POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
KA-POLI NOTES The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
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BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT
When is fine excessive?
When it is clearly shown that the nature of the violation
compared with the fine is disproportionate, or if it exceeds the
utmost limit of the punishment which the vindication of the
law demands.
When is this Constitutional mandate violated?
When the penalty is flagrant and plainly oppressive, and
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
senses of the community.
When an unforeseeable accident adds to the suffering of the
convict, a penalty otherwise valid does not become cruel or
unusual.
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convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
State the prohibition of the death penalty and the use of
torture?
RA 936 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, while
RA 9745 prohibits the use of torture as punishment, to ensure
that the human rights of all persons are respected at all times.
What is the concept of cruel or unusual punishment?
A punishment is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to
the nature of the offense unless it is barbarous, unknown to
law, or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as
to shock the moral sense of the community.
That the penalty is out of proportion to the crime does not
warrant the declaration of unconstitutionality of the law on
the ground that it is cruel or unusual. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make
it cruel or unusual.
The form of punishment as fixed in antiquity and not the
severity of the same that makes it cruel and unusual penalty.
Further, the punishment is cruel when it involves torture or
lingering death.
What punishments are prohibited by law?
(1.) Excessive fines;
(2.) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment
Based on this provision, does the 1987 Constitution prohibit
imposition of death penalty?
Unless compelling reasons involving heinous crimes provided
by Congress
Is the imposition of the Congress absolute?
Once the Congress classify a crime as heinous, the Congress
may, in its discretion, impose the penalty of death.
How many penalties or punishments are prohibited?
(1.) Excessive fines;
(2.) Cruel;
(3.) Degrading; or
(4.) Inhuman punishment.
These are separate punishments. So, it is prohibited even if it
is just cruel, but not inhuman; cruel but not degrading.
Is long duration of imprisonment cruel?
Generally, the long duration of imprisonment is not
considered in determining whether the punishment is cruel or
not, but it is the manner of imposing the penalty which is
considered.
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Supposing the penalty for violating quarantine protocols is
reclusion perpetual and the penalty for going out without a
pass punishable for a maximum of 3 years. So, here, can
cruelty be applied depending on the duration of the
imprisonment?
No, the prohibition also includes periods, or the length of
imprisonment. When the duration of penalty is not
commensurate with the offense or the crime committed, it
may become “cruel”, so to speak.
Why did the Court provide in People vs. Estoisa that the
imprisonment of 5-10 years is not considered as cruel
punishment?
The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even
the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful
weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances
might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional
for this reason.
Supposing the Congress revives death penalty by lethal
injection, would that constitute “cruel punishment”?
The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden vs. Director of
Prisons, this Court held that "punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life."
Can we say that death penalty in itself is cruel?
No. Death is simply the consequence as to constitute cruelty,
it must constitute torture or lingering death.
In the case of Echagaray, in injecting the lethal injection, it will
inflict pain. Would that be considered “cruel punishment”?
No. Pain is consequence of punishment; what is prohibited is
that kind or level of pain, which is no longer necessary in the
imposition of the penalty.
How about not knowing the schedule of when the prisoner
would be entitled to death penalty. Would that constitute
“cruel punishment”?
No, the person who would soon undergo death penalty would
know when as it is stated clearly in law. Section 1 of RA 8177
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not
earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise
by the President of his executive clemency powers at all
times.”
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People vs. Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793. August 27, 1953
Facts:
➔ The firearm, which the appellant allegedly used, was his
father’s, Bruno Estoista’s.
➔ Herein defendant, Alberto Estoista allegedly took shot at
a wild rooster, but instead hit their helper, Diragon Dima.
➔ However, Bruno testified in court that his son was a
“sharp shooter” and that when the event happened, he
was far from his son.
➔ Alberto, testified, however that it was his father who told
him to shot the wild rooster.
➔ These testimonies were in direct contradiction. Thus, the
court knew that there was not a slightest ground to
believe that these affidavits contained any truth in it.
UNITED STATES vs. SAMSON
In this case, it stated that carrying a gun by order of the owner
does not constitute illegal possession of the firearm.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4, AMENDING SECTION 2692 OF THE
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
Possess – This word was employed in its broad sense as to
include “carries” and “holds”. And that “ownership of the
weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend
to establish the guilt or intention of the accused.”
Issue: W/N there was excessive, cruel, or unusual punishment
which violated the Constitutional right of the accused.
Held: No. It is a mistake to point to US vs. Samson as authority
for the appellant’s plea for acquittal.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to
United States vs. Samson as authority for the appellant's plea
for acquittal. The implied holding in that case that the
intention to possess is an essential element of a violation of
the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to
the weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did
not mean only intention to own but also intention to use.
From the very nature of the subject matter of the prohibition
control or dominion of the use of the weapon by the holder
regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential factor.
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative
terms not susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the
degree and character of control or dominion sufficient to
constitute a violation vary.
A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks
up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a
moment, or to shoot at some object."
Appellant's case does not meet the above test.
His holding or carrying of his father's gun was not incidental,
casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his father's sight
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
and control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using
it, as in fact he did, with fatal consequences.
US vs. Samson People vs. Estoista
Samson carried the gun
solely in obedience to its
owner’s order or request
without any inferable
intention to use it as a In this case, however, there
weapon. Here, the right to was an intention to carry
bear arms as a means of the firearm to shoot at wild
defense is guaranteed, chickens. It was not for the
possession such as that by defense of anything.
Samson is by the weight of
authority considered a
violation of similar
statutes.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution
against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies
both to the form of the penalty and the duration of
imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 6 to 10
years for possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual,
having due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law
proposes to suppress or curb.
The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even
the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful
weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal circumstances
might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional
for this reason.
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be
judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors
for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fish,
bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this
that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the
Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
However, considering the degree of malice of the defendant,
application of the law to its full extent would be too harsh and,
accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be
furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with
the recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed
be reduced to six months.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." To come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," or "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."
The ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural right
protected by the Constitution. Above the right to own
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property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty—the police
power of the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the
safety and good order of society.
Doctrine: The power of the legislature to prohibit the
possession of deadly weapon carries with it the power to
provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons
unlawfully used or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.
Pursuant to the exercise of police power, the right to private
property may be limited, restricted, and impaired so as to
promote the general welfare, public order and safety.
Thus, the ownership or possession of firearms is not a natural
right protected by the Constitution. Above the right to own
property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty—the police
power of the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the
safety and good order of society.
People vs. Esparas
G.R. No. 120034. August 20, 1996
A little history on death penalty
The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty. Both the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964
require the transmission to the Court of the records of all
cases in which the death penalty was imposed by the court,
whether the defendant has appealed or not, for review and
judgment. These rules were taken from the General Orders
itself.
The 1973 Constitution did not also prohibit death penalty.
Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review of death
penalty cases by the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of
review and even expressly used the term "automatic review
and judgment" by the Court.
(1.) In People v. Villanueva, the Court held that the
withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not deprive
the Court of jurisdiction to review his conviction.
(2.) In People v. Cornelio, which involved the escape of a
death convict, the Court held that said escape does not
relieve the Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction.
(3.) In People v. Daban, the Court said, speaking about
convictions by TC of death penalty on the defendant,
that until after the Court has spoken en consulta, no
finality could be attached to said decision. This
automatic review cannot be waived by the accused nor
by the courts. The mere fact of escape of the accused
cannot be a bar at all.
(4.) In People v. Saliling, the Court said that it is not
precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an
accused who is at large.
(5.) In People v. Buynay, the Court reiterated the rule that
escape of a death convict will not automatically result in
the dismissal of his appeal.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. In our current
Constitution, it expressly prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes as determined by Congress.
When the Congress reimposed the death penalty in December
1993, in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes, it
revived the procedure by which the Court reviews death
penalty cases per the Rules. It remains automatic, does not
depend on the whims of the death convict, continues to be
mandatory, and leaves the Court without any option.
Thus, Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an appeal
when the appellant jumps bail, does not apply to cases where
the death penalty is imposed. In death penalty cases,
automatic review is mandatory.
Facts:
➔ Esparas, together with her niece, arrived NAIA.
Afterwards, Esparas’ alleged husband, Libed, approached
Customs Examiner Bandong and handed her the
baggage declaration form stating that he was there for
an official government business.
➔ However, upon checking the baggage, the Customs
Examiner noticed that there was something unusual with
the baggage as the accused has placed a plywood to
seem like the bottom of the bag. Thus, Bandong called
Customs Collector Templo to further inspect.
➔ After the inspection, they have found 9.9 kilograms of
shabu. Here, Libed stated that he was an employee of the
Office of the Presidential Assistant on Military Affairs and
insisted that the shabu found has already been cleared
by “higher authorities”. But, ofc, Customs personnel did
not believe.
➔ Libed, Esparas, and their niece, were taken to the
customs extended service room where a more rigid
examination was conducted. Here, another bag was
discovered to have been carrying the same amount of
shabu.
➔ The DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation of the
incident. During this investigation, Esparas pointed to a
certain Robert Yu—whom she blamed as her “sponsor”.
However, after a series of investigation, it was found that
Esparas was a member of a drug syndicate.
Issue: W/N there was excessive, cruel, or unusual punishment
which violated the Constitutional right of the accused.
Held: No. We have thoroughly examined the evidence and we
entertain no doubt as to the guilt of appellant Esparas. The
Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s death
sentence despite her absence.
The prosecution evidence indubitably shows that the traveling
bags containing the shabu were in the possession of
appellant. She personally accomplished the baggage
declaration form for her luggage which included said bags
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and declared categorically therein that they contain "personal
effects." Further, she checked in the traveling bags in her
name as evidenced by the baggage claim tags attached to her
plane ticket. Considering these circumstances, we are
governed by the disputable presumption that she owns the
subject bags. Moreover, she escaped from confinement
during the trial and there is nothing in the records to explain
how the subject shabu came to her possession.
There is not an iota of evidence on the absence of "animus
possidendi" or intent to possess on her part. We have held
that "mere uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did
not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is
insufficient. Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at
concealment on his to his part, in explaining how the drug
came into his possession, may be considered in determining
his guilt."
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or
determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances.
In the case at bar, there is evidence to believe that appellant
knew the existence of the shabu in her traveling bags. Upon
arriving at the NAIA, Libed, managed to obtain an official
business (OB) pass to gain access at the restricted customs
inspection area. He tried to dissuade the customs personnel
from examining appellant's luggage but failed. Appellant's
used clothes were found inside the bags upon inspection.
Upon further inspection, shabu was discovered in the false
bottom of said bags. Shortly after the discovery of the shabu,
and as customs personnel were arguing with accused Libed,
appellant walked away from the customs inspection lane
without waiting for her other luggage to be cleared. In an
unmistakable attempt to run away, appellant and Juson
clandestinely headed towards the exit gate. They were
fortunately intercepted by Agent Biteng. These circumstances
lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant knew the
illegal contents of her traveling bags.
However, it was urged that appellant should not have been
penalized with death because the prosecution failed to
establish that she is a member of an organized or syndicated
group. Allegedly, there is no proof that conspiracy existed
between her and accused Libed. However, the SC was not
persuaded.
The governing law at the time the crime was committed was
RA 7659, which amended Republic Act No. 6425 and some
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for
unlawfully bringing 200 grams or more of shabu into the
country is reclusion perpetua to death and the imposable fine
may range from P500,000 to P10,000,000. The crime is
aggravated when committed by any person who belongs to
an organized or syndicated crime group. In such a case, the
death penalty shall be imposed.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Appellant cannot rely on the June 20, 1994 Resolution issued
by Atty. Macapagal and approved by Assistant Chief
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno because the same was reversed
by then Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Liwag who found
prima facie showing of conspiracy between appellant and
accused Libed. Accordingly, appellant and accused Libed were
charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for
conspiring to import, without authority, the said regulated
drug into the country.
Moreover, an organized or syndicated crime group has been
defined as a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes
of gain in the commission of any crime.
In the case at bar, the collaborative efforts of appellant and
accused Libed were well established by the prosecution and
correctly appreciated by the trial court. Thus, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, it must be submitted to the
ruling of the Court, by a majority vote.
Doctrine: There is more wisdom in mandating the review by
the Court of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of
the convict and regardless of the will of the Court.
Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as
possible. An appellant may withdraw his appeal not because
he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law, or
because he may want to avail of the speedier remedy of
pardon, or because of his frustration and misapprehension
that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should
the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its
jurisdiction when a convict plans to escape.
The Court has the duty to review all death penalty cases. No
litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the
Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which the
Court has to discharge to assure the People that the
innocence of a citizen is the main concern especially in crimes
that that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be
diluted.
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Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
Facts:
➔ Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape of the
10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.
➔ Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising
for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape.
➔ This Court denied petitioner's Motion with a finding that
Congress duly complied with the requirements for the
reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the
death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
➔ In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the
mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection through Republic Act
No. 8177. Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the
Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement RA 8177 ("implementing
rules") and directed the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
➔ Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondents from carrying out the execution by lethal
injection as this is unconstitutional and void for being:
(a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se,
and (b) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under
international covenants.
Issue: W/N R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not
pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment; and (b) violation of our international
treaty obligations
Held: NO.
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment considering that
(1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in
carrying out lethal injection, the dosage, and the procedure;
(2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as
to the date of execution, time of notification, which
uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection
inherently cruel.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a
hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution room. A
trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's
arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At the
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into
the intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically includes
three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a
sleep-inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium
bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3) potassium
chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first two
drugs are commonly used during surgery to put the patient
to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart bypass
surgery.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty
per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the
case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that
"punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life."
Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved
in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel,
degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain"
in case of possible complications, as petitioner claims that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person
insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is
concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly speculative
and unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence
that lethal injection requires the expertise only of
phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs
to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of
R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel involved in the
execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public
officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty (by lethal injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel
punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely
incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress,
and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course,
the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is
to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
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What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society." Indeed, "other (U.S.) courts have focused
on 'standards of decency' finding that the widespread use of
lethal injections indicates that it comports with contemporary
norms." The primary indicator of society's standard of decency
with regard to capital punishment is the response of the
country's legislatures to the sanction. Hence, for as long as the
death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the
most stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we
must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177,
whose constitutionality we duly sustain in the face of
petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's
substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no
constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Indisputably, Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights enshrines the individual's right to life.
Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation
on the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed
for the "most serious crimes". The Human Rights Committee
issued General Comment No. 6 stating that "(while) it follows
from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to
abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its
use and, in particular, to abolish it for other than the 'most
serious crimes.'
Doctrine: The death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden vs.
Director of Prisons, this Court held that "punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life."
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely in carrying
out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within
the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain of suffering to the convict, it may be
said that all punishment is cruel. But of course, the
Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to
go unpunished." The cruelty against which the Constitution
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any
method employed to extinguish life humanely.
 POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
DISSENTING OPINION – UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH
PENALTY LAW

(1.) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from

our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit
its imposition.
(2.) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the
constitutional right against the death penalty, which is
really a species of the right to life.
(3.) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused, because such a statute denigrates the
Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny
equal justice to the underprivileged.
(4.) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and
should never be ignored, cavalierly treated or brushed
aside.
(5.) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely
limited by two concurrent requirements:
(a.) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the
elements of the crime and itself. Congress must
explain why and how these circumstances define
or characterize the crime as 'heinous.'
(b.) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out
clear and specific reasons which arose after the
effectivity of the Constitution compelling the
enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these
requirements are inseparable. They must both be
present in view of the specific constitutional
mandate — 'for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes.' The compelling reason must flow
from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6.) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness
and compelling reasons must be set out for each and
every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and
collectively.

WHERE END SOUGHT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, SO IS THE

MEANS TO ACHIEVE IT
Because of the unconstitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, I
cannot hold for the legality of RA 8177. The only purpose of
RA 8177 is to have a means of carrying out the death sentence
— by lethal injection. But if RA 7659 is inconsistent with the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution, essentially, there is
nothing to implement. With the abolition of the death penalty
in the 1987 Constitution, any means to carry it out is without
any basis and, therefore, is illegal.

POLI RECIT Qs / ARTICLE III, SECTION 19

KA-POLI NOTES 2020-2021
Dione Maghirang / Lara Murallos / Tin Narne-Pedralvez / Fergie Villanueva