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Let's Make a Deal: A Dynamic Exercise for Practicing Negotiation Skills

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DOI: 10.1080/08832323.2013.794121

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Let's Make a Deal: A Dynamic Exercise for Practicing

Negotiation Skills
a a
Gerard Beenen & John E. Barbuto Jr.
a
California State University, Fullerton, California, USA
Published online: 06 Mar 2014.

To cite this article: Gerard Beenen & John E. Barbuto Jr. (2014) Let's Make a Deal: A Dynamic Exercise for Practicing
Negotiation Skills, Journal of Education for Business, 89:3, 149-155, DOI: 10.1080/08832323.2013.794121

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 JOURNAL OF EDUCATION FOR BUSINESS, 89: 149–155, 2014
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ISSN: 0883-2323 print / 1940-3356 online
DOI: 10.1080/08832323.2013.794121

Let’s Make a Deal: A Dynamic Exercise

for Practicing Negotiation Skills
Gerard Beenen and John E. Barbuto, Jr.
California State University, Fullerton, California, USA

Because negotiation is among the most important skills for a manager to develop, activities that
Downloaded by [California State University Fullerton] at 17:49 20 May 2014

can foster its development are valuable for educators. The authors present an original exercise
that introduces three key concepts in negotiation: best alternative to a negotiated agreement,
distributive bargaining, and integrative bargaining. They review these concepts and present
the exercise and its purpose, and execution, then debrief. A unique feature of the exercise is
that instructors can configure dynamic buyer–seller dyads with varying distributions of power
between parties. A pre- and posttest using four questions to assess learning with Master of
Business Administration students and undergraduates suggest that the exercise is an effective
teaching tool.

Keywords: classroom exercises, negotiation, role play

2007; Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009). Experiential learning using

“Never try to make all the money that’s in a deal. Let the
other fellow make some money too, because if you have a
reputation for always making all the money, you won’t have
many deals.”
—J. Paul Getty (cited in Branaghan, 2009, p. 136)
Effective managers know how to balance their own self-
interests with the interests of the other party, which is what
good negotiators do. Negotiation is “a process in which two
or more parties seek agreement on what each shall give to, and
take from, the other(s)” (Movius, 2008, p. 51). Negotiation
skills are “at the core of the manager’s job” (Lax & Sebenius,
1986, p. 2), and a key component of managerial effective-
ness (Munduate, Ganaza, Peiro, & Euwema, 1999) and career
success (Melamed, 1996). Good negotiators can adjust more
effectively to their new jobs (Davey & Arnold, 2000) are bet-
ter at achieving work–family balance (Buzzanell & Meina,
2007), and are promoted faster (Fiona, 2008). Negotiation is
a core topic in organizational behavior textbooks (e.g., Mc-
Shane & Von Glinow, 2009; Robbins & Judge, 2010; Whet-
ten & Cameron, 2011) and an important, though underrepre-
sented, component of business school curriculum (Navarro,
Correspondence should be addressed to Gerard Beenen, California State
University, Department of Management, 800 N. State College Boulevard,
Fullerton, CA 92831, USA. E-mail: gbeenen@fullerton.edu
deal-making exercises is the best way to develop negotiation
knowledge and skills (Lewicki, 1997).
Though a number of published negotiation exercises are
available, most if not all of these do not give students experi-
ence with dynamic power distributions between negotiators.
For instance, published negotiation exercises provide direct
exposure to Pareto efficiency (Ball, 1999), building self-
confidence (Taylor, Mesmer-Magnus, & Burns, 2008), devel-
oping critical thinking skills (Page & Mukherjee, 2007), and
negotiating cross-culturally in an online context (Volkema &
Rivers, 2008). This article provides an experiential exercise
that introduces students to the fundamental concepts of best
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), distributive
bargaining, and integrative bargaining. A unique feature of
the exercise is the instructor can create buyer–seller dyads
with symmetrical and asymmetrical power to give students
a dynamic experience with these concepts. The key lesson
students take away from this exercise is that their BATNA in
the negotiation, and the extent to which they anticipate fu-
ture interactions with the other party, should influence their
negotiation strategy.
In the rest of this article, we provide a background
for understanding power in a negotiation is a function of
BATNA. Next, we explain two rudimentary negotiation
strategies—distributive and integrative bargaining. We then
describe the purpose and audience for the exercise, instruc-
tions for facilitating it, and processing guidelines to glean
 150 G. BEENEN AND J. E. BARBUTO, JR.
key concepts practiced in the activity. Finally, we pro-
vide preliminary indicators that the activity is effective at
increasing students’ understanding of a BATNA, and dis-
tributive and integrative bargaining strategies– indicating that
it achieves its desired objective.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
(BATNA)
A manager’s power in a negotiation is defined by the BATNA
that he or she brings to the negotiating table (Bazerman &
Neale, 1992). The BATNA is what negotiators are left with
Downloaded by [California State University Fullerton] at 17:49 20 May 2014
when they fail to reach a negotiated agreement. For example,
a renter and landlord who fail to agree on lease terms will
each be left with their BATNA. The renter’s BATNA may be
buying or renting another home, or moving in with family
or friends. The landlord’s BATNA may be finding another
tenant, risking a rent-free period, or selling the property. The
renter has a better BATNA and more power in the negotiation
if affordable housing is abundant. The landlord has a better
BATNA and more power in the negotiation if housing is
scare and there are a lot of eager tenants. Negotiators should
always keep in mind that expanding BATNA is an important
goal because it increases power in the negotiation.
Distributive Bargaining Strategy
The most common strategy to which the uninformed nego-
tiator is accustomed is usually characterized as a win–lose or
fixed pie approach. Distributive negotiators are eager to win
at the other party’s expense. Distributive bargaining involves
negotiating with a focus on one’s own position rather than
the underlying issues that each party values. A landlord us-
ing a distributive strategy with a tenant maybe focused only
on getting the highest rent possible, and may overlook other
important issues (e.g., cost of finding a new tenant, benefits
of a long-term tenant).
A distributive strategy is most appropriate under two con-
ditions. First, the negotiator has a stronger BATNA than the
other party. Second, the negotiator anticipates little or no
chance of dealing with the other party in the future. That is,
the negotiator has the upper hand and only needs a short-term
or single transaction with the other party. When both parties
have equal power and do not expect to deal with each other in
the future, a distributive strategy may be acceptable though it
can lead to an impasse. In such cases, an integrative strategy
may be more appropriate.
Integrative Bargaining Strategy
Integrative bargaining is a win–win or expanding pie ap-
proach to negotiating. Integrative negotiators focus on the
underlying issues or goals that are important to both parties,
rather than on rigid positions. A landlord using an integrative
strategy with a tenant may consider the search cost of finding
a new tenant, the holding cost of a vacant property, and the
benefits of a stable renter. The amount of rent is only one of
the issues to consider. An integrative strategy is usually best
if the negotiator expects to deal with the other party in the
future (e.g., a strategic supplier requiring high quality and
service). Alternatively, if the negotiator does not have the
upper hand, an integrative strategy can be considered.
CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE
Purpose and Audience for the Exercise
This exercise engages students in a simulated negotiation
between a buyer and seller of a used car with the follow-
ing learning goals: (a) experience how a BATNA can affect
a negotiation, (b) appreciate differences between distribu-
tive and integrative bargaining strategies, and (c) develop
a vocabulary to help them discuss key concepts in negoti-
ation The exercise can be used in undergraduate or grad-
uate organizational behavior or negotiation courses, or for
training–consulting, professional development, or executive
education.
Preparation and Facilitation Instructions
Instructors can start with a brief lecture to introduce the con-
cepts of BATNA, and distributive and integrative bargaining.
Alternatively, the exercise can be run first with the concepts
introduced after students reflect on their experiences. Stu-
dents will be assigned to dyads as a buyer and seller of a
used car using configurations noted below as selected by the
instructor. For an odd number of students, one student can be
paired with the instructor or assigned as an observer–data col-
lection assistant. Schedule the exercise before a brief break
or at the end of a class, with discussion after the break or
at the start of the next class. The exercise works best if stu-
dents can negotiate without others interfering. The instructor
should observe dyads to ensure they understand their roles.
Plan 30–40 min to run and process the exercise.
There are two versions for each of the buyer and seller
roles—a weak BATNA (buyer needs a car now, and seller
needs to sell the car now), and a strong BATNA (buyer has
other alternatives, and seller is considering keeping the car;
see Appendix). The roles should be supplemented with a sim-
ulated Blue Book pricing chart (for an example, see Table 1).
These can be configured in various ways. For the core con-
figuration, assign half the dyads to strong buyer/weak seller
BATNAs, and half to weak buyer–strong seller BATNAs.
The asymmetric power distribution in this configuration en-
courages the stronger BATNA negotiator to use a distributive
strategy. The average selling price is more likely to be higher
(lower) when the seller (buyer) has a stronger BATNA. To in-
crease the chances for impasse, assign dyads to strong buyer
 LET’S MAKE A DEAL 151

TABLE 1 what was the final price? Why were there so many different
Negotiation Exercise: Blue Book Pricing Provided to settlements?
Buyer and Seller Roles
The instructor can weave the concepts of BATNA, in-
Estimated market tegrative and distributive strategies into the discussion and
value for 2006 debrief. For instance, when students learn some had more
Toyota Prius Trade-in Private party Dealer retail or less advantageous positions (i.e., BATNAs), the instruc-
tor can guide the discussion into how these differences im-
National base price $7,737 $9,207 $10,410
pacted both the dynamics and outcome for specific negotia-
Optional equipment $0 $0 $0
Color $0 $0 $0 tion dyads. Students may wonder why not all negotiators with
adjustment—driftwood better BATNAs received better outcomes. The instructor can
pearl ask how much information sharing occurred between parties.
Regional $−32 $−40 $−44 Negotiators who revealed their stronger (or weaker) power
adjustment—for
position by signaling their BATNAs to the other party could
Southern CA
Mileage $−667 $−667 $−667 have been in a better (or worse) position than those who did
adjustment—95,000 not. The instructor also may introduce concepts of subjective
Downloaded by [California State University Fullerton] at 17:49 20 May 2014

miles value, emotion and personality, gender, and culture.

Condition $0 $0 $0
adjustment—clean
Total $7,038 $8,500 $9,699
and seller BATNAs. Adding this to the core configuration
should provide an engaging experience. To increase coop-
eration and reduce contentious negotiating dynamics, assign
dyads to a weak BATNA role. Another way to facilitate an in-
tegrative strategy is to modify the roles so negotiators expect
future dealings (e.g., buyer and seller are friends).
As buyer and seller roles are given to each student dyad,
the following guidelines should be presented: (a) do not share
your role description with your negotiation partner, though
you may share information as you see fit; (b) read your role
carefully and thoroughly and think of yourself as someone
who is really buying or selling your car; (c) find a quiet place
to negotiate; (d) do not use coercion, lie, or misrepresent any
facts presented to you in order to accomplish your goals in
the negotiation; (e) try to consider issues that are important
to you in this negotiation, beyond price; (f) take 10–15 min
to plan and execute your negotiation. If you agree on a price
and other terms, record the information on a bill of sale and
return it to the instructor. If you do not reach a settlement,
note this on the bill of sale.
Processing Instructions
After doing the exercise, the instructor can display pricing
results in a template available from Gerard Beenen. This is
useful to demonstrate some of the concepts the exercise con-
veys. For example, if some are assigned to strong buyer/weak
seller BATNAs, and others to weak buyer–strong seller BAT-
NAs, the average selling price should be lower for the former
and higher for the latter. Sample discussion questions include
the following: Did any of you fail to reach a final settle-
ment? Why did this happen? What issues were important to
you during the negotiation? What challenges, frustrations or
roadblocks did you encounter while negotiating? What was
your BATNA as a buyer or seller? How did it impact how
you approached the negotiation? If you reached a settlement,
Subjective value suggests individuals have different util-
ities for different issues that affect negotiated settlements
(Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). Some may value a car’s
appearance, while others value reliability. These may affect
the price they pay or other final conditions (e.g., detailing the
car before delivery, mechanical inspection). Subjective value
creates opportunity for integrative agreements if parties can
identify and agree on issues that each party values more than
the other.
Regarding emotion, angry negotiators may be more able
to get what they want, while happy negotiators may be more
willing to give in. Anger in negotiation, however, has sig-
nificant downsides including less willingness to deal with
the angry party in the future, greater conflict between what
negotiators want to do and think they should do, lower ac-
curacy in judging others’ interests, and a lower likelihood of
achieving joint gains (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley,
2000). Personality traits such as assertiveness or need for
power might have impacts on negotiated settlements, though
research has shown individual differences generally are not
effective predictors of negotiation outcomes (see Bazerman
et al., 2000).
In terms of gender differences, women obtain better out-
comes than men when negotiating on behalf of others, while
men obtain better outcomes than women when negotiating
for themselves (Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005). Modi-
fications can be made to buyer or seller roles in this exercise
(e.g., buying or selling the car on behalf of a close friend) to
see if results corroborate with these research findings. Alter-
natively, outcomes can be simply compared for this exercise
by gender.
Finally, relevant cultural differences can impact negotia-
tion dynamics including collectivism-individualism, power
distance, communication context, and perceptions of time
(see Bazerman et al., 2000). Collectivistic cultures (e.g., Tai-
wan) may focus on protecting relationships while individu-
alistic cultures (e.g., United States) may focus on protecting
individual rights. High power distance cultures that value so-
cietal hierarchies may rely more on authority figures to inter-
vene in negotiations. High communication context cultures
 152 G. BEENEN AND J. E. BARBUTO, JR.
(e.g., Japan) may be more attuned to non-verbal cues than low
context cultures (e.g., Germany). Finally, polychronic cul-
tures (e.g., Asia, Middle East) process issues simultaneously
while monochromic cultures (e.g., North America, West-
ern Europe) process sequentially. Consequently, polychronic
cultures may be more apt to tolerate interruptions and to ig-
nore turn taking in conversation than monochromic cultures.
Students from different cultural backgrounds may be able to
illuminate some of these differences in the debrief discussion.
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE EXERCISE
Sample, Procedures, and Measures
Downloaded by [California State University Fullerton] at 17:49 20 May 2014
To assess the exercise’s effectiveness, a four question pre- and
posttest quiz (see Appendix) was given to 22 MBA students
in an organizational behavior seminar, and 42 undergraduate
students in an introductory organizational behavior course
in a university in the western United States. The pretest was
done at the start of class, and posttest with the same questions
after the exercise and debrief were done. The undergraduate
sample was 56% male, 26% Asian, 4% African American,
44% Caucasian, 14% Hispanic, and 12% Middle Eastern,
and worked about 20 hr/week with a mean age of 24 years
(SD = 5.5). The MBA sample included full-time students
who were 48% male, 44% Asian, 16% Hispanic, 28% Cau-
casian, and 12% Middle Eastern, with three years of full-time
work experience with a mean age of 25 years (SD = 2.7).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A paired samples t test compared the number of correct an-
swers for the pre- and posttests for each sample as displayed
in Table 2. The MBA sample had significantly higher posttest
versus pretest scores (M = 3.64 vs. M = 1.73), t (21) = –5.93,
p < .001. The same was true for the undergraduate sample
posttest versus pretest scores (M = 3.43 vs. M = 2.26 ±
1.33) t(41) = –5.17, p < .001. This suggests the exercise
and debrief conveyed the meaning of key concepts including
BATNA, and distributive and integrative bargaining for both
TABLE 2
Negotiation Exercise Pre- and Posttest Scores for
MBA and Undergraduate Student Samples
Posttest
Pretest score score
Sample M SD M SD t p
MBA students 1.73 1.20 3.64 0.79 –5.93 <.001
Undergraduate students 2.26 1.33 3.36 0.73 –5.16 <.001
Note: n = 21 for MBA sample, n = 42 for undergraduate sample. Quiz
contained four questions.
TABLE 3
Negotiation Exercise Final Sales Price for MBA and
Undergraduate Student Samples
Average selling Average selling
price (strong price (strong Average selling
Sample seller BATNA) buyer BATNA) price overall
MBA students — — $8,627
Undergraduate $8,940 $8,550 $8,796
students
Note: n = 12 for strong seller BATNA, n = 7 for strong buyer BATNA.
One negotiating pair ended in impasse for undergraduate sample, two nego-
tiating pairs ended in impasse for MBA sample, n = 42 for undergraduate
sample.
student samples. The slightly higher undergraduate versus
MBA pretest score likely was due to the fact that the under-
graduate students had prior assigned reading on negotiations
and conflict management.
Table 1 displays hypothetical Blue Book pricing. The
same pricing chart was provided to both buyer and sellers
roles. Table 3 displays the actual selling prices for both sam-
ples, which were not significantly different for the MBA (M
= $8,627; SD = $468) and undergraduate (M = $8,796; SD =
$535) samples. Two MBA dyads and one undergraduate dyad
ended in impasse. Some undergraduate dyads were assigned
to a strong seller–weak buyer BATNA condition, while oth-
ers were assigned to a weak seller–strong buyer BATNA
condition. As expected, the average selling price was higher
when the seller had a stronger BATNA (M = $8,940; SD =
$322) and lower when the buyer had a stronger BATNA (M
= $8550; SD = $718). Given the small number of dyads,
however, the difference was not statistically significant.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the rationale, content, and procedure for a
classroom exercise intended to help students experience the
concepts of BATNA, integrative and distributive bargaining.
These are core concepts in negotiation that are critical to
include in both undergraduate and graduate courses. A sim-
ple pre- and posttest with MBA student and undergraduate
samples indicated the exercise was effective at conveying
a rudimentary understanding of these concepts. We encour-
age educators to consider using this activity with their un-
dergraduate and graduate students to introduce the topic of
negotiation in their planned curriculum.
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APPENDIX
Buyer Roles: Weak and Strong BATNAs
1. Buyer Role (Weak BATNA)
Your old car just died, so you need to buy a car. You’re focused
on finding a used Toyota Prius. After scouring Craig’s List
and AutoTrader.com, you found two “Prii” (yes, that’s the
new plural for “Prius”) that seem promising. Both are 2006
base models with standard features (air conditioning, power
steering, AM/FM stereo with CD player, air bags, and 4-
wheel ABS braking system). That’s really all you want. The
first Prius you saw was in good condition with 89,000 miles
LET’S MAKE A DEAL 153
and doesn’t need any maintenance work. You negotiated the
sellers down to a price of $10,000 but they refused to lower
the price any more. You told them you’d keep looking, and
they told you that if you changed your mind and were ready
to pay $10,000, you should come back. The second Prius
was advertised for $10,000 but you think you can get it
for less. During a test-drive you took it to an honest and
trusted mechanic. Your mechanic said the car is generally
well maintained and in good shape. There are some small
dings and scrapes on the paint, and marks on the seats, but
that’s to be expected in a 6 year old car with 95,000 miles. The
Blue Book (see chart) suggests the car may sell for between
$8,000 and $9,000 for a private party. But you know this is
only an estimate. Similar cars may sell for more or less than
that.
You’re returning from your test drive and preparing to
meet the seller of this second Prius. You’ve already secured
financing. You need a car because taking the bus is inconve-
nient and time consuming, and you live too far from school
and work to ride a bike. You’ve been taking a cab to save
time, but that is getting very expensive. You’re eager to close
the deal with the seller. You don’t think the Kelley Blue Book
Value accurately reflects the recent trend towards rising gas
prices. You expect the continued rise in gas prices will make
this a good purchase and make a Prius an even more desirable
car.
2. Buyer Role (Strong BATNA)
Yourold car just died, so you need to buy a car. You’re focused
on finding a used Toyota Prius. After scouring Craig’s List
and AutoTrader.com, you found two “Prii” (yes, that’s the
new plural for “Prius”) that seem promising. Both are 2006
base models with standard features (air conditioning, power
steering, AM/FM stereo with CD player, air bags, and 4-
wheel ABS braking system). That’s really all you want. The
first Prius you saw was in good condition with 89,000 miles
and doesn’t need any maintenance work. You negotiated the
sellers down to a price of $10,000 but they refused to lower
the price any more. You told them you’d keep looking, and
they told you that if you changed your mind and were ready
to pay $10,000, you should come back. The second Prius
was advertised for $10,000 but you think you can get it
for less. During a test-drive you took it to an honest and
trusted mechanic. Your mechanic said the car is generally
well maintained and in good shape. There are some small
dings and scrapes on the paint, and marks on the seats, but
that’s to be expected in a 6 year old car with 95,000 miles. The
Blue Book (see chart) suggests the car may sell for between
$8,000 and $9,000 for a private party. But you know this is
only an estimate. Similar cars may sell for more or less than
that.
You’re returning from your test drive and preparing to
meet the seller of this second Prius. You’ve already secured
financing. You need a car because taking the bus is inconve-
nient and time consuming, and you live too far from school
and work to ride a bike. At the same time, you’re evaluating
 154 G. BEENEN AND J. E. BARBUTO, JR.
if it makes sense to move closer to work and school so that
you don’t depend on owning a car. In fact, an opportunity
has just come up for you to move to a new place that’s close
enough to bike to work and school, without raising your rent.
This new place also is closer to more convenient bus routes
that would allow you to use the bus for work, school and
shopping when the weather is bad. Plus ZIPCar R
, the new
car sharing service, recently added vehicles near campus that
you can use for day trips when you want a car, for less than
the cost of owning.
On the one hand, you like the freedom that goes with
owning your own car. So you’re still willing to buy the Prius
if you can get a really good deal. On the other hand, rising gas
prices, the opportunity to move to a more convenient place,
and the potential for ZIPCar R
as a lower cost option, cause
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you to question if you really need to buy this Prius.
Seller Roles: Weak and Strong BATNAs
1. Seller Role (Weak BATNA)
It’s time for you to sell your 2006 Toyota Prius. You bought
it new 7 years ago, and it has 95,000 miles on it. You’ve
generally done a good job maintaining it. It’s been a good car,
but since you just bought a new SUV, you don’t really need it
any more. It has the standard features: air conditioning, power
steering, AM/FM stereo with CD player, air bags, and 4-
wheel ABS braking system. After consulting the Blue Book
(see chart below), which said your car was worth between
$8,000 and $9,000, you listed the car a few days ago with an
asking price of $10,000 on Craig’s List. A number of people
have emailed and texted you about the car. However, so far
only two potential buyers have come to see it.
The first potential buyer offered you $7,000, but refused
to pay any more. You weren’t ready to sell at that price. After
all, that’s why you decided to sell the car on your own rather
than trading it in at the dealer. You have their number and
can call them if you change your mind.
You’re now dealing with the second potential buyer. This
person took the car out on a test drive, and had it inspected
by a mechanic. You know your car is in good condition. The
second potential buyer is coming back from the test drive to
negotiate with you.
You’re eager to sell your car and close the deal with this
buyer. After all, the reason you’re selling the car to begin
with is you just bought a new SUV. And you really need the
cash from selling your Prius to help pay for gas since your
new SUV isn’t as fuel efficient as a Prius. Plus, you don’t
want to pay insurance on two cars, so you’re pretty eager to
sell the Prius.
2. Seller Role (Strong BATNA)
It’s time for you to sell your 2006 Toyota Prius. You bought
it new 7 years ago, and it has 95,000 miles on it. You’ve
generally done a good job maintaining it. It’s been a good
car, but since you just bought a new SUV, you don’t really
need it any more. It has the standard features: air condi-
tioning, power steering, AM/FM stereo with CD player, air
bags, and 4-wheel ABS braking system. After consulting
the Blue Book (see chart below), which said your car was
worth between $8,000 and $9,000, you listed the car a few
days ago with an asking price of $10,000 on Craig’s List. A
number of people have emailed and texted you about the car.
However, so far only two potential buyers have come to see
it.
The first potential buyer offered you $7,000, but refused
to pay any more. You weren’t ready to sell at that price. After
all, that’s why you decided to sell the car on your own rather
than trading it in at the dealer. You have their number and
can call them if you change your mind.
You’re now dealing with the second potential buyer. This
person took the car out on a test drive, and had it inspected
by a mechanic. You know your car is in good condition. The
second potential buyer is coming back from the test drive to
negotiate with you.
During the second potential buyer’s brief test drive, you
received 2–3 calls for the car (versus 2–3 calls over the pre-
vious few days)! You now think the Blue Book value may
be understated because it’s not accounting for the trend to-
wards higher gas prices. Given this trend, you’re wondering
if it makes sense to keep your Prius as a second car. After
all, your new SUV isn’t as fuel efficient as the Prius, and
keeping insurance on it shouldn’t cost much, and could more
than offset the fuel you’d save by driving the Prius on short
trips.
On the one hand, you’d like the cash if you can sell your
Prius at the right price, especially with the apparent increase
in demand (and potentially price) for Prii given the expected
increase in fuel costs. On the other hand, rising fuel costs and
the opportunity to keep the Prius as an economical second
car cause you to question if you really need to sell it. You
may be able to save more money on gas by just keeping the
Prius.
Pre- and Posttest Questions for Concepts
Conveyed by the Exercise
1. A BATNA stands for
a. I’m not sure
b. Best alternative to a negotiated agreement
c. Buyer’s alteration of a negotiated agreement
d. Buyer’s adjustment to a negotiated agreement
e. Buyer’s advancement to a negotiated agreement
2. A BATNA gives
a. I’m not sure
b. Power to the negotiating parties
c. Clarity to the negotiating parties
d. The selling party a sense that the buyer is decisive
e. The selling party a sense that the buyer is indeci-
sive
 LET’S MAKE A DEAL 155

3. bargaining describes a strategy where negotiators 4. bargaining describes a strategy where negotiators
focus on maximizing their own gains in the negotiation. focus on creating mutual gains in the negotiation.
a. I’m not sure a. I’m not sure
b. Two-sided b. Two-sided
c. Integrative c. Integrative
d. Distributive d. Distributive
e. Contentious e. Contentious
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