COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW Books | and Il of the Revised Penal Code and Special Penal Laws ATTY. LEONOR D. BOADO FOURTH EDITION 2016 hed & Distributed by REX Book Storeih Philippine Copyright 2016 by i. (EONOR D. BOAD ISBN 978-971-23-8043-3 No portion of this book may be copied or reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines or notes, whether printed, mimeographed, typewritten, copied in different electronic devices or in any other form, for distribution or sale, withoutthe written permission of the authorized representative of the publisher except briefpassagesin books, articles, reviews, ‘and judicial or other official proceedings with proper citation. Any copy of thisbook without the corresponding number and the authorized signature of ‘the author on this page either proceeds from an illegitimate source or is in possession of one who has no authority to dispose of the same ALL RIGHTS RESERVED No. 9810 CE RV-CEED 9 rites by B= REK prom PREFACE Inan attempt to make this book as compact as possible with- out sacrificing the substance, syntax and usefulness to reviewees, utilized abbreviations and paraphrased some rulings. Students id the language of the book simple and comprehensible with attempt to inject aids to remembering principles and juris- prudence. A lot of special laws like the new firearms code and the anti-cybercrime law; amendments to existing laws like R.A. 9160 and provisions of the Revised Penal Code like Art, 29, 98 and 202 have been enacted, hence, the necessity for this updated version. Best wishes to all students and reviewees in attaining their dream to become worthy members of the august profession. My profound gratitude to Dean Carlos M. Ortega whose influence on me regarding the subject of Criminal Law is quite evident in this work. His memory will live in the pages of book. But death is man’s enemy and the grave has an appetite. But it is not an unconquerable enemy for the Bible says in Rev. 21:3, 4 — death shall be no more. LDB.THIRD EDITION 2013 PREFACE Inan attempt to make this book as compact as possible with- out sacrificing the substance, syntax and usefulness to reviewees, ions and paraphrased some rulings. Students ,e of the book simple and comprehensible with attempt to inject aids to remembering principles and juris- prudence. Best wishes to all students and reviewees in attaining their dream to become worthy members of the august profession. LDB.SECOND EDITION 2007 PREFACE AND DEDICATION Itis generally admitted that Criminal Law is the most difficult but interesting branch of law. Relatively the shortest, consisting merely of 365 Articles and a number of special and amendatory statutes, it is a most perplexing subject matter because a slight twist of fact changes the crime committed or erases the existence thereof. With these in mind, an up-to-date Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law is conceived and painstakingly prepared with primarily the bar reviewees in mind. ‘This work is likewise in memory of the author's professors in the University of the E lege of Law, especially the Criminal Law professors who will always be her “Sirs.” Special gratitude to Ms. Remy Cabasal-Hadap, librarian at the Legal Office Library, Commission on Audit (COA), Quezon City and Ms. Reina Afos of the Office of Legal Affairs, COA. October 20, 2007 LDB.‘This textbook was written under the auspices of the Profes- sorial Chair program of the “Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno Library,” College of Law, University of the East. July 28, 2004 Antonio R. Tupaz Dean UE. College of LawCONTENTS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. Article 2 — Scope of application of the Code.. Article 4, Impossible Article 5. Article 6.. Article 7. Article 8. Article 9 Grave, less grave, light felonies. Article 10 — Special Laws CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY. Article 11 — Justifying Circumstance: Article 12 — Exempting Circumstances.. Article 13 — Mitigating Circumstance: Article 14 — Aggravating Circumstance: Taking advantage of official In contempt of or with insult to public authoritie Age, sex, rank, dwelling ‘Abuse of confidence/obvious ‘ungratefulness ‘Committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, etc. Nighttime, uninhabited place, band, aid of armed men.. (On the occasion and by means of cala or misfortune... Recidivism, reiteracion, delinquency and quasi-recidivism .... Sen 100 100 102 102Evident premeditation... Craft, fraud, disguise Abuse of superior strength.... Treachery (alevosi Ignominy and cruelty Unlawéul entry, breaking of door, etc Aid of minor, use of motor vehicle. Article 15 — Alternative Circumstances... Article 16 — Who are cri criminal liability... Penalties .. Articles 21-22.. Article 23 — Pardon by the offended ... le 36 — Pardon by the Chief Executive.... le 24 — Measures of Prevention OF Salety soronnn so Article 29 — Deduction of preventive imprisonment. . Article 25 — Classification of penalties. Article 45... Article 48 — Article 49... and accessories. Article 61 — Rules for graduat 105 106 107 108 108 mm 3 113, 3 6 6 u9 121 125 125 126 17 127 127 128 130 134 136 136 137 139 139 150 151 151 151 Article 71 — Graduated Scales Article 62 ‘Article 63 — Rules for application of indi penalties Article 64 — Rules for application o penalty .. Article 65 — Rules when penalty not composed of three periods. Article 76 — Legal duration of penalt “Article 66 — Impo: Article 75 — Incres e 69 — Penalty for incomplete justification and exemption..n.n Axticle 70 — Successive service of sentences Article 77 — Complex penalty’... Indeterminate Sentence Law. Probation Article 80 — PD. 603 (Chil Welfare Code) and Youth Articles 81-85 — Execution of Death Penalty. Article 89 — Total extinction of criminal ‘Asticle 36 — Pardon by the Chief Executi Article 23 — Pardon by the Offended R.A. 10592 amending A: and 99 Articles 100-113 — CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY Articles 114-117. Articles 122-123. 151 153 155 156 158 158 160 160 161 163 164 165 166 169 176 Ww 77 17 17 77 187 189 192 204 205PD. 532 — Anti-Piracy and Anti- Highway Robbery. R.A. 6235 — Anti. jacking Law TITLED CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE Article 124 — Arbitrary Detention. Aticle 125 — Delay inthe delivery ‘of detained persons... R.A. 7438 — Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Inve obtained; Abuse in Service; Searching ithout witnesses... 131, 146, 147 ‘Articles 132-133 — Crimes Against Rel Worship... ‘TITLE CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER Articles 134-134-A..... Articles 138, 142, 148, 149 R.A. 9372 — Human Security Act of 2007. R.A. 9745 — Anti-Torture Act of 2008... Articles 156-158 — Delivery of prisoners; evasion of service of sentence... 206 208 210 212 24 218 218 219 220 220 221 TITLE IV CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST Article 169 — Forgery Articles 171-172 — Fal Article 177 — Usurpatior ‘Articles 180 and 184 — False Testimony R.A. 9184 — Public Bidding Law Anti-Alias La TITLE V OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS ‘TITLE VI AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS R.A. 9287 — Gambling and Ilegal Lottery Article 200... Articles 201-202. TITLE VIL CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS Article 212 — Corruption of bul Article 213... Articles 214-217... Articles 218-22 R.A. 3019 — Anti-Graft La R.A. 7080 — Plunder Law ... 249 249 21 292 292TITLE VOL CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS Article 246 — Parricide... PD, 1866, as amended by R.A. 8294 and further amended by R.A. 10591... Article 254. Articles 255-259. Articles 260 and 261 Articles 262-266. R.A. 8049 — Hazing Regulat R.A. 8353 — The Anti-Rape R.A. 7610, as amended — Child Abuse Law R.A.9775 — Anti-Child Pornography Law... RA. 9208 — Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law RA. 7877 — Anti-Sexual Harassment Law... TITLE IX CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY Article 267 — Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. Article 268. Article 269 nan Articles 270-279 328 330 330 330 331 404 414 415 416 R.A. 4200 — Anti-Wire Tapping La R.A. 10175 — Anti-Cybercrime Lat RA. 1405 — Bank Secrecy Lat R.A. 10365 amending R.A. 9160, as amended TITLEX CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY Articles 294-29 Articles 297-29 Articles 299-305. Article 306 ... PD. 532 — Highway Robbery (B: Articles 308-311 PD. 1612 — Anti-Fencing Law of 1979. PD. 533 — The Anti-Cattle Rastlng Law of 1974. R.A. 6539 — Anti-Camapping Law. PD. 704, as amended — 1 ishing. PD. 705, as amended — Forestry Cod Article 312. Article 31! BLP. 22—Bouncing Checks Law PD. 1689 — Syndicated Estafa. R.A. 8042 — Migrant Workers Act (Illegal Recruitment) PD. 115 — Trust Receipts Law, Articles 316-31 Article 320. PD. 1613 — 517 518 519Articles 327-331 Article 332 TITLE XI CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY Articles 333-334... Articles 336 and 339. Articles 337 and 338. Articles 340-341 Articles 342-343. Articles 344-346 Articles 347-348 Articles 349-351 Articles 353-362 Articles Article 365... TITLE XII CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS TITLE XI CRIMES AGAINST HONOR 363-364. TITLE XIV CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 554 556 558, 560 363 566 566 569 572 572 576 587 589 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 1. Criminal law is a branch of public law that treats of acts ‘or omissions, which are primarily wrongs against the State. Hence, a criminal case is denominated “People of the ypines v. Xxx." 2. Penal laws are acts of the Legislature prohibiting certain acts or omissions and establishing penalties for their vio- lations. Those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. (Lacson v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999) 3, Whether a statute is a penal law is determined by the presence of the following elements: a. The law must define the criminal act; d c. It mustbe an act of the Legislature. b. _Itmust prescribe a penal 4, It is important to determine whether or not a statute is penal because only then will the principle of in dubio pro reoand the rule on ex post facto law apply. Thus, procedural ce suspension pendente lite, extradition treaty, and substantive laws on jurisdiction are not covered by the above rules, not being penal statutes. 5. Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws: a. The law must be general in application (equal protec- tion). b. It must observe substantive and procedural due process. ¢. It should not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.2 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW of attainder, d. _Itshould not operate as a e. Tt must not operate as an ex post facto law. 6. The equal protection clause assures that a penal law must apply to all similarly situated unless a valid classification exists, eg, RA. 9262 which recognizes the classification between man, on the one hand, and women and children, on the other. It complements the generality characteristic of penal law. 7. Due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. (Liang v. People) For justice to prevail, the scales must be balanced; justice is not to be dis- pensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other. (Dimatulac v. Vilon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998) 8. A court order issued in violation of the due process requirement renders it void. It has no legal and binding effect, force, or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of the law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment; it may simply be ignored. (Guevarra v, SB, G.R. No. 138792-804, March 31, 2005) 9, Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies something inhuman or bar- barous (Harden v. Dir. of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741) or shocking to the conscience (People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299) Mere severity of the penalty does not make it cruel or inhuman. Dura tex sed lex. 10. No ex post facto law may be enacted, and no law may be construed in such fashion as to permit a criminal prosecu- FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 5 tion offensive to the ex post facto clause. (Republic v. Eugenio, G.R. No, 174629, February 14, 2008) 11. The prohibition on ex post facto law applies solely to penal laws. It cannot prohibit the retroactivity of procedural laws such as one that prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice, e.g., the Extradition Treaty. (Wright v. CA, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994) 12. However, Eugenio applied the proscription against ex post facto laws to the interpretation of Section 11 of the ‘Anti-Money Laundering Act enacted on 17 October 2001, a provision which does not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts and deposits. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer of the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. (See no. 15 [h] below.) For that reason, the application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the ex post facto clause. Transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are indeed exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but not for records of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA. 13, The inclusion of public officers and employees earlier charged for violation of the anti-graft law prior to its amendment under suspension pendente lite does not offend the ex post facto rule because suspension is not a penalty but a mere preventive measure. It is not a penalty as it is not imposed after trial on the merits. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-54645-76, December 18, 1986) 14. Provisions in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) complemen- ting the ex post facto rule: a. Article 21:no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.15. 16. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW b. Article 22: penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the offender who is not a habitual delinquent. Therefore, a law which increases the penalty for an act or omission or prejudices the right of the accused cannot be given retroactive effect (irretrospectivity rule). Examples of ex post facto law: a. Makes an act or omission criminal which when committed was not criminal. b. _Aggravates the seriousness of the crime than when it ted. c. _Imposes a penalty that was committed. was co! higher than when the crime d. Makes it easier for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused than when the crime was committed. the e. Requires a lesser quantum of evidence than w/ crime was committed, £ Alters, in relation to the offense or its consequences, the situation of a person to his disadvantage. g Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful. h. Deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former convi a proclamation of amnesty. (Republic v, Eugeni No. 174629, February 14, 2008) A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. It offends against the due process clause and has features of ex post facto law. It is an encroachment of judicial function by the legislative. (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382) 18. Doctrinal application of the prospectivity rule: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 5 17. Characteristics of penal law: a. Generality — (persons to be governed) — penal law is binding on all persons who reside or sojourn in the Philippines whether citizens or not. Basis— Article 14, New Civil Code (NCC); Article I11(), 1987 Constitution. — (jurisdiction or the place where le) — the law is ap crimes committed within the limits of Philippine territory. Basis — Article 2, Revised Penal Code (RPC). c Prospectivity — (when the law shall be appli — the law should have only prospective a is favorable to the offender. (Irretrospec- its the retroactive application of penal Basis — Articles 21 and 22, RPC Article III (22), 1987 Constitution (ex post facto) Axticle 4, NCC a. The prospectivity rule applies to administrative rul- ings and circulars, and to judicial decisions which though not laws, are evidence of what the laws mean. Thus, under Article 8 of the NCC, judicial decisions, applying the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punish- ability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guid- ance of society. (Co v. CA, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993) b. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is, that a law usually divests rights which may have already become vested or impairs the obligations of19. Philosophies underlying the cri (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW contract, hence, unconstitutional. Prior to the statute's nullification it must have been in force and had to be complied with (doctrine of operative fact). It would be to deprive the fairness and justice iad transpired prior to such adjudication. (id.) Incase of conflict between the mala prohibita doctrine and the prospectivity rule in the adjudication of cases, the latter should prevail because all doubts must be resolved pro reo. (id.) Moreover, ex post facto is a cons- titutional edict hence is superior to a doctrine or rule. .w justice system: a. Classical or juristic i, Basis of criminal liability — human free ii, Purpose of the penalty — retribution, for the right of the State and/or the private offended party must be observed. i. Imposable penalty — penalty is predetermined for every crime the gravity of which is directly (0 the crime committed. With Shed with reclusion temporal, whereas, murder with reclusion perpetua. iv. Emphasis of the law — on the offense Under the classical theory on which the mainly based, ‘the basis of criminal is human free a moral creature with an absolutely free to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito the act is presumed to have been done ie, with freedom, intelligence and therefore, should be adjudged or ‘ountable for wrongful acts so long as appears unimpaired. (People v. Genosa, GR. No, 135981, September 29, 2000) 20. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 7 or realistic i. Basis —manis inherently good but because of his environment and upbringing, he becomes socially sick. ii, Purpose of the penalty — corrective or curative to reform the offender, thus, prisons are also called reformatory or correctional institutions. iii, Determination of penalty — on an individual basis after considering his circumstances. iv. Emphasis —on the actor. ‘The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), Probation Law, the three-fold rule, and the rules on mitigation of crimes apply this theory. ¢. Eclectic (or mixed) combines the good features of both the classical and the positivist theories. Ideally, the classical theory is applied to heinous crimes, whereas, the positivist works on economic and social crimes. ‘A heinous crime is a grievous, odious and hate- ful offense which by reason of its inherent or mani- fest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, is regarded as seriously outrageous to the common standards or norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and orderly society. (R.A. 7659) d. _Utilitarian or protective theory — the primary func- tion of punishment is to protect society from potential and actual wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them. The law should notbe applied to further materialism and opportunism. (Magno v. CA, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992) Penal laws are construed strictly against the State and liber- ally in favor of the accused. Whenever two interpretations of law or appreciation of evidence are possible, the excul- patory interpretation shall prevail, consistent with the pre~ sumption of innocence.8 ‘COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW 21. Under the equipoise rule, when the evidence of the pro- secution and the defense are equally balanced, the scale should be tilted in favor of the accused because of the presumption of innocence. (Lirsua v. CA, G.R. No, 112170, April 10, 1996) Where the State fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome that presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal as a matter of ris regardless of the weakness or even the absence of his defense. For any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecu-tion’s case and not on the weakness of the defense. (Cosep v. People, G.R. No. 110353, May 21, 1998) 22, must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of inv. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008) In dubio pro reo has two aspects: (1) the ambiguity of the law which is construed against the state, and (2) t equipoise rule. Both shall favor the accused. 23. The use of “reasonable doubt” standard is indispens- able to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. Its critical that the moral force jaw be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is important in a free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 24, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 9 reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No, 148560, November 19, 2001) Classifications of crimes: a. As to commission (Article 3) i. Dolo or felonies committed with deliberate intent ii, Culpa or those committed by means of fault b. As to stage of execution (Article 6) — attempted, frustrated, and consummated felonies Related to this is the classification of felonies as to: i, Formal felonies, those which are always con- summated because the offender cannot perform all the acts necessary for their execution without consummating the offense. For instance, physical injuries are punished as to result, whether serious, less serious, or slight. The degree of injury cannot be determined without first consummating the offense. Slander is consummated the moment the defamatory words are uttered and heard by a third person as the injury to the victim is inflicted and thus the crime is accomplished. ii, Material felonies, or those which have various stages of execution iii, Crimes with no frustrated stage, such as rape because its essence is carnal knowledge. Hence, even the slight penetration of the female organ consummates the crime. Likewise, arson can only be attempted or consummated, because the law on arson defines the crime as setting fire or burning of the property. Theft and robbery has no frustrated stage for the offender either has complete control or none of the thing c. As to gravity (Article 9) — grave, less grave felonies and light feloniese (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ‘As to count — composite, compound, complex, continued, continuing As to nature — mala in se and mala prohibita 25. Crimes mala in se and mala prohibita compared a An act or omission may either be inherently evil (mala recause there is a law prohibiting it (mala laws (SPL) are However, it is really the nature of the act or omission that makes a crime either malum in se or malum prokibitum. For instance, the P an SPL but it is malum in se. Also, even ‘uses the terms of penalties in the RPC, that alone will not make the act or omission a malum in se. The law may only intend to make the RPC apply suppletorily thereto. For instance, P.D. 533 is an amendment of Articles 308, 309, and 310 of the RPC. Thus, cattle rustling is still malum in se. (Taer v. CA, G.R. No. 85204, June 18, 1990) Mala in se involve moral turpitude whereas mala prohibita do not. The doing of the act itself and not its prohibition by statutes fixes moral turpitude. It does not include such acts as are not of themselves im- moral but whose illegality lies in its positively being prohibited. (Dela Torre v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996) Distinctions: In mala in se: i. Basis — the moral state of the offender hence, ‘good faith or lack of criminal intent is a defense. ii, Modifying circumstances — are taken into account in imposing the penalty precisely because the offender's moral trait is the basis of FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES " this crime. Hence, greater perversity deserves a higher penalty whereas lesser depravity deserves mitigation. |. Degree of participation — the penalty is com- puted on the basis of whether the malefactor is a principal offender, or merely an accomplice or accessory. iv, Stage of accomplishment — the penalty imposed depends on whether the crime is consummated, frustrated, or attempted. v. Moral turpitude — crimes mala in se generally involve moral turpitude for its basis is the moral state of the offender. vi. Law violated — generally, the RPC. In mala prohibita: i, Basis — voluntariness, hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is not a defense, unless intent is an element of the crime such as in Section 3(e) of RA. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Prac tices Act. ii, Modifying circumstances — are not considered because the law intends to discourage the commission of the act especially prohibited. Degree of participation — the penalty on the offenders is the same as they are all deemed principals, unless the SPL considers them otherwise, such as abettors of brigandage in P.D. 532 who are deemed as accomplices. iv. Stage of accomplishment — violation of law is, punished only when accomplished or consum- mated because intent is not relevant in crimes mala prohibita for intent is inherent in the attempt- ed or frustrated stage(COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW v. Moral turpitude — generally, not involved in crimes mala prohibita for the act would not have been wrong if not for the prohibition by law. vi. Law violated — generally, SPLs. 26. Absorption rules ‘The general rule is that a mala in se felony (such as reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property) cannot absorb mala pro! es (such as those violating P.D. 1067, P.D. 984, and R.A. 7942). What makes the former a felony fo) o negligence (culpa); what makes the latter offenses are the special laws enacting them. (Loney v. People, G.R. ‘No. 152644, February 10, 2006) Sometimes the SPL for emphasis will expressly dis- allow absorption such as B.P. 22 and estafa by post- dating checks; torture and the effects thereof such as murder, physical injuries, coercion, maltreatment of prisoners, etc.; R.A. 9165 where the commission of the such phrase as “without prejudice to th der any other laws.” The exception is when the SPL expressly allows absorption such as sexual abuse of a minor under for the predicate crimes like murder, arson, etc; a wandering acts which says that the predicate act shall be absorbed. ‘The absorption rule can result to the greater absorbing the lesser such as terrorism which absorbs the predi- cate act and R.A. 7610 wh rape, Or the lesser may abso lion which absorbs destructive arson. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES B e. A felony cannot be complexed with an offense. For instance, abuse of minor is either for rape or for violation of R.A. 7610. (People v. Optana, G-R. No. 133922, February 12, 2001) f. Thus, when an act offends against a provision of the RPC and an SPL, the offender can be prosecuted for: i, twocrimes, such as estafa and violation of B.P., 22; estafa and illegal recruitment, Anti-Torture and crime resulting from torture, because they do not absorb each other; ii, only one crime, when the special penal law bars the prosecution for other offenses, e.g., terrorism. absorbing the predicate crimes; child abuse or rape; violation of Anti-Violence against Women or Children or murder, paricide, homicide or felonies with greater punishment; or iii, one crime absorbing the others as an element, or as an aggravating circumstance (illegal possession of firearms absorbed by rebellion or aggravating murder or homicide; Anti- Terrorism law absorbing the predicate crimes; plunder absorbing the predicate crimes). 27. Effect of repeal of penal law on the accused: ‘a. Absolute or total or express repeal — the act or omis- sion is decriminalized. i. Pending case — dismissed whether the accused is habitual delinquent or not. ies that detention is to continue. b. Partial, relative, implied repeal, or repeal by re- enactment28. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW i, The first law will govern if the accused is habitual delinquent or when the favorable second law prohibits retroactivity. ii, The second law will govern if favorable to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent or the Jaw is silent as to its retroactivity. Asa rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the law prior to its repeal. This is because an sd repeal of a penal law constitutes a ive act of rendering legal what had been gal, such that the offense committed it never did so. There are, however, exceptions to the rule, as follows: a. The inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. b. Where the repealing act re-enacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized under the law. In such instance, the act committed before the re- enactment continues to be an offense, and pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the accused. (Benedicto 2. CA, GR. No. 125359, September 4, 2001) ‘The Spanish version should prevail over the English for the RPC was originally approved and enacted in Spanish (ection 15, Revised Administrative Code [RAC] a. Article 267 uses the term “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “Kidnap” (secuestar or raptar), thus, the Spanish version should prevail in the interpretation of that soo (People v. Astorga, G.R. No. 110097, December 22, 1997) 29. ARTICLE2- SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CODE 1B b. “Immediate” is an incorrect translation into English of the word “proxima.” The Spanish text allows for a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual vindication. (People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514-15, September 30, 2003) Finality of acquittal rule: The fundamental philosophy highlighting this rule cuts deep into the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. (People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000) ARTICLE 2 - Scope of application of the Code 1 2. ‘Two applications of the RPC: a. _Intra-territorial — within the Philippine archipelago, including its atmosphere, interior waters and mari- time zone. b, _ Extratertitorial — the RPC may be given application even to those crimes committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction (sub-paragraphs 1-5). (Note: when the question asks for the excep! do not include in the answer the intra-terri application in paragraph one for that is the general rule.) Treaties and laws of preferential application such as RA. 75 on immunity of diplomatic representatives of foreign countries prevail over the provisions of the RPC. Under international laws, sovereigns, heads of states and their official representatives enjoy immunity from suits.16 ‘COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re (VCDR) states the three levels of heads of diplomatic missions, thus: (a) Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of States; () Envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of State; and (©) Charges a’ affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the staff of the (diplom are the diplomatic staff, the adminis technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff are accorded diplomatic rank. (Minucher & CA, GR. No. 142396, February 11, 2003) Only “diplomatic agents” are vested with blanket diplomatic munity from civil and criminal suits. The VCDR defines iplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, withholding the same privileges from all others. Even consuls, who represent their respective States in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform enjoy the traditional diplomatic imm« accorded diplomats, because they are not charged with the duty of representing their States in political matters. The main yardstick in ascertaining if a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is whether or not he per- forms duties of diplomatic nature. (d,) ‘The basis of the immunity of diplomatic agents and heads of States is par in parem non habet imperium. For the others enjoying limited immunity, the basis is the doctrine of State immunity from suit which requires the consent of the State tobe sued. (id.) 5. [ARTICLE 2-SCOPE OF APPLICATION OP THE CODE v Mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso {facto result in the dropping of the charges in court. There ‘a need to inquire whether the accused is covered by the provision of the immunity clause. Under the VCDR, a diplomatic agent enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity agent in the receiving State functions. (Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000) First exception — for crimes committed in a Philippine ship/ airship: a. This is subject to the within the territoris otherwise, the latter's laws will govern beca laws are primarily territorial. The Philippines will have jurisdiction only if the foreign country did not assume jurisdiction. b. The country of registry, not the ownership, deter- mines its nationality. Thus, a Filipino-owned ship registered in Panama is a Panamanian ship. c. French/English Rules refer to the jurisdiction over merchant vessels of one country located in another country. The effect on jurisdiction over the crime committed in a merchant vessel under either rule is about the same because the general rule of one is the exception in the other. Thus: i French rule recognizes flag or nationality of vessel. The country of registry will have diction but when the crime violated the peace and order of the host country (such as drug- trafficking), the host country will have juris- diction. (Memory aid: French — Flag) ii, English rule adheres strictly to the territoriality principle or situs of the crime. The country of registry will have jurisdiction only where the8 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW crime relates to internal management of the vessel. In other cases (such as drug-trafficking) the host country will have jurisdiction. d. When a Philippine merchant ship is in the high seas, it, in effect, is an extension of Philippine territory as the high seas is not within the jurisdiction of any country. ‘The crime shall be subject to Philippine courts. ©. War vessels and official vessel of heads of States such as Ang Pangulo are extensions of the country’s jurisdiction wherever it may be located, 7. Second and third exceptions: a. Forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true genuine document or by ing or altering by any sures, letters, words or signs contained ere other document, such as passport, the crime is falsification which is not among the exceptions in Article 2. b. If forgery was committed abroad, it must involve only Philippine coin, currency note or obligations and securities. The special mention of United States (US.) notes and currencies in the RPC should be deemed as not written for the Philippines is no longer ‘a commonwealth of the U.S. 8. Fourth exception: Public officers/einployees who commit a crime related to the exercise of their office. Example: a Philippine official sent to a war-torn country who absconds ino workers (OFW) thereat. Without this relation, they are acting in their private capacity and hence bound by the law of the host country. 9. Fifth exception: Title 1 of Book II on crimes against national security and the law of nations which covers Treason, Espionage, Provoking War, and Disloyalty in Case of Wat, 10. nu. ARTICLE ~ FELONIES. 9 Piracy, and Mutiny, but not rebellion. When rebellion is committed abroad, the Philippine courts will not acquire jurisdiction because rebellion is a crime against public order. When a singer in a boxing bout abroad sang the Philippine national anthem in a rock or pop style, in violation of the Philippine Heraldic Law, he cannot be prosecuted here because his act is not among those exceptions mentioned under Article 2. ‘The referral to the Government of the Philippine Islands should be changed to Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ARTICLE 3 ~ Felonies 1 Felony refers exclusively to acts or omissions punished under the RPC. Violations of special laws are generally referred to as offenses. Crimes under the RPC are called felonies although it is not wrong to call felonies as offenses also. On the other hand, crimes penalized by SPLs are termed offenses but they cannot be called interchangeably as felonies. ‘The relationship between a felony and an offense are: a. A felony does not absorb nor is absorbed by an offense (Loney) i Th jore than one crime is charged if an act tes both the RPC and an SPL. ii, Examples — violation of Article 365 (culpa) and environmental laws (id); B.P. 22 and estafi; illegal recruitment and estaf; ture) and the resulting murder, homicide, physical injuries, ete b. Ifthe SPL allows for absorption, then only one crime is committed. Examples: i, RA. 7610 and statutory rape — the case shall be filed under RPC;2 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ii, R.A. 9372 (Human Security Act) absorbs the predicate acts like arson, murder, kidnapping, etc. . Offenses and felonies cannot be complexed for Article 48 does not allow complexing of felony with offense. (People v. Abay, February 24, 2009) d. But special complex crime is possible for offenses and felonies like carnapping with homicide for the carnapping law allows it. It is therefore necessary to know whether a crime is a fel- ony or an offense. For instance, in Article 160, a convicted prisoner who commits a felony w1 tence liable for quasi-recidivism in addition to the felony. But if he commits an offense while serving such sentence, he is not liable for recidivism for the article uses the word “felony.” Felonies are either intentional (dolo) or due to fault or negligence (culpa). Either kind has its own elements, viz for dolo— gence, freedom of action and for ligence, freedom of action—whichneed notbestated inthe Information. Specific felonies under Book Il of the RPC have their own specific elements which must be alleged in the Information. The elements under Article 3 pertain to the actor; the elements of specific felonies relate to the act or acts constituting the felony. Intent is the use of a particular means to bring about the desired result. For instance, the use of a lethal weapon would show intent to kill although death did not result. Intent is a mental state, thus the need to determine it by the means used. This intent is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. Criminal intent is presumed from the voluntary commis- sion of an unlawful act. Section 5, Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) presumes disputably 10. nL ARTICLES - FELONIES, a that “an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.” (Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005) People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, clarified that when the victim dies, intent to Kill is conclusively unlawful. im survives, intent to specific criminal intent which cannot be presumed but must be proved. In other words, when the act is equivocal, it could result to variant crimes such as physical injuries vis-d-vis attempted / frustrated homicide; acts of lasc ness as against attempted rape; unjust vexation vs. slander by deed, etc. In these cases, specific criminal intent cannot be presumed but must be established. ‘Two instances when one is criminally liable even without criminal intent: a, Felonies committed by culpa; and b. Offenses mala prohibit ‘These two species of crime can only be consummated because intent is inherent in the attempted and frustrated stages where the offender commences the commission of a crime but was unable to consummate the offense for cause other than his own spontaneous desistance or independent of his Thus, there is no attempted or frustrated culpa for intent is inherent in the attempted or frustrated stage, and in culpa, there is no intent. ‘Actus non faciteum, nisi mens sit rea — the act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal. (Llamoso v. SB, G.R. Nos. L-63408 & 64026, August 7, 1985) A felony requires criminal intent. Hence, when intent is absent as the mind is not criminal, no crime is committed. This doctrine applies only to dolo. Motive is the moving power or force (such as vengeance) which impels a person to a desired result. It is different from intent which is the means used to accomplish the desired result like use of a gun to kill2. 13. 4. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW Motive is immaterial in determining criminal liability, except in the following where motive is relevant: a. The act may give rise to variant crimes, ¢g., kidnap- ping or robbery (People v. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, Febru- ary 17, 1993). Here motive is relevant to determine the crime committed; b. There is doubt whether the accused committed the crime, or the identity of the accused is doubtful; and . The evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial. Where the identity of the assai in dispute, motive becomes relevant, and when motive is supported with sufficient evidence for a conclusion of guilt, a conviction is sustainable. (People v. Macoy, G.R. Nos. 96649-50, July 1, 1997) In Article 3, culpa is a mode of committing a crime hence killing, for instance, is denominated homicide through reckless imprudence. In Article 365, culpa itself is the crime punished, thus the killing is denominated reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. ustrations of culpa resulting to homicide: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend who was killed by the discharge due to negligent handling; (2) firearm from the window and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; (3) fist fight, defendant fired his gun twice in the ais, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. (People v. Belbes, G.R. No. 124670, June 21, 2000) al negligent act is not a simple modality of a ‘al crime (Quizon v. Justice of the Peace, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995) but a distinct crime designated as a quasi- offense. Nevertheless, a conviction for the former can 16. W. 18. 19. 20. 21. ARTICLE 3 - FELONIES. 2 be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. (Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No, 93885, May 14, 1991) Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proved, recklessness disappears. (People v. ay, G.R. No. 140794, October 16, 2001) Intelligence is the capacity to understand what is right and what is wrong. Discernment is relevant to intelli- gence, not to intent. It does not mean though, that when a person acted with discernment, he intends the crime or the wrong done. (People v. Cordova, G.R. Nos. 83373-74, July 5, 1993) Intelligence is an element of both dolo and culpa, thus, whether the resulting felony is intentional or culpable, discernment is an element. Absent discernment, there is no offense whether dolo or culpa. .e could be either completely lacking as ity and minority (15 or under case, the offender is exempt from criminal liability. Or it could merely be diminished as in the case of minority (16-17), schizophrenia or passion and obfuscation, in which case itis either privileged or ordinary mitigating circumstance. When insanity is interposed as a defense or a ground of a motion to quash the burden rests upon the accused to establish that fact, for the law presumes every man to be sane. Hence, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove insanity, the legal presumption of one’s sanity stands. (Zosa v. CA, G.R. No, 105641, March 10, 1994) Freedom of action means that volition is absolutely ‘unimpaired or that a person is not acting under duress. “Absence thereof does not refer to a situation where he is insanity4 ‘COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW acting grudgingly or against his better judgment; he is actually acting not only without a will but even against his will. 22. Freedom of action can either be lacking such as in duress, thus exempting, or diminished as when offender is deaf, dumb, or blind hence, mitigating. ARTICLE 4 1, Article 3 deals with how a felony is committed; Article 4, who is liable for a felony. There are two kinds of offend- ers in this article: those who commit a felony, whether by dolo or culpa, and those who commit an impossible crime. 2. There are two clauses in paragraph 1 of this article: a. “By any person committing a felony (de to both dolo and culpa, Note that the article specifica added in parenthesis the word delito, b. “Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended,” referring to dolo because of the presence of intent (note the word “intended”, The elements in the second clause are: i, An intentional felony is committed. and logical ted even ii, ‘The wrong done is the direct, natur consequence of the felony comi though different from that intended. affecting intent and correspondingly the criminal a, Mistake of fact (intent to commit a crime is lacking) b. Aberratio ictus (mistake in the intended victim of the blow) . Error int personae (mistake in identity of the intended victim) d._Practer intentionem (so grave a wrong caused than that 4, 5. 6 ARTICLE 4 5 fe. Proximate cause (the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused) Mistake of fact (MOF) is an absolutory cause for had the facts been true to the belief of the offender, that act he did can be negative criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat) as the element of criminal is absent. Thus, MOF is relevant only in dolo, hence, if the offender is negligent in ascertaining the true state of facts, he may be free from doto but not from culpa. MOF refers to the situation itself where criminal intent is lacking, It is different from mistake in the identity of the victim because here criminal intent is present. In aberratio ictus or error in the victim of the blow, the offender intends the injury on one person but the harm fell on another. There are three persons involved: the offender, the intended victim, and the actual victim. Consequently, the act may result ies, although there ictus may resul the offender. ‘Treachery and evident premeditation are appreciated in aberratio ictus. If the unintended victim dies, the crime is murder because of any of these qualifying circumstances; he survives, it is physical injuries because of the absence of intent to kill the victim. Error in personae (EIP) or mistake in identity involves only one offended party but the offender committed a mistake in ascertaining the identity of the victim. Unlike in aberratio ictus, there are only two persons involved: the actual but unintended victim and the offender. ‘The effect of EIP depends upon whether the intended and the actual crime committed are: a, Ofdifferent gravity, Article 49 shall apply — the lower penalty between the intended and the actual felony committed shall be imposed. Example: if the intended ‘a complex crime (Article 48) or in Thus,26 9. 10. 1, (COMPACT REVIEWER TN CRIMINAL LAW crime is homicide but parricide was committed or vice- versa, In effect, EIP is an extenuating circumstance. b. Of the same gravity or severity, the penalty is not mitigated. Example: if the intended crime is homicide and the actual crime committed is also homicide but on a wrong victim. The mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on his intended victim because the accused hhad acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim without checking carefully the latter’s identity as to place him: the same legal plain as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously. (People v. Pinto, G.R. No. 39519, Nove In praeter intentionem (PD, the injury is on the intended victim but the resulting consequence is much graver than intended. It is mitigating (Article 13, no. 3). But if the means ‘employed in the commission of the crime would logically and naturally bring about the actual felony committed, PI should not be appreciated (but see Flores below). It does not apply to culpa for “intentionem” denotes tent or to hazing because the anti-hazing law expressly ws it This circumstance should be appreciated where the accused had no intent to kill but only to inflict injuries when he attacked the victim. (People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31) Proximate cause is that cause which, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient interven- ing cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is to be considered generally in determining whether the conse- quence of the act should also be borne by the offender. (Article 4, no. 1) The perceived delay in giving medical treatment does not break at all the causal connection between the felonious act of the offender and the injuries sustained by the victim. It does not constitute an efficient inter- 12. Anyone who inflicts ARTICLE z vening cause since the victim's death is still due to the jes inflicted by the offender, for which the latter is inally responsible. (People v. Acuirams, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000) jury voluntarily and with intent is liable for all the consequences of his criminal act, such as death, that supervenes as a consequence of the injuries. ‘Accused is liable for the demise of the victim for such was caused by the violent kicks which he inflicted on the vital parts of the victim's body. (Flores) 13. The significance of evidence on the precise nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased is that it often leads to the discovery of the real cause of death. The examination of a wound, from the legal point of view, should lead to the determination as to when the wound was inflicted, what the degree of danger of the wound is, with its dangers ife or function, whether the wound was given by the jured man himself, or by someone else, and with what manner of instrument the wound was produced. ‘To hold a person liable for the death of another, the eyond reasonable doubt that ac- the proximate cause of such death. Such proof is especi ‘when there are several pos~ sible causes of death such as lingering illness, food poison- 1g and beating by the offender. Even assuming that the victim was afflicted with food poisoning, accused may still be held liable for her death if the prosecution had presented proof that accused’s act of beating his wife was the efficient or proximate cause of death, or had accelerated her death. (People v. Matyaong, G.R. No. 140206, June 21, 2001) Impossible Crime 1. Elements: a. The acts performed would have been a crime against persons or property; b, There is criminal intent;28 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW is not accomplished because of inherent impossibil- ‘or because the means employed is inadequate or ineffectual ‘The act performed by the offender cannot produce an of- fense against persons or property because: (a) the commis- sion of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplish- ment; or (b) the means employed is either: (1) inadequate ineffectual. (Intod v. CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992) Impossible crime is punished to suppress lawlessness or to teach a lesson to the offender. Subjectively, the offender is a criminal although objectively no crime has been committed. There is no attempted or frustrated stage. There is now the impossible crime of rape because the Anti-Rape Law reclassified rape to crimes against persons. (Article 266-A to D) There is legal impossibility where the intended acts, even if completed would not amount to a crime. Example: stealing property that turned out to be owned by the stealer. ‘would apply to those circumstances where: a. The motive, desire, and expectation are to perform an b. There is an intention to perform the physical act; There is a performance of the intended physical act; and d. The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. Physical impossibility is present when extraneous circum- stances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime as the act cannot ‘be completed. Example: stealing from a vault that turned out to be empty. The offender must not know the circumstance which made the crime impossible. For instance, homicide requires ARTICLES 2 intent to Kill. Had the offender known that the victim has just died, he would not have the intent to kill anymore the deceased. At most, it will amount to desecration of the dead. Likewise, the malefactors will not go to all the trouble and risks attending the commission of bank robbery if they knew that the vaults are empty. ARTICLE 5 ‘Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege — there is no crime when there is no law that defines and punishes it. As a civil law country, in the Philippines penal laws are enacted. Crime is the product of the law; no matter how evil an act is, it is nota crime unless theres a law punishing it. Thus, Article 21 prohibits the imposition of a penalty not prescribed by law prior to the commission of a felony; and, the Constitution prohibits the retroactive application of a penal law (ex post facto) Contrarily, a common-law crime is one that is manifestly contrary to good customs and public policy even though not expressly punished by law. As distinguished from legislated law, common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming and enforcing such usages and customs. It does not rest for authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature. (Black’s Law Dictionary) . It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, to report to the Chief Executive, through the DOJ, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. For instance, present law prohibits and punishes only drunk driving. There is no law banning a drunk person from riding a public vehicle, or the driver from allowing a person who appears to be drunk to board4 5. ‘COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW a public conveyance. A drunk passens influence of liquor or drug posesa veritable pet passengers. He is prone to react irrationally and violently, due to lack or diminution of self-control. Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be avoided, and the riding public duly protected, if the potential danger posed by drunk passengers can be addressed properly. (People 2. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007) The court can likewise recommend to the Chief Executive to grant executive clemency in view of the harshness of the law such as in the case of the mother convicted with forcible abduction with rape with her son, and meted reclusion perpetua because of her maternal love which moved her to conspire with him. (People v. Villorente, G.R. No. 100198, July 1, 1992) But courts cannot recommend to the President no! pardon an offender who committed incestuous rape as is not authorized by Article 5. ARTICLE 6 1 In the consummated stage, all acts of execution are present hence the offender is in the objective stage as he no longer has control over the outcome of his acts, having performed all that is necessary to accomplish his purpose. In the frustrated stage, the offender has also reached the objective stage for he has performed all the acts which would produce the felony, but the crime was not commit- ted for reasons independent of his will. In both consum- mated and frustrated stages, offender is in the objective stage because having performed all acts for the accom- plishment of the crime, there is nothing more left for him todo. If the reason is dependent on his w cide, the wound is fatal but he himself brought the vic- to the hospital, it is not frustrated homicide but some other crime like physical injuries. ARTICLES at 4. For the attempted felony, the offender is still in the subjective stage because he has not performed all acts necessary for its accomplishment. Therefore, he still has control as he may or may not continue his overt acts. 5. The elements of an attempted felony are: a. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts; b. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and d. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. (People v. Mingming, G.R. No. 174195, December 10, 2008) 6. The important phrases in the definition of attempted felony are: lowed the start “Overt acts” or external acts — those which to continue will logically result ina felony; of criminal I Preparatory act refers to an act prior to the overt act. Example: buying poison. The purpose of buying poison is a state of mind which cannot be determined lunless there are overt acts to imply such intent, and to make him liable therefor would be speculative. This is, why preparatory acts are as a rule not criminal unless these acts are in themselves penalized as independent ‘crimes, Example: proposal and conspiracy to commit a crime are not punished except in those cases provided for by law, eg., proposal and conspiracy to commit rebellion, b. “Directly” — the offender shall be liable for the attempted stage of the felony that is directly linked to the overt act irrespective of his intention. Example: A ‘person intending to rob a store forced open the win-7. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW dow but before he could enter he was apprehended. He cannot be charged with attempted robbery even that was his intention (which could not be specu- lated) because the overt act of forcing open the win- dow is not directly linked with robbery. He may be charged with attempted trespass because that act is directly related to entering the store. c. “Desistance” — an absolutory circumstance only in the attempted stage. The attempted stage exists up to that time when the offender still has control of his is now either frustrated or consummate phase) where desistance is merely factual and pro- duces no legal effect, thus, will not exempt the offender from criminal For instance, when the thief has taken the object of his theft, even if he goes back to the owner and returns the property stolen, theft has been consummated. Desistance by returning the property will not legally extinguish criminal liability for theft. When the cause of the non-performance of all the acts necessary for the commission of the offense is other than the offender’s spontaneous desistance, the felony is attempted. (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 88043, December 9, 1996) Without p: the crime com- mitted may still constitute attempted rape or consummated acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape, however, requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. (Mingming) In the attempted phase, the overt act must be an external one which has a direct connection with the felony, it being necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if ARTICLES 3 carried to its complete termination, following its natural course without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense. Accused already commenced her criminal scheme by taking hold of WW by the hand and leading her out of the school premises to Kidnap her. (People . dela Cruz, G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997) Formal crimes are always consummated. Criteria to determine whether the crime is formal: a. The offender cannot possibly perform all the acts of execution to bring the desired result without consummating the offense, such as slander and libel b. When the crime is treated by the RPC in accordance with the results, ie, the result should be there before ity can be determined, e.g., physical injuries, the ime is only in the consummated stage. In physical cannotbe determined whether the injury’ less serious, or serious unless consummated. inj be slight, ¢. When intent is absent such as in culpa and in malum prohibitu. |. Some crimes have no frustrated stage, such as a. When the RPC defines a felony in such a manner that it cannot be frustrated. For instance, since the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge, the slightest penetration of the female organ consummates the felony. Same with arson. Since the burning of even a portion of the building is considered arson, the mere scorching thereof consummates the crime. b. When the crime requires agreement between two parties, as in corruption of public officers — the moment the public officer accepts the gift, promise or consideration in bribery, the crime of corruption is. consummated but when the public officer refuses to ‘be corrupted, the crime is attempted only.(COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW c._As the RPC defines theft and robbery as the unlawful taking of property belonging to another, the moment the offender has complete control of the property, the crime is consummated 10. The difference between a frustrated and consummated u crime lies in whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution because in both stages, all the elements have been completed by the offender. Therefore, the statutory definition of theft cannot admit of a frustrated stage, as theft is produced upon the completion of the element of unlawful taking. This lays to rest the controversy about frustrated theft created by Dirio and Flores. While these cases considered the mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim, By definition of Article 308, theft can only be attempt- ed or consummated. It does not have a frustrated stage as its element of unlawful taking, apoderamiento, is complete from the moment offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of it. v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007) By the same token, robbery cannot also be frustrated as ilar to theft except for the presence of violence or intimidation. Between attempted and frustrated felonies: a. As to acts of execution — in atiempted, not all acts of execution had been done whereas in frustrated, all acts of execution had been performed. b, As to causes of non-accomplishment — in attempted, sa cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance; in frustrated, itis some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, c. In the attempted stage, the offender is the subjective phase as he still has control of his acts; in the frustrated stage, he is already in the objective phase. 12. ARTICLE? 35 d. Example: in attempted homicid und inflicted is not mortal; the offender should still deal another blow on the victim, which, however, he was not able to do because he was apprehended. He is therefore still in the subjective stage. On the other hand, in frustrated homicide, the wound | sufficient to bring about death, hence, there is no need of another blow but death nevertheless did not supervene because of, the timely medical attendance. He has passed on to the objective phase because he has performed all acts necessary to bring about the death of the victim. e ‘A mere attempt to commit a felony is subsumed in the ful execution thereof. To attempt is to commence the comunis~ sion of a crime by overt acts. If one has been proved to have completely carried out all the acts necessary to commit the crime, he has certainly been proved to have executed act required in an attempt. Thus, the accused could have suffered no prejudice, had they been tried un- der either one or the other section. (People v. Boco, G.R. No. 129676, June 23, 1999) ARTICLE 7 1 2 When light felonies are punishable: a. Only when consummated, except for crimes against persons or property. b. _Inall stages if the crime is against persons or property. Who are punishable for light felonies — principals and accomplices. Accessories are not criminally liable for light felonies. (Article 16) Why are attempted and frustrated light felonies not punishable? Why is an accessory in consummated light lony not punishable? Because the deduction of penalty is one degree for frustrated, two degrees for the attempted stage and another two degrees for accessory offender. Since the penalty for light felony is arresto menor, there is no way of further reducing the penalty. De minimis non curat lex.(COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ARTICLE 8 1 4 There is proposal when the person who decided to commi a felony proposes its execution to another; a conspiracy ex- ists when two or more persons come to an agreement con- cerning the commission of a felony and decide to com When the proposal is accepted, it becomes cons; The essence of conspiracy is community of crimis intent. (People v. Tilos, G.R. No. 138385, January 16, 2001) ‘Thus, conspiracy and negligence cannot co-exist because in conspiracy, there is a meeting of the minds of the co- conspirator for the intention of committing a crime. The conspirator “decides” to commit a crime. |. It is essential for one to be liable for the acts of the others there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design, Except when he is the mastermind or principal by inducement, a conspirator must have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. Mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any a\ the conspiracy, is not enough for convic People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010) ‘Two concepts of conspiracy: a. Asacrime by itself, the subject of conspiracy is not yet committed but the mere act of conspiring is defined and punished as a crime. Examples of punishable pro- posal and/or conspiracy: proposal and conspiracy to commit treason or rebellion; arson under Section 7 of PD. 1613; drug importation, sale, manufacture, cul- tivation and maintenance of drug den under Section 26 of R.A. 9165; torture; and child pornography under RA.975. b. As a basis of incurring liability, the execution of the plan is commenced. Conspiracy ceases to be the crime but is absorbed by the crime itself. Hence, the ARTICLES a crime is no longer conspiracy to commit rebel but rebellion; not anymore to commit arson but arson. As a basis of incurring liability, it is necessary to deter- js conspiracy by prior agreement or im- cy. Thus: a. By prior agreement — a conspirator is liable as long as he appeared in the situs of the crime. But the mastermind or principal by inducement is liable even if he does not appear because the crime would not have been committed without his inducement. In conspiracy by prior agreement, the 1e conspirators is only for the crime agreed upon except: i. When the other crime was committed in their presence and they did not prevent its commis- sion which is taken as approval or acquiescence to the second crime; ii, When the other crime is the natural consequence of the crime planned, eg, homicide resulting from physical injuries; or iii, When the resulting crime is a composite crime or special complex crime considered a single indivisible felony except when a conspirator is not aware of the commission of the second unplanned crime. b. In implied conspiracy where the conspiracy is instantaneous at the moment of the commission of the crime — it is essential for criminal liability that the conspirator participated in the commission of the crime. His mere presence or approval of the crime, without more, i i would be no basis for deducing conspiracy as to him, as there is absence of criminis particeps. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy38 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People 2. Bragaes, G.R. No. 62359, November 14, 1991) Necessarily, conspiracy as a crime cannot be implied conspiracy. It can only be by pre-agreement or by plan because it is the act of conspiring that is penalized. Implied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed, The concerted acts of the parties to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-65017, November 13, 1989, first described implied conspiracy thusly: “The act of the appellant in holding the victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by constitutes a positive and overt act towards the realiza- tion of a common criminal intent which may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting the criminal design of the slayer immediately before the commission of the offense.” (Subayco v. SB, G.R. No. L-65017, August 22, 1996) Estrada, G.R No. 148965, February 26, 2002, categorized two structures of multiple conspiracies: (1) “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or more oth persons or groups (the “spokes”); and (2) the “ch conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narc ics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. ‘The overt act of a co-conspirator in the furtherance of conspiracy may be any of: a. Active participation in the actual commission of the 10. ARTICLES 2 b. Lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime; or c. Exerting moral ascendancy over the other co- conspirators. (People ». Pablo, G.R. Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001) This is why mere presence without more of a enough to make him equally liable with the rect participators and inducers, for participation could be the form of moral assistance or encouragement. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary for conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003, explained why direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary: Secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. at the very instant the plotters t the felony and Conspiracy comes to li agree, expressly or implied!12. 14. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW forthwith to pursue it actually. Conspiracy is proved by concerted acts or other forms of evidence indicative of actual cooperation — a common purpose or design, as well as a concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and to pursue it actually. (People v. Caraang, G.R. Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003) . Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy mustbe proved beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show community of criminal design. (Magsuci v. Sandiganbayar, G.R. No. 101545, January 3, 1995) This is so because a person may be adjudged liable solely on the basis of conspiracy. ‘The finding of the criminal racy is significant, because it changes of all the accused and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their pasticipation in the crime. Their becomes collective, with each participant deemed equally responsible for the acts of the others. (People v. Caraang) One who. joins a criminal conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators, and he can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized Conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert. The act of one then beeomes the act of ‘each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally as coprincipals of the crime committed. (People v. Maranion, G.R. Nos, 90672-73, July 18, 1991) Even if appellant never fired a gun, he would still be princi- pally liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of the victims, for while only BB might have inflicted the fatal blows or wounds, nevertheless, appellant must be held liable under the principle that the act of a conspirator is the act ofall co- conspirators. The degree of actual participation in the com- mission of the crime is immaterial in a conspiracy. (id) 15. Itis not necessary to show that all the conspirators actu: 16. Although conspiracy is ARTICLES a committed all the elements of the crime charged; what is important is that all of them performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the crime. It must be shown that each co-accused cooperated in the commission of the offense — either morally through advice, encouragement or agreement; or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the efficacious perpetration of the crime. (id) joint act, there is nothing irregular if a supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others convicted. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed: the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one conspirator alone cannot be convicted when there is a conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, other conspirators may be found guilty of the offense. (People v. Tiguman, G.R. Nos. 130502-03, May 24, 2001) 17. A conspirator may be liable differently if there is present a circumstance personal to him, ¢., in case where one was held liable for murder whereas his co-conspirator was convicted for homicide because the former killed the victim with treachery unknown to the latter. (People v. rt, G.R. No, 131808, February 6, 2002) 18, The following do not make one a conspirator: a. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or agreement to coop- erate is not enough to constitute one as a conspirator absent any active participation in the commission of the crime pursuant to the common design and pur- pose. b. Conspiracy transcends companionship. (People v. Compo, G.R. No. 112990, May 28, 2001)20. 21. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW Mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto is not sufficient ground to hold a person liable as a co-conspirator. d. The mere fact that the accused had prior knowledge of the criminal design of the principal perpetrator of the crime does not ipso facto make him as co- or. Participation in the criminal act is for he may yet be an accomplice. (People v. Samudio, G.R. No. 126168, March 7, 2001) . For conspiracy to exist, there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts (‘decides to commit it”). For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there be a conscious design to commit an offense. (Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010) In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of crimin. purpose and intention immediately before the commi sion of the crime, or community of criminal design, the crimi- nal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act com- mitted by him. (People v. Desoy, G.R. No. 127754, August 16, 1999) When may the head of a government office be held liable as co-principal for the acts of his subordinates? Either by conspiracy or by reckless imprudence, if such reckless imprudence allowed the commission of estafa or malversation through falsification, without which the crime could not have been accomplished. When, however, that infraction consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom rests, absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine prevails. heads of offices have to rely rr subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, Under the Arias Doctrine, ARTICLE 9 GRAVE, LESS GRAVE, LIGHT FELONIES 6 or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouch- and supporting papers that routinely pass through is hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989) One who signs or initials documents in course of transit in the conduct of the agency's standard operating procedure does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime committed at a stage where he had no participation. Knowledge of conspiracy plus active and knowing participation must be proved by positive evidence. One Who signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not make him part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each of the supposed conspirator must be established. (Albert v. Gangan. G.R. No. 126557, March 6, 2001) ARTICLE 9 - Grave, less grave, light felonies 1 Grave felonies are penalized by capital or afflictive penalty in any of its period, ie, the minimum, medium, or maximum period is an afflictive penalty, ie. prision mayor, disqualification, reclusion temporal, and reclusion perpetua. . Less grave felonies are punished with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, thus the maximum. period must be any of destierro, suspension, arresto mayor, or prision correccional. . Light felonies are infractions punished with arresto menor or a fine of P200 or below. But in Article 26, a P200 fine is correctional, hence, less grave. The classification of felonies as to severity is significant to determine: a. Ifthe felony is punishable (Article 7)(COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW b. Whether the accessory is liable (Article 16) Whether a complex crime was committed (Article 48) d. The duration of the subsidiary penalty (Article 39, 10.2) e. The duration of detention in case of failure to post bond to keep the peace (Article 35) £ Whether the crime has prescribed (Article 90) g Whether arbitrary detention has been committed (Article 125) h. The proper penalty for quasi-offenses (Article 365) ARTICLE 10 ~ Special Laws 1 Special penal laws (SPL) define and penalize crimes not included in the RPC; their nature is different from those defined and punished ction 3, Act 3326) An example is R.A. 9165 amending the Dangerous Drugs Act, RA. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659 which is not covered under any provisions of the RPC. It is a purely w. . The, law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves (mala in se) and acts which would not be ‘wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them (mala prohibita). This distinction is important the intent with which a wrongful act is done. In is, has’the law been terial, (Dunlao v. CA, G.R. No. 111343, August 22, 1996) . The general rule is that SPLs are not subject to the provi- sions of the RPC. The first sentence of Article 10 is a superfluity for it merely expresses the cardinal rule in statutory construction that special law prevails over general law. (Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, ARTICLE 10 -SPECIAL LAWS 6 4, The second sentence is the soul of the article. (id.) The RPC shall have supplementary application to the SPLs whenever the latter uses the nomenclature of penalties in the RPC, thus indicating the intent of Congress to make it apply suppletorily with its duration, correlation and legal effects under its system of penalties. (People 2 Simon, G.R ‘No. 930280, July 29, 1994) 5, The suppletory effect of the RPC under this article cannot be invoked where there is legal or physical impossibility of or a prohibition in the SPL against such supplementary application. Where the special law expressly grants the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the RPC. (id.) For instance, Romualdez v. Marcelo explained that the suppletory application of the RPC to $PLs finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter, thus: a. People v. Moreno, 60 Phil. 712, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 may be applied in cases of violations of Act 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the SPL did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. b. People v. Li Wai Cheung, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, applied the rules on the service of sentences in Article 70 in favor of the accused found guilty of ions of R.A. 6425 considering the lack under that law. lied Articles 17, 18 and 19 to define complices” and “accessories” under R.A. defined therein although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for illegal recruit- ment, 6. When the SPL uses the nomenclature of the penalties in the RPC, the effects are:(COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW a. The system of penalties under the RPC shall apply, hence, modifying circumstances shall be considered in the determination of penalties. b. In the imposition of penalties under the Indeter- minate Sentence Law (ISL), the rules under the RPC shall be followed, not the rules for special laws. The use of “RPC pen: offense into malum in se. ies” does not per se convert the Dolo is not required in crimes punished by SPLs because the act alone, irrespective of the motives which cons- LL committed were committed with full knowledge and with intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption. (Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993) ‘An SPL that merely amends the provisions of the RPC, such as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law modifying Articles 308, 309, and 310, is not a true SPL. (Ter v. CA; Canta v. People, G.R. No, 140937, February 28, 2001) [Contra: The Anti- Carnapping Law, though an amendment of Article 310 was declared a malum probibitum.] ‘Afelony cannot be complexed with an offense. Hence, rape cannot be complexed with violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. (People v. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009) Since R.A. 7610 is a special law referring to a particular lass in society, the prosecution must show that the ctim truly belongs to this particular class to warrant the application of the statute's provisions, Any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favor of the accused. (People ». Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25, 2009) ‘The benign provisions of the RPC are not applicable to offenders prosecuted under SPLs. (People v. Ondo, 227 SCRA 562) . People v. Pacificador, G.R. No. 139405, March 13, 2001 said that Section 2 of Act 3326 governs the computation CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 9 of prescription of offenses penalized by SPLs. Peopl v. Sandiganbayan ruled that Section 2 was correctly applied by that court in determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the violation of R.A. 3019, as amended, CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1. The RPC subscribes to the classical theory hence there is a predetermined penalty for each crime. It is the office of modifying circumstances to increase or decrease the penalty in accordance with the presence or absence of circumstances showing the moral state of the offender. 2. The circumstances which affect or modify criminal liability are: a. Justifying — Article 11 b. Exempting — Article 12 Mitigating — Articles 13 and 15 d.Aggravating — Articles 14 and 15 e. Absolutory — exempting circumstances outside Article 12 f. Extenuating — mitigating circumstances not found in Article 13, such as concealment of dishonor in abortion and abandonment of wife by the husband in adultery. 3. Justifying and exempting circumstances are both in the nature of confession and avoidance — the accused is confessing to the commission of the act but seeks to avoid criminal liability. Hence, the strict requirement that all the elements necessary to constitute such must be present, Not being a penal provision, these beneficial provisions are strictly construed against the accused. Thus: a. Allelements present — accused is not crimin: per Articles 11 and 128 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW b. Majority of the elements present — accused will be given the benefit of privileged mitigating pursuant to Article 69. When there are only two elements of the circumstance to justify the act or exempt the actor from criminal liability, the presence of one will be considered as majority, the rule being that the law favors a lesser criminal liability. Only one element present - offender shall be given an ordinary mitigating circumstance according to Arti- dle 13, paragraph 1. 4, Absolutory circumstances: a. Instigation due to public policy b. Article 6(3) — spontaneous desistance in the attempt- ed stage unless the overt act committed constitutes another crime c. Article 7 — attempted/frustrated light felonies except those against persons or property d. Article 16 — accessories in light felonies fe. Article 20 — accessories-relatives except for profiting in the crime f° Article 247 — injuries except serious physical injuries g Article 332 — cer malicious mischief in relatives in theft, estafa and bh. Somnambulism due to lack of intelligence Mistake of fact due to lack of intent Total repeal of penal law which decriminalizes the act, 5, Entrapment is the employment of ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker; the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. In induce- mn, the criminal intent or tigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, (People v. Ramos, Jr, G.R. No. 88301, October 28, 1991) 6 (CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ° A buy-bust is a form of entrapment that in recent years has iid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. doubt as instigation. Instigation is an absolutory cause akin to an exempting circumstance. (People v. De Paz, G.R. No. 104277, July 5, 1993) Instigation and frame-up cannot be both present in a case for they are incompatible. In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducers. In frame-up, the offense is not committed by the accused. the accused is only framed or set up in a situation leading to a false accusation against him. An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drug cases. It is viewed with disfavor, for it ‘can be easily concocted. To substantiate such defense, including instigation, the evidence must be clear and convincing because of the presumption that publ officers acted in the regular performance of their offi duties. (id.) Distinctions between entrapment and instigation: ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION ‘a. The mens rea originated | a. The evil idea ori from the accused who nated from the peace was merely trapped officer who induced by the peace officer int the accused to commit flagrante delicto. the act. >. Notabsolutory asthe |b. Absolutory by reason. offender authored the of public policy. evil idea.12. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMI aw © Consistent with public ]¢. Contrary to public policy. policy. @. Trapfortheunwary[d. Trap for unwary in- criminal. (People 2 nocent Marcos, G.R. No, 83325, ‘May 8, 1990) e. The peace officer is a principal by induce- ment. (People v. Ramos) ity for his acts are in accordance with law. |. The rule is that the testimony of police officers involved in a buy-bust operation deserves full faith and credit, given the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. This presumption can be overturned if clear and convincing evidence is presented to prove either of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty; or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive. (People. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July 28, 2008) Inducement is a valid defense that accused and partakes of the natui avoidance. It is a positive defense. has-the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise. The two kinds of tests used in American courts to deter- mine whether entrapment really occurred when raised as defense are the “subjective” or “origin of intent” or predisposition test, and the objective test. the focus is on the accused’s it the offense, his state of mind exposure to government ies, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, are considered 2B. 14. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 51 to assess his state of mind before the crime. The test em- phasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer’s misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a “trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to com: offense at any favorable opportunity, the defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. The “objective test” considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by govern- ment agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. ‘The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the rw enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally ibiding pers: an one who is ready and g, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normal resist the temptation to commit a crime that is by the simple opportunity to act unlawf conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, or appeals to sentiments such as sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are (People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999) The concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is fa defense, and is considered as an absolutory cause. To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, the courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The “objective” test first applied in USS. v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. Nevertheless, adopting the “objective” approach has not2 (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW precluded the Court from likewise applying the “subjective” test. (id.) ion or what is known as the prohibited by law and does Legaspi pronounced drugs, any of the following will not exculpate the accused: (a) that facilities for the com intentionally placed in his wa jon of the crime were (b) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or (©) that the police authorities feigning com; the act were present and apparently assis ‘commission. Hence, even assuming that the operatives repeatedly asked her to sell them shabu, the defense of instigation not prosper. This is especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was committed by hhim free from the influence or instigation of the officer. (People v. Espiritu, C.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013) ARTICLE 11 - Justifying Circumstances 1. Justifying circumstances are those’ where the acts of the actor are in accordance with law, thus he incurs no criminal ity. Since there is no crime, there is no criminal and 2. Article 101 states, “in cases falling within subdivision no. 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has een prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.” The civil liability is not on the actor for he is not criminally liable but on those who benefited from the act. ARTICLE 11 - JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 3 ‘The justifying circumstances are: a. Defense of self, of relatives, or of strangers; b, State of necessity; Fulfillment of duty; and d. Obedience to superior order. Self-defense includes defense of life, chastity, property and honor of the accused who must prove with clear and convincing evidence the following elements: a. Unlawful aggression; b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and ©. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself The effect of invoking self-defense is to place the burden on the accused to prove to the fact of legitimate defense because thereby he admits the commission of the act complained. Unlawful aggression is the primordial requisite which must at all times be present. When unlawful aggression is absent, there is no self-defense whether complete or incomplete. ”. Aggression must be actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression. Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself or of others being defended and not an imagined threat. (People v. Lopez, G.R. ‘No. 177302, April 16, 2009) ‘Unlawful aggression must be real or at least imminent. Real aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon such as to cause injury or danger to life or per- sonal safety. Aggression is imminent if an attack is impend-2B. 4. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW ing or at the point of happening, It must be offensive and positively strong. (i ‘That RR sustained injuries does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression. (Roca v. CA, G.R. No. 114917, January 29, 2001) |. When the aggression no longer exists, such as when the aggressor ran away after the attack or when the defender was able to wrest the weapon from the aggressor, there is no need for self-defense. The person defending himself must stop for when aggression ceased and he still continued to attack, he then becomes the aggressor. |. The presence of large number of wounds inflicted on the victim and the severity thereof disprove self-defense; they belie the claim of incomplete defense and indicate not the desire to defend but a determined effort to kill and belies the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. (People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 130708, October 22, 1999) In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was TT who had initiated the attack only against DD; and that RR had not been at any time a target of only happened to be present at the scene. neither of the two had committed any unlawful aggression aggression from the victim (RR), thereby rend plea of self-defense unwarranted. (Talampas v. People, G.R. No, 180219, November 23, 2011) Reasonable necessity of the means employed depends upon the circumstances surrounding the aggression, the state of mind of the aggressor and the available weapon at the defender’ disposal ‘There is no reasonable necessity of the means of defense when the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has 15. 18. ARTICLE 11 - JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES = ceased because there is no more need for the offender to defend himself. It does not imply commensurability between the means of the attack and defense — the law requires a rational equivalence which is determined by the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense. The proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. (People v. Gutual, G.R. No. 115233, February 22, 1996) . “Stand ground when in the right” applies when the aggressor is armed with a weapon and is especi liberal if the person attacked is a peace offic performance of his duty. (ULS. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784) This rule superseded “retreat to the wall” which makes it a duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before hhe meets the assault with force. It means that the defender has reached the and has no more place to run, s0 he can now legally defend himself. In defense of one’s chastity, there must be imminent or immediate danger of rape to killing. If it were only acts of lasciviousness, killing is an unreasonable means. Slander may be a necessary means to repel slander. But it must not be more than needed to defend oneself from the defamatory remarks. In defense of property, killing is not justified. There must be, in addition, the necessity to save another life. If the aggression is on property, even if there was no attack on the defender or owner or possessor, defense is proper but not to the extent of killing the aggressor, otherwise the means used to repel or prevent the aggression will not be reasonable. (People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983)20. 21. 22. 24. 26. 27. (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMINAL LAW In civil law, the parallel rule is in Article 429 thus, “The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.” Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself shows that there may have been provocation but it should not be sufficient and it must not immediately precede the act. It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. This requisite is present when: (1) no provocation at all was given to the aggress even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) even if the provocation Was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending or (4) when given by the person defending it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. (Cano v. People, G.R. No. 155258, October 7, 2003) . As an element of self-defense, there must be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender; as a mitigating circumstance, there must be presence thereof on the part of the offended party. For defense of relatives, the third requisite becomes: “in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the person defending had no part therein.” . For defense of strangers, the third requisite is that the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motives. Defense of relatives beyond the fourth degree of consanguinity is defense of strangers and the third ele- ment in defense of relatives will be replaced, ‘The presence of all or lack of some of the requisites for the defense has the following effects 29. ARTICLE 11 - JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 7 uisites are present — justifying circumstance; (Article 11) b. Two requisites are present — privileged mitigating circumstance; (Article 69). In all cases, unlawful aggression must be present otherwise, there is no need to defend one’s self. One requisite present which must be unlawful aggression — ordinary mitigating circumstance. (Article 13, no. 1) Unlawful aggression is not a mitigating circumstance; it is the incompleteness of the requisites of defense that is. (See Article 13, no. 1) ‘The elements of state of necessity are: a, The evil sought to be avoided actually exists; b. The injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and c. There is no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. The state of ‘necessity must not be caused by the ence or violation of the law of the actor otherwise this benefit cannot be invoked. Under Article 101, the civil liability shall be borne not by the actor but the ones benefited by the avoidance of the evil. ‘The elements of fulfillment of duty or exercise of right or office are: a. The offender acted in the performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. b. The injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. ‘The doctrine of “self-help” in Article 429 of the NCC justifies the act of the owner or lawful possessor of a30. ai. 32. 33, (COMPACT REVIEWER IN CRIMIN, thing to use force necessary to protect his proprietary or possessory rights. He must however exercise this right at the very moment that he is being deprived of his property. ‘When possession has already been lost, he must resort to judicial process in reclaiming his property (German Manage- ‘ment and Services, Inc. v. CA, 177 SCRA 495) otherwise he could be liable for coercion. PP was not in the performance of his duties at the time of the shooting for the girls he was attempting to arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his presence. If at all, the only person he was authorized to arrest during the time was RR who offered him service of a prostitute, for vagrancy. Even then, the fatal injuries that PP caused the victim were not a necessary consequence of performance of his duty as a police officer. His duty to arrest the female suspects did not include any right to shoot the victim to death. (People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 128116, January 24, 2001) This circumstance has only two elements, For purposes of Article 69, the presence of one is deemed a majority and the accused is entitled to a privileged mitigating circum- stance resulting to one degree lower penalty. (Lacanilao v. CA, G.R. No, L-34940, June 27, 1988) The elements of obedi a. Anorder has been issued by a superior. \ce to superior order are: b. The order is for a legal purpose. cc. The means used to carry out such order is lawful. Even if the order of the superior is illegal, if it appears to bbe legal, and the subordinate is not aware o! gal ity, the subordinate is not liable. (Tabuena v. SB, G.R. Nos. 108501-03, February 17, 1997) ARTICLE 12- Exempting Circumstances 1 The exempting circumstances are: a, Imbecility/insanity ARTICLE 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES #8 ‘Minority Accident eos Compulsion of irresistible force e. Impulse of uncontrollable fear £, Insuperable or lawful cause Distinctions between justifying and exempting circum- stances: JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING a. Theactis legal. a,_The act is criminal. >. Thereisnocrime, |b. Thereisa crime, hence no criminal. hence a criminal. c. Since there is no c. Since there is a crime, there is a criminal (but the law exempts him from criminal d. Theemphasis ofthe | d. law is on the act, eg, self-defense. Iaw is on the actor, eg, insane, imbecile. ‘The basic reason behind the enactment of exempting circumstances is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negli- gence on the part of the accused. (Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008) Insanity under Section 1039 of the RAC is “a manifes- tation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain or a more or less permanently diseased or disorder- ed condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties or by impaired or disordered volition.”