POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
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BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER
What is a Bill of Attainder?
It is a law that punishes an act without judicial trial. It is a law
that substitutes legislation for judicial determination of guilt.
It is a situation where the legislative body, in enacting a bill of
attainder, exercises the powers and office of a judge. It
pronounces upon the guilt of the party without any of the
forms or safeguards of trial; it fixes the degree of punishment
in accordance with its own notions of the offense.
What is the purpose of the prohibition against the passage of
a bill of attainder?
It is designed to respect the principle of separation of powers.
Is BP 22 a bill of attainder?
No. In BP 22, every element of the crime must still be proven
before the trial court can warrant a conviction for the
violation.
What is an ex post facto law?
(1.) Which makes an act done criminal before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action;
(2.) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when
it was committed;
(3.) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed;
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or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant;
(5.) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage;
(6.) Which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only
but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful; or
(7.) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
What are the characteristics of an ex post facto law?
The law must be penal, retroactive, and prejudicial to the
accused.
Is the imposition of tax an ex post facto law?
No, because tax law is not penal in nature.
Is the creation of Sandiganbayan an ex post facto law?
No, because while it erases the two channels of appeal, the
decision is made by three judges of the Sandiganbayan.
Is suspension of a public officer ex post facto?
No, even if it is retroactive. Suspension from office is not a
penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.
Application of an ex post facto law
The prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which
affects the substantial rights of the accused. It also applies to
criminal procedure law prejudicial to the accused. Further, it is
improper to apply the prohibition to an executive
proclamation suspending the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus. Moreover, even if the law be penal and retroactive, it
will still not be ex post facto if it does not operate to the
disadvantage of the accused.
United States vs. Conde
G.R. No. 18208. February 14, 1922
Facts:
➔ The defendants were charged with the violation of the
Usury Law (Act No. 2655).
➔ However, the appellants averred that the contract upon
which the alleged usurious interest was collected was
executed before the Act was adopted, that there was no
usury law in force when the contract was made, and that
such law could have no retroactive effect or operation.
➔ Regardless, the lower court stated that at the time of the
collection of the usurious rate of interest, the Usury Law
was already promulgated. Thus, the lower court
sentenced them guilty of the violation of such Act.
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Issue: W/N the Constitutionally mandated right of the
appellants were violated when they were sentenced guilty of
the violation of the Usury Law.
Held: Yes. The obligation to pay interest on money due under
a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of the obligation
of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a
contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, cannot be
made to apply to such contract without violating the
provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of
a law impairing the obligation of contract.
That law must govern and control the contract in every aspect
in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect its
validity, construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the
parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself.
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability,
or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as
having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract
that the laws in force at the time the contract was made must
govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be
construed prospectively and not retrospectively.
If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered
illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted
then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is
prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant,
are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an
action, done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an
ex post facto law.
In the present case, Act No. 2655 made an act which had been
done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make
said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give
it an ex post facto operation. The Legislature is prohibited
from adopting a law which will make an act done before its
adoption a crime.
A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action,
providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are
absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable
to the defendant.
For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the
present case were legal at the time of their occurrence, they
cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto
legislation. What the courts may say, considering the
provisions the Civil Code, when a civil action is brought upon
said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract may be
annulled by the courts when it is shown that it is against
morals or public order.
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Doctrine: A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or
disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be
construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary
rule of contract that the laws in force at the time the contract
was made must govern its interpretation and application.
Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively.
Concepcion vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-32380. November 29, 1929
Facts:
➔ The Government of the Philippine Islands instituted a
civil action (No. 35867) against Florencio Reyes, former
chief of the stamp division in the Bureau of Posts, for the
purpose of recovering the sum of P212,349.42, the value
of stamps alleged to have been misappropriated by him.
➔ In connection with the complaint in said case the
Government obtained an attachment against the
defendant, by virtue whereof the respondent, in the
capacity of deputy sheriff, levied upon certain household
effects as the property of the defendant.
➔ The present petitioner, Dominga Concepcion, the wife of
Reyes, presented a third-party claim asserting ownership
in the household effect which had been taken upon
attachment, all pursuant to section 442 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
➔ Upon receiving this claim the respondent Garcia
demanded that the Government should give bond to
secure him against liability from said claim.
➔ At the request of the Attorney-General the period for the
giving of this bond was extended until October 10, 1929,
and before this date arrived the Legislature enacted a
statute (Act No. 3531) adding an amendment, in the form
of a proviso, to both sections 442 and 451 of the Code
of Civil Procedure: "Provided, however, That when the
plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ of
attachment runs, is the Insular Government, or any
officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall
not be required, and in case the sheriff or attaching
officer is sued for damages as a result of the attachment,
he shall be represented by the Attorney-General and if
held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the
court shall be paid by the Insular Treasurer out of such
funds as may be appropriated for the purpose."
➔ This Act was approved on September 28, 1929, and it was
therefore in full effect upon October 10, 1929, when the
period expired within which the bond demanded by the
sheriff should have been given. However, under the
authority of the amendment above mentioned, the
respondent deputy sheriff maintained the attachment,
and he now admittedly has the attached property in his
possession.
➔ The present petition seeks to compel the respondent, by
mandamus, to surrender the property, consisting of the
household effects described in the petitioner's third-
party claim; and the theory underlying the petition is that
Act No. 3531 is not applicable to the situation described,
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and that, if the Act should be interpreted as applicable
thereto, it should be held unconstitutional. In this
connection it is claimed that, if the Act be interpreted as
applicable to the subject matter of the aforesaid
attachment, it would be an ex post facto law.
Issue: W/N the Act was ex post facto.
Held: No. Act No. 3531 is an Act dealing exclusively with
remedies and modes of procedure. Such an Act is repugnant
to no constitutional provision, and its legality is beyond
question. A person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure. Statutes making changes in the
remedy or procedure are laws within the discretion of the
lawmaking power, and are valid so long as they do not deprive
the accused of any substantial right, or conflict with specific
and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution.
Moreover, the term "ex post facto," as applied to statutes, is a
technical term, used only in connection with crimes and
penalties. The term is never used to indicate the obnoxious
character of statutes dealing retroactively with civil rights. Of
course, retroactive statutes dealing with civil rights may also
be unconstitutional if they impair the obligations of contracts
or deprive a person of a vested right, but this remedial Act is
not subject to criticism on this ground. As was said in Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal, "The Act in
question is not an ex post facto law, as it is not penal in its
nature. It has long been settled that the phrase 'ex post facto
laws' is not applicable to civil laws, but to penal and criminal
laws which punish a party for acts antecedently done which
were not punishable at all, or not punishable to the extend or
in the manner prescribed. In short ex post facto laws relate to
penal and criminal proceedings, which impose punishment or
forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings, which affect private
rights retrospectively."
Doctrine: Ex Post Facto Laws do not apply to:
(1.) Remedial Laws - A person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure. Statutes making changes in the remedy or
procedure are laws within the discretion of the
lawmaking power, and are valid so long as they do not
deprive the accused of any substantial right, or conflict
with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal
Constitution.
(2.) Civil Laws - The Act in question is not an ex post facto
law, as it is not penal in its nature. It has long been settled
that the phrase 'ex post facto laws' is not applicable to
civil laws, but to penal and criminal laws which punish a
party for acts antecedently done which were not
punishable at all, or not punishable to the extend or in
the manner prescribed. In short ex post facto laws relate
to penal and criminal proceedings, which impose
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punishment or forfeitures, and not to civil proceedings,
which affect private rights retrospectively.
Nasi-Villar vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 176169. November 14, 2008
Facts:
➔ The accused was charged with willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously recruiting Nila Panilag for employment
abroad while she was not even licensed to engage in
recruitment of workers abroad.
➔ An information was filed against Nasi-Villar, which
provided that she has violated RA 8042 on the ground of
illegal recruitment.
➔ However, after due trial, the RTC found the evidence
presented credible to hold petitioner liable for the
offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
➔ Nasi-Villar, then, appealed to the CA averring that there
was an error in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment.
➔ The appellate court stated that the criminal acts alleged
to have been committed happened sometime in 1993.
However, RA 8042, under which Nasi-Villar was charged,
was approved only in 1995. Thus, the appellate court
declared that Nasi-Villar should have been charged
under the Labor Code and not RA 8042.
Issue: W/N there was a violation of the Constitutionally
mandated right against ex post facto laws.
Held: No. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
real nature of the crime charged is determined, not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the law alleged to have been violated, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
What controls is not the designation but the description of
the offense charged. From a legal point of view, it is of no
concern to the accused what the technical name of the crime
of which he stands charged is. If the accused performed the
acts alleged in the body of the information, in the manner
stated, then he ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which
those acts constitute.
In this case, the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner had performed the acts constituting the
offense defined in the Labor Code:
(1.) The person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities
enumerated in the Labor Code, as amended; and
(2.) The same said person does not have a license or
authority to do so.
The Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising, or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided that any
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person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons, is considered
engaged in recruitment and placement."
The trial court found these two elements had been proven in
the case at bar. Petitioner has not offered any argument or
proof that countervails such findings.
A criminal act is punishable under the law in force at the time
of its commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and
found guilty under the Labor Code.
Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an Information that
erroneously designated the offense as covered by RA 8042,
but alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the
Labor Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed
the acts she was charged with, she was properly convicted
under the Labor Code, and not under RA 8042. There is no
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a
retroactive application of RA 8042, as alleged by petitioner.
An ex post facto law is one which, among others, aggravates
a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed or
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed.
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and
prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.
Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when
they are favorable to the accused.
RA 8042 only amended pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code and gave a new definition of the crime of illegal
recruitment and provided for its higher penalty. There is no
indication in RA 8042 that said law, including the penalties
provided therein, would take effect retroactively.
A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it
operates prospectively since its strictures would cover only
offenses committed after and not before its enactment.
Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give RA 8042
a retroactive application since both courts passed upon
petitioner's case only under the aegis of the Labor Code.
The proceedings before the trial court and the appellate court
did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto law nor
involved a retroactive application of RA 8042 in any way.
Doctrine: A law can never be considered ex post facto as long
as it operates prospectively since its strictures would cover
only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.
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Salvador vs. Mapa Jr.
G.R. No. 135080. November 28, 2007
ANTECEDENT FACTS
➔ October 8, 1992 – Former President FVR issued
Administrative Order No. 13 (AO 13) creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans.
➔ November 9, 1992 – By Memorandum Order No. 61 (MO
61), the functions of the Committee were subsequently
expanded.
Facts:
➔ Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee
for investigation, including the loan transactions
between Metals Exploration Asia (MEA), not Phil. Eagle
Mines (PEMI), and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).
➔ After examining and studying the documents on the loan
transactions, the Committee determined that they bore
the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under MO
61.
➔ The investigation revealed that PEMI applied for a
foreign currency loan and bank investment on its
preferred shares with DBP. The loan was approved as per
Board Resolution 1297, but the loan was never released
because PEMI failed with the conditions imposed by DBP.
➔ To accommodate PEMI, DBP subsequently adopted
Board Resolution No. 2315 amending 1297, and then
authorizing the release of PEMI’s foreign currency loan
proceeds, and even increasing the same. Thus, PEMI was
granted a foreign currency loan and it was released
despite non-compliance.
➔ Here, the Committee claimed that the loan had no
sufficient collaterals and PEMI had no sufficient capital at
that time.
➔ Thus, herein respondents were charged with the
violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Issue: W/N AO 13 and MO 61 are ex post facto laws.
Held: No.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one:
(1.) Which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action;
(2.) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed;
(3.) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed;
(4.) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
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This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely:
(1.) That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies
only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; or
(2.) That which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
a proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal
laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their
punishment.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly
do not come within the shadow of this definition.
AO 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition
and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of
granting behest loans.
What are “behest loans”?
Under MO 61, the following criteria may be utilized as a frame
of reference in determining a behest loan:
(1.) The loan must be under-collateralized;
(2.) The borrower-corporation is undercapitalized;
(3.) There is direct or indirect endorsement by high
government officials like presence of marginal notes;
(4.) Stockholders, officers, or agents of the borrower-
corporation are identified as “cronies”;
(5.) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended;
(6.) There is use of corporate layering;
(7.) There is non-feasibility of the project for which financing
is being sought; and
(8.) There is extraordinary speed in which the loan release
was made.
A behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan
in that while both may involve civil liability for non-payment
or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail criminal
liability.

MO 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining

behest loans.

Not being penal laws, AO 13 and MO 61 cannot be

characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no
basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject
administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

Doctrine: An ex post facto law has been defined as one:

(1.) Which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done criminal, and
punishes such action;
(2.) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when committed;
(3.) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it
was committed;
(4.) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less
or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
(5.) That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies
only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful; or
(6.) That which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
a proclamation of amnesty.

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