment
of
o f Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n also a l s o significantly
s i g n i f i c a n t l y impacted
im p a c te d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s approach
a p p r o a c h towards t o w a r d s the t h e Tali-T a li­
b a n . T h e U S p o l i c y m a k e r s p u b l i c l y e x p r e s s e d t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o c u t t h e n u m b e r of
ban. The US policymakers publicly expressed their intention to cut the number of
American
A m e r i c a n ttroops r o o p s in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and a n d tto o hand
h a n d overo v e r authority
a u t h o r i t y tto o N NATO.A T O . As A s General
G e n e ra l
John
J o h n P. P . Abizaid,
A b i z a i d , Head H e a d of o f the
t h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s Central
C e n t r a l Command,
C o m m a n d , said s a i d in i n late
l a t e 2005,
2005,
“it
“ i t m a k e s s e n s e t h a t a s N A T O f o r c e s g o i n , a n d t h e y ’ r e m o r e i n n u m b e r s , tthat
makes sense that as NATO forces go in, and they’re more in numbers, hat
58
wwee couldc o u l d drop
d r o p some s o m e of o f tthe he U US S requirements
r e q u i r e m e n t s somewhat.”
s o m e w h a t . ” 5 8 Some S o m e analystsa n a l y s t s argued
a rg u e d
that
t h a t tthe h e Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i (and ( a n d Afghan)
A f g h a n ) government
g o v e r n m e n t officials
o f f i c i a l s interpreted
i n t e r p r e t e d tthis h i s statement
s ta te m e n t
as
a s an a n expression
e x p r e s s i o n of o f thet h e US U S lack l a c k of o f commitment
c o m m i t m e n t tto o Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . The T h e thent h e n Afghan
A fg h a n
regime vehemently viewed India as a strategic partner
r e g im e v e h e m e n tly v ie w e d I n d ia a s a s tr a te g ic p a r tn e r w h ic h in tu r n c o n v in c e d which in turn convinced
the
t h e Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i government
g o v e r n m e n t officials o f f i c i a l s tot o support
s u p p o r t the t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n tto o p protect
r o t e c t Islamabad’s
I s la m a b a d ’s
strategic i n t e r e s t s . 59
s t r a t e g i c interests. 59
In
I n tthis
h i s context,
c o n te x t, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n mainly
m a i n l y relied
r e l i e d on o n the
t h e Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban
T a l i b a n to t o protect
p r o t e c t itsi t s geo-
geo­
strategic interest in the region. General Musharraf acknowledged
s tr a te g ic in te r e s t in th e r e g io n . G e n e r a l M u s h a r r a f a c k n o w le d g e d in a n in te r v ie w in an interview
wwithi t h TheThe G Guardian:
u a r d ia n :

The
T h e ISI
I S I cultivated
c u l t i v a t e d tthe
h e Taliban
T a l i b a n after
a f t e r 2001
2 0 0 1 bbecause
e c a u s e Karzai’s
K a r z a i ’ s government was
g o v e rn m e n t w as
dominated by non-Pashtuns, the country’s largest ethnic group, and officials
d o m in a te d b y n o n - P a s h tu n s , th e c o u n tr y ’s la r g e s t e th n ic g r o u p , a n d o f f ic ia ls
who
w were
ho w e r e tthought
h o u g h t to t o ffavor
a v o r India.
I n d i a . Obviously
O b v i o u s l y we
w e were
w e r e looking
l o o k i n g ffor
o r some
s o m e groups
g ro u p s
120 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
to
t o counter
c o u n t e r this
t h i s Indian
I n d i a n action
a c t i o n against
a g a in st PPakistan.
a k i s t a n . That
T h a t is
i s where
w h e r e tthe
h e intelligence
in te llig e n c e
work
w o r k c o m e s i n . I n t e l l i g e n c e b e i n g i n c o n t a c t w i t h T a l i b a n g r o u p s . Definitely
comes in. Intelligence being in contact with Taliban groups. D e f in ite ly
60
they
t h e y were
w e r e ini n contact,
c o n t a c t , and
a n d they
t h e y should be.
s h o u ld b e .60

A
A prominent
p r o m i n e n t jjournalist
o u r n a l i s t and
and a a close
c l o s e observer
o b s e r v e r of o f Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , Ahmed
A hm ed R Rashid,
a sh id ,
argued that Pakistan considered the Taliban to be the best bet against
a r g u e d th a t P a k is ta n c o n s id e r e d th e T a lib a n to b e th e b e s t b e t a g a in s t th e c o n v e r ­ the conver-
gence
g e n c e of
o f India
I n d i a and
a n d Afghanistan’s
A f g h a n i s t a n ’s interests
i n t e r e s t s during
d u r i n g tthe
he N Northern
o r t h e r n Alliance
A l l i a n c e rule
r u l e in
i n the
th e
61
post 9/11 period. Pakistan’s support to the Taliban primarily aimed at countering
p o s t 9 / 1 1 p e r i o d . 6 1 P a k i s t a n ’s s u p p o r t t o t h e T a l i b a n p r i m a r i l y a i m e d a t c o u n t e r i n g
growing
g r o w i n g Indian
In d ia n p presence
r e s e n c e anda n d influence
i n f l u e n c e in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . General
G e n e r a l McChrystal
M c C h r y s t a l in in
his September 2009 report revealed Pakistan’s anxiety
h is S e p te m b e r 2 0 0 9 r e p o r t r e v e a le d P a k i s t a n ’s a n x ie ty o v e r I n d ia n pover Indian presence
r e s e n c e inin
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and
a n d tthe h e possible
p o s s i b l e negative
n e g a t i v e impact
i m p a c t over
o v e r the
t h e region.
re g io n . HHee stated:
s ta te d :

Indian
I n d i a n political
p o l i t i c a l and
a n d economic
e c o n o m i c influence
i n f l u e n c e iiss increasing
i n c r e a s i n g ini n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , includ-
in c lu d ­
ing
i n g s i g n i f i c a n t d e v e l o p m e n t e f f o r t s a n d f i n a n c i a l i n v e s t m e n t . In
significant development efforts and financial investment. I n addition,
a d d itio n ,
the
t h e current
c u r r e n t Afghan
A f g h a n government
g o v e r n m e n t is is p perceived
e r c e iv e d b by y Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d to t o bbee p pro-Indian.
r o -I n d ia n .
While
W h i l e I n d i a n a c t i v i t i e s l a r g e l y b e n e f i t t h e A f g h a n p e o p l e , i n c r e a s i n g Indian
Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing In d ia n
influence
i n f l u e n c e ini n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n is
i s likely
l i k e l y ttoo exacerbate
e x a c e r b a t e regional
r e g i o n a l ttensions
e n s i o n s and
a n d encour-
e n c o u r­
62
age
a g e Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i countermeasures
c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ini n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n or o r India.
I n d i a .6 2

PPakistan
a k i s t a n ini n non o stretch
s t r e t c h of
o f imagination
i m a g i n a t i o n couldc o u l d tthink
h i n k ofo f ana n Indian
In d ia n p presence
r e s e n c e on on b both
o th
its
i t s eastern
e a s t e r n anda n d western
w e s te rn b borders.
o rd e rs. H Hasan
a s a n Askari
A sk a ri R Rizvi,
iz v i, a a P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i foreign
f o r e ig n p policy
o lic y
analyst,
a n a l y s t , said,
s a i d , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , which
w h i c h has h a s ffought
o u g h t tthree
h re e w warsa rs wwithi t h India,
In d ia , w was a s worried
w o r r i e d over over
India’s
I n d i a ’ s growing
g r o w i n g influence
i n f l u e n c e in i n Afghanistan,
A fg h a n ista n , w which
h i c h bborders
o r d e r s Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i tterritory”
e r r i t o r y ” and
and
aa “growing
“ g r o w i n g influence
i n f l u e n c e of o f India
I n d i a in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n creates
c r e a t e s problems
p r o b l e m s ffor or P Pakistan.”
a k is ta n .” 63
63

Therefore, Pakistan would never be able to tolerate India

T h e r e f o r e , P a k is ta n w o u ld n e v e r b e a b le to to le r a te I n d ia g a in in g c o n s id e r a b le gaining considerable
influence
i n f l u e n c e in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n . P Pakistan
a k i s t a n ffelt
e l t bbeing
e i n g marginalized
m a r g i n a l i z e d bby y ttheh e growing
g r o w i n g Indo- In d o -
64
US relations in political, military and economic
U S r e la tio n s in p o litic a l, m ilita r y a n d e c o n o m ic s p h e r e s .64 spheres.
This
T h i s context
c o n t e x t provides
p ro v id e s a a clear
c l e a r understating
u n d e r s t a t i n g of of P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s reluctance
r e l u c t a n c e to t o ttake
ake
decisive actions against the Taliban, even though Pakistan
d e c is iv e a c tio n s a g a in s t th e T a lib a n , e v e n th o u g h P a k is ta n w a s a U S a lly a g a in s t was a US ally against
the
th e w war a r ono n terror.
t e r r o r . Stephen
S t e p h e n P. P . Cohen
C o h e n noted,
n o t e d , “Pakistani
“ P a k i s t a n i officials
o f f i c i a l s ffreely
r e e l y admit
a d m i t tthathat
their main concerns in Afghanistan are Indian penetration
th e ir m a in c o n c e r n s in A f g h a n is ta n a r e I n d ia n p e n e tr a tio n ( w h ic h w o u ld m e a n (which would mean
encirclement
e n c i r c l e m e n t for f o r Islamabad)
I s l a m a b a d ) and a n d Afghan
A fg h a n P President
r e s i d e n t Hamid
H a m i d Karzai’s
K a r z a i ’ s dependence
dependence
on
o n N e w D e l h i ” a d d i n g f u r t h e r , “ G i v e n t h i s s t r a t e g i c c o m p u l s i o n , it
New Delhi” adding further, “Given this strategic compulsion, i t is
i s not
n o t sur-
su r­
prising
p r i s i n g t h a t P a k i s t a n t o l e r a t e s , i f i t d o e s n o t d i r e c t l y s u p p o r t , t h e T a l i b a n ; it
that Pakistan tolerates, if it does not directly support, the Taliban; i t has
has
65
no
n o other
o t h e r instrument
i n s t r u m e n t available
a v a i l a b l e to t o iti t tthan
h a n this
t h i s Pashtun
P a s h t u n tribal
t r i b a l hammer.”
h a m m e r .” 6 5 M Manyany
analysts
a n a l y s t s concurred
c o n c u r r e d tthat h a t Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s continued
c o n t i n u e d support
s u p p o r t tot o thet h e Taliban
T a lib a n w was a s mainly
m a in ly
66
motivated
m o t i v a t e d b y i t s s t r a t e g i c c a l c u l a t i o n s a b o u t I n d i a . 6 6 A c c o r d i n g t o a n analyst,
by its strategic calculations about India. According to an a n a ly st,
“Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s ffears e a r s are a r e quite
q u i t e genuine.
g e n u i n e . India’s
I n d i a ’ s attempt
a t t e m p t tto o develop
d e v e l o p its i t s influence
i n f l u e n c e in in
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n i s a i m e d a t i s o l a t i n g P a k i s t a n p o l i t i c a l l y , d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , and
is aimed at isolating Pakistan politically, diplomatically, a n d mili-
m ili-
67
tarily.”
t a r i l y .” 6 7 K Kabul
a b u l increasing
i n c r e a s i n g reliance
r e l i a n c e and
a n d dependence
d e p e n d e n c e on o n India
I n d i a served
s e r v e d as as a a stum-
s tu m ­
bling block in the way of cordial relations between
b lin g b lo c k in th e w a y o f c o r d ia l r e la tio n s b e tw e e n A f g h a n is ta n a n d P a k is ta n .Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Under
U n d e r these t h e s e strategic
s t r a t e g i c compulsions,
c o m p u l s i o n s , Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d could c o u l d not
n o t go g o against
a g a i n s t tthe h e Taliban
T a lib a n
forces, who have primarily represented the Pashtuns in Afghanistan
f o r c e s , w h o h a v e p r im a r ily r e p r e s e n te d th e P a s h tu n s in A f g h a n is ta n s y m p a th e tic sympathetic
to P a k i s t a n . 68
t o Pakistan. 68
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 121
Pakistan’s Approach Towards the Current US–Taliban
Peace Process
In the late 2000s, the western interests in Afghanistan faded away, and they were
looking for an exit strategy from Afghanistan. The United States was looking for
a political settlement and reconciliation among Afghan warring groups, includ-
ing the Afghan Taliban. In January 2009, General David Petraeus suggested that
“it’s not possible to solve the challenges internal to Afghanistan without address-
ing the challenges, especially in terms of security, with Afghanistan’s neighbours.
A regional approach is required.” Since then, the rhetoric of a regional approach
has been articulated to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict in the post-
NATO situation.69 In November 2010, the NATO member countries signed a truce
to handover the security of Afghanistan to Afghan national forces by the end of
2014. In June 2011, President Obama also announced the US exit strategy to
gradually withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Moreover,
Obama confirmed the preliminary peace talks with the Afghan Taliban leader-
ship.70 Since then, there was growing interest and competition among regional
stakeholders in the endgame of Afghanistan. Pakistan wants to have a stable and
peaceful Afghanistan with a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul after the US
withdrawal. More specifically, Islamabad does not want an Afghan government
that is closer to India.
In addition to this, the Afghan High Peace Council presented a roadmap for the
peace process in which five goals were planned in November 2012:

(1) the Taliban and other insurgent groups would renounce violence, includ-
ing cutting ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups; (2) all insurgent
groups would be converted into legitimate political groups; (3) these groups
would recognize and operate within the boundaries of the Afghan consti-
tution; (4) all disarmed and demobilized groups would be reintegrated into
Afghanistan’s political space and co-exist with one another, where they could
vie for political power in a peaceful manner through elections; and (5) the
Afghan National Security Forces would be the sole legitimate security organ
of the state, responsible for protecting Afghans and providing security for the
country against internal and external threats.71

In this context, Pakistan saw an opportunity to have a greater role in the politi-
cal settlement of Afghanistan by facilitating the reconciliation process with the
Afghan Taliban on which Islamabad has mainly relied to protect its strategic inter-
ests despite international pressure in post-9/11.72 According to General Ashfaq
Parvez Kayani, “Pakistan sees the Taliban not as potential conquerors of Afghani-
stan but more of an anti-Indian asset in a post-NATO world.”73 Admiral Mike
Mullen said that “Pakistan’s long-term goal was to use the Taliban as a ‘hedge’
to redress imbalance in regional power.”74 This meant that reconciliation with the
Afghan Taliban has increased Islamabad’s relevance in the future government
122 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
in Kabul, whereas the role of India has decreased despite its billions of dollars
investment in developmental projects and cooperation on security. More specifi-
cally, “any power-sharing arrangement accompanying a peace deal with Afghan
Taliban would likely align with Pakistan’s vision of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghani-
stan i.e. a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan.”75
After the US announcement of its exit strategy in 2011, there has been a shift
in Pakistan’s approach to have a stable Afghanistan after the international forces
left the country. Actually, Pakistan has experienced a severe blowback in the form
of religious militancy and extremism due to its proxy wars in Afghanistan.76 As a
result, a dangerous nexus emerged among Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Cen-
tral Asian militant groups in the former FATA that has largely destabilized the
northern part of Pakistan on the Pak–Afghan border areas.77 Therefore, there has
been a realization in the Pakistani strategic circles that it is in the best interest of
Pakistan to have a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. According to former KP Chief
Minister Amir Haider Khan Hoti, “stability in KP and FATA is closely linked to
stability in Afghanistan.” Since then, Pakistan has showed greater interests in the
peace process in Afghanistan.
During Afghan High Peace Council’s visit to Pakistan in 2012, Pakistan
released nine Afghan Taliban leaders and handed over to Afghanistan, which
was an old demand of the Afghan government. This initiative was appreciated by
both Afghan officials and western diplomats based in Kabul. They believed that it
would help in reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban to find a political settlement
of the decade-long insurgency in the country. It was also seen as a shift in Paki-
stan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan and a step towards a political settlement
of the Afghan conflict. Salahuddin Rabbani, the Head of the Peace Council, called
the Afghan Taliban release as a breakthrough in the reconciliation with the Afghan
Taliban.78
Additionally, Pakistan has been blamed for all the wrongdoings by NATO
forces in Afghanistan and failure of the Afghan government to establish its order
in the country. Many saw Pakistan’s role as a spoiler that has severely affected
Pakistan’s image in Afghanistan. Islamabad believed that its active role in the
peace process and political settlement would improve its image both in Kabul and
at international levels. Furthermore, China has been investing in its Belt and Road
Initiative in which Pakistan is seeing a greater role due to its key geographic posi-
tion which can connect energy-rich Central Asia, Afghanistan and Middle East.
Nonetheless, stability in Afghanistan is a key for the Chinese initiative.
In this scenario, Pakistan has played an active role in the reconciliation pro-
cess to bring the Afghan Taliban into the negotiating table. Pakistan has hosted
the peace talks with the Afghan Taliban and participated in other regional initia-
tives by China, Saudi Arab, Qatar and Russia to find a political settlement in the
war-torn country. In October 2018, Pakistan released Taliban central leader Mul-
lah Abdul Ghani Baradar on the request of the government of Qatar to facilitate
the US–Taliban direct peace talks in Doha where the Taliban political office is
based.79 Mullah Baradar has played a significant part in the recently concluded
peace talks between the United States and Afghan Taliban.
 Pakistan’s
P Policy
a k i s t a n ’s P o l i c y Towards
T o w a r d s AAfghanistan 123
f g h a n i s t a n ZYXWVUTSRQPON
123

In
I n February
F e b r u a r y 2020, 2 0 2 0 , tthe he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s and a n d Afghan
A f g h a n TalibanT a l i b a n signeds ig n e d a a historical
h is to r ic a l
t r u c e i n D o h a f o r b r i n g i n g p e a c e t o A f g h a n i s t a n a f t e r 1 8 y e a r s o f c o n f l i c t . The
truce in Doha for bringing peace to Afghanistan after 18 years of conflict. The
United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s and a n d itsi t s allies
a l l i e s have
h a v e agreed
a g r e e d “to “ t o withdraw
w i t h d r a w all a l l troops
tro o p s w within
i t h i n 14 1 4 months
m o n th s
if
i f the
t h e militants
m ilita n ts u uphold
p h o l d tthe h e deal.”
d e a l.” P President
r e s i d e n t Trump
T r u m p said, s a i d , “it “ i t had
h a d bbeen een a a long
l o n g and and
hard
h a r d j o u r n e y i n A f g h a n i s t a n . I t ’ s t i m e a f t e r a l l t h e s e y e a r s t o b r i n g o u r p e o p l e bback
journey in Afghanistan. It’s time after all these years to bring our people ack
80
home.”
h o m e . ” 8 0 This T h i s peace
p e a c e ttruce ru c e w wasa s thet h e result
r e s u l t of o f 14-month
1 4 - m o n t h long l o n g negotiating
n e g o t i a t i n g process
p ro c e ss
bbrokered
r o k e r e d and a n d ffacilitated
a c i l i t a t e d bby y P Pakistan.
a k i s t a n . It I t is
i s important
i m p o r t a n t tto o noten o t e tthathat P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s efforts
e ffo rts
are appreciated by the United States and Western
a r e a p p r e c ia te d b y th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d W e s te r n o f f ic ia ls a n d d ip lo m a ts . officials and diplomats.
Nonetheless,
N o n e t h e l e s s , tthe h e US–Taliban
U S - T a l i b a n ttruce r u c e is is a a setback
s e t b a c k to t o India,
I n d ia , w which
h i c h has has b brought
ro u g h t
the
t h e A f g h a n T a l i b a n a t t h e c e n t r e o f t h e f u t u r e g o v e r n m e n t i n A f g h a n i s t a n . It
Afghan Taliban at the centre of the future government in Afghanistan. I t is
is a a
win of the Pakistani strategists to have a greater role
w in o f th e P a k is ta n i s tr a te g is ts to h a v e a g r e a te r r o le in th e p o litic a l s e ttle m e n t in the political settlement
of
o f Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . As A s mentioned
m e n tio n e d b before,
e f o r e , India
I n d i a hash a s always
a lw a y s b been
e e n sceptical
s c e p t i c a l about
a b o u t the th e
Afghan
A f g h a n T a l i b a n d u e t o i t s c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h P a k i s t a n . S u b s e q u e n t l y , New
Taliban due to its close association with Pakistan. Subsequently, N ew
Delhi
D e l h i has h a s supported
s u p p o r t e d anti-Taliban
a n t i - T a l i b a n fforces o r c e s in i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n tto o neutralize
n e u t r a l i z e or o r isolate
is o la te
the
t h e T a l i b a n ’ s r o l e i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s a l s o r e q u e s t e d India
Taliban’s role in Afghanistan. The United States has also requested I n d i a ttoo
support
s u p p o r t tthe he U US–Taliban
S - T a l i b a n deal d e a l anda n d starts t a r t negotiation
n e g o t i a t i o n withw i t h the t h e Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban.
T a l i b a n . To To
neutralize
n e u t r a l i z e tthe h e growing
g r o w i n g role r o l e ofof P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n Afghanistan,
A f g h a n i s t a n , Indian I n d i a n leadership
l e a d e r s h i p may m ay
reach
r e a c h o u t t o t h e A f g h a n T a l i b a n a n d e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h tthe
out to the Afghan Taliban and establish a relationship with h e outfit
o u t f i t iin
n
81
future.
f u tu r e .81
After
A f t e r tthe he U US—Afghan
S — A f g h a n Taliban T a l i b a n truce,
t r u c e , thet h e newly
n e w l y US U S electede l e c t e d President
P re sid e n t B Biden
id e n
82
announced that they will complete their mission in Afghanistan
a n n o u n c e d th a t th e y w ill c o m p le te th e ir m is s io n in A f g h a n is ta n b y A u g u s t 2 0 2 1 .82 by August 2021.
This means that Biden continued former President
T h i s m e a n s t h a t B i d e n c o n t i n u e d f o r m e r P r e s i d e n t T r u m p ’s p o l i c y t o w a r d s Trump’s policy towards
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and and w withdrew
i t h d r e w all a ll U US S forces
f o r c e s ffrom r o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n bby y August
A u g u s t 2021. 2 0 2 1 . The The
Afghan
A f g h a n T a l i b a n t e r m e d i t t h e i r v i c t o r y a g a i n s t 2 0 y e a r s U S o c c u p a t i o n that
Taliban termed it their victory against 20 years US occupation t h a t had
had
83
started
s t a r t e d in
i n tthe h e post-9/11.
p o s t - 9 / 1 1 .8 3
Nonetheless,
N o n e t h e l e s s , tthe he v victory
i c t o r y of o f ttheh e Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban T a lib a n w will i l l have
h a v e negative
n e g a t i v e fallout
f a l l o u t onon
P a k i s t a n ’ s p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y . M a n y r a d i c a l g r o u p s i n P a k i s t a n w i l l t a k e inspira-
Pakistan’s peace and security. Many radical groups in Pakistan will take in s p ir a ­
ttion
i o n from
f r o m the t h e Afghan
A f g h a n TalibanT a lib a n w whichh i c h willw i l l lead
l e a d tto o extremism
e x t r e m i s m and a n d radicalization
r a d i c a l i z a t i o n in in
t h e c o u n t r y . A l s o , a n e w i n f l u x o f A f g h a n r e f u g e e s w i l l a r r i v e to
the country. Also, a new influx of Afghan refugees will arrive to P Pakistan
a k i s t a n due due
tto
o humanitarian
h u m a n i t a r i a n crisisc r i s i s in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . More M o r e importantly,
i m p o r t a n t l y , many m a n y anti-Pakistan
a n t i - P a k i s t a n ele- e le ­
ments
m e n t s s u c h a s P a k i s t a n i T a l i b a n b a s e d i n A f g h a n i s t a n h a v e i n c r e a s e d ttheir
such as Pakistani Taliban based in Afghanistan have increased h e i r tterror
e rro r
attacks
a t t a c k s on on P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i security
s e c u r i t y fforces
o r c e s in i n ttheh e fformer
o r m e r tribal
t r i b a l areas
a r e a s along
a l o n g tthe h e Durand
D u ra n d
84
Line.
L in e .84
In
I n addition,
a d d i t i o n , manym a n y rregional
e g i o n a l stakeholders
s t a k e h o l d e r s will w i l l try
t r y ttoo ffill i l l the
t h e vacuum
v a c u u m left l e f t bby y the
th e
U n i t e d S t a t e s i n A f g h a n i s t a n . I n d i a h a s r e l u c t a n t l y s t a r t e d t o r e a c h o u t t o the
United States in Afghanistan. India has reluctantly started to reach out to th e
Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban
T a l i b a n in i n Doha
D o h a in i n September
S e p t e m b e r 2020 2 0 2 0 despite
d e s p i t e itsi t s official
o f f i c i a l stance
s t a n c e to t o support
su p p o rt
tthe
h e Afghan
A f g h a n government.
g o v e r n m e n t . The The p primary
r i m a r y objective
o b j e c t i v e of o f India
I n d i a is i s toto p protect
r o t e c t its i t s secu-
secu­
r i t y i n t e r e s t s a n d i n v e s t m e n t i n A f g h a n i s t a n . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , I n d i a w a n t s tthat
rity interests and investment in Afghanistan. More specifically, India wants hat
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n would w o u l d not n o t bbecome
ecom e a a major
m a j o r security
s e c u r i t y concern
c o n c e r n bby y harbouring
h a rb o u rin g K Kashmir-
a s h m ir-
85
b based
a s e d militant
m i l i t a n t groups
g r o u p s such s u c h as a s Jaish-e-Mohammed
J a i s h - e - M o h a m m e d and and L Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.
a s h k a r - e - T a y y a b a .8 5 In In
addition,
a d d i t i o n , I n d i a b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e U S d e p e n d e n c y o n P a k i s t a n w i l l b e r e d u c e d fol-
India believes that the US dependency on Pakistan will be reduced fo l­
lowing
l o w i n g its i t s withdrawal
w ith d r a w a l w whichh i c h will
w ill p provide
r o v i d e her h e r ana n opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y to t o ffilli l l tthe
h e vacuum
vacuum
in Afghanistan by cooperating with the United
in A f g h a n is ta n b y c o o p e r a tin g w ith th e U n ite d S ta te s . I n d ia c o u ld a ls o u States. India could also use
s e its
its
regional
r e g i o n a l d i p l o m a c y b y e n g a g i n g I r a n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n t h e q u e s t i o n of
diplomacy by engaging Iran with the United States on the question of
A f g h a n i s t a n . 86
Afghanistan. 86
124 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
To
T o sumsum u up,p , Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n w will
i l l remain
re m a in a a major
m a j o r source
s o u r c e of o f security
s e c u r i t y concern
c o n c e r n ffor
or
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n d e s p i t e t h e A f g h a n T a l i b a n a d v a n c e m e n t i n t h e c o u n t r y . I n f a c t , tthe
despite the Afghan Taliban advancement in the country. In fact, h e Tali-
T a li­
ban
b a n takeover
t a k e o v e r of o f Afghanistan
A f g h a n is ta n w wouldo u l d create
c r e a t e security
s e c u r i t y concerns
c o n c e r n s as a s extremism
e x t r e m i s m andand
Taliban
T a l i b a n m i l i t a n c y w i l l s p i l l o v e r t o t h e P a k i s t a n ’s w e s t e r n b o r d e r a r e a s in
militancy will spill over to the Pakistan’s western border areas in K KP P and
and
Balochistan
B a l o c h i s t a n provinces.
p ro v in c e s . M More o r e importantly,
i m p o r t a n t l y , India–US
I n d i a - U S cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n in i n Afghanistan
A fg h a n is ta n
would
w o u l d create
c r e a t e further
f u r t h e r security
s e c u r ity pproblems
r o b l e m s for
fo r P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s strategic
s t r a t e g i c and
a n d regional
r e g i o n a l inter-
in te r­
ests following the US drawdown from Afghanistan.
e s ts f o llo w in g th e U S d r a w d o w n f r o m A f g h a n is ta n .

Conclusion
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s long
lo n g b been
e e n accused
a c c u s e d of of p providing
r o v i d i n g safe s a f e havens
h a v e n s tto o the
t h e Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban
T a lib a n
from
f r o m tthe h e international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community,
c o m m u n i t y , in in p particular
a r t i c u l a r from
f r o m Washington,
W a s h i n g t o n , andand p playing
l a y i n g lit-
lit­
tle or conflicted role in the War on Terror as an ally of the United
tle o r c o n f lic te d r o le in th e W a r o n T e r r o r a s a n a lly o f th e U n ite d S ta te s . H o w e v e r , States. However,
the
t h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s did
d i d not
n o t acknowledge
a c k n o w l e d g e for f o r long
l o n g its
i t s own
o w n mistakes
m i s t a k e s of o f undermining
u n d e r m in in g
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s m a i n l y I n d i a - c e n t r i c s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s w h i c h c o m p r o m i s e d its
mainly India-centric security interests which compromised i t s perfor-
p e rfo r­
mance
m a n c e a g a i n s t t h e W a r o n T e r r o r . H o w e v e r , r e c e n t l y , t h e U S i n t e r e s t s in
against the War on Terror. However, recently, the US interests in p pulling
u llin g
out
o u t ffrom
r o m Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n and a n d initiating
i n i t i a t i n g dialogues
d ia lo g u e s w withi t h the
t h e Afghan
A f g h a n Taliban
T a lib a n p provided
ro v id e d
an
a n opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y tto o P Pakistan
a k i s t a n ttoo secure
s e c u r e itsi t s strategic
s t r a t e g i c interests.
i n t e r e s t s . This
T h i s opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y hashas
not
n o t b e e n u n a t t e n d e d s o f a r . T h i s i s e v i d e n t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t P a k i s t a n played
been unattended so far. This is evident from the fact that Pakistan p l a y e d anan
active
a c t i v e role
r o l e for
fo r a a ffair
a i r share
s h a r e ofo f the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n in i n new
n e w political
p o l i t i c a l setup.
s e tu p . H However,
o w e v e r , tthere
h e r e is
is
possible
p o s s ib le b blowback
l o w b a c k on on P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n tthe
h e form
f o r m of o f extremism
e x t r e m i s m and a n d radicalization
r a d i c a l i z a t i o n in
i n the
th e
case
c a s e ofo f the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n ttaking
a k i n g over
over K Kabul.
a b u l.

Notes
11 S.S. M M.. Burke,
B u rk e, M KJIHGFEDCBA
Mainsprings
a i n s p r i n g s ofo f IIndian
n d i a n and
and P Pakistani
a k is ta n i F Foreign
o r e ig n P o l i c i e s (Karachi:
Policies ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x fo rd
UUniversity
n i v e r s i t y Press,
P r e s s , 1975),
1 9 7 5 ) , 22.
22.
22 C.C . Christine
C h ris tin e F Fair,
a ir, FFighting
i g h t i n g tot o the
th e E End:
n d : TheThe P Pakistan
a k is ta n A Army’s
r m y ’s WayW a y of W a r (New
o f War ( N e w York:
Y o rk :
Oxford
O x f o r d University
U n i v e r s i t y Press,
P r e s s , 22014).
0 1 4 ).
33 H Howard
o w ard W Wriggins,
r i g g i n s , “The
“T he B Balancing
a la n c in g P Process
r o c e s s ini n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s Foreign
F o re ig n P Policy,”
o l i c y , ” in
in P Pakistan:
a k is ta n :
The
T h e LLong V i e w , ed.
o n g View, ed. L Lawrence
a w r e n c e Ziring
Z i r i n g (Durham,
(D u rh a m , N NC:
C: D Dukeu k e University
U n iv e rs ity P Press,
r e s s , 1977),
1 9 7 7 ),
303–4.
3 0 3 -4 .
44 RRichard
i c h a r d Sisson
S i s s o n and a n d Leo
L eo R Rose,
o s e , War
W ar a and
n d SSecession:
e c e s s io n : P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , IIndia
n d i a and
a n d thet h e Creation
C r e a t i o n of
of
B a n g l a d e s h (Karachi:
Bangladesh ( K a r a c h i : Oxford
O x fo rd U University
n i v e r s i t y Press,
P r e s s , 1992),
1 9 9 2 ) , 35.
35.
55 IIbid.
b id .
66 RRifaat
i f a a t Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “The “ T h e IIndia-Pakistan
n d i a - P a k i s t a n Peace
P eace P Process,”
r o c e s s ,” D Defense
e fe n s e & & SSecurity
e c u r ity A n a l y s i s 22,
Analysis 22,
nno.o . 44 (2006):
( 2 0 0 6 ) : 4410. 10.
77 RRashid
a s h id A Ahmad
h m a d Khan, K h a n , “Pakistan-India
“ P a k is ta n -In d ia P Peace
e a c e Process:
P ro ce ss: A Ann AAssessment,”
s s e s s m e n t , ” IIPRIP R I JJournal
ournal
IIX,
X , nno. o. 1 1 (Winter
( W i n t e r 22009):
0 0 9 ) : 90.
90.
88 Ibid.,
I b i d . , 91.
91.
99 John
J o h n Thomson,
T h o m s o n , “Kashmir:
“ K a s h m i r : TheThe M Most o s t Dangerous
D a n g e r o u s PlaceP l a c e ini n the
t h e World,”
W o r l d , ” in in K Kashmir:
a s h m ir : N Newew
Voices,
V o ic e s , N New p p r o a c h e s , ed.
e w AApproaches, ed. W W.. PP.. S. S . Sidhu
S i d h u (New(N e w D Delhi:
e l h i : Viva
V i v a Books
B o o k s Private
P r i v a t e Ltd.,
L td .,
22007),
0 0 7 ) , 188.
188.
10
1 0 “India
“ In d ia H Has a s Reached
R eached L Limit
i m i t ofo f Tolerance-Vajpayee,”Reuters,
T o l e r a n c e - V a j p a y e e ,” R e u t e r s , December
D e c e m b e r 16, 1 6 , 22001.
001.
11
11 A Atultu l A Aneja,
n e j a , “India
“ I n d i a Recalls
R e c a lls E Envoy
n v o y tot o Pak,”
P a k , ” TheThe H i n d u , December
Hindu, D e c e m b e r 222, 2 , 2001.
2001.
12
1 2 “India
“ In d ia H Has a s Reached
R eached L Limit
i m i t ofo f TOLERANCE-VAJPAYEE.”
T O L E R A N C E - V A J P A Y E E .”
13
1 3 “Pakistani
“ P a k is ta n i D Dailya i l y Reports
R e p o r t s Troops
T r o o p s ono n High
H ig h A Alert
le rt AAlong
l o n g IIndian
n d i a n Border,”
B o r d e r,” B BBCBC M Monitoring
o n ito r in g
SSouth
o u th A D e c e m b e r 15,
s i a , December
Asia, 1 5 , 22001.
001.
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 125
14 Anton La Guardia, “We Do Not Want a War, Says Pakistan,” The Daily Telegraph,
December 29, 2001.
15 “The Pressure Rises in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 20, 2001; John F. Burns,
“Pakistan Is Said to Order an End to Support for Militant Groups,” New York Times,
January 2, 2002.
16 Text of the speech is available at the official web site of the government of Pakistan,
accessed November 3, 2010, www.infopak.gov.pk.
17 Luv Puri, “Be Ready for Decisive Battle, PM Tells Jawans,” The Hindu, May 23, 2002.
18 Ibid.
19 Hussain, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process,” 411.
20 Syed Nadzri, “Musharaf – Threat of Full-Scale India–Pakistan War Has Diminished,”
New Straits Times, June 8, 2002.
21 Ishtaiq Ahmad, “Securing Peace in South Asia,” Pakistan Vision 8, no. 2 (2007): 67.
22 “India to Appoint High Commissioner, Restore Air Links to Pakistan,” The Hindu,
May 3, 2003.
23 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Dialogue to Start Next Month: Joint Statement on Musharaf–
Vajpayee Meeting,” Dawn, January 7, 2004.
24 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “The Futute of India-Pakistan Peace Process Amid the War on Terror
in Afghanistan,” IPRI Journal VII, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 56.
25 Sydney J Freedberg Jr, “The Kabul- New Delhi Axis,” National Journal 39, no. 19
(May 12, 2007): 60.
26 As cited in Qadar Bakhsh Baloch and Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi, “Indian Encroach-
ment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making,” The Dialogue III, no. 1
(2008): 17.
27 Perveen Swami, “The Terror Trajectory,” Frontline 18, no. 21 (October 13–26, 2001).
28 “Jaswant Support to NA,” Times of India, October 3, 2001.
29 Christine C. Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Paki-
stan,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (April 2009): 159.
30 Shah Imran Ahmed, “News Analysis: Indian Prime Minister’s Visit Promotes Indo-
Afghan Ties,” Xinhua News Agency, August 30, 2005.
31 Stephen Blank, “India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia,” Comparative Strategy 22,
no. 2 (2003): 142.
32 Scott Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” Christian Science
Monitor 95, no. 202 (September 12, 2003): 2.
33 Baloch and Niazi, “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan,” 17.
34 As cited in R. G. Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow: The U.S.-Pakistan Strate-
gic Alliance and the War in Afghanistan,” Asian Affairs: An American Review (2007):
164.
35 Sudha Ramachandran, “In Afghanistan, Pakistan's loss is India's gain,” Asia Times,
February 01, 2002.
36 Nirmala George, “Afghanistan Turns to India for Advice,” Associated Press, Janu-
ary 16, 2002.
37 “President Musharaf’s Address to the Nation,” The News, September 20, 2001.
38 Praveen Swami, “Covert Contestation,” Frontline 22, no. 19 (September 10–23,
2005), accessed July 25, 2010, www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2219/stories/2005092
3004503000.htm.
39 Mubashir Zaidi, “The Loss of Strategic Depth Can Be Attributed to the Unholy Shadow
of the Foreign Office-Former ISI Chief, Hameed Gul,” Herald, December 2001.
40 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Balti-
more: John Hopkins, 2000), 335.
41 Ibid.
42 As cited in Hussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuity and Change,” 5.
43 Ibid.
126 Shahzad Akhtar and Arshad Ali
44 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 159.
45 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 68.
46 “India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in Between,” The Washington Times, September 4,
2005.
47 J. N. Raina, “Is India Benign Role in Afghanistan Anti-Pakistan,” Asian Tribune
19, no. 266 (July 27, 2008), accessed December 19, 2009, http://asiantribune.com/
node/12407.
48 “Afghan Paper Rejects Pakistani Allegations on Terrorist Camps,” BBC Monitoring
South Asia, October 22, 2003.
49 Baldauf, “India-Pakistan Rivalry Reaches into Afghanistan,” 2.
50 Ibid.
51 Shaiq Hussain, “Pakistan to Ask India to Rein in Afghan Consulates,” Nation (Lahore),
March 18, 2006.
52 Jam Muhammad Yousaf, Balochistan CM Statement. See Herald (Karachi, Pakistan),
September, 2004.
53 “Arms Supply to Bugti, Baloch Rebels to Be Taken Up with India, Afghanistan, Says
Tariq Azeem,” Pakistan Press International Information Services, September 05,
2006.
54 Pakistan Openly Accuses India, “Afghanistan of Supporting Secession Movement in
Balochistan,” United News of Bangladesh, April 23, 2009.
55 “Pakistan Interior Adviser Says India, Afghanistan Behind Baluch Unrest,” BBC Mon-
itoring South Asia, April 24, 2009.
56 Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Ene-
mies,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 156–57.
57 M. G. Weinbaum and J. B. Harder, “Pakistan’s Afghan Policies and Their Conse-
quence,” Contemporary South Asia 16, no. 1 (2008): 36–37.
58 Eric Schmitt and David S. Cloud, “U.S. May Start Pulling Out of Afghanistan Next
Spring,” New York Times, September 14, 2005.
59 Gregory Treverton and Seth Jones, Measuring National Power (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2005), 18.
60 “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for ‘Proxies’ in Afghanistan Must
Stop,” The Guardian, February 13, 2015, accessed October 12, 2017, www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afgha
nistan-ghani-taliban.
61 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 86–87.
62 As cited in Syed Farooq Hasnat, “Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the
Fluctuating U.S. Strategy,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall–Winter
2009): 153.
63 Kamal Zaheer, “Karzai in India to Boost Ties, Pakistan Wary,” Reuters, April 9, 2006.
64 Frederic Grare, “Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Era,” Carnegie
Papers no. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2006), 12.
65 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166.
66 Fair, “Time for Sober Realism,” 160.
67 Ibid., 159.
68 Wirising, “In India’s Lengthening Shadow,” 166.
69 Nishank Motwani and Srinjoy Bose, “Afghanistan: ‘Spoilers’ in the Regional Security
Context,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 3 (2015): 269.
70 CFR report, The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999–2020, www.cfr.org/timeline/us-
war-afghanistan.
71 Motwani and Bose, “Afghanistan,” 268.
72 Arshad Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s New Approach, RSIS Commentar-
ies,” RSIS, Singapore, No. 230/2012, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1790-the-
endgame-in-afghanistan-pa/#.XYByYigzY2w.
 Pakistan’s Policy Towards Afghanistan 127
73 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2014), 189.
74 Ibid., 261.
75 Madiha Afzal, “Will the Afghan Peace Process Be Pakistan’s Road to Redemption?” Blog,
Brookings, June 25, 2020, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/25/
will-the-afghan-peace-process-be-pakistans-road-to-redemption/.
76 Michael Hughes, “Afghanistan’s Troika of Instability: Political Illegitimacy, State-
Building and Pakistani Realolitik,” A Master Degree Thesis Submitted to Johns Hop-
kins University, May 2016, 95.
77 Zahid Hussain, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspec-
tive,” CIDOB Policy Research Paper (2011): 8.
78 Ali, “Endgame in Afghanistan.”
79 “Afghan Taliban Founder Mullah Baradar ‘Released’ by Pakistan,” Aljazeera, Octo-
ber 25, 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/afghan-taliban-founder-mullah-bara
dar-released-pakistan-181025093128441.html.
80 “Afghan Conflict: US and Taliban Sign Deal to End 18-Year War,” BBC Report, Febru-
ary 29, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51689443.
81 Umair Jamal, “Understanding Pakistan’s Take on India-Taliban Talks,” The Diplomat,
May 23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/understanding-pakistans-take-on-
india-taliban-talks/.
82 Zeke Miller and Aamer Madhani, “Biden Says U.S. War in Afghanistan Will End
August 31,” The Diplomat, July 9, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/biden-
says-u-s-war-in-afghanistan-will-end-august-31/.
83 “US completes Afghanistan withdrawal as final flight leaves Kabul,” Al Jazeera, August
30, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/30/us-completes-afghanistan-with
drawal-as-final-flight-leaves-kabul.
84 Zahid Hussain, “The Demons of Conflict,” Dawn, Pakistan, July 7, 2021 www.dawn.
com/news/1633636/the-demons-of-conflict.
85 Abdul Basit, “Why Did India open a Backchannel to the Taliban?” Al-Jazeera, July
7, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/7/7/why-did-india-open-a-backchannel-
to-the-taliban.
86 Raja Mohin, “India Resists the Taliban Bandwagon,” Foreign Affairs, July 25, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/25/india-afghanistan-taliban-blinken-jaishankar-
modi-meeting-new-delhi-geopolitics-regional-order/.
8 Geopolitics, the Thucydides
Trap, and the China–
Pakistan–India Trilateral
Rizwan Zeb

Introduction
Of late, India is being projected as an emerging power house. Since the end of the
Cold War and especially since the 1998 nuclear tests, New Delhi and Washington
have forged a strong relationship.1 Jeffrey Garten included India in the list of ten
emerging markets,2 it is one of the 17 middle powers as per Carsten Holbraad’s
list,3 and Paul Kennedy et al. believe that India is one of the nine pivotal states
of the world.4 At present, India is a close ally of the United States in the region
and is projected by Washington as a balancer to the rising Chinese power in the
region. Emphasizing this point, Condoleezza Rice, former American Secretary of
State, argued that while India is not a great power at present, it has the potential
to be one and that India would play a significant role in balancing China.5 Ameri-
can strategic planners envisage a role for India in monitoring and policing in the
arc stretching from Aden, Singapore to Central Asia.6 A number of Indian strate-
gic thinkers have stressed the need for India to work out its own Monroe Doc-
trine.7 In 2005, the United States and India signed a defense agreement. Within
months, in March 2006, both signed a nuclear cooperation agreement.8 The way
Washington manipulated international and proliferation laws and regulations to
accommodate India by doing a nuclear partnership deal with New Delhi, growing
Indo-US strategic partnership, and the recent name change of Pacific command
to the Indo-Pacific command are indications of Washington’s confidence in New
Delhi’s ability as its strategic ally and to do its bidding in and around the region.
At the same time, the challenge of a rising China is getting stronger and
stronger for Washington. As the don of American strategic community Henry
Kissinger has prophesized that a Sino-US clash is inevitable, one could argue
that the Sino-US confrontation could be delayed but cannot be postponed. Not
unless the geo-strategic prism through which both countries view each other is
changed. The biggest lesson one can learn from Thucydides is that whenever an
existing great power feels threatened to be displaced by an emerging one, it would
result in a war.9 This logic is at play when it comes to US–China relations. In this
coming clash, South Asia would play the most pivotal role. Apparently, both the
United States and China have already picked their partners in this theatre: India
for the United States and Pakistan for China. And herein lies a dilemma for New

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-10
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 129
Delhi.
D e lh i. B Both
o t h China
C h i n a and a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n are a r e itsi t s immediate
i m m e d i a t e neighbors,
n e ig h b o rs , w whereas
h e r e a s tthe he U United
n ite d
States
S t a t e s i s n o t . A n d i t s l o v e h a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C h i n a i s o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e same
is not. And its love hate relationship with China is operating under the sam e
Thucydidesian
T h u c y d i d e s i a n logic. l o g i c . AtA t thet h e same
s a m e time, t i m e , it i t is
i s not
n o t clear
c l e a r howh o w ffar a r would
w o u l d the th e U US–India
S -In d ia
relations
r e l a t i o n s c o n v e r g e a s N e w D e l h i ’ s a m b i t i o n a n d a s p i r a t i o n a r e f a r g r e a t e r ffor
converge as New Delhi’s ambition and aspiration are far greater o r iti t tto
o
be content with the role of a deputy
b e c o n te n t w i th th e r o le o f a d e p u ty to th e s h e r if f . to the sheriff.
Historically,
H i s t o r i c a l l y , all
a l l great
g r e a t powers
p o w e rs w were e r e regional
r e g i o n a l hegemon
h e g e m o n and a n d had
had a a dominant
d o m i n a n t posi- p o s i­
ttion
i o n ini n ttheir
h e i r immediate
i m m e d i a t e neighborhood:
n e i g h b o r h o o d : India I n d i a isi s neither.
n e i t h e r . AtA t present,
p r e s e n t , iti t has
has p problem-
ro b le m ­

atic
a t i c relationship
r e la tio n s h ip w withi t h all
a l l of o f its
i t s South
S o u t h AsianA s i a n neighbors.
n e i g h b o r s . Its I t s standing
s t a n d i n g in i n thet h e region
re g io n
could
c o u l d b e g a u g e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t N e p a l , w h i c h i s s m a l l e r a n d h e a v i l y reliant
be gauged from the fact that Nepal, which is smaller and heavily r e l i a n t on
on
India,
I n d i a , openly
o p e n l y accused
accused N New ew D Delhi
e l h i of o f encroaching
e n c r o a c h i n g into i n t o itsi t s tterritory.
e r r i t o r y . The
The N Nepalese
e p a le s e
10
parliament
p a r l i a m e n t passed p assed a a new
n e w map m a p including
i n c l u d i n g the t h e disputed
d i s p u t e d Indian
I n d i a n territories.
te r r ito r ie s .10
Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , I n d i a ’ s p r o v e r b i a l t w i n , c o n t i n u e s t o h a v e p r o b l e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s with
India’s proverbial twin, continues to have problematic relations w ith
India.
I n d ia . D Despite
e s p i t e bbeing e i n g militarily
m ilita r ily w weak e a k especially
e s p e c i a l l y in i n tthe h e conventional
c o n v e n t i o n a l military
m ilita r y b bal-
a l­
ance,
a n c e , P a k i s t a n h a s a d e m o n s t r a t e d c a p a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n b a l a n c e w i t h I n d i a and
Pakistan has a demonstrated capability to maintain balance with India and
arguably
a r g u a b l y is i s the
th e b biggest
i g g e s t impediment
i m p e d i m e n t tto o itsi t s hegemonic
h e g e m o n i c designs
d e s i g n s in i n ttheh e region.
re g io n .
With
W i t h t h e r i s e o f i t s m i l i t a r y m i g h t a n d g l o b a l s t a n d i n g b y v i r t u e of
the rise of its military might and global standing by virtue o f USU S support,
s u p p o r t,
b e a m i n g w i t h c o n f i d e n c e , N e w D e l h i o n m o r e t h a n o n e o c c a s i o n b o a s t e d of
beaming with confidence, New Delhi on more than one occasion boasted o f its
its
capability of being able to militarily engage both China
c a p a b ility o f b e in g a b le to m ilita r ily e n g a g e b o th C h in a a n d P a k is ta n a n d a c h ie v e and Pakistan and achieve
its
i t s objectives.
o b j e c t i v e s . India’s
I n d i a ’ s two-front
tw o -fro n t w war ar p preparedness
re p a re d n e ss p planning
l a n n i n g is i s tooto o w well
e l l known
k n o w n to to
the
t h e S o u t h A s i a w a t c h e r s . F e w i n I n d i a w o u l d g o a s f a r a s t o c l a i m t h a t India
South Asia watchers. Few in India would go as far as to claim that I n d i a is is
fully
f u l l y equipped,
e q u i p p e d , ttrained,
r a i n e d , and a n d prepared
p r e p a r e d to t o ffight
ig h t a a 2 2 + + 1 1 (China,
( C h i n a , Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , and a n d the th e
Kashmiri
K a s h m i r i ffreedom
r e e d o m fighters)
f ig h te r s ) w war. 11
a r . 11
This
T h i s c h a p t e r o v e r v i e w s t h e r e c e n t developments
chapter overviews the recent d e v e l o p m e n t s in i n Indo-China
I n d o - C h i n a relations
r e l a t i o n s and and
Indo-Pakistan
I n d o - P a k i s t a n r e l a t i o n s w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r f o c u s o n t h e r e c e n t I n d i a n m i l i t a r y con-
relations with a particular focus on the recent Indian military con­
ffrontations
r o n t a t i o n s withw i t h China
C h i n a in i n thet h e Galwan
G a l w a n Valley V a l l e y in i n June
J u n e 2020 2 0 2 0 and a n d withw ith P Pakistan
a k i s t a n aftera fte r
the Pulwama/ Balakot strikes in February 2019 in
th e P u lw a m a / B a la k o t s tr ik e s in F e b r u a r y 2 0 1 9 in w h ic h I n d ia c la im e d to h a v e which India claimed to have
12
targeted
ta rg e te d a a Jaish-e-Mohammed
J a i s h - e - M o h a m m e d (JeM) ( J e M ) ttraining
r a i n i n g camp.
c a m p . 1 2 ThisT h i s overview
o v e r v i e w is i s then
th e n u used
sed
to critically examine India’s two-frontal
to c r itic a lly e x a m in e I n d i a ’s tw o - f r o n ta l w a r a r g u m e n t. war argument.
The
T h e chapter
c h a p t e r is i s divided
d i v i d e d into i n t o tthree
h r e e major
m a j o r pparts: a rts : p part
a r t one
o n e examines
e x a m i n e s Indo-China
In d o -C h in a
relations
r e l a t i o n s h i s t o r i c a l l y f o l l o w e d b y t h e d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g t h e f a t a l Galwan
historically followed by the details regarding the fatal G a l w a n confronta-
c o n fro n ta ­
tion.
t i o n . The
T h e second
s e c o n d part p a r t critically
c r i t i c a l l y evaluates
e v a l u a t e s Indo-Pak
I n d o - P a k relations
r e l a t i o n s anda n d thet h e developments
d e v e lo p m e n ts
that
t h a t ledl e d tot o anda n d during
d u r i n g tthe he P Pulwama/Balakot
u l w a m a / B a l a k o t crisis. c r i s i s . The
T h e third
t h i r d anda n d ffinali n a l section
s e c tio n
provides
p r o v i d e s a c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h i s t r i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r focus
a critical analysis of this trilateral relationship with a particular f o c u s on on
India’s
I n d i a ’s two-frontal
t w o - f r o n t a l war w a r argument.
a rg u m e n t.

Sino-India Relations: From Hindi-Chini bhai bhai

to Galwan Clash
India
I n d i a and
a n d China
C h i n a started
s t a r t e d off
o f f as
as b being
e i n g friendly
f r i e n d l y states
s t a t e s during
d u r i n g tthe
h e 1950s
1950s w whenh e n Nehru
N e h ru
w a s c h a m p i o n i n g t h e n o n - a l i g n e d m o v e m e n t . N e h r u ’s s o c i a l i s t l e a n i n g s and
was championing the non-aligned movement. Nehru’s socialist leanings and
belief
b e l i e f that
t h a t India
I n d i a isi s destined
d e s t i n e d tto
o p play
la y a a major
m a j o r role
r o l e ata t the
t h e global
g l o b a l level
l e v e l bbrought
r o u g h t India
In d ia
and
a n d China
C h i n a closer.
c l o s e r . It
I t was
w a s ttheh e time
t i m e ofo f tthe
he H Hindi-Chini
KJIHGFEDCBA
in d i-C h in i B h a i - B h a i (Indians
Bhai-Bhai ( I n d i a n s and
a n d Chi-
C h i­
nese are brothers) and the Panjsheela (five principles of peaceful
n e s e a r e b r o th e rs ) a n d th e P a n js h e e la ( f iv e p r in c ip le s o f p e a c e f u l c o e x is te n c e ) . coexistence).
However,
H o w e v e r , thet h e romance
r o m a n c e remained
r e m a i n e d short
s h o r t lived
l i v e d and
a n d soons o o n resulted
r e s u l t e d in
i n active
a c t i v e hostility
h o s tility
b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a b o r d e r w a r i n w h i c h India
between the two countries which resulted in a border war in which In d ia w wasas
130 Rizwan Zeb
militarily humiliated by the Chinese army. Nehru never recovered from this. Sino-
Indian disagreement on the border demarcation was not new, but it was India’s so-
called forward or aggressive policy that resulted in building army posts that led to
border clashes. This border clash resulted in what is now called the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) that is till today the border between the two countries.
However, when Deng Xiaoping took over, China moderated its stance toward
South Asia. Since then, India–China relations have improved a lot. Since the end
of the Cold War, their relationship has further improved. The 1990s in particular
had a promising start. Both sides signed an agreement on the Maintenance of
Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in 1993.13 The agreement
signaled their resolve to move beyond the border issue. In 1996, both countries
signed an agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along
the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas. As per the agreement,
both sides agreed that those manning the border were not allowed to carry guns.14
By the turn of the century, the Chinese policy toward India was based on the fol-
lowing four considerations:15

1 The first and foremost compelling factor is the linkage between China’s stra-
tegic goals and foreign policy objectives. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) set the three tasks of modernization, national reunification, and safe-
guarding world peace while pursuing common development in the unipolar
world dominated by the United States. For its economic development, as Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao put it, it needed stability around China. Peace in the periph-
ery, especially normalization of ties with India became China’s top priority.
2 The second factor concerns the overall need felt by Beijing to respond to
the perceived US regional strategy to contain China with the objective of
constraining its rise. Growing US–India relations were viewed as being
reminiscent to the US Cold War era strategy of containing the Soviet Union.
By economically engaging India, China wanted to attract India toward its
orbit.
3 The third factor pertains to the relevance of improvement in Sino-South
Asian relations to New Delhi’s ties with East and South-East Asian nations.
These states are important for China in terms of strategy, trade, markets, and
resources.
4 Since 1994, the PRC became a net importer of oil. China, currently, imports
one-third of its oil supplies, which account for as much as 7 per cent of the
world oil demand at 5.46 million barrels a day. India, on the other hand,
imports as much as two-third of its oil needs, consuming about 2 million
barrels a day – which could increase to 7.4 million barrels a day by 2025.
Stability in relations with India, an Indian Ocean power, seems to give an
assurance to China in the matter of security of oil transportation, considering
the fact that the latter imports 50 percent of its oil needs from the Middle East
via the Indian Ocean, and 80 per cent of its total imports pass close to India’s
southern coast through the Strait of Malacca.
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 131
At present, there are a number of issues on which Sino-Indian interests con-
verge such as terrorism and environmental degradation.16 Currently, India’s big-
gest trading partner is China.17 The figures for the year 2019 are telling. While
India exported US$17.8 billion worth of material to China, Chinese exports to
India were worth US$74 billion.18 At the same time, tension was brewing up for
a while. For instance, India termed China as the primary factor behind its nuclear
tests in May 1998.19 Since the improvement of relations between the United States
and India and the signing of the strategic partnership between the two, the fault
lines between India and China became wider and glaring.

However, one should ignore the fact that despite sharing short to medium
term economic interests, both India and China view each other as long term
rivals. Since its second nuclear tests in 1998 and seeking American alliance,
India has been quite vocal about this fact. It is projecting itself as a balancer
to the rising influence of China and that China is its major military rival and
threat. General K. V. Krishna Rao, a former Chief of Army Staff of the Indian
Army, stated, “China is the real enemy not Pakistan. We are capable of fin-
ishing Pakistan with ease.” According to analysts, the Indian Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles Agni II, for instance – would primarily target China,
though these missiles are also capable of attacking sites in Southeast Asia,
Afghanistan, Central Asia as well as American bases in the Indian Ocean.20

India got more aggressive in its conduct since an ultra-Hindu Narendra Modi
took over the helm of affairs in New Delhi after winning the national elections
in May 2014. The famous 56-inch chest was exclusively for posturing against
Pakistan yet since 2017 crisis between the two at Doklam, India was perusing an
aggressive policy bordering intentional probing. Several border skirmishes took
place between China and India: Depsand in northern Ladakh (2013), Chumar in
eastern Ladakh (2014), Doklam on Sino-Bhutan border (2017), and the Galwan
(2020) are prime among these.21 Although India was quick to claim victory after
the Doklam clash, the incident left several questions unanswered. According to the
Indian strategic community, in a future confrontation, China might try to occupy
a piece of Indian territory and then use it as a bargaining chip. Driven by this
threat perception and overconfidence on its abilities led New Delhi to construct
new roads, and it aimed at quick transportation and positioning of troops in the
region especially the Darbuk Shyok Daulat Beg Oldie road. Although the changes
made in the status of Kashmir were aimed at what in New Delhi is described
as addressing the Pakistan problem, it adversely affected the Chinese interest in
the region especially as Ladakh’s position was also altered due to the changes
made in the Constitution.22 As per the change, Ladakh was made a union terri-
tory directly administrated by the center. In the new maps issued by New Delhi,
Ladakh and Aksai Chin are shown as Indian territories. India’s strong opposition
to China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and active participation in a mili-
tary alliance against the increasing Chinese influence in the region indicated its
132 Rizwan Zeb
confrontational policy. Alongside Australia and Japan, India is a key member in
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad.23
Around end of May 2020, reports of serious clashes started to appear in the
media.24 The views are still divided on how exactly this started; however, how it
ended is well documented. The clash that occurred in the Galwan Valley in east-
ern Ladakh on 15 June left 20 Indian soldiers dead.25 As a result of these clashes,
China gained control of territories in the Galwan valley including the Patrol Point
14 and Pangong Tso claimed by India. Through Patrol Point 14, China is in a
position to monitor and, if needed be, target an important road leading to Daulat
Beg Oldie. This is strategically significant as it has an advance landing facility for
C-130s. According to one observer of Sino-India relations, this is significant as
China sent clear signals to India.

One, we could have done more damage if we had used military-grade weap-
ons; two, how will you (India) respond? India can either get its troops despite
its losses to be better prepared with their own lethal rods and clubs or tell
them to act as army troops and use weapons. If India does the first, it signals
to PLA that it is not prepared to climb up the escalation ladder; if it does the
second, PLA still has the advantage of escalation on its side. In other words,
it continues to dominate the escalation dynamic, forcing the Indian army to
either react to any escalation or stay at the same rung.26

Despite all this, Indian Prime Minister Modi known for his ultra-Hindu racist
nationalist fervor simply denied that any such incident has taken place or that
Chinese were in control of what used to be Indian territory.27 A story in New York
Times described Modi’s response as “mild, almost careful not to offend China.”28

Blood and Water Cannot Flow Together: India–Pakistan

Relations, Pulwama Crisis, and Beyond
India and Pakistan’s rivalry is well documented and is considered to be one of the
most enduring rivalries in the world. Over the years, both countries have fought
wars and attempted to make peace. Although in all such attempts, some progress
was made, overall conflicts continued, and with the passage of time, the chances
of peace further reduced. Since the nuclearization of India and Pakistan in 1998,
both countries went through different trajectories. The Kargil conflict in 1999,
just a year later, could be taken as a case that played a major role in it. Unlike
Pakistan, India became the focus of global attention as a major power house con-
firming what one of India’s leading statesmen once said that there were two ways
of joining the elite club – nuclear weapons and economic prosperity. The new
century witnessed a major crisis between India and Pakistan after an attack on
the Indian parliament resulted in a yearlong military standoff 2001–02. Though it
ended without any military confrontation, it led to the most recent round of peace
process between India and Pakistan. During the Musharraf–Manmohan time, both
countries came close to resolving their issues, but certain developments and stiff
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 133
opposition from the Hawkish elements in India halted and then eliminated this
prospect.29 Hindu-nationalist BJP publicly accused Manmohan Singh of compro-
mising Indian national interest by being too soft on Pakistan and A.K. Anthony,
the then Defense Minister of India, of being a Pakistani agent.
In the 2014 elections, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won and established its
government. According to Lisa Curtis, in keeping with its track record and strong
criticism of the Congress government’s peace initiative with Pakistan, BJP was
clear that there was no chance of any meaningful progress in the peace process
under Modi’s rule. Modi was quick to signal that terror and talks would be unac-
ceptable to India.30 At the same time, an invitation was extended to the then Paki-
stani prime minister to attend his swearing-in ceremony. Nawaz Sharif attended
the ceremony and extended an offer of working together for peace in the region.
However, it led to nothing. The little progress that was made was stalled after the
terror attack on Pathankot, a strategic air base of Indian Air Force (IAF) Western
Air Command on January 2, 2016. New Delhi, as per the established pattern,
instantly pointed toward Pakistan for it and the unilaterally called off the forth-
coming meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two countries. Reacting to
the incident, Modi stated: “blood and water cannot flow together.”31 His Defense
Minister Manohar Parrikar counseled to removing a thorn with a thorn.32
Prime Minister Modi also gave a go-ahead to the Indian Army to what New
Delhi termed as the surgical strike.33 New Delhi claimed that Indian Special
Forces crossed on to the Pakistani side of the line of control and successfully
targeted several hideouts of the Kashmiri freedom fighters. It is still a contested
claim. Islamabad strongly denied any such attack took place and arranged the
Islamabad-based diplomatic fraternity’s visit to the area. A more balanced view
held by the South Asia watchers around the globe including Indians is that if any
such attack did occur, it was not different from the attacks armies of both countries
conducted against each other across the line of control (LoC). It is only that unlike
in the past when it was left to the forces across the LoC, the Indian Prime Minister
opted to use it to prove that his government was tougher than the Congress gov-
ernment toward Pakistan. However, soon after, New Delhi toned down its rhetoric
to defuse the situation apparently under intense American friendly persuasion.34
Earlier in March 2016, an Indian national Kulbhushan Yadav was arrested by
Pakistani security services. It was soon known that Kulbhushan was a serving
Commander in the Indian Navy and was stationed in Pakistan as an undercover
operative of Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
During the interrogation, it was discovered that Commander Yadav was the mas-
termind of several subversive activities in the Pakistani provinces of Sindh and
Balochistan.
Another challenge for Prime Minister Modi surfaced on 14 February 2019 that
put him in a commitment dilemma. He claimed that India had conducted surgi-
cal strikes against Pakistan, and under his government blood and water would
not flow together. The surgical strike was aimed at ending the so-called terror
problem. It put him in a situation from which he could not retract in the case of
another attack. He responded with a surgical strike and if that did not deter, what
134 Rizwan Zeb
next
n e x t would
w o u l d he h e do?d o ? On O n 14 14 F February
e b r u a r y 2019,2019, a a yyoung
o u n g Kashmiri
K a s h m iri b boyo y conducted
c o n d u c te d a a sui-
s u i­
cide attack against the Indian paramilitary forces’ convoy
c id e a tta c k a g a in s t th e I n d ia n p a r a m ilita r y f o r c e s ’ c o n v o y in th e I n d ia n O c c u p ie d in the Indian Occupied
35
Kashmir
K a s h m i r (IOK) ( I O K ) ttown o w n of ofP Pulwama.
u lw a m a .35 A A deadliest
d e a d l i e s t attack
a t t a c k in i n recent
r e c e n t history,
h i s t o r y , it i t killed
k i l l e d 4444
Indian soldiers and wounded more than 70. This attack
I n d ia n s o ld ie r s a n d w o u n d e d m o re th a n 7 0 . T h is a tta c k w a s a c le a r in d ic a tio n th a t was a clear indication that
Modi’s
M o d i’s b blood
l o o d and a n d guts
g u ts p policy
o l i c y had h a d failed.
f a ile d . K Kashmiris
a s h m i r i s in i n the
t h e IOKI O K were w e r e still s t i l l strug-
s tru g ­
gling
g l i n g a g a i n s t t h e I n d i a n r u l e . H o w e v e r , f o l l o w i n g a n e s t a b l i s h e d c r i s i s bbehavior,
against the Indian rule. However, following an established crisis e h a v io r,
New
N ew D Delhi
e l h i immediately
i m m e d i a t e l y bblamed l a m e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n ffor or b being
e i n g bbehind
e h i n d the t h e attack.
a t t a c k . ThisT h i s was w as
followed
f o l l o w e d b y p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t N e w D e l h i w o u l d a v e n g e t h i s a t t a c k . For
by public declarations that New Delhi would avenge this attack. For
next
n e x t 10 1 0 days,
d a y s , several
s e v e r a l statements
s ta te m e n ts w weree r e issued
i s s u e d bby y the th e p political
o l i t i c a l and
a n d military
m i l i t a r y leader-
le a d e r­
ship
s h i p to t o this
t h i s effect,
e f f e c t , and
a n d it it b became
e c a m e obviouso b v i o u s tthat hat M Modi odi w whoh o was w a s campaigning
c a m p a i g n i n g ffor or
another
a n o t h e r t e r m i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g e l e c t i o n s w o u l d u s e t h i s t o o n c e again
term in the forthcoming elections would use this to once a g a i n demon-
dem on­
strate
s t r a t e hish i s ttough
o u g h man m an p posture.
o s t u r e . Intense
I n t e n s e artillery
a r t i l l e r y exchanges
e x c h a n g e s ttook ook p place
la c e b between
e t w e e n the th e
two
t w o fforces o r c e s during
d u r i n g the t h e intervening
i n t e r v e n i n g days. d a y s . On O n 26 26 F February
e b r u a r y 2019,2 0 1 9 , NewN e w Delhi D e l h i bbroke ro k e
the
t h e newsn e w s to t o the
t h e world
w o r l d tthat h a t tthe h e Indian
I n d i a n AirA i r Force
F o r c e had h a d aggressed
a g g r e s s e d into i n t o tthe h e Pakistani
P a k ista n i
territory
t e r r i t o r y a n d h a d t a r g e t e d a n a l l e g e d t r a i n i n g c a m p o f J a i s h - e - M o h a m m e d in
and had targeted an alleged training camp of Jaish-e-Mohammed in
Balakot
B a l a k o t in i n tthehe p province
r o v i n c e of o f Khyber
K hyber P Pakhtunkhwa.
a k h t u n k h w a . It It w was a s claimed
c l a i m e d that t h a t this
t h i s strike
s tr ik e
was
w as a a non-military
n o n - m ilita r y p pre-emptive
r e - e m p t i v e strike s t r i k e against
a g a i n s t non-state
n o n - s t a t e actors
a c t o r s anda n d not n o t against
a g a in s t
the
t h e state
s t a t e of o f Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . In In a a report
re p o rt p published
u b l i s h e d in i n the India
n d i a Today
t h e IKJIHGFEDCBA T o d a y whichw h i c h read r e a d likelik e
aa Tom Clancy political thriller, Modi and his National
T o m C la n c y p o litic a l th r ille r , M o d i a n d h is N a tio n a l S e c u r ity A d v is o r ( N S A ) Security Advisor (NSA)
Ajit
A j i t Doval
D o v a l decidedd e c i d e d that t h a t India
I n d i a wouldw o u l d conduct
c o n d u c t an a n aira i r strike
s t r i k e against
a g a i n s t the t h e ttraining
r a in in g
camp.
c a m p . T h e r e p o r t c o v e r e d t h e w h o l e e v e n t f r o m d e l i b e r a t i o n t o p l a n n i n g and
The report covered the whole event from deliberation to planning a n d to t o the
th e
36
actual
a c t u a l e x e c u t i o n o f t h e s o - c a l l e d s t r i k e . 3 6 I t w a s t a k e n a s a t r i u m p h a n d t h a t i t had
execution of the so-called strike. It was taken as a triumph and that it had
established
e s ta b lis h e d a a newn e w normal
n o r m a l in i n which
w h i c h India I n d i a heldh e l d its i t s right
r i g h t ofo f defense
d e f e n s e and a n d strike
s t r i k e any
any
threat real or perceived anywhere. It was claimed that
th r e a t r e a l o r p e r c e iv e d a n y w h e r e . I t w a s c la im e d th a t th e s tr ik e w a s s u c c e s s f u l the strike was successful
and
a n d tthath a t Indian
I n d i a n Air A ir F Force
o r c e has h a s achieved
a c h i e v e d its i t s objective
o b j e c t i v e bby y completely
c o m p l e t e l y destroying
d e s t r o y i n g the th e
camp
c a m p a n d k i l l i n g s e v e r a l h u n d r e d s o f p e o p l e p r e s e n t t h e r e . M o d i , h i s NSA,
and killing several hundreds of people present there. Modi, his N S A , and and a a
considerable
c o n s i d e r a b l e number n u m b e r of o f members
m e m b e r s of o f ttheh e Indian
I n d i a n strategic
s t r a t e g i c community
c o m m u n i t y bbelieved e l i e v e d tthat hat
India
I n d i a could
c o u l d manipulate
m a n i p u l a t e tthe h e space
s p a c e under
u n d e r the t h e nuclear
n u c l e a r overhang
o v e r h a n g tto o strike
s tr ik e P Pakistan
a k ista n
and that Pakistan had played its nuclear card and that it is
a n d t h a t P a k i s t a n h a d p l a y e d i t s n u c l e a r c a r d a n d t h a t i t i s t i m e t o c a l l P a k i s t a n ’s time to call Pakistan’s
bbluff.
l u f f . In I n thet h e immediate
im m e d ia te w wakea k e of o f tthis
h i s attack,
a tta c k , P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s guarded
g u a r d e d and a n d measured
m e asu red
response was taken as a proof
r e s p o n s e w a s ta k e n a s a p r o o f o f th is . of this.
Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d responded
r e s p o n d e d at at a a time
t i m e and and p place
l a c e of o f its
i t s choosing.
c h o o s i n g . In I n an a n attempt
a t t e m p t tto o dem-
dem ­
onstrate
o n s t r a t e i t s a b i l i t y t o s t r i k e I n d i a n t a r g e t s a n y w h e r e a n d e n s u r e t h a t t h e c o n f l i c t did
its ability to strike Indian targets anywhere and ensure that the conflict d id
not
n o t escalate,
e s c a l a t e , Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d retaliated
r e t a l i a t e d in i n such
such a a w way a y thatth a t a a kkeye y Indian
I n d i a n military
m i l i t a r y ttargeta rg e t
was
w a s locked,
l o c k e d , and a n d then
th e n a a different
d i f f e r e n t location
l o c a t i o n was w a s hit.h i t . This
T h i s was
w a s ffollowed
o l l o w e d bby y ana n air a ir b bat-
a t­
tle.
t l e . W h a t i s p u b l i c l y k n o w n i s t h a t P a k i s t a n A i r F o r c e u s e d s u p e r i o r t r a i n i n g and
What is publicly known is that Pakistan Air Force used superior training and
performance,
p e r f o r m a n c e , jjammed a m m e d the t h e communication
c o m m u n i c a t i o n bbetween e t w e e n Indian In d ia n M MiGs,i G s , and a n d shots h o t ttwo wo
of
o f t h e s e d o w n . W i n g C o m m a n d e r A b h i n a n d a n e j e c t e d a n d w a s a r r e s t e d bby
these down. Wing Commander Abhinandan ejected and was arrested y theth e
Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i fforces. o r c e s . Two
T w o days d a y s later,
l a t e r , asa s another
a n o t h e r attempt
a t t e m p t not n o t tto o escalate
e s c a l a t e the t h e crisis
c r i s i s and
and
37
as
as a a peace
p e a c e gesture,
g e s t u r e , Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d released r e l e a s e d tthe h e arrested
a r r e s t e d Indian
In d ia n p pilot
ilo t u unconditionally.
n c o n d i t i o n a l l y .3 7
However, this did not stop Modi from claiming victory
H o w e v e r , th is d id n o t s to p M o d i f r o m c la im in g v ic to r y a n d th a t h a d P a k is ta n n o t and that had Pakistan not
released
r e l e a s e d the t h e IAF IA F p pilot,
i l o t , heh e would
w o u l d have have u unleashed
n l e a s h e d his h i s wrath
w r a t h against
a g a in s t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n bby y
waging
w a g i n g a n i g h t o f m a s s a c r e ( Q a t a a l k e r a a t ) b y h i t t i n g i t w i t h m i s s i l e s . T h i s might
a night of massacre (Qataal ke raat) by hitting it with missiles. This m ig h t
bbee music
m u s i c to t o his
h i s own
o w n and a n d his h i s Hindu-nationalist
H i n d u - n a t i o n a l i s t supporters’
s u p p o r t e r s ’ ears,
e a rs, b butu t thet h e facts
f a c t s on on
the ground were very different; yet, Modi refused
th e g r o u n d w e r e v e r y d if f e re n t; y e t, M o d i r e f u s e d to r e a d th e w r itin g o n th e w to read the writing on the wall.
a ll.
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 135
Cynics
C y n i c s argued a r g u e d tthat hat M Modi o d i achieved
a c h ie v e d w whath a t he he w wanted
a n t e d tto o tthrough
h r o u g h this t h i s episode
e p iso d e – - a a
second term by winning the Indian
s e c o n d te r m b y w in n in g th e I n d ia n n a tio n a l e le c tio n s . national elections.
Despite
D e s p i t e failingf a i l i n g tto o achieve
a c h i e v e any a n y of o f ttheh e stated
s t a t e d objectives,
o b j e c t i v e s , tthere
h e r e is i s non o guarantee
g u a ra n te e
that
t h a t M o d i w o u l d n o t b e t e m p t e d t o c o n s i d e r g o i n g f o r a n o t h e r r o u n d whenever
Modi would not be tempted to consider going for another round w h e n e v e r it it
is
is p politically
o l i t i c a l l y advantageous
a d v a n t a g e o u s ffor o r him h i m on o n tthe h e domestic
d o m e s t i c front.
f r o n t . And
A n d militarily
m i l i t a r i l y striking
s tr ik in g
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s not
n o t the t h e only
o n l y way:w a y : Modi’sM o d i ’s India I n d i a is i s targeting
t a r g e t i n g Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . For F o r quite
q u i t e some
som e
time, as an upper riparian, it is using the river
tim e , a s a n u p p e r r ip a r ia n , it is u s in g th e r iv e r w a te r s a s a w e a p o n a g a in s t Pwaters as a weapon against Paki-
a k i­
stan,
s ta n , a a lowl o w riparian.
r i p a r i a n . Recently,
R e c e n t l y , anothera n o t h e r bbone o n e of o f contention
c o n t e n t i o n has h a s emerged
e m e r g e d bbetween e tw e e n
the
t h e two:t w o : CPEC. C P E C . The T h e reasonr e a s o n ffor o r Indian
I n d i a n opposition
o p p o s i t i o n tto o CPEC
C P E C is i s ttwo-fold:
w o - f o l d : one, o n e , it it
would
w o u l d g i v e C h i n a t h a t I n d i a c o n s i d e r s i t s a r c h r i v a l a s t r o n g f o o t h o l d i n South
give China that India considers its archrival a strong foothold in S o u th
Asia
A s i a thatt h a t India
I n d i a claims
c l a i m s tto o b bee itsi t s strategic
s t r a t e g i c bbackyard;
a c k y a r d ; second,
s e c o n d , bbecause
e c a u s e CPEC C P E C would w o u ld
pass
p a s s tthrough
h r o u g h the th e P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i region
r e g i o n of o f Gilgit-Baltistan
G i l g i t - B a l t i s t a n which
w h i c h New N e w Delhi D e l h i claims
c l a i m s is is
aa disputed area being the part of the erstwhile state of
d is p u te d a r e a b e in g th e p a r t o f th e e r s tw h ile s ta te o f J a m m u a n d K a s h m ir , ir o n i­ Jammu and Kashmir, ironi-
cally
c a l l y tthough,
h o u g h , as as p per
e r thet h e same
s a m e UN U N resolutions
r e s o l u t i o n s thatth a t N New e w Delhi
D e l h i has h a s repeatedly
r e p e a t e d l y have have
claimed to have become outdated
c la im e d to h a v e b e c o m e o u td a te d a n d r e d u n d a n t. and redundant.
Although
A l t h o u g h one o n e should
s h o u l d not n o t ignore
i g n o r e tthe h e domestic
d o m e s t i c political
p o l i t i c a l reasons
r e a s o n s especially
e s p e c i a l l y theth e
discontent
d i s c o n t e n t o f s e v e r a l p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s a n d e l e m e n t s o n h o w s u c c e s s i v e Indian
of several political actors and elements on how successive I n d i a n gov-
gov­
ernments
e r n m e n t s and a n d leaders
l e a d e r s ffailed
a i l e d to t o address
a d d r e s s tthe h e several
s e v e r a l issues
i s s u e s anda n d problems
p r o b l e m s relatedr e l a t e d ttoo
Kashmir,
K a s h m i r , i t i s a l s o a f a c t t h a t M o d i ’ s d e c i s i o n t o c h a n g e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status
it is also a fact that Modi’s decision to change the constitutional s ta tu s
of
o f thet h e Indian-occupied
I n d i a n - o c c u p i e d Kashmir K a s h m ir w was a s motivated
m o t i v a t e d bby y hish i s aim
a i m to t o solve
s o l v e thet h e Pakistan
P a k ista n
p r o b l e m o n c e a n d f o r a l l . 3 8 I n t h e p r o c e s s , h e a l s o r u f f l e d t h e C h i n e s e feathers.
In the process, he also ruffled the Chinese
38
problem once and for all. f e a th e r s .
While
W h i l e it i t is
i s still
s t i l l not
n o t clear
c le a r w whether
h e t h e r it i t has
h a s solved
s o l v e d or o r further
f u r t h e r aggravated
a g g r a v a t e d tthe h e problem,
p ro b le m ,
all indicators point to
a ll in d ic a to r s p o in t to th e la tte r . the latter.
New
N ew D Delhi’s
e l h i ’s complete
c o m p l e t e failuref a i l u r e in i n responding
r e s p o n d i n g to t o the
t h e Chinese
C h i n e s e onslaught
o n s l a u g h t put p u t Modi
M odi
in
i n a n o t h e r d i l e m m a . H o w t o m a i n t a i n h i s t o u g h g u y i m a g e w h o h a s 5 6 - i n c h chest
another dilemma. How to maintain his tough guy image who has 56-inch chest
and
a n d is i s the
t h e savior
s a v i o r of o f India?
I n d ia ? H Hee got g o t tougher
t o u g h e r with w ith P Pakistan
a k i s t a n signaling
s i g n a l i n g to t o China
C h i n a thatt h a t it
it
still
s t i l l can
c a n hurth u r t its i t s interest.
i n t e r e s t . In I n June
J u n e 2020,
2 0 2 0 , New N e w Delhi D e l h i instigated
in s tig a te d a a process
p r o c e s s of o f reduc-
re d u c­
ing
i n g tthe h e diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c staff s t a f f bby y 50 5 0 percent.
39
p e r c e n t . 3 9 ThisT h i s action
a c t i o n clearly
c l e a r l y aimed
a i m e d at a t creating
c re a tin g a a
diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c r o w a n d d i v e r t i n g a t t e n t i o n f r o m d o m e s t i c a n d r e g i o n a l f a i l u r e s . The
row and diverting attention from domestic and regional failures. The
ttiming
i m i n g of o f this
t h i s action
a c t i o n alsoa l s o indicated
i n d i c a t e d that t h a t iti t was
w as a a smoke
s m o k e screens c r e e n tot o cover
c o v e r thet h e ongoing
o n g o in g
heavy-handed crackdown in Kashmir and what
h e a v y -h a n d e d c ra c k d o w n in K a s h m ir a n d w h a t h a d h a p p e n e d in th e G a lw a n v had happened in the Galwan val-
a l­
ley. Several questions were raised about India’s potential role
le y . S e v e r a l q u e s tio n s w e r e r a is e d a b o u t I n d i a ’s p o te n tia l r o le a s a b a l a n c e r a g a in s t as a balancer against
China
C h i n a in i n thet h e wake
w a k e of o f tthis
h i s incident.
i n c i d e n t . The The b biggest
i g g e s t puzzle
p u z z l e wasw a s how h o w Modi’s M o d i ’ s govern-
g o v e rn ­
ment
m e n t c o m p l e t e l y d e n i e d t h i s e v e r h a p p e n e d . M o d i a n d h i s n a t i o n a l security
completely denied this ever happened. Modi and his national s e c u r i t y team
te a m
continued
c o n t i n u e d its its w war a r mongering.
m o n g e r i n g . Now N o w tthey h e y claimed
c l a i m e d tthat h a t India
I n d i a would
w o u l d ttake a k e control
c o n t r o l of of
tthe
h e Kashmir
K a s h m i r tthat h a t is i s currently
c u r r e n t l y in i n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s control.
c o n t r o l . The
T h e Indian
I n d i a n chiefc h i e f wasw a s quoted
q u o te d
as
a s saying
s a y i n g tthat h a t the t h e Indian
I n d i a n army a r m y was w a s readyr e a d y and and w wasa s in in a a pposition
o s i t i o n tto o take
t a k e over
o v e r tthehe
K a s h m ir u n d e r P a k is ta n i c o n tr o l. I t w a s a ls o s ta te d th a t I n d ia o n ly n e e d e d 7
Kashmir under Pakistani control. It was also stated that India only needed 7 tot o 1010
40
days
d a y s to t o decisively
d e c i s i v e l y defeatd e fe a t P Pakistan.
a k is ta n .40

Critical Appraisal: The Geopolitics of Two Frontal Wars and

India–Pakistan–China Triangle4141
India-Pakistan-China Triangle
What
W h a t is i s currently
c u r r e n t l y happening
h a p p e n i n g in
i n South
S o u t h Asia
A s i a can
c a n bbe
e analyzed
a n a l y z e d tthrough
h r o u g h different
d iffe re n t
angles: India versus Pakistan, India versus China, or Pakistan–China
a n g le s : I n d ia v e r s u s P a k is ta n , I n d ia v e r s u s C h in a , o r P a k is ta n - C h in a p partnership
a rtn e rs h ip
136 Rizwan Zeb
against India. By replacing one country with the other, the dynamics and response
would remain the same. One look at New Delhi’s view of why it feels threatened
from China and then replace India with Pakistan and China with India, one would
still be reading from the same script. The competition between these countries
become obvious if one looks at the latest defense spending of these countries.
According to the authoritative SPIRI database, Pakistan spent US$11 billion,
India US$71, and China $261 billions.42 According to one analyst, the amount
China spent was enough to buy 777 Rafale aircraft. And all this is happening
when South Asia continues to be one of the poorest regions in the world. In its
geopolitical point scoring and overambitious power projection, India continues to
boast that it can fight a two-frontal war.
Until recently, the Indian military’s dissatisfaction with political leadership
was not as visible as it was in the last few years. The turning point was the fail-
ure of the Indian political leadership to decisively counter the Pakistan problem
after the Indian parliament attack,43 despite repeated plans by the government to
retaliate. The commonly held view is that the lessons learnt during the stand-off,
especially the time the Indian Army took from mobilization to reaching the posi-
tions gave birth to the Cold Start doctrine. Yet, the army’s “Cold Start” military
doctrine has an often-overlooked dimension.44 Through this policy, the Indian
military wanted to snatch the control of decision-making from the Indian political
leadership. However, internal logistical and technological shortcomings as well as
Pakistan’s response through the development of low yield nuclear weapons made
it a very risky proposition.
After assuming the position of the Chief of the Indian Army, General Bipin
Rawat frequently pushed for a more aggressive military stance in the Indo-
Pacific.45 During his tenure as the IA chief, General Bipin Rawat issued several
statements that are not only overly aggressive, provocative, and alarming, but
also gratuitously reckless. While addressing a seminar at the New Delhi-based
Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), General Rawat stated, “we have to be
prepared for conflict on the northern and western borders,” adding “India cannot
rule out the possibility of a two-front war with China and Pakistan despite having
credible nuclear deterrence capabilities.”46
On Pakistan, there seems to be a consensus in the Indian defence establishment
that it will remain an enemy state and continue to pose a threat to India whether
the country is stable or not.47 During his address, General Rawat claimed that dif-
ferences between India and Pakistan could not be reconciled. On China, General
Rawat stated,

as far as the northern adversary (China) is concerned, the flexing of muscles

has started . . . taking over territory in a very gradual manner, testing our lim-
its of threshold . . . is something we have to be wary about.

Post-Doklam crisis, New Delhi believed such needling operations from China
cannot be ruled out in the future, especially in the eastern Ladakh and eastern
Arunachal Pradesh area. The Indian army, as echoed in General Rawat’s address,
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 137
was
w a s concerned
c o n c e r n e d that t h a t in i n such
such a a future
f u t u r e crisis
c r i s i s “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n couldc o u l d well w e l l swing
s w i n g into i n t o action
a c tio n
to
t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f s u c h s i t u a t i o n s w h e n I n d i a w a s b u s y w i t h p r o b l e m s on
take advantage of such situations when India was busy with problems o n tthehe
48
China
C h i n a ffront.”r o n t . ” 4 8 ThisT h i s is i s tthe
h e scenario
s c e n a r i o tthat hat p prompted
r o m p t e d tthe h e General
G e n e r a l tto o encourage
e n c o u ra g e N New ew
Delhi
D e l h i tto o prepare
p r e p a r e ffor or a a ttwo-front
w o - f r o n t war. w a r.
One
O n e c o u l d a r g u e t h a t as
could argue that a s thet h e chief
c h i e f of of a a professional
p r o f e s s i o n a l army, a r m y , it i t isi s General
G e n e r a l Rawat’sR a w a t’s
j o b t o w a r g a m e a l l p o s s i b l e , p r o b a b l e , a n d i m p r o b a b l e s c e n a r i o s . It
job to war game all possible, probable, and improbable scenarios. I t is
i s also
a l s o ttrue
ru e
that
t h a t RawatR a w a t is i s not
n o t ttheh e onlyo n l y oneo n e who w h o has h a s talked
t a l k e d of o f India’s
I n d i a ’s need n e e d to to p prepare
r e p a r e for fo r a a two-
tw o -
front
f r o n t war. w a r . In I n 2009,
2 0 0 9 , the t h e tthen
h e n chiefc h i e f of o f thet h e Indian
I n d i a n Army,A r m y , GeneralG e n e ra l D Deepak
eepak K Kapoor,
a p o o r,
argued that the Indian army must prepare for a two-front
a r g u e d th a t th e I n d ia n a r m y m u s t p r e p a r e f o r a tw o -f r o n t w a r a t a n a r m y tr a in in g war at an army training
command
c o m m a n d doctrine d o c t r i n e seminar.
s e m i n a r . SinceS i n c e tthen,
h e n , all a l l Indian
I n d i a n armya r m y chiefs c h i e f s havehave v voiced
o i c e d simi-s im i­
49
lar
l a r o p i n i o n s . 4 9 Y e t , o n e c a n n o t i g n o r e t h e t i m i n g o f s u c h a p r o v o c a t i v e statement.
opinions. Yet, one cannot ignore the timing of such a provocative s ta te m e n t.
Although
A l t h o u g h several s e v e r a l Indian
I n d i a n strategic
s t r a t e g i c commentators
c o m m e n t a t o r s claim c l a i m tthat h a t New
N ew D Delhi
e l h i managed
m anaged
to
t o e n d D o k l a m w i t h C h i n a o n i t s t e r m s , t h e r e i s a l s o a c o n c e r n o v e r the
end Doklam with China on its terms, there is also a concern over t h e implica-
im p lic a ­
50
ttions
i o n s of o f the
t h e crisis
c r i s i s for
f o r ffuture
u t u r e disputes.
d i s p u t e s . 5 0 In I n tthe h e Indian
I n d i a n strategic
s t r a t e g i c calculus,
c a l c u l u s , ChinaC h i n a is is
aa challenger to its leadership in the Indo-Pacific.
c h a lle n g e r to its le a d e rs h ip in th e I n d o - P a c ific . O n e o f th e to o ls C h in a u One of the tools China uses
ses
tto o u undermine
n d e r m i n e India’s I n d i a ’ s roler o l e ini n tthe h e region
r e g i o n is is P Pakistan.
a k i s t a n . This
T h i s Sino-Pak
S i n o - P a k nexus n e x u s against
a g a in s t
India
I n d i a h a s o n l y s t r e n g t h e n e d w i t h t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l infrastruc-
has only strengthened with the implementation of transnational in fra stru c ­
51
tture
u re p projects
r o j e c t s likel i k e the
t h e CPEC.
C P E C .5 1 Although,
A l t h o u g h , currently,
c u r r e n t l y , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Army A r m y is i s responsible
r e s p o n s ib le
f o r t h e s e c u r i t y o f C P E C , a c c o r d i n g t o N e w D e l h i , t h e p r e s e n c e a n d involvement
for the security of CPEC, according to New Delhi, the presence and in v o lv e m e n t
of
o f Chinese
C h i n e s e Army A r m y cannot c a n n o t bbe e ruled
r u l e d out.
o u t . Such
Such a a development
d e v e lo p m e n t w willi l l further
f u r t h e r aggravate
a g g ra v a te
the situation for
th e s itu a tio n f o r I n d ia . India.
Is
I s India
I n d i a in in a a p position
o s i t i o n tto o ffightig h t a a ttwo-front
w o -fro n t w war ar w with i t h China
C h i n a and a n d Pakistan?
P a k i s t a n ? The The
v i e w s o f S o u t h A s i a n w a t c h e r s a r e d i v i d e d o n t h i s . H o w e v e r , i n kkeeping
views of South Asian watchers are divided on this. However, in e e p i n g with w ith
ttheh e two t w o recent
r e c e n t crises:
c rise s : P Pulwama/Balakot
u l w a m a / B a l a k o t crisis c r i s i s bbetween
e t w e e n India I n d i a and a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n and and
Galwan
G a l w a n V a l l e y b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d C h i n a c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h i s i s a f l a w e d assump-
Valley between India and China clearly indicates this is a flawed assum p­
ttion
i o n to t o says a y tthe h e lleast.
e a s t . TheT h e flaws
f l a w s in i n claims
c l a i m s that t h a t ttheh e Indian
I n d i a n armed a r m e d fforces o r c e s are a r e capable
c a p a b le
of
o f n e u t r a l i z i n g P a k i s t a n i n a n a r m e d c o n f l i c t w e r e g l a r i n g l y o b v i o u s even
neutralizing Pakistan in an armed conflict were glaringly obvious e v e n prior
p rio r
tto o thet h e Pulwama/
P u lw a m a / B Balakot
a l a k o t crisis,
c risis , b butu t this
t h i s crisis
c r i s i s hash a s almost
a l m o s t provedp r o v e d it i t bbeyond
e y o n d any any
doubt.
d o u b t. N Now o w ttake ake a a scenario
s c e n a r i o in in w which
h ic h b both
o t h China
C h i n a and and P Pakistan
a k i s t a n are a r e ffighting
ig h tin g a a wwarar
wwith i t h India.
I n d i a . OneO n e of o f India’s
I n d i a ’s assets
a s s e t s could
c o u l d bbe e itsi t s new
new B BrahMos
r a h M o s cruise c r u i s e missile
m i s s i l e tthat h a t can
can
52
bbe e u used
s e d against
a g a i n s t multiple
m u l t i p l e ttargets.
a r g e t s . 5 2 Initially,
I n i t i a l l y , India
I n d i a might
m i g h t have h a v e an a n advantage
a d v a n t a g e due d u e ttoo
Chinese jets taking off from high-altitude airfields
C h in e s e j e ts ta k in g o f f f r o m h ig h - a ltitu d e a ir f ie ld s a n d s u b s e q u e n tly d e liv e r in g and subsequently delivering
small
s m a l l payloads.
p a y lo a d s. Y Yet,
e t , how
h o w would
w o u l d tthe h e Indian
I n d i a n Air A i r Force
F o r c e capitalize
c a p i t a l i z e on o n this?
t h i s ? Moreover,
M o re o v er,
in
i n t h e s c e n a r i o o f C h i n a a n d P a k i s t a n c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r a t t a c k s , i s the
the scenario of China and Pakistan coordinating their attacks, is t h e IAF I A F readyre a d y
and equipped for such a large-scale military
a n d e q u ip p e d f o r s u c h a la r g e - s c a le m ilita r y d e p lo y m e n t? deployment?
It
I t is
i s ana n open
o p e n secrets e c r e t tthath a t thet h e IAFI A F is i s struggling.
s t r u g g l i n g . The T h e introduction
i n t r o d u c t i o n of o f newnew R Rafale
a fa le
f i g h t e r p l a n e s c o u l d a f f e c t i t s o p e r a t i o n a l p r e p a r e d n e s s i n t h e f u t u r e . A l r e a d y , the
fighter planes could affect its operational preparedness in the future. Already, th e
IAF
I A F requires
r e q u i r e s more m o r e RafaleR a f a l e aircraft
a i r c r a f t than
t h a n it i t isi s slated
s l a t e d tot o get g e t ffromro m F France
r a n c e tto o correct
c o rrec t
ttheh e deficit.
d e f i c i t . How
H o w many m a n y operational
o p e r a t i o n a l ffighter
i g h t e r squadrons
s q u a d r o n s IAF I A F currently
c u r r e n t l y holdsh o l d s and a n d howhow
many
m a n y i s r e q u i r e d r e m a i n e d a h o t l y d e b a t e d t o p i c . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e a g e i n g and
is required remained a hotly debated topic. Notwithstanding the ageing and
soon-to-be
s o o n - t o - b e decommissioned
d e c o m m i s s i o n e d fighter f i g h t e r jjets
e t s iin n existing
e x i s t i n g squadrons,
s q u a d r o n s , the t h e IAFI A F is i s lagging
la g g in g
ffarar b behind
e h i n d its i t s desired
d e s i r e d 45 4 5 squadrons
s q u a d r o n s of o f fully
f u l l y operational
o p e r a t i o n a l fighters.
f i g h t e r s . Almost
A l m o s t half h a l f ofo f the
th e
existing
e x i s t i n g o n e s w i l l b e d e c o m m i s s i o n e d i n t h e n e x t 9 y e a r s . S i m i l a r i s s u e s e x i s t ffor
ones will be decommissioned in the next 9 years. Similar issues exist or
iitst s helicopter
h e l i c o p t e r ffleet,l e e t , mid-air
m i d - a i r refueling
r e f u e l i n g capability,
c a p a b i l i t y , and a n d airborne
a i r b o r n e surveillance
s u r v e i l l a n c e capabil-c a p a b il­
ity.
i t y . The
T h e Indian
I n d i a n Army, A r m y , meanwhile,
m e a n w h i l e , is i s struggling
s tr u g g lin g w withith a a shortage
s h o r t a g e of o f officers
o f f i c e r s and and
138 Rizwan Zeb
ammunition
a m m u n i t i o n problems.p r o b l e m s . The T h e navyn a v y is i s also
a l s o suffering
s u f f e r i n g ffrom r o m similar
s i m i l a r difficulties.
d i f f i c u l t i e s . TheThe
Armed
A r m e d F o r c e s l e a d e r s h i p i s n o t h a p p y a b o u t t h i s a n d b l a m e s t h e Indian
Forces leadership is not happy about this and blames the I n d i a n political
p o litic a l
leadership
l e a d e r s h i p for f o r notn o t granting
g r a n t i n g national
n a t i o n a l security
s e c u r i t y tthe h e importance
i m p o r t a n c e it i t deserves.
d e s e r v e s . Admiral
A d m ira l
Sunil
S u n i l L a n b a , C h i e f o f N a v a l S t a f f , i s o n r e c o r d s a y i n g “ t h e w a y national
Lanba, Chief of Naval Staff, is on record saying “the way n a t i o n a l security
s e c u r ity
is
is b being
e i n g handled
h a n d l e d is i s notn o t commensurate
c o m m e n s u ra te w withi t h the
t h e security
s e c u r i t y environment,
e n v i r o n m e n t , which w h i c h is is
53
extremely serious at the moment.” General Rawat
e x tr e m e ly s e rio u s a t th e m o m e n t.” 53 G e n e r a l R a w a t h a s a ls o s ta te d th a t th e m ili­ has also stated that the mili-
tary
ta ry w wasa s notn o t getting
g e t t i n g enough
e n o u g h ffundsu n d s for f o r modernization.
m o d e r n iz a tio n . T This
h i s iis s the
t h e context
c o n t e x t iin n which
w h ic h

the
t h e two-front
tw o -fro n t w war a r statement
s t a t e m e n t should
s h o u ld b bee analyzed:
a n a ly z e d : a a chance
c h a n c e ffor o r the
t h e Indian
I n d i a n military
m ilita r y

to
t o flex
f l e x its
i t s political
p o l i t i c a l muscle
m u s c l e and a n d make
m a k e tthe h e case
c a s e ffor or a a concerted
c o n c e r t e d military
m i l i t a r y moderniza-
m o d e rn iz a ­
tion campaign.
tio n c a m p a ig n .
The
T h e militaristic
m i l i t a r i s t i c approach
a p p r o a c h has h a s notnot w worked
o r k e d for f o r India
I n d i a to t o resolve
r e s o l v e iits t s Pakistan
P a k i s t a n or or

China problem so far. There is hardly any chance

C h in a p r o b le m s o f a r . T h e r e is h a r d ly a n y c h a n c e o f th is h a p p e n in g in f u tu r e . of this happening in future.
There
T h e r e are a r e twot w o fundamental
f u n d a m e n t a l points p o i n t s ffor o r New N e w Delhi D e l h i to t o consider.
c o n s i d e r . First,
F irst, w without
i t h o u t an an

understanding
u n d e r s t a n d i n g with
w i t h Pakistan
P a k i s t a n canc a n it it b become
ecom e a a dominant
d o m i n a n t power p o w e r in i n thet h e region?
r e g i o n ? And A nd

can
c a n it it bbecome
ecom e a a regional
r e g i o n a l hegemon
h e g e m o n without w i t h o u t first f i r s t having
h a v in g a a ffriendly
r i e n d l y and a n d secure
se c u re
neighborhood?
n e i g h b o r h o o d ? At A t the t h e moment,
m o m e n t , all a l l south
s o u t h AsianA s i a n states
s t a t e s have
h a v e problematic
p r o b l e m a t i c relationsre la tio n s

with
w i t h India.
I n d ia . S Second,
e c o n d , bby y not
n o t ffocusing
o c u s i n g on o n improving
i m p r o v i n g its i t s relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h iits t s neighbors,
n e ig h b o rs ,

it
i t iiss leaving
l e a v i n g iits t s strategic
s t r a t e g i c bbackyard
a c k y a r d openo p e n ffor o r iitst s arch
a r c h rivalr i v a l China.
C h i n a . Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , Bangla-
B a n g la ­

desh, and Nepal are actively engaged with China in

d e s h , a n d N e p a l a re a c tiv e ly e n g a g e d w ith C h in a in s e v e r a l p r o je c ts . C h in a ’s B several projects. China’s BRI RI
and
a n d C P E C a r e a r e a l i t y , a n d S o u t h A s i a i s s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f i t . I n d i a n e e d s t o ttake
CPEC are a reality, and South Asia is significant part of it. India needs to ake
this
t h i s reality
r e a l i t y into
i n t o consideration
c o n s i d e r a t i o n and a n d in i n iitst s strategic
s t r a t e g i c calculation.
c a l c u l a t i o n . The T h e recent
r e c e n t two t w o crises
c ris e s
with
w i t h t w o o f i t s m o s t i m p o r t a n t n e i g h b o r s s h o u l d b e u s e d t o r e - e v a l u a t e i t s regional
two of its most important neighbors should be used to re-evaluate its re g io n a l
polices
p o l i c e s and a n d choices.
c h o i c e s . South S o u t h AsiaA s i a is i s increasingly
i n c r e a s i n g l y bbecoming e c o m in g a a hoth o t theatre
t h e a t r e for f o r the
th e
Indo-Chinese
I n d o - C h i n e s e r i v a l r y . T h i s w o u l d n o t o n l y h a v e l o n g - t e r m i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Asia-
rivalry. This would not only have long-term implications for A s ia -
Pacific
P a c i f i c security,
s e c u r i t y , itit w wouldo u l d also
a l s o decide
d e c i d e tthe h e ffuture
u t u r e of o f India.
I n d i a . ItI t would
w o u l d bbe e prudent
p r u d e n t for fo r
New
N e w D e l h i t o r e t h i n k a b o u t i t s S o u t h A s i a p o l i c y w h e r e i t i s l o s i n g g r o u n d tto
Delhi to rethink about its South Asia policy where it is losing ground o its
its
rival
r i v a l China.
C h i n a . However,
H o w e v e r , tthe h e likelihood
l i k e l i h o o d of o f that
t h a t happening
h a p p e n i n g is i s remote
r e m o t e as a s argued
a r g u e d in i n tthis
h is
chapter
c h a p t e r primarily
p r i m a r i l y due d u e tto o tthe
h e Thucydidesian
T h u c y d i d e s i a n logic l o g i c under
under w which
h i c h Sino-India
S i n o - I n d i a relations
re la tio n s
are
a r e o p e r a t i n g . W h i l e a s p e r t h i s l o g i c , C h i n a w o u l d t a k e e v e r y s t e p t o s t o p India,
operating. While as per this logic, China would take every step to stop I n d ia , a a
rival
r i v a l e m e r g i n g p o w e r t o r i s e , i t i s I n d i a t h a t h a s t o e n s u r e t h a t i t s r i s e i s n o t halted.
emerging power to rise, it is India that has to ensure that its rise is not h a lte d .
So
S o far,
f a r , China
C h i n a is i s making
m a k i n g steadys t e a d y progress
p r o g r e s s in i n pursuit
p u r s u i t of o f tthis
h i s objective
o b j e c t i v e ffor or w which
h i c h New N ew
Delhi has to take most of the blame. New Delhi
D e lh i h a s to ta k e m o s t o f th e b la m e . N e w D e lh i n e e d s to h a v e a f o r e ig n p needs to have a foreign policy
o lic y
rethink
r e t h i n k and a n d havehave a a more
m o r e South
S o u t h AsiaA s i a friendly
f r i e n d l y outlook
o u t l o o k especially
e s p e c i a l l y toward
t o w a r d Pakistan,
P a k is ta n ,
its
i t s m a i n c h a l l e n g e r i n t h e r e g i o n a n d C h i n a ’s s t r a t e g i c a l l y i f i t w a n t s to
main challenger in the region and China’s strategic ally if it wants t o achieve
a c h ie v e
aa ffavourable
a v o u r a b l e standing
s t a n d i n g amonga m o n g its i t s South
S o u t h Asian A s i a n neighbors
n e i g h b o r s and a n d eventually
e v e n t u a l l y rise r i s e asas a a
major player.
m a jo r p la y e r.

Notes
DDisclaimer:
i s c l a i m e r : The
T h e views
v i e w s expressed
e x p r e s s e d in
i n tthis
h i s chapter
c h a p t e r are
a r e the
t h e author's
a u t h o r 's own.
ow n.
11 John
J o h n W. W . Garver,
G a r v e r , “The
“T he F Future
u t u r e of
o f the
t h e Sino-Pakistani
S i n o - P a k i s t a n i Entente
E n t e n t e Cordiale,” i n KJIHGFEDCBA
C o r d i a l e , ” in SSouth
o u th A Asia
s ia
202:
202: F Future
u t u r e SStrategic
tr a te g ic B Balances
a l a n c e s and
and A l l i a n c e s , ed.
Alliances, e d . Michael
M i c h a e l R.R . Chambers
C h a m b e r s (Carlisle,
( C a r l i s l e , PA:
PA:
Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Studies
S t u d i e s Institute,
I n s t i t u t e , U.S.
U .S . A Army
rm y W War a r College,
C o l l e g e , 22002),
0 0 2 ) , www.strategicstudiesinsti
w w w .s tr a te g ic s tu d ie s in s ti
ttute.army.mil/pdffiles/00105.pdf.
u t e . a r m y . m i l / p d f f i l e s / 0 0 1 0 5 .p d f .
22 Jeffrey
J e ffre y E E.. Garten,
G a r t e n , The
The B Bigi g Ten:
T e n : The
The B Bigig E Emerging
m e r g in g M Markets
a r k e t s and
and H How
o w They
T h e y Will
W i l l Change
C hange
Our
O ur L i v e s (New
Lives ( N e w York:
Y o r k : Basic
B a s i c Books,
B o o k s , 1997).
1 9 9 7 ).
 The China–Pakistan–India Trilateral 139
33 Carsten
C a rs te n H Hobraad,
o b ra a d , M KJIHGFEDCBA
Middle
id d le P Powers
o w e r s in i n IInternational
n te r n a tio n a l P o l i t i c s (London:
Politics ( L o n d o n : Macmillan,
M a c m i l l a n , 1984).1 9 8 4 ).
44 Robert
R o b e r t Chase,
C h a s e , EmilyE m i l y Hill H i l l and
and P Paul
a u l Kennedy
K e n n e d y (eds.),( e d s . ) , The
The P Pivotal
i v o t a l SStates:
ta te s : A A NNew ew F Frame-
ram e­
work
w o r k ffor o r U.S.
U .S . P Policy
o l i c y ini n the
th e D Developing
e v e l o p i n g World W o r l d (New( N e w York:
Y o rk : W W.W. .W . N Norton,
o r t o n , 1998).
1 9 9 8 ).
55 Condoleezza
C o n d o l e e z z a Rice, R i c e , “Promoting
“ P r o m o t i n g the th e N National
a t i o n a l Interests,”
I n te r e s ts ,” F Foreign
o r e ig n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , January–
J a n u a ry -
FFebruary
e b r u a r y 22000,0 0 0 , 56. 56.
66 Bharat
B h a rat K Karnad,
a rn a d , N Nuclear
u c l e a r Weapons
W eapons & & IIndian e c u r i t y (New
n d i a n SSecurity ( N e w Delhi: D e lh i: M Macmillan,
a c m i l l a n , 22002), 0 0 2 ),
4479.
79.
77 Ibid.,
I b id ., 4 446–83.
4 6 -8 3 .
88 Rizwan
R iz w a n Z Zeb,e b , “India
“ In d ia R Rising:
i s i n g : Do D o tthe he N Neighbors
e ig h b o rs N Need
e e d tto o W Worry?o rry ? A A Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Perspec-
P e rsp e c­
tive,”
t i v e , ” The
T h e JJournal
o u r n a l of o fP Political S c i e n c e XXVI,
o l i t i c a l Science X X V I , nos. n o s . 11 & & 2 2 (2007–08).
(2 0 0 7 -0 8 ).
99 Graham
G rah a m A Allison,
l l i s o n , “The
“ T h e Thucydides
T h u c y d i d e s Trap,” T r a p ,” F Foreign
o r e ig n P o l i c y , June
Policy, J u n e 9, 9 , 22017,
017, h https://for
ttp s ://f o r
eignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/.
e ig n p o lic y .c o m /2 0 1 7 /0 6 /0 9 /th e - th u c y d id e s - tra p / .
10
1 0 Geeta
G e e ta M Mohan,
o h a n , “Nepal
“ N e p a l Parliament
P a r l i a m e n t ppasses asses n newew m map a p including
i n c l u d i n g disputed
d i s p u t e d IIndian
n d i a n tterritory,”
e r r i t o r y ,”
IIndia T o d a y , June
n d i a Today, J u n e 13,1 3 , 22020.
020.
11
1 1 “Army
“ A r m y Prepared
P r e p a r e d for f o r Two
T w o and and a a HHalf a lf F Front
ro n t W War,”
a r , ” The
The H i n d u , June
Hindu, J u n e 8, 8 , 22017.
017.
12
1 2 Raj R a j Chengappa,
C h e n g a p p a , “Balakot:
“ B a la k o t: H How o w IndiaI n d i a Planned
P l a n n e d IAF IA F A Airstrike
i r s t r i k e in i n Pakistan:
P a k is ta n : A Ann IInsiden s id e
Story,”
S t o r y ,” IIndia n d i a Today, Today, M Marcha r c h 15, 1 5 , 22019,019, w www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/
w w .in d ia to d a y .in /m a g a z in e /c o v e r - s to r y /
story/20190325-balakot-airstrikes-pulwama-terror-attack-abhinandan-varthaman-nar
s to ry /2 0 1 9 0 3 2 5 -b a la k o t-a irs trik e s -p u lw a m a -te rro r-a tta c k -a b h in a n d a n -v a rth a m a n -n a r
endra-modi-masood-azhar-1478511-2019-03-15.
e n d ra -m o d i-m a s o o d -a z h a r-1 4 7 8 5 1 1 -2 0 1 9 -0 3 -1 5 .
13
1 3 Complete
C o m p l e t e ttext e x t of of A Agreement
g r e e m e n t on o n tthe he M Maintenance
a i n t e n a n c e of of P Peace
e a c e and a n d Tranquility
T r a n q u i l i t y along
a l o n g tthe he
LLinei n e of of A Actual
c t u a l Control
C o n t r o l in i n the
t h e India–China
In d ia -C h in a B Border
o rd er A Areas,
r e a s , September
S e p t e m b e r 7, 7 , 1993,
1 9 9 3 , www.www.
ppeacemaker.un.org.
e a c e m a k e r. u n .o r g .
1 4 Complete
14 C o m p l e t e ttext e x t of o f tthe
he A Agreement
g r e e m e n t on o n Confidence
C o n f i d e n c e Building
B u i l d i n g Measures
M e a s u r e s in i n tthehe M Military
ilita ry
FField
i e l d along
a l o n g tthe he L Line
i n e ofo fA Actual
c t u a l Control
C o n t r o l in i n tthe
h e IIndia–China
n d i a - C h i n a Border B o rd er A Areas,
rea s, N November
o v e m b e r 229, 9,
1996,
1996, w www.peacemaker.un.org.
w w .p e a c e m a k e r .u n .o rg .
15
15 A Amna m n a Yusaf,
Y u s a f , “Sino-Indian
“ S in o -In d ia n R Relations:
e l a t i o n s : IImplications
m p l i c a t i o n s for f o r Pakistan,”
P a k i s t a n ,” PaperP a p e r ppresented
r e s e n t e d at at
tthe
h e seminar
s e m i n a r on on P Pakistan–China
a k is ta n -C h in a R Relations
e la tio n s - – 2011:
2 0 1 1 : YearY e a r of F r i e n d s h i p , organized
o f Friendship, o r g a n i z e d by b y theth e
IInstitute
n s t i t u t e ofo f Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Studies,
S t u d i e s , Islamabad,
I s l a m a b a d , JanuaryJ a n u a r y 11–12,
1 1 - 1 2 , 22011, 0 1 1 , hhttp://issi.org.pk/pub
ttp ://is s i.o r g .p k /p u b
lication-files/1299745166_57265659.pdf
l i c a t i o n - f i l e s / 1 2 9 9 7 4 5 1 6 6 _ 5 7 2 6 5 6 5 9 . p d f as a s quoted
q u o t e d in i n Rizwan
R iz w a n Z e b , “Pakistan–China
Zeb, “ P a k is ta n -C h in a
Relations:
R e la tio n s : W Where h e r e They
T h e y Go G o From F ro m H Here?”
e r e ? ” UNISCI
U N IS C IP a p e r s , no.
Papers, n o . 229 9 (May
( M a y 2012):
2 0 1 2 ) : 54–55.
5 4 -5 5 .
16
1 6 AAgreement
g r e e m e n t on o n the th e M Maintenance
a i n t e n a n c e of ofP Peace
e a c e and a n d Tranquillity
T r a n q u illity A Along
l o n g the t h e LLinei n e of ofA Actual
c tu a l
Control
C o n t r o l in i n the t h e IIndia-China
n d ia -C h in a B Border
order A r e a s , September
Areas, S e p t e m b e r 7, 7 , 1993,
1 9 9 3 , hhttps://peacemaker.
ttp s ://p e a c e m a k e r.
u n .o r g /s ite s /p e a c e m a k e r .u n .o rg /f ile s /C N % 2 0 I N _ 9 3 0 9 0 7 _ A g r e e m e n t% 2 0 o n % 2 0
un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20
India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf.
I n d ia - C h in a % 2 0 B o r d e r % 2 0 A r e a s .p d f.
17
1 7 Zia Z i a Haq,H a q , “From“ F r o m Infrastructure
I n f r a s t r u c t u r e to t o Hi-Tech:
H i - T e c h : Mapping
M a p p i n g China’s C h i n a ’ s Large L a r g e Trade
T ra d e F Footprint
o o tp rin t
in
i n IIndia,”
n d i a ,” H Hindustan
i n d u s t a n Times, T i m e s , JuneJ u n e 19, 1 9 , 2020,
2020, w www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/
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illio n ,” E Eurasia
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19
1 9 “Nuclear
“N u c le a r A Anxiety:
n x i e t y : IIndian’s
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C l i n t o n on o n theth e N Nuclear
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T e s t i n g , ” TheThe N Newe w York Y ork
T i m e s , May
Times, M a y 13, 1 3 , 1998.
1998. A Alsol s o see;
s e e ; Jaswant
J a s w a n t Singh,S i n g h , “Against
“ A g a in s t N Nuclear
u c le a r A Apartheid,”
p a r t h e i d , ” FForeign
o r e ig n
A Affairs,
f f a i r s , September–October
S e p t e m b e r - O c t o b e r 1998. 1998.
2200 Zeb,Z e b , “Pakistan–China
“ P a k i s t a n - C h i n a Relations,”
R e l a t i o n s , ” 56. 56.
221
1 “Explainer:
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T e n s io n ? ” D a w n , May
Dawn, M a y 29, 2 9 , 22020.
020.
2222 “India
“ I n d i a Revokes
R evokes K Kashmir’s
a s h m i r ’ s Special
S p e c i a l Status,
S ta tu s , R Raising
a is in g F Fears
e a r s of o f Unrest,”
U n re s t,” N New e w YorkY o r k Times,
T im e s,
A August
u g u s t 5, 5 , 22019;
0 1 9 ; IIndian d ia R Revokes
e v o k e s Kashmir’s
K a s h m i r ’ s SpecialS p e c i a l Status,
S t a t u s , “Raising
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U n re s t,”
The
The N New e w YorkY o r k Times,
T im e s, n nytimes.com.
y tim e s .c o m .
2233 Derek
D e r e k Grossman,
G r o s s m a n , “The “ T h e Quad Q u a d IIs s P Poised
o i s e d tto o Become
B e c o m e OpenlyO p e n ly A Anti-China
n t i - C h i n a Soon,”
S o o n ,” R RANDAND
B l o g , July
Blog, J u l y 228, 8 , 22020,020, w www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/the-quad-is-poised-to-become-
w w .r a n d .o rg /b lo g /2 0 2 0 /0 7 /th e - q u a d - is -p o is e d - to - b e c o m e -
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o p e n ly - a n ti- c h in a - s o o n .h tm l.
140 Rizwan Zeb
24
2 4 Sushant
S u s h a n t Singh, S i n g h , “Chinese
“ C h i n e s e Intrusions
I n t r u s i o n s at at 3 3 P Places
l a c e s in in L Ladakh,
adakh, A Armyr m y Chief
C h i e f Takes S t o c k , ” KJIHGFEDC
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T h e IIndian n d ia n E x p r e s s , May
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0 2 0 . Chinese
C h i n e s e intrusions
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n d ia N News,
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In d ia n E Express.
x p re s s .
25
2 5 “Galwan
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ought
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o c k s , ” The G u a r d i a n , June
T h e Guardian, J u n e 17, 1 7 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.theguardian.com/world/2020/
w w w .th e g u a rd ia n .c o m /w o r ld /2 0 2 0 /
jjun/17/shock-and-anger-in-india-after-worst-attack-on-china-border-in-decades.
u n /1 7 /s h o c k -a n d -a n g e r-in -in d ia -a fte r-w o rs t-a tta c k -o n -c h in a -b o rd e r-in -d e c a d e s.
26
26 E Ejazja z H Haider,
a i d e r , “India’s
“ I n d i a ’ s China
C h i n a Problem,”
P r o b l e m ,” The The F Friday T i m e s , June
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020, w www.thefri
w w .th e fr i
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d a y t i m e s . c o m / i n d i a s - c h i n a - p r o b l e m /.
2 7 “PMO
27 “ P M O Issues I s s u e s Clarification
C l a r i f i c a t i o n Over
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C o m m e n t s That T hat N No o One
O ne E Entered
n t e r e d IIndian
n d i a n Ter-
T e r­
rritory,” T r i b u n e , June
i t o r y , ” Tribune, J u n e 20,2 0 , 2020,
2020, w www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/govt-issues-clarifi
w w tr ib u n e in d ia .c o m /n e w s /n a tio n /g o v t- is s u e s -c la rif L
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28
28 A Ajai j a i Shukla,
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w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /9 1 5 7 5 0 /
tthe-four-point-formula.
h e -fo u r-p o in t-fo rm u la .
30
30 L Lisai s a Curtis,
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“ I n d i a andand P Pakistan
a k is ta n U Under
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n d ia n
E x p r e s s , September
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2 0 1 6 , https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/
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indus-water-treaty-blood-and-water-cant-flow-together-pm-modi-pakistan-uri-attack/.
in d u s -w a te r-tre a ty -b lo o d -a n d -w a te r-c a n t-flo w -to g e th e r-p m -m o d i-p a k ista n -u ri-a tta c k / .
3 2 “Army
32 “ A r m y InstructedI n s t r u c t e d tto o N Neutralise
e u t r a l i s e Infiltrators:
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a r r i k a r ,” D Daily
a ily P Pioneer,
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w w .d a ily p io n e e r .c o m /2 0 1 5 /to p - s to r ie s /a r m y -in s tr u c te d - to -n e u tr a lis e - in f iltra to r s -
pparrikar.html.
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33
33 A Ankitn k it P Panda,
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“ L e s s o n s From F r o m IIndia’sn d i a ’ s ‘Surgical
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S t r i k e s ’ , One
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surgical-strikes-one-year-later/.
s u rg ic a l-s trik e s -o n e -y e a r-la te r/ .
34
34 M Moeed o e e d Yusuf, Y u s u f , “The “ T h e Pulwama
P u l w a m a Crisis: C r i s i s : Flirting
F l i r t i n g withw i t h War W a r in in a N Nuclear
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w w .a r m s c o n tr o l.o rg /a c t/2 0 1 9 - 0 5 /f e a tu re s /
ppulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear-environment.
u lw a m a -c ris is -flirtin g -w a r-n u c le a r-e n v iro n m e n t .
35
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S h a s w a t i Das, D a s , “44 “ 4 4 CRPFC R P F Jawans Jaw ans K Killed,
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w w w .liv e m in t.c o m /n e w s /in d ia /p u lw a m a -te r
rror-attack-death-toll-rises-to-40-jem-claims-responsibility-1550143395449.html.
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36
36 R Raj a j Chengappa,
C h e n g a p p a , “Balakot:
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n d i a Planned
P l a n n e d IAF IA F A Airstrike
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n d i a Today, M a r c h 15, 1 5 , 2019,
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37
37 F Fayaz
a y a z Bukhari,
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4 4 ; India
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Reuters, F e b r u a r y 14, 1 4 , 22019,
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w w .b b c . c o m / n e w s / w o r l d - a s i a - 4 7 4 1 2 8 8 4 .
38
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w w .b b c .c o m /n e w s /w o r ld - a s ia - in d ia - 4 9 2 3 1 6 1 9 .
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39 A Ayazy a z Gul, G u l , “Pakistan,
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F o r detail,
d e t a i l , see
s e e SIPRI
S I P R I Military
M i l i t a r y Expenditure
E x p e n d itu re D Database,
a t a b a s e , www.sipri.org/databases/milex;
w w w .s ip ri.o r g /d a ta b a s e s /m ile x ;
also
a l s o see
see M Mosharraf
o s h a rra f Z Zaidi,
a i d i , “India’s
“ I n d i a ’ s nnext e x t attack
a t t a c k isi s coming,”
c o m i n g , ” The The N e w s , June
News, J u n e 223, 3 , 22020,
020,
wwww.thenews.com.pk/print/676287-india-s-next-attack-is-coming.
w w .th e n e w s .c o m .p k /p r in t/6 7 6 2 8 7 - in d ia - s - n e x t- a tta c k - is -c o m in g .
443
3 hhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/13/newsid_3695000/369
ttp ://n e w s .b b c .c o .u k /o n th is d a y /h i/d a te s /s to r ie s /d e c e m b e r /1 3 /n e w s id _ 3 6 9 5 0 0 0 /3 6 9
5 0 5 7 .s tm .
5057.stm.
444
4 “What
“ W h a t IIs s India’s
I n d i a ’ s Cold
C o l d StartS t a r t Doctrine?”
D o c t r i n e ? ” IIndian n d ia n E x p r e s s , September
Express, S e p t e m b e r 221, 1 , 22017,
0 1 7 , https://
h ttp s ://
indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-india-cold-start-doctrine-military-strategy-
in d ia n e x p r e s s .c o m /a r tic le /w h a t- is /w h a t- is - in d ia - c o ld - s ta rt- d o c tr in e -m ilita r y - s tr a te g y -
india-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-4854019/?device=desktop.
in d ia -p a k is ta n -in d ia n -a rm e d -fo rc e s -4 8 5 4 0 1 9 /? d e v ic e = d e s k to p .
445
5 “Lt
“ L t Gen
G en B Bipinip in R Rawat
a w a t tto o B Bee NNext ext A Armyr m y Chief,
C h i e f , Superseding
S u p e r s e d i n g Two T w o Senior
S e n i o r Officers,”
O f f i c e r s ,” The
The
W i r e , December
Wire, D e c e m b e r 18, 1 8 , 22016,
0 1 6 , hhttps://thewire.in/security/army-chief-bipin-rawat.
t t p s : / / t h e w i r e .i n / s e c u r i t y / a r m y - c h i e f - b i p i n - r a w a t .
446
6 “India
“ In d ia M Must ust B Bee Prepared
P r e p a r e d forf o r Conflict
C o n f l i c t on on W Western
e s t e r n and
and N Northern
o rth e rn F Fronts:
r o n t s : General
G en e ral R Rawat,”
a w a t,”
BBusiness t a n d a r d , September
u s i n e s s SStandard, S e p t e m b e r 6, 6 , 22017,017, w www.business-standard.com/article/news-
w w .b u s in e s s - s ta n d a rd .c o m /a r tic le /n e w s -
ani/india-must-be-prepared-for-conflict-on-western-and-northern-fronts-general-
a n i/in d ia -m u s t- b e - p r e p a r e d - f o r- c o n flic t- o n - w e s te r n - a n d - n o r th e r n - fr o n ts - g e n e r a l-
rawat-117090601319_1.html.
r a w a t- 1 1 7 0 9 0 6 0 1 3 1 9 _ 1 .h tm l.
477
4 Zeb,
Z e b , “India
“ I n d i a Rising.”
R is in g .”
448
8 Rizwan
R iz w a n Z Zeb,e b , “Can
“ C a n IIndia n d i a Fight
F ig h t a a Two-Front
T w o -F ro n t W War ar w withi t h China
C h i n a and a n d Pakistan?”
P a k i s t a n ? ” TheThe
AAsia
s ia D i a l o g u e , March
Dialogue, M a r c h 30, 3 0 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/30/can-india-
h ttp s ://th e a s ia d ia lo g u e .c o m /2 0 1 8 /0 3 /3 0 /c a n - in d ia -
ffight-a-two-front-war-with-china-and-pakistan/.
ig h t-a -tw o -fro n t-w a r-w ith -c h in a -a n d -p a k is ta n /.
449
9 “Wiki
“ W i k i Leaks
L e a k s TermsT erm s F Former
o r m e r Indian
In d ia n A Armyr m y ChiefC h i e f General
G e n e ra l D Deepak
e e p a k Kapoor
K a p o o r as as a a Geek,”
G e e k ,”
The
The N Nation,
a tio n , D December
e c e m b e r 8, 8 , 2010, 2 0 1 0 , hhttps://nation.com.pk/08-Dec-2010/wikileaks-
ttp s ://n a tio n .c o m .p k /0 8 - D e c -2 0 1 0 /w ik ile a k s -
terms-former-indian-army-chief-general-deepak-kapoor-as-a-geek.
te rm s -fo rm e r-in d ia n -a rm y -c h ie f-g e n e ra l-d e e p a k -k a p o o r-a s -a -g e e k .
50
50 James
J a m e s Griffiths,
G r i f f i t h s , “India,
“ I n d i a , China
C h in a A Agreeg r e e tto o ‘Expeditious
‘E x p e d itio u s D Disengagement’
i s e n g a g e m e n t ’ of of DDoklam
o k la m B Bor-
o r­
der D
der i s p u t e ,” CNN,
Dispute,” CNN, A u g u s t 29,
August 2 9 , 22017,0 1 7 , hhttps://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/28/asia/india-
ttp s ://e d itio n .c n n .c o m /2 0 1 7 /0 8 /2 8 /a s ia /in d ia -
china-brics-doklam/index.html.
c h in a - b r ic s - d o k la m /in d e x .h tm l.
51
51 “The
“ T h e China–Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n EconomicE c o n o m i c Corridor:C o rrid o r: A A View
V i e w from f r o m tthe h e Ground,”
G ro u n d ,” D December
e c e m b e r 1, 1,
22017
017 wwww.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-view-the-
w w .w ils o n c e n te r .o r g /e v e n t/th e - c h in a - p a k is ta n - e c o n o m ic - c o r r id o r - v ie w - th e -
ground;
g r o u n d ; complete
c o m p l e t e rreference,
e f e r e n c e , with
w i t h author,
a u t h o r , where
w h e r e it i t was
w a s published.
p u b lis h e d .
52
52 “India
“ I n d i a Successfully
S u c c e s s fu lly F Flight
l i g h t Tests
T e s t s Supersonic
S u p e r s o n i c CruiseC ru is e M Missile
is s ile B BrahMos,”
r a h M o s ,” The The E Economics
c o n o m ic s
Times,
T im e s , M March a r c h 22,2 2 , 2018,
2 0 1 8 , https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-
h ttp s ://e c o n o m ic tim e s .in d ia tim e s .c o m /n e w s /d e fe n c e /in d ia -
successfully-flight-tests-supersonic-cruise-missile-brahmos/articleshow/63411447.
s u c c e s s fu lly -flig h t-te s ts -s u p e rs o n ic -c ru is e -m is s ile -b ra h m o s /a rtic le s h o w /6 3 4 n 4 4 7 .
cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
c m s ? u tm _ so u rc e = c o n te n to fin te re s t& u tm _ m e d iu m = te x t& u tm _ c a m p a ig n = c p p s t .
53
53 “Dilemma
“ D i l e m m a of o f a Two-Front
T w o -F ro n t W War,” a r , ” The T r i b u n e , July
T h e Tribune, J u l y 14,1 4 , 2017,
2017, w www.tribuneindia.com/
w w .trib u n e in d ia .c o m /
nnews/archive/comment/dilemma-of-a-two-front-war-436191.
e w s /a rc h iv e /c o m m e n t/d ile m m a -o f -a -tw o -f ro n t- w a r- 4 3 6 1 9 1 .
9 Conservative Administration
in Iran and Future of
Pakistan–Iran Relations
Khurram Abbas

Introduction
Elections of Islamic Republic of Iran are largely contested between two politi-
cal fractions, that is moderates and conservatives. In February 2020, Iran had
held its 11th Parliamentary elections, and conservatives won over two-third seats.1
Almost 16 months later, Presidential elections were held in Iran, and, as expected,
an ultra-conservative candidate won with securing a handsome majority of
61.95 percent of votes.2 lower turnout, i.e, 42.6 percent turnout in parliamentary
elections in 2020 and 48.8 percent turnout in presidential elections in 2021 helped
conservatives to win these two elections consecutively. It is interesting to note
that the lower turn out often favours conservatives to win elections. For instance
the parliamentary elections of 1996 and 2000 witnessed 70 percent turnout, which
favoured moderates, while in 2004 and 2008 the turnout drastically reduced to
50 percent and conservatives won both these elections.
Conservatives came into power owing to failure of various domestic and for-
eign policies of Rouhani administration. The foremost reason is Iran’s failure to
follow Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The moderates predomi-
nantly contested 2012 and 2016 elections anticipating normal relations with the
United States and Western countries. The landslide victory of 2016 elections was
manifestation of people’s desire for a standard quality life. However, Trump’s
unilateral withdrawal and his subsequent ‘Maximum Pressure Campaign’ against
Iran helped conservatives to convince public and state institutions that Rouhani’s
approach was illusionary in practice and that the United States is not trustwor-
thy.3 The killing of General Qasem Soleimani, Commander Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) in the US raid on 3rd January 2020, was another severe
blow on moderates’ popularity. The US hatred of the general public was further
flared by conservatives. Rouhani administration’s ‘calculated response’ against
the killing of General Soleimani was perceived as being naive in nature, and con-
servatives diverted their criticism to Rouhani and moderates.4
Likewise, Rouhani’s soft approach towards Arab countries was also not wel-
comed by conservatives and some state institutions. The internal atmosphere
was not welcoming to this approach after the stampede of 2016 and subsequent
burning of Saudi Embassy in Tehran.5 Iranian public was charged against Saudis.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-11
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 143
However, Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister of Iran, attempted to reengage Arabs, and
his online meeting with Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Foreign Minister
UAE, also raised concerns within Iranian establishment and public at large.6 Fur-
ther, Guardian Council of Iran had barred 50 percent candidates to contest elec-
tions majority of which belonged to reformist background including 90 elected
members of former Majlis.7 In Tehran, 134 conservative candidates ran against
28 moderate candidates for the city’s 30 seats, which is the largest single bloc of
seats of any place.8 The Guardian Council’s extraordinary rejections of reformist
candidates illustrate Iranian institutions’ objective of seeing hardliners in power to
reinforce hardline approach to regional and international security affairs.
To sum up, the conservatives have come in to power after manipulating
public’s hatred against the United States and Arab countries, and their voters
would expect them to be tough while dealing with these countries. It is Iran’s
political culture that the government in power wholeheartedly tries to fulfill
its electoral slogans. Rouhani tried his best to normalize relationship with the
United States and Western countries in 2012 as he had promised his voters
of a quality life without international sanctions. The reengagement with the
United States and Western countries could serve his purpose politically. Like-
wise, conservatives came in power after February 2020 elections by promising
to bring back Iran’s dignity and glory in the region.9 If conservatives strive to
fulfill their promises, as Rouhani strived during his tenure, the overall Persian
Gulf security environment would likely remain strained and bleak during the
tenure of conservatives.

Basic Ingredients of Conservative Parliament and

Presidents of Iran
Totalitarianism out of conservative Parliament and presidents of Iran represent
interesting case studies of personification of domestic and foreign policies. Their
pendulum of behavioural swings on both sides of extremes makes them highly
unpredictable, and, resultantly, their relationship with other countries remains
inconsistent. Unlike many typical nation-states, Iran is not an industrial society
owing to absence of typical industrial/capitalist characteristics. The informal
social, cultural, and religious relationship dominates Iranian politics. Hence, the
change of presidents and Conservatives being in the Parliament can lead to drastic
domestic and foreign policy changes.
Conservative presidents largely remained cynical to criticism. Though there
are constant issues in Iran that are immune to criticism, such as personality of
Supreme Leader and policies of IRGC, however, conservative governments fur-
ther add red lines to mute critical voices within the country to consolidate their
power. For instance during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, government added redlines
which were largely undefined and termed many voices as being threats to Iran’s
national security.10 This culture or practice discourages outflow of neutral infor-
mation from Tehran, which creates an information vacuum for regional and inter-
national audiences. This gap has often been filled by country’s adversaries and
144 Khurram Abbas
presented
p r e s e n t e d pessimistic
p e s s i m i s t i c vviewsi e w s of o f Iranian
I r a n i a n intensions
i n t e n s i o n s and a n d exaggerated
e x a g g e r a t e d iits t s defence
d e fe n ce
capabilities,
c a p a b ilitie s , w which
h i c h have
h a v e ledl e d tot o suspicious
s u s p i c i o u s environment.
e n v iro n m e n t.

There
T h e r e are a r e twot w o extreme
e x t r e m e iideological
d e o lo g ic a l v views
ie w s w within
i t h i n Iranian
I r a n ia n p politics
o l i t i c s on
o n fforeign
o re ig n
affairs. The office of Supreme Leader, IRGC, and conservatives
a f f a ir s . T h e o f f ic e o f S u p r e m e L e a d e r , I R G C , a n d c o n s e r v a tiv e s c a te g o r ic a lly categorically
negate
n e g a t e any a n y engagement
engagem ent w with
i t h tthe
h e Arab
A r a b countries,
c o u n t r i e s , tthe
he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s and a n d West.
W e s t.
Ahmadinejad’s furious criticism of international political system
A h m a d in e ja d ’s f u r io u s c r itic is m o f in te r n a tio n a l p o litic a l s y s te m a n d p r o p a g a tio n and propagation
of
o f maltreatment
m a l t r e a t m e n t of of M Muslim
u s l i m countries
c o u n t r i e s bbyy the
t h e leading
l e a d i n g stakeholders
s t a k e h o l d e r s of o f the
t h e system
s y ste m
11
were
w e r e c l e a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f h i s i d e o l o g i c a l l e a n i n g s t o w a r d s A l i S h a r i a t i . 11 How-
clear manifestation of his ideological leanings towards Ali Shariati. H ow ­
ever,
e v e r , tthere
h e r e is i s another
a n o t h e r group,
g r o u p , known
k n o w n as a s ‘Resistance
KJIHGFEDCBA
‘R e s is ta n c e F o r c e s ’ to
Forces’ t o revolutionary
r e v o l u t i o n a r y ideal-
id e a l­
ists.
i s t s . Akbar
A k b a r Hashemi
H ashem i R Rafsanjani,
a f s a n j a n i , Mohammad
M oham m ad K Khatami,
h a t a m i , and a n d Hassan
H a ssa n R Rouhani
o u h a n i led
le d
this group as presidents and tried to minimize the influence of
th is g r o u p a s p r e s id e n ts a n d tr ie d to m in im iz e th e in f lu e n c e o f r e v o lu tio n a r y id e a l­ revolutionary ideal-
ists
i s t s on
o n Iranian
I r a n i a n foreign
f o r e i g n policy.
p o l i c y . Though
T h o u g h weak w e a k anda n d short
s h o r t lived,
l i v e d , this
t h i s resistance
r e s i s t a n c e group
g ro u p

partially
p a r t i a l l y e n g a g e d A r a b c o u n t r i e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d W e s t . T h e f o l l o w i n g Raf-
engaged Arab countries, the United States and West. The following R a f-
sanjani’s
s a n j a n i ’s statement
s t a t e m e n t summarizes
s u m m a r i z e s Iran’s
I r a n ’s two
t w o extreme
e x tre m e p parallels
a r a l l e l s on
o n foreign
f o r e i g n affairs.
a ffa irs.

One
O n e ofo f the
th e wwrong
r o n g tthings
h i n g s wew e did
d i d in
i n tthe
h e revolutionary
r e v o l u t i o n a r y atmosphere
a tm o s p h e re w was a s to
t o make
m ake
enemies.
e n e m i e s . WeW e pushed
p u s h e d those
th o s e w whoh o could
c o u l d bbe e neutral
n e u t r a l into
i n t o hostility
h o s t i l i t y and
a n d did
d i d not
not

do
d o anything
a n y t h i n g to
t o attract
a t t r a c t those
t h o s e who
w h o could
c o u l d bbecome
e c o m e ffriends.
r i e n d s . It
I t iis
s p part
a r t of
o f the
t h e new
new

plan
p l a n that
t h a t in
i n fforeign
o r e i g n policy
p o l i c y we
w e should
s h o u l d bbehave
e h a v e iin n a way
a w a y not
n o t to
t o needlessly
n e e d l e s s l y leave
le a v e
12
ground to the enemy.
g r o u n d to th e e n e m y .12

The
T h e aforementioned
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d ingredients
i n g r e d i e n t s primarily
p r i m a r i l y change
c h a n g e the t h e regional
r e g i o n a l and
a n d international
in te rn a tio n a l
security
s e c u r ity p perceptions.
e r c e p t i o n s . The
T h e history
h i s t o r y suggests
s u g g e s t s that
t h a t during
d u r i n g the
t h e tenures
t e n u r e s of
o f conserva-
c o n se rv a­

tive
t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s , I r a n ’ s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h A r a b c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e U n i t e d States
governments, Iran’s relationship with Arab countries and the United S ta te s
drastically
d r a s t i c a l l y fell
f e l l from
f r o m normalcy.
n o r m a l c y . In I n fact,
f a c t , ffiery
i e r y statements
s t a t e m e n t s radically
r a d i c a l l y changed
c h a n g e d regional
re g io n a l
security
s e c u r i t y outlook.
o u t l o o k . For
F o r instance
i n s t a n c e Ahmadinejad’s
A h m a d i n e j a d ’s statement
s t a t e m e n t to t o wipe
w i p e outo u t Israel
I s r a e l from
fro m
the map of the world still haunts
th e m a p o f th e w o r ld s till h a u n ts I r a n . Iran.

Pakistan–Iran
Pakistan-Iran Relations: A Brief Overview
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n anda n d IranI r a n have
h a v e witnessed
w itn e s s e d a a series
s e r i e s of of u upsp s anda n d downs
d o w n s in i n their
t h e i r relation-
r e la tio n ­
ship
s h i p since
s i n c e 1947.
1 9 4 7 . Their
T h e i r relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p can can b bee divided
d i v i d e d intoi n t o three
t h r e e major
m a jo r p phases.
h a s e s . The
The
first
f i r s t phase
p h a s e starts
s t a r t s ffrom
r o m 1947 1 9 4 7 and a n d endse n d s ono n 19791 9 7 9 with w i t h Islamic
I s l a m i c Revolution
R e v o l u t i o n in i n Iran.
Ira n .
During
D u r i n g this th is p phase,
h a s e , the
t h e two t w o countries
c o u n t r i e s enjoyed
e n jo y e d a a cordial
c o r d i a l relationship.
r e l a t i o n s h i p . TheyT h e y had had

formed
fo rm e d R Regional
e g i o n a l Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n ffor o r Development
D e v e l o p m e n t (RCD) ( R C D ) along a lo n g w withi t h Turkey.
T u r k e y . IranIra n

helped
h e l p e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n during
d u r i n g itsits w warsa r s with
w i t h India
I n d i a in i n 1965
1 9 6 5 and a n d 1971.
1 9 7 1 . In I n fact,
f a c t , the
t h e Paki-
P a k i­
13
stan’s military veterans used to consider Iran as its actual
s t a n ’s m ilita r y v e te r a n s u s e d to c o n s id e r I r a n a s its a c tu a l s tr a te g ic d e p th .13 B strategic depth. Both
o th
countries were part of South East Asia Treaty Organization
c o u n tr ie s w e r e p a r t o f S o u th E a s t A s ia T r e a ty O r g a n iz a tio n ( S E A T O ) a n d C e n tra l (SEATO) and Central
Treaty
T r e a t y Organization
O r g a n i z a t i o n (CENTO)
( C E N T O ) bbloc. l o c . Pakistan
P a k i s t a n and a n d Iran
I r a n shared
s h a r e d American
A m e r i c a n securitys e c u r ity

umbrella during 1950s and

u m b r e lla d u r in g 1 9 5 0 s a n d 1 9 6 0 s . 1960s.
The
T h e ouster
o u s t e r ofo f Shah
S h a h of o f Iran
I r a n anda n d ttheh e installation
i n s t a l l a t i o n ofo f revolutionary
r e v o l u t i o n a r y forcesf o r c e s in i n Iran
Ira n
started
s ta r te d a a new
n e w era e r a ofo f relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p bbetween
e t w e e n the t h e twot w o countries.
c o u n t r i e s . Initially,
I n itia lly , P Pakistan
a k ista n

tried
t r i e d to
t o develop
d e v e l o p cordial
c o r d i a l relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p with
w i t h Islamic
I s la m ic R Republic.
e p u b l i c . It I t remained
r e m a i n e d neutral
n e u tra l

during
d u r i n g I r a n - I r a q W a r a n d t o s o m e e x t e n t s u p p o r t e d T e h r a n . H o w e v e r , t h e larger
Iran–Iraq War and to some extent supported Tehran. However, the la rg e r
insecurity
in s e c u r ity p paradox
a r a d o x along
a l o n g with w i t h fewf e w regional
r e g i o n a l developments
d e v e l o p m e n t s and a n d furious
f u r io u s b behaviour
e h a v io u r
 IIran
r a n and Future
and F u t u r e of Pakistan–Iran
o fP Relations
a k ista n -Ir a n R e la tio n s 145
145

of
o f revolutionary
r e v o l u t i o n a r y fforces o rc e s p pushed
u s h e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n away a w a y from f r o m Iran.I r a n . This
T h i s era e r a witnessed
w itn e s se d a a

significant turmoil in bilateral relationship between the

s ig n if ic a n t tu r m o il in b ila te r a l r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e tw o c o u n tr ie s m a in ly d u e two countries mainly due
to
t o their
t h e i r divergence
d i v e r g e n c e of o f interests
i n t e r e s t s iin n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . The T h e iincident
n c i d e n t of of M Mezar-e-Sharif
e z a r-e -S h a rif

further
f u r t h e r i n t e n s i f i e d h a t r e d a n d m i s p e r c e p t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . Follow-
intensified hatred and misperceptions between the two countries. F o llo w ­
iing
n g thet h e seizure
s e i z u r e of of M Mazar-e-Sharif,
a z a r - e - S h a r i f , Taliban
T a l i b a n arrested
a r r e s t e d tent e n Iranian
I r a n i a n diplomats.
d i p l o m a t s . Teh- T eh­

ran
r a n s o u g h t P a k i s t a n ’ s h e l p , a n d I s l a m a b a d t r i e d t o c o n v i n c e T a l i b a n t o h a n d over
sought Pakistan’s help, and Islamabad tried to convince Taliban to hand over
these
t h e s e diplomats
d i p l o m a t s tto o Tehran.
T e h r a n . However,
H o w e v e r , TalibanT a l i b a n claimed
c l a i m e d that t h a t tthose
h o s e diplomats
d i p l o m a t s were w e re
involved
i n v o l v e d in i n armsa r m s ttransfer
r a n s f e r to t o Tajiks
T a j i k s and and H Hizb-e-Wahdat
i z b - e - W a h d a t and and k killed
i l l e d them
th e m p publi-
u b li-
14
cally.
c a l l y .1 4 T e h r a n b l a m e d t h a t I s l a m a b a d c o u l d h a v e d o n e m u c h m o r e t h a n i t did
Tehran blamed that Islamabad could have done much more than it d i d ttoo
convince
c o n v i n c e Taliban
T a l i b a n for f o r the
t h e safety
s a f e t y of o f Iranian
I r a n i a n diplomats.
d ip lo m a ts .
The
T h e third
th ird p phase
h a s e starts
s t a r t s ffrom
r o m 20012 0 0 1 whenw hen b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s once
o n c e again
a g a i n ffound o u n d conver-
c o n v e r­
gence
g e n c e o f i n t e r e s t s . T h e A m e r i c a n i n v a s i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n a n d K h a t a m i ’ s positive
of interests. The American invasion in Afghanistan and Khatami’s p o s itiv e
response
r e s p o n s e to t o thet h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s and a n d iitst s allies
a l l i e s (including
( i n c l u d i n g Pakistan)
P a k i s t a n ) led l e d to t o diplomatic
d ip lo m a tic
reconciliation
r e c o n c ilia tio n b between
e t w e e n the t h e twot w o countries.
c o u n t r i e s . Since S i n c e then,
t h e n , despite
d e s p i t e ffears,
e a r s , reluctance,
re lu c ta n c e ,

and
a n d external
e x t e r n a l and a n d iinternal
n te r n a l p pressures,
re ssu res, b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s haveh a v e evolved
e v o l v e d their t h e i r relation-
r e la tio n ­
ship.
s h i p . M i s p e r c e p t i o n s a n d S a u d i i n f l u e n c e d o m i n a t e d t h e i n i t i a l y e a r s of
Misperceptions and Saudi influence dominated the initial years o f this
t h i s era;
e ra ;
however, both countries have gradually overcome of many
h o w e v e r , b o th c o u n trie s h a v e g r a d u a lly o v e r c o m e o f m a n y is s u e s c o n c e r n in g b issues concerning both
o th
countries’
c o u n t r i e s ’ interests
i n t e r e s t s including
i n c l u d i n g ttrade, r a d e , bborder
o r d e r security,
s e c u r i t y , and
a n d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n affairs.a f f a i r s . Once
O nce
considered
c o n s i d e r e d rival r i v a l ports,
p o r t s , Gwadar
G w a d a r and a n d Chabahar
C h a b a h a r are a r e now
n o w officially
o f f i c i a l l y sister
s iste r p ports. 15
o r t s . 1 5 Iran
Ira n
today provides electricity to many towns of Balochistan
to d a y p r o v id e s e le c tr ic ity to m a n y to w n s o f B a lo c h is ta n a lo n g its b o r d e r . along its border.
Both
B o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s are a r e now n o w engaged
e n g a g e d iinto n to a a much
m u c h more m o r e complicated
c o m p l i c a t e d relationship
r e la tio n s h ip
w h e r e e x t e r n a l p l a y e r s s u c h a s S a u d i A r a b i a a n d t h e U n i t e d States,
where external players such as Saudi Arabia and the United S t a t e s , geopolitics
g e o p o litic s
of
o f Middle
M id d le E East,
a s t , and
a n d Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n peace p e a c e process
p r o c e s s influence
i n f l u e n c e thist h i s bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relation-
r e la tio n ­
ship.
s h i p . However,
H o w e v e r , domestic
d o m e s tic p politics
o l i t i c s of
o f Iran
I r a n is i s another
a n o t h e r significant
s i g n i f i c a n t factor,
f a c t o r , which
w h i c h couldc o u ld
not get its due share while discussing Pakistan–Iran relations.
n o t g e t its d u e s h a r e w h ile d is c u s s in g P a k is ta n - I r a n r e la tio n s . D o m e s tic p o litic s Domestic politics
of
o f Iran
I r a n often
o f t e n shapes
s h a p e s thet h e regional
r e g i o n a l security
s e c u r i t y outlook
o u t l o o k and a n d directly
d i r e c t l y manages
m a n a g e s external e x te rn a l
actors’
a c t o r s ’ p e r c e p t i o n s a n d u l t i m a t e l y b e c o m e s a r e a s o n t o i m p a c t Pakistan–Iran
perceptions and ultimately becomes a reason to impact P a k ista n -Ira n
relations
r e la tio n s – - directly
d i r e c t l y and
a n d iindirectly.
n d ir e c tly .

Pakistan’s Approach to Iran Under PTI Government

The
The P PTIT I government
g o v e r n m e n t has h a s showed
show ed a a flexible
f l e x i b l e and
and b balanced
a la n c e d p position
o s i t i o n ttowards
o w a r d s the th e
bilateral relationship between Iran and Pakistan.
b ila te r a l r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n I r a n a n d P a k is ta n . T h e g o v e r n m e n t w The government wantsa n t s tto o
broaden
b r o a d e n its
i t s bbilateral
i l a t e r a l engagement
engagem ent w with
i t h Iran
I r a n tthrough
h r o u g h China-Pakistan
C h i n a - P a k i s t a n Economic
E c o n o m i c Cor- C o r­
ridor
r i d o r (CPEC)
( C P E C ) CPEC C P E C investments
i n v e s t m e n t s and a n d Afghan
A fg h a n p peace
eace p process.
ro c e ss. D During
u r i n g last
la st 2 2 yyears,
e a rs,

high-profile visits including Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit

h ig h - p r o f ile v i s it s in c lu d in g P r im e M i n is t e r I m r a n K h a n ’s v i s it to I r a n h a v e t a k e n to Iran have taken
place.
p l a c e . Imran
I m r a n Khan’s
K h a n ’s v visit
i s i t to
t o Iran
I r a n and
a n d subsequent
s u b s e q u e n t policies
p o l i c i e s have
h a v e prioritized
p r i o r i t i z e d Paki-
P a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s r e l a t i o n s h i p t h r o u g h t w o - p r o n g s t r a t e g y . F i r s t , t h e g o v e r n m e n t does
relationship through two-prong strategy. First, the government d o e s not not
want
w a n t to
to w witness
i t n e s s active
a c t i v e conflicts
c o n f lic ts b between
e t w e e n Iran I r a n and
a n d Saudi
S a u d i Arabia.
A r a b i a . In I n tthis
h i s regard,
re g a rd ,
PM
P M KhanK h a n considers
c o n s i d e r s thatth a t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n can
can p play
l a y ana n active
a c t i v e role
r o l e ofo f mediator
m e d ia to r b between
e t w e e n tthe he
t w o c o u n t r i e s . T h e g o v e r n m e n t b e l i e v e s t h a t c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s is
two countries. The government believes that conflict between the two countries is
16
complex,
c o m p le x , b butu t it i t can
c a n bbe e resolved
r e s o l v e d through
t h r o u g h dialogues.
d i a l o g u e s .1 6 Iran
I r a n ttoo
o o considers
c o n s i d e r s it i t impor-
im p o r­
ttant
a n t tthat
hat P Pakistan
a k i s t a n may m a y kkeep e e p assuming
a s s u m i n g the t h e role
r o l e asas a a mediator
m e d i a t o r during
d u r i n g any
a n y conflict
c o n f lic t
b e t w e e n t h e t w o M i d d l e E a s t e r n r i v a l s ; h o w e v e r , S a u d i A r a b i a h a s a l w a y s shown
between the two Middle Eastern rivals; however, Saudi Arabia has always show n
uunwillingness
n w i l l i n g n e s s to t o accept
a c c e p t Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s mediatory
m e d i a t o r y role r o l e in
i n any
a n y Persian
P e r s i a n Gulf
G u l f conflict.
17
c o n f l i c t . 1 7 KJIHGFEDCBA
146 Khurram Abbas
It
I t seems
s e e m s that t h a t thet h e PTI P T I government
g o v e rn m e n t w will i l l likely
l i k e l y tot o continue
c o n t i n u e this th is p policy
o l i c y of o f medi-
m e d i­
ation
a tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o c o u n tr ie s , w h ic h w ill g a in I r a n ia n a p p r e c ia tio n , a
between the two countries, which will gain Iranian appreciation, a good
good
sign
s i g n ffor o r the
t h e bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship.
r e l a t i o n s h i p . Overall,
O v e r a l l , theret h e r e isi s consensus
c o n s e n s u s within w i t h i n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n that
th a t

materializing the (CPEC) dream into reality can only

m a te ria liz in g th e ( C P E C ) d r e a m in to r e a lity c a n o n ly b e p o s s ib le th r o u g h f r ie n d ly be possible through friendly
relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p with w i t h Iran.
I r a n . Therefore,
T h e re fo re , a a friendly
f r i e n d l y Iran I r a n has
h a s bbecome
e c o m e an a n utmost
u t m o s t priority
p r io r ity

for Pakistani government in order to minimize any

f o r P a k is ta n i g o v e r n m e n t in o r d e r to m in im iz e a n y n e g a tiv e im p a c t o f g e o p o li­ negative impact of geopoli-
18
tics
t i c s and
a n d major
m a j o r powers’
p o w e r s ’ ingressi n g r e s s in i n ttheh e region.
r e g i o n . 1 8 The T h e recent
re c e n t v visit
i s i t of
o f Iranian
I r a n i a n Foreign
F o r e ig n
Minister
M i n i s t e r J a w a d Z a r i f t o P a k i s t a n a f t e r U S P r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s s u g g e s t s that
Jawad Zarif to Pakistan after US Presidential elections suggests t h a t Iran
Ira n
too
t o o considers
c o n s id e rs P Pakistan
a k i s t a n as a s ana n important
i m p o r t a n t country
c o u n t r y and a n d as a s oneo n e of o f thet h e major
m a j o r players
p l a y e r s in
in
power
p o w e r and a n d geopolitics
g e o p o l i t i c s of o f ttheh e region.
re g io n .
However,
H o w e v e r , the th e b bilateral
i l a t e r a l relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p will w i l l not n o t remain
r e m a i n limited
l i m i t e d to t o thet h e mediatory
m e d ia to ry
role
r o l e o f P a k i s t a n i n P e r s i a n G u l f c o n f l i c t s . T h e P M K h a n ’ s v i s i t h a s articulated
of Pakistan in Persian Gulf conflicts. The PM Khan’s visit has a r tic u la te d
Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s desire d e s i r e to t o engage
e n g a g e Iran I r a n through
t h r o u g h the t h e development
d e v e l o p m e n t of o f economic
e c o n o m i c partner- p a r tn e r ­
ship.
s h i p . T h i s e a g e r n e s s i s p r i m a r i l y f o c u s e d o n t h e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of
This eagerness is primarily focused on the economic development of b border
o rd e r
areas of both sides. For this purpose, the government
a r e a s o f b o th s id e s . F o r th is p u r p o s e , th e g o v e r n m e n t h a s ta k e n m a n y p o s itiv e has taken many positive
initiatives
i n i t i a t i v e s tto o uplift
u p l i f t tthe h e existing
e x is tin g b business
u s i n e s s and a n d economic
e c o n o m i c environment
e n v i r o n m e n t of o f the
th e b border
o rd e r
region.
re g io n . F First,
i r s t , the
t h e government
g o v e r n m e n t has h a s set set u up p 18 1 8 newn e w markets
m a r k e t s along a l o n g Iran–Afghanistan
Ira n -A fg h a n ista n
19
border
b o r d e r to t o facilitate
f a c i l i t a t e trade
t r a d e activities
a c t i v i t i e s in i n tthe
h e region.
r e g io n .19 L Likewise,
ik e w is e , b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s havehave
increased
i n c r e a s e d w o r k i n g h o u r s o f b o r d e r c r o s s i n g s , a n d a n e m p h a s i s o n jjoint
working hours of border crossings, and an emphasis on o i n t vventures
e n tu re s
has
has b become
ecom e a a new
n e w norm n o r m at a t tthe
h e bborder
o r d e r areas.
a r e a s . ThisT h i s ttrend
r e n d hash a s started
s t a r t e d facilitating
f a c i l i t a t i n g local
lo c a l
inhabitants of both
in h a b ita n ts o f b o th s id e s . sides.
Further,
F u r t h e r , Border
B o r d e r Trade T r a d e Committees
C o m m i t t e e s (BTCs) ( B T C s ) of o f Iran
I r a n and
and P Pakistan
a k i s t a n are a r e now
n o w meet-m e e t­
20
ing
i n g o n a r e g u l a r b a s i s , 2 0 w h i c h i s e s s e n t i a l f o r c u r b i n g r e d t a p e c u l t u r e a n d for
on a regular basis, which is essential for curbing red tape culture and f o r the
th e
improvement
i m p r o v e m e n t of o f bbilateral
i l a t e r a l trade.
tra d e . M Moreover,
o r e o v e r , the t h e PTI
P T I government
g o v e r n m e n t has has b been
e e n develop-
d e v e lo p ­
ing
in g a a mechanism
m e c h a n i s m to t o cease
c e a s e diesel
d i e s e l smuggling
s m u g g l i n g from f r o m IranI r a n to to P Pakistan
a k i s t a n at a t theth e b border
o rd er
region
r e g i o n in in B Balochistan
a l o c h i s t a n province.
p r o v i n c e . In I n this
t h i s context,
c o n t e x t , theth e P Prime
r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r of of P Pakistan
a k ista n
Imran
I m r a n Khan K h a n has h a s approved
a p p ro v e d a a comprehensive
c o m p r e h e n s i v e action a c tio n p plan,
la n , w whichh i c h willw i l l curb
c u r b ttheh e smug-
sm ug­
gling
g l i n g at at P Pakistan–Iran
a k i s t a n - I r a n bborder o r d e r region.
r e g i o n . TheT h e losses
l o s s e s incurred
i n c u r r e d tto o Pakistan
P a k i s t a n due d u e to t o smug-
sm ug­
gling are estimated between Rs 100 billion and
g lin g a r e e s tim a te d b e tw e e n R s 1 0 0 b illio n a n d R s 1 5 0 b illio n b y th e F e d e r a l Rs 150 billion by the Federal
21
Board
B o a r d of o f Revenue.
R e v e n u e .2 1 If I f this
t h i s ttrade
r a d e is i s channelized,
c h a n n e l i z e d , the th e b bilateral
i l a t e r a l trade
tra d e w would
o u l d substan-
s u b s ta n ­
tially improve in the
tia lly im p r o v e in th e n e a r f u tu r e . near future.

Future of Pakistan–Iran
Pakistan-Iran Relations under Conservative
Government of Iran

Likely Stressed Regional Environment and Pakistan-Iran

Pakistan–Iran Relations
According
A c c o r d i n g to t o Ansari,
A n s a r i , tthe h e conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e governments
g o v e r n m e n t s of o f Iran
I r a n have
h a v e tthree
h r e e major
m a j o r com-
com ­
ponents
p o n e n t s o f g o v e r n a n c e - t h a t i s p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c p o p u l i s m , r e p r e s s i o n , and
of governance – that is political and economic populism, repression, and
22
the
t h e sustenance
s u s t e n a n c e of o f crisis
c r i s i s in
i n fforeign
o r e i g n relations.
r e la tio n s .2 2 P Perhaps
e r h a p s ttheh e crisis
c r i s i s in
i n foreign
f o r e i g n rela-
r e la ­
tions
t i o n s politically
p o l i t i c a l l y serves
s e r v e s the t h e interests
i n t e r e s t s ofo f conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e governments.
g o v e r n m e n t s . The T h e influence
in f lu e n c e
of
o f t h i s c r i s i s c o u l d a f f e c t r e g i o n a l o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t . Their
this crisis could affect regional or international security environment. T h e ir
overwhelming
o v e r w h e l m i n g reliancer e l i a n c e on o n thet h e populist
p o p u l i s t slogans
s l o g a n s such
s u c h as a s over-projection
o v e r - p r o j e c t i o n ofo f Ira-
Ira­
nian
n i a n dominance
d o m i n a n c e iin n thet h e region,
r e g i o n , overtly
o v e r t l y supporting
s u p p o r t i n g militant
m i l i t a n t religious
r e l i g i o u s groups,
g r o u p s , and
and
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 147
threatening regional countries especially Israel lead to unstable foreign relations
and stressed regional security environment.
Another reason of stressed regional security environment is the cultivation of
identity politics at state level. The conservative governments of Iran often tried
to inject superiority complex in the Iranian nation and created a divide between
Iran and the rest of Middle Eastern nations.23 This identity or civilizational supe-
riority complex trickles down hatred to the people-to-people level, and between
regional countries and Iran. This instability, hatred, and hostility in Middle East
directly affect Pakistan–Iran relations due to Islamabad’s close coordination and
cooperation with Arab countries. Resultantly, Pakistan faces a serious problem
of justifying its relations with Iran at home and in the Arab world. Therefore, a
cautious approach of Islamabad is more likely needed to deal with a conservative
government during the next term of conservative parliament. There is a consen-
sus in Islamabad’s policymaking circles that Pakistan will play its role only as a
mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts.
Pakistan has multiple interests to mediate between Iran and GCC states. It has
strong economic and defence relations with GCC states, particularly with KSA,
the UAE, and Bahrain. Because of having a large diaspora in these countries,
Pakistan’s economy is dependent on foreign remittances coming from the Gulf
region. At the same time, it does not want to harm its relations with its important
neighbor Iran. Since the 1980s, Pakistan has been a victim of sectarian violence
which had reached its peak in the 1990s. During 1989–2018, there were 3,072
incidents of sectarian violence that led to 5,602 casualties in Pakistan. While
Iran has successfully spread its tentacles in the Middle East in the shape of ter-
rorist proxies, it has also been able to create similar terrorist paraphernalia in
the Afghanistan–Pakistan (Af–Pak) region in the shape of two battle-hardened
groups – the Liwa Fatemiyoun (Arabic for Fatemiyoun Brigade) and the Liwa
Zainebiyoun (Arabic for Zainebiyoun Brigade). Both the groups have fought in
the Syrian theatre against the anti-Baathist regime factions and Sunni militant
groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh.
The exact date of the formation of Liwa Zainebiyoun is not known. However,
the militant group came to the limelight in early 2015. The group mainly com-
prises recruits from the Pakistani Shias – mainly from the Turi and Bangash tribes
of Kurram tribal district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP), as well as from
other parts of Pakistan, mainly from urban cities of Quetta (Hazara population
of Balochistan Province), Karachi and Hyderabad (Sindh province), and Pun-
jab Province. Before the formation of the Liwa Zainebiyoun, its members were
fighting under the banner of Liwa Fatemiyoun which mainly comprised Afghan
nationals. In a Fatwa, Irani Shia Cleric (living in Iraq) Ayatollah Ali Sistani said
that fighting against Daesh (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq is compulsory for all his fol-
lowers. In response, these fighters volunteered themselves for fighting against
Daesh. Hence, Iran has the capacity to lure in thousands of Shias to work accord-
ing to its political objectives. The last point to be noted is that what Islamabad
does not want more trouble at home as it has already been facing terrorist attacks
148 Khurram Abbas
in various part of the country since 2002. Islamabad understands that any trou-
bles in relations with Iran may fuel sectarian violence in Pakistan. The current
government in Islamabad has been concerned about the domestic fallout of the
Iranian–Saudi conflict in the Middle East. The Pakistani authorities have already
been not only concerned but also have taken serious actions at home in relation
to Pakistani Shi’a pilgrims returning from Iran, Iraq, and Syria as there have been
reports of Iran recruiting Afghan and Pakistani Shi’as into its military brigades to
support the Assad regime in Syria.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been a strong supporter of pan-Islamism,
and therefore it does not suit its foreign policy to not do anything in terms of fis-
sures within the Ummah. While Pakistan has a foreign policy tilt towards Saudi
Arabia, it still wants to have a balance in terms of its relations with Iran and Saudi
Arabia. A part and parcel of this approach is to act in accordance with its interests,
for example through efforts to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 2019,
Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan visited Iran and Saudi Arabia with the
key agenda of acting as a mediator to resolve the growing differences between
Iran and Saudi Arabia. In August 2020, Khan claimed that his mediation between
Tehran and Riyadh ‘played an important role in defusing tensions between arch-
foes Saudi Arabia and Iran.’ However, Pakistan’s ability to act as a mediator might
be harmed if rifts of Tehran with Saudi Arabia and the UAE grow under the new
conservative administration.

The Sectarian Support by Conservative Governments and Sectarian

Tensions in Pakistan
One of the major concerns of Pakistan in recent years from Iran has emerged when
Iran recruited Pakistani youth to fight in Syrian civil war. This recruitment, train-
ing, and funding process by IRGC is a practical manifestation of Iranian influence
on Pakistani society. Iran has been pursuing robust strategies of enhancing its soft
power in South and Central Asia mainly focusing on Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Scholars argue that Iran has been pursuing largely three types of soft power strat-
egies to influence societies in South and Central Asia.24 First, Iran’s pre-Islamic
cultural and civilizational heritage including language, arts, and culture has been
widely used by its embassies to influence larger segments of societies. Second,
Iran influences societies through overtly and covertly empowering Shia commu-
nities in South and Central Asia. Third, Iran’s anti-Western and anti-American
outlook also fascinates many in South and Central Asian societies.25 The accumu-
lating impact of these three elements helps Iran to influence cultural and social
policies of other countries.
The moderates usually remain reluctant to outrightly support such activities in
the region. For instance IRGC faced strong resistance during Rouhani’s admin-
istration for its overseas soft power operations. Many leading figures includ-
ing Foreign Minister Javad Zarif were critical to IRGC’s overwhelming role in
the foreign policy of Iran.26 However, with conservatives in power, it is highly
likely that IRGC may find like-minded people in Iranian parliament and Raisi’s
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 149
administration who would support and may further expand IRGC’s activities for
cultural and social perception management in Iran’s periphery. A recent study
reveals that in past, the empowering of Pakistani Shia community by Iran has
led to sectarian tensions in the country.27 From 1980s to early 2000s, Pakistan
has faced the brunt of sectarian violence with over 2,000 killings, which resulted
into a tarnishing of the social fabric of the country.28 Therefore, Pakistan does not
want another wave of sectarian conflict in the country. This is why it has remained
neutral in Yemen’s conflict and tried to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia
during their tensions in 2016 after the killing of a prominent Saudi Shia cleric
Nirm-al Nimr.29
Hence, the outright support of Iran’s hardliners for Shia community of Pakistan
may disturb the equilibrium that has been created by Pakistan in the last one dec-
ade. This means that Pakistan will be forced to take various measures to protect
its social fabric such as by distancing itself from Iran, revisiting its policy of neu-
trality in Middle Eastern conflicts, and limiting its interaction with Iran at cultural
and people-to-people level. Therefore, the policy approach of hardliners towards
Shia community of Pakistan, especially Hazaras, will largely determine the future
outlook of Iran–Pakistan bilateral relationship.

Nuclear Issue and Pakistan-Iran

Pakistan–Iran RelationsZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Relations
After
A f t e r President
P r e s id e n t H Hassan
a s s a n Rouhani’s
R o u h a n i ’ s extraordinary
e x t r a o r d i n a r y achievement
a c h i e v e m e n t of o f improvement
im p ro v e m e n t
in
i n f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , t h e e v e n t o f t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e J C P O A i n 2 0 1 5 took
foreign relations, the event of the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 t o o k place.
p la c e .
The
T h e J C P O A h a d s i g n a l e d o f d e v e l o p i n g p o t e n t i a l l y n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p bbetween
JCPOA had signaled of developing potentially normal relationship e tw e e n
Iran
I r a n and a n d the t h e West.
W e st. H However,
o w e v e r , Trump’s
T r u m p ’ s unilateral
u n ila te r a l w withdrawal
i t h d r a w a l legitimized
l e g i t i m i z e d con- con­
servatives’
s e r v a t i v e s ’ n a r r a t i v e w i t h i n I r a n t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a n u n r e l i a b l e country
narrative within Iran that the United States is an unreliable c o u n t r y ttoo
negotiate
n e g o t i a t e and a n d tot o sign
s i g n anya n y agreement
a g r e e m e n t in i n future
f u t u r e would
w o u l d bbe e like
lik e a a bbetrayal
e t r a y a l to t o Iranian
Ira n ia n
30
national
n a t i o n a l integrity.
i n t e g r i t y .3 0 Keeping
K e e p i n g in i n vviewi e w tthe h e nuclear
n u c l e a r issue,
i s s u e , it i t seems
s e e m s highly
h i g h l y likely
l i k e l y tthat
hat
the nuclear controversy will further aggravate during the
th e n u c le a r c o n tr o v e r s y w ill f u r th e r a g g r a v a te d u r in g th e te n u r e o f c o n s e r v a tiv e tenure of conservative
administration
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in i n Iran.
I r a n . The
T h e direct
d i r e c t result
r e s u l t might
m i g h t bbe e economic
e c o n o m i c sanctions
s a n c t i o n s and a n d rising
ris in g
t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n I r a n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . R e s u l t a n t l y , P a k i s t a n ’ s economic
tensions between Iran and the United States. Resultantly, Pakistan’s e c o n o m ic
cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n will w i l l remain
r e m a i n limited
l i m i t e d anda n d to t o some
s o m e extent
e x t e n t would
w o u l d lead l e a d tot o negative
n e g a t i v e growth
g ro w th
amid
a m i d a b l e a k r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n v i r o n m e n t d u e t o a f o r e m e n t i o n e d ffactors.
a bleak regional security environment due to aforementioned a c to r s .
The
T h e nuclear
n u c l e a r dimension
d i m e n s i o n of o f Pakistan–Iran
P a k i s t a n - I r a n relations
r e l a t i o n s iis s also
a l s o not n o t pleasant
p l e a s a n t asas
it
i t s h o u l d b e . P a k i s t a n o f t e n r e m a i n e d c a r e f u l w h i l e d e a l i n g w i t h I r a n over
should be. Pakistan often remained careful while dealing with Iran o v e r its
its
alleged
a l l e g e d nuclear
n u c le a r p programme.
r o g r a m m e . Dr D r Abdul
A b d u l Qadeer
Q adeer K Khan’s
h a n ’ s controversy
c o n t r o v e r s y ffurther
u r t h e r lim-
lim ­
31
ited options for Pakistan on the issue. Since the emergence
ite d o p tio n s f o r P a k is ta n o n th e is s u e .31 S in c e th e e m e r g e n c e o f th e c o n tr o v e r s y , of the controversy,
PPakistan
a k i s t a n often
o f t e n supported
s u p p o rte d a a peaceful
p e a c e fu l u uses e of o f nuclear
n u c l e a r energy
e n e r g y (in (in a a covert
c o v e r t manner
m anner
criticized
c r i t i c i z e d t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s b y I r a n ) a n d r e m a i n e d cautious
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran) and remained c a u t i o u s overover
ttime.
i m e . The T h e Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s security
s e c u r i t y ffraternity
r a t e r n i t y bbelieves
e l i e v e s that
th a t a a nuclear-armed
n u c l e a r - a r m e d Iran I r a n might
m ig h t
32
ppose
ose a a p potential
o t e n t i a l threat
t h r e a t toto P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s interests.
in te r e s ts .32 F Foro r instance,
i n s t a n c e , on o n 20 2 0 June
J u n e 2020,
2 0 2 0 , the
th e
International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A t o m i c E n e r g y A g e n c y ( I A E A ) p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n c r i t i c a l to
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution critical t o Ira-
Ira -
nian
m a n nuclear
n u c le a r p programme.
ro g ra m m e . P Pakistan
a k i s t a n along
a lo n g w withi t h other
o t h e r sixs i x countries
c o u n t r i e s including
i n c l u d i n g SouthS o u th
Africa,
A f r i c a , I n d i a , T h a i l a n d , M o n g o l i a , A z e r b a i j a n , a n d N i g e r a b s t a i n e d d u r i n g the
India, Thailand, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, and Niger abstained during th e
voting.
v o tin g . P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’s noncooperation
n o n c o o p e r a t i o n and a n d silence
s i l e n c e often
o f t e n leave
l e a v e negative
n e g a tiv e v vibes
ib e s w within
ith in
150
150 Khurram
KJIHGFEDCBA
K h u r r a m AAbbas
bbas

33
Iranian
I r a n i a n academic
a c a d e m i c and
a n d policymaking
p o l i c y m a k i n g circles.
c i r c l e s . 3 3 The
T h e soft
s o f t approach
a p p r o a c h of
o f moderates
m o d e r a t e s on
on
nuclear
n u c l e a r i s s u e a n d J C P O A h a d m a d e P a k i s t a n ’ s d i p l o m a c y e a s i e r . I s l a m a b a d was
issue and JCPOA had made Pakistan’s diplomacy easier. Islamabad w as
happy
h a p p y tto o deal
d e a l with
w ith a a lesser
l e s s e r sanctioned
s a n c t i o n e d and
a n d non-nuclear
n o n - n u c l e a r Iran. However,
Ira n . H o w e v e r , the
t h e end
e n d of
of
JCPOA and likely revival of Iran’s uranium enrichment might make
J C P O A a n d l i k e l y r e v i v a l o f I r a n ’s u r a n i u m e n r i c h m e n t m i g h t m a k e P a k i s t a n ’s Pakistan’s
diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c jjob
o b ttougher
o u g h e r during
d u r i n g conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e administration
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in
i n power.
p o w e r.

Iran-Pakistan Economic Relations

Iran–Pakistan
The
T h e geopolitical
g e o p o l i t i c a l environment
e n v i r o m n e n t and a n d suspicion
s u s p i c i o n overo v e r intentions
i n t e n t i o n s directly
d i r e c t l y affect
a f f e c t ttrade
ra d e
and
a n d m e r c a n t i l e r e l a t i o n s . T h e f e a r o f u n s t a b l e a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e p o l i t i c a l environ-
mercantile relations. The fear of unstable and unpredictable political e n v iro n ­
ment
m e n t negatively
n e g a t i v e l y affects
a f f e c t s tthe
he F Foreign
o r e i g n Direct
D i r e c t Investment
I n v e s t m e n t (FDI)
( F D I ) and
a n d bbilateral
i l a t e r a l trade.
tra d e .
The
T h e e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e o f b i l a t e r a l t r a d e b e t w e e n I r a n a n d P a k i s t a n suggests
empirical evidence of bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan s u g g e s t s tthat
hat
trade
t r a d e relations
r e l a t i o n s often
o f t e n witnessed
w itn e s se d a a drastic
d r a s t i c dip
d i p during
d u r i n g ttheh e conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e governments.
g o v e rm n e n ts.
A
A comparative
c o m p a r a t i v e chartc h a r t ofo f ttrade
r a d e vvolume
o l u m e bbetweene t w e e n IranI r a n and
a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n during
d u r i n g the t h e ttwo
wo
governments of different political ideologies is given
g o v e r m n e n ts o f d if f e r e n t p o litic a l id e o lo g ie s is g iv e n in F ig u r e 9 .1 . in Figure 9.1.
Pakistan–Iran
P a k i s t a n - I r a n economic
e c o n o m i c relations
r e l a t i o n s have
h a v e bbeen e e n underutilized
u n d e r u t i l i z e d ffor
o r decades.
d e c a d e s . Though
Though
the
t i r e t w o c o u n t r i e s s i g n e d P r e f e r e n t i a l T r a d e A g r e e m e n t ( P T A ) i n 2 0 0 4 , however,
two countries signed Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) in 2004, h o w e v e r , tthish is
agreement
a g r e e m e n t could c o u l d notn o t bbe e translated
t r a n s l a t e d into i n t o increased
in c re a se d v volume
o l u m e of o f trade
t r a d e bbetweene tw e e n
the
t h e twot w o countries.
c o u n t r i e s . In
In p past
a s t 161 6 yyears,
e a r s , the
t h e twot w o countries
c o u n t r i e s could
c o u l d not
n o t convert
c o n v e rt P PTAT A into
in to
34
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) mainly because of Iranian protectionist
F r e e T r a d e A g r e e m e n t ( F T A ) m a i n l y b e c a u s e o f I r a n i a n p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s .3 4 policies.
The overall trade figures suggest that the volume of bilateral trade
T h e o v e r a ll tr a d e f ig u r e s s u g g e s t th a t th e v o lu m e o f b ila te r a l tr a d e r e d u c e s s ig n if i­ reduces signifi-
cantly
c a n t l y during
d u r i n g ttheh e conservative
c o n s e r v a t i v e governments.
g o v e r m n e n t s . This T h i s isi s mainly
m a i n l y bbecause
e c a u s e of o f tthe
h e impo-
im p o ­
sition
s i t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n s , w h i c h d o e s n o t a l l o w I r a n i a n b a n k s t o i s s u e letter
of international sanctions, which does not allow Iranian banks to issue le tte r

.= - - - - - C o n s e r v a t i v e s

- - - - - - M o d e r a te s

2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19

Figure
F i g u r e 9.1 A BBrief
9 .1 A r i e f Comparison
C o m p a r i s o n of
o f Pakistan–Iran
P a k i s t a n - I r a n Trade
T r a d e During
D u r i n g Conservative
C o n s e r v a t i v e and
a n d Moder-
M o d e r­
ates’
a t e s ’ Era
E r a (USD
( U S D in Million)
in M illio n )

Source:
S o u r c e : Compiled
C o m p i l e d by
b y tthe
h e author
a u t h o r based
b a s e d on
o n annual
a n n u a l rreports
e p o r t s of
o f Pakistan
P a k i s t a n Bureau
B u r e a u of
o f Statistics
S t a t is t i c s (PBS)
(P B S )
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 151
of credit. Pakistani officials are highly careful while dealing with economically
sanctioned Iran. Former diplomats have consensus that economic sanctions are
the major impediment in bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan.35 The Iranian
perspective is that Pakistan can avoid economic sanctions through developing
alternative channels as India and China have developed alternative channels to
bypass American economic sanctions and carrying out business with Iran. In this
context, Pakistan needs to develop alternative transaction channels such as barter
system to improve bilateral trade between the two countries. It is interesting to
note that Iranian government has shared names of five Iranian banks with Foreign
Office of Pakistan, which do not fall under American sanctions.36 However, Paki-
stan is not willing to pursue trade through those banks due to the likely pressure
of the United States and Saudi Arabia.37
The international sanctions on Iran have become a permanent feature. There are
many other structural issues that limit Pakistan–Iran trade. The foremost reason is
that Iran’s economy is a mixture of central planning, state ownership of oil, and
other large enterprises as well as small-scale private trading and service ventures.
Iran’s economy is more inward looking, and conservative governments owing to
international sanctions often follow highly protectionist policies.38 The textile and
furniture industries face severe restrictive trade policies, which creates difficulties
for Pakistani traders to compete in Iranian market. These import duties range from
100 percent to 150 percent on various Pakistan products.39
During conservative government, the Iranian economic system becomes highly
bureaucratic. This adds further difficulties for Pakistani traders. Frequent change
in rules and regulations without prior notification also discourages the proper func-
tioning of business environment. This practice was frequent during Ahmadinejad’s
era due to regional tensions and internal political turmoil.40 However, Rouhani
administration lately discouraged this practice.41 If the new conservative admin-
istration restarts this practice, it would be detrimental to Pakistan–Iran economic
cooperation. Further, the uncertainty in geopolitics also negatively affects bilat-
eral trade. The stark difference between economic achievements of Ahmadine-
jad and Rouhani administrations’ is primarily due to Rouhani’s engagement with
Obama administration that led to JCPOA and lifting of economic sanctions on
Iran. That engagement also established an environment favorable to business and
trade. A repeat telecast of conservative government’s furious statements and vola-
tile geopolitical situation may likely discourage Pakistani businessmen to invest
and trade with Iran.
Smuggling is also one of the biggest hurdles in the expansion of regular bilat-
eral trade. The main items smuggled from Iran to Pakistan include oil, chemicals,
petroleum products, cement, tiles etc. while from Pakistan the smuggled items
include rice, fruit, livestock, surgical and sports goods, and garments and tex-
tiles.42 However, smuggling cannot be attributed to any particular government in
Iran. Reportedly, it is often associated to military institutions. The IRGC is alleg-
edly involved in drug smuggling through Nimroz province.43 Such activities often
reduce possibilities of expansion of regular trade volume. However, time will
judge whether conservative government will strive for curbing this practice or not.
152 Khurram Abbas
Further, Iran–Pakistan (IP) Gas Pipeline will be a test case for both govern-
ments in future. Pakistan believes that economic sanctions are major impediments
in the materializing of the project. Despite extensive efforts, Pakistan has been
able to secure funding for the project. After passing of JCPOA, Pakistan actively
sought funding for this project, and initially Asian Development Bank (ADB)
agreed to fund the project; however, owing to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from
nuclear agreement and subsequent series of conflicts, the process has once again
been stalled. Iran has completed its part of project, while Pakistan’s part remains
incomplete. According to Gas Sales Purchase Agreement (GSPA) of 1995, Paki-
stan is bound to pay USD 1 million per day from January 2015 onwards as per
penalty clause of the agreement. So far, Iran has cooperated with Pakistan and
extended the deadline of the project multiple times. However, Tehran served a
legal notice to Pakistan last year on moving to arbitration court.44 There is strong
point of view within Iranian official and academic community that further delay
in the completion of IP gas pipeline project might irk Iranian authorities in future
and might become a source of tension between the two governments.45

Some Glimpses of Hope

Counterweight Policy of Conservatives

One cannot rule out the optimism in Pakistan–Iran relations under a conserva-
tive administration. It has been observed that the conservatives often consider
South and Central Asia as a counterweight to their fractured relationship with
Middle East. Iran often tried to minimize pressure of Gulf countries in Middle
East through active cooperation with South and Central Asian countries. This has
been proved during Ahmadinejad’s tenure who sought active cooperation with
South Asia. He not only visited India and Pakistan, but also pursued Iran–Pakistan
gas pipeline. Former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari inaugurated the IP gas
pipeline during his visit to Tehran.46 However, it will be highly challenging for
Islamabad to develop closer cooperation with Iran amid Tehran’s stressed rela-
tionship with Arab countries.

Likely Support on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute

Likewise, there’s expectation that keeping in view Islamist leanings and popu-
list sloganeering, the conservative government of Iran might be more vocal on
Jammu and Kashmir dispute. This has been evident from Supreme Leader of
Iran Ayatollah Khamenei’s recent statements that overtly criticized human rights
violations against Kashmiri Muslims by India.47 Majority of conservatives follow
Supreme Leader’s statements while formulating their foreign policy priorities.
The former diplomats are also authenticating that during their diplomatic over-
tures, they found conservatives more inclined towards Pakistan’s stance on Jammu
and Kashmir dispute as compared to moderate governments.48 Furthermore, the
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 153
Indian tilt towards the United States has irked Iranian authorities.49 The Iranian
perspective is that India has changed its strategy in Himalaya region (reference to
China) owing to fulfill American strategic objectives.50 Therefore, a robust criti-
cism of Indian human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir and frequent state-
ments in this regard are more likely expected from the conservative government
of Iran in future. If so happens, Tehran–Islamabad relations will likely witness
an uptrend.

The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Intra-Afghan

Peace Process
Afghanistan has remained one of the serious bones of contentions between Paki-
stan and Iran. Both countries were supporting the opposing fractions of Afghani-
stan during 1990s. The Afghan infighting converted into a greater proxy war
between Iran and Pakistan. Afghan Sunni groups were financially and militar-
ily backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while Hizb-e-Wahdat and Tajiks were
backed by Iran.51 Due to this proxy war, both countries witnessed a dip in their
relationship. However, the post-9/11 developments and death of Mullah Omar
(former Commander of Taliban) led to a change of geopolitical realities of the
region. Iran changed its approach and attitude towards Taliban. In fact, Qatar bro-
kered a détente between Iran and Taliban through latter’s presence in Doha.52
Tehran’s engagement with Taliban led to a convergence of interests between Iran
and Pakistan. The basic contentious issue between Iran and Taliban was sectarian
hatred.53 Historically, Saudi Arabia through its extravagant funding and export of
ideology further aggravated this sectarian hatred. However, the working relation-
ship and rapprochement between Taliban and Iran substantially developed during
Rouhani’s era. This is mainly because Rouhani administration had reduced sectar-
ian hatred and followed pragmatic policy.
As of now, Tehran’s apparent strategy seems to witness a complete US with-
drawal from Afghanistan. Taliban–US Peace Agreement and Trump’s approach
of lesser overseas commitment might materialize Tehran’s desire into reality.
On intra-Afghan peace process, Iran and Pakistan both share similar objectives
with almost identical approaches. In fact, Tehran appreciates Pakistan’s efforts
of facilitation of negotiation process between Afghan factions.54 Thanks to Iran–
Taliban normal working relationship, Tehran has no issue if Taliban shares power
with Kabul.55 Iran has been supportive of the intra-Afghan peace process and
would support any outcome that would satisfy all factions of Afghanistan.56 How-
ever, if new conservative government, as happened in the past, starts supporting
Hazaras and Tajiks in Afghanistan based on their sectarian leanings, it would
be hard to control another conflict between Taliban and Iran, ultimately danger-
ous to Afghan peace and detrimental to Pakistan–Iran relationship.57 Therefore,
the new government in Iran would have to be careful while shaping its foreign
policy towards Afghanistan, and sectarian tendencies should not be reflected in
its approaches.
154 Khurram Abbas
China–Iran Strategic Agreement
China–Iran strategic deal might be another source of confluence between Iran–
Pakistan relations in near future. The proposed Beijing–Tehran agreement com-
prising US$400 billion and spanning over 25 years might be a game changer for
the regional security and development. The general atmosphere in Islamabad is
largely supportive to this agreement as it has been perceived that India might be
sidelined in the region.58 It was Islamabad’s longstanding concern that India has
been using Iranian soil to sabotage Pakistan’s strategic interests in Balochistan.
The arrest of Indian Navy Commander Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadhav, who was trav-
elling in Pakistan’s Balochistan through Iran, has further coagulated Pakistan’s
concerns. However, New Delhi cannot be sidelined easily. According to Dr Zahid
Shahab Ahmad, India won’t give Chabahar easily to China owing to the fact that
both Iran and India are strategic partners and remained considerably engaged at
multiple forums.59 In fact, Tehran–New Delhi’s strategic cooperation and interests
in Afghanistan are aligned to each other’s strategic objectives. Therefore, New
Delhi’s expulsion from Iran might not be possible in near foreseeable future.
The Iranian leanings towards Russia and China are often hailed by Pakistani
academia and public due to Iranian resistance against status quo.60 However, there
are skeptics to this deal who believe that Pakistan might be forced by its Arab
friends to stay away from China–Iran deal, which is difficult for Pakistan given its
strategic, economic, and political relations with China.61 This skepticism is based
on the strategic dimension of the agreement between China and Iran. The greater
military cooperation, joint military exercises, joint weapons’ development, and
robust economic investments would bolster Iranian military strength, which is
detrimental to Saudi-led Arab countries’ interests in the region. This situation
might create further insecurity which might lead to greater realignments and arms
race in the region. Pakistan often paid heavy cost of Saudi-led Arab countries’
insecurities against Iran. The basic problem with Pakistan’s foreign policy is that
it is primarily guided with two basic factors, that is money and security. Without
money, Islamabad cannot secure better and expansive security deals to strengthen
its conventional military muscle. Therefore, the money (in terms of loans and
aids) remains a pivotal discussion point during internal meetings on foreign policy
issues within civil and military leaderships.62

Pakistan’s Desire for Robust Security Cooperation with Iran

Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh has sparked a
new debate within Islamabad regarding enhanced security cooperation with Iran.
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is widely referred to Iran’s Robert Oppenheimer due to ser-
vices rendered by him for nuclear program of Iran.63 This is a major psychological
and professional blow to alleged Iranian nuclear program. It has been a declared
strategy of Mossad to kill Iranian nuclear scientists so that the Iranian nuclear
programme could be delayed. This strategy has intensified recently, which means
Israel has been able to develop a subversive Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
 IIran
r a n and Future
and F u t u r e of Pakistan–Iran
o fP Relations
a k ista n -Ir a n R e la tio n s 155
155

network
n e t w o r k deep d e e p inside
i n s i d e Iran.I r a n . TheT h e establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of H HUMINT
U M I N T network n e t w o r k in i n Iran
I r a n is
i s an
an
extraordinary
e x t r a o r d i n a r y success
s u c c e s s story s t o r y of of M Mossad.
o ssad .
Netanyahu’s
N e t a n y a h u ’ s secret se cre t v visit
i s i t to
t o Saudi
S a u d i Arabia
A r a b ia w was a s not
n o t solely
s o l e l y forf o r theth e p purpose
u r p o s e to t o con-
con­
vince
v i n c e CrownC r o w n Prince P r in c e M Muhammad
uham m ad B Bin i n Salman
S a l m a n tto o recognize
r e c o g n i z e Israel,I s r a e l , which
w h i c h is i s per-
p e r­
haps a medium-term goal for Netanyahu. The short-term
h a p s a m e d iu m - te r m g o a l f o r N e ta n y a h u . T h e s h o r t- te r m g o a l is to c o o p e r a te goal is to cooperate
with
w i t h Saudi S a u d i Arabia
A r a b i a on o n an a n establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of a a jjoint
o i n t regional
r e g i o n a l security
s e c u r i t y network
n e t w o r k bbasedased
on human and artificial intelligence against Iran amid
o n h u m a n a n d a r tif ic ia l in te llig e n c e a g a in s t I r a n a m id f e a r s th a t P r e s id e n t- e le c t fears that President-elect
Joe
J o e BidenB i d e n and a n d the t h e European
E u r o p e a n Union U n i o n may m a y renew
r e n e w the t h e IranIra n N Nuclear
u c le a r D Deal,
e a l , releasing
r e le a s in g
the
t h e p r e s s u r e o f f t h e I r a n i a n r e g i m e a n d l e a v i n g t h e G C C a n d I s r a e l t o ffend
pressure off the Iranian regime and leaving the GCC and Israel to e n d offo ff
against
a g a i n s t I r a n b y t h e m s e l v e s . I t s e e m s t h a t t h e b a s i c a i m b e h i n d t h e U A E tto
Iran by themselves. It seems that the basic aim behind the UAE o b ban
an
visas
v i s a s tto o Pakistanis
P a k i s t a n i s and a n d othero t h e r Muslim
M u s l i m countries
c o u n t r i e s including
i n c l u d i n g Turkey,
T u r k e y , Afghanistan,
A f g h a n is ta n ,
Yemen,
Y e m e n , etc., e t c . , is
i s tto o forestall
f o r e s t a l l anya n y prospects
p r o s p e c t s of o f bbuilding
u i l d i n g (HUMINT)
( H U M I N T ) inside in s id e U UAEA E bby y
Iran
I r a n a g a i n s t I s r a e l i c i t i z e n s . A r a b c o u n t r i e s a r e n o w p r e p a r i n g t h e m s e l v e s f o r sub-
against Israeli citizens. Arab countries are now preparing themselves for sub­
versive
v e r s i v e proxy
p r o x y warfare
w a r f a r e and a n d securing
s e c u r i n g ttheirh e i r citizens
c i t i z e n s and
a n d territories
t e r r i t o r i e s from
f r o m any any p possible
o s s ib le
retaliation
r e t a l i a t i o n b y I r a n . T h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e - b a s e d s u b v e r s i o n a n d a s y m m e t r i c c o n f l i c t bby
by Iran. This intelligence-based subversion and asymmetric conflict y
Israel–GCC
Is ra e l-G C C w willi l l likely
l i k e l y exacerbate
e x a c e r b a t e iin n n near
e a r ffuture,
u tu re , w which
h i c h means
m e a n s such s u c h high–profile
h ig h -p r o f ile
kkillings
i l l i n g s ini n Iran
I r a n will
w i l l increase
i n c r e a s e in i n number.
n u m b e r.
In
I n t h i s e n t i r e c o n t e x t , J a i s h u l - A d l will
this entire context, Jaish ul-Adl w ill b bee aa logical
lo g ic a l p proxy
r o x y ffor o r Israel
I s r a e l and
a n d Arab
A ra b
countries
c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t I r a n . N e x u s b e t w e e n J a i s h u l - A d l a n d B a l o c h t e r r o r i s t groups
against Iran. Nexus between Jaish ul-Adl and Baloch terrorist g ro u p s
could
c o u l d bbe e used
u s e d for f o r funds
f u n d s ttransfer,
r a n s f e r , provision
p r o v i s i o n of o f weapons,
w e a p o n s , and a n d establishment
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of
HUMINT
H U M I N T network, n e t w o r k , which w h i c h meansm e a n s tthe h e importance
i m p o r t a n c e of of B Baloch
a l o c h tterrorist
e r r o r i s t group
g r o u p willw ill
likely
l i k e l y iincrease
n c r e a s e during d u r i n g tthis h i s subversive
s u b v e r s i v e conflict
c o n flic t b between
e t w e e n Iran I r a n and a n d Israel–GCC.
I s r a e l- G C C .
Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , i t i s s a f e t o c l a i m t h a t t h i s p r o x y c o n f l i c t m a y l i k e l y rrejuvenate
it is safe to claim that this proxy conflict may likely e j u v e n a t e theth e
Baloch
B a l o c h insurgency
i n s u r g e n c y in i n Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n wants
w a n t s to t o develop
d e v e l o p and a n d enhance
enhance
intelligence
i n t e l l i g e n c e sharing
s h a r i n g with w i t h IranI r a n against
a g a i n s t Jaish
J a i s h ul-Adl
u l - A d l and and B Baloch
a l o c h separatists
s e p a r a t i s t s along
a lo n g
tthe
he P Pak–Iran
a k - I r a n bborder.
o r d e r . Through
T h r o u g h this t h i s cooperation,
c o o p e r a t i o n , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n may m a y not n o t only
o n l y undermine
u n d e r m in e
any
a n y negative
n e g a t i v e implication
i m p l i c a t i o n of of a a new
n e w proxyp r o x y war w ar b between
e t w e e n Iran I r a n and a n d Israel-GCC,
I s r a e l- G C C , b butut
also may neutralize any subversive activity against
a ls o m a y n e u tr a liz e a n y s u b v e r s iv e a c tiv ity a g a in s t C P E C in itia te d b y B a lo c h CPEC initiated by Baloch
separatists.
s e p a r a t i s t s . Likewise,
L i k e w i s e , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s also
a l s o looking
l o o k i n g for f o r ttheh e option
o p t i o n of o f convincing
c o n v i n c i n g SaudiSaudi
Arabia
A r a b i a a n d I r a n f o r s i g n i n g o f a n o n - a g g r e s s i o n a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h can
and Iran for signing of a non-aggression agreement, which c a n reduce
re d u c e
hostilities
h o s t i l i t i e s and
a n d shape
s h a p e tthreath r e a t perception
p e r c e p t i o n of of b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s against
a g a i n s t eache a c h other.
o t h e r . There
T h e re
is
i s a l s o b e l i e f t h a t I r a n w o u l d b e l i k e l y t o a g r e e t o s i g n t h i s n o n - a g g r e s s i o n agree-
also belief that Iran would be likely to agree to sign this non-aggression a g re e­
ment,
m e n t, b but
u t convincing
c o n v i n c i n g Saudi S a u d i Arabia
A ra b ia w would
o u ld b bee aa hardh a r d taskt a s k ffor or P Pakistan.
a k is ta n .

Concluding Remarks
Iran–Pakistan
I r a n - P a k i s t a n relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p isi s not
n o t simple.
s i m p l e . There
T h e r e are
a r e many
m a n y actorsa c t o r s involved
i n v o l v e d tot o influ-
in flu ­
ence
e n c e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p . F o r m e r d i p l o m a t s a r e h o p e f u l t h a t s i n c e t h e r e i s n o major
the relationship. Former diplomats are hopeful that since there is no m a jo r
dispute
d i s p u t e bbetween
e t w e e n the t h e two
t w o countries,
c o u n t r i e s , it
i t is
i s highly
h i g h l y likely
l i k e l y tthathat b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s maym ay
64
overcome
o v e r c o m e i r r i t a n t s t h r o u g h b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n a n d d i p l o m a t i c channels.
irritants through bilateral negotiation and diplomatic c h a n n e l s . 6 4 InIn
fact,
f a c t , bboth
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s havehave b been
e e n in
i n close
c l o s e coordination
c o o r d i n a t i o n on o n various
v a r i o u s issues
i s s u e s concerning
c o n c e rn in g
bbilateral
i l a t e r a l relations
r e l a t i o n s such
s u c h asa s bborder
o r d e r security
s e c u r i t y and
and b bilateral
i l a t e r a l trade.
t r a d e . Apart
A p a r t from
f r o m domestic
d o m e stic
politics,
p o l i t i c s , t h e i n f l u e n c e o f A r a b c o u n t r i e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d I n d i a shapes
the influence of Arab countries, the United States, and India shapes b bilat-
ila t­
eral relationship. However, the influence of Arab countries and
e r a l r e la tio n s h ip . H o w e v e r , th e in f lu e n c e o f A r a b c o u n tr ie s a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s the United States
is
i s ffading
a d i n g away
a w a y in i n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s foreign
f o r e i g n ppolicy.
o lic y . L Likewise,
i k e w i s e , the t h e China–Iran
C h i n a - I r a n strategic
s t r a t e g i c KJIHGFEDCBA
156 Khurram Abbas
agreement may likely minimize the Indian role in Iran – a longstanding concern of
Islamabad. Hence, the regional political and security environment has somehow
neutralized many hiccups for a smooth cordial relationship. The future of bilateral
relationship will largely rely upon the domestic politics of Iran as Islamabad’s
eagerness to develop cordial relationship with Tehran is too strong to be ignored.
Therefore, the behaviour of conservative government of Iran will be a stronger
variable between bilateral relations of the two countries. However, history sug-
gests that conservatives are very good at making enemies through outrageous
statements, supporting religious groups in other countries, and so on.

Notes
1 Conservatives won 221 out of 290 seats, while moderates could get only 30 seats,
Arash Azizi, “Factbox: The Outcome of Iran’s 2020 Parliamentary Elections,” The
IranSource Blog, February 26, 2020, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs2/iransource/
factbox-the-outcome-of-irans-2020-parliamentary-elections/.
2 Maziar Motamedi, “Hardliner Ebrahim Raisi Elected Iran’s New President,” Al-Jazeera,
June 19, 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/19/raisi-wins-irans-presidential-elec
tion-amid-low-turnout.
3 Nasser Hadian, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran in discussion
with the author on August 3, 2020.
4 Ambassador Javad Kachoueian, Former Ambassador of Iran to Ireland in discussion
with the author on August 21, 2020.
5 Ibid.
6 “Iran, UAE Foreign Ministers Hold Rare Talks on Regional Challenges, Coronavirus
Pandemic,” Daily Sabah, August 02, 2020, www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/iran-
uae-foreign-ministers-hold-rare-talks-on-regional-challenges-coronavirus-pandemic.
7 Kim Sengupta, “Iran Elections: Hardliners Win Every Seat in Tehran as They Sweep
To Crushing Victory,” Independent, February 23, 2020, www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/iran-elections-hardliners-victory-tehran-revolutionary-guards-turn
out-a9353811.html.
8 Ibid.
9 Nasser Hadian, Faculty of Law & Political Science, University of Tehran in discussion
with the author on August 03, 2020.
10 Ali M. Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation,” Adelphi
Paper 393, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2007, 07.
11 Farhad Rezaei, Iran’s Foreign Policy After Nuclear Agreement: Politics of Normal-
izers and Traditionalists (Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 14.
12 M. Ibrahim Youssef, “Iran Calls U.S. Action a ‘Barbaric Massacre’,” The New York
Times, July 4, 1988, www.nytimes.com/1988/07/04/world/iran-calls-us-action-a-bar
baric-massacre.html.
13 Muhammad Noor-ul-Haq, former Senior Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy
Research Institute (IPRI) in discussion with the author on July 30, 2020.
14 Dilip Hero, Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for
Supremacy (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2018), 168–69.
15 Masood Haider, “Chabahar Port Not to Rival Gwadar, Rouhani Tells PM,” Dawn, Sep-
tember 23, 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1285530/chabahar-port-not-to-rival-gwadar-
rouhani-tells-pm.
16 “Welcome Peace Gesture by Pakistan, Says President Rouhani Alongside PM Imran,”
Dawn, October 14, 2019, www.dawn.com/news/1510619.
 Iran and Future of Pakistan–Iran Relations 157
17 Khurram Abbas, “Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Paki-
stan’s Peace Initiatives,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 13, no.
4 (2019): 604–20.
18 Sahibzada Muhammbad Usman, “Iran-Pakistan Relation: Impact on CPEC,” Asian
Journal of Social Science and Management Technology 2, no. 3 (June 2020): 56.
19 Afghanistan, “18 Markets to Be Set Up Along Borders with Iran,” Dawn, Septem-
ber 18, 2020, www.dawn.com/news/1580291.
20 “Pakistan–Iran Border Trade Committee Meets in Zahedan,” Dawn, November 29,
2019, www.dawn.com/news/1519455/pakistan-iran-border-trade-committee-meets-in-
zahedan.
21 “PM Orders Action Against Fuel Smuggling Across Iran Border,” Dawn, January 03,
2021, www.dawn.com/news/1599346.
22 Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad,” 42.
23 Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: The Untold Story of Iran’s Radical Leader (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2007); Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad,” 44.
24 Shahram Akbarzadeh, Zahid Shahab Ahmed, and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “Iran’s Soft
Power in Pakistan,” Asian Politics and Policy (2021): 1–21, http://doi.org/10.1111/
aspp.12586.
25 Ibid.
26 Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Foreign Minister, in Leaked Tape, Says Revolutionary Guards
Set Policies,” New York Times, April 25, 2021, www.nytimes.com/2021/04/25/world/
middleeast/iran-suleimani-zarif.html.
27 Akbarzadeh et al., “Iran’s Soft Power in Pakistan,” 10.
28 South Asian Portal, “Sectarian Violence in Pakistan,” www.satp.org/satporgtp/coun
tries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm.
29 Khurram Abbas, “Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Paki-
stan’s Peace Initiatives,” Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1–18.
30 Ambassador Javad Kachoueian, Former Ambassador of Iran to Ireland, in discussion
with the author on August 21, 2020.
31 Zahid Shahab Ahmad, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies Forum, Deakin Univer-
sity, Australia, in discussion with the author on September 01, 2020.
32 Col. (R) Muhammad Hanif, former Research Fellow at Islamabad Policy Research
Institute (IPRI) and Senior Security and Defence Analyst, in discussion with the author
on August 07, 2020.
33 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political
and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discus-
sion with the author on July 29, 2020.
34 Commercial Counselor of Pakistan to Iran in discussion with the author on August 16,
2020.
35 Amb (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018) in discus-
sion with the author on July 21, 2020.
36 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political
and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria in discus-
sion with the author on July 29, 2020.
37 Ibid.
38 Ambassador (R) Javed Hafeez, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, in
discussion with the author on August 18, 2020.
39 Commercial Counselor of Pakistan to Iran in discussion with the author on August 16,
2020.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Khurram Abbas, “Pakistan–Iran Relations: Economic Potential and Prospects,” IPRI
Insight 2, no. 1–2 (2015): 87–99.
158 Khurram Abbas
43 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in
discussion with the author on July 21, 2020.
44 Khalid Mustafa, “IP Gas Pipeline: Iran Issues Notice to Pakistan on Moving Arbitra-
tion Court,” The News, May 8, 2019.
45 Mustafa Zamani, Political Counselor of Iran to Pakistan, in discussion with author on
July 29, 2020.
46 “Pakistan, Iran Break Ground on Pipeline Project,” Dawn, March 11, 2013, www.
dawn.com/news/791865.
47 “Ayatollah Khamenei’s ‘Pinned’ Tweet Calls For ‘Just Policy’ on Kashmir,” The
Wire, August 22, 2019, https://thewire.in/diplomacy/ayatollah-khamenei-twitter-
just-policy-kashmir.
48 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in
discussion with the author on July 21, 2020.
49 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political
and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discus-
sion with the author on July 29, 2020.
50 Ibid.
51 Dilip Hero, Cold War in the Islamic World, 168–69.
52 Air Cdr. (R) Khalid Iqbal (Senior Defence Analyst and Chairman, IPS Committee on
Pakistan’s Geo-strategic and Geo-political Dynamics, Institute of Policy Studies) in
discussion with the author on September 2, 2020.
53 Ibid.
54 Ambassador (R) Muhammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s Special Representative to Afghanistan,
in discussion with the author on August 24, 2020.
55 Brig. (r) Said Nazir Mohmand, Senior Defence Analyst and Expert of Afghanistan
Affairs, in discussion with author on August 13, 2020.
56 Ambassador (R) Dr. Raza Zadah, Senior Executive Director at Institute for Political
and International Studies (IPIS) and former Ambassador of Iran to Nigeria, in discus-
sion with the author on July 29, 2020.
57 Brig. (r) Said Nazir Mohmand, Senior Defence Analyst and Expert of Afghanistan
Affairs, in discussion with author on August 13, 2020.
58 This assessment is based on author’s discussions with various Pakistani officials and
academics in Islamabad.
59 Zahid Shahab Ahmad, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies Forum, Deakin Univer-
sity, Australia, in discussion with the author on September 01, 2020.
60 Kulsoom Bilal, “Emerging Politics in Iran: Last Year of Rouhani’s Term and the New
Conservative Parliament,” Policy Perspective 17, no. 1 (2020): 105–28.
61 Ambassador (R) Javed Hafeez, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, in
discussion with the author on August 18, 2020.
62 Ibid.
63 Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Iran's top nuclear scientist, assassinated near Tehran, BBC,
November 27, 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55105934.
64 Ambassador (R) Asif Durrani, Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran (2016–2018), in
discussion with the author on July 21, 2020.
10 Pakistan–U.S. Relations
Is Past the Prologue?
Rabia Akhtar

Pakistan Choosing Allies: The Cold War in South Asia

The period of history dominated by the Cold War from 1945 to 1991 was a strug-
gle between two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for power,
influence and territory around the globe. For the United States, it was also a
struggle to break out of isolation and forge new alliances beyond the Atlantic.
South Asia as a region played a critical role in enabling U.S. global supremacy.
The two newly decolonized, independent countries, Pakistan and India in 1947,
were caught in the superpower Cold War struggle for regional alliances within
the first decade of their independence from the British Raj. The decision to align
their foreign policies by joining one bloc or the other remained a challenge for
many third-world countries. For some, the dilemma was acute. But countries in
the developing world did make their choice in favor of one or the other bloc as
dictated by their domestic political environment and external constraints. While
some aligned with the United States in the West and some with the Soviet Union
in the East, some countries chose to remain nonaligned, retaining the freedom
to make independent foreign policy choices, free of pressures from either bloc.
India and Pakistan chose opposite sides of the superpower divide during much
of the Cold War even though they both actively continued their flirtation with
nonalignment.1
According to Stephen Cohen, Pakistan’s relevance to the regional security
debate around 1947 revolved around two questions,

How would an independent Pakistan stand between India and Afghanistan,

on the one hand, and between India and the Soviet Union, on the other?2
Could Pakistan maintain a viable army? Would it serve as a bulwark for India
against Soviet pressure or radical Islamic movements?3

Pakistan did not have much to offer to the Americans in its early days. Unlike
India, Pakistan had neither inherited strong infrastructure nor a strong military.4
As per the early American calculations, Pakistan’s location could only have pro-
vided them with a possible “bomber base on the Soviet Union’s southern flank”
and nothing more.5

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-12
160 Rabia Akhtar
Pakistan did come forth and align its own interests with those of the United
States whereas Nehru chose non-alignment over major power alliances. Why was
Pakistan enthusiastic about a pro-Western foreign policy as a newly independ-
ent small state?6 In order to understand how Pakistan’s foreign policy toward the
United States was shaped leading to alliance formation in the first three decades
of the Cold War, it is important to conduct a chronological analysis of Pakistan’s
motivations for joining the alliance in the mid-1950s and its expectations from the
United States at different time periods during the alliance.

From 1947 to 1959: Beginning of the Alliance

When the Cold War arrived in South Asia, India steered clear of the superpower
rivalry in its initial years while Pakistan showed enthusiasm for pro-Western
alignment. Unfortunately for Pakistan, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not
live long enough to lay strong foundations for Pakistan’s foreign policy, but he
had visualized its direction. In his September 7, 1947 cabinet meeting – within
the first month of Pakistan’s independence – Jinnah shared his views and stated,
“Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam.
It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic
countries, namely the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia.”7 Even though
Pakistan’s pro-Western leaning was discernible, it took some time to officially
identify with the American camp. Three years later when Pakistan’s first Prime
Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, an Oxford graduate of law, visited the United States
on the invitation of the U.S. President Harry S. Truman on May 3, 1950 –
Pakistan was still a nonaligned country that had recognized communist China in
1949 much to the dismay of the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan had also contem-
plated visiting Moscow, but his visit never materialized.8
In his speech before the U.S. Senate on May 4, 1950, Khan spoke directly and
openly about Pakistan’s ideology. He assured the Americans that Islamic ideology
was not in contradiction with the principles of democracy and freedom – ideals
that were valued and practiced by the Western world.
Liaquat Ali Khan was the short-lived architect of Pakistan’s nonalignment pol-
icy. According to Khan,

Pakistan was not tied to the apron strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor
was she a camp-follower of the Communist bloc. Pakistan . . . had all along
been uninfluenced by the inter-bloc struggle going on in the world and had
supported the cause which it considered to be just. . . . it was on this principle
that Pakistan had voted in the United Nations sometimes with the Western
bloc, at others with the communists.9

Khan’s reference to Pakistan’s voting record in the UN caused much anxiety to

the United States and the Soviets. At the time of Khan’s visit to the United States,
North Korean invasion of South Korea was underway marking the beginning of
the Korean War. Pakistan voted in favor of U.S. troops to fight the North Koreans,
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 161
but when the United States dismissed Khan’s proposal for all-out-support for the
Kashmir cause, Pakistan decided not to commit its troops to fight in Korea.10
Unfortunately, Khan did not live long enough to pursue nonalignment and was
assassinated on October 16, 1951 in Rawalpindi. Pakistan had already lost its
founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, and now with Khan’s assassination,
Pakistan’s foreign policy needed direction and leadership. After Khan’s death,
seven different prime ministers governed Pakistan until the first martial law was
imposed in 1958.
Within 3 years of Khan’s death, Pakistan had joined four defense organizations –
regional associations supported by the United States making it “America’s most
allied ally”11 in Asia. Pakistan formally joined the pro-Western U.S. bloc after sign-
ing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on May 2, 1954. The same year, along
with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New
Zealand, it became a member of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).
The purpose of SEATO was to block communist expansion in the region and to seek
support for U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. India, Indo-
nesia and Burma were invited to join, but they refused to form an alliance against
communism and preferred to retain their nonalignment or “peaceful co-existence
and non-aggression pacts.” Thailand and the Philippines from the region joined the
organization. Even though Pakistan did not belong to the region, its basic objective
of joining the organization was to gain U.S. support against Indian “aggression,”
and it did not want defensive action to be confined only to communist aggression.
Though the members of the organization agreed to Pakistan’s broader definition of
aggression, U.S. clarified that military action will only be taken against communist
entities and “promised to consult in the event of other aggression.”12
In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, which included Britain, Turkey,
Iran and Iraq – the organization was renamed as Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) when Iraq left the Baghdad Pact after 3 years of membership. Although
the United States was not a member of CENTO – just an observer – it signed a
bilateral agreement of cooperation with Pakistan in 1959 as reiteration of its com-
mitment of mutual defense with its regional alliance partners. Like SEATO, under
the Baghdad Pact or CENTO, the objective also was to curtail communism and
collective military action against communist aggression. The organization dis-
solved when Iran left the organization post-Islamic revolution in 1979.13
In the initial decades of the Cold War, major U.S. foreign policy objectives in
Asia were to gain influence in the region through forging economic and military
alliances with free and friendly like-minded governments in the region, and the
development of their individual and collective ability to resist communist influ-
ences in the region and to gain access to resources for U.S. markets in Asia. In the
first decade of their alliance, Pakistan allowed the United States to realize most of
its objectives in the region and became America’s bulwark in Asia against Sino-
Soviet communist influences. But the cracks in the alliance became visible after
the end of their first decade. Events from 1962 onwards reveal incompatibility in
U.S. and Pakistani alliance objectives and expectations from each other leading
to their first breakdown.
162 Rabia Akhtar
Pakistan’s President Iskander Mirza had appointed General Ayub Khan, a
Sandhurst graduate, as Pakistan’s first chief martial law administrator in 1958
after abrogating the constitution. Ayub Khan joined the Pakistani Army in 1947
after independence as a brigadier and rose to become Pakistan’s first native
Commander-in-Chief in 1951. Within two weeks of his appointment by Mirza,
Ayub declared himself as the president of Pakistan and exiled Mirza to London.14
As a result of Pakistan’s participation in SEATO and CENTO, the United States
signed an Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan on March 5, 1959 which was
a bilateral extension of U.S. commitment toward Pakistan which allowed Pakistan
to receive military assistance from the United States.15 The United States signed
similar agreements with the other two CENTO countries, Turkey and Iran as well.

From 1959 to 1965: Fractures in the Alliance

After Field Marshal Ayub Khan became the president of Pakistan, he reoriented
the country’s foreign policy and decided to develop friendly ties with China and
the Soviet Union. He articulated his rationale for this new policy later in his book
Friends Not Masters and discussed at length Pakistan’s security imperatives
demanding a change in foreign policy outlook. To understand how the narrative
took shape it is important to read through Ayub’s reasoning for “the new outlook”
in toto. Addressing Pakistan’s geostrategic imperatives, Ayub wrote:

Take the geographical location first. Here is East Pakistan surrounded on

three sides by India and the only approach is from the sea which is not dif-
ficult for an enemy to control.
West Pakistan is wedged in between three enormous powers with the
Soviet Union at the top, the People’s Republic of China in the north-east,
and India in the south and east. I know of no other small country which has
the somewhat dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbours.
Now, this location is a source of weakness in physical terms but it could be
converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal and mutually
acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in.16

With India, the prospects of good relations were not a possibility in the near term
given the dispute over Kashmir.17 By joining SEATO and CENTO, Ayub argued,
Pakistan had already alienated the Soviet Union but was hopeful that it was “pos-
sible to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts
and misgivings” and that the design was never to harm the Soviet Union since
Pakistan’s membership of the pacts was dictated by the requirements of Pakistan’s
security.18 Change in Ayub’s thinking about accommodating the Soviets resulted
from the U-2 incident and the subsequent Soviet threats to Pakistan. Ayub had
leased the Americans a communications facility for 10 years at the Badaber Air
Base, Peshawar on July 17, 1959, which was not renewed beyond July 17, 1969.
CIA had used this facility as a listening post and to run a U-2 spy program to
monitor Soviet nuclear and missile developments. On May 1, 1960, the KGB
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 163
captured CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers after shooting down his U-2 plane that
had flown from Badaber on a reconnaissance mission. This exposed the U-2 spy-
flight program and angered the Soviets. It also brought to light Pakistan’s role in
facilitating the Americans to spy on the Soviets. As Dennis Kux notes, Khrush-
chev threatened Pakistan that “if any American plane is allowed to use Peshawar
as a base of operations against the Soviet Union, we will retaliate immediately.”19
Although Ayub in a public announcement dismissed any knowledge of the U.S.
U-2 program operating from Pakistan (his statement was corroborated by the U.S.
State Department stating that the U.S. was running this program and using Paki-
stan’s airspace without Pakistan’s knowledge) he was nevertheless unnerved by
the Soviet threat. On April 3, 1965, Ayub Khan met the Soviet Prime Minister,
Alexei Kosygin, for the first time, and they discussed Pakistan’s membership in
SEATO and CENTO and also the U-2 incident. In his defense, Ayub maintained
that the U-2 incident “had been as much of a shock to us as it was to the Soviet
Union.”20
Pakistan saw China as an “emerging power” that wanted friendly neighbors,
and all Pakistan had to do to get on her side was to “convince her of our sincerity
and friendly intent.” Given that friendly relations with India were more problem-
atic than building friendly relations with the two communist countries in Paki-
stan’s immediate neighborhood, Ayub felt that

[I]f we could not establish normal relations with all our three big neighbours,
the best thing was to have an understanding with two of them. They might
have their internal differences but we did not need to get involved in that.
This was a vital element in our new thinking: to keep clear of the internal
disputes and conflicts of other countries; neither to philosophize about their
problems nor to act as busybodies. It was on this basis that I set out to normal-
ize our relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.21

The problem, however, remained that in order to boost Pakistan’s economy, ini-
tial capital investments needed to be made, and only one country was capable of
making such incredible economic investments in Pakistan – the United States.
Ayub understood that given the Cold War ideological confrontations, establish-
ing bilateral relations with all three powers – China, the Soviet Union and the
United States – would be an arduous task. However, Ayub believed that “because
of the emergence of China, the earlier polarization between the Soviet Union and
the United States is gradually disappearing,” and for a long period of time to
come they will be engaged to compete with one another for areas of influence
and “none of them could afford to isolate and antagonize any of the developing
countries completely.”22 The task for Pakistan, Ayub argued, then was to convince
the United States that the former’s relations with China and the Soviet Union were
not against U.S. interests and to inform the United States that Pakistan could not
afford to take sides in major powers struggles, that we were not “in the market for
becoming partisans in their struggle for power.”23 The choice, Ayub said, rested
with the people of Pakistan.
164 Rabia Akhtar
For the United States, it was increasingly becoming difficult to find a balance
between India and Pakistan especially when the policy was to arm them against
China. Pakistan perhaps learned early on that entente with China would be benefi-
cial in the long run and that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” had merit beyond
proverbial and thus had made its choice. During the border conflict between India
and China in October 1962, Pakistan rejected President Kennedy’s request of
assuring India that Pakistan would not attack and open another front for India
while it was under attack by China. Such an assurance would have allowed India
to move some divisions from its border with Pakistan against the Chinese border
in the Himalayas. Kennedy in his letter to Ayub on October 28, 1962, also assured
Ayub that U.S. aid to India would only be used against the Chinese and not against
Pakistan. To Kennedy’s disappointment, Ayub in his reply wrote that he believed
the Sino-Indian war would be a short one since China had limited objectives with
respect to addressing the disputed border thereby not justifying American military
assistance to India against the Chinese.
From 1962 to 1965, the United States provided India with $90 million worth
of grant military assistance. Although both Pakistan and India had been receiving
assistance from the United States under the Military Assistance Program (MAP)
from 1954 to 1965 – Pakistan received “over $630 million in grant military assis-
tance for weapons, $619 million for defense support assistance, and some $55 mil-
lion worth of equipment purchased on a cash or concessional basis” and India
“purchased over $50 million in military equipment” from the United States24 – the
U.S. decision to grant military assistance to India after the Sino-Indian conflict
pushed Pakistan toward China for additional military and economic assistance.25

1965 Indo-Pak War

War and the U.S.
U.S. Arms EmbargoZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Embargo
As
A s already
a l r e a d y stressed,
s tre s s e d , P Pakistan–U.S.
a k i s t a n - U . S . relations
r e l a t i o n s hit
h i t ana n all-time
a l l - t i m e lowl o w after
a f t e r tthe
he U United
n ite d
States imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan and India,
S ta te s im p o s e d a n a r m s e m b a r g o o n P a k is ta n a n d I n d ia , f o llo w in g th e ir s e c o n d following their second
war
w a r overover K Kashmir.
a s h m ir .26 P
26
Pakistan
a k i s t a n and
a n d India
I n d i a had h a d ffought
o u g h t their
t h e i r ffirst
i r s t war
w a r over
over K Kashmir
a s h m ir
within
w i t h i n m o n t h s o f t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e s t a r t i n g f r o m O c t o b e r 1 9 4 7 u n t i l J a n u a r y 1,
months of their independence starting from October 1947 until January 1,
1949.
1 9 4 9 . TheT h e war w a r ended
e n d e d with
w ith a a ceasefire
c e a s e f i r e line
l i n e drawn
d r a w n bbetween
e t w e e n tthe h e occupied
o c c u p i e d Pakistani
P a k ista n i
and
a n d Indian
I n d i a n tterritories
e r r i t o r i e s in
i n the
t h e disputed
d i s p u t e d region
r e g i o n of of KKashmir.
a s h m i r . By B y 1965,
1 9 6 5 , tthey
hey w weree r e ready
re a d y
to fight their second
to fig h t th e ir s e c o n d w a r. war.
By
B y the
t h e time
t i m e thet h e warw a r bbroke
r o k e out
o u t bbetween
e tw e e n P Pakistan
a k i s t a n and
a n d India,
I n d ia , b both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s were
w e re
recipients
r e c i p i e n t s o f M A P e q u i p m e n t f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d o n e o f the
of MAP equipment from the United States, and one of t h e greatest
g re a te st
U.S.
U . S . worries
w o r r i e s wasw a s their
th e ir u use
s e ofo f American-supplied
A m e r i c a n - s u p p l i e d military
m i l i t a r y equipment
e q u i p m e n t against
a g a i n s t each
each
other
o t h e r d u r i n g t h e w a r . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d e c i d e d t o w a r n b o t h c o u n t r i e s against
during the war. The United States decided to warn both countries a g a i n s t the
th e
use
u s e of of M MAP A P equipment
e q u i p m e n t as a s one
o n e ofo f tthe
h e conditions
c o n d i t i o n s of o f its
i t s supply
s u p p l y tto o India
I n d i a anda n d Paki-
P a k i­
stan
s t a n was
w a s itsi t s use
u s e only
o n l y against
a g a i n s t communist
c o m m u n i s t countries,
c o u n t r i e s , namely
n a m e l y China C h i n a andand n not
o t against
a g a in s t
each
e a c h other.
o t h e r . When
W h e n Bhutto,
B h u t t o , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’s Foreign
F o r e ig n M Minister
i n i s t e r on
o n April
A p r i l 30,
3 0 , 1965,
1 9 6 5 , metm et U U.S.
.S .
Ambassador
A m b a s s a d o r Walter W a l t e r PP.. McConaughy
M c C o n a u g h y stationeds t a t i o n e d inin K Karachi,
a r a c h i , he h e sought
sought U U.S.. S . action
a c tio n
on
o n its
i t s assurances
a s s u r a n c e s tto o defend
d e f e n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n citing
c itin g

December
D e c e m b e r 23,
2 3 , 1957
1957 D Dulles-Noon
u l l e s - N o o n assurances; November
a ssu ra n c e s; N o v e m b e r 29,
2 9 , 1956
1 9 5 6 assurances
a ssu ra n c e s
given
g i v e n t o B a g h d a d P a c t c o u n t r i e s ; A m b a s s a d o r L a n g l e y r e i t e r a t i o n to
to Baghdad Pact countries; Ambassador Langley reiteration t o Ayub
A yub
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 165
on April 15, 1959 of earlier Dulles assurances to Noon; 1961 Kennedy-Ayub
communiqué reaffirming March 5, 1959 US-Pakistani agreement and other
assurances given Pakistan; and March 5, 1959 agreement.27

McConaughy told Bhutto that he would have to consult with Washington on the
assurances Pakistan was seeking. He also warned Bhutto not to use MAP against
India to which Bhutto replied that he was aware of U.S. concerns about the use
of MAP equipment, but he hoped the United States also realized that Pakistan’s
territory was under attack.28
After the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan planned an offensive “Operational
Gibraltar” to “defreeze the stalemate in Kashmir.” As Feroz Khan documents, in
the build-up to the Indo-Pak war in September 1965, Pakistan’s plans included
“infiltration into Indian held Kashmir and formation of an uprising” in the val-
ley. Given how rapidly the situation between India and Pakistan was developing
in September of 1965, Ambassador Chester B. Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to
India (1963–69), wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk propos-
ing a change in U.S. military aid criteria to both India and Pakistan whereby the
United States would continue to provide military and economic assistance to both
countries only if they were committed in defending the subcontinent against Com-
munist China where the equipment provided by the United States would only
be used against the Chinese. But he also acknowledged that the way Pakistan’s
relationship with China was evolving, U.S. military alliance with Pakistan was
becoming irrelevant. He stressed that the new criteria of giving military aid to
India and Pakistan should aim at providing only those weapons that would meet
the “logistical and tactical” requirements to defeat the threat from China. Further-
more, he proposed that U.S. military aid “could be discreetly cautioned on India’s
willingness to work toward a reconciliation with Pakistan,” and U.S. economic
assistance to both India and Pakistan could be used as a “carrot to draw them
into mutually beneficial cooperative economic ventures.” Bowles believed that if
India’s confidence in the United States increased, “U.S. influence can effectively
be used to moderate India’s relationship to Pakistan.”29
The dilemma for the United States was much greater than the potential loss
of Pakistan to Communist China if there was inaction on the U.S. part and if the
Chinese came to assist Pakistan. Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar to stir an offen-
sive in Kashmir did not go as planned. India decided to cross the international
boundary, and Pakistan’s assumption that the international community would not
allow India to attack Pakistan across the international border proved to be wrong.
On September 6 and 7, 1965, when three Indian divisions, out of which two
were U.S.-supplied mountain divisions, crossed the international boundary to
attack toward Lahore, the heart of Punjab in Pakistan, Pakistan’s offensive strat-
egy had transformed into a defensive one. In a desperate attempt, Ayub Khan once
again invoked U.S. alliance commitments to Pakistan demanding U.S. action to
protect Pakistan against Indian aggression and reminded Ambassador McCo-
naughy of his earlier warning that any arms given to India to fight China by the
United States would eventually be used against Pakistan.30 But the United States
referred Pakistan to the UN.
166 Rabia Akhtar
Despite
D e s p i t e RuskR u s k and a n d McConaughy’s
M c C o n a u g h y ’s p pro-Pakistan
r o - P a k i s t a n positions,
p o s i t i o n s , the
t h e Johnson
J o h n s o n admin-
a d m in ­
istration
i s t r a t i o n d e c i d e d t o s u s p e n d m i l i t a r y a i d s h i p m e n t s t o P a k i s t a n a n d India
decided to suspend military aid shipments to Pakistan and I n d i a after
a f t e r the
th e
1965
1 9 6 5 war. w a r . Ambassador
A m b assad o r M McConaughy
c C o n a u g h y deliveredd e l i v e r e d ttheh e U.S.
U . S . decision
d e c i s i o n to t o Bhutto
B h u t t o with w ith
aa word
w o r d tthat h a t tthe
h e decision
d e c isio n w was a s not
n o t punitive
p u n i t i v e and a n d that
t h a t the
t h e Secretary
S e c r e t a r y General
G e n e r a l of o f the
th e
U.N. had appealed the United States to suspend arms
U .N . h a d a p p e a le d th e U n ite d S ta te s to s u s p e n d a r m s s h ip m e n t to b o t h c o u n tr ie s shipment to both countries
in
i n order
o r d e r tto o bbring
r i n g an a n end e n d tto o ttheh e fighting.
f ig h tin g . B Bhutto
h u t t o ttold
o l d McConaughy
M c C o n a u g h y tthat h a t “Pak,
“ P a k , cor-c o r­
nered, deserted, bitched, had no alternative but interpret
n e r e d , d e s e r te d , b itc h e d , h a d n o a lte r n a tiv e b u t in te r p r e t U S a c tio n a s p u n itiv e US action as punitive
one
o n e assisting
a s s i s t i n g India,
In d ia , a a non-aligned
n o n - a l i g n e d and a n d treacherous
t r e a c h e r o u s country
c o u n t r y aggressing
a g g r e s s i n g against
a g a in s t U US S
31
ally.”
a l l y .” 3 1
The
T h e war w a r ended
e n d e d when w h e n the th e U UN N Security
S e c u r i t y Council
C o u n c il p passed
assed R Resolution
e s o l u t i o n 2112 1 1 on o n Sep-
Sep­
tember
t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 6 5 c a l l i n g b o t h c o u n t r i e s t o a c c e p t t h e c e a s e f i r e a n d s t a r t nego-
20, 1965 calling both countries to accept the ceasefire and start nego­
tiations
t i a t i o n s on o n tthehe K Kashmir
a s h m i r issue.
i s s u e . The
T h e Indian
I n d i a n Prime
P rim e M Minister,
in is te r , L Lalal B Bahadur
a h a d u r Shastri,
S h a stri,
accepted
a c c e p t e d t h e c e a s e f i r e o n 2 1 s t S e p t e m b e r , a n d A y u b a c c e p t e d t h e c e a s e f i r e , against
the ceasefire on 21st September, and Ayub accepted the ceasefire, a g a in s t
Bhutto’s
B h u t t o ’ s advice,a d v i c e , ono n September
S e p t e m b e r 22, 2 2 , 1965.
1965. B Both
o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s accepted
a c c e p t e d thet h e Soviet
S o v ie t U Union
n io n
32
as a third-party mediator for the resolution of Kashmir’s status.
a s a t h i r d - p a r t y m e d i a t o r f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f K a s h m i r ’ s s t a t u s .3 2 T h e s u b s e q u e n t The subsequent
Tashkent
T a s h k e n t Declaration
D e c la r a tio n w wasa s signed
s i g n e d on o n January
J a n u a r y 10, 1 0 , 1966
1 9 6 6 where
w h e re b both
o t h sides
s i d e s agreed
a g r e e d tto o
restore
r e s t o r e n o r m a l r e l a t i o n s a n d w i t h d r a w t h e i r f o r c e s t o p o s i t i o n s p r i o r t o A u g u s t 5,
normal relations and withdraw their forces to positions prior to August 5,
1965.
1965. A A month
m o n t h bbefore e f o r e signing
s i g n i n g the t h e Tashkent
T a s h k e n t Declaration,
D e c l a r a t i o n , Ayub
A y u b KhanK han v visited
i s i t e d the
th e
United States in December 1965 (a trip that had been cancelled
U n ite d S ta te s in D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 5 ( a tr ip th a t h a d b e e n c a n c e lle d b y P r e s id e n t J o h n ­ by President John-
son
s o n earlier
e a r l i e r in i n April
A p r i l 1965)1 9 6 5 ) tto o seek
seek U U.S.. S . support
s u p p o r t ffor o r the
t h e issue
i s s u e ofof K Kashmir
a s h m i r and a n d repair
re p a ir
the damage done to Pak–U.S. relations in the wake of 1965
th e d a m a g e d o n e to P a k - U .S . r e la tio n s i n th e w a k e o f 1 9 6 5 w a r . J o h n s o n c a te g o r i­ war. Johnson categori-
cally
c a l l y told
t o l d Ayub
A y u b tthath a t if if PPakistan–U.S.
a k i s t a n - U . S . alliance
a l l i a n c e hadh a d any
a n y chance
c h a n c e of o f survival
s u r v i v a l ini n future,
fu tu re ,
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n w o u l d n e e d t o s t a y a w a y f r o m C h i n a . I n p r i v a t e , h o w e v e r , J o h n s o n told
would need to stay away from China. In private, however, Johnson to ld
Ayub
A y u b that t h a t heh e “understood
“ u n d e r s t o o d certainc e r t a i n relationships
r e l a t i o n s h i p s jjust
u s t as as a a w wife
i f e could
c o u l d understand
u n d e r s ta n d a a
Saturday
S a t u r d a y night n i g h t ffling
l i n g bby y her
h e r husband
h u s b a n d so s o long
l o n g as a s she
she w was a s ttheh e wife.”
w if e .” 33
33

The
T h e UnitedU n i t e d States
S t a t e s reminded
r e m in d e d P Pakistan
a k i s t a n time t i m e anda n d again
a g a i n that
t h a t the
t h e ttreaty
r e a t y commit-
c o m m it­
ments
m e n t s o n l y a l l o w e d f o r a U .S . r e s p o n s e t o a c o m m u n i s t a g g r e s s i o n against
only allowed for a U.S. response to a communist aggression a g a i n s t Paki-
P a k i­
stan,
s t a n , not n o t Indian
I n d i a n aggression.
a g g r e s s i o n . But B u t AyubA y u b and and B Bhutto
h u t t o remained
r e m a i n e d dismissive
d i s m i s s i v e of o f the
th e
treaty
t r e a t y stipulations.
s t i p u l a t i o n s . In I n tthe
h e short
s h o r t term,
t e r m , the t h e Tashkent
T ashkent D Declaration
e c l a r a t i o n achieved
a c h i e v e d its i t s objec-
o b je c ­
tives,
tiv e s, b butu t ttheh e essence
e s s e n c e of o f Bhutto’s
B h u t t o ’ s statement
s t a t e m e n t to t o McConaughy
M c C o n a u g h y about about U U.S.. S . desertion
d e s e r tio n
of
o f i t s a l l y b e c a m e a p e r m a n e n t p a r t o f P a k i s t a n ’ s n a r r a t i v e , a n d t h e U . S . embargo
its ally became a permanent part of Pakistan’s narrative, and the U.S. e m b arg o
on
o n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n after
a f t e r itsi t s 1965
1 9 6 5 war w a r with
w i t h India
In d ia w was a s seen
s e e n asa s the
t h e ffirst
i r s t betrayal.
b e tra y a l.

From 1965 to 1972: Bhutto’s Nuclearization of the Pakistani

Narrative
On April 12, 1967, the United States announced that it would not resume mili-
tary aid to Pakistan and India that had been suspended in the wake of their 1965
war. The United States maintained that the decision was taken in the interest of
maintaining security in the region, preventing another war between India and
Pakistan and reducing the threat of arms race between the countries.34 Although
the U.S. decision in April 1967 was an extension of its arms suspension policy
of 1965 with only a ban on the direct sale of lethal weapons, Bhutto viewed this
U.S. decision to stop military assistance to Pakistan as a deliberate U.S. policy
to pressure Pakistan over India. Bhutto was skeptical of the stated objectives of
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 167
the American arms policy in South Asia on the suspension of aid to both coun-
tries. He believed ever since the two countries concluded defense agreements
with the United States – Pakistan in 1959 and India in 1962 – it had been the
biggest contributor to the arms race in the region, even though there was aware-
ness that unresolved disputes between the two countries would have hindered
normal relations between them.35 Bhutto acknowledged that the U.S.-supplied
military weapons in Pakistan’s possession and their effective use acted as a deter-
rent for India until the United States decided to stop military supplies. He ques-
tioned how Pakistan could maintain a deterrent in the absence of U.S. military
assistance.36 The answer had been with him all along – through Pakistan’s own
nuclear deterrent.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto started a new chapter with the United States once the 1971
crisis was over and Pakistan had lost its eastern half. Bhutto had praised the Nixon
administration “for standing by basic principles of international law and civilized
society” (during the Indo-Pak 1971 war) and told the secretary that he was ready
for reconciliation with India.37 His efforts toward normalization of relations with
India resulted in the signing of the Simla Agreement between the two countries
in 1972.
Pakistan’s foreign policy tone with the United States found its anchor in the
U.S. arms embargo on Pakistan after the 1965 war with India and strengthened
with the 1971 breakup of Pakistan after the United States failed to meet Paki-
stan’s expectations as an ally during that time period. Given its dependency on the
United States for economic and military assistance, Pakistan had no choice but
to reconcile its differences with the United States In addition to Bhutto’s friendly
overtures, two U.S. policies helped smoothen previous anxieties in Pakistan–U.S.
relations: a) Nixon’s rapprochement with China and Pakistan’s role in facilitat-
ing the opening between the two countries and b) Nixon’s resumption of military
sales to Pakistan and India.38
From 1974 to 1998, Pakistan relentlessly pursued nuclear weapons develop-
ment, ultimately testing its nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear
tests in May 1998. The United States nonproliferation legislation constrained
U.S. foreign policy choices toward Pakistan from 1976 onwards – after the first
nonproliferation legislation, the Symington amendment was enacted, and as per
U.S. law, Pakistan was sanctioned for its proliferation behavior under different
administrations.
Pakistan is a unique case, popularly known as “the most sanctioned ally” of
the United States, where in almost all cases with the exception of one when Paki-
stan tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, the United States unilaterally imposed
economic, political and military sanctions at different periods in their alliance
relationship to deter Pakistan’s proliferation behavior – the result was negative.
Pakistan’s narrative that developed during this time period maintained that (a)
the U.S. policy selectively targeted Pakistan for nuclear proliferation in South
Asia and (b) the U.S. policy was uneven in its approach and sanctioned Pakistan
only when the country was no longer needed to achieve other U.S. foreign policy
objectives.
168 Rabia Akhtar
Post-9/11, when the United States needed Pakistan to join its war against ter-
rorism, sanctions were lifted to enlist Pakistan’s support in Afghanistan. Once
again, Pakistan and the United States found themselves in a situation similar to
that of the later 70s and early 80s, willing to accommodate each other to align
their national interests. Little did Pakistan know at the time that its involvement in
U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan which began in 2001 will bring the war home
to Pakistan taking lives of its citizens and soldiers alike.

Section 2: Contemporary Foreign Policy Challenges in

Pak–U.S. Relations
This section examines three key bilateral foreign policy interests that drive the
contemporary Pak–U.S. relations: a) mutual expectations relating to the future of
Afghanistan, b) challenges for Pakistan in navigating the Sino-U.S. rivalry and c)
Pakistan’s challenge of the growing Indo-U.S. strategic and defence partnership.

Pakistan, U.S. and the Future of

ofAfghanistanZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
Afghanistan
In
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e r h a p s thet h e most
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e n d i n g in i n tthe
h e history
h i s t o r y of
of
wars, Taliban’s peaceful and nonviolent
w a r s , T a l i b a n ’s p e a c e f u l a n d n o n v i o l e n t B l i t z k r i e g o n t h e i r w a y t o t a k i n g over
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39
community
c o m m u n i t y s t u n n e d .3 9 T h e f u t u r e o f A f g h a n i s t a n i s u n c e r t a i n . However,
stunned. The future of Afghanistan is uncertain. H o w e v e r , Paki- P a k i­
stan’s
s t a n ’ s fforeign
o re ig n p policy
o l i c y interests
i n t e r e s t s in
i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n are a r e shaped
s h a p e d in i n the
t h e long
l o n g tterm
e r m bby y the
th e
investments it has made in bringing all stakeholders together
in v e s tm e n ts it h a s m a d e in b r in g in g a ll s ta k e h o ld e r s to g e th e r to e n s u r e th a t p e a c e to ensure that peace
and
a n d stability
s t a b i l i t y return
r e t u r n ttoo Afghanistan.
A fg h a n ista n . A A b brief
r i e f overview
o v e r v i e w of o f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s efforts
e f f o r t s in
i n tthis
h is
regard merits acknowledgment.
r e g a rd m e rits a c k n o w le d g m e n t.

Pakistan’s Role in Shaping the U.S.–Afghan

U.S.-Afghan Peace Process
The
T h e DohaD o h a agreement
a g r e e m e n t signeds i g n e d on o n February
F e b r u a r y 29,
2 9 , 2020
2020 b between
e t w e e n thet h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s and
and
Taliban
T a l i b a n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d u s h e r e d in
and the United States and the Afghan government had ushered in a a nnew
ew
era
e r a of o f hope
h o p e for f o r Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . And A n d ffor o r tthis
h i s hope
h o p e tot o arrive,
a r r i v e , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s role
r o l e in in b bring-
rin g ­
ing
i n g ttheh e Taliban
T a l i b a n to t o the
th e n negotiating
e g o t i a t i n g ttable
a b le w with
i t h the
th e U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s and
a n d ffor o r the
th e U United
n ite d
States to recognize Taliban as a legitimate stakeholder of
S ta te s to r e c o g n iz e T a lib a n a s a le g itim a te s ta k e h o ld e r o f p o w e r i n A f g h a n is ta n power in Afghanistan
was
w a s absolutely c r i t i c a l . 40
a b s o l u t e l y critical. 40
A
A p process
r o c e s s bbegane g a n in i n 2009,
2009, w whenhen a a P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i delegation
d e l e g a t i o n explored
e x p l o r e d the t h e scope
s c o p e of
of
peace negotiations between the stakeholders of power
p e a c e n e g o tia tio n s b e tw e e n th e s ta k e h o ld e r s o f p o w e r in A f g h a n is ta n a n d th ein Afghanistan and the
United
U n i t e d States.
S t a t e s . OnO n another
a n o t h e r level,
le v e l, w with
i t h tthe
h e support
s u p p o r t of
o f tthehe P Pakistan
a k i s t a n government,
g o v e rn m e n t,
factions in the Afghan government tested the waters
f a c tio n s in th e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t te s te d th e w a te r s f o r p e a c e n for peace negotiations
e g o t i a t i o n s with
w ith
the
t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n and a n d also
a l s o with
w i t h Gulbuddin
G u lb u d d in H Hekmatyar.
e k m a t y a r . It
It w was a s not
n o t until
u n t i l 2011,
2 0 1 1 , however,
h o w e v e r,
that
t h a t the
t h e first
f i r s t meeting
m e e t i n g of o f ttheh e Afghanistan–Pakistan
A f g h a n i s t a n - P a k i s t a n Joint
J o i n t Commission
C o m m i s s i o n for fo r R Recon-
econ­
ciliation and Peace took place. The commission reiterated that
c ilia tio n a n d P e a c e to o k p la c e . T h e c o m m is s io n r e ite r a te d th a t th e p e a c e p r o c e s s the peace process
in
i n Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n has h a s tto o bbe e Afghan-led
A f g h a n - l e d and a n d Afghan-owned.
A f g h a n - o w n e d . This T h i s effort
e f f o r t received
r e c e i v e d its
its
first
f i r s t b l o w , l a t e r i n 2 0 1 1 , w i t h t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n c a r r i e d o u t b y t h e T a l i b a n of
blow, later in 2011, with the assassination carried out by the Taliban o f Burha-
B u rh a -
nuddin
n u d d i n Rabbani,
R a b b a n i , Afghanistan’s
A f g h a n i s t a n ’ s fformer o rm e r p president
r e s i d e n t (1992–1996)
( 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 6 ) and a n d thet h e leader
l e a d e r of
of
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 169
Afghanistan’s High Council of Peace, an outfit responsible for bringing Taliban
to the negotiating table. Undeterred by the fallout, Pakistan offered facilitation of
the peace process in Qatar in 2012 and helped Taliban set up a liaison office to
pursue peace negotiations with the United States. Pakistan also released some of
the captured Taliban prisoners as an incentive to start negotiations between the
Afghan High Peace Council and the Taliban.
Pakistan was at the forefront of the Afghan peace effort and hosted an Afghan
government delegation to meet with Taliban representatives in Islamabad in 2015.
In order to make the peace process more multidimensional, Afghanistan–Pakistan–
the United States–China Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) was set
up, and its first meeting was held on January 11, 2016 in Islamabad. Although
the QCG was an offshoot of the 2015 Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference, it
became the first of its kind forum to discuss the roadmap of the Afghan peace
process bringing all stakeholders to discuss the political future of Afghanistan by
resolving all outstanding disputes by negotiations. It was believed that with the
support of the United States, China and Pakistan, Afghan peace and reconciliation
process would find the momentum it initially lacked. Upon the request of Zalmay
Khalilzad, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Pakistan
continued its efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiations, and Mullah Abdual
Ghani Baradar met Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in Islam-
abad in October 2019 to discuss the scope of Taliban’s engagement on negotia-
tions with other parties. The year 2020 finally saw a breakthrough, and Pakistan’s
efforts were realized in the form of two agreements that the United States signed
on Feb 29, 2020, one with the Taliban and the other with the Afghan government
to formally pave the way for intra-Afghan negotiations.
In his July 2019 meeting with President Trump, the Prime Minister of Pakistan
Imran Khan reiterated Pakistan’s support for the Afghan peace process, conveyed
Pakistan’s expectations from the U.S.-led process and expressed Pakistan’s desire
for an all-inclusive political solution in Afghanistan.41 While Khan found a con-
vergence of interest with Trump over Afghanistan which helped set the stage for
the two historical agreements signed between the United States, Afghan govern-
ment and the Taliban, there was speculation about the continuation of the same
spirit under the Biden administration with whom Khan had to start anew to estab-
lish his credentials. The good thing was that the Biden administration had retained
Zalmay Khalilzad as the Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation,
which suggested some form of continuity of the process that was initiated with
Pakistan’s facilitation.
Now that the Taliban have taken over Kabul and are looking toward interna-
tional recognition of their government to establish Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(IEA), Pakistan is being scapegoated for the failure of the Afghan peace process –
a process which was owned by the United States and facilitated by Pakistan at
every step. The narrative surrounding Kabul’s fall to the Taliban paints Pakistan
in a negative light, and the United States’ and allied forces’ collective failure of
intelligence in predicting Taliban’s ascendancy is being diverted to blame Paki-
stan for a double game.
170 Rabia Akhtar
Irrespective of who governs Afghanistan in near future and whether that gov-
ernment is internationally recognized or not, there are several areas which are of
critical importance for Pakistan, which should form the central pillar of Pakistan’s
Afghan policy:

• Pakistan must convey to the Taliban now and any future Afghan government
in no uncertain terms that the use of Afghan territory by terrorist groups will
not be tolerated and that Afghanistan must ensure no safe havens are pro-
vided to the terrorist groups. The one-way conversation about “safe havens”
by groups using Pakistan’s territory and working against peace and stability
in Afghanistan needs to change. The latest UN report submitted by Trine
Heimerback, Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolu-
tions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011)and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities, vindicates Pakistan’s longstanding position on the
use of Afghan soil to conduct terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, something
to which Pakistan has been apprising the international community for the
past couple of decades. The report reveals that Al-Qaeda moderated reun-
ion of splinter groups in Afghanistan, bringing together five terrorists groups
namely, Sheryar Mehsud group, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Hizb-ul-Ahrar, the Amjad
Farooqi group and the Usman Saifullah group (former Lashkar-e-Jhangvi)
pledging their allegiance to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).42
• This is one conversation Pakistan must have with the Biden administra-
tion where the United States along with Pakistan should assert the future
Afghan government to take steps for joint counter-terrorism activities
inside Afghanistan for the elimination of these groups. A joint-counter ter-
rorism initiative should be created for intelligence sharing in operations to
effectively deal with this menace of terrorism plaguing both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. As U.S. evacuates from Afghanistan, its patronage for such a
joint venture might receive less resistance from Afghanistan, even under
Taliban rule. The deadly attack on Kabul Airport on August 26, 2021 in
which more than 200 people were killed including 11 U.S. marines was
claimed by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) who is Taliban’s
nemesis in Afghanistan. ISKP will never want to see the Taliban getting
recognized by the international community and will continue to destabilize
Afghanistan under Taliban’s control to ensure it does not have a chance at
creating an IEA. Herein lies an opportunity for both Pakistan and the United
States whereby joint counterterrorism operations against ISKP and TTP
can be conducted and Taliban’s hand can be strengthened to stop terrorism
inside Afghanistan and that emanating from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
• While Pakistan is having this conversation with the United States and
Afghanistan as to what its priorities are in the region with respect to Afghani-
stan’s peace and stability in particular, it needs to include China as a stake-
holder as well to engage on the regional integration and connectivity issues.
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 171
The international community is pushing the Taliban to form an inclusive
government, in the absence of which no government in Afghanistan will be
recognized. Extension of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor to include
Afghanistan will provide an incentive to the Taliban and other political
stakeholders to accelerate progress on the intra Afghan peace process, which
despite Taliban’s takeover is still at stake, given that the peace dividends will
be immense for all involved. Pakistan can have two parallel conversations,
one with the United States and one with China over Afghanistan and can
also become a bridge bringing both China and the United States to not see
Afghanistan as a zero-sum game. Once the government is formed in Afghani-
stan, the United States and China can jointly work toward development and
infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.
• The third conversation Pakistan needs to have with the United States is about
the destabilizing role India has played in Afghanistan to launch its proxy war
in Pakistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan had always been one of Paki-
stan’s strategic concerns and will remain so with or without Taliban ruling
Afghanistan. Last year, in an unprecedented move, Pakistan published a com-
prehensive dossier of the Indian state-sponsored terrorist activities in Paki-
stan, making India a constant fixture of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Some of the
highlights from the dossier on the Indian sponsorship of terror inside Pakistan
via Afghanistan were:
• “Promotion/ sponsorship of listed terrorist organisations – Tehreek-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), which were uprooted
from Pakistan, to conduct cross-border attacks
• Sponsorship of Baloch insurgents inter alia to disrupt the China–Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC)
• Merging TTP splinter groups and creating a coalition between the TTP
and the Baloch secessionists
• Providing weapons, ammunition and IEDs to these groups
• Raising a special force of 700 to sabotage CPEC; training anti-Pakistan
terrorists in camps in Afghanistan and India – 66 such training camps
have been identified in Afghanistan and 21 in India
• Tasking terrorists with conducting targeted killings of important Paki-
stani personalities
• Organising of a new militia, based in Nangarhar (Afghanistan), called
“Daesh-Pakistan” by India’s spy agency (RAW)
• Setting up a dedicated cell to subvert CPEC projects with Rs 500 million
to subvert Pakistan’s progress and economic strength”43
Given this evidence, which was shared with the UN Secretary General
and the P5, it is easier for Pakistan to situate its concerns about the Indian
involvement in Afghanistan to sabotage Pakistan’s interests and raise them
with the United States so that at bilateral level, U.S. can engage India using
the evidence presented by Pakistan. That conversation should not end with
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. India evacuated its citizens and
172 Rabia Akhtar
closed its consulates in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover of Kabul in
August 2021. In the absence of a formidable political relationship with the
Taliban, Pakistan fears that India could sponsor ISKP in future to deal a blow
to the Taliban and Pakistan. Pakistan’s FM, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, made
a mention of Indian attempts to recruit terrorists from ISIS to create “Daesh
Pakistan.”44 Given the evidence of Indian attempts to destabilize Pakistan,
it is not mere speculation to suggest that the Indian strategic interests align
well with ISKP as proxy against Pakistan and the Taliban especially at a time
when the future of Afghanistan is uncertain under the current Taliban control.
For Pakistan’s part on countering terrorism, significant progress has
been made on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF)45 Action Plan, and
Pakistan has completed 21 points out of 27 points. Pakistan was placed in
FATF’s grey list in 2018 for some structural deficiencies with respect to its
domestic legal frameworks linked to terrorism financing and money launder-
ing.46 As part of Pakistan’s compliance to FATF Action Plan grey list recom-
mendations, Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) arrested and
convicted Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) Chief, Hafiz Saeed. CTD also arrested
Zakirur Rehman Lakhvi, mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks on
terrorism financing charge.47 Given this progress and promise of more, Paki-
stan is in a position of strength to demand from the international community,
especially the extra regional forces to help engage both India and Afghanistan
to stop terrorist activities emanating from Afghanistan and funded by India.

Challenges for Pakistan in Navigating the Sino-U.S. Rivalry

Pakistan’s biggest foreign policy challenge in the coming decade will be to manage
its alliances and partnerships with two major powers, China and the United States.
In a post-COVID-19 world and the manner in which regional and global security
situation is evolving, it is much likely that the coming years will see increased
competition and conflict instead of competition and cooperation between the two
powers especially with respect to how these two powers tailor their partnerships.48
The important question for Islamabad, however, is whether it would be asked to
compromise on CPEC in order to reset its equation with Washington. Given the
trajectory of U.S.–China relations during Biden’s 8 years in office as Vice Presi-
dent (2009–2017) during the two Obama administrations, it does not seem likely
that Pakistan will be pushed into a “with us or against us” situation with respect
to its relations with China. The Trump years (2018–2020) should be considered
an anomaly and should not become the lens to view how the Biden administration
will continue to deal with China despite this duo’s downward trajectory.
In 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis went on record to mark his
reservations about President Xi’s One Belt One Road project and stated,

In a globalised world, there are many belts and many roads, and no one nation
should put itself into a position of dictating “one belt, one road” . . . that said,
the One Belt One Road also goes through disputed territory, and I think, that
in itself shows the vulnerability of trying to establish that sort of a dictate.49
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 173
This statement was forcefully rejected by both Pakistan and China stating that the
disputed nature of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was already accounted for in
the CPEC projects. While Pakistan navigated the challenge of U.S. opposition
at the time this statement was made, the real challenge still remains: U.S.’ fear
of losing influence and leverage over Pakistan and seeing the loss of Pakistan to
China’s camp as it continues to drift away.
For the current government of Prime Minister Imran Khan, perhaps the biggest
challenge is to make sure that the Biden administration does not look at Pakistan
through a lens similar to that of Af-Pak. Were that to happen, the relationship would
not have any real potential to survive. Pakistan must work toward strengthening its
bilateral relationship with the United States and convey to the United States that
CPEC is not zero-sum and that Pakistan as a sovereign entity is not a mutually
exclusive domain where U.S. and Chinese security and strategic interests cannot
coexist. Pakistan needs to communicate to the Biden administration that its primary
interest in CPEC is economic, and, at the end of CPEC projects in 2030, Pakistan
aims to achieve enhanced economic indicators, improved energy infrastructure with
prosperity and better employment opportunities for its people. Pakistan in 2030
with better socioeconomic dividends and marked improvement on SDGs related to
overall human security, that is, a prosperous Pakistan, will be a better partner for the
United States. Given this long-term goal, the United States must allow Pakistan to
continue with the development projects under CPEC with no resistance.
The future of the South and Central Asian region in coming years is that of con-
nectivity and regional integration despite the geopolitics, and Pakistan is central
to how that future is shaped. Therefore,

Pakistan needs to carve out its space in the New Great Game in Central Asia
signified by the grand strategic competition between China, Russia and the
U.S. amplified by the politics of pipelines and economic corridors. Pakistan’s
entry to CARs is through CPEC, expansion of which aims at integrating
CARs into China’s BRI.50

While Pakistan continues with the CPEC projects, it must not forget that the
United States still is a major player in South and Central Asian region. Given that
Pakistan is at the heart of CPEC expansion “to include Afghanistan, CARs and the
Middle East, it must not threaten U.S. interests in the region given its incredible
clout over current and prospective CPEC partners in the region and its influence
over regional economic organizations.”51

Pakistan’s Challenge of the Growing Indo-U.S. Strategic and

Defence Partnership
The third critical foreign policy challenge for the Pakistan–U.S. relations is the
growing Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, part of which is anchored in the Sino-
U.S. strategic rivalry of which India is one component. While the United States
appears to be grooming India to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific region, Paki-
stan is the “collateral damage” and is at the downward end of what India stands
174 Rabia Akhtar
to gain from its strategic and defence partnership with the United States. Being
the world’s fifth largest economy, India is the second-largest arms importer in the
world. Since the Galwan valley skirmishes between India and China in June 2020,
India has propagated the threat of the two front war and has raised the spectre of
Pakistan–China collusion to engage India on two fronts simultaneously at the
Line of Control (Pakistan–India) and the Line of Actual Control (India–China).
After losing 20 soldiers in a fist and club fight to the Chinese PLA at the LAC,
the world awaited retaliation from India akin to the action seen at the LOC. But
India’s muted response toward the Chinese incursions on what India claims to be
its territory across the LAC in Galwan, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh speaks
volumes about the lack of India’s preparedness to fight the Chinese or even chal-
lenge them at the LAC. Therefore, anchoring its vulnerabilities in the “two-front
war” scare affords it the right audience which otherwise was not paying attention
to its defense modernization requests.
Given the humiliation Indian Air Force (IAF) faced in its botched strikes on
Balakot in Feb 2020, the drive to modernize IAF led India to accelerate the pace
of its purchase of Rafale jets from France which seemingly will provide India
with strategic advantage both against China and Pakistan. Pakistan believes that
India will be using these Rafale aircraft against Pakistan in a phantom surgical
strike across the LoC or international boundary using Pakistan as a surrogate for
deterrence signaling to China since it neither has the capability nor the resolve to
tackle China directly (as events post-Galwan suggest). For India, “bogging down
China’s ally, Pakistan, and that too, near the route of the China-Pakistan Eco-
nomic Corridor (CPEC) could be one of the ways a beleaguered India may want
to deter or at the very least hurt China.”52 This is how “Surrogate Deterrence”53
will manifest itself in South Asia as these three nuclear weapon states continue
to engage with each other, with India high on its high-ticket defense purchases.
The recent Indo-U.S. strategic communication agreement, Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement (BECA), is another case in point which comes at the
heels of India’s confrontation with the PLA in Ladakh. As part of the four foun-
dational agreements, BECA

[W]ill enable India access to classified real-time signal intelligence (SIGINT)

and other sensitive information gathered by the U.S. satellites about India’s
Northern and Western borders. This will significantly enhance the Indian
military’s situational awareness for planning conventional or nuclear strikes,
especially against Pakistan, in line with India’s evolving counterforce
temptations.54

In addition to BECA, the other three agreements between the United States and
India include the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
signed in 2002; Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA) signed
in 2016 and Communications Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COM-
CASA) signed in 2018. The other foundational agreements like COMCASA
“allows the U.S. military to transfer secure communications and data equipment
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 175
to India”; while GSOMIA will allow India as a third-country to “acquire high-end
US-made military equipment through foreign military sales (FMS) and access
defense article,” it will also allow India as a participating country to “pledge sig-
nificant support and actively cooperate with the United States to counter terrorism
and violent extremism . . . to prevent piracy in the Ocean.” Similarly, LEMOA
“gives access to both countries, to designated military facilities on either side for
the purpose of refueling and replenishment.”55
Pakistan’s concerns with these series of agreements is India’s reciprocity as
enshrined in the articles of these agreements, especially BECA, whereby India
will be sharing classified information, intelligence and operational details about
countries of mutual concern with the United States; Pakistan and China figure
prominently in that sequence. Pakistan should raise these concerns with the Biden
administration since all these agreements taken together provide India strength
which will only add to the perpetual security dilemma Pakistan faces; however,
this time, Pakistan is not alone since China too is concerned about the edge India
will get through its enhanced strategic cooperation with the United States. If the
United States is not sensitive to Pakistan’s concerns, Pakistan will be left with no
choice but to counter these agreements matching its own with those of China and
coupling up with it to deal with rapid Indian defense modernization.
If the United States continues to be the highest exporter of arms in the world
and India takes the second slot as world’s highest arms importer, the strategic
stability in South Asia which is already fragile between the three nuclear armed
states sharing disputed borders with each other will become more precarious.
Pakistan–U.S. conversation needs to address this aspect of U.S. responsibility
and its contribution to the fragility of overall deterrence and strategic instability
in South Asia.

Is Past the Prologue?

Pakistan wants to have a fresh prologue as it enters the new era of Pakistan–U.S.
relations under the Biden administration. The anchors for this new foreign policy
direction are economic security and connectivity, building developmental partner-
ships for Pakistan with those in the region and extended neighborhood. But if this
foreign policy is devoid of Pakistan’s reading of what the geostrategic compul-
sions are for the United States in South Asia and vice versa, then the dividends
will not be realized by either country.
The historical survey of Pakistan–U.S. relations conducted in this chapter
reveals convergences and divergences developed over the length of this relation-
ship. The story of foreign aid and economic sanctions, which was the hallmark
of this relationship for several decades in the 1970s and 1980s, found periods
of mutual reliance on each other giving rise to narratives that were specific to
each country. Often called a rollercoaster ride, the journey that Pakistan and the
United States have covered together since the independence of Pakistan and for-
mal alliance during the early periods of the Cold War is unique and unprecedented.
Revival of this relationship from a brutal arms embargo on Pakistan post-1965 war,
176 Rabia Akhtar
to proliferation sanctions on Pakistan for the development of its nuclear weapons
program in the 1970s, U.S.’ enlisting Pakistan’s support to oust the Soviets from
Afghanistan in a decade-long proxy war in the 1980s and lifting of sanctions, back
to nonproliferation sanctions on Pakistan in the 1990s, coming full circle to post
2001 with lifting of sanctions and enlisting Pakistan’s support for global war on
terrorism in Afghanistan – Pakistan and the United States have experienced it all.
Contemporary challenges in their bilateral foreign policy relations are not
entirely different than those faced during the Cold War decades. Pakistan is bring-
ing many ghosts from the past to this current relationship. India is still central to
Pakistan’s foreign policy alignments and so is Afghanistan. The new conversa-
tion perhaps only centers around Pakistan’s management of its relationship with
the United States and China as it makes economic security a central pillar of its
foreign policy. The good thing is that the conversation is happening and that there
is enough space to discuss each other’s expectations and deliverances, given the
rich history of their shared past which allows them to learn from what worked
for both. If Pakistan plays its cards right, and without compromising on its core
national security and foreign policy interests, this relationship will survive the
rough waters since history tells us that it has the potential to come back with much
more force and vigor than before. Past will definitely be the prologue for this
uneasy but essential relationship but will only set the context if the right lessons
are learned from history by both sides.

Notes
1 Nonalignment was Jawaharlal Nehru’s legacy, the first prime minister of India. For
details see, Jawaharlal Nehru, “Changing India,” Foreign Affairs 41, no. 3 (April 1963):
453–65.
2 For an excellent account of the Pasthunistan issue after Pakistan’s independence, see
James Spain, “Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier,” Middle East Journal 8, no. 1 (1954):
27–40.
3 Stephen Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” in Superpower Rivalry and Conflict:
The Long Shadow of the Cold War on The Twentieth Century, ed. Chandra Chari (New
York: Routledge, 2010), 75.
4 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 2002); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the
Unending War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).
5 Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” 76.
6 This research uses the definition of ‘small’ or weak states in terms of their capabil-
ities or power – having limited ineffectual capacity to influence security dynamics
in its region or to defend itself against a larger more powerful neighbor. As a newly
independent country, Pakistan’s size was small, its resources limited, and its military
strength was 1:5 in comparison to India, but it was not small in ‘influence’ given its
geostrategic location.
7 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 20.
8 There are conflicting interpretations of Liaquat Ali Khan’s non-visit to the Soviet Union
despite the invitation in 1949. One Pakistani commentator notes that Liaquat Ali Khan
‘maneuvered’ an invitation from Kremlin “as a move on the political chess board;
the United States had invited Nehru and, fearing that America would be captivated
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 177
by Nehru’s charm, Liaquat Ali Khan applied shock tactics by arranging his invitation
from Kremlin,” F. M. Innes, “The Political Outlook in Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs XXVI
(1953) quoted in Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, “Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet
Union,” Asian Survey 6, no. 9 (September 1966): 493. An Indian account of the invi-
tation maintains that it was the Soviet leadership that was annoyed by Nehru’s U.S.
visit and thereby invited Khan to visit the Soviet Union in 1949, but the visit did not
materialize and Khan decided to go to the United States, see Shri Ram Sharma, India-
USSR Relations, 1947–1971: From Ambivalence to Steadfastness, Part-1 (New Delhi:
Discovery Publishing House, 1999); chapter 4, p. 24. Yet another account records that
Joseph Stalin invited Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow in 1949, but Khan declined the
invitation, see James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan (New York: Facts on File,
2009).
9 Liaquat Ali Khan’s address in Gujranwala, Punjab on March 9, 1951 summarized by
K. Sarwar Hasan, “The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,” Pakistan Horizon 4,
no. 4 (December 1951): 181–99; pg. 5–6.
10 For details on Pak–U.S. diplomacy over the Korean War issue, see Hussain Haqqani,
Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, United States and an Epic History of Misunder-
standing (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); 52–53.
11 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1967), 130.
12 Pakistan formally withdrew from SEATO in 1973 on the pretext that the organization
or its members did not support Pakistan in its 1971 war with India. The organiza-
tion was formally disbanded in 1977. For a brief history of Pakistan’s membership
in SEATO, see “SEATO and Pakistan,” Pakistan Horizon 7, no. 3 (September 1954):
138–49.
13 For a Pakistani perspective on CENTO and the narrative of how the United States.
undermined its pledges of collective security in helping Pakistan against Indian aggres-
sion in 1965 and 1971, see Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “Secu-
rity Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to
Encircle Pakistan,” Pakistan Economic and Social Review 49, no. 1 (Summer 2011):
109–32. Pakistan’s fourth prime minister since Liaquat Ali Khan, Mohammad Hussain
Shaheed Suhrawardy (1956–57) was strongly pro-western in his approach to foreign
policy. When asked about Pakistan’s decision against the Egyptian position in the 1956
Suez crisis – which caused much disappointment with Egypt and India in the NAM –
Suhrawardy remarked, “The question is asked: why don’t we get together rather than
be tied to a big power like the UK or America? My answer to that is that zero plus zero
plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero. We have therefore, to go farther afield
rather than get all the zeros together,” quoted in Ardeshir Cowasjee, “Hypocrites to
the Core,” DAWN, December 19, 2010 cited in Tughral Yamin, “An Appreciation of
the Pakistani Military Thought Process,” Strategic Studies XXXII, no. 2–3 (Septem-
ber 2012): 114–33, see footnote, 11.
14 For a political history of Ayub Khan as Pakistan’s first military dictator, see Altaf
Gauhar, Ayub Khan: Pakistan’s First Military Ruler (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publica-
tions, 1993). For a review of political development in Pakistan during Ayub Khan’s
period, see Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).
15 “Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of Amer-
ica and the Government of Pakistan,” Treaty, March 5, 1959, Digital National Secu-
rity Archives retrieved from, accessed December 1, 2014, http://gateway.proquest.
com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:
CAF00002.
16 Khan, Friends not Masters, 117.
17 Kashmir is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan and is a legacy of the hasty
partition of the subcontinent.
178 Rabia Akhtar
18
18 K h a n , KJIHGFEDCBA
Khan, FFriends
r i e n d s notnotM a s t e r s , 117.
Masters, 117. F Foro r a bbeautiful
e a u t i f u l ode o d e to t o Badaber
B a d a b e r and and w what h a t itit m meant
e a n t for
fo r
tthe
he A Americans
m e r i c a n s who w h o served s e r v e d there,
t h e r e , seesee A Airgram
irg ra m A A-550
- 5 5 0 from f r o m tthe he E Embassy
m b a s s y in in P Pakistan
a k is ta n
ttoo thet h e Department
D e p a r t m e n t of o f State,
S t a t e , October
O c t o b e r 6, 6 , 1969
1 9 6 9 by b y James
Jam es W W.. Spain,
S p a i n , Charge
C h a r g e d’Affaires
d ’A f f a i r e s
in
i n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n (July ( J u l y to to N November
o v e m b e r 1969), 1 9 6 9 ), D Document
o c u m e n t 38, 38, F R U S , 1969–1976,
FRUS, 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 6 , vol. v o l. E E-7,
-7 ,
DDocuments
o c u m e n t s on o n South
S o u th A Asia,
s i a , 1969–1972,
1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 2 , http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
h ttp ://h is to r y .s ta te .g o v /h is to r ic a ld o c u m e n ts /
frus1969-76ve07/d38.
fru s 1 9 6 9 -7 6 v e 0 7 /d 3 8 .
19
19 K Kux,ux, D Disenchanted
i s e n c h a n t e d AAllies, l l i e s , 113.
113.
20
20 K Khan,
han, F Friends
r ie n d s N Not otM a s t e r s , 171.
Masters, 171.
21
2 1 IIbid.,
b i d . , 118.
118.
22
2 2 IIbid.,
b i d . , 119.
119.
23
2 3 IIbid.,
b i d . , 120.
120.
24
2 4 Stephen
S t e p h e n P. P . Cohen,
C o h e n , “U.S. “ U . S . Weapons
W e a p o n s and a n d South
S o u th A Asia:
s ia : A A Policy
P o lic y A Analysis,”
n a ly s is ,” P Pacific
a c i f i c AAffairs
ffa ir s
449,9 , nno. o. 1 1 (Spring
( S p r i n g 1976):
1 9 7 6 ): 4 49–69.
9 -6 9 .
25
2 5 1963
1 9 6 3 was w a s an a n important
im p o r ta n t y year
e a r forf o r Pakistan–China
P a k i s t a n - C h i n a relations.r e l a t i o n s . Pakistan
P a k i s t a n signed
s i g n e d threet h r e e agree-
a g ree ­
ments
m e n ts w with i t h China:
C h i n a : The T h e Boundary
B o u n d a ry A Agreement,
g r e e m e n t , Trade T rad e A Agreement
g r e e m e n t and a n d thet h e Civil
C iv il A Aviation
v ia tio n
AAgreement.
g r e e m e n t . The The B Boundary
o u n d a ry A Agreement
g r e e m e n t unsettled
u n s e t t l e d tthe h e IIndians
n d i a n s deeply
d e e p ly w who h o rrefused
e f u s e d tto o
aaccept
c c e p t tthe h e legitimacy
l e g i t i m a c y of o f thet h e agreement,
a g r e e m e n t , and a n d the t h e Civil
C iv il A Aviation
v ia tio n A Agreement
g r e e m e n t uunsettled n s e ttle d
tthe
h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s since
s i n c e it it pprovided
r o v i d e d China
C h i n a with w i t h uunprecedented
n p r e c e d e n t e d air a i r aaccess
c c e s s to t o aand nd b beyond
eyond
AAsia.
s ia . F For o r aan n aappraisal
p p r a i s a l of o f tthese
h e s e ttwo w o aagreements,
g r e e m e n t s , see see D Dennis
e n n is K Kux,
u x , The
T h e UnitedU n i t e d SStates ta te s
aandnd P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , 1947–2000:
1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 0 : D Disenchanted
is e n c h a n te d A l l i e s (Baltimore:
Allies ( B a l t i m o r e : Johns J o h n s Hopkins
H o p k in s U University
n iv e rs ity
PPress,
r e s s , 22001);
0 0 1 ); P Pervaiz
e r v a i z IIqbal q b a l Cheema,
C h e e m a , “Significance
“ S i g n i f i c a n c e of of P Pakistan-China
a k is ta n -C h in a B Border
o rd er A Agree-
g re e ­
mment e n t of o f 1963,”
1 9 6 3 ,” P Pakistan
a k is ta n H o r i z o n 39,
Horizon 3 9 , no.
n o . 4,4 , Focus
F o c u s on: o n : Sino-Pakistan
S i n o - P a k i s t a n Relations
R e l a t i o n s (Fourth(F o u rth
Quarter,
Q u a r t e r , 1986): 1 9 8 6 ): 4 41–52.
1 -5 2 .
2 6 IIn
26 n 1972,
1 9 7 2 , with w i t h thet h e Simla
S im la A Agreement
g r e e m e n t between
b e t w e e n the t h e twot w o governments,
g o v e r n m e n t s , tthe h e ceasefire
c e a s e f i r e linelin e
wwas a s renamed
r e n a m e d as a s tthe h e LineL i n e of o f Control.
C o n t r o l . For F o r historical
h i s t o r i c a l overview
o v e r v i e w of o f tthe h e origins
o r i g i n s of o f the
th e
KKashmir
a s h m i r dispute,
d i s p u t e , sees e e Victoria
V i c t o r i a Schofield,
S c h o fie ld , K Kashmir
a s h m i r in i n Conflict:
C o n f l i c t : IIndia,
n d ia , P Pakistan
a k is ta n a and
n d theth e
Unending
U n e n d i n g War W a r (London:
( L o n d o n : II.B. . B . Tauris,
T a u r i s , 22010).
0 1 0 ) . ForF o r an a n account
a c c o u n t of o f Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s m military
i l i t a r y strat-
s tr a t­
egy
e g y in i n 1965
1 9 6 5 war, w a r , seesee A Asghar
s g h a r Khan,
K h a n , The The F First
ir s t R Round:
o u n d : IIndo-Pakistan
n d o - P a k i s t a n War W a r 19651 9 6 5 (Lon-(L o n ­
don:
d o n : VikasV i k a s Publishing
P u b lis h in g H House
ouse P Pvt.
v t . Ltd.,
L t d . , 1979);
1 9 7 9 ) ; also a l s o see s e e Farooq
F a ro o q B Bajwa,
a j w a , FFrom rom K Kutch
u t c h toto
Tashkent:
T a s h k e n t : The T h e IIndo-Pakistan
n d o - P a k i s t a n War W a r of 1 9 6 5 (London:
o f 1965 ( L o n d o n : Hurst H u rs t & & Co, C o , 2013).
2 0 1 3 ).
2 7 “Rann
27 “ R a n n of o f Kutch,”
K u t c h ,” telegram
t e l e g r a m originated
o r i g i n a t e d from fro m A American
m e r i c a n embassy e m b a s s y officeo f f i c e in i n Rawalpindi
R a w a lp in d i
bby y A Ambassador
m b a s s a d o r McConaughy
M c C o n a u g h y tto o Secretary
S e c r e t a r y State,
S t a t e , Department
D e p a r t m e n t of o f State,
S ta te , A April
p r i l 30,3 0 , 1965
1965
cited
c i t e d in i n Roedad
R oedad K h a n , The
Khan, The A American
m e r ic a n P Papers:
a p e r s : SSecret ecret a and n d Confidential
C o n f i d e n t i a l IIndia-Pakistan-
n d ia -P a k is ta n -
BBangladesh
a n g la d e s h D Documents
o c u m e n t s 1965–19731 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 3 (Karachi:
( K a r a c h i : OxfordO x fo rd U University
n iv e rs ity P Press,
r e s s , 1999),
1 9 9 9 ) , 3–4. 3 -4 .
28
28 W With i t h rreference
e f e r e n c e tto o Bhutto’s
B h u t t o ’ s uuse s e ofo f the
t h e word
w o r d “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s territory”
t e r r i t o r y ” under
u n d e r attack,
a t t a c k , consult
c o n s u lt
FFeroz
e r o z Khan’s
K h a n ’ s account
a c c o u n t of o f tthe
h e 19651 9 6 5 war w a r in in E Eating
a t i n g Grass.
G rass.
29
2 9 “Summary
“ S u m m a r y of ofA Ambassador
m b a s s a d o r Bowles B o w l e s Memorandum,”
M e m o r a n d u m ,” Tab-A, T ab -A , M Memorandum
e m o r a n d u m for f o r thet h e Sec-
S ec­
rretary
e t a r y of o f States
S t a t e s from
fro m P Phillips
h i l l i p s Talbot,
T a lb o t, N NEA E A (reference
( r e f e r e n c e Bowles B o w le s m meeting
e e tin g w withi t h the
t h e Secre-
S e c re ­
ttary
a r y on o n June
J u n e 2, 2 , 1965),
1 9 6 5 ) , The The A American
m e r ic a n P a p e r s , 13.
Papers, 13.
30
3 0 Telegram
T e l e g r a m from fro m A Ambassador
m b a s s a d o r McConaughyM c C o n a u g h y to t o Secretary
S e c r e t a r y of o f State,
S t a t e , September
S e p t e m b e r 7, 7,
1965,
1 9 6 5 , apprising
a p p r i s i n g the t h e secretary
s e c r e t a r y of of h hisi s meeting
m e e tin g w with ith A Ayub y u b anda n d Bhutto,
B h u t t o , The The A American
m e r ic a n
P a p e r s , 36.
Papers, 36.
31
31 A Ambassador
m b a s s a d o r McConaughy’s
M c C o n a u g h y ’ s letter l e t t e r ttoo Secretary
S e c r e t a r y of o f State,
S ta te , D Dept e p t ofo f State
S t a t e on o n Septem-
S e p te m ­
bbere r 10,1 0 , 1965,
1 9 6 5 , detailing
d e t a i l i n g his h is m meeting
e e tin g w withith Z Zulfikar
u lfik a r A Ali l i Bhutto,
B h u t t o , Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s foreign
f o r e i g n minis-
m in is ­
tter,
e r , TheThe A American
m e r ic a n P a p e r s , 60–61.
Papers, 6 0 -6 1 .
3 2 IIn
32 n A April
p r i l 1965,
1965, A Ayubyub K Khan h a n visited
v i s i t e d Moscow
M o s c o w and a n d became
b e c a m e tthe h e first
firs t P Pakistani
a k is ta n i p president
re s id e n t
ttoo do d o so.so. A Ayub’s
y u b ’ s visit
v i s i t tto o Soviet
S o v ie t U Union
n i o n was w a s successful,
s u c c e s s f u l , and a n d bothb o t h countries
c o u n trie s h had a d signed
s ig n e d
aagreements
g r e e m e n t s tto o advance
a d v a n c e ttrade r a d e aand n d economic
e c o n o m i c cooperation.
c o o p e ra tio n .
33
33 M Memorandum
e m o r a n d u m of o f Johnson’s
J o h n s o n ’ s second s e c o n d pprivater i v a t e meeting
m e e tin g w with ith A Ayub
y u b on o n Dec
D e c 15, 1 5 , 1965,
1 9 6 5 , cited
c ite d
in
in K Kux,ux, D Disenchanted
is e n c h a n te d A l l i e s ; 168.
Allies; 168. A Ayub
y u b aand n d Bhutto
B h u t t o secretly
s e c r e t l y ttraveled
r a v e l e d to t o China
C h i n a for fo r a a
bbrief
r i e f ttrip
r i p on o n SepS e p 19–20,
1 9 - 2 0 , 1965, 1 9 6 5 , after
a f t e r the
t h e decision
d e c i s i o n of o f suspension
s u s p e n s i o n of o f the t h e U.S.
U . S . aid a id w was as
ffinalized
i n a l i z e d and a n d shared
s h a r e d withw i t h tthe h e ttwo.
w o . F.S.
F .S . A Aijazuddin
i j a z u d d i n in in h his i s bbook
ook F From
r o m aa H Head,
e a d , Through
T hrough a a
HHead,
e a d , to to a a H Heade a d and and K Kux u x in in D Disenchanted
is e n c h a n te d A l l i e s discuss
Allies d is c u s s A Altafl t a f Gauhar’s
G a u h a r ’ s (Information
(In fo rm a tio n
 Pakistan–U.S. Relations 179
Secretary
S e c r e t a r y uunder nder A Ayub)
y u b ) viewsv i e w s on o n the t h e secret
s e c r e t China
C h i n a visit, v i s i t , which
w h i c h hhe e details
d e t a i l s in i n his
h i s biogra-
b io g ra ­
phy
phy A KJIHGFEDCBA
Ayub
yub K Khan.
han.
34
34 The
T h e suspension
s u s p e n s io n h hada d onlyo n ly b been
e e n relaxed
r e l a x e d in i n 1966
1 9 6 6 tto o allow
a l l o w bothb o t h countries
c o u n t r i e s to t o purchase
p u r c h a s e nnon- on-
lethal
l e t h a l equipment
e q u i p m e n t from f r o m the t h e United
U n i t e d States, S t a t e s , which
w h i c h included
i n c l u d e d vehicles
v e h i c l e s and a n d electronic
e l e c t r o n i c gear.g e ar.
AAnn assessment
a s s e s s m e n t of of U U.S. .S . m military
i l i t a r y aid a i d suspension
s u s p e n s i o n in i n 1965
1 9 6 5 rrevealed
e v e a l e d tthat h a t it i t only
o n l y encour-
e n c o u r­
aged
a g e d both b o t h IIndia
n d i a and and P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to t o seek s e e k alternative
a l t e r n a t i v e aarms r m s supply
s u p p l y ppartners.
a rtn e rs . A According
c c o r d i n g to to
the
t h e rreport,
e p o rt, P Pakistan
a k i s t a n in i n 1966
1 9 6 6 “acquired
“ a c q u i r e d at a t least
l e a s t 2200 0 0 tanks
t a n k s and a n d 100 1 0 0 or o r more
m o r e aircraft
a i r c r a f t from
fro m
Communist
C o m m u n i s t China C h i n a as as w well e l l aas s aa substantial
s u b s t a n t i a l aamount m o u n t of o f other
o t h e r arms,
a r m s , suchs u c h aas s artillery
a r t i l l e r y and
and
ammunition.
a m m u n i t i o n . It I t also
a l s o got g o t ttwo
w o squadrons
s q u a d r o n s of ofM Miragei r a g e IIII’s I I ’ s from
fro m F France
r a n c e at a t a cost
c o s t of o f $100
$100 m mil- il­
lion.”
lio n .” F From
r o m tthe h e Soviets
S o v i e t s aand n d Communist
C o m m u n i s t China, C h in a , P Pakistan
a k i s t a n hopedh o p e d tto o receive
r e c e i v e ttanks a n k s and and
aircraft.
a i r c r a f t . The
T h e rreport
e p o r t assessed
a s s e s s e d that t h a t after
a f t e r tthe h e 1965
1965 w war,a r , IIndia
n d i a received
r e c e i v e d “135“135 M MIG-21
IG -2 1 F FL L jjet
et
fighters,
fig h te rs , a a MIG-21
M I G - 2 1 factory, f a c t o r y , 75 7 5 SU-7S U - 7 ffighter i g h t e r bombers,
b o m b e r s , nnumerous u m e r o u s helicopters
h e l i c o p t e r s and a n d ttrans-
ra n s­
port
p o r t aaircraft,
irc ra ft, m missiles,
i s s i l e s , some
s o m e 800 8 0 0 ttanks, a n k s , aartillery
r t i l l e r y aand n d naval
n a v a l vessels
v e s s e l s of o f various
v a r i o u s types.”ty p e s .”
Moreover,
M o r e o v e r , Indians In d ia n s b blamed
l a m e d tthe he U United
n i t e d States
S t a t e s for f o r pushing
p u s h i n g tthem h e m ttowards
o w a r d s MoscowM o s c o w due d u e toto
their
t h e i r lack
l a c k of o f response
r e s p o n s e to t o ttheir
h e i r nneeds e e d s duringd u r i n g the t h e 19651965 w war a r (reference
( r e f e r e n c e Kennedy’s
K e n n e d y ’ s denial d e n ia l
of
of F F-104s
- 1 0 4 s to t o IIndia).
n d i a ) . The T h e report
r e p o r t lists l i s t s lethal w e a p o n s or
l e t h a l weapons o r equipment
e q u i p m e n t tto o include
i n c l u d e “armed “a rm ed
or
o r armored
a r m o r e d vehicles,
v e h i c l e s , such s u c h as a s tanks
t a n k s and and A APC’s;
P C ’ s ; infantry
in fa n try w weapons;
e a p o n s ; artillery;
a r t i l l e r y ; ammuni-
a m m u n i­
tion;
t i o n ; armed
a r m e d helicopters;
h e l i c o p t e r s ; and a n d combat
c o m b a t aircraft.a i r c r a f t . Spare
S p a r e pparts a r t s in i n support
s u p p o r t of o f tthese
h e s e itemsi t e m s are a re
also
a l s o included.
in c lu d e d . N Non-lethal
o n - l e t h a l includes
i n c l u d e s ttransport;
r a n s p o r t ; observation;
o b s e r v a t i o n ; trainer
t r a i n e r aircraft;
a i r c r a f t ; aand n d unarmed
u n a rm e d
helicopters
h e l i c o p t e r s aand n d support
s u p p o r t equipment
e q u i p m e n t and a n d spares;
s p a r e s ; trucks;
t r u c k s ; communications,
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , radar r a d a r aand n d sig-
s ig ­
nal
n a l equipment;
e q u i p m e n t ; engineer
e n g i n e e r equipment;
e q u i p m e n t ; etc.” e t c .” ThisT h i s report
r e p o r t is is p part
a r t of
of a a Secret
S e c r e t Cover
C o v e r Memo- M em o­
randum
r a n d u m sent s e n t tto o Secretary
S e c r e t a r y of o f State
S t a t e HenryH e n ry K Kissinger
i s s i n g e r from fro m A Assistant
s s i s t a n t Secretary
S e c r e t a r y State S t a t e for
fo r
NNear ear E Easta s t and
a n d SouthS o u th A Asian
s ia n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , Joseph
J o s e p h Sisco, S i s c o , on on N Nov o v 14, 1 4 , 1969,
1 9 6 9 , “U.S.
“ U .S . M Military
ilita ry
Supply
S u p p l y PolicyP o l i c y for f o r South
S o u th A Asias ia – - Response
R e s p o n s e to to N NSSMS S M 226, 6, P Presidential
r e s i d e n t i a l Directives,
D ire c tiv e s , P Parta rt
III,I, D Digital
ig ita l N National
a t i o n a l Security
S e c u rity A Archives,
r c h i v e s , accessed
accessed D December
e c e m b e r 4, 4 , 220140 1 4 hhttp://gateway.pro
ttp ://g a te w a y .p r o
quest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:
q u e s t.c o m /o p e n u r l? u rl_ v e r = Z 3 9 .8 8 - 2 0 0 4 & re s _ d a t= x r i:d n s a & r f t_ d a t= x r i:d n s a :a r tic le :
CPR00383.
C PR 00383.
35
35 Ibid.,
I b i d . , 80.80.
36
36 Ibid.,
I b i d . , 112.
112.
37
37 Immediately
I m m e d i a t e l y after a f t e r attending
a t t e n d i n g the t h e UNGA
U N G A session s e s s i o n on o n 19711 9 7 1 IIndia–Pakistan
n d i a - P a k i s t a n war w a r on o n Decem-
D ecem ­
bber e r 15,
1 5 , 1971,
1 9 7 1 , Bhutto
B h u t t o requested
re q u e s te d a a meeting
m e e t i n g with w i t h tthe he U U.S.. S . Secretary
S e c r e t a r y of o f State,
S ta te , W William
illia m
RRogers,
o g e r s , and and P President
re s id e n t N Nixoni x o n and and m met e t tthem
h e m on o n December
D e c e m b e r 18, 1 8 , 1971.
1971. H Hee tthen h e n returned
r e tu r n e d
hhomeo m e to t o assume
a s s u m e tthe h e charge
c h a r g e as a s the
t h e ppresident
r e s i d e n t of ofP Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , after
a f t e r Gen.
G e n . Yahya’s
Y a h y a ’ s resignation.
re s ig n a tio n .
Kux
K u x in i n his
h i s bbookook D Disenchanted
is e n c h a n te d A l l i e s writes
Allies w r i t e s that th a t w whenh e n Bhutto
B h u t t o met m et N Nixon,
i x o n , hhe e ttoldo l d him
h im
that
th a t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n wasw a s “completely
“ c o m p l e t e l y in i n debtd e b t of o f tthe h e United
U n i t e d States S t a t e s during
d u r i n g the t h e rrecent
e c e n t ttrying
ry in g
days,”
d a y s , ” and a n d hhe e w was a s assured
a s s u r e d by by N Nixoni x o n of o f full
f u l l support
s u p p o r t bby y ttheh e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s in i n the
t h e form
fo rm
of
o f humanitarian
h u m a n i t a r i a n aand n d economic
e c o n o m i c assistance,
a s s is ta n c e , w with i t h military
m i l i t a r y aassistance
s s i s t a n c e bbeinge i n g tthe he m most o s t dif-
d if­
ficult
f i c u l t one
o n e dued u e to t o congressional
c o n g r e s s i o n a l ‘attitudes,’
‘ a t t i t u d e s ,’ K Kux, ux, 2 204–5.
0 4 -5 . F For o r ttheh e complete
c o m p l e t e account
a c c o u n t of o f tthe
he
meeting
m e e t i n g bbetween e tw e e n B Bhutto
h u t t o aand n d Rogers,
R o g e r s , see s e e Telegram
T e l e g r a m 227784 2 2 7 7 8 4 from f r o m tthe h e State
S t a t e Department
D e p a rtm e n t
to
t o ttheh e Embassy
E m b a s s y in i n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , Dec D e c 18, 1 8 , 1971,
1971, N National
a tio n a l A Archives,
rc h iv e s , R Record
e c o r d Group
G r o u p 59, 5 9 , Cen-
C en­
tral
t r a l Files
F i l e s 1970–73,
1 9 7 0 -7 3 , P POL O L 15–1 1 5 -1 P PAK,AK, F R U S , 1969–1976,
FRUS, 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 6 , Vol. V o l. E E-7,
-7 , D Documents
o c u m e n t s on o n South
S o u th
AAsia,s i a , 1969–1972.
1 9 6 9 -1 9 7 2 .
38
38 On
O n February
F e b r u a r y 5, 5 , 1969,
1969, N Nixon
i x o n directed
d ir e c te d a a review
r e v i e w of o f U.S.’s
U . S . ’ s ChinaC h i n a policy,
p o lic y , U U.S.. S . objec-
o b je c ­
tives
t i v e s and a n d interests
i n t e r e s t s towards
t o w a r d s China, C h i n a , nature n a t u r e of o f Chinese
C h i n e s e Communist
C o m m u n i s t tthreat h r e a t in in A Asia s i a and
and
aa cost–benefit
c o s t - b e n e f i t analysis
a n a l y s i s of o f U.S.U . S . approaches
a p p r o a c h e s on o n China.
C h i n a . See See N National
a t i o n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Study S tu d y
Memorandum
M e m o r a n d u m 14, 14, w www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nationalsecurity
w w .n ix o n lib r a r y .g o v /v ir tu a llib r a ry /d o c u m e n ts /n a tio n a ls e c u r ity
studymemoranda.php
s t u d y m e m o r a n d a . p h p On On F February
e b r u a r y 221, 1 , 1969,
1969, N Nixon
i x o n directed
d i r e c t e d a rreview e v i e w of o f ttheh e U.S.
U . S . armsa rm s
supply
s u p p l y policy
p o l i c y in i n South
S o u th A Asia,
s i a , seesee N National
a t i o n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Study S t u d y Memorandum
M e m o r a n d u m 26. 26.
39
39 “How
“ H o w tthe heW Worldo r l d Reacted
R e a c t e d tto o Taliban
T a l i b a n Takeover
T a k e o v e r of o fK Kabul,”
a b u l,” A / / 'a z e e r a ,August
Aljazeera, A u g u s t16, 1 6 ,2 2021,
0 2 1 , www.
www.
aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/16/how-the-world-reacted-to-taliban-takeover-of-kabul.
a l j a z e e r a . c o m / n e w s / 2 0 2 1 / 8 / 1 6 / h o w - t h e - w o r l d - r e a c t e d - t o - t a l i b a n - t a k e o v e r - o f - k a b u l.
40
40 For
F o r a chronology
c h r o n o l o g y of o f Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s role r o l e in in A Afghan
fg h a n P Peace
eace P Process,
r o c e s s , see s e e CSSPR
CSSPR A Afghanistan
fg h a n is ta n
Country
C o u n t r y Study, S tu d y , h https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Afghanistan-
ttp s ://c s s p r .u o l.e d u .p k /w p - c o n te n t/u p lo a d s /2 0 2 0 /1 0 /A fg h a n is ta n -
Country-Study-1.pdf.
C o u n tr y - S tu d y - 1 .p d f.
180 Rabia Akhtar
41
4 1 Shamila
S h a m ila N N.. Chaudhary,
C h a u d h a r y , “Trump“ T r u m p Gave G ave P Pakistan
a k i s t a n What
W h a t It I t Wanted,
W a n te d , b butut A Afghan
fg h a n P Peace
eace
IIs
s FarFar F From G u a ra n te e d ,” N
r o m Guaranteed,” KJIHGFEDCBA J u l y 24,
P R , July
NPR, 2 4 , 22019,
0 1 9 , www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744575066/
w w w .n p r.o r g /2 0 1 9 /0 7 /2 4 /7 4 4 5 7 5 0 6 6 /
opinion-trump-gave-pakistan-what-it-wanted-but-afghan-peace-is-far-from-guarante.
o p in io n - tru m p - g a v e - p a k is ta n - w h a t- it-w a n te d - b u t- a f g h a n -p e a c e - is -f a r -f ro m - g u a ra n te .
42
4 2 The
T h e ttwenty-seventh
w e n t y - s e v e n t h report r e p o r t ofo f the
th e U UN N A Analytical
n a l y t i c a l Support
S u p p o r t aand n d Sanctions
S a n c t i o n s Monitoring
M o n ito rin g
Team
T e a m pursuant
p u r s u a n t to t o rresolutions
e s o l u t i o n s 15261 5 2 6 (2004)
( 2 0 0 4 ) anda n d 222532 5 3 (2015)
( 2 0 1 5 ) submitted
s u b m i t t e d to t o the
t h e Security
S e c u rity
Council
C o u n c i l hhttps://undocs.org/S/2021/68.
ttp s ://u n d o c s .o rg /S /2 0 2 1 /6 8 .
43
43 A Anwer
n w e r IIqbalq b a l andand N Naveed
a v e e d Siddiqui,
S i d d i q u i , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Shares
S h a r e s Dossier
D o s s i e r on o n India’s
I n d i a ’ s Terror
T e r r o r Cam-
C am ­
ppaign
a ig n w withith U UN N Secretary
S e c r e t a r y General,”
G e n e r a l ,” D DAWN,
AWN, N November
o v e m b e r 225, 5 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.dawn.com/
w w w .d a w n .c o m /
nnews/1592313.
e w s/1 5 9 2 3 1 3 .
44
44 N Naveed
a v e e d Siddique,
S i d d i q u e , “Irrefutable
“ Irre fu ta b le E Evidence:
v i d e n c e : Dossier
D o s s i e r on o n IIndia’s
n d i a ’ s Sponsorship
S p o n s o r s h i p of o f State
S t a t e Ter-
T e r­
rrorism
o r i s m in in P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Presented,”
P r e s e n t e d ,” The The D DAWN,
AWN, N November
o v e m b e r 14, 1 4 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , www.dawn.com/
w w w .d a w n .c o m /
nnews/1590333.
e w s/1 5 9 0 3 3 3 .
45
45 F Financial
in a n c ia l A Action
c t i o n Task
T ask F Force
o r c e (FATF)
( F A T F ) is is aa global
g l o b a l policy-making
p o l i c y - m a k i n g body.body.
46
46 M Mapping
a p p i n g Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s Compliance
C o m p l i a n c e with w i t h FFATFATF R Recommendations,
e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , RSIL R S IL R Report,
e p o r t , Sep-
Sep­
ttember
e m b e r 22020, 0 2 0 , https://rsilpak.org/2020/mapping-pakistans-compliance-with-fatf-recom
h ttp s ://r s ilp a k .o r g /2 0 2 0 /m a p p in g - p a k is ta n s - c o m p lia n c e -w ith - fa tf - re c o m
mmendations/.
e n d a tio n s /.
47
4 7 IImran
m r a n Gabol, G a b o l , “LeT “ L e T leaderle a d e r L Lakhvi
akhvi A Arrested
r r e s t e d from
f r o m Lahore
L a h o r e on o n Terrorism
T e r r o r i s m Financing
F in a n c in g
Charge:
C h a r g e : CTD,”C T D ,” D A W N , Jan
DAWN, J a n 2,2 , 22021,
021, w www.dawn.com/news/1599281.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 9 9 2 8 1 .
48
48 R Rabia
a b ia A Akhtar,
k h t a r , “COVID-19
“ C O V I D - 1 9 and a n d ttheh e Geopolitical
G e o p o l i t i c a l Dilemma:
D ile m m a : B Battle
a t t l e ofo f tthe
he E Elephants?”
le p h a n ts ? ”
in
in M Making
a k i n g SSense e n s e of o fP Post
o s t COVID-19
C O V I D - 1 9 World W o r ld P o l i t i c s , eds.
Politics, eds. H Huma um a B Baqai
a q a i and
and N Nausheen
ausheen
WWasi a s i (Karachi:
( K a r a c h i : Lightstone
L ig h ts to n e P Publishers,
u b l i s h e r s , Karachi
K a r a c h i Council
C o u n c i l on o n Foreign
F o r e i g n Relations
R e l a t i o n s (KCFR),
(K C F R ),
July
J u ly 2 2020).
0 2 0 ).
49
49 M Muhammad
uham m ad F Faisal,
a i s a l , “Analyzing
“ A n a l y z i n g U.S. U . S . Objections
O b j e c t i o n s tto o CPEC,”
C P E C ,” IISSI S S I IIssuessue B r i e f , Octo-
Brief, O c to ­
bber
e r 17, 1 7 , 2017,
2 0 1 7 , http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/IB_Faisal_October_17_
h ttp ://is s i.o r g .p k /w p - c o n te n t/u p lo a d s /2 0 1 7 /1 0 /IB _ F a is a l_ O c to b e r _ 1 7 _
22017.pdf.
0 1 7 .p d f.
50
50 R Rabia
a b ia A Akhtar,
k h ta r, B Building
u ild in g R Regional
e g i o n a l Connectivity
C o n n e c t i v i t y ffor or P Pakistan,
a k is ta n , F FESES M Monograph,
o n o g ra p h ,
DDecember
e c e m b e r 22019, 0 1 9 , https://csspr.uol.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/BUILDING-
h ttp s ://c s s p r .u o l.e d u .p k /w p - c o n te n t/u p lo a d s /2 0 2 0 /0 1 /B U I L D I N G -
RREGIONAL-CONNECTIVITY.pdf.
E G IO N A L - C O N N E C T I V I T Y .p d f.
51
5 1 IIbid.,
b i d . , 52.
52.
5 2 Syed
52 Syed A Ali li Z Zia i a Jaffery,
J a f f e r y , “India
“ I n d i a anda n d tthehe L Line
i n e of o f Control:
C o n t r o l : Reducing
R e d u c in g R Reputational
e p u ta tio n a l D Dam-
am ­
age,” t r a f a s i a , July
a g e , ” SStrafasia, J u l y 17, 1 7 , 22020,
0 2 0 , hhttps://strafasia.com/india-and-the-line-of-control-
ttp s ://s tr a f a s ia .c o m /in d ia - a n d - th e -lin e -o f -c o n tr o l-
rreducing-reputational-damage/.
e d u c in g - re p u ta tio n a l-d a m a g e / .
53
5 3 The
T h e author
a u t h o r coined
c o i n e d thist h i s tterm
e r m in in a a wwebinar
e b in a r h hosted
o s t e d bby y the
t h e Institute
I n s t i t u t e of o f Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Studies,
S tu d ie s ,
IIslamabad
s l a m a b a d on o n July
J u l y 3, 3 , 2020
2 0 2 0 aavailable
v a i l a b l e here
h e r e www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yNPG2Zdik0.
w w w .y o u tu b e .c o m /w a tc h ? v = 8 y N P G 2 Z d ik 0 .
54
54 A Adild i l Sultan,
S u l t a n , “India-US
“ In d ia -U S B Basic
a s ic E Exchange
x c h a n g e anda n d Cooperation
C o o p e ra tio n A Agreement
g r e e m e n t (BECA),”
( B E C A ) , ” hhttps://ttp s ://
strafasia.com/india-us-basic-exchange-and-cooperation-agreement-beca/.
s t r a f a s i a .c o m / i n d i a - u s - b a s i c - e x c h a n g e - a n d - c o o p e r a t i o n - a g r e e m e n t - b e c a / .
55
5 5 “The
“ T h e Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Value
V a l u e of o f Signing
S i g n i n g GSOMIA,
G S O M I A , LEMOA, L E M O A , COMCASA C O M C A S A and and A ACSACSA A Agree-
g re e ­
mmente n t with
w i t h theth e U US,” S , ” Global
G lo b a l D Defense C o r p , January
e f e n s e Corp, J a n u a r y 17, 1 7 , 22021,
021, w www.globaldefensecorp.
w w .g lo b a ld e fe n s e c o rp .
com/2021/01/17/gsomia-lemoa-and-acsa/.
c o m / 2 0 2 1 / 0 1 / 1 7 / g s o m i a - l e m o a - a n d - a c s a /.
11 The Contours of Pakistan’s
Relations with Russia
Adeela Ahmed

Introduction
During the Cold War, Pakistan and the then Soviet Union maintained limited
ties due to their affiliation with opposite security blocs. Pakistan tilted toward
the United States and gained economic and military assistance by signing anti-
Communist military pacts. The Soviet Union maintained closer ties with India.
Islamabad–Moscow ties further deteriorated during the 1980s as Pakistan vehe-
mently opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was at the turn of the twenty-
first century especially during the 2010s that the relationship began to improve.
Against this backdrop, this chapter explicates the significance of Pakistan–Russia
relations in the current strategic environment and sheds light on what converges
their interests. It first provides a short historical background of the relationship.

From Divergence to Convergence: A Historical Background

Pakistan and the former Soviet Union established diplomatic relations in
May 1948. For the initial years, the relations between the two sides remained
stable. In 1950, Joseph Stalin invited the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to
visit the Soviet Union. Following this, Khan also received an invitation from the
US President Harry S. Truman to visit the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan set aside
the former invitation and visited the United States. Analysts termed that it was a
decisive moment in Pakistan’s foreign policy to tilt toward the Western Bloc.1
In the following years, Pakistan actively pursued pro-US alignment, and India
under Nehru’s leadership tilted toward a socialist camp led by the Soviet Union.
Thus, both Pakistan and the USSR were placed in opposite security blocs from
the very beginning. Pakistan formally joined the capitalist bloc and signed four
defense-related pacts by 1959. Based on its commitment, Pakistan was regarded
as ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia.’2 Pakistani decision-makers were clear
that it was just the right way to build up country’s defense capabilities against
the archrival India. While in return the United States got the extraterritorial privi-
lege, Pakistan allowed the United States to establish an intelligence network in
Peshawar for spying on the USSR. In 1962, a US U-2 aircraft that took off from
Peshawar, Pakistan, was shot down by the Soviets, and its pilot was captured.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-13
182 Adeela Ahmed
The incident annoyed Soviet leader Khrushchev who threatened Pakistan with
dire consequences taking the bilateral relations to the lowest ebb.3
During the 1960s, Pakistan sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union
in trade and cultural areas. In April 1964, Ayub became the first Pakistani ruler
to visit Moscow. The relations again froze as the Soviet Union sided with India
during the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971 under the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship, Peace, and Cooperation.4 Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s visit to
Moscow in 1974 once again helped in improving two-way ties.5 The Soviet Union
assisted Pakistan in the establishment of the Pakistan Steel Mill (PSM) and key
thermal power plants at Muzaffargarh, Multan, and Guddu and supported Paki-
stan in the establishment of the Oil and Gas Development Company (OGDC).
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 once again deteriorated
the relationship as Pakistan played a frontline state role in the anti-Soviet war of
United States throughout the 1980s.6
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Russia in 1999 began to thaw
the relationship. On that occasion, Pakistan acknowledged Moscow as an ‘emerg-
ing global power’ and stressed the importance of the multipolarity of world poli-
tics. Russian President Boris Yeltsin termed the visit as a start of a new chapter
in bilateral ties.7 Under the presidentship of Vladimir Putin who came to power
in May 2000, relations began to improve. Both sides started two-way visits. As
an important development, Russia supplied Pakistan with MI-17 and MI-35
attack helicopters.8 In 2007, the 3-day official visit of the Russian Prime Minister,
Mikhail Fradkov, to Pakistan after 38 years brightened the prospects of improved
relations in the future. He had in-depth discussions with the then President Gen-
eral Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.9 In 2010, the relations
further improved as Russia invited Pakistan for a summit on Afghanistan. In 2011,
Putin publicly endorsed Pakistan’s bid to join the SCO and stated that Pakistan
was an important partner of Russia in South Asia. He offered Russia’s assistance
in the expansion of Pakistan Steel Mills and the provision of technical support for
the Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants. Russia also offered help in develop-
ing the Thar Coal Project.10 Pakistan became a full member of the SCO at the
Astana Summit in June 2017. This was not possible without Russian support.11
Hence, both countries are positively engaged with each other in different areas.12
An assessment of the evolving structure of the Pakistan–Russia relationship
reveals that both sides intend to expand their options in search of reliable regional
partners.
A look at regional geopolitical environment demonstrates growing tension
between Russia and the US. Moscow’s main security concerns are US edge in
conventional armaments, NATO expansion, and the prospect of regime change
by promoting democracy. The US National Security Strategy-2017 pinpointed
Russia as one of the key threats to US interests.13 Likewise, the US Indo-Pacific
strategy titled ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP), the reemergence of Quad-
rilateral Security Alliance QUAD,14 US-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, and the
Indo-US strategic partnership all were seen with unease in Moscow. It was in
this backdrop that Russia issued its ‘Maritime Doctrine-2020’15 and ‘National
 Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 183
Security Strategy-2021’ to highlight its foreign policy priorities in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean region.16 At the same time, Russia was working on economic
revival to regain its (lost) political-diplomatic prominence at the international
level. It expanded its market especially in the high-tech industry and military
enterprises in addition to its traditional market of goods.17 A gradual shift in Rus-
sian policy from the West to the East demonstrated its need to make new alliances
and strategic partnerships.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has realized the importance of collaboration and
has started working on revisiting its foreign policy, especially under the current
government.18 Pakistan due to its geostrategic location and strong clout in the
Islamic world reset its goals to make its geo-strategic significance worthwhile.
It partnered with China in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) whose ‘flagship’
project the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passed through it. The
CPEC once completed will not only benefit these two strategic partners but
also benefit regional countries especially Iran, Afghanistan, the Central Asian
Republics, and Russia. At the same time, a gradual lukewarmness in Pakistan’s
ties with the United States in the backdrop of burgeoning Indo-US partnership
especially in defense and nuclear areas further required Pakistan to search for
new allies.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan and Russia started taking measures to come
closer to each other. They began consultation on Afghanistan (along with other
countries) while also ramping up their mutual engagements under bilateral and
multilateral arrangements like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).19
It is appraised that their relations are mainly affected and shaped by the strate-
gic international environment, rather than the domestic factors.20 As both have
decided to improve their relations, they face both challenges and opportunities.

Challenges
The key challenges that the two countries are facing include a) trust deficit, b)
Russia’s continued ties with India, c) minimal media coverage, d) limited socio-
cultural ties, e) and the language barrier. Since the two countries had maintained
a limited relationship in the past, it will take time for the both sides to fill the
gap. At the same time, Russia’s closer strategic partnerships with India, Paki-
stan’s archrival, continue to remain an issue. In past, both sides did not pay
attention to promoting their languages and culture. Only recently, some efforts
were made in this regard. For example, the first bilingual Urdu-Russian diction-
ary was published.21Moreover, the two countries lacked social media platforms
which could play an important role in constructing a positive perspective of their
relations. Given the limited sociocultural ties, it will be difficult to promote their
relations in the absence of specialized organizations. The Area Study Centre at
Peshawar University focuses on Russia and Central Asia. However, its scope was
limited to academic research. Likewise, the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies,
Moscow, had only a few scholars dealing with Pakistan.22 According to Paki-
stani Embassy in Moscow, there are hardly 1,200 Pakistani nationals in Russia for
184 Adeela Ahmed
23
study,
s t u d y , bbusiness,
u s i n e s s , or o r bblue-collar
lu e -c o lla r w work.
o r k . 2 3 InIn a a country
c o u n t r y withw i t h over
o v e r 1001 0 0 million
m i l l i o n of of p popu-
opu­
lation, this is a very small number and reflects the limited
la tio n , th is is a v e r y s m a ll n u m b e r a n d r e f le c ts th e lim ite d n a tu re o f r e la tio n s h ip .24 nature of relationship. 24

Along these challenges and limitations, several opportunities

A lo n g th e s e c h a lle n g e s a n d lim ita tio n s , s e v e r a l o p p o r tu n itie s to e x p a n d th e ir to expand their
cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n in i n tthe h e changing
c h a n g i n g geopolitical
g e o p o l i t i c a l landscape
l a n d s c a p e are a re k knocking
n o c k i n g at a t the t h e door.
d o o r.
Though
T h o u g h r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n R u s s i a a n d P a k i s t a n h a v e r e m a i n e d t u r b u l e n t over
relations between Russia and Pakistan have remained turbulent o v e r the
th e
years,
y e a r s , they
t h e y have h a v e bbecome e c o m e comparatively
c o m p a r a t i v e l y warmer w a r m e r over o v e r tthe h e last
l a s t decade.
d e c a d e . Moscow
M o s c o w is is
reaffirming
r e a f f i r m i n g its i t s roler o l e in i n its
i t s economic,
e c o n o m i c , political/diplomatic,
p o l i t i c a l / d i p l o m a t i c , and a n d defense
d e f e n s e domains,d o m a in s,
whereas
w h e r e a s Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d is i s seeking
s e e k i n g new n e w avenues
a v e n u e s of o f opportunities
o p p o r t u n i t i e s tto o lessen
l e s s e n its i t s reliance
r e lia n c e
25
on
o n t h e W e s t . 2 5 T h e r e i s a n e e d t o t a p t h o s e n e w a v e n u e s o f c o o p e r a t i o n that
the West. There is a need to tap those new avenues of cooperation t h a t were
w e re
lost
l o s t ini n tthehe p past.
a s t.
Russian
R u s s i a n President
P r e s i d e n t Vladimir V l a d i m i r Putin’s
P u t i n ’ s vision
v i s i o n of o f multipolarity
m u l t i p o l a r i t y of o f world
w o rld p politics,
o litic s ,
greater
g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t s i n S o u t h A s i a a n d t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , a n d e m p h a s i s u p o n eco-
interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and emphasis upon eco­
nomic
n o m i c revival
re v iv a l p provide
r o v i d e opportunities
o p p o r t u n i t i e s ffor or P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to t o bbuild
u i l d upon
u p o n its i t s relations
r e la tio n s w withith
26
veto-yielding
v e t o - y i e l d i n g power. p o w e r . 2 6 In I n particular,
p a r t i c u l a r , ifif P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is i s able
a b l e to t o connect
c o n n e c t CPEC C P E C with w ith
Russian
R u s s i a n the t h e Eurasian
E u r a s i a n EconomicE c o n o m i c Union U n i o n (EAEU),(E A E U ), w willi l l open
open n new
e w pathways
p a t h w a y s in i n the
th e
27
Eurasian
E u r a s i a n h i n t e r l a n d . 2 7 U s i n g i t s g e o s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n a s w e l l a s t h e c u r r e n t inter-
hinterland. Using its geostrategic location as well as the current in te r­
national
n a tio n a l p political
o l i t i c a l climate,
c l i m a t e , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is i s inin a a u unique
n iq u e p position
o s i t i o n of o f having
h a v i n g the t h e opportu-
o p p o r tu ­
28
nity to develop close relations
n ity to d e v e lo p c lo s e r e la tio n s w ith R u s s ia .28 with Russia.
On
O n the t h e othero t h e r hand, h a n d , tthereh e r e is i s ana n understanding
u n d e r s ta n d in g w within
ith in R Russia
u s s i a that
th a t P Pakistan
a k i s t a n is is a a
29
‘key regional player.’ The increased number of visits on
‘ k e y r e g i o n a l p l a y e r .’ 2 9 T h e i n c r e a s e d n u m b e r o f v i s i t s o n b o t h s i d e s i s i t s t e s t i ­ both sides is its testi-
mony.
m o n y . In I n February
F e b r u a r y 2018, 2018, P Pakistan’s
a k is ta n ’s F Foreign
o r e i g n Minister
M i n i s t e r Khawaja
K h a w a j a Asif A s i f vvisited
is ite d R Russia
u s sia
and
a n d m e t w i t h h i s R u s s i a n c o u n t e r p a r t , S e r g e y L a v r o v . T h e t w o m i n i s t e r s a g r e e d tto
met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. The two ministers agreed o
expand
e x p a n d their t h e i r bbilateral
i l a t e r a l engagement.
e n g a g e m e n t. F Following
o l l o w i n g this,t h i s , tthe
h e 13th
1 3 t h meeting
m e e t i n g of o f the t h e Paki-
P a k i-
stan–Russia
s t a n - R u s s i a Consultative
C o n s u l t a t i v e Group G r o u p on o n Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Stability
S t a b i l i t y was
w a s heldh e l d in i n Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d in in
March
M a r c h 2019. 2 0 1 9 . ForeignF o r e i g n Secretary
S e c r e t a r y Tehmina
T e h m i n a Janjua J a n j u a anda n d Deputy
D e p u t y Foreign
F o r e ig n M Minister
i n i s t e r of
of
Russia
R u s s i a SergeiS e rg e i R Ryabkov
y a b k o v led l e d their
t h e i r respective
r e s p e c t i v e delegations.
d e le g a tio n s.
In
I n a n i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t , Pakistan’s
an important development, P a k i s t a n ’ s PrimeP r i m e Minister
M i n i s t e r Imran
I m r a n Khan K h a n and a n d For-
F o r­
eign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi held
e ig n M in is te r S h a h M a h m o o d Q u r e s h i h e ld h ig h - le v e l m e e tin g s w ith R high-level meetings with Russian
u s s ia n
President
P r e s i d e n t Vladimir
V la d im ir P Putin
u t i n anda n d Foreign
F o r e i g n Minister
M i n i s t e r Sergey
S e r g e y Lavrov
L a v r o v on o n tthe h e sidelines
s id e lin e s
of
o f t h e S C O s u m m i t i n B i s h k e k i n J u n e 2 0 1 9 . T h i s m e e t i n g c a u g h t the
the SCO summit in Bishkek in June 2019. This meeting caught th e w world’s
o r l d ’s
attention.
a t t e n t i o n . P a k i s t a n c o n v e y e d t h a t i t w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n b u i l d i n g s y n e r g i e s w i t h Rus-
Pakistan conveyed that it was interested in building synergies with R u s­
sia
s i a and
a n d to t o chart
c h a r t new n e w frontiers
f r o n t i e r s of o f engagement.
e n g a g e m e n t . In I n September
S e p t e m b e r 2020, 2 0 2 0 , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n For- F o r­
eign
e ig n M Minister
i n i s t e r vvisited
i s i t e d Moscow
M o s c o w tto o attend
a t t e n d the t h e Council
C o u n c i l of o f Foreign
F o r e ig n M Ministers
i n i s t e r s of o f SCO
SCO
30
Member
M e m b e r States S t a t e s (SCO-CFM).
( S C O - C F M ) .3 0 B Botho t h countries
c o u n t r i e s agreed
a g r e e d tto o expand
e x p a n d ttheirh e i r cooperation
c o o p e r a tio n
31
on
o n regional
r e g i o n a l connectivity
c o n n e c t i v i t y projects.p r o j e c t s . 3 1 OnO n AprilA p r i l 7, 7 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , Russian
R u s s i a n foreign
f o r e i g n ministerm in is te r
Sergey
S e r g e y L a v r o v m a d e a 2 - d a y v i s i t t o P a k i s t a n a f t e r a g a p o f 9 y e a r s . D u r i n g the
Lavrov made a 2-day visit to Pakistan after a gap of 9 years. During th e
visit,
v is it, h hee met m et w with i t h alla ll h high-level
i g h - l e v e l officials
o f f i c i a l s that
th a t a a month
m o n t h later l a t e r resulted
r e s u l t e d in i n the t h e sign-
s ig n ­
ing
i n g of of a a key k e y ttrade r a d e agreement
a g r e e m e n t on o n North-South
N o r t h - S o u t h Gas G a s Pipeline
P ip e lin e P Project
r o j e c t (NSGPP).
(N S G P P ).
The
T h e f r e q u e n c y o f b i l a t e r a l v i s i t s h a s b e e n p l a y i n g a r o l e t o s m o o t h e n the
frequency of bilateral visits has been playing a role to smoothen th e p path
a t h ffor
or
mutual
m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e k e y s a r e a s t h a t w i l l f u r t h e r o p e n o p p o r t u n i t i e s and
understanding of the keys areas that will further open opportunities and
will
w i l l develop
d e v e l o p tthe h e level
l e v e l of o f trust
t r u s t tthrough
h r o u g h reliable
r e l i a b l e communication.
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . There T h e re w were e r e specu-
specu­
lations in media that the Russian President might
la tio n s in m e d ia th a t th e R u s s ia n P r e s id e n t m ig h t v is it P a k is ta n o n c e C O V I D -1 9visit Pakistan once COVID-19
situation
s i t u a t i o n is i s under
u n d e r control.
c o n tr o l.
Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n o n counterterrorism
on c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m is i s another
a n o t h e r emerging
e m e r g i n g area a r e a of o f cooperation
c o o p e r a tio n
b e t w e e n P a k i s t a n a n d R u s s i a . B o t h s i d e s a r e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e rise
between Pakistan and Russia. Both sides are concerned about the r i s e of o f terrorist
te r r o r is t
 Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 185
organizations in the region especially the ISIS Khorasan (IS-K).32 Russia reported
that the terrorist body had 71,000 fighters, whereas the US Intelligence reported
that it had 20,000 to 30,000 fighters.33 In 2014, when ISIS was at its peak, some
10 million people were living in areas controlled by it. At the beginning of 2016,
ISIS had control over 78,000 sq/km in Iraq and Syria, but it lost 17,600 sq/km in
the same year. In January 2015, ISIS declared Afghanistan and Pakistan as being
part of the Wilayat Khorasan. It established the Khorasan Council to look after
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.34 Both Pakistan and Russia have serious
security concerns for their regional economic projects.
Pakistan–Russia cooperation in the defense sector is also on the rise. This
reflects in the form of high-level official visits, joint military exercises, estab-
lishment of joint military commission, Russian military assistance to Pakistan,
and security training agreement and naval cooperation. In 2015, Pakistan’s Army
Chief Raheel Sharif visited Russia. Under a defense deal, Islamabad purchased
Mi-35M Hind-E assault helicopters from Moscow.35 In March 2017, Russian
military delegation visited Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the same year, the special
forces of the two countries launched joint counterterrorism drills ‘DRUZBA-
Friendship 2017’ in the mountains and forests of Russia’s North Caucasus repub-
lic of Karachay-Cherkessia.36
On April 24, 2018, Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Naseer Janjua and
Army Chief General Bajwa paid an official visit to Russia. At that occasion,
Bajwa appreciated Russia’s ‘positive role’ in resolving the ‘complex security
of the region’ and extended Pakistan’s full cooperation. The visit resulted in an
understanding to expand the security cooperation between the two countries.37
On July 11, 2018, Pakistan hosted an unprecedented meeting of the heads of
intelligence agencies from Russia, China, and Iran to discuss counter-terrorism
cooperation with a particular focus on the buildup of the Islamic State in Afghani-
stan. Participating countries stressed the need for more active inclusion of regional
powers in the efforts to end the war in Afghanistan and stressed on taking steps
to prevent the trickling of IS terrorists from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan, from
where they would pose risks for neighboring countries.38
On July 3, 2019, Russian Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander in Chief
Russian Ground Forces, visited Islamabad and held talks with the top Pakistani
military leadership. Both the countries agreed to enhance security/training coop-
eration and to adopt measures to further expand joint military ties. Pakistani Army
Chief stated that cooperation between both countries will not only help in improv-
ing peace and stability in the region but will also usher in economic prosperity.39
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Nadeem Raza,
in his meeting with the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation, General
Valery V. Gerasimov, discussed bilateral defense ties and the regional security
situation. Gen. Raza was on a 2-day official visit to Russia to attend the Defense
and Security Cooperation Conference at the SCO forum in September 2020.40
After 2 months, on November 8, 2020, a two-week-long military drill Druzhba-V
(Friendship) commenced in Tarbela, Islamabad.41 Druzhba-VI, military exercises
between Pakistan and Russia concluded in October 2021 in Molkino Training Area
186 Adeela Ahmed
in Krasnodar, Russia.42 The exercise was held despite the threat of the COVID-19
pandemic. Pakistan and Russia each has hosted three exercises. This reflected the
consistency in bilateral cooperation between the two countries.43
In the time of shifting geopolitical landscape, Russia’s search for new arms
markets44 and Pakistan’s search for new suppliers also drive the evolving pattern
of a two-way relationship. This is particularly noticeable if compared to the past
when defense ties were very limited. In this regard, the visits of Pakistan Army
Chief General Ashfaq Kayani and Air Chief Marshall Tahir Rafiq in 2011 and
2012 respectively played an important role. On June 2, 2014, Russia lifted its arms
embargo on Pakistan.45 Second, on November 21, 2014, both countries signed the
defense agreement which was termed as a ‘milestone in their evolving relations.46
Following this, both sides signed the Russia–Pakistan Joint Military Consultative
Committee (JMCC) and the ‘Contract for Admission of Service Members of Paki-
stan in RF’s (Russian Federation) Training Institutes. This enabled Pakistan to
gain training in Russian military institutions.47 Moscow and Islamabad conducted
joint naval drills in the Arabian Sea in 2014 and 2015. Russia also participated in
some of the AMAN naval exercises regularly organized by Pakistan Navy.48 From
2014 to 2021, the frequency of high-level official visits by military officials of
both sides, the setting up of the joint military commission, and naval cooperation
signaled that both states were cooperating to sustain the momentum of evolving
defense relations.
Bilateral trade between the two countries remained limited throughout the past.
Some of the policies adopted during the 1980s and 1990s imposed restrictions on
trade in particular. According to reports, during the 1980s, some Pakistani and the
Soviet Union companies were engaged in the trade of textile and other materials.
The Soviet companies opened accounts in the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP)
to ensure the smooth functioning of this barter trade. As the Soviet Union disinte-
grated, these funds were stuck. There were claims and counterclaims by the busi-
ness community of both sides. Pakistani companies acquired stay orders from the
Sindh High Court (SHC) restraining the NBP from transferring funds amounting
to $104.93 million to the Russian banks.49 In response, Russia imposed restric-
tions on trade with Pakistan thus adversely affecting the bilateral trade for years.
Under the new bonhomie, Islamabad agreed to return US$93.5 million to Russia
and the pending exporters’ claims of US$23.8 million as per agreements set in
2016 and 2017, respectively.50 This removed the legal barriers and opened new
avenues of trade between Pakistan and Russia.51 According to media reports, Rus-
sia expressed its willingness to invest in different sectors of Pakistan.52 Thus, the
removal of key stumbling block in two-way trade relationship will enable Russia
to invest in different sectors of Pakistan.
On November 19, 2020, Pakistan and Russia signed a revised deal for laying
the Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline with major shareholding for Islamabad. In the
revised project structure, Pakistan will hold 74 percent shares whereas Russia will
have a 26 percent stake. Earlier, the agreement was for Russia to build the pipeline
on the build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) model and hand over its owner-
ship to Pakistan after 25 years.53
 Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 187
Under
U n d e r tthe h e growing
g r o w i n g economice c o n o m i c and a n d ttrader a d e tties,
i e s , the
t h e sixth
s i x t h session
s e s s i o n of of P Pakistan–Rus-
a k ista n -R u s ­
sia
s i a I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t C o m m i s s i o n s ( I G C ) o n T r a d e , E c o n o m i c , S c i e n t i f i c , and
Inter-Government Commissions (IGC) on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and
Technical
T e c h n i c a l Cooperation
C o o p e r a tio n w was a s held
h e l d in i n Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d in in D December
e c e m b e r 2018. 2 0 1 8 . RussiaR u s s i a extended
e x te n d e d
cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n tto o P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to t o revive
r e v i v e the t h e country’s
c o u n t r y ’s steel s t e e l mills
m i l l s and a n d enhance
e n h a n c e its i t s pro-
p ro ­
54
ductivity
d u c t i v i t y a n d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f N S G P P .5 4 B o t h s i d e s u r g e d t o r e m o v e the
and in the construction of NSGPP. Both sides urged to remove th e
ttemporary
e m p o ra ry b ban
a n on o n Pakistan’s
P a k i s t a n ’ s agriculture
a g r i c u l t u r e exports
e x p o r t s including
i n c l u d i n g rice r i c e and and p potatoes.
o t a t o e s . The
The
RRussian
u s s i a n side
s i d e invited
i n v i t e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n to t o organize
o rg a n iz e a a roadr o a d show
s h o w in in M Moscowo s c o w to t o provide
p r o v i d e an an
opportunity to the Russian private companies to
o p p o r tu n ity to th e R u s s ia n p r iv a te c o m p a n ie s to e x p lo r e n e w a v e n u e s in P explore new avenues in Pakistan.
a k ista n .
On
O n the t h e Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i side,s i d e , it i t invited
i n v i t e d Russia
R u s s i a tto o p participate
a r t i c i p a t e in i n trade
t r a d e expose x p o s in in P Pakistan.
a k is ta n .
R u s s i a i s p a r t i c u l a r l y k e e n o n p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e g a s p i p e l i n e , e l e c t r i c i t y , and
Russia is particularly keen on participating in the gas pipeline, electricity, and
other
o t h e r energy
e n e r g y projects.
p r o j e c t s . According
A c c o r d i n g to t o media
m e d i a reports,
re p o rts , R Russia
u s s i a has has p promised
r o m is e d a a hefty
h e f ty
55
sum
s u m of o f US$14
U S$14 b billion
i l l i o n tto o bbe e invested
i n v e s t e d in in P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s energy
e n e r g y sector. s e c to r .55
At
A t t h e e n d , i n J u n e 2 0 2 1 , R u s s i a l i f t e d i t s b a n o n t h e i m p o r t of
the end, in June 2021, Russia lifted its ban on the import of P Pakistani
a k i s t a n i rice.
ric e .
According
A c c o r d i n g t o r e p o r t s , P a k i s t a n e x p o r t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 5 , 0 0 0 t o n s of
to reports, Pakistan exported approximately 35,000 tons o f rice
r i c e and
and
other
o t h e r grains
g r a i n s worth
w o r t h $40–50 $ 4 0 - 5 0 million.m illio n . F Federal
e d e ra l M Minister
i n i s t e r ffor o r National
N a tio n a l F Food
o o d Secu-Secu­
rity
r i t y Fakhar
F a k h a r Imam I m a m stated s t a t e d tthath a t “there
“ t h e r e is is a a market
m a rk e t p potential
o t e n t i a l of o f 2.5 2 . 5 million
m i l l i o n ttonnes
onnes
o f P a k i s t a n ’s r i c e i n R u s s i a . ” 5 6 P a k i s t a n i - R u s s i a n t r a d e s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased
Pakistani-Russian trade significantly i n c r e a s e d in
56
of Pakistan’s rice in Russia.” in
2020,
2 0 2 0 , reaching
r e a c h i n g an a n all-time
a l l - t i m e highh i g h of o f $790
$ 7 9 0 million,
m illio n , a a 4646 p percent
e r c e n t rise,r i s e , owing
o w i n g primar-
p rim a r­
ily
i l y ttoo substantial
s u b s t a n t i a l shipments
s h i p m e n t s of of R Russian
u s s i a n wheatw h e a t to t o support
s u p p o r t Islamabad’s
I s l a m a b a d ’ s domesticd o m e stic
57
consumption.
c o n s u m p t i o n .5 7 According
A c c o r d i n g tto o the
th e P Pakistan
a k i s t a n Economic
E c o n o m i c Survey S u r v e y 2020–21,
2 0 2 0 - 2 1 , Russia R u s sia w was as
58
not
n o t a m o n g th e to p 1 0 c o u n tr ie s o f P a k is ta n i f o o d e x p o r ts .58 T h e f o o d g r o u p is a
among the top 10 countries of Pakistani food exports. The food group is a
significant
s i g n i f i c a n t sector
s e c t o r of of P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s economy,
e c o n o m y , and a n d the t h e country
c o u n t r y is i s already
a l r e a d y exporting
e x p o rtin g
rice
r i c e ttoo 1401 4 0 countries.
c o u n t r i e s . ThereT h e r e is is a a need
n e e d to to u utilize
t i l i z e tthese
h e s e channels
c h a n n e l s of o f opportunities
o p p o r t u n i t i e s tto o
increase trade.
in c re a s e tra d e .
Russia
R u s s i a hash a s vastv a s t potential
p o t e n t i a l ffor o r itsi t s military-industrial
m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l complex,
c o m p l e x , IT I T Industries,
I n d u s t r i e s , and
and
energy
e n e r g y r e s o u r c e s . A c c o r d i n g t o B P ’ s S t a t i s t i c a l R e v i e w o f W o r l d Energy
resources. According to BP’s Statistical Review of World E n e r g y 2020 2020
report,
r e p o r t , Russia
R u s s i a holdsh o l d s around
a r o u n d 19.1 1 9 .1 p percent
e r c e n t of o f the t h e ttotal
o ta l p proven
r o v e n natural
n a t u r a l gas g a s reserves
re serv e s
59
thus being the largest producer in the world.
th u s b e in g th e la r g e s t p r o d u c e r in th e w o r ld .59 O n th e o th e r h a n d , P On the other hand, Pakistan
a k i s t a n is is
energy-deficient
e n e r g y - d e f i c i e n t country.
c o u n t r y . As As R Russia
u s s i a intends
i n t e n d s to t o revive
r e v i v e its i t s economy,
e c o n o m y , Pakistan P a k i s t a n could
c o u ld
bbe e ana n important
i m p o r t a n t destination
d e s t i n a t i o n of o f its
i t s energy
e n e r g y exports.
e x p o r t s . At A t thet h e sames a m e time, t i m e , Russia
R u s s i a is i s look-
lo o k ­
ing forward to expanding its business market especially
in g f o r w a r d to e x p a n d in g its b u s in e s s m a r k e t e s p e c ia lly in th e h ig h - te c h in d u s tr y in the high-tech industry
and
a n d military
m i l i t a r y enterprises
e n t e r p r i s e s in i n addition
a d d i t i o n tto o ttheh e ttraditional
r a d i t i o n a l marketm a r k e t of o f goods
g o o d s and a n d ttrade.
ra d e.
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n c a n c o n t r i b u t e i n t h e d o m a i n s o f m a n p o w e r , d o m e s t i c m a r k e t s , need
can contribute in the domains of manpower, domestic markets, n e e d ffor or
defense
d e f e n s e equipment,
e q u i p m e n t , and a n d ttechnology
e c h n o lo g y w withi t h Russia.
R u s s i a . Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has h a s the th e p potential
o t e n t i a l in
i n ffood
ood
products
p r o d u c t s and a n d tthe h e ttextile
e x t i l e sectors.
s e c to r s . F Furthermore,
u r t h e r m o r e , given g i v e n its i t s strategic
s t r a t e g i c location,
l o c a t i o n , Pakistan
P a k ista n
can
c a n p r o v i d e R u s s i a a n d t h e C e n t r a l A s i a n S t a t e s a n o u t l e t t o t h e Indian
provide Russia and the Central Asian States an outlet to the I n d i a n Ocean.
O cean.
Both
B o t h sidess i d e s are a re p pushing
u s h i n g ttheir h e i r relations
r e l a t i o n s tto o n new e w heights.
h e i g h t s . According
A c c o r d i n g to to a a R Russian
u s s ia n
analyst:
a n a ly st:

Russia
R u s s i a should
s h o u l d explore
e x p l o r e ttheh e potential
p o t e n t i a l ffor
o r expanding
e x p a n d i n g commercial
c o m m e r c i a l relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w ith
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n t h r o u g h t w o t r a n s - c o n t i n e n t a l t r a d e c o r r i d o r s . T h e N - C P E C + and
through two trans-continental trade corridors. The N-CPEC+ and
W-CPEC+
W - C P E C + bbeing e i n g the t h e northern
n o r t h e r n and
a n d western
w e s t e r n expansions
e x p a n s i o n s of o f CPEC
C P E C respec- re sp e c­
tively.
t i v e l y . N-CPEC+,
N -C P E C + , w which
h i c h can
c a n also
a l s o bbe e called
c a l l e d the
t h e RuPak
R u P a k corridor,
c o r r i d o r , envisions
e n v i s i o n s the
th e
creation
c r e a t i o n o f a t r a d e c o r r i d o r t h r o u g h p o s t - w a r A f g h a n i s t a n , w h i l e W-CPEC+
of a trade corridor through post-war Afghanistan, while W -C P E C +
would
w o u l d run ru n p parallel
a r a l l e l tto
o tthe
h e stalled
s ta lle d N North-South
o r t h - S o u t h Transport
T r a n s p o r t Corridor
C o r r i d o r (NSTC)
(N S T C ) v via
ia
188 Adeela Ahmed
Iran and Azerbaijan. It’s arguably in Moscow’s best interests to pursue these
proposals since they align with President Putin’s earlier expressed desire
to expand Eurasian connectivity, but once again, Russia will have to resist
Indian pressure if this is to happen.60

Pakistan plans to import gas and other natural fuel resources by the proposed gas
pipeline to Gwadar with the rail and road link and beyond. As already mentioned,
Moscow has signed the protocol to construct the NSGPP in Pakistan. However,
this project will take time to implement due to the US sanctions on Russian com-
panies and red-tapism on the Pakistani side. About the case of the Gas Infrastruc-
ture Development Cess (GIDC), Pakistan’s Supreme Court set a deadline of 6
months, but both countries failed to make progress. While on a political and dip-
lomatic level, efforts are in process to implement the gas pipeline project, Pakistan
has to cope up with the technical issues of laying a 56-inch diameter pipeline for
gas transmission as Pakistan Sui gas companies can only lay a pipeline of 42-inch
diameter.61
Both countries are also consolidating their ties with Beijing thus drifting into
a similar group. China has become an economic juggernaut, exemplified by the
BRI. This is a linchpin that can bring these countries closer both economically
and strategically. Apart from this, the CPEC linkage with the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union will augment trade and cooperation in energy while opening up the
routes to the warm waters for Russia.
According to the International Trade Centre World Trade Map, the volume of
bilateral trade between Russia and Pakistan stood at 532 million USD in 2018
compared to 442 million USD in 2017. In 2021,790 million USD trade was
observed between Moscow and Islamabad that was of 46 percent rise.62 It was
primarily due to the export of Russian wheat to Islamabad. This is still much
lower than the actual potential. There is a need to remove remaining barriers and
tap new opportunities.

Policy Options for Pakistan

1 Pakistan–Russia relations are not high profile and are still in a formative
phase. At this stage, there is a need to build greater understanding and trust
between the two sides.
2 The CPEC provides an excellent opportunity to Russia for its outlet to the
Indian Ocean. Pakistan must not be a battleground for China, Russia, and
the United States. Instead, it should focus on making its location strategic to
make it more beneficial by availing economic opportunities that have been
and are arising.
3 There is a need to expand people-to-people connectivity between Russia and
Pakistan.
4 Pakistan should proactively work to establish an institutional mechanism to
enhance cooperation in diverse fields. It has to gear up the governmental
commission in trade and commerce and institute more working groups in
 Pakistan’s
P Relations
a k i s t a n ’s R e l a t i o n s with Russia
w ith R 189
u s s i a ZYXWVUTSRQPON
189

agriculture and the technology industry. Both countries need to use exist-
ing channels for enhancing bilateral trade through harnessing business-to-
business and institutional relations.
5 The Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting should give more
media coverage to Russia to further boost the relations in a positive light.

Conclusion
With rapid changes in global politics, countries are realigning their foreign policy
choices. This is bringing Pakistan and Russia closer to each other, even though
both were in opposite camps in the past. In the backdrop of the rapidly changing
geopolitical landscape of Eurasia, both sides should focus on connectivity pro-
jects. These should lay down a roadmap for future cooperation that will give a new
shape to their politics, defense, and trade ties. In fully promoting Pakistan–Russia
ties, there seems to be a degree of reluctance on Russia’s side due to the sensitivi-
ties of its relations with traditional ally India. What would be the impact of India’s
growing ties with the United States on Indo-Russian relations is yet to be seen.
Even though Russian–Pakistani ties will not be at the expense of India, New Delhi
will be perturbed if Moscow deepens closer ties with Islamabad beyond a certain
level. Russia requires a more balanced policy toward the subcontinent to expand
ties with Pakistan. Thus far, some encouraging signs can be discerned in Islamabad–
Moscow ties, but they still are not enough to ensure the level of trust required to
turn the relationship genuinely robust. Both countries should focus to fathom the
benefits of economic cooperation as a vehicle of growth, a phenomenon that could
help turn a page in this relationship.63 The baggage of history has to be left behind
in a bid to take ties to the next level.64

Notes
11 Syed
Syed R Riffat
iffa t H Hussain,
u s s a i n , “Pak-Soviet
“ P a k -S o v ie t R Relations
e l a t i o n s Since
S i n c e 1947:
1947: A A DDissenting
is s e n tin g A Appraisal,”
p p r a i s a l , ” SStra-
tr a ­
tegic t u d i e s 10,
t e g i c SStudies 1 0 , no.
no. 3 3 (1987):
( 1 9 8 7 ) : 66,
66, w www.jstor.org/stable/45182719.
w w .js to r .o r g /s ta b le /4 5 1 8 2 7 1 9 .
22 Mohammed
M oham m ed A Ayub
yub K Khan,
h a n , “The
“T he P Pakistan-American
a k is ta n -A m e ric a n A Alliance,”
llia n c e ,” F Foreign
o r e ig n A Affairs,
f f a i r s , January
J a n u a ry
1964,
1964, w www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1964-01-01/pakistan-american-alliance.
w w .fo r e ig n a f fa irs .c o m /a rtic le s /a s ia /1 9 6 4 -0 1 - 0 1 /p a k is ta n - a m e ric a n - a llia n c e .
33 Sarfraz
S a r f r a z Khan
K h a n and and N Noor
oor A Amin,
m i n , “An
“ A n Overview
O v e r v i e w of o f Pak-Soviet/Russia
P a k - S o v i e t / R u s s i a Relations,”
R e l a t i o n s , ” Cen-
C en­
tral
tr a l A s i a 71
Asia 7 1 (2012):
( 2 0 1 2 ) : 1–28.
1 -2 8 .
44 NNazir
a z i r Hussain
H u s s a i n and a n d Quratulain
Q u r a t u l a i n Fatima,
F a t i m a , “Pak-Russian
“ P a k - R u s s ia n R Relations:
e la tio n s : H Historical
i s t o r i c a l Legacies
L e g a c ie s
and
and N Newew B Beginnings,”
e g i n n i n g s , ” Central
C e n tr a l A s i a 72
Asia 7 2 (2015):
( 2 0 1 5 ) : 6. 6.
55 N
Nazir
a z ir HHussain,
u s s a i n , “Pak-Russia
“ P a k -R u s s ia R Relations:
e la tio n s : L Losto s t Opportunities
O p p o r t u n i t i e s and
and F Future
u t u r e Options,”
O p t i o n s , ” JJour-
o u r­
nal
n a l ofo fPPolitical S t u d i e s 19,
o l i t i c a l Studies 1 9 , no.
n o . 11 (2012).
(2 0 1 2 ).
Author’s
66 A u t h o r ’ s conservation
c o n s e r v a tio n w with
i t h Former
F o r m e r Official
O f f i c i a l of o f tthe
he M Ministry
i n i s t r y of
of D Defence,
e fe n c e , P Pakistan
a k is ta n L Lt.
t.
General
G e n e r a l (R),
(R ), N Naeem
a e e m Lodhi.
L o d h i.
77 Muhammad
M u h a m m a d Owais, O w a i s , “Pakistan–Russia
“ P a k is ta n -R u s sia R Relations:
e l a t i o n s : Economic
E c o n o m i c and and P Political
o l i t i c a l Dimensions,”
D im e n s io n s ,”
Pakistan
P a k is ta n H o r i z o n 60,
Horizon 6 0 , no.
n o . 22 (2007):
( 2 0 0 7 ) : 127.
127.
88 A
Adnan
dnan A Alil i Shah,
S h a h , “Pakistan–Russia
“ P a k is ta n -R u s s ia R Relations:
e la tio n s : P Post-Cold
o s t-C o ld W War ar E Era,”
r a , ” SStrategic
t r a t e g i c SStud-
tu d ­
i e s 21,
ies 2 1 , no.
no. 2 2 (2001):
( 2 0 0 1 ) : 31–60.
3 1 -6 0 .
99 Muhammad
M uham m ad N Nawaz
a w a z KhanK h a n and a n d Beenish
B e e n is h A Altaf,
l t a f , “Pakistan-Russia
“ P a k i s t a n - R u s s i a Rapprochement
R a p p r o c h e m e n t and and
Current
C u r r e n t Geo-Politics,”
G e o - P o l i t i c s , ” IIPRI o u r n a l 13
P R I JJournal 1 3 (2013):
( 2 0 1 3 ) : 125–34.
1 2 5 -3 4 .
10
1 0 Hussain,
H u s s a i n , “Pak-Russia
“ P a k - R u s s i a Relations.”
R e la tio n s .”
190 Adeela Ahmed
11 APP, “It Is a Historic Day’: Pakistan Becomes Full Member of SCO at Astana Sum-
mit,” Dawn, June 9, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1338471.
12 Almas Haider Naqviand Yasir Masood, “Rejuvenating Pakistan-Russia Rela-
tions,” Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2017): 18–38.
13 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Decem-
ber 2017,” (2017), www.heritage.org/defense/report/preparing-the-us-national-security-
strategy-2020-and-beyond.
14 The Quadrilateral Alliance also known as Asian NATO is a strategic forum between
the US, Japan, and India formed in 2007.
15 Petr Topychkanov, “Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine Moves the Focus from Non-Western
Threats,” SIPRI, October 1, 2020, www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/russias-
nuclear-doctrine-moves-focus-non-western-threats.
16 Igor Denisov, “What Russia’s National Security Strategy Has to Say About Asia,”
The Diplomat, July 14, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/what-russias-national-
security-strategy-has-to-say-about-asia/ see also Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia’s
2021 National Security Strategy: Cool Change Forecasted for the Polar Regions,”
RUSI, July 14, 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/
russias-2021-national-security-strategy-cool-change-forecasted-polar-regions.
17 Author’s conversation with Gul Dad, Director Research and HR Manager at Pakistan
Institute of Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) Islamabad, November 23, 2020.
18 For a detailed discussion on the changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy under Prime Min-
ister Imran Khan, see Chapter 1 of this book.
19 Author’s conversation with Rabia Akther, Director Centre for Security, Strategy and
Policy Research (CSSPR) Islamabad, November 28, 2020.
20 Author’s conversation with Manzoor Afridi, Chairman Department of International
Relations and Politics, International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), Novem-
ber 15, 2020.
21 Qaisar Zulfiqar, “Bridging Cultural Borders: First-Ever Urdu-Russian Dictionary
Launched,” The Express Tribune, August 2, 2012, https://tribune.com.pk/story/416250/
bridging-cultural-borders-first-ever-urdu-russian-dictionary-launched.
22 Author’s conversation with Leonid Savin, Geopolitical analyst, Chief editor of Geopo-
litica.ru, November 12, 2020.
23 Embassy of Pakistan, Moscow, http://parepmoscow.com/en/pakistan-russia-relations/.
24 Author’s conversation with Leonid Savin.
25 Author’s conversation with Najam Rafique, Director Research Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad.
26 C. Dale Walton, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and the Rest: By Angela Stent
(New York: Twelve, 2019), 448 pp.’ (2020): 403.
27 Author’s conversation with Muhammed Asif Nawaz, Senior Research Fellow Institute
of Policy and Research Institute Islamabad, November 15, 2020.
28 Author’s conversation with Dr. Tehmina Aslam Ranjha, Assistant Professor at Univer-
sity of Lahore, Lahore, December 2, 2020.
29 Nishtha Kaushiki, “Factors Contributing to an Emerging Russia-Pakistan Strategic
Proximity,” Journal of International and Area Studies 26, no. 1 (2019): 43–64.
30 “Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of SCO Member States (SCO-CFM),
Moscow, 9–10 September 2020,” Ministry of Foreign Affair Islamabad, http://mofa.
gov.pk/meeting-of-the-council-of-foreign-ministers-of-sco-member-states-sco-cfm-
moscow-9-10-september-2020/.
31 Ibid.
32 The word Khorasan was used by Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in his saying that an
army of black flags will carry out a war from Khorasan and called it a Battle of Hind.
ISIS declared the region as a Wilayat Khorasan (Governorate). Khorasan was a prov-
ince (Wilayat) under the Muslim rulers of Umayyad and Abbasid era. It had parts
of Afghanistan, Central Asian States, Pakistan, and China. In 2014, a group of 50
 Pakistan’s Relations with Russia 191
members
m e m b e r s in
i n Syria
S y r i a first used
firs t u s e d the
t h e name
n a m e of
o f ISIS
I S I S Khorasan.
K h o r a s a n . The
T h e members
m e m b e r s of
o f this
t h i s group
g ro u p
were
w e r e nnatives
a t i v e s of
o f Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , Chechnya,
C h e c h n y a , aand Afghanistan.
nd A f g h a n i s t a n . Pakistan, Afghanistan,
P a k is ta n , A f g h a n i s t a n , the
th e
United
U n i t e d States,
S t a t e s , and
a n d Taliban
T a l i b a n are
a r e currently
c u r r e n t l y ffighting
i g h t i n g against
a g a i n s t so-called
s o - c a l l e d IISIS Wilayat
S IS W i l a y a t Kho-
K ho-
rasan.
r a s a n . This
T h is W Wilayat
i l a y a t is
i s becoming
b e c o m in g a a direct
d i r e c t security
s e c u r i t y threat
t h r e a t to t o Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , China,
C h i n a , Russia,
R u s s i a , and and
Iran.
Ira n .
33
33 Muhammad
M uham m ad A Aminm i n and a n d Muhammad
M uham m ad A Asif,
s i f , “ISIS
“IS IS K Khorasan:
h o rasa n : P Presence,
re se n c e, A Affiliations
f f i l i a t i o n s andand
RRegional
e g io n a l A Alliances
l l i a n c e s with
w i t h Russia,” KJIHGFEDCBA
R u s s i a , ” Walia o u r n a l 35,
W a l i a JJournal 3 5 , nno. o. 1 1 (2019):
( 2 0 1 9 ) : 70–76,
7 0 - 7 6 , hhttp://waliaj.
ttp ://w a lia j.
com/wp-content/2019/11w.pdf.
c o m /w p -c o n te n t/2 0 1 9 /1 1 w .p d f.
34
34 Ibid.
Ib id .
35
35 Franz-Stefan
F r a n z - S t e f a n Gady, G a d y , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Receives
R e c e iv e s 4 4 A Advanced
dvanced A Attack
t t a c k Helicopters
H e l i c o p t e r s from f r o m Rus- R u s­
s i a , ” The
sia,” The D ip lo m a t, A
Diplomat, u g u s t 19,
August 1 9 , 22017,0 1 7 , hhttps://thediplomat.com/2017/08/pakistan-
ttp s ://th e d ip lo m a t.c o m /2 0 1 7 /0 8 /p a k is ta n -
receives-4-advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/.
r e c e i v e s - 4 - a d v a n c e d - a t t a c k - h e l i c o p t e r s - f r o m - r u s s i a /.
36
36 NNewsew s D Desk,
e s k , “DRUZBA
“ D R U Z B A 2017: 2017: P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , Russia
R u s s ia H Hold
o ld A Anti-Terror
n t i - T e r r o r Exercise,”
E x e r c i s e ,” The The E Express
xpress
T r i b u n e , September
Tribune, S e p t e m b e r 225, 5 , 22017,
0 1 7 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/1515661/pakistan-russia-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /1 5 1 5 6 6 1 /p a k is ta n - r u s s ia -
bbegin-military-drills.
e g in -m ilita ry -d rills .
37
37 Baqir
B a q i r Sajjad
S a j j a d Syed,
S y e d , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , Russia
R u s s ia A Agree
g r e e to t o Boost
B o o s t Military
M i l i t a r y Cooperation,”
C o o p e ra tio n ,” D Dawn,
aw n,
AApril
p r i l 25, 2 5 , 22018, 018, w www.dawn.com/news/1403729/pakistanrussia-agree-to-boost-mili
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 0 3 7 2 9 /p a k is ta n ru s s ia -a g re e - to -b o o s t- m ili
ttary-cooperation.
a ry -c o o p e ra tio n .
38
38 Correspondent,
C o r r e s p o n d e n t , “Pakistan“ P a k i s t a n Hosts
H o s t s Spy S p y Chiefs
C h i e f s from f r o m Russia,
R u s s i a , China,
C h i n a , Iran,”
I r a n , ” The The E Express
xpress
T r i b u n e , July
Tribune, J u l y 13, 1 3 , 22018,0 1 8 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/1756610/1-pakistan-hostsspy-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /1 7 5 6 6 1 0 /1 - p a k is ta n - h o s ts s p y -
chiefs-russia-china-iran/.
c h i e f s - r u s s i a - c h i n a - i r a n /.
39
39 Ibid.
Ib id .
440
0 “Pakistan–Russia
“ P a k i s t a n - R u s s i a Defence D e f e n c e Ties T i e s Discussed,”
D i s c u s s e d ,” D a w n , September
Dawn, S e p t e m b e r 6, 6 , 22020, 0 2 0 , www.dawn.
w w w .d a w n .
com/news/1578167.
c o m /n e w s /1 5 7 8 1 6 7 .
441
1 Staff
S t a f f Reporter,
R e p o r t e r , “Russian
“ R u s s i a n Troops
T ro o p s A Arrive
r r i v e for fo r D Drill
r i l l with
w ith P Pakistan
a k is ta n M Military,”
i l i t a r y ,” D Dawn,
aw n,
NNovember
o v e m b e r 6, 6 , 2020,
2020, w www.dawn.com/news/1588880.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 8 8 8 8 0 .
442
2 AAPP,P P , “Pakistan-Russia
“ P a k i s t a n - R u s s i a exercisee x e r c i s e ends,”
e n d s ,” D a w n , October
Dawn, O c t o b e r 10, 1 0 , 22021,
0 2 1 , hhttps://www.dawn.
ttp s ://w w w .d a w n .
com/news/1651156.
c o m /n e w s /1 6 5 1 1 5 6 .
443
3 Staff
S ta ff R Reporter,
e p o r t e r , “Russian
“ R u s s i a n Troops
T ro o p s A Arrive
r r i v e forf o r Drill
D r i l l with
w i t h Pakistan
P a k is ta n M Military.”
i l i t a r y .”
444
4 AAccording
c c o r d i n g to t o SIPRI
S IP R I R Report
e p o r t 22021,
021, R Russia
u s s i a has h a s consistently
c o n s i s t e n t l y bbeen e e n among
a m o n g tthe he w world’s
o r ld ’s
ttop
o p ffive i v e military
m i l i t a r y spenders
s p e n d e r s and a n d modified
m o d i f i e d its i t s world
w o r l d rank r a n k to t o be b e the
t h e fourth-largest
f o u r th - la r g e s t w withith
an
a n annual
a n n u a l increase
i n c r e a s e in i n its
i t s military
m i l i t a r y expenditure
e x p e n d i t u r e of o f 44.5 .5 p percent
e r c e n t to t o $65.1
$ 6 5 . 1 bbillion i l l i o n after
a f t e r tthe
he
United
U n i t e d States,
S t a t e s , China,
C h i n a , and a n d IIndia.
n d ia .
445
5 AAFP,F P , “Russia
“ R u s s ia L Lifts
ifts A Armsrm s E Embargo
m b a r g o tto o Pakistan:
P a k i s t a n : Report,”
R e p o r t ,” D a w n , June
Dawn, J u n e 22,, 2014,2 0 1 4 , accessed
accessed
AAugust
u g u s t 220, 0 , 22021,021, w www.dawn.com/news/1110131.
w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 1 1 0 1 3 1 .
446
6 Baqir
B a q i r Sajjad
S a j j a d Syed,S y e d , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , Russia
R u s s i a Sign S ig n L Landmark
a n d m a r k Defence D e f e n c e Cooperation
C o o p e ra tio n A Agree-
g re e ­
ment,”
m e n t,” D Dawn,
aw n, N November
ovem ber 2 21,1 , 22014,
0 1 4 , www.dawn.com/news/1145875
w w w . d a w n . c o m / n e w s / 1 1 4 5 8 7 5 see s e e also
a ls o A Ayaz y a z Gul,
G u l,
“Pakistan,
“ P a k is ta n , R Russia
u s s i a Sign
S ig n R Rare
a r e Military
M i l i t a r y Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n Pact,” P a c t ,” VoANews,
V oA N ew s, A August
u g u s t 8, 8 , 22018,
018,
www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-russia-sign-rare-military-cooperation-
w w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /s o u th - c e n tra l- a s ia /p a k is ta n - ru s s ia - s ig n - r a r e -m ilita r y -c o o p e ra tio n -
pact.
p a c t.
477
4 Baqir
B a q i r Sajjad
S a j j a d Syed,S y e d , “Accord
“ A c c o r d with w ith R Russia
u s s i a Signed
S i g n e d for f o r Training
T r a i n i n g of o f Pakistani
P a k i s t a n i Troops,”
T ro o p s ,”
DDawn,
aw n, A August
u g u s t 8, 8 , 22018,
0 1 8 , www.dawn.com/news/1425673.
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 4 2 5 6 7 3 .
448
8 NNaveed
a v e e d Siddiqui,
S i d d i q u i , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n N Navy’s
a v y ’s A Amanm a n 22021 021 E Exercise
x e r c i s e Concludes
C o n c l u d e s with w i t h ‘Grace-‘G ra c e ­
ful’
f u l ’ International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Fleet F le e t R Review,”
e v i e w ,” D a w n , February
Dawn, F e b r u a r y 16, 1 6 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , www.dawn.com/news/
w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /
1607705.
1607705.
449
9 Zafar
Z a fa r B Bhutta,
h u t t a , “Pakistan
“ P a k i s t a n Settles
S e t t l e s Soviet-Era
S o v i e t - E r a TradeT r a d e Dispute
D i s p u t e with w ith R Russia,”
u s s i a , ” The The E Express
xpress
Tribune,
T r ib u n e , N November
o v e m b e r 7, 7 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , hhttps://tribune.com.pk/story/2095099/2-pakistan-settles-
ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /2 0 9 5 0 9 9 /2 - p a k is ta n - s e ttle s -
decades-old-trade-dispute-russia.
d e c a d e s -o ld -tra d e -d is p u te -ru s s ia.
50
50 Ibid.
Ib id .
51
51 AAuthor’s
u t h o r ’ s Conversation
C o n v e r s a t i o n with w i t h Lenoid
L e n o i d Savin.
S a v in .
52
52 Ibid.
Ib id .
53
53 The
T h e Correspondent,
C o r r e s p o n d e n t , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , Russia
R u s s i a SignS i g n Revised
R e v i s e d Gas G a s Pipeline
P ip e lin e D Deal,”
e a l , ” TheThe E Express
xpress
Tribune,
T r ib u n e , N November
o v e m b e r 19, 1 9 , 2020,
2 0 2 0 , https://tribune.com.pk/story/2272729/pakistan-russia-
h ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /2 2 7 2 7 2 9 /p a k is ta n - r u s s ia -
sign-revised-gas-pipeline-deal.
s ig n - r e v is e d - g a s - p ip e lin e - d e a l.
192 Adeela Ahmed
54
5 4 IImran
m ra n A Ali l i Kundi,
K u n d i , “Pakistan,
“ P a k is ta n , R Russia
u s s ia AAgree
g r e e tto
o Give
G iv e B Bilateral
i l a t e r a l Trade
T rad e a a Boost,” KJIHGFEDCBA
B o o s t , ” The
The N Nation,
a tio n ,
DDecember
e c e m b e r 12, 1 2 , 2019,
2 0 1 9 , hhttps://nation.com.pk/12-Dec-2019/pakistan-russia-agree-to-give-
ttp s ://n a tio n .c o m .p k /1 2 - D e c -2 0 1 9 /p a k is ta n - r u s s ia -a g r e e - to -g iv e -
bbilateral-trade-a-boost.
ila te ra l-tra d e -a -b o o s t.
55
55 Z Zafar
a f a r Bhutta,
B h u t t a , “Building
“ B u ild in g a N New e w Strategic
S tra te g ic R Relationship,”
e la tio n s h ip ,” D Dawn,
a w n ,A August
u g u s t 9,
9 , 2021,
2 0 2 1 , hhttps://
ttp s ://
ttribune.com.pk/story/2314618/building-a-new-strategic-relationship.
r ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to ry /2 3 1 4 6 1 8 /b u ild in g - a - n e w -s tra te g ic - re la tio n s h ip .
56
56 W Web eb D Desk,
e s k , “FM“ F M Qureshi
Q u r e s h i LaudsL a u d s Russia’s
R u s s ia ’s DDecision
e c i s i o n to to L Lift
ift RRicei c e IImport
m p o r t BanB a n on on P Paki-
a k i­
stan,”
s t a n , ” The The N e w s , June
News, J u n e 14, 1 4 , 22021, 0 2 1 , www.thenews.com.pk/latest/849443-fm-qureshi-
w w w .th e n e w s .c o m .p k /la te s t/8 4 9 4 4 3 - f m - q u re s h i-
lauds-russias-decision-to-lift-rice-import-ban-on-pakistan.
la u d s -ru s s ia s -d e c is io n -to -lift-ric e -im p o rt-b a n -o n -p a k is ta n .
57
5 7 Sana
S a n a Jamal,
J a m a l , “Russia
“ R u s s ia L Lifts
i f t s Ban
B a n on o n IImport
m p o r t of
o fRRice
i c e from
fro m P Pakistan,”
a k i s t a n , ” Gulf N e w s , June
G u l f News, J u n e 11,1 1 , 2021,
2021,
hhttps://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/russia-lifts-ban-on-import-of-rice-from-
ttp s ://g u lf n e w s .c o m /w o rld /a s ia /p a k is ta n /r u s s ia - lifts - b a n - o n -im p o r t-o f -r ic e -f ro m -
ppakistan-1.79837618.
a k i s t a n - 1 . 7 9 8 3 7 6 1 8 . see s e e also
a ls o A Ayaz
y a z Gul,
G u l , “Russia’s
“ R u s s i a ’ s Lavrov
L a v r o v in i n Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto o Discuss
D is c u s s
BBilateral
i l a t e r a l Ties,
T ie s , A Afghan
fg h a n P Peace,”
e a c e , ” VOANews,
V O A N ew s, A April
p r i l 6,
6 , 22021,
0 2 1 , https://www.voanews.com/
h ttp s ://w w w .v o a n e w s .c o m /
a/south-central-asia_russias-lavrov-pakistan-discuss-bilateral-ties-afghan-peace/62
a /s o u th -c e n tra l-a s ia _ ru s s ia s -la v ro v -p a k is ta n -d is c u s s -b ila te ra l-tie s -a fg h a n -p e a c e /6 2
04223.html.
0 4 2 2 3 .h tm l.
58
5 8 Government
G o v e r n m e n t of o f Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . TheT h e FinanceF in a n c e D Divison,
i v i s o n , “Trade
“ T r a d e and and P Payments,”
a y m e n t s , ” in in P Pakistan
a k is ta n
EEconomic
c o n o m i c SSurvey, 2 0 2 0 - 2 0 2 1 (Economic
u r v e y , 2020–2021 (E c o n o m ic A Adviser’s
d v i s e r ’ s Wing,
W i n g , Finance
F in a n c e D Division
i v i s i o n Gov-
G ov­
ernment
e r n m e n t of o f Pakistan, 2 0 2 1 ) , www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/08-Trade%20
P a k i s t a n , 2021), w w w .f in a n c e .g o v .p k /s u r v e y /c h a p te r s _ 2 1 /0 8 - T r a d e % 2 0
and%20payments.pdf.
a n d % 2 0 p a y m e n ts .p d f.
59
59 B Bernard
e rn a rd L Lonney,
o n n e y , “BP“ B P Statistical
S t a t i s t i c a l Review
R e v i e w ofof W World
o rld E Energy
n e r g y 22021,”
0 2 1 , ” SStatistical
ta tis tic a l R Review,
e v ie w ,
70th
7 0 t h ed.,
e d ., wwww.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-
w w .b p .c o m /c o n te n t/d a m /b p /b u s in e s s - s ite s /e n /g lo b a l/c o r p o r a te /p d fs /e n e r g y -
economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2021-full-report.pdf.
e c o n o m ic s /s ta tis tic a l-r e v ie w /b p - s ta ts - re v ie w -2 0 2 1 - f u ll-r e p o rt.p d f.
60
60 A Andrew
n d r e w Korybko,
K o r y b k o , “India “ In d ia W Will i l l Be
B e aa Roadblock
R o a d b l o c k in in R Russia–Pakistan
u s s i a - P a k i s t a n Relations,”
R e la tio n s ,”
Global
G l o b a l Village
V i l l a g e SSpace,
pace, N November
o v e m b e r 44,, 2020, 2 0 2 0 , www.globalvillagespace.com/india-will-
w w w .g lo b a lv illa g e s p a c e .c o m /in d ia - w ill-
bbe-a-roadblock-in-russia-pakistan-relations/.
e - a - r o a d b l o c k - i n - r u s s i a - p a k i s t a n - r e l a t i o n s /.
61
61 B Bhutta,
h u t t a , “Building
“ B u ild in g a a N New e w Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Relationship.”
R e la tio n s h ip .”
62
6 2 Sana
S a n a Jamal,J a m a l , “Pakistan,
“ P a k i s t a n , Russia
R u s s ia A Agree
g r e e tto o Build
B u i l d Economic,
E c o n o m i c , Energy E n e r g y and a n d Defence
D efen c e
Ties,”
T i e s , ” Gulf
G u lf N News,
ew s, A April
p r i l 7,
7 , 22021,0 2 1 , https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/pakistan-
h ttp s ://g u lfn e w s .c o m /w o r ld /a s ia /p a k is ta n /p a k is ta n -
rrussia-agree-to-build-economic-energy-and-defence-ties-1.78395748.
u s s ia - a g r e e - to - b u ild - e c o n o m ic - e n e r g y - a n d - d e f e n c e - tie s - 1 .7 8 3 9 5 7 4 8 .
63
63 A Author’s
u t h o r ’ s conservation
c o n s e r v a t i o n withw ith R Rabiaa b ia A Akther.
k th e r.
64
6 4 IIbid.
b id .
12 The European Union (EU)–
Pakistan Relations: A Critique
of Strategic Engagement Plan
Najimdeen Bakare

IntroductionZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA
The
T h e European
E u r o p e a n Union U n i o n (EU)–Pakistan
( E U ) - P a k i s t a n relations, r e l a t i o n s , stretching
s tre tc h in g b back a c k tto o tthe h e 1960s,
1960s,
demonstrate
d e m o n s t r a t e tthat h a t international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations
r e l a t i o n s transcend
t r a n s c e n d immediate
i m m e d i a t e regional r e g i o n a l proximity.
p r o x im ity .

Efforts
E f f o r t s tot o establish
e s t a b l i s h relations
r e l a t i o n s bbetween
e t w e e n tthe he E European
u ro p e a n E Economic
c o n o m i c CommunityC o m m u n i t y (EEC) (E E C )1
1

and
and P Pakistan
a k ista n w weree r e laid
l a i d on on 2 2 August
A u g u s t 1962 1962 w whenh e n the t h e Community
C o m m u n i t y proposed p ro p o se d a a trade
tra d e
agreement
a g re e m e n t w withith P Pakistan
a k i s t a n and a n d ttwo w o other o t h e r South S o u t h Asian s t a t e s . 22 The
A s i a n states. T h e proposal
p ro p o sa l w wasas

considered
c o n s id e re d a a w watershed
a t e r s h e d ffor o r the t h e nascent
n a s c e n t country.
c o u n t r y . In I n 1976,
1 9 7 6 , thet h e ffirst i r s t Commercial
C o m m e r c ia l
Cooperation
C o o p e r a t i o n Agreement
A g r e e m e n t was w a s signed
s ig n e d b between
e t w e e n the th e E European
u r o p e a n Economic
E c o n o m i c Community C o m m u n ity
(EEC)
( E E C ) and and P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , ffollowed,
o l l o w e d , in i n 1986,
1986, b by y a a newn e w Commercial
C o m m e r c i a l and a n d Cooperation
C o o p e ra tio n
Agreement
A g r e e m e n t valid v a l i d ffor
or 5 e a r s . 33 D
5 yyears. Diplomatic
i p l o m a t i c relations
r e l a t i o n s continued
c o n t i n u e d ttill i l l the
t h e 1990s.
1 9 9 0 s . How-H ow ­

ever,
e v e r , certain
c e r t a i n events
e v e n t s in i n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , such s u c h as a s tthe h e nuclear
n u c l e a r testst e s t s ini n 1998, 1 9 9 8 , the t h e military
m ilita ry
ttakeover
a k e o v e r of o f 1999,
1 9 9 9 , anda n d the t h e Kargil
K a r g i l crisis
c r i s i s ini n 1999,
1 9 9 9 , impinged
i m p i n g e d tthe h e trajectory
t r a j e c t o r y of o f mutual
m u tu a l
relations.
r e l a t i o n s . Therefore,
T h e r e f o r e , ttill i l l September
S e p t e m b e r 11, 1 1 , 2001,
2 0 0 1 , EU–Pakistan
E U - P a k i s t a n relations r e l a t i o n s remained
r e m a i n e d on on
4
the
th e p periphery
e r i p h e r y of o f the
th e E EU’sU ’s Asia
A s i a policy.
p o l i c y . 4 Incidentally,
I n c i d e n t a l l y , tthe h e dawn
d a w n of o f September
S e p t e m b e r 11, 11,
2001,
2 0 0 1 , caused
caused a a convergence
c o n v e r g e n c e of o f interest,
i n t e r e s t , and a n d the t h e calculation
c a l c u l a t i o n that t h a t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n couldc o u ld
bbe e instrumental
i n s t r u m e n t a l in i n surmounting
s u r m o u n t i n g tthe h e menace
m e n a c e of o f extremism
e x t r e m i s m within w i t h i n and a n d across
a c r o s s its its
bborder
o r d e r incentivised
i n c e n t i v i s e d the t h e United
U n i t e d States
S t a t e s and and E England
n g l a n d tto o influence
i n f l u e n c e tthe h e EU E U to t o bbecome
ecom e
more
m o r e attentive
a t t e n t i v e ttowards
o w a r d s tthe h e development
d e v e l o p m e n t of o f Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . At A t thet h e same
s a m e time, t i m e , tthe h e situa-
s itu a ­
tion
t i o n offered
o f f e r e d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n an a n opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y tto o change
c h a n g e gears g e a r s bby y winning
w in n in g b back
a c k tthe he U United
n ite d
States
S t a t e s after
a f t e r extended
e x te n d e d w weak eak U US–Pakistan
S - P a k i s t a n relationsr e l a t i o n s and a n d offered
o f f e r e d it i t an
a n opportunity
o p p o r t u n i t y tto o
draw
d r a w closer
c l o s e r tto o tthe
he E EU U at a t the
t h e same
s a m e time. t i m e . Hence,
H ence, P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s resolve
r e s o l v e tto o jjoin
o i n Washing-
W a sh in g ­
5
ton
t o n in i n the
t h e war
w a r against
a g a i n s t tterrorism
e r r o r i s m changed
c h a n g e d tthe h e course
c o u r s e of o f thet h e strained
s t r a i n e d relations
r e l a t i o n s 5 and
and
rejuvenated
r e ju v e n a te d E EU’s
U ’s p peripheral
e r i p h e r a l tties i e s with
w i t h Islamabad.
I s l a m a b a d . The T h e shifts h i f t in
i n EU EU p policy
o lic y p precipi-
r e c ip i­

tated
t a t e d tthe h e Union’s
U n i o n ’ s Country
C o u n t r y Strategy
S t r a t e g y Paper P a p e r (CSP) ( C S P ) on o n Pakistan,
P a k i s t a n , adopted
a d o p t e d in i n 2002
2 0 0 2 and and
2 0 0 7 . 6 Subsequently,
S u b s e q u e n t l y , the t h e Third
T h i r d Generation
G e n e r a t i o n Agreement,
A g r e e m e n t , ratified r a t i f i e d bby
6
later
l a t e r revised
r e v i s e d in i n 2007. y
tthe
he E European
u r o p e a n Parliament
P a r l i a m e n t on o n April
A p r i l 22, 2 2 , 2004,
2 0 0 4 , was w a s signeds i g n e d in i n agreement
a g r e e m e n t with w i t h Paki-
P a k i-
s t a n .77 The
stan. T h e agreement
a g r e e m e n t accorded
a c c o r d e d Pakistan
P a k ista n a a special
s p e c i a l status
s t a t u s anda n d wasw as p premised
r e m i s e d on o n the
th e

rrecognition
e c o g n i t i o n of o f Pakistan
P a k i s t a n as as a a ffrontline
r o n t l i n e states t a t e iin n the t h e fight
f i g h t against
a g a i n s t terrorism
t e r r o r i s m and and w wasas
aimed
a i m e d at a t incentivising
in c e n tiv is in g P Pakistan
a k i s t a n ffor o r itsi t s support
s u p p o r t vvis-à-vis
i s - a - v i s thet h e European
E u r o p e a n ttroops r o o p s in i n tthe
he
8
International
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Security
S e c u r i t y Assistance
A s s is ta n c e F Force
o r c e (ISAF)
( I S A F ) in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . 8 In I n 2007,
2 0 0 7 , the th e E EU U
adopted
a d o p t e d tthe he 5 5 y years’
e a r s ’ CSP,
CSP, w which
h i c h covered
c o v e r e d the th e p period
e r i o d from
f r o m 2007 2 0 0 7 tto o 2013.
2 0 1 3 . Interest-
I n te r e s t­
ingly,
i n g l y , ttheh e different
d i f f e r e n t agreements
a g r e e m e n t s did d i d not n o t rule
r u l e out out a a vvarying
a r y i n g degree
d e g r e e of o f oscillation
o s c i l l a t i o n andand

DOI: 10.4324/9781003250920-14
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194 Najimdeen
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disagreements
d i s a g r e e m e n t s in i n ttheh e conduct
c o n d u c t of o f relations.
re la tio n s. F For
o r instance,
i n s t a n c e , in i n tthe
h e larger
l a r g e r context
c o n t e x t ofof
Europe,
E u r o p e , “ t h e f a c t o r s l i k e P a k i s t a n ’s i m a g e a s a n e x t r e m i s t s t a t e , s u p p r e s s i o n of
“the factors like Pakistan’s image as an extremist state, suppression of
women
w o m e n and a n d minorities
m i n o r i t i e s in i n the
t h e country,
c o u n t r y , sectarianism,
s e c t a r i a n i s m , nuclearn u c le a r p proliferation
r o l i f e r a t i o n anda n d theth e
issues
i s s u e s of o f illegal
i l l e g a l immigration/smuggling
i m m i g r a t i o n / s m u g g l i n g have h a v e maligned
m a lig n e d P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s image;
i m a g e ; Euro-
E u ro ­
9
pean investors are reluctant to invest
p e a n in v e s to r s a r e r e lu c ta n t to in v e s t i n P a k is ta n .” 9 in Pakistan.”
Meanwhile,
M e a n w h i l e , in i n 2014,
2 0 1 4 , the th e E EU U b brought
r o u g h t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n into i n t o ttheh e ffold
o l d ofo f countries
c o u n t r i e s bbenefit-
e n e f it­
ing
i n g f r o m E U ’s G e n e r a l i s e d S y s t e m o f P r e f e r e n c e s ( G S P ) . M o r e o v e r , in
from EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Moreover, i n 2019,
2 0 1 9 , the
th e
Union
U n i o n raised r a i s e d tthe h e profile
p r o f i l e of of P Pakistan
a k i s t a n anda n d granted
g r a n t e d it i t the
t h e GSP-Plus
G S P - P l u s status,s t a t u s , consid-
c o n s id ­
ered
e re d y yet
e t another
a n o th e r w watershed
a t e r s h e d in in E EU–Pakistan
U - P a k i s t a n relations.
r e l a t i o n s . Interestingly,
I n te re s tin g ly , w while
h i l e tthe
h e GSPGSP
or GSP-Plus grants Pakistan huge access to the
o r G S P -P lu s g r a n ts P a k is ta n h u g e a c c e s s to th e U n io n ’s m a r k e t, it d o e s s o wUnion’s market, it does so with
ith
aa determination
d e t e r m i n a t i o n tto o effect
e f f e c t social
s o c i a l and
a n d political
p o l i t i c a l changes
c h a n g e s in in P Pakistan. 10
a k i s t a n . 1 0 Against
A g a i n s t tthis
h is
backdrop,
b a c k d ro p , w whileh i l e most
m o s t literature
l i t e r a t u r e onon E EU–Pakistan
U - P a k i s t a n relationsr e l a t i o n s has
h a s lavishly
l a v i s h l y expressed
e x p re sse d
how
h o w t h e E U r e m a i n s t h e l a r g e s t d o n o r a n d t r a d i n g p a r t n e r o f P a k i s t a n , and
the EU remains the largest donor and trading partner of Pakistan, a n d howhow
Islamabad has been cooperating with the EU in
I s la m a b a d h a s b e e n c o o p e r a tin g w ith th e E U in th e a r e a o f c o u n te r te r r o r is m ,the area of counter terrorism,
development,
d e v e l o p m e n t , trade t r a d e andand h humanitarian
u m a n i t a r i a n assistance,
a s s i s t a n c e , silence
s i l e n c e or o r inattention
i n a t t e n t i o n surrounds
su rro u n d s
the
t h e d y n a m i c o f p o w e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e E U a n d P a k i s t a n , especially
dynamic of power relations between the EU and Pakistan, e s p e c i a l l y in i n the
th e
context of Pakistan–EU Strategic Engagement
c o n te x t o f P a k is ta n - E U S tra te g ic E n g a g e m e n t P la n s ig n e d in 2 0 1 9 . Plan signed in 2019.
To
To p place
l a c e the t h e discussion
d i s c u s s i o n iin n p perspective,
e r s p e c t i v e , the t h e first
f i r s t section
s e c t i o n diligently
d ilig e n tly u unpacks
n p a c k s theth e
notion
n o t i o n o f p o w e r a s u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h e o r i e s . T h e section
of power as understood in the international relations theories. The s e c tio n
starts
s t a r t s off
o ff w with i t h realism,
r e a lis m , a a school
s c h o o l that
t h a t has
has p played
la y e d a a foundational
f o u n d a t i o n a l and and p pivotal
i v o t a l role
r o l e in
in
shaping
s h a p i n g our our u understanding
n d e r s t a n d i n g of o f IR.
I R . Realist
R e a l i s t concepts
c o n c e p t s are a r e contrasted
c o n tra ste d w withi t h other
o t h e r non-
non­
power-centric
p o w e r - c e n t r i c ttheories,h e o r i e s , culminating
c u lm in a tin g w with
i t h radical
r a d i c a l (anti-foundational)
( a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l ) ttheories.
h e o r i e s . For
For
aa bbetter
e t t e r p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e s u c c e e d i n g s e c t i o n t h e o r i s e s p o w e r r e l a t i o n s and
perspective, the succeeding section theorises power relations a n d takes
ta k e s
that
t h a t as a s ttheoretical
h e o r e t i c a l underpinning
u n d e r p i n n i n g tto o critique
c r i t i q u e tthe he E EU–Pakistan
U - P a k i s t a n relations.
r e l a t i o n s . Within
W ith in

the
t h e b o d y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s l i t e r a t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y n e o r e a l i s m , t h e i d e a of
body of international relations literature, especially neorealism, the idea of
power
p o w e r is i s attached
a tta c h e d w withi t h capability,
c a p a b i l i t y , suggesting
s u g g e s t i n g that t h a t state
s t a t e or or ppolitical
o l i t i c a l entity
e n t i t y must
m u s t bbe e
skilful
s k i l f u l ini n channelling
c h a n n e l l i n g and a n d mobilising
m o b i l i s i n g its i t s capability
c a p a b i l i t y tto o achieving
a c h ie v in g a a set
s e t of
o f external
e x te rn a l
objectives.
o b j e c t i v e s . WhileW h i l e theoretical
t h e o r e t i c a l exposition
e x p o s i t i o n is i s appealing,
a p p e a l i n g , it i t can
can b best
est b bee applied
a p p l i e d onto
o n to

empirical
e m p i r i c a l data d a t a and a n d arguments.
a r g u m e n t s . In I n tthis
h i s connection,
c o n n e c t i o n , tthe h e chapter
c h a p t e r ttakes
a k e s the th e E EU–Paki-
U -P a k i-

stan
s t a n Strategic
S t r a t e g i c Engagement
E ngagem ent P Plan
l a n (SEP)
( S E P ) as a s reference
re fe re n c e p point
o i n t ofo f analysis
a n a l y s i s and a n d care-
c a re­
fully argues that the power relations between the two
f u lly a r g u e s th a t th e p o w e r r e la tio n s b e tw e e n th e tw o r e v o lv e a r o u n d p e r s u a s io n ,revolve around persuasion,
reward,
r e w a r d , and a n d threat.
t h r e a t . This
T h i s discussion
d i s c u s s i o n is i s ffollowed
o l l o w e d bby y thet h e last
l a s t section,
s e c tio n , w which
h i c h offers
o f f e r s an
an
analysis
a n a l y s i s tthath a t looks
lo o k s b beyond
e y o n d tthe h e current
c u r r e n t SEP.
SEP.

Power Relations
The
T h e ffieldi e l d of
o f international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations
r e l a t i o n s is
is v vividly
iv id ly p punctuated
u n c t u a t e d with
w ith a a p plethora
l e t h o r a ofo f schol-
s c h o l­
arship
a r s h ip o n th e c o n c e p t o f p o w e r , w h ic h is g e n e r a lly a s s o c ia te d w ith r e a lis m –
on the concept of power, which is generally associated with realism - IR’s
I R ’s
traditional
t r a d i t i o n a l school
s c h o o l of o f tthought.
h o u g h t . Power
P o w e r is i s often
o f t e n associated
a s s o c ia te d w withi t h state
s t a t e sovereignty,
s o v e r e i g n t y , and
and
it
i t is
i s conceived
c o n c e i v e d that t h a t the
t h e integrity
i n t e g r i t y of
of a a state
s t a t e isi s directly
d ire c tly p proportional
r o p o r t i o n a l to t o tthe
h e amount
am ount
of
o f power
p o w e r it i t wields
w i e l d s (extra)
( e x t r a ) regionally.
r e g i o n a l l y . To
T o markm a rk a a meaningful
m e a n i n g f u l niche,
n i c h e , thet h e state
s t a t e must
m u st
either be endowed with, or must have accrued, both
e ith e r b e e n d o w e d w ith , o r m u s t h a v e a c c r u e d , b o th ta n g ib le a n d in ta n g ib le tangible and intangible
11
power.
p o w e r . 11 Among
A m o n g realist r e a l i s t scholars,
s c h o l a r s , especially
e s p e c i a l l y thet h e neorealist,
n e o r e a l i s t , the
t h e concept
c o n c e p t of of p power
ow er
is
i s not
n o t merely
m e re ly a a medium
m e d i u m of o f understanding
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the t h e major
m a jo r p phenomenon
h e n o m e n o n in i n international
in te rn a tio n a l
politics,
p o l i t i c s , it
i t can
c a n as a s well
w e ll b bee an a n important
i m p o r t a n t ttoolo o l of o f ffathoming
a t h o m i n g tthe h e operationality
o p e r a t i o n a l i t y ofof
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 195
international system.12 Without stretching the history of power in modern dis-
course of power, Han Morgenthau is the foremost advocate of power as a theo-
retical optic and core of international politics. Morgenthau’s fixation on power as
the bedrock of international politics and the determinant factor that shapes state’s
behaviour and relational attitude is an acceptable dictum among the generality of
realists, who subscribe to Morgenthau’s analysis and prescriptive theorisation of
IR through the lens of foreign policy.13 Irrespective of the strands of realism, the
common narrative is state survival and security,14 which are directly intertwined
with the quantity and quality of power harboured by a state.15
Without categorically rejecting the reality of power politics, liberalism – a phil-
osophical tradition – offers an alternative understanding of power in international
relations.16 The liberals argue that the means of restraining power are liberal inter-
nationalisation, commercial cooperation, interdependence, and liberal institution-
alism.17 This philosophical worldview posits democratic values and principles to
the international realm, with the assumption that democracy is intrinsically peace-
ful. To them, a world order predicated on democracy is a premium, as democratic
states will have less craving and incentives for war, as all nations would recipro-
cally recognise each other’s legitimacy.18 Additionally, liberal thinking on inter-
national relations theorises that country cannot always afford to live in the state
of inconvenience but should be willing to eschew war as a means of settling their
differences, a view which rejects realist characterisation of international relations
as the struggle for power and security.19 The realist response is, if such ideal-
ism is tenable, how then democratic governments were supposed to achieve their
objectives without playing the card of power-politics? This dialogical venture has
remained one of the protracted philosophical discourses in international relations.
Against the backdrop of offering multiple conceptual explanations to the major
phenomenon in international politics, radical theories such as Marxism have con-
tributed to the larger spectrum of IR. Marxism’s central argument of international
politics revolves around the competition and conflict between nation-states. The
protracted conflict produces two conflicting social classes: the national bour-
geoisies and cosmopolitan proletariat;20 the by-product of the class struggle is an
intractable global inequality. Marxist fixation with global inequality as the under-
pinning factor for conflict has brought this tradition directly into contact with the
field of international relations. Like many other critiques of realism – power poli-
tics, Marxism has struggled not just to expose the unequal architecture of global
order, based on uneven mode of production and the imbalanced wealth resource
distribution, but to also offer an alternative approach through which international
relations can be better understood. Like many Marxists, Robert Cox argues that
“the internationalisation of relations of production and on the forms of global gov-
ernance which perpetuate inequalities of power and wealth,”21 expose the unequal
architecture of the liberal world order.
The connection between Marxism and anti-foundational theories such as criti-
cal theory cannot be understated. As an anti-foundational theory, the intellectual
tradition of critical theory stems from Marxism, dating back to the 1970s22 where
it became popular, but it was primarily developed out of the work of the Frankfurt
196
196 Najimdeen
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N Bakare
a jim d e e n B a ka re

23
School,
S c h o o l , which w h i c h was w a s ffounded
o u n d e d in i n 1923.
1 9 2 3 .23 F From
ro m a a b broader
r o a d e r lens l e n s of o f critical
c r i t i c a l ttheory,
h e o ry ,
global
g l o b a l p o w e r r e l a t i o n s h a v e b e e n l o n g c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y i n e q u a l i t y a n d domination
power relations have been long characterised by inequality and d o m in a tio n
and
a n d mustm ust b e l i m i n a t e d . 24
bee eliminated. 24

While
W h i l e m a n y s t a t e s w o u l d find
many states would f i n d Ray
R a y Cline’s
C l i n e ’s strategic
s t r a t e g i c formula
f o r m u l a of o f measuring
m e a su rin g p power
ow er
unsuitable, yet the suitability of this parameter of power
u n s u ita b le , y e t th e s u ita b ility o f th is p a r a m e te r o f p o w e r f o r f e w s ta te s is g la r in g ly for few states is glaringly
convincing
c o n v i n c i n g as a s Cline
C l i n e rightly
r i g h t l y argues,
a r g u e s , “the“ th e p preponderance
r e p o n d e r a n c e of of p power
o w e r appears
a p p e a r s tto o bbee
25
in
i n t h e h a n d s o f a r e l a t i v e l y f e w n a t i o n s . ” 2 5 T h i s i s n o t t o i n s i n u a t e t h a t m a n y less
the hands of a relatively few nations.” This is not to insinuate that many le s s
26
powerful
p o w e r f u l states s t a t e s area r e unimportant,
u n i m p o r t a n t , 2 6 and a n d thist h i s certainly
c e r t a i n l y reiterates
r e i t e r a t e s the t h e relativity
r e l a t i v i t y ofof
power,
p o w e r , which w h i c h is i s unequal
u n e q u a l ffor o r all.a ll.

While
W h i l e attending
a t t e n d i n g to t o thet h e idea
i d e a of o f power
p o w e r relations,
re la tio n s, H Hamilton
a m i l t o n and a n d SharmaS h a r m a episte-e p is te ­
mologically offer multilayers and dimensions
m o lo g ic a lly o f f e r m u ltila y e r s a n d d im e n s io n s o f p o w e r . T a k in g R o b e r t Rof power. Taking Robert R.. DahlD ahl
as
as a a reference
r e f e r e n c e point,
p o i n t , their
t h e i r argument
a r g u m e n t “. “ . .. .. situates
s itu a te s p power
o w e r as a s one o n e element
e l e m e n t in i n the
th e

relational
r e l a t i o n a l fframeworks
r a m e w o r k s of o f social
s o c i a l and a n d political s y s t e m . ” 27
p o l i t i c a l system.” 2 7 ToT o ffathom a t h o m tthe he p power
ow er

relations
r e l a t i o n s bbetween
e t w e e n ttwo w o entities,
e n t i t i e s , one
o n e mustm u s t seek s e e k to t o understand
u n d e r s t a n d the t h e depth
d e p t h of o f such
such a a
relationship, the level of interdependence, the area(s) of
r e la tio n s h ip , th e le v e l o f in te r d e p e n d e n c e , th e a r e a (s ) o f d o m in a tio n a n d c o n tr o l, domination and control,
the
t h e constituents
c o n s titu e n ts – - number
n u m b e r of o f players,
p l a y e r s , constituting
c o n s t i t u t i n g each e a c h entity,
e n t i t y , and a n d tthe h e ttypesy p e s of of
28
power
p o w e r - c a p a b i l i t y a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f e a c h e n t i t y , 2 8 w h i c h M o r r i s s d u b b e d “power
– capability at the disposal of each entity, which Morriss dubbed “pow er
as
as a a dispositional c o n c e p t . ” 29
d i s p o s i t i o n a l concept.” 2 9 The
T h e ffluidity,
l u i d i t y , interdependence,
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , complexity, c o m p l e x i t y , and and

dyadic
d y a d i c p o w e r r e l a t i o n s d i s m i s s t h e a t o m i s t i c ( r e d u c t i o n i s t ) n o t i o n o f p o w e r as
power relations dismiss the atomistic (reductionist) notion of power as
only
o n l y bbeing e i n g central
c e n t r a l tto o thet h e core
c o re – - dominant
d o m i n a n t partner.
p a r t n e r . In In a a dyadic
d y a d i c relationship,
r e la tio n s h ip , p power
ow er

is
i s situated
s i t u a t e d and
a n d never
never a a “monopolistic
“ m o n o p o l i s t i c agency” a g e n c y ” either e i t h e r ttoo core
c o r e or o r thet h e peripheral
p e r i p h e r a l part-
p a rt-
30
ner. Nuancing the discourse of power relations,
n e r .30 N u a n c in g th e d is c o u r s e o f p o w e r r e la tio n s , B a c h r a c h a n d B Bachrach and Barate
a r a t e contend
c o n te n d
that
t h a t partners
p a r t n e r s in in b bilateral
i l a t e r a l oro r multilateral
m u l t i l a t e r a l relations
r e l a t i o n s must m u s t seeks e e k moderation
m o d e r a t i o n and a n d mustm u st
adopt
a d o p t limitation
l i m i t a t i o n in i n ttheir
h e i r conversion
c o n v e r s i o n and a n d discussion.
d i s c u s s i o n . For F o r tthem,
hem , b bilateral
i l a t e r a l or o r multilat-
m u ltila t­
eral
e r a l discussions
d i s c u s s i o n s shoulds h o u l d bbe e limited
l i m i t e d to t o safer
s a f e r issues
i s s u e s tthath a t dod o not n o t tthreaten
h r e a t e n tthe h e interest
in te re st
31
of the power holders.
o f t h e p o w e r h o l d e r s .3 1
For
F or H Holsti,
o l s t i , tthe
h e capability
c a p a b i l i t y of of a a nation
n a tio n p plays
la y s a a defining
d e f i n i n g and a n d decisive
d e c i s i v e role r o l e in i n the
th e
debate
d e b a t e o f p o w e r r e l a t i o n s . F o r i n s t a n c e , l e t t h e E U r e p r e s e n t A a n d P a k i s t a n as
of power relations. For instance, let the EU represent A and Pakistan as BB..
If the former can get the latter to do something, but the
I f th e f o r m e r c a n g e t th e la tte r to d o s o m e th in g , b u t th e la tte r d o e s n o t h a v e s im ila r latter does not have similar
(political,
( p o l i t i c a l , economic,
e c o n o m i c , and a n d diplomatic)
d i p l o m a t i c ) capability
c a p a b i l i t y to t o get
get A A tto o dod o similar
s i m i l a r tthing,
h i n g , then
th e n
it
i t c a n e a s i l y b e s u r m i s e d t h a t A h a s m o r e p o w e r t h a n B , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , there
can easily be surmised that A has more power than B, and, therefore, t h e r e area re
asymmetric
a s y m m e t r i c power p o w e r relations
r e l a t i o n s bbetweene t w e e n tthe h e two.
t w o . Such Such a a relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p points p o i n t s tto o whyw hy
some
s o m e scholars
s c h o l a r s contend
c o n t e n d that t h a t the t h e influence
i n f l u e n c e of of p power
o w e r is i s intrinsically
i n t r i n s i c a l l y embedded
e m b e d d e d iin n
32
power quantity.
p o w e r q u a n tity .32
While
W h i l e tthe h e aforementioned
a f o r e m e n t i o n e d theoretical t h e o r e t i c a l underpinnings
u n d e r p i n n i n g s are a r e important
i m p o r t a n t tools t o o l s of of
understanding
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s t a t e s , t h i s c h a p t e r a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g discus-
the relations among states, this chapter and the following d is c u s ­
sion
s i o n (EU–Pakistan
( E U - P a k i s t a n relations)re la tio n s ) w will
ill b bee anchored
a n c h o r e d along a l o n g tthe h e line
l i n e of o f liberalism.
l i b e r a l i s m . As As
aa ttheoretical
h e o r e t i c a l l e n s , l i b e r a l i s m e s p o u s e s c o o p e r a t i o n a m o n g p o l i t i c a l entities,
lens, liberalism espouses cooperation among political e n t i t i e s , and
and
it
i t does
d o e s not n o t promote
p r o m o t e militarised
m i l i t a r i s e d and a n d confrontational
c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l relations.
r e l a t i o n s . As A s an a n intellectual
in te lle c tu a l
tradition,
t r a d i t i o n , i t p a v e s w a y n o t j u s t f o r c o m m e r c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n , b u t also
it paves way not just for commercial cooperation, but a l s o ffor o r inter-
in te r­
dependence and liberal institutionalism. It encourages
d e p e n d e n c e a n d lib e r a l in s titu tio n a lis m . I t e n c o u ra g e s a n d s p o n s o r s d e m o c ra tic and sponsors democratic
dispensation
d i s p e n s a t i o n and a n d thet h e strengthening
s t r e n g t h e n i n g of o f tthe
h e civil
c i v i l society.
s o c i e t y . In
I n thet h e light
l i g h t of of E EU–Pakistan
U -P a k ista n
relations,
r e l a t i o n s , i t i s h a r d t o d r a g t h e r e l a t i o n s i n t o t h e r e a l m o f r e a l i s m , w h i c h primarily
it is hard to drag the relations into the realm of realism, which p r im a r ily
centres
c e n t r e s on on p power
o w e r contestation.
c o n te s ta tio n .
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 197
EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP)
This section dwells on the EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP): a six-
page document that outlined the eight areas in which the two partners aimed at
strengthening cooperation. Through the lens of power relations, the section begins
with a brief conceptual analysis of EU–Pakistan power relations, then progresses
to problematising and critiquing the existing structure of the SEP and, in so doing,
proffers answers to the formulated research questions.
While the EU–Pakistan relations do not have direct resonance with power poli-
tics as forcefully opinionated by the realists, they are, however, in consonance
with liberal thinking of power relations, which does not necessarily conjure physi-
cal or militarised expression of power. Hence, the subsequent discussion will be
largely situated within the neoliberal theoretical lens.
The accumulation of power in both tangible and intangible form speaks largely
of the quantity and quality of capabilities at the disposal of a state. While this
alone does not guarantee the exercise of influence, it is imperative that state must
also be skilful in mobilising these capabilities in support of the stated foreign
objectives and the credibility of such power – capabilities must be reasonably
incontestable. If power equals to influence and is measured by the scope of capa-
bilities and skill in an actor to mobilise these capabilities for political purposes,
then one must define the mobilisation skill of the EU and Pakistan. Doing this, we
might be able to understand not just the direction and dimension of influence, but
also how it has been mobilised over the years.
There is a huge disparity between the capabilities of the EU and Pakistan. The
disparity begins with one being a regional and powerful institution, with extra
territorial power, while the other’s power is limited like every other nation-state.
Comparatively, the EU is better positioned to mobilise a wide variety of capa-
bilities in support of its external objectives than Pakistan could ever muster. It is
interesting to note that the incomparability between the two is not merely a mat-
ter of different geographies but a matter of varying degree of capabilities that are
directly proportional and dependent on their external objectives. Hence, a nation
with bigger (regional and global) external objectives will be compelled to mobi-
lise and accumulate proportional capabilities as well as the skill to translate the
capabilities into influence.
The EU–Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP) is a watershed in bilateral
relations between the two parties. It was signed in 2019 following a protracted
negotiation at the fourth round of Pakistan–EU strategic dialogue. The plan is set
to serve and bring cooperation in areas including trade, peace and security, and
anti-money laundering.33
The SEP is an example of cross-regional and international partnership, and it
has no written centre of authority; nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss that one of
the partners possesses comparatively better bargaining leverage. Yet, based on
the critique of power relations, there is no indication that the other partner is
entirely devoid of any influencing capacity. Scholars have drawn our attention to
198
198 Najimdeen
KJIHGFEDCBA
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a jim d e e n B a ka re

the
t h e bbargaining
a r g a i n i n g ttechniques
e c h n i q u e s tthat h a t characterise
c h a r a c t e r i s e power
p o w e r relations
r e l a t i o n s in i n international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l poli-
p o li­
tics,
t i c s , o f t e n r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d p e r s u a s i o n , o f f e r i n g o f r e w a r d s , t h r e a t e n i n g punish-
often revolving around persuasion, offering of rewards, threatening p u n ish ­
34
ments,
m e n t s , anda n d tthehe u use
s e ofo f fforce.
o r c e . 3 4 In
I n addition
a d d i t i o n tto o tthe
h e ffact
a c t tthat
h a t these
t h e s e categories
c a t e g o r i e s are
a r e useful
u se fu l
for
f o r a n a l y s i n g t h e w i e l d i n g o f i n f l u e n c e i n r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s t a t e s , t h e i r u t i l i t y also
analysing the wielding of influence in relations among states, their utility a lso
depends
d e p e n d s on o n thet h e general
g e n e r a l climate
c l i m a t e ofo f relations
r e l a t i o n s bbetween
e t w e e n tthem.hem .
The
T h e ffollowing
o l l o w i n g discusses
d i s c u s s e s tthe h e crosspollination
c r o s s p o l l i n a t i o n anda n d intersection
i n t e r s e c t i o n of o f certain
c e r t a i n sec-
sec­
tions
t i o n s ofo f the
t h e SEP.
S E P . InI n our
o u r estimation,
e s t i m a t i o n , EU–Pakistan
E U -P a k ista n p power
o w e r relations
r e l a t i o n s are
a r e characterised
c h a r a c te r is e d
bby y persuasion,
p e r s u a s i o n , offering
o f f e r i n g ofo f rewards,
r e w a r d s , and
a n d somes o m e degree
d e g r e e of o f threats.
t h r e a t s . While
W h i l e tthe h e peace
peace
and security section is analytically more appealing, this is by
a n d s e c u rity s e c tio n is a n a ly tic a lly m o r e a p p e a lin g , th is is b y n o m e a n s s u g g e s tin g no means suggesting
that
t h a t other
o t h e r sections
s e c t i o n s are
a r e less
l e s s important
im p o rta n t – - in i n fact,
f a c t , tthey
h e y are
a r e closely
c l o s e l y interconnected.
in te rc o n n e c te d .

Peace and Security

Seemingly,
S e e m i n g l y , the t h e utility
u t i l i t y ofo f tthreat,
h r e a t , punishment,
p u n i s h m e n t , and a n d use u s e of o f fforce
o r c e is i s ana n implausible
im p la u s ib le
option
o p t i o n t o a t t a i n t h e s e t o f g o a l s u n d e r t h e p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y s e c t i o n of
to attain the set of goals under the peace and security section o f the
t h e SEP.
SEP.
Instead, the best option and workable instrument is
In s te a d , th e b e s t o p tio n a n d w o rk a b le in stru m e n t is n o th in g le s s th a n p e rs u a s io nnothing less than persuasion
and
a n d offering
o f f e r i n g of o f rewards.
r e w a r d s . Coercion
C o e r c i o n will w ill y yield
ie ld a a failed
f a i l e d and
a n d an an u unfavourable
n f a v o u r a b l e outcome
o u tc o m e
if Pakistan is asked to denuclearise. However,
if P a k ista n is a s k e d to d e n u c le a rise . H o w e v e r, Is la m a b a d c a n b Islamabad can bee persuaded
p e r s u a d e d on on
issues
i s s u e s such s u c h as a s “disarmament
“ d i s a r m a m e n t and a n d non-proliferation,
n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n , counter-terrorism,
c o u n te r - te r r o r is m , p preventing
r e v e n tin g
and
a n d countering
c o u n t e r i n g violentv i o l e n t extremism
e x t r e m i s m and a n d ttackling
a c k l i n g ttheirh e i r root
r o o t causes,
c a u s e s , asa s well
w e l l as
a s in
i n the
th e
field
f i e l d o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z e d c r i m e ; m o n e y l a u n d e r i n g ; a n t i - p i r a c y ; a n d cyber
of transnational organized crime; money laundering; anti-piracy; and cyber
security”
s e c u r i t y ” and, a n d , in i n return,
r e tu r n , b bee rewarded,
r e w a r d e d , as as w was a s ttheh e case
case w when
h e n tthe h e EU E U rewarded
r e w a r d e d Paki-
P a k i­
stan
s t a n for f o r its
i t s ffrontline
r o n tlin e p position
o s i t i o n and
a n d sacrifice
s a c r i f i c e ini n ttheh e warw a r against
a g a i n s t terrorism.
35
t e r r o r i s m . 3 5 Such
Such a a
reward would be non-existent if there were no relationship
r e w a r d w o u ld b e n o n - e x is te n t if th e r e w e r e n o r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n th e tw o . O n e between the two. One
aspect,
a s p e c t, h however,
o w e v e r , remainsr e m a i n s glaring
g la r in g – - tthat
h a t is i s relationship
r e l a t i o n s h i p in i n international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations
re la tio n s
goes
g o e s w i t h i n p u t , o u t p u t , a n d f e e d b a c k . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , a s P a k i s t a n complies
with input, output, and feedback. In this context, as Pakistan c o m p lie s w withith
EU’s
E U ’ s w i s h e s a n d d o e s i t s b i d d i n g , t h a t b e h a v i o u r c o n s e q u e n t l y p r o m p t e d t h e EU
wishes and does its bidding, that behaviour consequently prompted the EU
36
to
t o change
c h a n g e its i t s approach
a p p r o a c h in i n ttheh e interest
i n t e r e s t of
o f Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n . 3 6 Such
S u c h reciprocity
r e c i p r o c i t y underscores
u n d e rsc o re s
37
the dyadic nature of power
th e d y a d ic n a tu r e o f p o w e r r e la tio n .37 relation.
At
A t tthe h e core
c o r e of o f the
t h e peace
p e a c e anda n d security
s e c u r i t y cooperation
c o o p e r a t i o n is i s the
t h e protracted
p r o t r a c t e d Afghan
A f g h a n con-con­
flict.
f l i c t . I t i s m e a n i n g l e s s t o a r g u e t h a t P a k i s t a n h a s n o c r u c i a l r o l e i n advancing
It is meaningless to argue that Pakistan has no crucial role in a d v a n c in g
mediation
m e d i a t i o n efforts e f f o r t s bbetween
e t w e e n the t h e Taliban
T a l i b a n anda n d Washington
W a s h i n g t o n and a n d as a s such
s u c h positioning
p o s itio n in g
38
itself
i t s e l f a s a p o w e r f u l b a r g a i n i n g f o r c e i n t h e f u t u r e ( a n d p e a c e ) o f A f g h a n i s t a n 3 8 and
as a powerful bargaining force in the future (and peace) of Afghanistan and
as
a s a k e y p l a y e r t o w a r d s p e a c e a n d s e c u r i t y i n t h e r e g i o n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e E U has
a key player towards peace and security in the region. Interestingly, the EU has
also
a lso b been
een v vocal
o c a l about
about P Pakistan’s
a k i s t a n ’ s role
r o l e in
i n the
t h e peace
peace p process
r o c e s s bby y declaring
d e c l a r i n g it it aa helpful
h e lp fu l
39
state
s t a t e in i n reaching
re a c h in g a a “sustainable
“ s u s ta in a b le p peace
e a c e agreement”
a g r e e m e n t ” in i n Afghanistan.
A f g h a n is ta n .39
P e a c e i n A f g h a n i s t a n i s o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e E U , a s the
Peace in Afghanistan is of paramount importance to the EU, as t h e protracted
p r o tr a c te d
Afghan
A f g h a n c o n f l i c t h a s w e i g h e d h e a v i l y o n t h e E U i n m a n y w a y s . T h e EU
conflict has weighed heavily on the EU in many ways. The E U needs
needs
solutions
s o l u t i o n s t o t h e d r u g a n d h u m a n t r a f f i c k i n g e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e c o n f l i c t zone,
to the drug and human trafficking emanating from the conflict zone,
the
t h e incessant
i n c e s s a n t mobility
m o b i l i t y of o f Afghan
A f g h a n refugees
r e f u g e e s and a n d asylum
a s y l u m seekerss e e k e r s inundating
i n u n d a t i n g the th e
EU
E U bborders, o r d e r s , the t h e socio-economic
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c and and p political
o l i t i c a l costs
c o s t s of
o f integration
i n t e g r a t i o n amidst
a m id st a a grow-
g ro w ­
ing
i n g anti-immigration
a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n and a n d anti-Muslim
a n t i - M u s l i m rhetoric
r h e t o r i c bby y European
E u ro p e a n P Populist
o p u lis t P Parties
a r tie s
40 41
and
a n d m o v e m e n t s ,4 0 a n d a s a f e e x i t f o r N A T O t r o o p s i n A f g h a n i s t a n . 4 1 T h e s e are
movements, and a safe exit for NATO troops in Afghanistan. These a re
very
v e r y crucial
c r u c i a l tto o thet h e EU E U and a n d are a r e directly
d i r e c t l y intertwined
in te r tw in e d w with i t h peace
p e a c e in i n Afghanistan
A fg h a n is ta n
for
fo r w whichh i c h Pakistan
P a k i s t a n is is a a k key
ey p player.
la y e r. D Despite
e s p i t e hish i s past
p a s t rhetoric
r h e t o r i c on on P Pakistan,
a k i s t a n , during
d u r in g
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 199
a 2-day official visit to Pakistan, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reiterated
“Pakistan has an important role and there are strong interdependencies between
[the] Taliban and Pakistan. We need to recognize this and arrive at pragmatic
approaches to move from conflict to cooperation,”42 This realisation transcends
regional acknowledgment, and even the Russians concede to the instrumental-
ity of Pakistan. With particular reference to Afghanistan, President Putin’s envoy
Zamir Kabulov marked Pakistan as “a key regional player to negotiate with.”43
The EU recognition of Pakistan as a partner for securing regional peace and
security is a testimony to the capability and situational analysis of power vis-à-vis
Pakistan. The realisation further points to the dynamic of modern diplomacy and
power relations in international politics, which is largely concerned with elicit-
ing support of friends, not just to increase the legitimacy of an action, but also
to achieve external objectives through a proxy. Such power relations echo the
non-monopolistic agency of power, since it is concentrated neither in the EU nor
Pakistan but is interdependent.
Another important aspect of the peace and security section of the SEP is the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
(GCTS). It is argued that there is crosspollination between the FATF and EU’s
Generalised System of Preferences-Plus (GSP+) and both nuance the power rela-
tions between the EU and Pakistan. The GSP-Plus is a mechanism through which
developing and least developed countries are granted easy access to export their
products to European Union. This is done through tariff concessions for their
goods when entering the EU market. In 2014, the EU granted GSP-Plus status
to Pakistan with 406 votes, giving the Pakistani products duty-free access to the
European market till 2022. The status has exponentially impacted Pakistan’s
economy based on an enhanced export to the EU from 4.538 billion Euros in 2013
to 7.492 billion Euros in 2019.44 Meanwhile, according to the International Trade
Centre, EU–Pakistan trade balance stands at $728.257.000, $736,866.000, and
$608.381.000 for 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.45 Consequently, Pakistan
stands as the third-largest textile- and garment-exporting country in Asia with an
improved export of around 78 percent to the EU, representing almost 20 percent of
Pakistan’s exports globally.46 Nevertheless, despite the enormous opportunity pre-
sented by the GSP-Plus, Pakistan still has huge challenges to surmount in order to
meet the EU standards.47 For Pakistan, the discontinuity of the GSP-Plus would be
a perilous external policy outcome. The stakes for Pakistan are plenty, as its GSP-
Plus status “allows almost 20 per cent of Pakistani exports to enter the EU market
at zero tariff and 70 per cent at preferential rates.”48 Therefore, given the intrinsic
connection between the GSP-Plus and the protection of human rights, compliance
with labour laws and standards, sustainable development, good governance,49 and
above all, clearance from FATF through EU’s technical support,50 the EU demon-
strates its capacity and capability to influence Pakistan, which underscores what
the EU expects of Pakistan. One, Pakistan must significantly satisfy the strict con-
ditionality that is exigently required to unhook Islamabad from or remain in the
FATF grey list or the worse “blacklist.”51 According to Pakistan’s foreign office,
Pakistan risks $10 billion loss annually, if it protractedly remains in the “grey
200
200 Najimdeen
KJIHGFEDCBA
N Bakare
a jim d e e n B a ka re

52
list.”
l i s t . ” 5 2 Additionally,
A d d i t i o n a l l y , this
t h i s apprehension
a p p r e h e n s i o n explains
e x p la in s w why h y ttheh e administration
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of of P Prime
rim e
Minister
M i n i s t e r I m r a n K h a n i s f o r c e d t o t i g h t e n t h e n a t i o n ’ s b a n k i n g a n d f i n a n c i a l regu-
Imran Khan is forced to tighten the nation’s banking and financial re g u ­
53
latory
l a t o r y system.
s y s t e m . 5 3 Two,
T w o , Pakistan
P a k i s t a n mustm u s t comply
c o m p l y with w i t h ttheh e international
i n t e r n a t i o n a l labour
l a b o u r lawl a w andand
standards. To remain eligible for the EU market, concerted
s ta n d a r d s . T o r e m a in e lig ib le f o r th e E U m a r k e t, c o n c e r te d e f f o r t m u s t b e g e a re d effort must be geared
towards
t o w a r d s eradicating
e r a d i c a t i n g forced
f o r c e d and a n d child
c h i l d labour.
l a b o u r . Three,
T h r e e , tthe he p promotion
r o m o t i o n of o f good
g o o d gov- gov­
ernance,
e r n a n c e , sabotaging
s a b o t a g i n g the t h e chain
c h a i n anda n d mechanism
m e c h a n i s m of o f money
m o n e y laundering,
l a u n d e r i n g , and a n d freeing
fre e in g
the
t h e country
c o u n t r y ffrom r o m thet h e menace
m e n a c e of o f extremism
e x t r e m i s m and a n d terrorism
t e r r o r i s m area r e also
a l s o kkeye y expectations
e x p e c ta tio n s
from Pakistan.
fro m P a k ista n .
While
W h i l e the th e E EU U hashas w waysa y s of o f influencing
i n f l u e n c i n g Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tto o doing
d o i n g its i t s bbidding,
i d d i n g , thet h e nature
n a tu re
of
o f r e l a t i o n s d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t P a k i s t a n p o s s e s s e s s i m i l a r c a p a b i l i t y to
relations does not indicate that Pakistan possesses similar capability t o iinflu-
n f lu ­
ence
e n c e the t h e EU,
EU, w which
h i c h the
t h e latter
l a t t e r does
d o e s not n o t necessarily
n e c e s s a r ily w want
a n t tto o happen
happen – - fforo r instance
i n s t a n c e tto o
increase
i n c r e a s e foreign
f o r e i g n aid
a i d payment,
p a y m e n t , tto o lower
l o w e r tariff
t a r i f f on
o n goods,
g o o d s , or o r to
t o integrate
in te g r a te P Pakistan
a k i s t a n into
in to
its
i t s GSP.
G S P . As A s aforesaid,
a f o r e s a i d , the
t h e quantity
q u a n t i t y anda n d quality
q u a l i t y of
of p power
o w e r bbecome
e c o m e meaningful
m e a n i n g f u l only o n ly
when
w h e n m o b i l i s e d a n d s t e e r e d t o w a r d s a c h i e v i n g a s e t o f f o r e i g n o b j e c t i v e s . In
mobilised and steered towards achieving a set of foreign objectives. I n tthis
h is
case,
c a s e , the t h e capability
c a p a b i l i t y ofo f Pakistan
P a k i s t a n rrestse s t s on
o n iitst s skill
s k i l l to
t o influence
i n f l u e n c e politics
p o l i t i c s in
i n Afghani-
A fg h a n i­
stan,
s t a n , which
w h i c h bby y extension
e x t e n s i o n doesd o e s notn o t only
o n l y ffavour
a v o u r Islamabad,
Is la m a b a d , b butu t also
a l s o swayed
s w a y e d the t h e EU
EU
to
t o c o n s i d e r P a k i s t a n a s a p o t e n t i a l a l l y i n t h e s e a r c h f o r s o l u t i o n s t o A f g h a n crisis
consider Pakistan as a potential ally in the search for solutions to Afghan c risis
and
a n d an a n eligible
e l i g i b l e candidate
c a n d i d a t e ffor o r the
t h e GSP-Plus
G S P - P l u s status.
s ta tu s .

Trade and Investment and Democracy, Rule of

Trade ofLaw, Good
Governance, and Human Rights
Another
A n o th e r w waya y ofo f analysing
a n a l y s i n g EU–Pakistan
E U - P a k i s t a n relationsr e l a t i o n s isi s tthrough
h r o u g h tthe h e dependency
d e p e n d e n c y optics, o p tic s ,
characterised
c h a r a c t e r i s e d b y p e r s u a s i o n a n d t h r e a t . S u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p c o n v e n i e n t l y explicates
by persuasion and threat. Such relationship conveniently e x p lic a te s
the
t h e way
w a y tthe he E EU U treats
tr e a ts P Pakistan
a k i s t a n tthe he w way a y tthe h e former
f o r m e r ttreated
r e a t e d anda n d integrated
i n t e g r a t e d the t h e for-
fo r­
mer
m e r c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s o f C e n t r a l a n d E a s t E u r o p e ( C E E ) i n t o t h e E U . The
communist countries of Central and East Europe (CEE) into the EU. The
integration
i n t e g r a t i o n ofo f these
t h e s e countries
c o u n tr ie s w was a s subject
s u b j e c t tto o structural
s t r u c t u r a l anda n d institutional
i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms.
re fo rm s.
There
T h e r e i s n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t P a k i s t a n i n t e n d s t o o r w i l l b e i n t e g r a t e d into
is no indication that Pakistan intends to or will be integrated i n t o ttheh e EU,
EU,
however,
h o w e v e r , in i n similar
s i m i l a r ttoken
o k e n of o f the
th e E EU U integration
i n t e g r a t i o n policy
p o l i c y towards
t o w a r d s the t h e CEE,
C E E , mutual
m u tu a l
interest
i n t e r e s t has
h a s pushed
p u s h e d the th e E EU U and a n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n towards
to w a rd s h having
a v i n g deeper
d e e p e r and a n d larger
l a r g e r ttrade
ra d e
relations
r e l a t i o n s u n d e r t h e S E P , t h u s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e G S P - P l u s s t a t u s . T h e prerequi-
under the SEP, thus the provision of the GSP-Plus status. The p r e r e q u i­
sites
s i t e s ofo f the
t h e status
s t a t u s cause
c a u s e tthe
h e EU E U tto o bbe e closely
c l o s e l y concerned
c o n c e r n e d and a n d involved
i n v o l v e d in i n tthe
h e politi-
p o liti­
cal process of Pakistan, especially the restoration and transition
c a l p r o c e s s o f P a k is ta n , e s p e c ia lly th e r e s to r a tio n a n d tr a n s itio n o f th e d e m o c ra tic of the democratic
governments,
g o v e rn m e n ts, w which
h i c h is is y yete t another
a n o t h e r displayd i s p l a y of of p power
o w e r relations
r e l a t i o n s wherein
w h e r e i n tthe he E EUU
mobilises its resources – capabilities to influencing Pakistan
m o b ilis e s its r e s o u r c e s - c a p a b ilitie s to in f lu e n c in g P a k is ta n in to b e in g c o m m it­ into being commit-
ted
t e d towards
to w a rd s p political
o l i t i c a l reforms.
r e f o r m s . It I t is
i s safe
s a f e tto o argue
a r g u e that
t h a t such
s u c h relations
r e l a t i o n s make
m ake P Pakistan
a k ista n
the
t h e d e p e n d e n t p a r t n e r , w h o d e p e n d s o n t h e w o r l d ’ s l a r g e s t e c o n o m i c u n i o n for
dependent partner, who depends on the world’s largest economic union f o r its
its
54
trade
t r a d e a n d b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s . 5 4 G i v e n t h e d e p e n d e n c y , t h e E U h a s s e v e r a l l y com-
and business ventures. Given the dependency, the EU has severally com ­
plained
p l a i n e d over
o v e r Pakistan’s
P a k is ta n ’s v violation
i o l a t i o n or o r laxity
l a x i t y ttoo ffulfilling
u l f i l l i n g the
t h e prerequisite
p r e r e q u i s i t e of o f the
t h e GSP-
G SP-
Plus
P l u s s t a t u s . W h i l e i t i s h a r d t o p a i n t t h i s a s t r a n s a c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n , I s l a m a b a d has
status. While it is hard to paint this as transactional relation, Islamabad has
remained
r e m a i n e d on on a a cautious
c a u t i o u s mode,
m o d e , tailored
t a i l o r e d not n o t tot o jjeopardise
e o p a r d i s e tthe h e status.
s t a t u s . For
F o r instance
in s ta n c e
the
th e E EU U places
p la c e s a a premium
p r e m i u m on o n ttheh e contribution
c o n t r i b u t i o n of o f the
t h e civil
c i v i l society
s o c i e t y and a n d democratic
d e m o c ra tic
process,
p r o c e s s , b u t , b a s e d o n i t s r e c e n t r e p o r t , t h e c i v i l s o c i e t y s p a c e i s s h r i n k i n g , nota-
but, based on its recent report, the civil society space is shrinking, n o ta ­
55
bly
b l y ini n Pakistan.
P a k is ta n .55 B Besides,
e s i d e s , tthe
h e Union
U n i o n also a l s o cautioned
c a u tio n e d P Pakistan
a k i s t a n against
a g a i n s t risking
r i s k i n g its
its
GSP-Plus
G S P - P l u s status,
s t a t u s , ifi f Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d does d o e s not n o t cease
c e a s e imposing
i m p o s i n g sanctions
s a n c t i o n s on o n international
in te rn a tio n a l
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 201
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in country,56 which Pakistan
has occasionally accused of undermining its national interest. This power relation
characterised by persuasion and threat vividly demonstrates and reinforces the
capabilities of the EU to employ multiple tools geared at ensuring that Pakistan
complies with the EU-standard regulations; for instance Pakistan has seen a drop
in child labour down from 16 per cent to 1 per cent through pioneering “Child
Labour Free Zones.”57

Migration and MobilityZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Mobility
In
In a a dyadic
d y a d i c relationship,
r e la tio n s h ip , p power
o w e r is i s never
n e v e r the t h e monopoly
m o n o p o l y of o f oneo n e dominant
d o m in a n t p partner,
a rtn e r,
and relationship is predicated on mutual interest, interdependence,
a n d r e la tio n s h ip is p r e d ic a te d o n m u tu a l in te r e s t, in te r d e p e n d e n c e , r e c ip r o c ity , reciprocity,
trust,
t r u s t , and
a n d open-endedness.
o p e n - e n d e d n e s s . It I t is
i s equally
e q u a l l y important
i m p o r t a n t to t o dissect
d i s s e c t EU–Pakistan
E U - P a k i s t a n rela- re la ­
tions
t i o n s t h r o u g h s i m i l a r d y a d i c r e l a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s a n d u n d e r t h e optics
through similar dyadic relational analysis and under the o p t i c s of o f migra-
m ig ra ­
tion
t i o n anda n d mobility.
m o b i l i t y . Free F r e e movement
m o v e m e n t of of p people
e o p l e is i s one
o n e of o f tthe
h e ffundamental
u n d a m e n t a l cores c o r e s of of
human rights. While migration is as old as humans,
h u m a n r ig h ts . W h ile m ig r a tio n is a s o ld a s h u m a n s , to d a y ’s n a tio n -s ta te s a n d b today’s nation-states and bor-
o r­
der
d e r regimes
re g im e s h hold
o l d somes o m e degree
d e g r e e of o f restrictions
r e s t r i c t i o n s and a n d regulations
r e g u l a t i o n s ono n human
h u m a n mobil- m o b il­
ity,
i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y o n i r r e g u l a r a n d f o r c e d m i g r a t i o n . O v e r t h e l a s t ffour
particularly on irregular and forced migration. Over the last o u r decades,
decades,
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has has b beene e n ablea b l e tot o successfully
s u c c e s s f u l l y host h o s t the t h e largest
l a r g e s t iinflux
n f l u x ofo f rrefugees
e f u g e e s from fro m
Afghanistan
A f g h a n i s t a n prior p r i o r tto o and
a n d after
a f t e r the
th e U US S invasion
i n v a s i o n of o f Afghanistan.
A f g h a n i s t a n . The T h e EU E U is i s facing
fa c in g
similar
s i m i l a r conflict-induced
c o n f l i c t - i n d u c e d migration
m i g r a t i o n as a s itsi t s bborders
o r d e r s are a r e flooded
f l o o d e d bby y rrefugees
e f u g e e s fleeing
fle e in g
conflict
c o n f l i c t z o n e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t . I n a d y a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e E U can
zones in the Middle East. In a dyadic relationship, the EU c a n adopta d o p t theth e
same
s a m e modelm o d e l that t h a t Pakistan
P a k i s t a n adopted
a d o p t e d tto o host
h o s t the t h e refugees.
r e f u g e e s . As A s part
p a r t of
o f tthe
h e SEP,
S E P , theth e E EU U
expects
e x p e c ts P Pakistan
a k i s t a n to t o secure
s e c u r e its its b border
o r d e r against
a g a i n s t irregular
i r r e g u l a r migrants,
m i g r a n t s , smuggling,
s m u g g l i n g , and and
human
h u m a n ttrafficking.
r a f f i c k i n g . Once O n c e again,
a g a i n , theth e p possibility
o s s i b i l i t y of o f tthis
h i s tot o happen
h a p p e n depends
d e p e n d s on o n reci-
r e c i­
procity, trust, persuasion, and reward; all of which define
p r o c ity , tr u s t, p e r s u a s io n , a n d r e w a rd ; a ll o f w h ic h d e f in e a d y a d ic r e la tio n s h ip . a dyadic relationship.
For
F o r instance,
i n s t a n c e , in i n ttheh e case
c a s e tthathat P Pakistan
a k i s t a n secures
s e c u r e s its its b border
o r d e r ffromr o m drug
d r u g and a n d human
hum an
trafficking
t r a f f i c k i n g t h a t m i g h t e n d u p i n t h e E U c o u n t r i e s , s u c h b e h a v i o u r m a y prompt
that might end up in the EU countries, such behaviour may p r o m p t the th e
EU
E U to to p positively
o s i t i v e l y deepend e e p e n its i t s relations
r e l a t i o n s with
w i t h Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d and a n d reward
r e w a r d Islamabad
I s l a m a b a d ffor or
acting
a c t i n g responsibly.
r e s p o n s ib ly .
The
T h e primary
p r i m a r y objective
o b j e c t i v e ofo f tthish i s chapter
c h a p t e r is i s ttheh e critique
c r i t i q u e ofo f the
t h e EU–Pakistan
E U - P a k i s t a n rela- re la ­
tions
t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e l e n s o f S E P , b u t , o t h e r t h a n t h a t , f e w c o n t e n t i o u s issues
through the lens of SEP, but, other than that, few contentious i s s u e s area re
equally
e q u a l l y important
i m p o r t a n t and a n d worthy
w o r t h y of o f critiquing.
c r i t i q u i n g . TheseT h e s e complementary
c o m p l e m e n t a r y issuesi s s u e s are a r e not
not
necessarily
n e c e s s a r i l y an a n integral
i n t e g r a l part
p a r t ofo f SEPSEP b butu t are
a r e ffundamental
u n d a m e n t a l tto o tthe
h e larger
la rg e r p picture
i c t u r e ofo f the
th e
EU–Pakistan
E U - P a k i s t a n relations.r e la tio n s .

Beyond Strategic Engagement Plan

Selective Relations
South
S o u t h Asia
A s i a is is a a vast
v a s t political
p o l i t i c a l geography
g e o g r a p h y with
w i t h enormous
e n o rm o u s p potential
o t e n t i a l anda n d proclivity
p r o c liv ity
to
t o c o n t r i b u t e i m m e n s e l y t o r e g i o n a l a n d g l o b a l g e o - e c o n o m i c a n d geopolitical
contribute immensely to regional and global geo-economic and g e o p o litic a l
development.
d e v e lo p m e n t. H However,
o w e v e r , the
th e p protraction
r o t r a c t i o n of
o f intra-state
i n t r a - s t a t e and
a n d inter-state
i n t e r - s t a t e conflicts
c o n f l i c t s in
in
the
t h e r e g i o n h a s l o n g a c t e d a s i m p e d i m e n t t o s u c h p o t e n t i a l s . A m o n g others,
region has long acted as impediment to such potentials. Among o t h e r s , the
th e
Kashmir
K a s h m i r conflict
c o n f l i c t is
i s not
n o t jjust
u s t ana n imbroglio
i m b r o g l i o to
t o the
t h e sense
s e n s e of
o f diplomacy
d i p l o m a c y of o f the
t h e states
s ta te s
202
202 Najimdeen
KJIHGFEDCBA
N Bakare
a jim d e e n B a ka re

involved,
in v o lv e d , b but u t it i t is,
i s , bbyy all
a l l standards,
s t a n d a r d s , alsoa l s o oneo n e of o f thet h e world’s
w o r l d ’ s most m o s t intractable
i n t r a c t a b l e deba- deba­
cles
c l e s w i t h o u t a f o r e s e e a b l e r e s o l u t i o n . G i v e n t h i s p r e m i s e , p e a c e in
without a foreseeable resolution. Given this premise, peace i n South
S o u t h Asia A s ia
and
a n d thatt h a t especially
e s p e c i a l l y bbetween e t w e e n India I n d i a anda n d Pakistan
P a k i s t a n has has b been
e e n severely
s e v e r e l y ttraumatised
r a u m a t i s e d and and
decimated.
d e c im a te d . A A p plethora
l e t h o r a of o f works
w o r k s suggest
s u g g e s t tthat hat a a resolution
r e s o l u t i o n tto o the
t h e Kashmir
K a s h m i r conflict c o n flic t
will
w i l l open o p e n manym a n y opportunities.
o p p o r t u n i t i e s . While W h i l e it i t has
has b been
e e n bbarely
a r e l y difficult
d i f f i c u l t for f o r tthe h e major
m a jo r
players
p l a y e r s ( I n d i a a n d P a k i s t a n ) i n t h e c o n f l i c t t o m a k e p e a c e , f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l entity,
(India and Pakistan) in the conflict to make peace, foreign political e n tity ,
especially
e s p e c i a l l y tthe h e EU, E U , whosew h o s e external
e x t e r n a l interest
i n t e r e s t intersects
in te rs e c ts w with i t h South
S o u t h Asia,A s i a , should
s h o u l d have have
mobilised
m o b i l i s e d i t s p o l i t i c a l a n d d i p l o m a t i c c l o u t t o i n f l u e n c i n g t h e t r a j e c t o r y of
its political and diplomatic clout to influencing the trajectory o f the
th e
Kashmir
K a s h m i r dispute.d i s p u t e . The The U Union
n i o n must m u s t muscle
m u s c l e up u p its i t s political
p o l i t i c a l and
a n d diplomatic
d i p l o m a t i c clout c l o u t to
to
influence
i n f l u e n c e tthe h e ttrajectory
r a j e c t o r y of o f tthehe K Kashmir
a s h m i r dispute,
d i s p u t e , as a s ifi f overdue.
o v e r d u e . If I f tthehe E EU U is is p par-
a r­
ticularly
t i c u l a r l y concerned
c o n c e r n e d about a b o u t tthe he w well-being
e l l - b e i n g of of P Pakistan
a k i s t a n as a s depicted
d e p i c t e d in i n thet h e SEP, S E P , thenth e n
it must start playing a pivotal and instrumental role
it m u s t s ta r t p la y in g a p iv o ta l a n d in s tr u m e n ta l r o le in r e s o lv in g I n d o - P a k is ta n in resolving Indo-Pakistan
intractable
i n t r a c t a b l e conflict
c o n f l i c t and a n d most m o s t particularly
p a r t i c u l a r l y tthe h e Kashmir
K a s h m i r dispute. d i s p u t e . Brussels
B r u s s e l s cannot cannot
afford
a f f o r d t o r e m a i n a n o n l o o k e r , i t m u s t b e s e r i o u s l y a n d p r a g m a t i c a l l y concerned
to remain an onlooker, it must be seriously and pragmatically c o n c ern e d
about
a b o u t the t h e conflict
c o n f l i c t in i n distant
d i s t a n t region
re g io n – - like
l i k e South
S o u t h Asia.A s i a . This
T h i s is i s necessary,
n e c e s s a r y , in i n order
o r d e r ttoo
prevent the transmigration of conflict consequences into
p r e v e n t th e tr a n s m ig r a tio n o f c o n f lic t c o n s e q u e n c e s in to its b o r d e r s . F o r in s ta n c e , its borders. For instance,
the
t h e recent
re c e n t M Middlei d d l e East E a s t refugee
r e f u g e e crisis
c r i s i s on o n European
E u ro p e a n b borders
o r d e r s should
s h o u ld b bee aa glaringg la rin g
reminder.
r e m in d e r .
It
I t argued
a r g u e d that t h a t the th e E EU U has h a s largely
l a r g e l y limited
l i m i t e d its i t s role
r o l e in
i n thet h e Kashmir
K a s h m i r conflict c o n f l i c t to t o that
th a t
of a facilitator, and not as an intermediary, fearing being
o f a f a c ilita to r , a n d n o t a s a n in te r m e d ia r y , f e a r in g b e in g e n ta n g le d in th e I n d ia - entangled in the India–
58
Pakistan
P a k i s t a n tensions.
t e n s i o n s . 5 8 Interestingly,
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the t h e Union
U n i o n is i s not
n o t ffearful
e a r f u l tto o entangle
e n t a n g l e itself i t s e l f ini n the
th e
economic, financial, and commercial relations but has,
e c o n o m ic , f in a n c ia l, a n d c o m m e rc ia l r e la tio n s b u t h a s , h o w e v e r , b e e n m a in ta in in ghowever, been maintaining
aa cautious
c a u t i o u s approach
a p p ro a ch v vis-à-vis
i s - a - v i s thet h e geopolitical
g e o p o l i t i c a l ttensions.
e n s i o n s . GivenG i v e n its i t s capability
c a p a b i l i t y level, le v e l,
one
o n e c a n a r g u e t h a t t h e E U h a s h u g e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d m u s t a v o i d remaining
can argue that the EU has huge responsibility and must avoid r e m a in in g a a
spectator
s p e c t a t o r ffor o r thet h e reasons
r e a s o n s giveng i v e n in i n tthe
h e subsequent
s u b s e q u e n t paragraphs.
p a ra g rap h s.
First,
F irst, v virtually
i r t u a l l y all a l l tthe
h e EU E U memberm e m b e r countriesc o u n t r i e s agreeda g r e e d with w ith K Kosovo’s
o s o v o ’s u unilateral
n ila te r a l
independence
i n d e p e n d e n c e d e c l a r a t i o n a n d s t o o d b y t h e I C J r u l i n g o v e r t h e s a m e i s s u e in
declaration and stood by the ICJ ruling over the same issue i n 2008.
2008.
Yet,
Y e t , t h e E U h a s f a i l e d t o r e p l i c a t e s i m i l a r p o l i t i c a l a n d d i p l o m a t i c s t a m i n a towards
the EU has failed to replicate similar political and diplomatic stamina to w a rd s
the
t h e Kashmir
K a s h m i r conflictc o n f l i c t vvis-à-vis
i s - a - v i s tthe h e long-relegated
lo n g - r e le g a te d p plebiscite,
le b is c ite , w whichh ic h w wouldo u l d accorda c c o rd
voice to the Kashmiris and their future and in fact grant
v o ic e to th e K a s h m ir is a n d th e ir f u tu r e a n d in f a c t g r a n t le g itim a c y o r d e le g itim is e legitimacy or delegitimise
India’s
I n d i a ’ s claim
c l a i m over o v e r tthe h e vvalley.
a lle y .
Second,
S e c o n d , i f t h e E U maintains
if the EU m a i n t a i n s strategic
s tr a te g ic p partnership
a r t n e r s h i p withw ith b both
o t h India
I n d i a and a n d Pakistan,
P a k is ta n ,
the
t h e U n i o n s h o u l d m u s c l e u p i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s t o i n f l u e n c e b o t h c o u n t r i e s towards
Union should muscle up its capabilities to influence both countries to w a rd s
mutually
m u t u a l l y acceptable
a c c e p t a b l e resolution
r e s o l u t i o n of o f ttheh e conflict.
c o n f l i c t . ItI t bbehoves
e h o v e s tthe he E EU U tto o ttransit
r a n s i t fromfro m a a
mere rhetoric towards embracing a more pragmatic
m e r e r h e to r ic to w a r d s e m b r a c in g a m o re p r a g m a tic a p p r o a c h r e g a r d in g th e K approach regarding the Kash-
ash ­
mir
m i r conflict.
c o n f l i c t . India
I n d i a has h a s long
l o n g maintained
m a i n t a i n e d that t h a t tthe he K Kashmir
a s h m i r conflict
c o n f l i c t is i s an a n internal
in te rn a l
issue
i s s u e a n d p r e m i s e d o n i t s d e m o c r a t i c c r e d e n t i a l a n d t h a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l com-
and premised on its democratic credential and that the international com ­
munity
m u n i t y should
s h o u l d trust t r u s t India
I n d i a not n o t tot o commit
c o m m i t any a n y excesses;
ex cesses; h however,
o w e v e r , tthe h e recent
r e c e n t devel-d e v e l­
opments
o p m e n t s in i n the t h e valley
v a l l e y abundantly
a b u n d a n t l y contradict
c o n t r a d i c t such such a a claim.
c la im . N Not o t onlyo n l y did d i d India
In d ia
v i o l a t e t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w b y r e v o k i n g t h e A r t i c l e s 3 7 0 a n d 3 5 A o f t h e Indian
violate the international law by revoking the Articles 370 and 35A of the In d ia n
Constitution
C o n s titu tio n - –w whichh i c h respect
r e s p e c t tthe h e autonomous
a u t o n o m o u s status s t a t u s ofo f thet h e disputed
d i s p u t e d tterritorye rrito ry - – itit
has also exacerbated the gruesome violation of human
h a s a ls o e x a c e r b a te d th e g r u e s o m e v io la tio n o f h u m a n r ig h ts in th e v a lle y . T h e s e rights in the valley. These
atrocities
a t r o c i t i e s spurred
sp u rre d a a powerful
p o w e rfu l U UN N humanh u m a n right r i g h t report
r e p o r t anda n d tthe h e first
f i r s t ever
e v e r OHCHR OHCHR
59
report
r e p o r t o n K a s h m i r . 5 9 T h e h u m a n r i g h t s v i o l a t i o n h a s f a i l e d t o e v a d e tthe
on Kashmir. The human rights violation has failed to evade h e ttraction
r a c tio n
of
o f tthehe U US S State
S ta te D Department,
e p a rtm e n t, w whose
h o s e report
r e p o r t denounced
d e n o u n c e d tthe h e horrid
h o r r i d and and u unpleasant
n p le a sa n t
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 203
scenario in the valley.60 The opponents of the revocation question the legality of
the unilateral Indian action, considered as a blatant violation of international law
and a breach of the UN trust, which entrusted the valley to India till the peo-
ple of Kashmir make their own decision through plebiscite.61 While Jammu and
Kashmir – a largely Muslim-populated valley has remained besieged by the Indian
army in an attempt to showcase a different story and build bridges with sections of
the international community, New Delhi invited curated far-right and Islamophobic
European politicians to the valley, worsening a volatile issue.62
Third, peace in Kashmir is important for the EU as it is for the region, hence
the cogent reason why Brussels should leverage its financial and diplomatic influ-
ence over Islamabad and New Delhi. No doubt, India has been adamantly against
any intermediary role to be played by the EU or any other global player, but,
notwithstanding, the Union should be prudent enough to understand that Peace
and Security as envisioned in the SEP will simply remain a paperwork without
pragmatic effort. Pakistan–India relations centre on numerous issues, of which the
Kashmir dispute is at the core. Thus, peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute
will not only be a realisation of the EU aspiration that peace and security reign in
the region, but it will equally guarantee the EU against unwarranted immigrants
inundating its borders.
Fourth, while the EU has remained cautious from being entangled in global
conflict; nevertheless, the fruition of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) underscores the instrumental role of the EU. Brussels’ pivotal and indel-
ible role demonstrates the victory of multilateralism, dialogue, and diplomacy
over unilateralism and confrontation.63 The amount of diplomacy poured into
the success of the JCPOA can be replayed in South Asia, even though President
Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA is nothing but a jeopardy to the
long-laboured agreement. With the stock of its capabilities, Brussels must repli-
cate and demonstrate its diplomatic skill for the peace of South Asia. Allowing
economic and commercial preferences to outweigh the consideration for peace
and security will be less beneficial for all, be it for the regional players or external
player like the EU.
Beyond geopolitics, it is imperative that the EU should avoid being labelled
as selective in its approach towards democratic dispensation, human rights, and
civil society in Pakistan. While Brussels has demonstrated its support for democ-
racy in Pakistan, scholars argue that the EU has a predilection for military, given
the strong hold of the latter on Pakistan’s polity. Similarly, the SEP requires the
two sides to embrace the value of protecting human rights, but should the EU be
selective?

The European Parliament deeply concerned about the fate of a Christian

women Aasia Bibi, sentenced to death for blasphemy against Islam, urged
Pakistan to release the woman. The parliament also reiterated the need to
revise blasphemy laws and their application. However, the EU never raised
a voice for the release of Afia Siddiqui, facing trial in the US, despite its
avowed concern for human rights.64
204 Najimdeen Bakare
Subsequently, both parties agreed on enhancing the capacity of the civil society,
enriching its parliamentary system, and strengthening the mushrooming demo-
cratic dispensation; yet, unlike the United States, the EU must muscle up beyond
being a marginal political player and should prioritise Pakistan, similar to the
United States and China.65

Conclusion
The EU–Pakistan relations stretch back to the 1960s. The fact that the relation-
ship between the two covers a long period of time hints at periods of oscillation,
agreement, disagreement, negotiation, and compromise. Understanding power
relations between or among states requires identifying the elements of power.
Influence is an important element of power, an instrument of inducement, a cause
of behavioural change, and a means to an end. Influence is not just to change but a
plan of action to get others to continue a course of action or policy which is com-
mensurate with the interest of the supposed influencer. It is unquestionably glar-
ing that the EU is more capacitated and endowed with an abundance of resources
to induce and influence Pakistan to change its behaviour and comply with the
EU’s external objectives. It follows that influence as an integral element of power
is meaningless without tangible and demonstrable capability. Furthermore, power
relations between the two demonstrate and speak of power as non-momentary,
but a process.
Relationship between states comes in many complexions, shapes, and often
revolves around bargaining techniques which include but not limited to persua-
sion, offering of rewards, threatening punishments, and the use of force. In the case
of the EU–Pakistan relations, the bargaining techniques have generally revolved
around the first three, while the utility of force has been virtually non-existent.
Although the SEP claims that the relation is that of trust and mutual interest, it
does not truly portray a transactional diplomatic intercourse, given the imbalance
of power and dependency contour. While the EU might apparently appear more
influential than Pakistan, it does not discount the ability of Islamabad to influence
Brussels. Nonetheless, it is also hard to dispute how the relations have helped
both sides achieve their foreign policy objectives. For the EU, its influence over
Islamabad is ever more glaring and deeper, and for Islamabad, the relations draw
it closer to the most powerful economic Union, having accessibility to the EU
market, but at some cost. It has to fulfil the demands of the EU and trade-off some
of its sovereign rights and integrity in order to achieve a greater good. Though not
entirely like the CEE, yet, Islamabad had to initiate internal reforms, not because
of its own volition, but upon the demand of a foreign entity. Nevertheless, the
EU–Pakistan relationship is not truly transactional but is rather based on power
relations predicated on compromise, persuasion, reward, and threat.

Notes
1 The European Economic Community (EEC) morphed into EU in 1993.
2 Sanam Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,” Pakistan Horizon 61, no. 3(2008): 20.
 The European Union (EU)–Pakistan Relations 205
3 Ibid., 21.
4 Shada Islam, “EU–Pakistan Relations: The Challenge of Dealing with a Fragile State,”
in The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, eds. Christiansen Thomas, Kirchner
Emil, and Murray Philomena (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 591.
5 Hassan Oz, “Securitising Proliferation, Failing Security Governance: The European
Union’s Role in India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Rivalry,” Asia Europe Journal 11 (2013):
93–112.
6 Noor, “Pakistan–EU Relations,” 19–20; Rashid Soorty, “Pakistan-European Union
Relations,” Pakistan Horizon 57, no. 4 (October 2004): 29; Ana Ballesteros-Peiró, “The
EU–Pakistan Relationship: Looking Beyond the Trading Partnership,” Elcano Royal
Institute (2015): 1–11, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/e6a53b00485ef-
6c5a64eb77939ebc85f/ARI26-2015-The-EU-Pakistan-relationship-looking-beyond-
the-trading-partnership.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e6a53b00485ef6c5a64
eb77939ebc85f.
7 Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations.”
8 Ballesteros-Peiró, “The EU–Pakistan Relationship,” 1; Soorty, “Pakistan-European
Union Relations,” 30; Islam, “EU–Pakistan Relations: The Challenge of Dealing with
a Fragile State.”
9 KhurramAbbas, “Pakistan’s Relations with European Union (EU),” IPRI, March 31, 2015,
accessed July 2, 2020, https://ipripak.org/pakistans-relations-with-european-union-eu/.
10 Ballesteros-Peiró, “The EU–Pakistan Relationship.”
11 William Nester, International Relations: Politics and Economics in the 21st Century
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 85.
12 Kalevi J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” Back-
ground 7, no. 4 (1964): 179–94.
13 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds.
Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson,
Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29.
14 Chris Brown, “Realism: Rational or Reasonable?” International Affairs (Royal Insti-
tute of International Affairs 1944-) 88, no. 4 (2012): 860.
15 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Realism and Security Studies,” in Contemporary Security and
Strategy, ed. Craig A. Snyder (London: Palgrave, 1999), 53–76; Kenneth N. Waltz,
“Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1
(1990): 21–37.
16 Tim Dunne, “Liberalism,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations Eighth Edition, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia
Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 163.
17 Scott Burchill, “Liberalism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition, eds.
Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson,
Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 57.
18 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press,
1992), 20.
19 Burchill, “Liberalism,” 56.
20 Andrew Linklater, “Marxism,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edition,
eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Pater-
son, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 110.
21 Andrew Linklater, “Marxism,” 127.
22 Steve Smith, “Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory,” in
The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations Eighth
Edition, eds. John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2001), 223.
23 Robert J. Antonio, “The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical
Theory,” The Sociological Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1983): 325–51.
24 Richard Devetak, “Critical Theory,” in Theories of International Relations Third Edi-
tion, eds. Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew
206 Najimdeen Bakare
Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 146.
25 Ray S. Cline Boulder, World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 35.
26 Ibid., 34.
27 Tim Hamilton and Satish Sharma, “Power, Power Relations, and Oppression: A Per-
spective for Balancing the Power Relations,” Peace Research 28, no. 1(1996): 23–24.
28 Robert A. Dahl, The International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (New York: The
Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), 405–15.
29 Peter Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, Second Edition (Manchester and New
York: Manchester University Press, 2002), 14–20.
30 Peter Bachrach and M. Barate, quoted in Jeffry C. Isage, “Beyond the Three Faces of
Power: A Realist Critique,” in Rethinking Power, ed. Thomas Wartenberg (New York:
State University of New York Press, 1992), 85–94.
31 Ibid., 37.
32 Kalevi J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” Back-
ground 7, no. 4 (1964): 181.
33 Nation, “Pakistan, EU ink New Strategic Engagement Plan,” June 26, 2019, https://
nation.com.pk/26-Jun-2019/pakistan-eu-ink-new-strategic-engagement-plan.
34 Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” 189.
35 Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,” 22.
36 Ibid.
37 Peter Bachrach and M. Barate, quoted in Isage, “Beyond the Three Faces of Power,”
85–94.
38 Murat Sofuoglu, “Where Does Pakistan Stand in the Afghanistan Deal,” TRT World,
February 26, 2020, www.trtworld.com/magazine/where-does-pakistan-stand-in-the-
afghanistan-deal-34142?
39 Joint Press Release between the European Union and Pakistan on Regional Peace and
Security March 25, 2019.
40 Erin Cunningham, “Europe Wants to Deport Afghan Migrants, but Kabul Is Reluc-
tant to Accept Them,” Washington Post, March 19, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/
world/asia_pacific/europe-wants-to-deport-afghan-migrants-but-kabul-is-reluctant-to-
accept-them/2016/03/17/8b2d9e6a-e54e-11e5-a9ce-681055c7a05f_story.html.
41 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Afghanistan Challenge: U.S. Troop Withdrawal and the
Stability of Afghanistan,” in Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major Pow-
ers and Regional Countries, ed. Sarah Siddiq Aneel (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy
Research Institute, 2016), 85.
42 Ayaz Gul, “Ghani Seeks Pakistan’s Support for Afghan Peace Talks with Taliban,” VOA,
June 28, 2019, www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/ghani-seeks-pakistans-support-
afghan-peace-talks-taliban.
43 Vinay Kaura, “Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implica-
tions for India,” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1(2018): 58–79.
Also see, Najimdeen Bakare, “Contextualizing Russia and South Asia Relations
Through Putin’s Look East Policy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies (July 2020),
doi:10.1177/0021909620939113.
44 Khalid Mustafa and Mehtab Haider, “EU Extends GSP Plus Status to Pakistan
Till 2022,” The News, March 7, 2020, www.thenews.com.pk/print/625091-eu-
extends-gsp-plus-status-to-pakistan-till-2022.
45 www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c586%7c%7c492%7c%7cTOTAL%
7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c3%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1.
46 Democracy Reporting International, “GSP+ in Pakistan: A Brief Introduction,”
democracy-reporting.org › wp-content › uploads › 2016/05 › gsp__i.
47 Islamabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry, “Status of GSP Plus: Its Implications
and Benefits for Pakistani Industries,” www.lcci.com.pk › pdfs › Benefit of GSP Plus.
 The European
The E u r o p e a n Union
U n i o n (EU)–Pakistan Relations
(E U )-P a k ista n R e la tio n s 207
207

448
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Im ra n A d n a n , “Pakistan’s
“ P a k i s t a n ’ s GSP Plus
GSP P l u s Status
S t a t u s in
i n Jeopardy,”
J e o p a r d y , ” The Express
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ttp s ://tr ib u n e .c o m .p k /s to r y /2 0 0 1 8 3 8 /p a k is ta n s - g s p - p lu s - s ta tu s - je o p a r d y .
9 Weifeng
449 W e i f e n g Zhou
Z h o u and
a n d Ludo
L u d o Cuyvers,
C u y v e r s , “The
“ T h e effectiveness
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of EU’s
of E U ’ s Generalised
G e n e r a l i s e d System
S y s t e m of
of
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P r e f e r e n c e s : Evidence
E v i d e n c e from ASEAN
fro m A S E A N Countries,”
C o u n t r i e s , ” JJournal
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50
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T e c h n ic a l A Assistance
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w w w .d a w n .c o m /n e w s /1 5 1 7 1 8 4 .
51 A T F , “Jurisdictions
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22020, w w w .a lja z e e r a .c o m /n e w s /2 0 2 0 /1 0 /2 3 /p a k is ta n - to - r e m a in - o n - g lo b a l- te r r o r - f in
ancing-grey-list;
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( 2 0 1 5 ) : 391–407.
3 9 1 -4 0 7 .
52
5 2 Dipanjan
D i p a n j a n Roy R o y Chaudhury,
C h a u d h u r y , “Pakistan
“ P a k is ta n R Risks
i s k s Losing
L o s i n g $10 $ 1 0 Billion
B illio n A Annually
n n u a l l y Following
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0 1 9 , https://economictimes.india-
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times.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-risks-losing-10-billion-annually-
tim e s .c o m /n e w s /in te r n a tio n a l/w o r ld - n e w s /p a k is ta n - ris k s - lo s in g -1 0 - b illio n - a n n u a lly -
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C o u n te r-T e rro ris t F Financing
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g e t- d o c u m e n t.a s h x ? d = 3 8 9 f f4 6 5 - 2 4 a 1 -4 1 c f -9 a b 9 - 2 7 e d c 2 e 4 c 8 3 6 .
5 4 Democracy
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“ G S P + in i n Pakistan:
P a k is ta n : A A Brief
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In tro d u c tio n .”
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C o m m i s s i o n , “Joint “ J o i n t Report
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56
56 A Adnan,
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i n Jeopardy.”
J e o p a r d y .”
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5 7 European
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u r o p e a n Parliament
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C o u n c il.”
58
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“ P a k is ta n -E U R Relations,”
e l a t i o n s , ” 225.5.
5 9 Office
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Countries/IN/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf;
C o u n tr ie s /I N /K a s h m ir U p d a te R e p o r t_ 8 J u ly 2 0 1 9 .p d f; OHCHR,
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6 1 Sarral
S a r r a l Sharma,
S h a r m a , “The “T he P Political
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62
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63
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Index
Afghanistan 7, 9, 12, 13, 20, 28, 64, 66,
71, 72, 75, 193, 198, 199, 201; Soviet
invasion of 7
Afghanistan-Pakistan confederation
100 – 1, 107
Afghan Taliban 26, 105, 106, 111, 119,
121, 122, 123, 124
agency 10, 66, 68, 69, 73, 75
alliance 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166,
172, 175
Al-Qaeda 103, 104, 111, 118, 122
Australia 45, 46, 49, 56, 57, 59
Bajwa, General 75, 76, 185
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 4, 12, 72,
73, 74, 75
Bhutto, Benazir 19, 64, 86
Bibi, Aasia 203
Bin Laden, Osama 70
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) 44, 46
Central and East Europe (CEE) 200, 204
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 64,
161, 162, 163, 177
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) 64, 68, 70,
73, 76
Child Labour Free Zones 101
China 5, 12, 44, 46, 56, 57 – 8, 60; as
challenger in Indo-Pacific 137
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC) 12, 72, 73, 74, 75, 131, 135,
137, 138, 171, 172, 173, 174, 180, 183,
184, 187, 188
China-Pakistan relations 64, 65, 71, 73, 85,
88, 89, 91, 93, 94
Chinese arms (to Pakistan) 5 – 6
civil military relations in India 136, 138
Cold Start doctrine 136
Cold War 64, 73
Communist government 115
counter-terrorism 184, 185
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 193
Dawn Leak 74
defective democracy 63
defence partnership 168, 173, 174
defense 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189,
190; spending 136
Doklam crisis 131, 136, 137
Durand Line 99 – 101, 103, 108, 118, 123
East Pakistan (Bangladesh) 6
energy exports 187
England 74
Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 75
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 184
European Economic Community (EEC) 193
European Union (EU)-Pakistan relations 193
extremism 122, 123, 124
Federally Administered Tribal Area
(FATA) 118, 119, 122
feminism 46
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 11,
25, 76, 172, 199
Foreign Office 73, 76
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 67, 68
Frankfurt School 195
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 182
Galwan Valley clash 129, 132, 135,
137, 174
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
199, 200
geoeconomics 35, 36
geostrategic location, Pakistan’s 3, 4, 10
Germany 63

Global Counter Terrorism Strategy
(GCTS) 199
globalization 12, 44
great power(s) 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 56,
57, 59
Green Theory 46
Gwadar 12, 88, 89, 90, 94
high-level official visits 185, 186
Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai 129
India 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53 – 4, 56, 57,
58, 65, 71, 72, 76, 103, 112 – 20, 123,
129 – 38, 154, 159, 164 – 7, 171 – 4, 181;
as an emerging power 13, 128, 138
Indian Ocean 4
India’s relations with neighbors
129, 138
India’s two frontal war 129, 135,
136, 137
Indo-China rivalry 138
Indo-China trade 131
Indonesia 66
Indo-Pak rivalry 132, 138
Indus Waters Treaty 67
institutional mechanism 188
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 74,
75, 92
International Relations (IR) 67, 68
International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) 104, 193
Iran 14, 66, 71, 73, 123, 142 – 56
Islamic Emirates 115
Israel 76
Jaish-e-Mohammed 129
Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 51, 52
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) 203
Junagadh 3
Karakoram Highway 88, 94
Kargil conflict 132
Kashmir 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 34,
65, 66, 76, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 123
Kashmir conflict 201 – 4
Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act 69
Khan, Ayub 63, 100, 162, 163,
165, 166
Khan, Imran 8, 9, 18, 19, 23, 25, 28, 36,
74, 75, 76, 91, 145, 148
Khan, Mahathir Mohammad 75
Kuala Lumpur Summit 75
Kulbhushan Yadav 133
Index 209
liberalism 195 – 6
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) 8, 10
Maritime Doctrine-2020 182
Marxism 46, 195
material power 56, 58, 59
Middle Power 45 – 50; Pakistan as 50 – 60
military 63, 65, 68 – 76, 181, 183, 185, 186,
187, 191; agency 76; ranking 54, 57, 59
military drill Druzhba-V 185
Modi, Narendara 72, 131, 132, 133, 1
34, 135
Morgenthau, Hans 195
Mujahideen 7, 113, 115, 117
multipolarity 182, 184
Musharraf, Pervez 64, 65, 68
narrative 162, 166, 167, 169, 175,
177
National Security Advisor (NSA) 76
NATO 71, 75
naval drills 186
nonproliferation 167, 176
Northern Alliance 115, 116, 117,
118, 120
North-South Gas Pipeline Project
(NSGPP) 184
nuclear test (1998) 128, 131
Obama, Barack 20, 69, 70
Oil and Gas Development Company
(OGDC) 182
Pakistan 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 181,
182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189,
190, 191, 192; ideology of 51
Pakistan-China (friendship, diplomatic
relations) 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94
Pakistani-Russian trade 187
Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) 85
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 7, 69, 70,
71, 72, 75
Pakistan–Russia Inter-Government
Commissions (IGC) 187
Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline 186
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) 72, 74
Panama Papers 74
Panjsheela 129
Pashtunistan 99 – 102
Pashtun nationalists 114
Pathankot attack 133
peace 185, 192; process 112, 114, 121,
122, 132; and stability 185
PML-N 11, 69, 70, 72, 74, 75
210 Index
post-colonialism 46
Pulwama attack 134
Pulwama/Balakot conflict 129
Pulwama/Balakot crisis 129, 137
Putin, Vladimir 182, 184
Quadrilateral Security Alliance (QUAD) 182
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 132
Qureshi, Shah Mahmood 76
Rafale 136, 137
R&AW 133
Rawat, General Bipin 136, 137, 138
Ray Cline’s strategic formula 195
Raymond Davis 71
realism 47 – 9, 54, 195
relations, China-Pakistan 5 – 6
revisionist theories 46
Russia 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187,
188, 189, 190, 191, 192
Salala 71
Salman, Mohammad Bin 75
sanctions 167, 168, 175, 176, 180
Saudi Arabia 66, 74, 76
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
182, 183, 184, 185, 190
Sharif, Nawaz 64, 70, 72, 73, 74
Siddiqui, Afia 203
Sino-US rivalry 128
Sir Creek 3
Social Constructivism 46
South Africa 44, 46, 59
South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) 65
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) 4, 64, 161, 162, 163, 177
sovereignty 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31
Soviet intervention 115
Soviet Union 181, 182, 186
Soviet Union-Pakistan relations 6
stability 185
status-quo theories 49
strategic depth 117, 118, 122
Strategic Engagement Plan (SEP)
197 – 9
surgical strike 133
Taliban 65, 102 – 8
Taliban movement 117
Taliban regime 111, 115, 116, 118
terrorism 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31
Thucydides 128, 138; trap 128
trade 182, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189,
191, 192
Trump, Donald 75
Turkey 66, 74
United States 63, 64, 67
US-Afghan Taliban truce 123
US-Pakistan relations 64, 65, 71, 74
USSR 5, 64
War on Terror 114, 117, 120, 124
Wing commander Abhinandan 134
Yusuf, Moeed 76
Zardari, Asif Ali 69, 70, 71, 152