CASES LL&W

1. AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950

The legal maxim that applies in this case is "Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium," which translates to "Where there
is a right, there is a remedy." This principle underscores the importance of access to justice and the
protection of fundamental rights. It implies that if a person's rights are violated, there should be a legal
remedy available to seek redress. In the context of A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, Gopalan's
petition argued that the Preventive Detention Act deprived him of his fundamental rights without
providing him with an adequate remedy. He claimed that the Act did not provide for judicial review
and therefore violated the principle of Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium.

The Indian Supreme Court heard the A.K. Gopalan V. State of Madras case on 15th December, 1950.
This case is also known as the Preventive Detention case. It is a landmark case in Indian Constitution law
deal with the interpretation of key fundamental rights under Article 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution
.As it established a precedent for the protection of individuals' rights under Preventive Detention laws .This
was the first case after independence of India.

Background of the Case:

A K Gopalan, commonly known as AKG, was a prominent communist leader for many years he was
detained by the state of the madras (now Tamil Nadu) under the Preventative Detention Act, 1950. He
claims that he has been imprisoned since 1947 without being put on trial. He challenged his detention on
several grounds, primarily arguing that it violated his Fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of
the Indian Constitution. He stated that he was not given a fair hearing and the rules of natural justice didn't
apply in his case.

Fact of the Case:

In 1950, he was again detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Then Mr. Gopalan files a Writ
petition under article 32(1) of the Indian Constitution known as Habeas Corpus Writ. He argued that the
order violated his fundamental rights under Article 19 and Article 21. He said that the order against him
was done by mala fide intention. He also stated that Article 21's definition of "procedure established by
law" means due process of law. In his case the law was not followed, which is a breach of article 21 of the
Indian constitution.

Issue Raised Before The Court:

There are several issues in this case:

 Whether the Prevention Detention Act of 1950 violated the Indian constitutions Article 14, 19, and
21?
 What is the scope of interpretation of the words-'procedure established by law' as laid down in
article 21 of the constitution?
 Is there relation between the article 19 and 21?

Judges Bench:
The Supreme Court of India's constitutional bench of Six heard the case and delivered a decision
on May 19, 1950.
Six judges name- M.H. Kania (CJI), Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali, Justice M. Patanjali Sastri, Justice
Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjee and Justice S.R. Das.

Arguments:
By the Petitioner:
The petitioner challenged the validity of the Preventive Detention Act, under which he was
detained, on the grounds that the Act passed by Parliament was not in accordance with the standard
of 'procedure established by law' prescribed under Article 21 and was violative of constitutional
protections under that article.

By the Respondent:
It was argued by the respondent State that the term 'procedure established by law' means only any
procedure established or prescribed by law made by the State, whereas the petitioner argued that
the expression procedure established by law has to be interpreted in a wider sense. Needed
Procedural due process was understood in American constitutional law.

Ratio of the Court:

Six members of the Supreme Court's constitutional bench rendered a 5:1 majority decision in this
case. Justice Fazl Ali gave the dissenting opinion.

Dissenting Opinion: According to Justice Fazl Ali, It is permissible to interpret the expression
'procedural established by law' as meaning what American writers have read into the words
"procedural due process", an expression which does not exclude certain fundamental principles of
justice. He stated that this act should be struck down as unconstitutional as it violated the basic
principles of natural justice and human rights.

Judgement:
AK Gopalan judgment was delivered by a bench of six judges where the majority opinion in the
matter was that Article 21 which covered procedure established by law would simply mean to
established by the state. The Supreme Court determined that there is no relation between Article
21 and 19 of the constitution. The court also declared that in this case the natural justices were not
violated.

The Supreme Court finally dismissed Mr. Gopalan writ petition which also upheld the
constitutionality of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 held that it did not violate the basic rights
of the citizen under Article 19(1) (d) and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

Analysis:
The case of A.K. Gopalan V. State of Madras is one of the most important case in which apex
court of India interpreted the provision of Indian constitution. It is a landmark case in the legal
history of India. This case is also important because it was one of the first cases in India where the
natural justice concepts were put into practice. This case is also important because it established
the principle that the Indian Constitution is a living document and can be interpreted in the light of
changing times and circumstances.

The Supreme Court interpreted Article 21's meaning in A.K. Gopalan V. State of madras,
restricted it by disregarding its true significance, and decided in the government's favor.

After several years, the Supreme Court reversed this decision and upheld Justice Fazl Ali's
conclusion in Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India, 1978.
 Conclusion of the Case:
In the A.K. Gopalan case, the court restricted the scope of Article 21 such that it only refers to the
freedom of individual's body and nothing else. It sparked debate and future legal development that
expanded the protection of personal freedom and basic rights under Indian Constitution.

A.K. Gopalan and the State of madras is an important case in the history of Indian law. The court
case set essential precedents for Indian individual's fundamental rights. It also explains the concept
of 'Due processes in India. The case created and clarified the doctrine of natural justice which states
that the government cannot act arbitrarily. This concept of natural justice is talks about fairness and
justice.

The case continues to be a significant turning point in the development of Indian constitutional law
and the harmony between personal freedoms and national security.

OR

INTRODUCTION:

A.K. Gopalan V. State of Madras is one of the most important cases in the domain of constitutional right
to freedom and its application. In very recent years after the adoption of the Indian Constitution, this case
gave an opportunity to the Supreme Court of India to interpret the various articles of Indian Constitution in
depth. After independence, this was the first case which brought before the Supreme Court, a question
leading to discussion on various articles contained in the chapter of Fundamental Rights in the Indian
Constitution.

The judgement was delivered in this case by a 6 – Judge Bench of the Supreme Court consisting of then
CJI Harilal Kania. Each and every article contained in Chapter III of the Indian Constitution, i.e.,
Fundamental rights was discussed along with its limitations. The validity of the Preventive Detention Act
of 1950 was discussed in the light of the fundamental rights given to the citizens of India. The jurisdiction
and powers of the ‘State’ as defined under Article 13 were also discussed at length.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A.K. Gopalan, the petitioner in this case, was a Communist leader in the state of Madras at that time. He
filed a suit in the Supreme Court through a writ petition under Article 32(1) of the Constitution through a
writ of Habeas Corpus against his detention in the Madras jail from several years. He alleged that he has
been kept in detention since 1947. He was detained in the jail according to the rules contained in Section
3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950.

Through his petition, he had challenged the legality of the said section of the act as the provisions contained
there were violative of Article 22 of the Constitution. He also contended that the preventive detention
without giving any just cause and reasons was violative of his right to freedom under Article 19 of the
Constitution. He also challenged the validity of the order of his detention on being mala fide.

ISSUES INVOLVED:

1. Whether Preventive Detention Act, 1950 is violative of Article 19, 20 and 21 of the Indian
Constitution.
2. Whether Preventive Detention Act, 1950 is in consonance with Article 22 of the Indian
Constitution.
 3. Whether the detention of A.K. Gopalan is lawful or unlawful.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED:

 The petitioner in this case contended that Preventive Detention Act, 1950 infringes the right of the
citizens given in Article 19-21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioner further argued that the
impugned act is violative of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. For this, the Court read and
interpreted all the clauses of Article 19 of the Indian constitution and made the conclusion that once
legislation is formed by the State, as defined under Article 13, it is only needed to see whether it is
directly affecting any of the fundamental rights granted to the citizen’s and not its effect on the
mode of life of someone who is detained.
 Another argument presented by the petitioner was that the fundamental right to move freely
throughout the territory of India was curtailed by the detention. In this context, the court analyzed
whether the restrictions imposed on the petitioner were in the interest of the general public and held
that the contention urged in the respect of Article 19 was not valid.
 The third argument which was dealt with was that Article 19 and Article 20 of the Constitution
shall be read together as if they are implementing each other. However, the Supreme Court
contradicted this statement with a clear analysis of both the articles distinctly. The court here stated
the major difference between Article 19 and 21 stating that Article 19 grants fundamental rights
only to the citizens of India whereas Article 21 gives Right to life to each and every person. It was
also explained here that citizens are clearly distinct from people in lawful terms.
 It was further argued that “due process of law” as granted in the American Constitution shall also
be applicable to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. To this contention, the Supreme Court clearly
laid down the differences between the “due process of law” and “procedure established by law”.
 The last argument was that Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was unlawful in the
way that it didn’t allow the person in detention to inquire about the reasons for his detention and
hence was restrictive in its application. This contention was upheld by the vast majority of the Six
– Judge bench.

JUDGEMENT:

 In this landmark judgement, the Six – Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that the detention of
A.K. Gopalan was not unconstitutional with a 5:1 ratio. The Supreme Court very vividly discussed
each and every contentions presented by the petitioner and held that the detention was not unlawful
and not infringing fundamental rights granted to him by the Indian Constitution.
 The Supreme Court in this judgement held that none of the Fundamental Rights granted by the
Constitution were interconnected and they must be read separately so as to get the essence of each
one of them on their own. They must be read as one complete and separate article and not in
connection to other articles.
 The Supreme Court further established the difference between the “due process of law” and
“procedure established by law”. The idea of “Procedural due process” was upheld. The absence of
“due process of law” in the Indian Constitution was explained in the light of being deliberately
omitted by the Constitution makers.
 The Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was held to be not violative of any of the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed in the Indian Constitution. It was held that natural justice was not violated by the said
impugned act because if the freedom of a person is curtailed legally by lawful means by the
lawmakers, it cannot be said to be violative of Article 19, 20 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
 Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was held to be ultra vires, i.e., unconstitutional
as it did not allow any person detained to present their case in the Court with just cause and reasons.
 Section 14 restrained the disclosure of the grounds of detention and was held to be unlawful in this
context.

CONCLUSION:

Hence, it can be concluded that the Supreme Court in this judgement, took a restrictive view of the Indian
Constitution as it made a literal interpretation of the various Articles of the Indian Constitution and did not
delve in the essence of it. Justice Fazl Ali, who gave the dissenting opinion, held that the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 was unconstitutional as any law curtailing the freedom of citizens must be in
consonance with “personal liberty” granted to them by the Constitution. The landmark judgement in this
case was however turned down in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI.

2. KM NANVATI v. State of Maharashtra, 1961

Legal Maxim: The legal maxim that applies in the case of K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra is "actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." This Latin phrase translates to "an act does not make a person guilty
unless there is a guilty mind." It is a fundamental principle in criminal law that requires proof of both actus
reus (the wrongful act or omission) and mens rea (the guilty mind or intention) to establish criminal liability.

In the K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra case, Commander K. M. Nanavati was charged with the
murder of his wife's lover, Prem Ahuja. Nanavati's defense team successfully argued that he had acted under
provocation, and therefore, he lacked the necessary mens rea for a murder conviction. The court ultimately
acquitted Nanavati of the charge of murder, though the case had significant implications for the country's
legal system and the jury trial system in particular.

This case underscored the importance of proving the accused's mental state, or mens rea, in criminal cases
and highlighted the complexities surrounding crimes of passion or provocation. The verdict in this case,
and the subsequent abolition of jury trials for criminal cases in India, reflect the complexities and challenges
inherent in determining criminal liability based on both actus reus and mens rea.

Facts of the case

1. The petitioner K.M. Nanavati, an Indian Naval Officer, shifted to Bombay with his wife Sylvia
and their children.
2. A businessman named Prem Bhagwan Ahuja was residing with his sister in the same city.
3. In 1956, Ahuja and his sister were introduced to Nanavatis through Agniks, who were common
acquaintances of Ahujas and Nanavatis.
4. When Nanavati was frequently away from Bombay on his official duty for longer durations
then Sylvia, his wife, fell in love with Prem Ahuja and developed Illicit relations with him.
5. When Nanavati returned from his ship he tried to be affectionate to his wife to which she was
not being responsive on multiple occasions.
6. On 27 April 1959, Nanavati asked his wife if she had been faithful to him. She merely shook
her head to indicate that she was not.
 7. On 27 April 1959, Sylvia confessed to her husband about the Illicit relationship with Prem
Ahuja.
8. In the heat of agony, Nanavati went to his ship to procure a loaded revolver and then went to
the office of Prem Ahuja.
9. On not finding him at the office he drove to Ahuja’s residence and shot him dead.
10. K.M. Nanavati, the accused, initially was declared not guilty under Section 302 by the Jury with
an 8 : 1 verdict.
11. The case was then referred by the Sessions Judge to the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay
under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
12. The Hon’ble High Court declared the accused guilty under Section 302 of IPC.
13. An appeal was finally made to the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Contentions of the petitioner

1. The argument put forth by the counsel of Nanavati was that after hearing Sylvia’s confession,
Nanavati wanted to kill himself, but his wife managed to calm him down. He planned to find
out whether Ahuja wanted to marry her or not because she didn’t inform him. As a result, he
dropped his wife and two children off at the movie theatre and drove to his ship in his car.
2. Nanavati informed the authorities in the ship that he wanted to take a revolver and six rounds
from the ship’s stores because he was going to drive alone to Ahmednagar by night, but his true
intention was to shoot himself. He placed the revolver and six cartridges inside a brown
envelope after receiving them.
3. Nanavati then drove to Ahuja’s office, but when he didn’t find him there, he drove to Ahuja’s
flat, which was unlocked by a servant, and walked to Ahuja’s bedroom, closing the door behind
him. He was also carrying the envelope containing the revolver.
4. When Nanavati saw Ahuja inside the bedroom, he labelled him a dirty swine and asked if he
would marry Sylvia and care for the children. “Am I supposed to marry every woman I sleep
with?” Ahuja raged. Nanavati became enraged, stowed the revolver in an envelope in a
neighbouring cabinet, and threatened to thrash him. When Ahuja made a sudden grab at the
envelope, Nanavati drew his revolver and told Ahuja to return. A scuffle erupted between the
two, and during the struggle, two rounds were mistakenly fired, killing Ahuja.
5. Nanavati returned to his car after the shooting and drove it to the police station, where he
surrendered. Hence, the petitioner shot at the Ahuja in response to a grave and sudden
provocation, and even if he did commit an offence, it would be culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.

Contentions of the respondent

1. The first point of disagreement was that Ahuja had just gotten out of the shower while wearing
a towel. His towel was still on his body when his body was discovered. It hadn’t loosened or
fallen off, which was exceedingly unlikely in the event of a scuffle.
 2. Following Sylvia’s confession, a calm and composed Nanavati drove them to a movie theatre,
dropped them off, and then went to his ship to get his pistol, all on false pretences. This
demonstrates that he had sufficient cooling time, that the provocation was neither grave nor
sudden, and that Nanavati had premeditated the murder.
3. Anjani, Ahuja’s servant who was there at the time of the incident and was a natural witness,
testified that four shots were fired in rapid succession and that the entire event occurred in less
than a minute, ruling out a scuffle.
4. Nanavati exited Ahuja’s residence without informing his sister Mamie, who was present in
another room, that it was an accident.
5. According to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Nanavati admitted to shooting Ahuja and
even rectified the misspelling of his name in the police record, demonstrating Nanavati’s ability
to think normally.

Issues before the Court

1. Whether the High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 307 of the CrPC to examine the facts
in order to determine the competency of the Sessions Judge’s referral.
2. Whether the High Court had the power to strike aside a jury’s decision on the grounds of
misdirection in charge under Section 307(3) of the CrPC.
3. Whether there were any misdirections in the charge.
4. Whether the jury’s decision was such that it might have been reached by a group of reasonable
men based on the facts presented to them.
5. Whether the act was done in “the heat of the moment” or whether it was a premeditated murder?
6. Whether the pardoning power of the Governor and the Special Leave Petition can be clubbed
together?

Hon’ble High Court’s judgement

A division Bench of the said High Court, consisting of Shelat and Naik, JJ., heard the case. The two learned
Judges issued separate decisions, but both agreed that the accused was guilty of murder under Section 302
of the Indian Penal Code and should be imprisoned for the rest of his life. After concluding that the jury
had been misled, Shelat, J. evaluated the complete evidence and concluded that the accused was plainly
guilty of murder; alternatively, he expressed the opinion that the jury’s finding was perverse, irrational,
and, in any case, contrary to the weight of evidence. Naik, J., opted to reach his finding on the alternative
argument that no reasonable group of people could have reached the jury’s conclusion. Both the learned
Judges agreed that no case had been made out to reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. The present appeal has been preferred against the said conviction and sentence.

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgement

As pointed out by the Supreme Court, confession by the wife of adultery was grave but Ahuja was not
present at the time the confession was made, hence, the element of the suddenness of killing was missing.
Because three hours had transpired between the time of confession and the time of the killing, the Court
concluded that a reasonable man had had enough time to cool down since the provocation.

The Supreme Court ruled that the accused’s conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the High Court are legitimate, and there are no grounds for
interference.

1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that if the judge disagrees with the jury’s decision, he can
refer the case to the High Court under subsection (1) of section 307 of the CrPC. The following
two elements must be met: (1) the judge must disagree with the jury’s verdict, and (2) he must
believe that the jury’s verdict was one that no reasonable man could have reached. The referral
order will be competent if and only if these two conditions are met; otherwise, it will be deemed
incompetent and will be rejected by the High Court.
2. When the High Court determines that the order of reference is competent, it must perform the
responsibilities set forth in subsection (3) of section 307 of the CrPC. Under this provision, the
High Court must review all evidence, give due weight to the judge’s and jury’s opinions, and
then acquit or condemn the accused. The defendant’s learned counsel contended that the
opposite meaning would contradict the objective of this clause.
3. The Court concurred with the High Court’s conclusions about the Judge’s allegation of
misdirection. It noted that the question of whether a misdirection tainted the jury’s verdict must
be considered in light of the likely impact that the misdirection had on the lay jury. The Supreme
Court went on to say that the purpose of the judge’s charge to the jury is to explain and present
the facts and circumstances of the case to them. The Judge’s job is to make sure that the jury
understands the law and its ramifications, as well as to present all of the evidence to them so
that they can make the best conclusion possible.
4. After reviewing all the evidence, the Hon’ble Court was of the view that the conduct of the
appellant was inconsistent with his defence that the deceased was shot by accident. In contrast,
he had the mentality of someone who had planned and calculatedly exacted vengeance on his
wife’s lover. On a false pretext, he secured the revolver and marched into Ahuja’s bedroom
with a loaded weapon. Despite having numerous opportunities to do so, he did not tell anyone
that he shot the deceased by accident until his trial. The injuries found on the deceased’s body
were consistent with a deliberate shooting. Thus the verdict of the jury could not stand.As a
result, the Court came to the conclusion that no reasonable group of men could have reached
the same determination as the jury based on the evidence.
5. After considering the facts of the case, the Court determined that not only had the
accused/appellant developed self-control, but he was also considering his family’s future. After
his wife confessed her infidelity to him, he had plenty of time to calm down. His actions were
plainly calculated and purposeful. The case did not fall under the defence of, grave and sudden
provocation and that it was premeditated murder.
6. The Supreme Court held that the pardoning power of the Governor and the Special leave
petition cannot operate together. If a Special leave petition is filed, then the power of the
Governor will cease to exist.

3. Gloucester Grammar School Case, 1410

Legal Maxim : The legal maxim "damnum sine injuria" translates to "harm without legal injury" and refers
to a situation where a plaintiff suffers a loss or harm, but there is no corresponding violation of a legal right.
In other words, the harm suffered by the plaintiff is not recognized as a legal injury, and therefore, the
plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy.

In the case of the Gloucester Grammar School, the schoolmaster John Collett brought an action against the
new grammar school, which was established by the town of Gloucester. Collett argued that the
establishment of the new school had caused him to lose students and therefore income, leading to financial
harm.

The court, however, found that there was no legal injury, as Collett did not have an exclusive right to teach
grammar in Gloucester. The establishment of the new school did not violate any of Collett's legal rights,
and therefore, he was not entitled to a remedy for the harm suffered. This case is often cited as an example
of the application of the "damnum sine injuria" maxim, as it demonstrates a situation where harm was
suffered by the plaintiff, but there was no corresponding legal injury.

Introduction

The case revolves around the principle of injuria sine damnum and damnum sine injuria. Both the concepts
state different theories and reasoning. The case is necessary for the law of torts as it specifies some of the
conditions necessary to hold a person guilty. Also, it makes the concept of injuria sine damnum clearer.
The parties, in this case, are a school and a person who was a teacher in the mentioned school.

Facts– the plaintiff in the case is a school that was set up a long time ago and was much known for its
education system. The defendant was a teacher in the plaintiff’s school. However, after some time, due to
some disputes, the defendant left the plaintiff’s school. After leaving the job in the plaintiff school. The
defendant has set up his school, that too next to the plaintiff school. The defendant had the advantage of
being known among the students for his teaching skills. Due to this reason, many of the students from the
plaintiff school took admission to the defendant’s school. This caused a loss to the reputation as well as
income of the plaintiff school. Also, the new school charged lesser fees from the students. However, the
fees of Gloucester grammar school were 40 pence. Due to the action of the defendants’ school, the plaintiff
had to reduce the fees of the school too. Aggrieved by various cations of the defendant, the plaintiff filed a
suit for suing the defendant and for recovery of damages.

Issues Raised:

 Can the defendant be held liable for loss of the loss suffered by the establishment of a new school?
 Has any of the legal rights of the plaintiff been damaged? Does this count in the doctrine of damnum
sine injuria?

Doctrines Stated:
  Damnum sine Injuria- this states that the damage has been done but no legal injury has been
suffered. This is used in some of the cases as a defense because legal wrong is given more
importance. Therefore. No legal wrong serves as a defense to the damages caused.
 Injuria sine Damnum- this states that legal injury has been caused but no damage is done. This is
usually punishable as it infringes a legal right that is punishable in law. This does not serve as a
defense mostly.

Contention of Plaintiff

The plaintiff, in this case, contends that the school was set up by the defendant to cause loss to the plaintiff.
The aim was to set the school as illegal and malafide. This leads to the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation
and defames the school by keeping lesser fees. The defendant is liable for paying the damages suffered by
the plaintiff school due to a reduction in fees and admission. The defendant must have opened the school
in some other location and not near the plaintiff’s school. This has affected the school’s functioning
rigorously.

Contention of Defendant

The defendant contended that the school was not set up with any malafide intention and no such damage
has been caused to the plaintiff. Also, in this situation the doctrine of damnum sine injuria will apply as no
legal right of the plaintiff has been infringed which states that no illegal activity has been taken by the
defendant. The setting up of school was for the personal motive of the defendant as he had no other income
source after leaving his job in the plaintiff school.

Judgment

In this case, it was held that the defendant is not liable for paying any damages to the plaintiff. As the
damages that have been caused to the plaintiff school have not infringed any of the legal rights. Also, it was
stated that the case enshrines the doctrine of damnum sine injuria. It was necessary to do so because there
was no violation of any of the legal rights of the plaintiff school that has been infringed. The right to choose
a profession stands here as it was the choice of the defendant that where and how he wants to start his
school. No damage has been done to the property of the plaintiff school.

Reasoning

The judgment is based on the doctrine damnum sine injuria. The judgment has been purely based on the
concept that the person who has not suffered any legal wrong is not entitled to damage. As in some cases,
the compensation on an unnecessary basis is taken. However, in some instances, this doctrine also proves
to be wrong as due to this many of the actual culprits are not punished and this causes loss to innocent
people. With time, concepts of laws are also changing and new concepts are being adopted as per the need.
For applying this principle, it is necessary to look after several other aspects before deciding a case. The
background, scenario, and motive are necessary to be considered before holding a person free or guilty.

4. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, 1978

Legal Maxim: In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), the legal maxim "audi
alteram partem" or "hear the other side" is particularly relevant.

Introduction
Imagine a situation where you have to live without access to clean water, a green environment,
nutrition and every other necessity of sustaining life. What a dystopian world that would be!
Similarly, when our Constitution deals with the right to life under Article 21, it must encompass
the right to live a life with dignity and access to basic sustenance. The means of life are sacrosanct
to life itself, and this idea has been interpreted by the judiciary in multiple cases, the primary of
which is Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978). This case became a landmark judgment for
highlighting the importance of the right to life as an expansive right and for emphasising the
interconnectedness of rights in the form of the golden triangle. The judgement deals with various
aspects related to the expansive interpretation of Article 21, including peripheral rights, the right to
travel abroad, the relationship between Articles 14, 19 and 21, as well as the difference between
due process of law and procedure established by law. Principles of natural justice as enshrined in
the judgement are also discussed in brief. The article also explores cases similar to Maneka Gandhi
and how it overruled established principles in AK Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950). These
concepts will be discussed in further detail in the following sections of this article.

Summary of facts
The petitioner (Maneka Gandhi) was a journalist whose passport was issued on June 1, 1976, under
the Passports Act, 1967. Later on July 2nd, 1977, the Regional Passport Officer, New Delhi, ordered the
petitioner to surrender her passport by a letter posted. On being asked about the reasons for her passport
confiscation, the Ministry of External Affairs declined to produce any reasons “in the interest of the general
public.”

Therefore, the petitioner had filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating the
size of her passport as a violation of her fundamental rights, specifically Article 14 (Right to Equality),
Article 19 (Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression) and Article 21 (Right to Life and Liberty)
guaranteed by the Constitution of India.

The respondent countered stating that the petitioner was required to be present in connection with the
proceedings that were going on, before an inquiry comission.

Identification of parties

 Petitioner: Maneka Gandhi

  Respondent: Union Of India And Other
 Date Of Judgment: January 25, 1978
 Bench: Before M.H. Beg, C.J., Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna Iyer, P.N. Bhagwati, N.L.
Untwalia, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and P.S Kailasam.

Issues before the Court

 Whether the Fundamental Rights are absolute or conditional, and what is the extent of the
territorial application of such Fundamental Rights provided to the citizens by the Constitution
of India?
 Whether ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ is protected under the umbrella of Article 21 as a peripheral
and concomitant right?.
 What is the connection between the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution of India (The Golden Triangle Principle)?
 What is the scope of the phrase “Procedure established by Law” as mentioned under Article
21?.
 Whether the provision laid down in Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967, is a violation of
Fundamental Rights, and if it is, whether such legislation is a concrete law?
 Whether the impugned order of Regional Passport Officer is in contravention of principles of
natural justice?

Contentions by parties on issues

Petitioner’s Contention

1. The ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ is a derivative of the right provided under ‘personal liberty’, and
no citizen can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure prescribed by law.
Also, the Passports Act, 1967, does not prescribe any procedure for confiscating, revoking or
impounding the passport of its holder. Hence, it is unreasonable and arbitrary.
2. Further, the Central Government acted in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by
not giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Hence, the true interpretation of Article 21,
as well as its nature and protection, are required to be laid down.
3. Any procedure established by law is required to be free of arbitrariness and must comply with
the “principles of natural justice”.
4. To uphold the intention of the Constituent Assembly and to give effect to the spirit of our
Constitution, Fundamental Rights should be read in consonance with each other and in this case,
Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India must be read together.
5. Fundamental rights are entitled to every citizen by virtue of being human and are guaranteed
against being exploited by the state. Hence, these fundamental rights should be expansive and
comprehensive to provide optimum protection.
 6. To have a well-ordered and civilised society, the freedom guaranteed to its citizens must be in
regulated form, and therefore, reasonable restrictions were provided by the Constituent
Assembly from clauses (2) to (6) in Article 19 of the Constitution of India. But the laid
restrictions do not provide any grounds to be executed in this case.
7. Article 22 confers protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. In this case, the
government, by confiscating the passport of the petitioner without providing her any reasons
for doing so has illegally detained her within the country.
8. In Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. (1962), it was held that the term “personal liberty” is used
in the constitution as a compendium including all the varieties of rights in relation to personal
liberty, whether or not included in several clauses of Article 19(1).
9. An essential constituent of natural justice: “Audi Alteram Partem,” i.e., every individual must
be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard, not granted to the petitioner.
10. Passports Act 1967 violates the ‘Right to Life and Liberty’ and hence is ultra vires. The
petitioner was restrained from traveling abroad by virtue of the provision in Section 10(3)(c) of
the Act of 1967.
11. The petitioner highlighted the importance of judicial review in cases dealing with administrative action
and law, as the judiciary has a vital role in scrutinising the legality of executive actions and orders. By doing
so, the petitioner demanded judicial scrutiny of the decision that led to the impoundment of her passports
and sought the judiciary to examine whether such action was constitutional or not.

12. The petitioner also highlighted the standards prescribed by International Human Rights Law and drew
a comparison with other jurisdictions. It stated that the right to free movement across borders is a globally
recognised right, and restricting international travel is a clear violation of international legal norms. It
argued for the necessity of aligning domestic laws with international laws.

Respondents contentions

1. The Attorney General of India argued that the ‘Right to Travel Abroad’ was never covered
under any clauses of Article 19(1) and hence, Article 19 is independent of proving the
reasonableness of the actions taken by the Central Government.
2. The Passports Act was not enacted to adversely affect the fundamental rights in any manner.
Also, the government should not be compelled to state its grounds for seizing or impounding
someone’s passport for the public good and national safety. Therefore, the law should not be
struck down, even if it overflowed Article 19.
3. Further, the petitioner was required to appear before a committee for an enquiry, and hence, her
passport was impounded.
4. Reiterating the principle laid down in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the respondent
contended that the word law under Article 21 cannot be comprehended in light of fundamental
rules of natural justice.
5. Further, the principles of natural justice are vague and ambiguous. Therefore, the constitution
should not refer to such vague and ambiguous provisions as a part of it.
 6. Article 21 is very wide, and it also contains in itself the provisions of Articles 14 and 19.
However, any law can only be termed unconstitutional under Article 21 when it directly
infringes on Articles 14 and 19. Hence, passport law is not unconstitutional.
7. Article 21 in its language contains “procedure established by law,” and such procedure need
not pass the test of reasonability.
8. The respondent also stated that the petitioner’s passport was impounded for national security
concerns and established that it is the government’s duty to protect its interests. They argued
that such restrictions on international travel are important to prevent subsequent threats and
preserve public order.
9. The constitutional makers, while drafting this Constitution, debated at length on American “due
process of law” and British “procedure established by law”. The conspicuous absence of due
process of law from the Constitutional provisions reflects the mind of the framers of this
Constitution. The mind and spirit of the framers must be protected and respected.
10. The respondent stressed that the act of impounding passports was done under “executive discretion” as
it was necessary in the moment where security concerns were highly escalating, leading to possible
disruptions to public order. Therefore, the execution decision was justified.

Judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978

After thorough analysis of the contentions of both the parties, the court held that:

1.
Before the enactment of the Passports Act 1967, there was no law regulating the passport
whenever any person wanted to leave his native place and settle abroad. Also, the executives
were entirely discretionary while issuing the passports in an unguided and unchallenged
manner. In Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D Ramarathnam (1967), the Supreme Court stated that
“personal liberty” in its ambit also includes the right of locomotion and travel abroad. Hence,
no person can be deprived of such rights except through procedures established by law. Since
the State had not made any law regarding the regulation or prohibiting the rights of a person in
such a case, the confiscation of the petitioner’s passport is in violation of Article 21, and its
grounds being unchallenged and arbitrary, it is also in violation of Article 14.
2. Further, clause (c) of Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967, provides that when the state
finds it necessary to seize the passport or take any such action in the interests of sovereignty
and integrity of the nation, its security, its friendly relations with foreign countries, or the
interests of the general public, the authority is required to record in writing the reason for such
act and, on-demand furnish a copy of that record to the holder of the passport.
3. The Central Government never disclosed any reasons for impounding the petitioner’s passport;
rather, she was told that the act was done in “the interests of the general public,”. The reason
was given explicitly that it was not really necessarily done in the public interest, and no ordinary
person would understand the reasons for not disclosing this information or the grounds for her
passport confiscation.
4. “The fundamental rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution are not distinctive nor mutually
exclusive.” Any law depriving a person of his personal liberty has to stand a test of one or more
of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19. When referring to Article 14, “ex-
hypothesis” must be tested. The concept of reasonableness must be projected into the procedure.
 5. The phrase used in Article 21 is “procedure established by law” instead of “due process of law,”
which is said to have procedures that are free from arbitrariness and irrationality.
6. There is a clear infringement of the basic ingredient of principles of natural justice, i.e., audi
alteram partem and hence, it cannot be condemned as unfair and unjust even when a statute is
silent on it.
7. Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967, is not violative of any fundamental rights, especially
Article 14. In the present case, the petitioner is not discriminated against in any manner under
Article 14 because the statute provided unrestricted powers to the authorities. The ground of “in
the interests of the general public” is not vague and undefined, rather it is protected by certain
guidelines which can be borrowed from Article 19.
8. It is true that fundamental rights are sought in case of violation of any rights of an individual
and when the State has violated it. But that does not mean, Right to Freedom of Speech and
Expression is exercisable only in India and not outside. Merely because state action is restricted
to its territory, it does not mean that Fundamental Rights are also restricted in a similar manner.
9. It is possible that certain rights related to human values are protected by fundamental rights,
even if they are not explicitly written in our Constitution. For example, Freedom of the press is
covered under Article 19(1)(a) even though it is not specifically mentioned there.
10. The right to go abroad is not a part of the Right to Free Speech and Expression as both have
different natures and characters.
11. A.K Gopalan was overruled stating that there is a unique relationship between the provisions
of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said provisions. Earlier
in Gopalan, the majority held that these provisions in themselves are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, to correct its earlier mistake, the court held that these provisions are not mutually
exclusive and are dependent on each other.

5. Bhim Singh v. State of J&K, 1985

Legal Maxim: Habeas corpus is a legal principle that grants individuals the right to challenge the
lawfulness of their detention or imprisonment. The term itself is Latin for "you have the body,"
referring to the requirement that the detainee be physically brought before the court so that the court
can determine whether the detention is lawful. In the case of Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir (1986), the legal maxim habeas corpus was directly relevant.

In this case, Bhim Singh, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) of Jammu & Kashmir,
was detained under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, during a time of political unrest
in the region. Singh challenged his detention through a habeas corpus petition filed in the Supreme
Court of India. He argued that his detention was arbitrary and that his fundamental rights under
Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Indian Constitution were violated.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, upheld the principle of habeas corpus and held that the
detention of Bhim Singh was unlawful. The court emphasized the importance of individual liberty
and the need for strict adherence to procedural safeguards in cases of preventive detention. The
judgment in Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir reaffirmed the significance of the habeas
corpus remedy in protecting individual rights and ensuring the rule of law.

This case serves as a notable example of how the legal maxim habeas corpus is applied in the
context of challenging unlawful detention and safeguarding individual liberties.
Brief Facts Of The Case:
The petitioner a member of legislative assembly of Jammu & Kashmir was arrested and detained
in police custody. He was deliberately prevented from attending the parliament sessions to be held
on 11th September 1985. He was arrested under section 153A of Ranbir Penal Code was registered
against him for delivering a malicious/ seditious speech at the public gathering near the parade
ground in Jammu on 8th September 1985.

He was not produced before any magistrate until the 13th of September and he was produced before
magistrate within a requisite time period that is 24 hours. As a consequence of this, there was also
a voting session at the assembly which he apparently missed, where his vote was very crucial but
the person to whom he wanted to cast the vote won but his right to vote was infringed.

Name Of The Judge: O. Chinnapa Reddy And V. Khalid - Name Of The Court: Supreme Court
Of India
Date Of The Decision: 22nd November, 1985 - Citation: Air 1986 Sc 494
Plaintiff: Bhim Singh - Defendant: State Of Jammu & Kashmir

Arguments Advanced Of The Case:

Petitioner:
The learned counsel from the side of the petitioner openly denied the other parties argument that
he was produced in the front of the magistrate on 11th September 1985 and in front of the sub-
judge on 13th September 1985 and even to be examined by any doctor to obtain a medical
certificate that was used for obtaining a remand for one day from the Sub Judge. They accept that
on 14th of September 1985 his client was produced before the Sub Judge, Jammu, and remanded
for 2 days of judicial custody.

They also accept that thereafter on the 16th of September, his client was brought in front of the
Additional Sessions Judge and was granted bail. They further also argued that during police custody
his client had been harassed by the detained police.

Defendant:
Inspector � General of Police. Shri M.M. Khajuria and superintendent of Police, Anantnag, Shri
M.A. Mir contented that on 10th of September 1985, the police control room sent a notice to them
asking the petitioner to be arrested and also after the arrest, the petitioner was brought to District
Headquarters as instructed and given necessities.

Officers were only asked to pay attention to whether the petitioner had travelled safely through the
Udhampur region they further added that on 11th of September 1985, the petitioner was produced
before the court and the Executive Magistrate First Class signed to keep petitioner under police
custody for a period of 2 days and on expiry of the remand extended it for two more days, further
remand for one day from Sub -Judge on 14th September and 2 more days of judicial custody was
granted by the judge.

Judgement:
After hearing the arguments from both the parties and considering the facts of the case the hon�ble
Supreme court observed that the law enforcement officials acted in a very most arbitrary way and
ruled �if the non-public liberty of a member of the legislature is to be played within this fashion
one can only wonder what may happen to lesser mortals�.
 Moving forward the apex court reminded the duties of �police officials who are the custodians of
law and order within the state should have the best respect for private liberty of citizens and will
not float the laws by stopping to such weird acts of lawlessness. Custodians of law and order mustn't
become depredators of civil liberties.

Their duty is to safeguard and to abduct.� Chinnappa Reddy J. and Khalid J. followed the choice
of Supreme Court in Rudul Shah and Sebastian Hongray cases and expressed the view that when
someone involves us with the complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous
and malicious intent which his Constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice
and invasion might not be washed away or whisked-away by his being unfettered.

The petitioner for such gross violation of his fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution
of the country was awarded monetary compensation by way of exemplary costs. within the cases
of Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar and Anr. and within the case of Sebastian Hongray v. UOI, it
absolutely was noticed that just in case of such violation of the basic rights provided by the
Constitution, it's necessary to compensate the victim by way of exemplary costs. The respondent,
the State of Jammu and Kashmir was ordered to pay to the petitioner five thousand rupees within
2 months from the date of the judgment. the number was to be deposited with the Registrar of the
Court which might then be paid to the petitioner.

6. R v. Dudley and Stephens, 1884

Legal Maxim: The legal maxim that applies to the case of *R v. Dudley and Stephens* is
"necessitas non habet legem," which translates to "necessity knows no law."

In this case, Dudley, Stephens, and Brooks were stranded at sea without food or water and with
little hope of rescue. To survive, they killed the cabin boy, Parker, and consumed his flesh. Upon
their rescue, Dudley and Stephens were charged with murder, and the case went to trial.

At trial, the defendants argued that they were justified in killing Parker due to necessity, as they
believed it was necessary to kill him in order to survive. The trial judge, Justice Coleridge,
instructed the jury that necessity could not justify the killing, and the defendants were found guilty
of murder and sentenced to death.

The case was then appealed to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, where the appeal
was dismissed. The court held that necessity could not justify the killing, and the defendants'
conviction was upheld.

The case of *R v. Dudley and Stephens* is often cited as an example of the principle that necessity
cannot justify the commission of a crime. It demonstrates the importance of upholding the rule of
law, even in extreme circumstances, and the consequences of violating legal principles, even when
motivated by survival instincts.

INTRODUCTION

The widely famous case of R v Dudley and Stephens which deals with the taboo act of cannibalism
asks the debatable question of having necessity as a defence. The case brings forth the beastly side
of human nature and shows how it is triggered when faced with helplessness and proximity to death.
 The situation is that four men from an English ship, Mignonette face a storm and are trapped in a
boat thousand miles from the land in the sea without sufficient food or water. After extinguishing
their meagre food they are left with nothing but the vast sea without any sight of land. After going
without food and water for seven days, the captain of the ship, Thomas Dudley decides that a lot
should be drawn to sacrifice one of the four men so that the other three could survive by feeding
on his flesh to which Edward Stephans agreed. Ned Brooks refused to follow the method and the
cabin boy Richard Parker was not consulted. After some days Dudley and Stephens decided to kill
the boy. After the killing, the three men fed on the boy’s flesh for four days and then they were
rescued. Both the men were tried first at Falmouth then released on bail, and in November stood
trial before a judge, Baron Huddleston, and jury at Exeter. There the jury, at the instigation of the
judge, found a special verdict, setting out the facts and leaving it to the court to decide whether the
men were guilty of murder. In 1884, this procedure had long been neglected: it was specially
revived for the occasion. By various procedural devices, it was decided to bring the case before a
bench of five judges constituting the Queen’s Bench Division in London. They were found guilty
of murder. They were sentenced to death but later their sentence was reduced to life imprisonment.
It was held that necessity is no defense for a crime.

ISSUES

Whether necessity can be claimed as a defense for murder and can it make the act permissible?

Whether killing of the boy to save one’s own life, in this case, be termed as an act of self-defense?

ANALYSIS

The case deals with a few important questions.

First, we encounter the question that how to weigh the value of one’s life against another? The very fact
that Richard Parker was chosen to be killed suggests that his life was considered less important than the life
of the others reason being that Richard was an orphan and had no family to look after. Even if it was
essential to kill one person to survive, it is just immoral or unjust to kill the weakest and unresisting one. If
this trend of picking on the weakest continues until the rescue arrives, then everyone would be justified in
killing and thereby would not be guilty of murder.

Second, the case deals with the application of Self-defense. The law is that a person can be justified in
taking the life of another only in case of self-defense against the one whose life was taken. This rule,
however, has no application in this case as Parker, being ill, posed no threat to the men? So the man cannot
claim self-defense as a justification because there was no provocation, implied or otherwise by the
unresisting boy which may encourage the men to take such a drastic action. Moreover, self –defense which
extends to defense of others, is sufficiently flexible to allow the pre-emptive use of force, provided the
person employing the force believes his or her conduct to be necessary and the use of force is objectively
reasonable taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances. The situation here is quite different as
there is no involvement of Parker at any point in time.
Third, by the killing of the boy, which was itself an immoral act, the defendants with certainty deprived
him of any chances of survival. If was possible that the men might be rescued the next day in which case it
would be a “profitless” act to kill the boy.

Fourth, and the most important is the question whether murder is permissible when someone dons on the
coat of necessity? Necessity, in simple terms is using violence to repel that is violence which is reasonable,
justified and necessary to stop the illegal act towards oneself. Necessity which justifies homicide is of two
kinds, 1. Necessity which is of private nature and 2. Necessity dealing with public welfare. The first kind
which is relevant for the case, is self-defense which has already been dealt with. In the present case,
however, there was clear murder as the temptation to which the defendants succumbed is not what law calls
“necessity”. Necessity must be inevitable to justify homicide. Moreover, the concept of “necessity” should
extend to everyone, not just the boy because he was in a disadvantageous position.

CONCLUSION

The court didn’t distinguish between justification and excuse properly. The classical view treats the defense
of necessity as a powerful excuse whereas the modern view characterizes it as a justification but fails to
capture the sort of justification it is. Although Aristotle’s Magna Moralia says, “what is done from necessity
is involuntary not accompanied by thought.” It makes no effect in the verdict in the case. Necessity as an
excuse would result in the defendant as criminal but not punishable. Using necessity as an excuse would
gradually weaken the system, allowing the defense would encourage people to overrate the danger to which
they are exposed and yield quickly to temptation. Moreover, necessity provides limited justification by just
making the act morally permissible but will not ensure that the act is the best possible option to carry out
in a certain circumstance. Secondly, the intrusion on the victim’s interests undermines his/her integrity.

The choice of killing the boy by the two defendants is based on the principles of Utilitarianism. Given by
Jeremy Bentham, the principle suggests that “the just thing to do is to maximize utility” that is, the balance
of pleasure over pain, happiness over sorrow. This principle bases morality on maximizing pleasure. It
focuses on the greater good for the greater number of people. The morality of certain act consists in
weighing the costs and benefits of the act. The consequentialist moral reasoning is along these lines, the
right thing to do depends on the consequences of an act. The act of killing Parker is justified in the
defendants’ view and is supported by these principles. The defendants were maximizing the pleasure or
happiness for themselves and if in the way they murder someone, in their eyes they did no wrong as their
actions had a good consequence i.e. their own survival, therefore their act is good. The principle, in this
case, results in people taking the law in their own hands. There is a clash in this point. These principles are
clearly violated if we look at things from the boy’s perspective. His death will not, in any case, maximize
his pleasure or happiness neither would it fit for being a good action as the consequence for him is bad.
Here we come across the concept of categorical moral reasoning. It is put forth by Immanuel Kant, which
suggests that it is not just the consequence of an act but also its intrinsic quality i.e. certain duties and rights
must command our respect and should be intrinsically wrong or right. The theory of Moral Absolutism runs
along the same line suggesting that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged
meaning that some actions are intrinsically right or wrong regardless of the beliefs and goals of the society
and individual. Immanuel Kant was a promoter of this idea. Dudley and Stephans had no right to kill the
boy, denying him any chances of survival as well as choosing death on his behalf. It was wrong to succumb
to temptation and then cover it all with the cloak of “necessity”. Question is why was Parker chosen? Just
because he is weak and unresisting and “may” have died eventually. The defendants had no right to just use
the situation to their advantage. If Parker had died a natural death the situation had been different. Even if
Parker had consented to be killed, with or without a lottery, one questions the morality of the murder. If
Parker had been consulted during the decision on drawing lots, it might be a different issue altogether
because Parker would have exercised his right to have a fair procedure and equal treatment. During the
19th century practising cannibalism by sailors and seaman was quite a natural act but there were some
conditions. There had to be a draw of lots to ensure fairness and there should be consent of everyone present.
This was the proper procedure followed at that time- the right thing to do. Dudley and Stephens were not
the first cannibals of their time. A tentative guesswork is that maybe that is why they were tried, they didn’t
follow the procedure and cheated. After the verdict, everything changed. The savage, barbarous nature of
cannibalism was widely condemned and the custom of the sea denounced as a blasphemous appeal to god
to sanction killing.

The law laid down by this case is a good law. It strengthens the justice system by discouraging people to
take the law into their hands. Necessity is never the defense for any crime. Morality is something more than
just what is right, it is a general respect for another human being.

7. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, 1997

Legal Maxim:
Facts of the case Bhanwari Devi, a lady from Bhateri, Rajasthan, started working under the
Women’s Development Project (WDP), run by the Government of Rajasthan, in 1985. In 1992,
Bhanwari took up an issue based on the government’s campaign against child marriage as part of
her job. The villagers were ignorant of the matter and supported child marriages despite knowing
that it was illegal. In the meantime, the family of Ram Karan Gurjar decided to conduct such a
marriage of his infant daughter. Bhanwari attempted to convince the family not to perform the
marriage. However, her endeavours brought about being vain. The family chose to proceed with
the marriage. On 5th May 1992, the sub-divisional officer, along with the Deputy Superintendent
of Police (DSP), went and stopped the said marriage. However, the marriage was performed the
next day, and no police action was taken against it. Later, it was established by the villagers that
the police visits were a result of Bhanwari Devi’s actions. This led to boycotting Bhanwari Devi
and her family, whereby she lost her job. To seek revenge, on 22nd September 1992, five men, i.e.,
four from the above-mentioned Gurjar family- Ram Sukh Gyarsa Gujjar, Ram Karan Gujjar, and
Badri Gujjar along with one Shravan Sharma, attacked Bhanwari Devi’s husband and brutally
gang-raped her. The police had attempted to play all dirty tricks to prevent her from filing any
complaint due to which there was a delay in the investigation as well as medical examination which
was deferred for 52 hours only to find that no reference of rape was mentioned in the report. At the
police station, she was continually and grossly taunted by the women countable for the whole of
midnight. At past midnight she was asked by the policeman to leave her lehnga as the evidence of
that incident and go back to her village. She was just left with the bloodstained dhoti of her husband
to wrap her body, because of which they needed to go through their entire night in that police
station. In the absence of adequate proof and with the help of the local MLA Dhanraj Meena, all
the accused managed to get an acquittal in the Trial Court. Women activists and organisations chose
not to be silent and raised strong protests and voices against the acquittal. A PIL was filed by a
women’s rights organisation known as ‘Vishaka’, which focused on the enforcement of the
fundamental rights of women at the workplace under the provisions of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21
of the Constitution of India and the need to protect their sexual harassment at the workplace.

Issues
If formal guidelines were required to deal with incidents involving sexual harassment at the
workplace?

Whether sexual harassment at the workplace amounts to the violation of the fundamental rights of
a woman?

If the employer has any responsibility in cases of sexual harassment by its employees at work
place?

Contentions by the Petitioner Although the judgement does not provide separate arguments made
by both parties, some arguments were to consider while delivering the judgement:

The writ petition filed by Vishaka put forth the argument that sexual harassment at workplaces at
common, and the employer often gets away with it in the absence of adequate legislation. Such acts
violate the fundamental rights of the woman enshrined under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of
the Constitution of India. A request was made at the Hon’ble Court to frame guidelines for
preventing sexual harassment in the workplace.

Contentions by the Respondents It is astonishing to note that the Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the respondents, supported the petitioners. he respondent assisted the Hon’ble court in
sorting out an effective method to curb sexual harassment and formulate guidelines to prevent it.
Fali S. Nariman, the amicus curiae, Ms. Naina Kapur and Ms. Meenakshi, provided valuable
assistance to the court.

Judgement The court held that sexual harassment at the workplace was indeed violative of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The court also defined sexual harassment as unwelcome “sexually determined behaviour (whether
directly or indirectly) like physical contact and advances, a demand or request for sexual favours,
sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, or any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-
verbal conduct of sexual nature”. The honourable court also acknowledged the lack of adequate
legislation and loopholes which allowed such heinous crimes to thrive.

Section 354 and 354A of the Indian Penal Code were to be referred in any case of sexual harassment
but these provisions were not specific to the issue at hand. This made the Hon’ble court realize the
need for effective legislation to deal with sexual harassment cases.

The Court also took reference from the international conventions to give a deeper analysis. Article
11(1), (a) and (f) and Article 24 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women were cited.

The court made a special mention that “Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment
and right to work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right.” Therefore, it
was the court’s responsibility to show light in that regard, and it was their obligation under Article
32 to ensure that fundamental rights were protected at any cost.

The court also noted that it was discriminatory when the woman had reasonable grounds to believe
that objecting to sexual harassment would disadvantage her in her employment in terms of
recruiting or promotion or the creation of a hostile work environment. Thus, sexual harassment
need not involve physical contact. Any act that creates a hostile work environment by cracking
lewd jokes, verbal abuse, circulating rumours etc, can be considered as sexual harassment.
 The Hon’ble Supreme Court outlined the rules to forestall sexual harassment at the Workplace,
known as ‘Vishaka Guidelines’, that should have been treated as law under Article 141 of the Indian
Constitution to allow time-bound treatment of complaints. These rules provided the foundation for
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act,
2013.

8. R v. Prince 1875

Legal Maxim: The legal maxim that applies in the case of *R v. Prince* (1875) is "Ignorantia juris
non excusat," which translates to "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." This maxim implies that
individuals are expected to know and comply with the law, regardless of whether they were aware
of its existence or content.

In the context of *R v. Prince*, the case involved a man, Prince, who had taken a girl, aged 14,
away from her father without his consent. Under the law at the time, it was a crime to take a girl
under the age of 16 away from her father without his consent. However, Prince argued that he was
not aware of this law and therefore should not be held criminally liable.

The court rejected Prince's argument, stating that ignorance of the law is not a valid defense. The
judge held that "the law presumes that every person knows the law," and therefore, Prince's lack of
knowledge of the law was not a justification for his actions.

In summary, the maxim "Ignorantia juris non excusat" applies in *R v. Prince* because the court
held that Prince's lack of knowledge of the law did not excuse his actions, and he was found guilty
of the crime.

Ignorantia facti excusat

The Defendant Henry Prince was convicted for taking a 14-year-old unmarried girl named Annie
Phillips out of the possession and without the consent of her parents. At trial, the jury found that
although the girl was 14 at the time, she had told Defendant and he had reasonably believed that
she was 18. The statute he was convicted under was silent as to the mental state required to make
the act a crime. Defendant appeals. The defendant was charged with abduction case.

Appellant's contentions: It was contended that the defendant abducted the minor girl and is
punishable under charges of abduction.

Respondent's contentions: The respondent contended that he was provided with false truth of girl
being a major and thereby shall not be charged with the case of abduction.

Judgement: The Court held that “Mistake of fact does not stand as a defense to a crime where the
statute making the act a crime contains no requirement of knowledge of that fact to begin with.In
this case the forbidden act is wrong in itself and the legislature has enacted that if anyone does this
act, he does so at his own risk.The dissent believes that there can be no conviction of a crime
without a finding of criminal intent mens rea. A reasonable mistake of fact, where the mistaken
belief, if true, would not have resulted in the defendant committing a criminal act, should be an
excuse that is implied in all criminal charges”.

9. R v. Tolson 1889
 Legal Maxim: In the case of *R v. Tolson*, the legal maxim that is relevant is "Actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea," which translates to "The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind
is also guilty." This principle underscores the importance of the mental state (mens rea) of the
accused in determining criminal liability.

In the case of *R v. Tolson*, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting another person in
obtaining an abortion, which was illegal under the Abortion Act 1967. The defendant claimed that
he was not aware of the other person's intention to terminate the pregnancy and that he had not
aided or abetted the commission of the offense.

The court considered whether the defendant had the requisite mens rea (guilty mind) to be convicted
of aiding and abetting the offense. It held that the defendant's actions amounted to aiding and
abetting the commission of the offense and that he had the requisite mens rea. The court found that
the defendant knew that the other person was pregnant and that he had assisted her in obtaining an
abortion.

The case of *R v. Tolson* illustrates the principle that a person can be held criminally liable for
aiding and abetting an offense if they have the requisite mens rea, even if they did not personally
commit the offense. This principle is reflected in the legal maxim "Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea."

FACTS
The appellant and defendant were married in September 1880. The appellant went missing as the
ship he was in had got lost into the sea in December 1881. The defendant waited for six years for
her husband (the appellant) with the hope that he shall return. Eventually, believing her husband to
be dead, the defendant remarries. Eleven months later the appellant returned and onthe knowledge
of the remarriage of his wife (the defendant) he filed the appeal of bigamy against her.

ISSUE
Issue: Does second marriage on a reasonable beliefof death of the husband amounts to bigamy on
his return?

Appellant's contentions:
It was contended that the defendant had remarried and committed the offence of bigamy.

Respondent's contentions:
The respondent contended that she waited for six years and then remarried when her husband did
not return without the intention of committing bigamy.

Judgement:
The appeal court said that despite the absence of words such as “knowingly committing bigamy”
or “intentionally committing bigamy”, which would have excused her, Ms. Tolson was saved in
this situation by an old common law rule. An “honest and reasonable belief” in the existence of
circumstances that, if true, would make the accused’s acts innocent, was a proper defense, the court
ruled.

10. S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras, 1965

Legal Maxim: Doli Incapax

Doli Capax
 FACTS:

Natarajan lived in Nungambakkam with his wife and two daughters, Rama and Savitri. Savitri became
friendly with a neighbor named Varadarajan. On September 30, 1960, Rama observed Savitri and
Varadarajan talking to each other and later discovered that Savitri wished to marry Varadarajan.

Upon learning this, S. Natarajan, concerned about Savitri’s association with Varadarajan, took her to
live with a relative in Kodambakkam on the same day. However, on October 1, 1960, Savitri left the
relative’s house, met Varadarajan and together they registered their marriage at the Registrar’s office
with witnesses P.T. Sami and P.K. Mar. They then stayed at Ajanta Hotel before traveling to various
places.

The police, acting on a complaint filed by S. Natarajan, eventually located Varadarajan and Savitri in
Tanjore. The case went to the Madras High Court, which convicted Varadarajan of kidnapping and
sentenced him to one year of rigorous imprisonment. Varadarajan then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues Before the Court

The issues raised in S. Varadarajan v State of Madras were:

 Whether a minor can abandon the guardianship of their guardian.

 Whether the act of taking out of lawful guardianship had been established.

Court’s Observations and Ratio

The Supreme Court in S. Varadarajan v State of Madras made several key observations:

 Savitri had voluntarily left her guardian’s house without any inducement from Varadarajan.
 Varadarajan did not coerce Savitri into marrying him or accompanying him to the Registrar’s
office.
 The desire for marriage and the insistence on accompanying Varadarajan came from Savitri herself.
 Savitri, being on the verge of adulthood and an educated college student, was considered capable
of making independent decisions.
 The court in S. Varadarajan v State of Madras concluded that Varadarajan was not guilty of taking
Savitri away from her father’s keeping, emphasising Savitri’s voluntary actions and the absence of
any legal duty on Varadarajan to return her to her father.

Court’s Decision in S. Varadarajan v State of Madras

The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence and considering the circumstances, acquitted Varadarajan
of the charges in S. Varadarajan v State of Madras. The court’s decision was based on the voluntary actions
of Savitri, her capacity to make decisions and the lack of coercion or inducement by Varadarajan.

11. Donaghue v. Stevenson, 1932

Legal Maxim : Res Ispa Loquitor (the thing speak for itself)
Facts of the case
On the 26th of August, 1928, Mr Minchella purchased a ginger beer bottle from Wellmeadow Cafe in
Paisley (Scotland) for his friend, Mrs Donoghue, the appellant. The ginger beer bottle was made of dark
opaque glass, and thus, there was no reason to suspect that the bottle might have contained anything other
than ginger beer.

After consuming almost half of the contents of the bottle, when the rest of the ginger beer was poured into
a tumbler, dead, decomposed remains of a snail floated into it. The nauseating sight coupled with the
consequences of ingesting the impurities in the bottle caused shock and severe gastro-enteritis to the
appellant.

The case was first filed in the Second Division of Sessions Court of Scotland where an interlocutor was
issued by Lord Ordinary for proof after a good cause of action of the petitioner was found. But subsequently,
another interlocutor by the majority was issued recalling the previous interlocutor and the action was
dismissed. An appeal was then filed in the House of Lords.

Legal background
The general principle established till then was that the manufacturers owed no duty of care to anyone with
whom they are not in contractual relation. However, this general rule had two exceptions-

1. The article is dangerous per se.

2. The dangerousness of the article was known to the manufacturer but said knowledge was
deliberately concealed.
In the present scenario, since the appellant was unable to claim compensation due to the breach of contract
(no contract existed between the appellant and the manufacturer as the appellant’s friend had originally
purchased the bottle), she submitted that Stevenson, the respondent, had breached the duty of care and
caused legal injury through negligence.

Most cases, with a comparable fact scenario, had till then rejected the claims of compensation, asserting no
duty of care arose without the presence of a contract. The only exception was George v. Skinvington (1869),
where it was held that ordinary care was owed to persons using the product even in lack of a contractual
relationship.

An important point to be noted is that even though the case was based in Scotland, English laws were used
to deliver the judgment regarding the issue at hand, existing Scottish and English law concurred.

Prominent issues raised

The following issues were raised in this case:
 1. Was the manufacturer of the ginger beer aware of the defect in the product that made it unfit to
consume and was it fraudulently concealed from the consumer?
2. Could the product be classified as dangerous per se and was there a failure on part of the
manufacturer to warn the consumer of the same?
3. Would an action of negligence be applicable in light of the fact that there was no contract formed
between the plaintiff and the manufacturer?

The arguments

Appellants

The ginger beer bottle was manufactured and sold to the public for consumption by the respondent- the
bottle bore labels of the respondent’s company, and it was by the respondent who used metal caps to seal
them.

The respondent, as manufacturers should have ensured that-

1. A system was in place to ensure snails would not get into their packaged products.
2. An efficient system of inspection was there to conduct checks before the bottles were
sealed.
According to the appellants, the respondents failed in both these duties and caused this accident. Since the
respondent invited the public (including the appellant) to consume a product they manufactured, bottled,
labelled, and sealed and offered no opportunity to the consumer to examine their contents, they owed a duty
of care to the appellant to ensure nothing in the bottle would injure such a consumer.

Moreover, the appellants contended that the principle of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the present
scenario. The fact that there was a snail in the bottle ‘spoke for itself’ the negligence of the manufacturers.

Finally, the appellants said that the exceptions to the general principle mentioned above were too strict and
limited.

Respondents

The respondents claimed that the allegations of injury to the appellant were exaggerated and not as a cause
of the alleged snail but due to existing health problems. Hence, the allegations were irrelevant and
insufficient to constitute a proper ground for a summons.
Final judgment
The outcome of the judgment, was by 3:2 majority, decided for the appellant, Mrs. Donoghue. Lord Atkin,
leading the judgment, declared that in the present case there was clear duty of care to Mrs. Donoghue.

It was held that-

1. The manufacturer owed a duty of care to all end-consumers of their product

2. The said liability could arise if and only if there was no way of intermediate inspection of the
product, and thus injury was a proximate cause of breach of duty.
3. The manufacturer did not owe any contractual duty towards the appellant (in line with
established doctrine of privity of contract) but at the same time owing to the appellant a general
duty of care to ensure the integrity of the said product.
Lord Thankerton and Lord Macmillan concurred.

Lord Buckmaster and Lord Tomlin presented a dissenting opinion on the grounds that the appellant’s case
went against the already established principles. Lord Buckmaster pointed out the importance of retaining
the distinction of dangerous and non-dangerous products and implored the application of the exception to
only those objects which were inherently dangerous.

Moreover, both these judges denied the legitimate authority of George v. Skivington (1869) and expressed
concern over the cascade of cases that might ensue if the ambit of liability of the manufacturers was
widened. Lord Buckmaster said that it would be socially and economically irresponsible to affix such a
wide liability on the manufacturing sector. Lord Tomlin was of the view that such a feat was logically
impossible.