SSRN Id4296120

Who’s dominating whom?
The perception of (EU)

dominance in the debate on
the Future of Europe
Karolina Czerska-Shaw
Magdalena Góra
Kinga Sekerdej
Natasza Styczyńska
Marta Warat
Katarzyna Zielińska
EU3D Research Papers

No. 26
December 2022
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

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Who’s dominating whom? The perception of (EU) dominance in the
debate on the Future of Europe
Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Magdalena Góra, Kinga Sekerdej, Natasza Styczyńska, Marta

Warat and Katarzyna Zielińska
Jagiellonian University
Abstract
In the decades of crises that have defined the European Union, debates on the future
of European integration, as well as its democratic legitimation, have taken complex
and often contradictory forms. In these discourses, one can detect both the image of an
impotent Union unable to respond to threats, and simultaneously one that is omnipo-
tent and exerting its dominance over national actors. Beyond this discursive dichot-
omy, it is of particular importance to capture the areas of institutional relationships
that are perceived as unjust, problematic, unaccountable, and imposing. In our paper,
we focus on perspectives from both Eurosceptic and pro-European integration actors.
Specifically, we focus on civil society organisations participating in ongoing Future of
Europe (FoE) debates. On one hand, we analyse the articulations of populist, Euro-
sceptic actors and anti-intellectual movements. On the other, we compare them to typ-
ically pro-integration organisations active in the field of migration, gender-equality,
and faith-based issues. Through qualitative content analysis, the paper firstly investi-
gates what is perceived as dominance in its institutional dimension, such as in refer-
ences to EU institutions and policies. Secondly, we detect the ways in which the per-
ception of dominance is utilised by these actors in the (de)legitimisation of European
integration. Lastly, we focus on the ideational/normative dimension embodied in ref-
erences to values, non-material resources and norms. This allows us to map the per-
ceptions of symbolic dominance within the EU system and the actors who raise these
aspects. Additionally, it allows for the observation of where the problematic forms of
dominance are located and enables us to zoom in on how these are perceived as well as
what solutions are offered. The aim is to deepen our understanding of where actors
perceive and locate unjustified exercises of power, which may shed light on how the
functioning of democracy within the EU is assessed by an ideologically diverse set of
actors.
Keywords
Civil Society | Domination | EU | European Integration | Future of Europe

Who’s dominating whom? The perception of (EU) dominance in the debate on the Future of
Europe
Introduction1
More than decades-long crises have deteriorated trust in the European Union (EU) – the
financial and migration crises, destabilisation of security in the block’s neighbourhood,
Brexit and Covid-19 – have revealed the EU’s systemic and institutional weaknesses and
highlighted internal divisions among Member States, resulting in a ‘critical legitimacy
juncture’ (Zappettini 2020, p.2). The alleged failures of the EU have had a profound sym-
bolic meaning for societies and domestic politics in many countries and have paved the
way for fundamental criticisms of the EU. They employ narratives of a weak and failing
Union unable to deal with crises, often proposing the strengthening of the nation state as
the only viable solution (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2018). Yet when the EU and its institu-
tions have proposed responsive measures to deal with crises, it has often been viewed as
imposing, exceeding competences, acting in the interest of ‘others’ (whether that be big
Member States or European bureaucrats) and thus dominating. Good examples are pro-
vided by the Greek responses to austerity measures put in place to deal with the eurozone
crisis (Glynos and Voutyras, 2016; Theodossopoulos, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2018;) or the
Polish government’s justifications for rejecting quota systems during the migration crisis
of 2015/2016 (Cianciara, 2022; Krzyżanowski, 2018). In these reactions, one can detect
both the image of an impotent Union unable to respond to threats and simultaneously one
that is omnipotent and exerting its dominance over national actors. Scholars note that
‘decades of crises of the EU have produced a complex interaction among competing pro-
integration narratives and counter-narratives to the European Union, as interdependent
elements within a wider debate’ (McMahon and Kaiser, 2022, p.2).
Partially as a response to these aforementioned crises, the EU initiated an unprecedented

public debate on the future of the bloc, aimed at finding the best solutions to current di-
lemmas in terms of institutional adaptation as well as policy shifts and developments. The
debate on the Future of Europe (FoE), initiated in 2015, was structured by five possible
integration scenarios included in the White Paper by the European Commission (EC) in
2017 (Fabbrini, 2019). The FoE debate created an opportunity for a variety of actors to
express their views on the future of European integration in various areas of the public
sphere. This also included participatory mechanisms such as consultations organised by
the EC within nationally held dialogues, as well as within the Conference on the Future of
Europe (CoFoE) (Alemanno and Organ, 2021). Overall, in the period between 2015-2022,
political and public actors utilised a variety of fora within the multilevel EU political system
to debate the possible scenarios for development of European integration. These debates
focused on institutional aspects of reforms including how differentiated the EU ought to
be, drawing attention to policy solutions and improvements.
In a nutshell, the debates since 2015 have, similarly to past debates, underscored conflict-
ing visions of European integration. These visions feature key contentious points such as
capacity issues, deepening integration and equipping EU institutions with more
1We would like to thank Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski, R. Daniel Kelemen and John Erik Fossum for
their invaluable comments to the previous version of this paper.
EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 2

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competences or protecting national competences, as well as developing new policies

(Fossum, 2021). Scholars have noted the struggles to create new narratives which seek to
justify and legitimise EU integration as well as a rise of Eurosceptic voices (Kaiser, 2017;
Kaiser and McMahon, 2017; McMahon and Kaiser, 2022; de Wilde, 2021). The debates
over the shape and the future of integration sheds light on the power struggles between
various actors, including civil society organisations, which were some of the most active
participants in the debate (Blokker, 2021).
Against this background, the aim of the paper is to analyse and compare the perceptions
of dominance featuring in the ongoing FoE debates, focusing on social actors from both
Eurosceptic and pro-European sides of the political spectrum. Social actors are uniquely
positioned to implement and cooperate with states and supranational institutions in pol-
icy-making processes, whether at the agenda-setting, implementation or evaluation stages.
They may also serve as watchdogs of accountability and legitimacy, or contest policies and
political practices (Banulescu-Bogdan, 2011, p.1). In comparing and contrasting the per-
ceptions of civil society actors who position themselves on both Eurosceptic and pro-Eu-
ropean sides of political debates, the paper contributes a cross-cutting civic angle to the
analysis of discourses on dominance in the EU.
The findings highlight one point of convergence between these otherwise disparate civil
society actors, namely that perceptions across the board point to the EU and its institutions
as the referent dominator. However, they differ significantly in how they perceive domi-
nance: Eurosceptic actors focus on the EU’s illicit abuse of its otherwise weak capabilities,
rather than conceding that the EU may have the upper hand in a game of asymmetrical
power relations (particularly vis a vis Member States). Typical pro-European integration
actors, on the other hand, maintain that the EU has institutional power (and this is favour-
able), yet it fails to act on it, allowing for power vacuums where human rights are abused,
and vulnerable groups are dominated (largely by Member States but sometimes EU agen-
cies). It is evident that these irreconcilable demands coming from various points along the
pro/anti EU integration continuum point not only to differing visions on the desired future
of EU integration, but also to deep inconsistencies on the vision and nature of a democratic
Union.
The paper categorises the social actors analysed into two ideologically aligned groups. The
first consists of populist, Eurosceptic actors (parties and think tanks linked to European
party groups) as well as anti-intellectual movements contesting the current state of Euro-
pean integration and some of the core EU policies. In the second group, we analyse civil
society organisations (CSOs) active in the sphere of migration, gender-equality and faith-
related issues. These organisations also engage in the contestation of the EU and its poli-
cies, but who are typically closer to agenda-setting practices and consultation processes in
the EU public sphere advocating for further European integration. Through qualitative
content analysis, the paper investigates what is perceived as dominance within the EU
from the perspective of the selected collective social actors. It does so by analysing the pro-
posals of these different political actors in a comparative framework and, secondly, detect-
ing the ways in which the perception of dominance is utilised by these actors in the (de)le-
gitimization of European integration.

Europe
The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, we present the theoretical framework explaining
the significance of dominance in order to decode current debates on the future of European
integration. Secondly, we justify our methodology, data sampling and operationalisation
of concepts. This is followed by an analytical section wherein we present key aspects of how
dominance is perceived and contextualised by various actors. The paper finishes with a
discussion and conclusions which highlight that the position of the EU and its institutions
is somewhere between a rock and a hard place – at once omnipotent (and thus dominating)
and impotent (and thus allowing for dominance), whilst not providing a voice for ordinary
citizens to ensure democratic legitimacy.
Theoretical framework: perceptions of dominance and Euro-

pean Integration
The EU operates as a specific but functional political system (Hix and Høyland, 2021). The
key feature of the system lies in the relation of the institutions with citizens who legitimise
the polity and provide input to the institutional setting. The perceptions of European citi-
zens vis-à-vis the EU polity have been thoroughly researched, providing a nuanced picture
of how the proponents and contestants see and narrate the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2009;
Kaiser, 2017; Kaiser and McMahon, 2017; Risse, 2010; Statham and Trenz, 2015; de Wilde
et al., 2016). Importantly, research points to the differentiated contestation between poli-
cies of the EU and the EU polity as such (de Wilde and Trenz, 2012).
One of the most important aspects of the functioning of the EU as well as of how it is per-
ceived, are the relations between actors within the polity (mainly between the central EU
institutions and Member States, as well as between Member States and citizens). These
actors pursue differentiated visions of integration, either stressing more intergovernmen-
tal or more supranational (federalizing) institutional solutions. However, as scholars note,
these relations cannot be captured so easily, even more so when citizens or CSOs are the
object of interest (McMahon and Kaiser, 2022; de Wilde, 2021). We argue that it is of par-
ticular importance to capture the areas of institutional relationships that are perceived as
unjust, problematic, unaccountable, and imposing. It allows for the observation of where
the problematic (from various perspectives) issues are located and examine how these are
perceived (who is abusing power, who is imposing) as well as what solutions are offered.
In other words, instead of looking at the desirable state of affairs promoted by social actors,
we want to look into what problems they see in the EU political system and why they are
considered to be problematic.
In our approach we utilise the concept of dominance used by theorists of democracy

(mostly in reference to the nation state) (Klein, 2020; Lovett, 2001; McCammon, 2015;
Pettit, 1999) in order to capture the dynamics of the perceived malfunctions of the EU sys-
tem (Bellamy, 2019; Fossum, 2019). Our starting point is that the imbalance of power and
relations of dominance are a ubiquitous feature of social relations and complex socio-po-
litical fields. We define dominance as ‘unjust exercises of power’ (Batora and Fossum,
2022) and a ‘relationship or a circumstance wherein an actor (be that a person, an

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organisation, or a collective) can be arbitrarily interfered with and/or manipulated’

(Fossum, 2019, p.2). Research on dominance and domination (usually terms used inter-
changeably) points to several considerations worth noting (Orzechowska-Wacławska et al.,
2021). First, dominance is relational, based on an asymmetry of access to resources, deci-
sion making, setting the rules, etc. Because it is relational, it involves actors (individuals,
groups, or institutions) occupying different positions, some being more privileged (with
higher access to power) and some less. This is specifically visible if we focus attention on
institutional actors within political systems. As a result, the decisions and practices of the
dominating agents affect those dominated to a much higher extent than vice versa. All ac-
tors operate within the socio-political field, thus a social arena where goods, services and
status are produced, reproduced and exchanged according to explicit and tacit rules
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.96). Each field has a centre and peripheries, notions
especially important when thinking about power relations and dominance. The closer to
the periphery, the less the likelihood of having the political, economic, social, and cultural
capital to challenge dominance and the closer to periphery, the less intelligible are the ex-
plicit and implicit rules of the field (Bernhard, 2011; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992;
Swartz, 1997).
Second, dominance is ubiquitous. Various factors determine the position one holds in this
relationship, but dominance is not an extraordinary nor avoidable state but a ubiquitous
condition of social relations (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). The bigger and more differenti-
ated the socio-political field, the more complex relations of dominance may occur. Hence,
given the size and especially the complexity of the European system of governance, one
may expect instances of dominance to occur there as well. Third, one should analytically
distinguish between domination as a process in which actors have possibilities of (re)ne-
gotiating the imbalance of power and dominance as a formalised and institutionalised hi-
erarchy. The latter is of concern for actors within the EU that are potentially in a disadvan-
taged power position, especially if such hierarchy is illicit and unaccountable (Batora and
Fossum, 2022).
Third, dominance does not require action or the exercise power over those in unprivileged
positions. It is the position itself, the potentiality of executing control or influence that is
sufficient for dominance. As Klein points out, it is important to reflect on ‘what makes a
political or social hierarchy a relationship or structure of domination’ (Klein, 2020, p.4).
Max Weber has famously distinguished between power (Macht) and dominance or author-
ity (Herrshaft). If power means ‘enforcing one’s own will even against resistance’, domi-
nance in this view indicates that the actors in less favourable positions will follow the rules
without being forced to, because they perceive them as legitimate (Szelenyi, 2016; Weber,
1978). Batora and Fossum observe: ‘It is obvious that confining it [dominance] to the ex-
ercise of power would rule out the role of hegemonic ideas and values that make some feel
and act superior and others inferior. In a similar manner, confining domination to the ac-
tions we can trace back to identifiable actors would rule out the role of systems of repres-
sion and exclusion and status devaluation/deprivation’ (Batora and Fossum, 2022, p. 8).
Finally, the concept of dominance is closely linked with political legitimacy, since the latter
is ‘able to create a sense of normative obligation that helps to ensure the voluntary

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compliance with undesired rules or decisions of a governing authority’ (Scharpf, 2009,

p.173). In order to ensure legitimacy an actor needs to engage in practices of legitimation
understood as obtaining legitimacy from the ruled. It is in principle a relational and dis-
cursive practice in which ‘the (dominant) group or institution seeks to legitimate itself
through approval from the dominated, and the dominated group legitimises the dominant
group or institution through various forms of more or less active agreement, acceptance,
compliance or at least tacit consent’ (Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997, p.528). In a similar way, the
processes of delegitimization means that social actors attempt to change what is acceptable
and seen as legitimised.
Hence, dominance denotes not only an objective set of rules and practices, but it is also
perceived subjectively. Because of this subjectivity, the same structures and practices
might be evaluated differently, either as equal relations, or as just or unjust dominance
relations. Whether they are seen as legitimate or not depends not only on certain objective
characteristics of those relations, but also on the ways they are subjectively perceived. It is
‘a specific felt experience to which (…) speakers attempt to refer by using the word ‘domi-
nation’ (Lovett, 2001, p.99). If dominance is viewed as illegitimate, it is prone to produce
backlash among those who are dominated. This is the case even when the occurrence of
dominance is debatable and subjectively perceived only by a given group of actors. Hence,
the crucial issue is if dominance is accepted as a legitimate exercise of authority (Weber,
1978) or rejected as an arbitrary interference (Fossum, 2019). In the context of the debate
on the Future of Europe, scholars witness attempts to legitimise and delegitimise the EU
and its policies (Blokker, 2021; de Wilde, 2021). The analysis of how social actors perceive
dominance will offer more insights into the mechanisms of such attempts.
Who’s dominating whom and how? Research questions,

sample and methodology
Our research focuses on the perceptions of dominance as articulated in the wider frame of
the ongoing debate on the Future of Europe. The following questions organise the analysis
of the collected material. Firstly, we are interested in finding out what the selected collec-
tive social actors perceive as dominance (unjustified exercises of power) in the EU system.
The constant tug of war between the competencies exercised by the EU and Member States
leads to these two entities being identified as the dominating agents (Bellamy, 2019). How-
ever, scholars also note that the EU may be perceived as dominated by external forces, i.e.,
global powers such as the US, China or rogue adversaries such as Russia (Brattberg and Le
Corre, 2020; Hanhimäki, 2021; Haukkala, 2020; Mead, 2014; Pelaudeix, 2021). This par-
adoxical situation, in which the EU may be both the dominated and dominator, has been
analysed by Fossum, Garcia Quesada and Zgaga (2020) from the perspective of the EU’s
vulnerability to internal and external pressures (Member State interests, big power actors,
and market forces). They argue that with increased vulnerability, the EU could take
measures that may – in the eyes of certain actors – make it seem more like a hegemon.

Europe
Scholars focusing on economic governance rightly point to external non-state actors such
as markets, transnational corporations, or criminal organisations. Since we take the per-
spective of citizens and their movements and organisations, we highlight another relation-
ship of dominance between the EU, Member States, citizens as well as non-citizens such
as refugees. Against such a background the analysis of our material is directed by a second
question of who the social actors perceive as dominating and who they identify as domi-
nated in the EU context. Taking into account the relational ‘nature’ of dominance, we are
also interested in mapping the relation of dominance between dominating and dominated.
In an attempt to better understand the perception of dominance by the selected actors, we

further analyse the articulations of unjustified exercises of power. Scholars distinguish a
variety of forms of dominance associated with – as stated above – both the direct exercise
of power as well as with hegemonic relationships producing more symbolic dominance
(Klein, 2020). Batora and Fossum (2022) claim that there are ‘forms of domination that
are associated with structural conditions: arbitrary and illicit forms of rule; inequality in
formal status; structural forms of deprivation, with effects being both material and emotive
such as sense of self-worth; undue impositions; as well as various forms of exclusion’
(Batora and Fossum, 2022, p.8). When analysing the contexts and articulations in which
dominance within the EU is raised, we will focus on the institutional dimension such as
references to EU institutions and policies in which the EU dominates or is dominated. This
allows us to deepen our understanding of where actors perceive and locate unjustified ex-
ercises of power and sheds light on how the functioning of democracy within the EU is
assessed. In addition, we focus on the ideational/normative dimension embodied in refer-
ences to values, non-material resources, and norms. This allows us to map the perceptions
of symbolic dominance within the EU system and the actors who raise these aspects.
The second aim of our analysis is directly linked to the wider debate on the Future of Eu-
rope and pertains to the ways the perception of dominance is utilised by our selected social
actors in the (de)legitimisation of European integration. In other words, we are interested
in finding out if and why actors are raising specific aspects of the functioning of the (dem-
ocratic) EU polity. As stated above, we assume that stressing instances of dominance
within the EU system – intrinsically linked with the legitimisation thereof – specifically
serves the purpose of delegitimising the polity. The burgeoning literature on populist ac-
tors and their stance on European integration provides an additional perspective on the
delegitimising functions of dominance. European integration provides populist actors with
a useful opportunity structure to magnify a typical ‘blame game’ in which national govern-
ments blame the EU for problems while ascribing all the successes to themselves
(Heinkelmann-Wild et al, 2020). In many studies on populism, it has been demonstrated
that the EU is often presented as a threatening external other, either imposing unfavoura-
ble decisions or enabling others (such as big Member States, particularly Germany or Eu-
ropean bureaucrats) to threaten domestic actors (Block and Negrine, 2017; Brubaker,
2017; Moffitt, 2016; Pirro et al., 2018). However, we are also interested in if and how typ-
ically pro-European actors are building narratives pointing toward various forms of dom-
inance in order to strengthen the EU or argue for more competences for its institutions
such as the European Commission.

Europe
Our empirical material comprises of proposals produced by collective social actors coming
from Eurosceptic and pro-European sides of the political spectrum. Drawing on the exist-
ing research (Almiron et al. 2020; Blokker, 2021; Johansson and Raunio, 2022; Nelsen
and Guth, 2017; de Wilde, 2021), we choose denialist movements located at European (i.e.,
Brussels) or national (i.e., in one of the nation states, but often operating transnationally)
levels and Eurosceptic actors (European party groups and civil society organisations (think
tanks) linked with them) as representatives of Eurosceptic stances. CSOs active in the anti-
gender and anti-abortion area as well as faith-based organisations representing Christian
Churches in Europe, who accept European integration but with serious limitations for its
scope, represent the middle ground on the above-mentioned spectrum. Finally, CSOs ac-
tive at the European level in the field of migration as well as women’s rights and gender-
equality, represent the most pro EU integration stances in our corpus of study.
Drawing on the literature on political claims (Statham and Koopmans, 2009), we define
our units of observation – proposals on the Future of Europe – as units of strategic action
in the public sphere which consist of an expression of political opinion on the future of the
EU, European integration or any of its aspects such as selected policies, policy instruments,
institutions and politics. The documents that were included in our sample thus needed to
address the future of the EU polity, its policies and/or politics.
The societal actors whose proposals we analysed speak on the future of Europe utilising a
variety of channels (Blokker, 2020). They organise advocacy domains, are engaged in lob-
bying and dialogues with political and public institutions using established channels of
communication with said institutions (e.g., citizens’ initiatives, lobbying channels, official
calls for opinions) in order to promote their political objectives. Such channels were used
in particular by the actors with a developed organisational structure, providing them with
the capacities needed to be involved in such formal processes. This was the case for most
of the CSOs as well as think tanks from our sample. The organisations or movements with
less developed organisational capacities would more often use more informal channels and
deliberative fora (e.g., public gatherings, protests, public mobilisations via the internet) to
make their claims. This was the case especially of the denialist movement as well as some
of the anti-gender/pro-life groups. As a result, we used diverse strategies to identify pro-
posals on the future of Europe, reviewing the official forums (e.g., transparency register,
involvement in the consultation process of the documents relevant to the discussion on the
future of Europe, registry of European citizens’ initiatives, the CoFoE platform as well as
looking into less formal spaces such as websites of organisations and platforms for creating
petitions). Our sample consists of 76 proposals prepared by actors, representing both pro-
and anti-EU integration stances, produced between 2015-2022 (see table 1 for details. The
full list of proposals is included in Annex 1). A qualitative content analysis applying pri-
mary coding derived from the research questions served as our method of analysis, con-
ducted with the use of MaxQDA software.
While we aimed at an exhaustive sample of proposals from the selected range of actors, it
is clear that in a qualitative content analysis with limitations such as language, algorithm
bias, and difficulties in accessing informal spaces, our sample cannot be viewed as repre-
sentative of this range of actors. However, we aimed to attain a saturation point in the

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views and proposals analysed, noting a repetition of tropes and key proposals voiced by
our actors. This body of data can thus be seen as a robust cross section of views coming
from a range of collective social actors from across the political spectrum captured within
a specific timeframe, although we note the dynamic nature of these discourses and under-
score that more research should be done to grasp the complexity of perceptions of domi-
nance, particularly at the peripheries of the debate.
Table 1. Type of collective social actors and number of proposals.
Eurosceptic pro-EU
Level of actor’s Move- Think CSOs – CSOs – CSOs – CSOs Total

operation ments – tanks pro- faith migra- gender-
denialists life, based tion equal-
/parties- anti- ity
Euroscep- gender
tics
European 10 9 1 2 16 9 51
National 7 - 13 - - - 20
Other (e.g., 5 - - - - - 5
global, subna-
tional, un-
specified)
Total 22 9 14 2 16 9 76

Who’s dominating whom? The perception of (EU) dominance in the debate on the Future of Europe
Results
The analysis of our data focuses on three key aspects: The relational aspects of dominance, the articulations and contexts in which domi-
nance was debated in the proposals, and how claims of dominance were utilised as a strategy to (de)legitimise European integration. Table
2 below presents a summary of the findings for each actor type while the paragraphs that follow nuance the findings presented in the table.
Table 2. Perceptions of dominance in the proposals on the FoE (2015-2022) by selected social actors.
Actor Relational aspects of dominance Articulations of domi- Dominance as strategy

nance of (de)legitimising EU
integration
Dominating Dominated
Lack of agency – rights, Legitimising via demands

for the EU to act more de-
Lack of access to status, cisively on behalf of vul-
nerable groups
Minorities (migrants), Dependency of 3rd coun-
EU – through policies, EU tries;
CSOs, 3rd countries in More control and account-
agencies
EU Neighbourhood ability of EU agencies
CSOs - migration absence of normative values
+ in the border regime imposes
+
a structure of near-total
Nation states
EU by national actors dominance
Dominance as failure to
act/(un)intended lack of de-
cision.

CSOs – gender- EU – through policies Minorities (women) Lack of agency - space for Legitimising via demands
equality diversity of voices, Lack of for EU to develop more
+ + access to decision-making tools to enforce gender-
equality
Nation states EU by national ac- Failure to act properly to
tors protect rights Implementation of soft law
CSOs – faith EU + Majoritarian Discrimination of majority Ambiguous perception of

based churches, religious (Christians) EU as (non)legitimate
states in the EU Neigh- (Christian) commu- power
bourhood nities Lack of recognition of
Churches’/Christians’ spe-
+ cial status
EU (misconception
of values)
Member States
CSOs – EU – through policies European people Discrimination of citizens, Lack of recognition of

the will of ordinary
anti-abortion, + “unborn citizens” Imposition of values people – illegitimate
anti-gender actions
EU institutions + Overreaching competences
EU (misconception
of values)

Member States
Movements-Eu- EU Institutions, specifi- Member States; Federalists pushing for more EU delegitimised via
rosceptics cally European Commis- elected institutions integration without listening to populist tropes of oth-
sion the people ering the EU
Unelected European institu- EU seen as incompe-

tions vs. elected and legitimised tent and incapable of
national actors; acting
Sovereigntist context; EU not democratically

elected
The EU as vehicle of ‘radical
forces’
Movements-de- Centralising forces, big in- ‘Ordinary’ citizens; Authorities dominating ordi- EU often delegitimised
nialists dustry, foreign interests nary people; as a set of institutions
(external actors), elites + that have not been es-
EU institutions lacking demo- tablished through elec-
Member States cratic mandate tions, thus not holding
(Polish nation) democratic legitimacy.
EU is less legitimate
than Member States.
Source: Own compilation.

Who dominates whom? The Relational aspect of perceived
dominance
In this section we discuss how European institutions are portrayed by social actors vis-à-
vis relations of dominance. Are EU institutions and related agents seen as dominating or
as being dominated, or both? All of the analysed actors consider the EU as dominating in
some respects and present it as problematic. However, what is meant by dominance differs
and, unsurprisingly, is mediated mostly by the position the given actors hold on the pro-
EU vs. anti-EU continuum.
The most blatant criticism of the EU comes from the Eurosceptic actors. In their view,
European institutions, especially the European Commission, dominate the Member States
along with their legitimately elected representatives. Interestingly, more activity was visi-
ble, and concerns were more vocal on the conservative side of the European political arena
than within the outright anti-EU party groups. The former claimed that the EU is in need
of profound reforms, because it has evolved into an overcontrolling ‘super-state’ that is
exercising dominance over its Member States. In a similar vein, EU institutions have been
presented as directly dominating the EU Member States, hence ‘national interests are be-
ing overridden’ by the institutions that have not been democratically chosen. Eurosceptic
actors often advocated for a weakening of EU institutions, portrayed as oppressive and too
dominant, threatening traditional values and the central position of national identity of
EU citizens. For instance, the CoFoE was criticised as undemocratic and exclusive. EU in-
stitutions were accused of pushing for their favourable scenario, a federal EU, and not be-
ing interested in alternative options.
Similar criticisms and expressions of resentment due to the perception of dominance of

the EU came from the denialist movements: Scattered actors, grouped around certain top-
ics relevant to EU policies they were opposed to. In their view, those who are dominated
are either ‘ordinary citizens’, countries or, in the case of some of the Polish documents, the
Polish nation. The biggest accusation was of depriving citizens (or at times nation states)
of individual freedoms, especially the power to control individual health decisions. De-
pending on the context it was either the EU or state actors dominating citizens, or an EU
or international agency (being under the influence of industry) dominating the Member
States. This group, as one of very few in our study, refers to external sources of dominance
of the EU – by external actors mostly connected to market forces and powerful industries
(such as pharmaceutical companies). The dominated are excluded from the debate and
decision-making process, and this perceived lack of inclusion is a recurrent theme in the
analysed documents. The European Union is mentioned in two contexts: Either as a place
where individual European citizens’ rights are endangered by institutions which do not
have democratic legitimacy and are susceptible to conflicts of interests (like WHO, EMA),
or where national sovereignty is at stake because of centralising plans regarding health,
digital, and climate policies. It is argued that these policies should be decided at the na-
tional level, where there is an appropriate democratic mandate. Similar to the Eurosceptic
actors, they pointed at the fact that unelected European institutions are dominating and
undermining democratically elected state authorities.

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The next group of actors is comprised of CSOs whose activities centred on protecting con-
servative social values and mobilizing EU citizens against EU initiatives aiming to
strengthen gender-equality, rights of women and LGBTQI+ groups. The domination ex-
pressed by the CSOs in question takes the form of an imposition of cultural norms and
denial of recognition of the ‘true nature’ of the EU as conceptualised by Christian values.
EU institutions promote or impose norms not only foreign to Europe’s ‘true nature’, but
also endangering its very existence. This is particularly visible in the reactions to the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s (EP) support for the reproductive rights of women or recognition of
same-sex unions. Such support is seen as threatening to the biological as well as cultural
survival of Europe. More implicitly, it suggests that the EU promotes immigration, some-
thing that could endanger European norms and identity in the longer term. This is implic-
itly conceptualized by the CSOs in question as embedded in Christianity. The EU is seen as
overstretching its competences, since it builds its policies on axiological foundations which
it takes for granted and which – in the eyes of these actors – are not legitimate. Therefore,
the policies themselves are imposed and lack legitimacy.
The next group of actors, faith based CSOs representing Christian Churches in Europe,
refer to analogous axiological roots. Similar to previous groups, they see Member States as
dominated by the EU, but they also express the conviction that Christian churches do not
hold the position they should within the EU, and that Christians are at times dominated
and discriminated against. There are two contexts in which the dominance of the EU is
seen as problematic. One relates to specific policy fields which are considered as limit-
ing/endangering the interests or privileges of Churches or their adherents. In short, de-
priving the Christian Churches in the EU of a special status is seen as unjust dominance.
The subtle references presenting Christians as being discriminated against or even perse-
cuted in the EU, explicitly suggests that EU institutions are in fact pursuing a secularist
agenda. The second context of EU dominance refers to the sphere of values and fundamen-
tal rights. Here, EU institutions such as the European Parliament are seen as exceeding
their competencies by imposing values and norms on Member States, overstepping the
sovereign competencies of the nation states.
Eurosceptic groups, contrarians and actors centred around Christian values ascribe to
mainly traditional right-wing and conservative worldviews. The last two groups of CSOs
we analysed do not belong to this ideological tradition, but have still voiced concerns about
dominance within the EU albeit in a less direct way. Gender-equality organisations claim
that the EU has fallen short of its expectations and obligations embedded in EU treaties;
the EU is urged to be more proactive and decisive in the sphere of gender equality. Hence,
it is viewed favourably as a potential agent of change, but it is criticized for not advancing
the developments (of gender-equality) inscribed in the European treaties. These CSOs see
Member States as dominating by hindering minority and gender-equality rights. The EU,
in turn, is seen as a tool to challenge insufficient progress towards gender-equality. This
has become even more pressing in the context of the unprecedented challenges of rising
populism, anti-gender movements, climate change, the migration crisis, backsliding in
gender-equality, women’s and LGBTQI+ rights, as well as the latest COVID-19 crisis.

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Our last group of actors were CSOs concentrating on issues of migration. Three forms of
asymmetrical power structures were highlighted through the discourses of those CSOs: (1)
an almost total absence of agency for migrants/asylum-seekers vis a vis EU (as well as na-
tion-state) institutions and policies; (2) the dependent position of non-EU Neighbourhood
‘transit’ or ‘hosting’ countries vis-à-vis the EU in the form of conditionality, particularly in
regards to managing (halting) irregular flows towards the EU and aiding in the readmis-
sion of irregular migrants in return for ‘incentives’ such as visa agreements and financial
subsidies for hosting centres; (3) civil society actors under threat of criminalisation of their
activities vis-à-vis policies of Member States, which are not sufficiently protected by the
Commission. Here the EU, particularly in the new proposed Pact on Migration and Asy-
lum, is viewed as capable of providing a counterbalance to Member States’ laws in favour
of civil society actors, yet it fails in its mission to do so.
Articulations of dominance
Social actors perceive the EU as dominating but also as dominated, but the domination is
perceived differently and is contextualised in various forms. As discussed in the theoretical
framework, since our key focus is the EU as a political system and most actors in the pro-
posals concerning the future of Europe referred to various forms of unjust use of power
within the EU polity, we were interested in institutional contexts that serve to articulate
dominance, which allow for a better understanding of democratic malfunctions of the mul-
tilevel EU system. Secondly, since the debate on the future of Europe refers to values and
principles, we were interested how these are approached in articulations of dominance.
Institutional context
We found three key institutional relations where dominance was stressed by social actors:
The EU (and its institutions) versus Member States (battles over sovereignty); the EU ver-
sus citizens, especially the lack of access to decision-making, and the EU’s refrainment or
failure (due to a lack of transparency) to act on behalf of oppressed groups.
The EU infringing on the sovereignty of nation states was a key topic raised by actors scep-
tical (albeit to various degrees) to European integration. The dominance of the EU is per-
ceived as excluding nation states from decision-making processes and imposing policies
and values on them. This is especially visible in the proposals of Eurosceptic parties and
CSOs, as well as denialist groups. For the latter, national sovereignty is at stake because of
centralising plans regarding health, digital and climate policies. It is argued that these pol-
icies should be decided at the national level where there is an appropriate democratic man-
date. To illustrate:
The adoption of the proposed agenda by the European Union and then implemen-
tation of its provisions into the national legal orders of the Member States (includ-
ing, of course, Poland) would mean the loss of an additional part of national sover-
eignty, this time in the area of health

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(Report Proposal (RP) no. 12, 15 and 20, see annex).
For the anti-EU groups, the policy areas related to health, euthanasia and reproductive
rights are seen as the last bastion of sovereign decision-making by Member States, which
is endangered due to the omnipresence of the EU and the enforcement of its policies. The
Eurosceptic movements go even further in their criticism of the EU, stressing the efforts
to create a ‘superstate’ by amassing competences at the supranational level at the expense
of national institutions. They specifically stress that EU institutions, particularly the Euro-
pean Commission, lack democratic legitimacy. This standpoint is echoed in anti-gender
organisations’ understanding of dominance as unjustified attempts of European institu-
tions to extend their competences over fields reserved to the national states:
Abortion is not part of the accepted and ratified fundamental principles and laws of
the European Union and we oppose its inclusion in any official document of the EU.
In this sense we would like to highlight that European institutions should respect
the values in the European Union's founding documents and the fact that each
Member State has the sovereign right to act on its own convictions in these matters.
If the aim of the report is ‘to reaffirm the commitment of the EU to the protection
of human rights’, it will never be achieved by rejecting the inherent right to life of
the most vulnerable human beings or by harming women through abortion
(RP, 68).
The second key context in which dominance was often raised, is related to the lack of access
to decision-making processes by social actors within the EU, with a special focus on the
CoFoE. Interestingly, this context was important for all actors in our analysis in spite of
their position toward the EU. The anti-gender and anti-abortion CSOs as well as Euroscep-
tic and denialist movements claim that the EU does not include the voices of citizens and
deprives them of their fundamental rights. The dominated are excluded from debate and
decision-making processes, which reduces their impact on how the EU is functioning. In
this context, EU institutions are blamed for revising the foundations of the Union without
a democratic mandate, i.e., citizens’ approval. Such a conceptualization of the EU institu-
tions as undermining citizens’ rights also implies the nondemocratic nature of the former.
Additionally, in such narratives the understanding of citizenship is also extended to in-
clude the ‘unborn children’ whose life is endangered by EU institutions’ support for repro-
ductive rights for women involving access to abortion. In the eyes of these actors, the EU,
both through its institutions as well as through introduced policies, dominates ordinary
citizens (including those unborn) and Member States. This is done mainly through the im-
position of values, often alien to ‘ordinary people’.
Similar voices illustrating the dominance of the EU over citizens and Member States are
presented by gender-equality, migration and faith-based organisations, although they de-
fine the dominated groups very differently. They highlight their lack of access to decision-
making, emphasising the exclusionary approach of the EU and lack of recognition of CSOs
representing underprivileged groups. They all, depending on their area of interest, indicate
an almost total absence of agency for migrants/asylum-seekers, European Churches and
Christians as well as women’s rights and feminist organisations vis-à-vis EU institutions

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and policies or as in the case of migration organisations, show how civil society actors are
under threat of criminalisation of their activities vis-à-vis policies of Member States, which
are not protected by the Commission.
The arguments highlighting a lack of access of social actors to EU institutions has been
expressed for quite some time within the EU, contributing to the ‘participatory turn’ initi-
ated by the Treaty of Lisbon (Alemanno and Organ, 2021; Gardels and Berggruen, 2018;
Kohler-Koch, 2010; Kohler-Koch, 2012; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013). One of the rem-
edies to this was supposed to be CoFoE, praised as a remarkable breakthrough in partici-
patory democracy, which included voices of a randomised selection of on-site participants
as well as a special website where further opinions were included (Alemanno and
Nicolaidis, 2021). Importantly however, the efforts of the EU to open access to nodes of
decision-making through the consultations during the CoFoE is seen as a missed oppor-
tunity by the social actors analysed. Eurosceptic actors claim that during the CoFoE, EU
institutions were pushing for their favourable scenario (a federal EU) whilst not showing
interest in the alternative visions of the EU proposed by the Eurosceptic parties and move-
ments. They claimed that it was organised to ‘give the federalists a chance to go ever further
and deeper in their European project but without democratic debate’ (Banks, 2020). The
current form of functioning of the EU is seen as non-democratic and consequently ‘crush-
ing nations, nation states and languages’ (Annemans, 2021).
The faith-based organisations raised concerns about the lack of special provisions to in-
clude the voice of the European Churches, and, by implication, the views of European
Christians during the CoFoE. Their complaints about the unequal treatment of the majori-
tarian and minority groups in the distribution of funds also exemplifies the perception of
the EU as a dominating entity that does not recognize the specific status that should be
granted to the Christian Churches and their adherents. As the following quote exemplifies:
As the principle of non-discrimination entails that discriminating means not only

to treat differently similar situations, but also to treat in the same way different
situations, EU funding possibilities should be established accordingly. Funding de-
voted to combatting discrimination on grounds of religion should equally cover per-
sons belonging to majority or minority denominations, as EU institutions and agen-
cies - as well as national authorities - have an obligation to fully apply the prohibi-
tion of discrimination on grounds of religion with regard to all citizens, whether
affiliated to the so-called ‘majority’ or ‘minority’
(RP, 60).
The analysis of various documents issued by faith-based organisations also indicates an

ambiguous perception of the EU as a (non)legitimate power vis-à-vis the nation state’s
prerogatives. This occurs especially in regard to the protection of religious values and in-
terests of religious organisations, biopolitical issues (e.g., abortion debates in Poland stress
that the EU has no competences in this area), but also in regard to migration (state’s
right/prerogatives to protect the borders). In an implicit way, as already described above,
these actors also highlight the secularist agenda pursued by EU institutions that results in

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discrimination against Christians. Similar concerns were raised by one of the gender-
equality organisations which described the CoFoE as a:
Very Brussels-bubble oriented process and no information has been provided on how
the debate is open at national and regional level with what support, for what kind of
groups. Women’s rights and feminist organisations do not seem to be specifically con-
sulted or receive support for campaigning for the conference. The need for the EU to
support women’s organisations, both in general and as part of the CoFoE process, was
highlighted
(RP, 74).
They further warned about the deficit of fora to discuss gender-equality and the deficit of
women taking part in the CoFoE, revealing that gender-equality is losing and is not in the
centre of attention. This critique of the exclusionary practices of the EU in decision-making
processes is accompanied by a recognition of the unequal power relations between the EU
and the Member States (as discussed by the gender-equality organisations) as well as the
EU and Churches (as in case of faith-based organisations). In the latter case, the faith-
based organisations consider the specific policy fields as limiting/endangering the inter-
ests or privileges of Churches or their adherents. More specifically, it was mentioned in
relation to the discussion and consultation on the change of the transparency registry. Both
the Conference of European Churches (CEC) and the Commission of the Bishops’ Confer-
ences of the European Union (COMECE) protested against the plans to extend the regis-
try’s prerogatives and include the Christian Churches. Also, both organisations implied
that the proposed stricter control over lobbying entities may in fact result in constraining
the development of civil society and, by implication, of democracy within the EU.
The third relevant institutional context that we detected in our analysis concerned the EU’s
refrainment or failure to act on behalf of oppressed groups, which was considered as a
failure to prevent dominance. For instance, it was visible in the case of migration organi-
sations. They see the dominance of the EU primarily as a reluctance to push the right (in
their view) policy agenda or even the failure to act on behalf of the most vulnerable. The
critical stance of CSOs vis-à-vis the EU point to their conviction that it is not merely a case
of the inability of the EU to act, but its unwillingness to do so, particularly in the sphere of
asylum. According to this perspective, the Commission is inadvertently handing over
power to Member States in order to more easily deny asylum seekers and other migrants
their rights, thus becoming the enabler of dominance towards the latter.
The European Commission clearly tries to push Member States to participate in relocation
as far as possible, knowing that proposing a compulsory quota would find no political con-
sensus. Even if we acknowledge the difficulty of such a task, we strongly disagree with the
idea that achieving a compromise by offering Member States the option to choose between
receiving asylum seekers or returning migrants to their country of origin reflects a consen-
sus on solidarity. Nor would it ultimately lead to an equitable division of responsibilities.
On the contrary, what the proposal really does is reconfirm and codify the disagreement
around solidarity and responsibility sharing between Member States within a legal frame-
work (RP, 38).

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Gender-equality organisations also raised the issue of the EU not acting properly to pre-
vent dominance in the form of eroding ‘its values in its own Member States’ (RP, 81, p.4),
and specially to protect the achievements of integration such as setting standards of gen-
der-equality. The policies to date are seen as ‘too soft’, not providing the sufficient effects
the EU is expected to ensure (RP, 87). Thus, the EU is urged to exercise its prerogatives
and undertake more decisive actions to implement gender-equality policies in the Member
States.
Values and principles
The second context where the articulations of dominance are present, is the sphere of val-
ues and principles. While this sphere is important for all actors, they differently define
what constitute the core values, how they should be understood and to whom they refer.
Not surprisingly, the normative dimension is perceived differently depending on the posi-
tion of actors on the pro-EU and anti- EU continuum. For more conservative and Euro-
sceptic groups, the EU acts as an imposter carrying certain (progressive) values against the
will of the people or against the traditional normative constellations. For the gender-equal-
ity and some of the migration CSOs the EU is failing in protecting its own (progressive)
values against the conservative backlash from some Member States and actors.
The strongest claims referring to values are presented by the anti-abortion, anti-gender
CSOs. They demand that the EU be based on Christian values and support a traditional
way of life and their visions crosscut with the agenda of Christian Churches as well as with
the (far) right (populist) movements or parties. In the narrative of such organisations, the
pro-gender or pro-sexual equality initiatives of European institutions are presented as
challenging the inner, true values and norms of the EU, embedded both in the Christian
tradition as well as the human rights framework. They present these initiatives as an im-
position of norms, blaming European secular elites. These perceptions of the EU as domi-
nated by secular forces were also detected among Eurosceptic actors (particularly within a
pan-European initiative which came from an informal radical-right wing coalition estab-
lished by 16 parties including Polish Law and Justice, Hungarian Fidesz, French Rassem-
blement National or Italian Lega). In a 2021 declaration they stressed:
the EU is becoming more and more a tool of radical forces that would like to carry
out a cultural, religious transformation and ultimately a nationless construction of
Europe, aiming to create a European Superstate, destruct or cancel European tra-
dition, transform basic social institutions and moral principles
(RP, 24).
The anti-gender, Eurosceptics and denialist groups represent conservative and traditional
values and often perceive the EU as a threat to the ‘real’ European tradition embedded in
Christianity. Similar arguments can be found in the proposals of faith-based organisations
who define the EU as ‘a project of peace and a community of principles and virtues’ (RP,
60), responsible for the promotion and protection of Christian values and Christians,

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especially in the EU neighbourhood. In their view, Christian values are a foundation for
the federal or even cosmopolitan visions of EU but at the same time, they claim that some
of the EU institutions (EP) are seen as overstretching their competencies by imposing cer-
tain values and norms on the nation state, overstepping sovereign competencies of the na-
tion state. EU visions of economic policies are also presented as being in contrast to the
(Christian) vision of EU integration based on social cohesion and human dignity. This is
mostly about the criticism of the EU becoming primarily an economic/market related pro-
ject. Such visions may lead to the detachment from the people but also from the integrated
view of people based on human dignity, as proposed by both organisations and the
Churches whom they represent. Therefore, for the faith-based organisations, the lack of
recognition of Christian values and traditions is seen as a way of establishing dominance
by the EU.
For gender-equality organisations the perception of dominance also occurs in the sphere
of values and human rights. The normative order proposed by these organisations is em-
bedded in values such as equality, diversity and inclusion, which are recognised as intrinsic
values and the ultimate goal of the EU. As stated above, their main concern is that the EU
is not sufficiently protective of the foundational values of the EU against Member States,
populist right-wing forces as well as in the context of various crises weakening these values.
In a similar vein, migration CSOs demand from the EU the protection of human rights in
the context of migration, for all persons regardless of their nationality or status, particu-
larly from outside of the EU. Further, they call on the EU for protection from Member
States and the EU’s own agencies responsible for a variety of brutal human rights violations
at the borders as well as toward asylum seekers within the EU.
Dominance as a strategy to (de)legitimise EU integration
Delegitimising the EU as dominating yet incapable.
In our analysis, narratives on dominance seem to serve as a strategy for various social ac-
tors to delegitimise the EU and its institutions. However, based on available data, we are
not be able to determine whether these are strategic actions. In our analysis, dominance
was utilised by various social actors to delegitimise the EU and its institutions. The prime
strategy was through othering the EU, its institutions and policies, as well as utilising pop-
ulist rhetoric. In the proposals put forward by Eurosceptic parties and adjoining CSOs, the
‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupted elites’ dichotomy can be observed, particularly in rela-
tion to EU institutions (e.g., the European Commission) and bureaucrats. The European
‘people’ are treated as dispensable, and their voices are being ignored, while the Brussels
‘elite’ is accused of threatening national actors (or nations) and dominating them. Domi-
nance is understood as crossing the limits given to EU institutions by the treaties and uti-
lising illicit means to impose its own agenda. Similarly, such tropes are used by denialist
actors which in principle position themselves as representatives of the pure (dominated)
people. For them, dominance can come in different forms and from all actors, including
external and national actors besides the EU. Finally, the anti-gender and anti-abortion

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groups mention the illicit hierarchical position of European bureaucrats and leftist elites
has enabled within the EU in order to impose certain normative orders perceived as harm-
ful to the people they claim to represent. This strategy is, in various forms, utilising the
image of the EU (or its institutions) as alien and other, facilitating the practices of juxta-
posing their own electorates and supporters against the EU.
The second type of delegitimising strategy pursued by similar Eurosceptic groups of actors
refers to the non-democratic character of the EU institutions, particularly the European
Commission. They stress the fact that EU institutions are acting without direct legitimacy
by citizens and point out the illicit hierarchy within the EU. Importantly for these actors,
these EU features are unfixable and intrinsic to the supranational construction, while for
proponents of integration, these are matters of unfinished institutional development of the
EU, as we argue below.
Finally, the EU is also seen as incompetent and incapable of acting in several areas such as
migration, health or security and only nation states are believed to be able to provide fully
fledged security and prosperity. As most of the EU institutions are not directly elected, they
are seen as illegitimate, and the proposal is to include national referendums as a means of
validating fundamental decisions of the Union (RP, 28). This proposal can serve as an ex-
ample of a strategy of delegitimization of EU policies and institutions that is often accom-
panied by criticism of their functioning and engagement in the internal affairs of Member
States. Consequently, the desired shape of the EU would be a union of loosely connected
nation states where decisions are preferably taken on the national level.
Legitimising the EU through ‘shaming’ dominance and EU submission.
Political actors defining themselves as primarily pro-European, stress that they are critical
of the policies the EU is pursuing. It is precisely in such a context that dominance is men-
tioned by migration and gender-equality organisations. We argue that it is also the policy
level where references to the EU’s (and in particular its executive institutions) dominance
is used for legitimising the EU and its competences. Actors highlight various unjust exer-
cises of power against the subjects they represent in order to push the EC to (re)gain a
better position to protect these specific groups.
These legitimising arguments can be grouped into two main types. Firstly, they are used to
stress the possible stronger role of the EC in pursuing desirable policies or more broadly
to protect specific values (human rights of refugees in the case of migration related CSOs
or women’s rights and gender-equality). For instance, in the case of migration, the CSOs
criticise the refrainment by the EC to push for human rights-based solutions against the
will of Member States. In a similar vein, gender-equality CSOs demand that the EU expand
the scope of its activities to build a feminist Europe. They argue that to bridge the gap
between the existing EU policies and the vision of a feminist Europe, the EU must, as a
part of its obligations and prerogatives shift from a strategy based on ‘soft’ laws related to
gender-equality, to expressing greater commitment to gender-equality issues and having
a real and significant impact on Member States. The EU is no longer seen mostly as being
responsible for the development of a general framework for gender-equality, and

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protection of this value as a European value. It is expected to monitor gender-equality pol-

icies and demand that Member States conform and implement policies as a part of building
a feminist Europe.
Secondly, the aim is to strengthen the control and accountability of specific EU institutions
and agencies through criticising current inadequate levels of transparency and accounta-
bility, which are seen as a failure to prevent dominance. This can be seen, for instance, in
the migration CSOs alarm concerning the new powers allocated to the European Border
and Coast Guard (EBCG, also known as Frontex) in 2019 (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border
and Coast Guard and Repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624
2019). Such new institutional power, it is highlighted, should come with accountability. As
an ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles) Policy Paper points out, ‘[we] inquire
whether the currently applicable accountability mechanisms are commensurate with the
hugely extended powers of the Agency under the 2019 Regulation’ (RP, 39). In the view of
these actors, the lack of accountability mechanisms may lead to violations of human rights,
such as expulsions and pushbacks, which in turn can lead to torture or ill-treatment, as
well as hindering access to asylum procedures and protection from violence. The proposed
extension of Frontex operations in neighbouring non-EU states poses particular risks in
this regard, entering a grey zone of jurisdiction over the protection of vulnerable persons,
and providing even less space for transparency and oversight.
Migration oriented CSOs stress dominance as a lack of transparency in the border proce-
dures themselves (particularly processing centres at borders), and as the asymmetrical
power structure of the EBCG and Asylum Agency in third countries. There is a clear lack
of oversight and legal jurisdiction for the actions noted, particularly in proposed EU agency
activities in neighbouring non-EU countries hosting or managing irregular migration flows
destined for the EU. This is connected to an illicit hierarchy with the proposed extended
powers of the EBCG in and outside of the EU borders lacking proper democratic scrutiny.
The gender-equality organisations also claim that the EU needs more political will to con-
trol and impose certain values and norms (of gender-equality) on the Member States, par-
ticularly those governed by right wing actors. This is more an acknowledgment of the ne-
cessity to use a legitimate power (stemming from anchoring gender-equality in core EU
values as argued above) rather than a form of clear-cut dominance.
Ultimately, in instances of (de)legitimising strategies, dominance plays a significant role

both for proponents and opponents of European integration. For the former, stressing the
hesitance (or refusal) to act (even if the competences are in place for EU institutions) is
perceived as allowing for dominance to be pursued by other actors at the expense of spe-
cific and often vulnerable social groups. Naming these practices aim at ‘shaming’ the EU
and forcing it to act or to pursue more ambitious policies. Another strategy is to pinpoint
the lack of transparency and accountability within the EU system that needs to be fixed in
order to achieve similar results – a more just and legitimate political order.
Finally, one can also detect – specifically when looking at the criticism of what is dysfunc-
tional in the EU system – what these actors’ preferred form of European integration and
its future course entails. For the proponents, especially gender-equality organisations, one

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can detect a more federalising vision with more stress on equipping the EU and its institu-
tions with sufficient tools, and especially with political will to implement the concept of
feminist Europe. For the opponents, reciprocal activity would be desired as they advocate
for reforms that would limit the competences of the institutions and cede them to the na-
tional parliaments.
Conclusions
Through the analysis of often conflicting proposals on the future of the EU coming from a
range of collective social actors spanning the anti/pro-European political spectrum, the
paper draws a complex image of relational structures and nodes or locations of perceived
dominance – in the form of unjustified exercises of power – within the EU polity. Its re-
construction also highlights some interesting patterns and offers some points of reflection.
The analysis of the relational aspect of dominance reveals that the EU features in domi-
nance relationships by all of the analysed collective social actors. However, their position
towards EU integration modifies how dominance is conceptualised: Who dominates and
who is dominated, and what functions it plays. Eurosceptic populist actors utilise the ref-
erences to dominance by the EU and its institutions to more convincingly present the EU’s
threatening position toward the nation state and national sovereignty. Since at the same
time they also present the EU as weak and incapable of dealing with crises as well as man-
aging daily affairs, dominance becomes a useful construction because it focuses on abuse
by EU institutions (and the EC in particular) of their competences rather than on who is
more powerful.
Strikingly, the current FoE debate is also witnessing reinvigorated attempts by the oppo-
nents of integration to build a compelling narrative of changing the course of integration.
Our analysis shows that the Eurosceptic actors utilise ’the story’ of dominance to
strengthen their sovereigntist arguments, which were needed in order to reconfigure their
narratives after the perceived failure of Brexit. Instead of convincing their voters to exit the
EU, these actors promote a vision of reversed integration. It implies returning many com-
petences to nation states and limiting EU integration to the economic integration of the
single market (Bellucci 2019; Fabbrini and Zgaga, 2022; Góra and Zielińska, 2022;
Spiegeleire et al., 2017). Since many sovereigntists are also populist actors, they employed
the populist tropes of othering the EU and its institutions (Verzichelli, 2020). The ‘pure
people’ versus ‘the corrupted elites’ dichotomy can be observed in relation to the EU insti-
tutions and bureaucrats in particular. Sovereigntists accuse them of threatening national
actors (or nations) and dominating them, understood as crossing the limits given them by
treaties and utilising illicit means to impose their own agenda. Hence, the criticism also
focuses on the polity level and questions the institutional arrangements allowing for the
shift of the power from the national level, seen as democratic and legitimate, to the EU
level, lacking both.
Interestingly, the framing of the EU and its institutions as dominating is not confined to
the strong Eurosceptic camp but is also expressed by proponents of European integration.
Analysed form another angle, it can be an effect of the perceived institutional power of the

Europe
EU. Noticing and stressing the ability of the EU to manipulate and/or impose certain ac-
tions within its competences given by treaties against the wish of national governments –
the powerhouses in the current political landscape in Europe – or hesitancy to act, demon-
strate for proponents of EU integration the power and potential of the EU (or the EC for
that matter). Therefore, the perception of dominance tends to be used as legitimising a
narrative for EU institutions, stressing more competence to the supranational level and
justifying the limits of power for Member States. Here, the intuitional arrangements as
such stay unquestioned, but the shape of the policies and authority to create them seem be
constitute the main bone of contention. Therefore, the common denominator for both op-
ponents and proponents of European integration is that they do refer in their narratives to
dominance and locate the EU as a side of such a relationship. As stated in the theoretical
introduction, the narratives on the EU have a mutually reinforcing effect even if they are
opposing. As in narrative Ju-jitsu (McMahon and Kaiser, 2022), these references to dom-
inance are an effect of competing anti-integration narratives and the pro-European coun-
ter-narratives.
Overall, our analysis also demonstrates that references to dominance in the context of Eu-
ropean integration shed light on how the functioning of democracy within the EU is as-
sessed. Selected actors – claiming to represent citizens –strongly advocated for enhancing
the ability of citizens to express their preferences. This was characteristic for all actors re-
gardless of their positioning on the pro vs. anti-EU spectrum. They pointed out the lack of
transparency and accountability of the EU (and occasionally national) institutions. Inter-
estingly, they were also very critical of the flagship EU initiative of CoFoE that is supposed
to strengthen the role of citizens’ views into the novel consultation system.

Europe
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Conference Proceedings. Athens, Greece, September 21st - 23rd, 2018.

ANNEX 1. THE LIST OF ANALYSED REFORM PROPOSALS.
Name of Title of the pro- Level of Type of collec- Medium for making pro- Date proposal Code of proposal
the actor posal actors' tive social ac- posal made
operation tor
1 petition of 5G Appeal. Sci- global movements-de- website of organisation 9/13/2017 petition_denial-

various sig- entist Appeal for nialists ists_2017-03-12
natories 5G Moratorium
2 Instytut Megaustawa 5G. national movements-de- website of organisation 8/20/2019 ISO_denialists_2019-
Spraw Oby- Czy ta księga nialists 08-20
watelskich rzeczywiście jest
(ISO) biała?
3 European Respect, promote European movements-de- website of organisation 3/2/2022 EFVV_denial-
Forum for and protect free- nialists ists_2022-03-02
Vaccine dom of informed
Vigilance vaccination con-
(EFVV) sent throughout
Europe
4 Stop 5G Proposal 1 European movements-de- website of organisation 10/7/2021 Stop5G1_denial-
nialists ists_2021-10-07







11 Doctors for Open letter to European movements-de- website of organisation 4/24/2021 DCE_denialists_2021-
Covid Eth- EMA nialists 04-24
ics (DCE)
12 Polskie kulminacja świa- national movements-de- website of organisation 5/16/2022 PSNLiN_denial-
Stowarzysz towego sojuszu nialists ists_2022-05-16
enie medycznego
Niezależny
ch Lekarzy
i
Naukowcó
w
(PSNLiN)
13 Stowarzysz List otwarty do national movements-de- website of organisation 8/11/2021 SWW_denial-
enie Wolne kapłanów nialists ists_2021-08-11
Wybory kościoła
(SWW) rzymskokatolicki
ego
14 Kongres Manifest lubelski national movements-de- website of organisation 10/8/2021 KSW_denialists_2021-
Środowisk środowisk nialists 10-08
Wolnościo- wolnościowych
wych
(KSW)

15 Polskie Mówimy NIE national movements-de- website of organisation 2/15/2022 PSNLiN_denial-

Stowarzysz wobec dyktatury nialists ists_2022-02-15
enie WHO
Niezależny
ch Lekarzy
i
Naukowcó
w
(PSNLiN)
16 Polskie Wezwanie do national movements-de- website of organisation 5/14/2021 PSNLiN_denial-
Stowarzysz działania nialists ists_2022-05-14
enie przeciwko
Niezależny narodowym
ch Lekarzy świadectwom
i szczepień
Naukowcó
w
(PSNLiN)
17 Stowarzysz O naszą wolność. national movements-de- website of organisation 3/16/2022 SWW_denial-
enie Wolne Apel do posłów i nialists ists_2022-03-16
Wybory senatorów RP.
(SWW)
18 Stowarzysz Oświadczenie national movements-de- website of organisation 11/16/2021 SWW_denial-
enie Wolne Ruchu Wolne nialists ists_2021-11-16
Wybory Wybory ws
(SWW) ustawy 1449
19 Doctors for Rebuttal letter to European movements-de- website of organisation 4/1/2021 DCE_denialists_2021-
Covid Eth- EMA nialists 04-01
ics (DCE)
20 Polskie Sprzeciw dla global movements-de- website of organisation 5/20/2022 PSNLiN_denial-
Stowarzysz jednego nialists ists_2022-05-20
enie

Niezależny światowego
ch Lekarzy rządu
i
Naukowcó
w
(PSNLiN)/
Health
Freedom
Defense
Fund
21 Doctors for Urgent open let- European movements-de- website of organisation 3/10/2021 DCE_denialists_2021-
Covid Eth- ter from doctors nialists 03-10
ics (DCE) and scientists to
EMA
22 Stowarzysz Deklaracja national movements-de- website of organisation 1/22/2021 SWW_denial-
enie Wolne nialists ists_2021-01-22
Wybory
(SWW)
23 European The future of the European move- website of organisation 3/7/2017 ECR_Euroscep-
Conserva- European Union ments/parties- tic_2017-03-07
tives and Eurosceptic
Reformists
(ECR)
24 16 Right Budapest Decla- European move- Other 7/2/2021 16RR_Euroscep-
Wing Radi- ration ments/parties- tic_2021-07-02
cal Parties Eurosceptic
(16RR)
25 13 Right Warsaw Summit European move- Other 12/4/2021 13RR_Euroscep-
Wing Radi- ments/parties- tic_2021-12-04
(13RR)

26 10 Right Madrid Summit European move- Other 1/29/2022 10RR_Euroscep-

Wing Radi- ments/parties- tic_2022-01-29
(10RR)
27 Identity and Gerolf Anne- European move- website of organisation 6/9/2021 ID_Eurosceptic_2021-
Democracy mans on the Fu- ments/parties- 06-09
(ID) ture of Europe Eurosceptic
28 Identity and Our 12 priorities European move- website of organisation n.d. IDF_Eurosceptic_nd
Democracy for Europe ments/parties-
Foundation Eurosceptic
(IDF)
29 European ECR conferences European move- website of organisation 6/2/2021 ECR_Euroscep-
Conserva- on FoE Europe’s ments/parties- tic_2021-06-02
tives and Future-New Eurosceptic
Reformists Hope
(ECR)
30 New Direc- Prof. Zdzisław European move- website of organisation 11/26/2020 ND_Euroscep-
tion – The Krasnodębski ments/parties- tic_2020-11-26
Foundation MEP: The Future Eurosceptic
for Euro- of Europe - Se-
pean Re- curity, demogra-
form (ND) phy, energy—
and more
31 The Euro- Vision for Eu- European move- website of organisation n.d. ECR_Eurosceptic_n.d.
pean Con- rope ments/parties-
servatives Eurosceptic
and Re-
formists
Group in
the Euro-
pean Com-
mittee of

the Regions
(ECR)
32 European ECRE Com- European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 11/23/2018 ECRE_migra-
Council on ments on the tion tion_2018_11_23
Refugees Commission Pro-
and Exiles posal for a Regu-
(ECRE) lation on the Eu-
ropean Border
and Coast Guard
33 Red Cross Key Priorities for European CSOs migra- website of organisation 6/24/2019 RC_migra-
Europe Of- the EU in the Fu- tion tion_2019_06_24
fice (RC) ture
34 Concord - CONCORD ini- European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 6/10/2020 CONC_migra-
European tial reaction to tion tion_2020_06_10
NGO Con- the New Pact on
federation Migration and
for Relief Asylum
and Devel-
opment
(CONC)
35 European The Future EU European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 10/30/2020 ECRE_migra-
Council on Action Plan on tion tion_2020_10_30
Refugees Integration and
and Exiles Inclusion: Ensur-
& Platform ing an Approach
for Interna- Inclusive of All
tional Co- Policy Paper
operation
on Undocu-
mented

Migrants
(ECRE)
36 European LYMEC's vision European website of organisation 5/25/2021 LYMEC_migra-

Liberal on political pri- tion_2021_05_25
Youth orities - Asylum
(LYMEC) and Migration
37 European Migrants on the European CSOs migra- website of organisation 8/10/2021 ES_migra-
Sardines Balkan Route: 6 tion tion_2021_08_10
(ES) concrete pro-
posals
38 Churches' Comments on European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 4/13/2021 CCME_migra-
Commis- the Proposal for tion tion_2021_04_13.1
sion for Mi- a Regulation of
grants in the European
Europe Parliament and
(CCME) of the Council on
asylum and mi-
gration manage-
ment and amend-
ing Council Di-
rective (EC)
2003/109 and the
proposed Regu-
lation (EU)
XXX/XXX
(Asylum and Mi-
gration Fund)
39 European ECRE Com- European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 2/28/2021 ECRE_migra-
Council on ments on the tion tion_2021_02_28
Refugees Commission Pro-
posal for a

and Exiles Regulation on

(ECRE) Asylum and Mi-
gration Manage-
ment
40 European PROTECTION European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 2/28/2017 ECRE_migra-
Council on IN EUROPE: tion tion_2017_02_28
Refugees SAFE AND LE-
and Exiles GAL ACCESS
(ECRE) CHANNELS:
ECRE’S VI-
SION OF EU-
ROPE’S ROLE
IN THE
GLOBAL REF-
UGEE PRO-
TECTION RE-
GIME: POLICY
PAPER 1
41 Caritas Eu- Caritas Europa’s European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 12/31/2020 CE_migra-
ropa (CE) analysis and rec- tion tion_2020_12_31
ommendations
on the EU Pact
on Migration and
Asylum
42 The Com- Statement by the European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 12/15/2020 CCEC_migra-
mission of COMECE Work- tion tion_2020_12_15
Catholic ing Group on
Episcopal Migration and
Confer- Asylum on the
ences of the EU Pact on Mi-
EU - Work- gration and Asy-
ing Group lum proposed by

on Migra- the European

tion and Commission
Asylum
(COMECE)
43 Churches' Comments on European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 4/13/2021 CCME_migra-
Commis- the EU New Pact tion tion_2021_04_13
sion for Mi- on Migration and
grants in Asylum
Europe
(CCME)
44 Danish Ref- New Pact, New National CSOs – migra- website of organisation 3/31/2020 DRC_migra-
ugee Coun- Direction? tion tion_2020_03_31
cil (DRC) DRC's Recom-
mendations on
the New Pact on
Migration and
Asylum
45 Don Bosco Children cannot European CSOs – migra- website of organisation 11/29/2016 DBI_migra-
Interna- wait: 7 priority tion tion_2016_11_29
tional - actions to protect
Joint State- all refugee and
ment of 78 migrant children
CSOs
(DBI)
46 Association The call for opin- National CSOs anti- Contribution to EU con- 4/20/2021 ASV_anti-abor-
Society and ions concerning abortion & sultations/legislation/pol- tion/anti-gender_2021-
Values EC goal to ex- Anti-gender icy proposals 04-20
(ASV) tend the list of
EU crimes to
‘hate speech’

47 Association The Coman case National CSOs anti- Contribution to EU con- 5/30/2018 ASV_anti-abor-
Society and and national sov- abortion & sultations/legislation/pol- tion/anti-gender_2018-
Values ereignty in mari- Anti-gender icy proposals 05-30
(ASV) tal matters
48 Association Opinion to the National CSOs anti- Contribution to EU con- 4/29/2021 ASV_anti-abor-
Society and European Com- abortion & sultations/legislation/pol- tion/anti-gender_2021-
Values mission on the Anti-gender icy proposals 06-29
(ASV) public consulta-
tion on the pro-
tection of women
against vio-
lence and the
consultation on
protection
against gender-
based violence
49 The Com- Position paper of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 6/17/2021 COMECE_faith
mission of the secretariat of based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2021-06-17
the Bishop's COMECE on the icy proposals
Confer- Position paper of
ences of the the secretariat of
European COMECE on the
Union Report on the
(COMECE) Situation of Sex-
ual and Repro-
ductive
Health and
Rights in the EU,
in the Frame-
work of
Women’s Health

50 One of Us Presentation for European CSOs anti- website of organisation 2/23/2019 OneofUs_anti-abor-
European presentation abortion & tion/anti-gender_2019-
Federation ‘One of Us’ Anti-gender 02-23
for Life and Manifest in
Human Paris
Dignity
(OneofUs)
51 One of Us One of Us state- European CSOs anti- website of organisation 7/8/2022 OneofUs_anti-abor-
European ment on the new abortion & tion/anti-gender_2022-
Federation resolution of the Anti-gender 07-08
for Life and European Parlia-
Human ment on the 7th
Dignity of July
(OneofUs)
52 One of Us The cause of Eu- European CSOs anti- website of organisation 2/20/2019 OneofUs_anti-abor-
European rope’s crisis lies abortion & tion/anti-gender_2019-
Federation in a shift away Anti-gender 02-20
for Life and from Christianity
Human and its Christian
Dignity roots
(OneofUs)
53 One of Us Manifesto Cul- CSOs anti- website of organisation 4/11/2019 OneofUs_anti-abor-
European tural Platform abortion & tion/anti-gender_2019-
Federation “One of Us” For Anti-gender 04-11
for Life and a Europe faithful
Human to human dignity
Dignity
(OneofUs)
54 European Preventing abor- European CSOs anti- website of organisation 6/22/2017 ECLJ_anti-abor-
Centre for tion in Europe. abortion & tion/anti-gender_2017-
Law and Legal framework Anti-gender 06-22

Justice and social poli-

(ECLJ) cies
55 Ordo Iuris Position of the National CSOs anti- website of organisation n.d. OI_anti-abortion/anti-
(OI) Ordo Iuris Insti- abortion & gender_n.d.
tute on the re- Anti-gender
quest for an
opinion submit-
ted by the Euro-
pean Parliament
under Article
218(11) TFEU.
56 Ordo Iuris Say No to EU National CSOs anti- website of organisation 00.00.2021 OI_anti-abortion/anti-
(OI) Redefining abortion & gender_2001
parenthood. Let's Anti-gender
protect the fam-
ily!
57 Ordo Iuris Demographic National CSOs anti- website of organisation n.d. OI_anti-abortion/anti-
(OI) Policy of the EU abortion & gender_n.d.
and the Popula- Anti-gender
tion Challenges
faced by Mem-
ber States
58 Ordo Iuris Równouprawnie National CSOs anti- website of organisation 1/1/2020 OI_anti-abortion/anti-
(OI) nie czy abortion & gender_2020
uniformizacja? Anti-gender
Polityka na rzecz
równości kobiet i
mężczyzn Unii
Europejskiej.

59 The Com- Bulgaria’s Presi- European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 3/1/2018 COMECE_faith
mission of dency of the based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2018-03-01
the Bishop's Council of the icy proposals
Confer- European Union.
ences of the A Catholic
European Church Reflec-
Union tion on the Presi-
(COMECE) dency Priorities.
60 The Com- Romania’s Presi- European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 1/1/2019 COMECE_faith
mission of dency of the based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2019-01-01
Confer- European Union.
ences of the A Catholic
European Church Reflec-
Union tion on the Presi-
(COMECE) dency Priorities
61 The Com- Contribution of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 7/1/2019 CEMECE-CEC_faith
mission of COMECE and based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2019-07-01
the Bishop's CEC to Finland’s icy proposals
Confer- Presidency Pro-
ences of the gramme “Sus-
European tainable Europe
Union and – Sustainable Fu-
Congress of ture”
European
Churches
(COMECE-
CEC)
62 The Com- Contribution of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 00.00.2020 COMECE-CEC_faith
mission of COMECE and based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2020
the Bishop's CEC to Croatia’s icy proposals
EU Council

Confer- Presidency Pro-

ences of the gramme ‘A
European strong Europe in
Union and a world of chal-
Congress of lenges’
European
Churches
(COMECE-
CEC)
63 The Com- Contribution of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 7/1/2020 COMECE-CEC_faith
mission of COMECE and based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2020-07-01
the Bishop's CEC to the Ger- icy proposals
Confer- man EU Presi-
ences of the dency Pro-
European gramme To-
Union and gether for Eu-
Congress of rope’s Recovery
European
Churches
(COMECE-
CEC)
64 The Com- Contribution of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 00-00.2020 COMECE-CEC_faith
the Bishop's CEC to the Por- icy proposals
Confer- tuguese EU Pres-
ences of the idency Pro-
European gramme ‘Time to
Union and deliver: for a
Congress of fair, green and
European digital recovery’
Churches

(COMECE-
CEC)
65 The Com- Making the Med- European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 1/18/2021 COMECE-CEC_faith
mission of iterranean again based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2021-01-18
the Bishop's a place of peace- icy proposals
Confer- ful encounters. A
ences of the contribution of
European the COMECE
Union Secretariat in
(COMECE) view of the up-
coming renewal
of EU’s part-
nership with the
Southern Neigh-
bourhood
66 The Com- Malta's Presi- European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 00.00.2017 COMECE_faith
mission of dency of the based sultations/legislation/pol- based_2017
Confer- European Union:
ences of the Reflections of
European the Church of
Union Malta
(COMECE)
67 The Com- Contribution of European CSOs – faith Contribution to EU con- 00.00.2021 COMECE-CEC_faith
the Bishop's CEC to the Slo- icy proposals
Confer- venian EU Coun-
ences of the cil Presidency
European Programme To-
Union and gether Resilient
Congress of Europe

European
Churches
(COMECE-
CEC)
68 Political Concerns on National CSOs anti- Contribution to EU con- 5/5/2021 PNV_anti-abor-
Network for draft report abortion & sultations/legislation/pol- tion/anti-gender_2021-
Values threatening hu- Anti-gender icy proposals 05-05
(PNV) man rights at the
European Parlia-
ment. The situa-
tion of sexual
and reproductive
health and rights
in the EU
69 Young A Gender Re- European CSOs gender Website of organization 5/20/2019 YFE_gender-equal-
Feminist sponsive Europe equality ity_2019-05-20
Europe
(YFE)
70 Young Feminist Activ- European CSOs gender Website of organization 4/3/2019 YFE_gender-equal-
Feminist ism in Peace and equality ity_2019-04-03
Europe Security
(YFE)
71 Young What Feminist European CSOs gender Website of organization 1/14/2022 YFE_gende-equal-
Feminist Gender-Based equality ity_2022-01-14
Europe Violence Policy
(YFE) Can Look Like
72 Young Young Feminist European CSOs gender Website of organization 3/22/2021 YFE_gender-equal-
Feminist Manifesto. A equality ity_2021-03-22
Europe Bold and Trans-
(YFE) formative Vision
for Change

73 G5+ Brainstorming European CSOs gender Website of organization April 2021 G5+_gender-equal-
session on the equality ity_2021-04
Conference on
the Future of Eu-
rope
74 G5+ CoFoE: Why a European CSOs gender Website of organization October 2021 G5+_gender-equal-
Gender Perspec- equality ity_2021-10
tive is needed -
Recommenda-
tions and High-
lights
75 G5+ CoFoE: Women European CSOs gender Website of organization February 2022 G5+_gender-equal-
and the Future of equality ity_2022-02
Europe -Recom-
mendations and
Highlights
76 G5+ Now more than European CSOs gender Website of organization 4/26/2020 G5+_gender-equal-
ever - Europe equality ity_2020-04-26
Needs a Gender
Strategy - Open
Letter to the Eu-
ropean Commis-
sion
77 European Appeal to the European CSOs gender Website of organization / 12/1/2020 EWLA_gender-equal-
Women German Presi- equality Press release ity_2020-12-01
Lawyers dency
Association
(EWLA)
78 European Proposal for a European CSOs gender Website of organization / 3/8/2021 EWLA_gender-equal-
Women Directive of the equality Press release ity_2021-03-08
Lawyers European Parlia-
ment and of the

Association Council to
(EWLA) strengthen the
application of the
principle of
equal pay for
equal work or
work for equal
value between
men and women
through pay
transparency and
enforcement
mechanisms
79 European EU legislative European CSOs gender Website of organization / 7/21/2021 EWLA_gender-equal-
Women bodies to classify equality Press release ity_2021-07-21
Lawyers Gender-based vi-
Association olence as a crime
(EWLA)
80 European EWLA wel- European CSOs gender Website of organization / 3/18/2022 EWLA_gender-equal-
Women comes the adop- equality Press release ity_2022-03-18
Lawyers tion by the EU of
Association a general ap-
(EWLA) proach on an EU
directive aiming
to strengthen
gender equality
on corporate
boards
81 Interna- Conference on European CSOs gender Website of organization / November IPPF_gender-equal-
tional the Future of Eu- equality position paper 2021 ity_2021-11
Planned rope a call for a
Parenthood feminist Europe:

Federation the need for

European stronger EU
Network leadership to ad-
(IPPF) vance sexual and
reproductive
health and rights
in the EU and
beyond
82 Interna- Call on the EU to European CSOs gender Website of organization 5/4/2018 IPPF_gender-equal-
tional reflect gender equality ity_2018-05-04
Planned equality in the
Parenthood next multiannual
Federation budget
European
Network
(IPPF)
83 Interna- Barometer of European CSOs gender Website of organization 1/15/2015 IPPF_gender-equal-
tional Women's s Ac- equality ity_2015-01-15
Planned cess to Modern
Parenthood Contraceptive
Federation Choice in 16 Eu-
European ropean Countries
Network
(IPPF)
84 Interna- For a gender- European CSOs gender Website of organization March 2018 IPPF_gender-equal-
tional sensitive EU equality ity_2018-03
Planned budget
Parenthood
Federation
European
Network
(IPPF)

85 Interna- How can you, as European CSOs gender Website of organization 7/19/2019 IPPF_gender-equal-
tional a MEP, cham- equality ity_2019-07-19
Planned pion sexual and
Parenthood reproductive
Federation health and rights
European (SRHR)?
Network
(IPPF)
86 Interna- The new presi- European CSOs gender Website of organization 1/31/2022 IPPF_gender-equal-
tional dency trio. An equality ity_2022-01-31
Planned opportunity for
Parenthood gender equality
Federation and SRHR
European
Network
(IPPF)
87 European The Conference European CSOs gender Website of organization March 2022 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s on the Future of equality ity_2022-03
Lobby Europe: A signif-
(EWL) icant opportunity
to advance
women’s rights
in the EU
88 European Need for in- European CSOs gender Website of organization 7/2/2020 EWL-gender-equal-
Women’s creased funds for equality ity_2020-07-02
Lobby equality between
(EWL) women and men
and for the EU’s
legal obligation
to implement
gender main-
streaming

89 European Open letter to the European CSOs gender Website of organization 11/3/2020 EWL-gender-equal-
Women’s ECOFIN Council equality ity_2020-11-03
Lobby calling for a
(EWL) long-term EU
budget and re-
covery funds that
advances
women’s rights
and equality be-
tween women
and men
90 European Women for Eu- European CSOs gender Website of organization 1/15/2019 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s rope. Europe for equality ity_2019-01-15
Lobby Women. A new
(EWL) kind of leader-
ship for the 21st
century. Euro-
pean Women’s
Lobby Manifesto
for the 2019 Eu-
ropean elections
91 European EWL's recom- European CSOs gender Website of organization 5/20/2020 EWL-gender-equal-
Women’s mendations to equality ity_2020-05-20a
Lobby Member States
(EWL) on the EU Gen-
der Equality
Strategy 2020-
2025
92 European Brussels can't European CSOs gender Website of organization 11/15/2017 EWL-gender-equal-
Women’s brush sexual har- equality ity_2017-11-15
Lobby assment under
(EWL) the carpet

93 European Call to put gen- European CSOs gender Website of organization 12/12/2018 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s der equality at equality ity_2018-12-12
Lobby the heart of the
(EWL) future budget of
the EU
94 European Consultation on European CSOs gender Website of organization 3/21/2019 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s European Semes- equality ity_2019-03-21
Lobby ter... at last?
(EWL)
95 European Together for a European CSOs gender Website of organization undated EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s feminist Europe. equality ity_undated
Lobby Our priorities for
(EWL) the European
Union
2016//2020
96 European European European CSOs gender Website of organization 2/8/2017 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s Women’s Lobby equality ity_2017-02-08
Lobby calls for a solid
(EWL) gender equality
Pillar of Social
Rights
97 European Statement sub- European CSOs gender Website of organization December EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s mitted by Euro- equality 2020 ity_2020-12
Lobby pean Women's
(EWL) Lobby, a non-
governmental or-
ganization in
consultative sta-
tus with the Eco-
nomic and Social
Council

98 European EWL Position European CSOs gender Website of organization 9/3/2002 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s Paper on the Fu- equality ity_2002-09-03
Lobby ture of Europe
(EWL)
99 European From words to European CSOs gender Website of organization 5/20/2020 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s action: EWL’s equality ity_2020-05-20b
Lobby recommenda-
(EWL) tions to the Euro-
pean Parliament
on the Gender
Equality Strategy
2020-2025
100 European Gender Equality European CSOs gender Website of organization 10/11/2017 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s in Europe - I's equality ity_2017-10-11
Lobby about time!
(EWL)
101 European Open Letter to European CSOs gender Website of organization 6/18/2019 EWL-gender_equal-
Women’s the European equality ity_2019-06-18
Lobby Heads of States
(EWL) ahead of the Eu-
ropean Council
on June 20-21
102 European EWL's President European CSOs gender Website of organization 2/10/2020 EWL_gender equal-
Women’s and Vice-Presi- equality ity_2020-01-10
Lobby dents meet Com-
(EWL) missioner for
equality Helena
Dalli to discuss
women's rights
in Europe and
the upcoming
EU strategy on

equality between
women and men.
103 European Purple Pact. A European CSOs gender Website of organization 2019 EWL_gender equal-
Women’s Feminist Ap- equality ity_2019
Lobby proach to the
(EWL) Economy
104 European The EP joins European CSOs gender Website of organization 6/9/2015 EWL-gender_equal-
Women’s women's organi- equality ity_2015-06-09
Lobby sations in calling
(EWL) for an EU Strat-
egy on equality
between women
and men
105 European The European European CSOs gender Website of organization 5/4/2020 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s Commission equality ity_2020-05-04
Lobby must act now to
(EWL) close the gender
pay gap
106 European The European European CSOs gender Website of organization 4/26/2017 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s Women's Lobby equality ity_2017-04-26
Lobby welcomes the
(EWL) Commission's
Work Life Bal-
ance but calls
for strengthened
maternity rights
for women
107 European We won't wait European CSOs gender Website of organization 11/20/2017 EWL_gender-equal-
Women’s another century equality ity_2017-11-20
Lobby
(EWL)

108 ILGA-Eu- EU shifts gear European CSOs gender Website of organization 11/12/2020 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope with adoption of equality ity_2020-11-12
LGBTIQ equal-
ity strategy
109 ILGA-Eu- EU LGBTI Strat- European CSOs gender Website of organization Apr-20 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope egy 2020-2024. equality ity_2020-04
Key EU legisla-
tive and policy
initiatives for
LGBTI rights in
Europe and be-
yond. Proposal
by ILGA-Europe
110 ILGA-Eu- EU LGBTIQ European CSOs gender Website of organization Nov-21 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope Equality Strategy equality ity_2021-11
– First year im-
plementation
evaluation
111 ILGA-Eu- European Parlia- European CSOs gender Website of organization 2/14/2019 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope, OII ment adopts equality ity_2019-02-14
Europe landmark resolu-
tion on intersex
rights
112 ILGA-Eu- LGBTI-inclusive European CSOs gender Website of organization Feb-20 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope Gender Equality equality ity_2020-02
work
113 ILGA-Eu- One in four European CSOs gender Website of organization 6/12/2019 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope MEPs committed equality ity_2019-06-12
to work on
LGBTI equality
in new European
Parliament

114 ILGA-Eu- Strong funda- European CSOs gender Website of organization 6/19/2019 ILGA_gender-equal-
rope mental rights equality ity_2019-06-19
framework must
be part of the
next strategic
agenda for the
EU

About the authors: Karolina Czerska-Shaw is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at
Jagiellonian University
Magdalena Góra is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Jagiellonian University and
leads the EU3D work package on the Future of Europe Reforms
Kinga Sekerdej is Assistant Professor of Sociology at University of Science and Technology in
Kraków
Natasza Styczyńska is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Jagiellonian University
Marta Warat is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Jagiellonian University
Katarzyna Zielińska is Associate Professor of Sociology at Jagiellonian University
EU3D Research Papers

EU3D Research Paper no. 26
Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Magdalena Góra, Kinga Sekerdej, Natasza Styczyńska, Marta Warat
and Katarzyna Zielińska
Who’s dominating whom? The perception of (EU) dominance in the debate on the Future
of Europe

Resul Umit, Asimina Michailidou and Hans-Jörg Trenz
A cross-country analysis of news reports on differentiation in the European Union

Fabian Terpan and Sabine Saurugger
Escaping the Court: Supranational adjudication and the EU/UK relationship

John Erik Fossum
The political future of the European Economic Area

Sergio Fabbrini and Tiziano Zgaga
Sovereignism and its implication: The differentiated disintegration of the European Union

Kalypso Nicolaidis
Differentiation, dominance and democratic congruence:
A relational view

Michael Kaeding
EU agencies and Brexit
Assessing the implications of Brexit for EU agencies

Justus Schönlau
Brexit: the sub-national dimensions from the vantage point of the European Committee of

the Regions

Joanna Orzechowska-Wacławska, Zdzisław Mach, Kinga Sekerdej Jagiellonian
The limits of voluntary submission
Dominance frames in Polish parliamentary debates on the EU accession

Federico Fabbrini
Brexit and the future of European integration

John Erik Fossum
On the search for viable governance in contested federal-type settings: the European
Union and Canada compared

John Erik Fossum
EU Constitutional Models in 3D: differentiation, dominance and democracy

Cécile Pelaudeix
The rise of China and EU vulnerability

Julian Schüssler, Max Heermann, Dirk Leuffen, Lisanne de Blok and Catherine de Vries
Differentiated integration – one or many? Public support for the varieties of differentiated
integration

Magdalena Góra and Marcin Zubek
Stuck in ENP purgatory? An assessment of the EU’s external legitimacy mechanisms

Dirk Leuffen
Member state equality and procedural fairness in differentiated integration:
A republican perspective

Martin Moland and Asimina Michailidou
News, misinformation and support for the EU: Exploring the effect of social media as
polarising force or neutral mediators

Jozef Bátora and John Erik Fossum
Differentiation and segmentation

EU3D Research Papers no. 8
Christopher Lord
The European Parliament and Brexit

Sergio Fabbrini
Executive power and political accountability: assessing the European Union’s experience

Jean-Claude Piris
The making of Brexit: Legal aspects of the 2016-2020 negotiations

Niilo Kauppi and Hans-Jörg Trenz
Notes on the ‘politics’ of EU politicization

Nanette Neuwahl
The proposed EU-UK partnership agreement as a Canada style agreement

Asimina Michailidou and Hans-Jörg Trenz
EU differentiation, dominance and the control function of journalism

Dirk Leuffen, Jana Müller and Julian Schüssler
National concerns and individual liberal values explain support for differentiated
integration in the European Union

John Erik Fossum
Europe’s triangular challenge: Differentiation, dominance and democracy

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Who’s dominating whom?

The perception of (EU)

EU3D Research Papers

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

EU3D Research Papers (online) | ISSN: 2535-8170

info@eu3d.uio.no www.eu3d.uio.no @EU3Dh2020

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Karolina Czerska-Shaw, Magdalena Góra, Kinga Sekerdej, Natasza Styczyńska, Marta

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Partially as a response to these aforementioned crises, the EU initiated an unprecedented

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

competences or protecting national competences, as well as developing new policies

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 3

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Theoretical framework: perceptions of dominance and Euro-

In our approach we utilise the concept of dominance used by theorists of democracy

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

organisation, or a collective) can be arbitrarily interfered with and/or manipulated’

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

compliance with undesired rules or decisions of a governing authority’ (Scharpf, 2009,

Who’s dominating whom and how? Research questions,

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 6

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

In an attempt to better understand the perception of dominance by the selected actors, we

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Table 1. Type of collective social actors and number of proposals.

Level of actor’s Move- Think CSOs – CSOs – CSOs – CSOs Total

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 9

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Actor Relational aspects of dominance Articulations of domi- Dominance as strategy

Lack of agency – rights, Legitimising via demands

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

CSOs – faith EU + Majoritarian Discrimination of majority Ambiguous perception of

CSOs – EU – through policies European people Discrimination of citizens, Lack of recognition of

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Unelected European institu- EU seen as incompe-

Sovereigntist context; EU not democratically

Source: Own compilation.

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 12

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

Similar criticisms and expressions of resentment due to the perception of dominance of

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 14

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

(Report Proposal (RP) no. 12, 15 and 20, see annex).

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

As the principle of non-discrimination entails that discriminating means not only

The analysis of various documents issued by faith-based organisations also indicates an

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 17

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296120

EU3D Research Paper no. 26 | 18