Hannah Wright Modern Britain Book Review 4 November 2011

Schneer, Jonathan. The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Random House, 2010.

The title of Jonathan Schneers book The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict would lead most to expect that he has devoted an entire monograph to a topic that typically receives a chapter at best in most volumes. Instead Schneer focuses most of his book on the background to the Declaration, only arriving at its issuance by page 333. While the emphasis on background makes the book poorly titled, Schneer does clearly state and support his thesis that the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration was anything but a simple triumphal progress (xxix). Schneer provides a detailed account of Palestine and British policy in the area from 1914-1917 which proves to be useful context for the Balfour Declaration even if the title of the book misleads the reader to expect more than two chapters actually focused on the Declaration itself. Before beginning the meat of the book, Schneer provides a glossary of names, listing key Arab, Jewish, and British players in the shaping of British policy in Palestine. The list includes a paragraph for each of 56 figures and is a useful tool for the reader to refer to rather than become bogged down in so many new names within each chapter.

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Schneer begins by describing Palestine before World War I. The country may not have been a land of milk and honey, as the vast majority living in Palestine was poor, but it was an important place in world affairs. The majority of the areas 700,000 residents were Sunni Muslim, but in Jerusalem Jews far outnumbered Christians and Muslims. As anti-Semitism increased in parts of Europe in the early twentieth century, Zionism and Jewish immigration into Palestine grew. By 1914 Jews made up about one-ninth of the total population (12). The Ottoman government remained somewhat ambivalent toward the growing Jewish influence, but the Arab residents increasingly resisted the influx of Jews (14). The rest of the first section of Jonathan Schneers The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict focuses on Arab actions during the World War I era. Schneer discusses Arab nationalism and the Grand Sharif Hussein of Mecca, whose correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon helped spark the Arab Revolt and continues to draw controversy in Britains policy of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. Also of importance leading up to the Balfour Declaration was the Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided the Middle East between French and British control and agreed to place Palestine under an international commission. Schneer comments that the Sykes-Picot Agreement is important for the light it casts upon British thinking about the Middle East during World War I but not for what it accomplishedfor it never was implemented (85). Despite its lack of implementation aspects of the Agreement angered the Arabs. Schneer takes no position on the document, but rather outlines the positions of the British and Arabs at the time and presents two opposing views of historians. By presenting the facts and offering opposing views Schneer allows the reader to decide

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for himself whether the British government was greedy in its dealings in the Middle East or if officials acted reasonably. Next Schneer examines the influence of Zionism and Zionist leaders on British politics in the few years leading up to the Balfour Declaration. At first British officials in the Foreign Office opposed supporting Zionism because the Turks were against the movement (109). Though the Zionist movement lacked in numbers before World War I, once Zionism entered the realm of practical politics, British Jews flocked to the Zionist banner (111). This section gives the account of key Zionist organizations like the English Zionist Federation (EZF) and key Zionist leaders like Chaim Weizman. Schneer is very thorough in explaining Zionism in Britain and sets up his later discussions of how Zionism influenced the drafting process for what became the Balfour Declaration. In the third and fourth sections of the book, Schneer traces the strands of Jewish and Arab nationalism in British foreign policy leading up to the Balfour Declaration. He claims that Zionists moved forward in their press for a British protectorate in Palestine that would be sympathetic to their cause as they were unaware that Palestine already was spoken for in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and perhaps in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence (208). Schneer passes over World War I as only background noise to the discussions of Palestine. When the Sykes-Picot Agreement came to light in 1917 Zionist leaders felt betrayed and began to petition the British government in a frenzy. At the same time, King Hussein and other Arab leaders also felt betrayed, but in the end the British Foreign Office seemed to side more with the Zionists. These two sections seem more relevant to the topic that the title of the book suggests. Both sections are still background to the actual Balfour Declaration, but at least Schneer seems to keep the

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Declaration in mind in explaining the positions of both the Zionists and the Arab nationalists as well as diplomats in Britain and France. Finally, in the third chapter of the fifth section (Chapter 24 of the book) Schneer discusses the writing and acceptance of the Balfour Declaration. Much more went into the Balfour Declaration than foreign secretary writing a letter to Lord Rothschild than it would appear. Zionist leaders with Weizman would work out a statement with Zionist sympathizers in the British government such as Sykes and Ronald Graham. Once ready, Lord Rothschild would send the statement to Arthur Balfour who would present it to the War Cabinet and then inform Rothschild of its approval (333). Though the process seemed to run smoothly the possibility of the Ottoman Empire concluding a separate peace with Britain threatened to halt Zionist dreams in Palestine. The terms in negotiating included stipulations that Turkish troops not be harmed in withdrawing and that Britain would not annex Palestine. In the end, Britain and Turkey did not come to a separate peace and the policy set forth in the Balfour Declaration for a Jewish National Home in Palestine stood. Schneers observations about the writing of the Declaration as well as initial threats to its incorporation and fulfillment in British policy are well-written. Sadly though, if a reader picked up the book based on its title and wanting to learn about the Declaration that was a letter, that reader would be disappointed by the mere two chapters devoted to its analysis. Schneer concludes that the Balfour Declaration was the highly contingent product of a tortuous process characterized as much by deceit and chance as by vision and diplomacy (369). His conclusion neatly ties together all the strands of the book and brings the work back to his thesis that the lead-up to the Balfour Declaration was not a

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simple process. Indeed, Schneer skillfully delves into the intrigue of British Zionism, Arab nationalism, and World War I diplomacy. In proving his thesis, Schneers book The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict should be commended. The main problem with the book is the misleading nature of its title. Since the main title is The Balfour Declaration readers should be able to expect more devotion to the actual conception of its declaration, how it was accepted into official British policy, and its effect on war diplomacy and British actions in the Middle East. Instead, analysis of the Declaration appears to be an afterthought or merely a conclusion. Overall, Jonathan Schneers book is a useful resource for background to the Balfour Declaration and he successfully proves his thesis that that background was incredibly complex.