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POLITICS AND CULTURE
IN INTERNATIONAL
HISTORY
POLITICS AND CULTURE
IN INTERNATIONAL
HISTORY
From the Ancient Near East
to the Opening of the Modern Age
SECOND EDITION
ADDA B. BOZEMAN
With a new introduction by the author
13
a ^^ Taylor & Francis Croup
LONDON AND NEW YORK
Originally published in 1960 by Princeton University Press
Published 1994 by Transaction Publishers

Published 2017 by Routledge
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New material this edition copyright © 1994 by Taylor & Francis.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

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without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Catalog Number: 94-8483
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Bozeman, Adda B. (Adda Bruemmer), 1908-

Politics and culture in international history : from the ancient Near
East to the opening of the modern age : with a new introduction by
the author /Adda B. Bozeman.—2nd ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-56000-735-4
1. International relations—History. 2. International relations and
culture—History. 3. World politics—1989-. I. Title.
JX1305.B65 1994
327'.092—dc20
94-8483
CIP
ISBN 13: 978-1-5600-0735-7 (pbk)
TO AJVYA BOZEMAN
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Work on the present volume was begun with the aid of a grant
from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a research
fellowship from Sarah Lawrence College. It was greatly furthered
through contacts with the students at the College, who gave me the
opportunity to test the material selected for inclusion in this book.
The staffs of various libraries, especially Mrs. Elisabeth Seely of Sarah
Lawrence College, were helpful in arranging for inter-library loans.
A number of friends and authorities have very kindly read chapters
and offered detailed criticisms that considerably altered and improved
my original intentions, and I wish to acknowledge their kindnesses
with profound thanks; notably, Drs. Mary and Arthur F. Wright
through whose suggestions many new insights were contributed to the
section dealing with China and Indo-Chinese relations; Sir Hamilton
A. R. Gibb, who read the chapter on the Islamic realm; and Dr. H. H.
Fisher, whose inspiration and moral support gave me the courage to
undertake this enterprise and who then gave particular attention to
my chapter on Byzantium. Dr. Philip C. Jessup read a good half of
the manuscript and sent me several pages of notes. My thanks go also
to Dr. Helen McMaster for her reading and discussion of a number of
chapters and to Dr. Arne Barkhuus, who went through a large portion
of the galleys. Special gratitude is due to Mr. Joseph Campbell, who
read the whole manuscript, made numerous editorial suggestions and,
for the Indian chapter, supplied valuable bibliographical advice.
A. B. B.
CONTENTS
Introduction to the Transaction Edition xv
Introduction 3
PART I
THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST AND INDIA
Chapter 1. The Ancient Near East in International Relations 17

A. The Significance of Near Eastern History for the Concept
of International History 17
B. The Near Eastern States 19
a. Mesopotamia 20
b. Egypt 24
C. International Relations in the Near East in the Second Mil-
lennium B.C. 27
a. The Political System of States 27
b. Communications between States 29
(1) The Development of an International Language
and its Unifying Effects 29
(2) The Impact of Trade on the Near Eastern States
System 32
(3) Summary 35
D. The Pattern of Empire in the Ancient Near East in the First
Millennium B.C. 36
a. Assyria and Chaldea 36
b. Persia 43
(1) The Foundations of the Persian World State 43
(2) Principle and Expediency in Persia's Imperial Policy 47
(3) The Administration of the Persian State 52
(4) Persia's Relations with Other States and Interna-
tional Societies 55
Chapter 2, The Place of Greece in International History: An

Introduction to International Relations between "East"
and "West" 57
A. The World Community and the Study of Greek History 57
B. The Greek City-States 66
a. The Historical Setting 66
b. Greek Approaches to International Relations 70
c. Hellenic Unity 77
(1) Retention of the City-State as an Independent Unit 77
(2) Panhellenism—Voluntary and Enforced 85
ix
CONTENTS
Chapter 3. The Empire of Alexander the Great and the Hel-
lenistic System 90
A. Alexander the Great and the Outline of a World State 90
a. The Scope of the Empire 90
b. The Administrative Design of the Empire 91
c. The Vision of Unity 92
B. The Hellenistic System of States 95
a. Multiple Sovereignties 95
b. The Individual and the Hellenistic Community 100
c. Hellenistic Cosmopolitanism in Law and Government 105
d. The Place of Rhodes in Hellenistic Society 106
e. The Rhodian Sea Law 110
f. Greek Government in Bactria 113
C. Greece and India 118
a. The Arthashastra and Buddhism as Sources of Indian
Foreign Policy 118
b. The Fusion of Stoicism and Buddhism in the Greco-
Indian Government of Demetrius and Menander 126
PART II
THE IMPERIAL SYSTEMS OF CHINA AND ROME
Chapter 4. The Place of the Chinese State in Asia 133

A. The Chinese System of International Relations 133
B. Conflicting Chinese Theories of International Relations and
their Influence on the Conduct of China's Foreign Policy 136
C. The Influence of Buddhism on China's Relations with India: a
Case Study in Cultural Adjustment 146
a. China and India 146
b. The Process of Adapting Buddhism to China 148
c. The International Significance of the Sino-Indian Ad-
justment 156
Chapter 5. The Place of Rome in International Relations 162

A. The Coexistence of Rome and China in the Ancient World 162
B. The Roman State as an International Society 173
C. The Influence of Natural Law on the Roman Empire 184
D. The Private Law of Rome 190
E. The Relationship of the Civil Law and the Natural Law 192
F. The Roman Law of Contract 196
G. The Importance of the Law of Contract for the Conduct of
International Relations 201
H. The Internationalization of the Law of Contract and the
lus Gentium 206
x
CONTENTS
PART III
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM
Chapter 6. New Perspectives 215

A. The Meaning of Time and Epochs in International History 215
B. The Great Powers in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries A.D. 220
Chapter 7. The Chief Elements in Mediterranean Power Politics 226

A. Expanding and Disintegrating Empires 226
B. Revealed Religions in International Affairs 231
Chapter 8. The Medieval Western European Realm 238

A. Ideological Foundations 238
B. The Relationship of Image to Reality in Western European
Politics 248
C. The Reality of the Western European Community in the
Middle Ages 254
a. The Influence of the Catholic Church on International
Government and International Relations 254
(1) The Papacy 254
(2) The Canon Law and its Relation to a Law of Na-
tions: the Problem of Peace 258
b. The Christian Community of Western Europe and the
Problem of War 268
(1) The Distinction between Private and Public War 268
(2) The Crusades as an Instrument of Foreign Policy 272
D. The Political Effect of the Crusades upon the Christian
Community 281
E. New Departures in Intercultural Relations 289
Chapter 9. The Byzantine Realm 298

A. The International Significance of Byzantium's History 298
B. The Foundations of the Byzantine State 310
a. The Position of Byzantium in the Middle Ages 310
b. Byzantine Institutions 316
C. Byzantine Diplomacy 324
a. Byzantine Diplomacy in Modern History 324
b. The Byzantine Theory and Practice of Diplomacy 327
D. The Continuance of the Byzantine Tradition in Diplomacy:
the Russian Realm 340
a. The Byzantine Impact upon the Russian Nation 341
b. The Relations between Kiev and Constantinople 344
xi
CONTENTS
Chapter 10. The Muslim Realm 357

A. Connections between Past and Present 357
B. The Theory of the Unity of Islam 362
C. The Theory of the Caliphate 367
D. The Position of the Jurists 371
E. The Disintegration of the Muslim Empire 381
PART IV
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND THE
WORLD SOCIETY TODAY: A RECONSIDERATION OF
REALITIES AND MYTHS
Chapter 11. Patterns of International and Intercultural Re-

lations at the Opening of the Modern Age 389
A. The Image of the World 389
B. Western Europe and Eastern Asia 391
C. The Middle East and the Far East 394
D. The Middle East and Western Europe 396
Chapter 12. The Mediterranean Elites and the Furtherance

of Cultural Affinities 399
A. The Knights 399
B. The Merchants 401
C. The Scholars and the Propagation of Literate Knowledge 412
D. The Intellectual Ascendancy of Western Europe 425
E. The Medieval Universities of Western Europe and their
Contribution to the Modern Society of Nations 432
Chapter 13. The Political Ascendancy of Western Europe and

the Establishment of the Modern States System 438
A. Residual Political Themes in the Non-Western World 438
B. European Approaches to Political Myths and Realities 441
C. The Modern State 447
a. Sicily: a Prologue 447
b. The Modern State in its Western European Setting 451
c. The Modern European State and Non-Western Societies 454
D. European Patterns of Diplomacy 457
a. The Place of Venice in International Relations 457
b. Venetian Diplomacy 454
c. The Florentine Restatement of the Venetian Diplomatic
Method 477
xii
CONTENTS
d. The Balance of Power in Renaissance Italy 485
e. Diplomacy in the Modern European States System 489
E. European Patterns of Transterritorial and Transnational Or-
ganization 499
a. The Council of Constance: The Beginnings of Congres-
sional Diplomacy 499
b. The Hanseatic League: a Transterritorial Union 505
F. Conclusion: International Constitutionalism and the World
Society Today 513
Bibliography 523
Index 539
xm
INTRODUCTION TO THE
TRANSACTION EDITION
POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE THRESHOLD OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
I, In Which Ways has the World Environment for the Conduct of
International Relations Changed in the Last Half Century?
II. Which New Orientations to the Study of International Relations
are Necessary Now if the Academic Universe of Learning is to do
Justice to the Political and Cultural Realities of the Coining Century?
A
N ASSESSMENT of world politics in the last half century sup-
ports the following findings. The interplay (the dual play?)
of politics and culture has intensified throughout the world,
and that on the plane of international relations as well as on
that of intrastate social existence and governance. Interactions between
polities and cultures are more confounded and conflicted than they had
been earlier, and trust in the validity and efficacy of governmental public
order systems as these had been installed between 1920 and 1950 under
Western auspices has subsided dramatically. Today's world assemblage
of states is thus held together not by substantive accords on norms, pur-
poses, and values but by loose agreements on the use of forms, tech-
niques, and words.
These changes are noted or forecast in the 1960 introduction, and most
are discussed in the following chapters, at least in their initial phases.
The present summary assessment will therefore focus on their different
yet interlocking causes and on their ultimate effects as these have been
recorded between the 1950s and 1990s in the non-Western, the Leninist,
and the Western orbits of the world society.
1. The Non-Western Orbit
Westernization has spent itself in all newly independent non-Western

states—particularly in Africa, the Islamic Middle East, and the Central
American/Caribbean region. In this sector of the vast non-Western orbit
xv
INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSACTION EDITION
in which government has traditionally been an outgrowth of religion,
Europeanized elites faced several particular predicaments. In each of the
regions here discussed, they had started out on the margins of two highly
disparate cultures: they could not belong to the foreign civilization that
attracted them intellectually, and they were no longer comfortable in their
own traditional society where they were a small minority alienated from
the majority. This type of ambivalence had probably not been seriously
unsettling in pre-independence times when the new culturally split elites
assumed the frustrating dual mandate to govern new, culturally confused
states in accordance with the Occidental norms upon whose introduction
they had originally insisted.
From the mid-twentieth century onwards however it was clearly ap-
parent that such a task could not be executed satisfactorily. The first gen-
eration of Westernized rulers was thus unable to Westernize the beliefs,
expectations and behavioral dispositions of those it ruled. Nor could its
members tamper with the traditional life-sustaining creeds in which all
individual and collective identitites in the nation—including their own
and those of their forbears—had been firmly imbedded from time imme-
morial. Frustration on a large scale settled in their midst, and doubt about
the worth of European precepts and models spread. Unrelieved by self-
criticism, or other analytical reflections, these sentiments soon grew into
suspicion and resentment until the West as a whole was being imagined
in many circles as a false prophet or a mischievous sorcerer who had led
his apprentices astray deliberately—a persuasion assiduously propagated
at that time by Marxism-Leninism.
The main attraction of this ideology for frustrated non-Western politi-
cians was no doubt the fact that it has actually been conceived as an
assault upon the West's civilization. In denying the force of ideas and of
individual inventiveness, Marxist doctrines of materialism, economic
determinism, and the inevitability of class conflicts thus had the effect of
explicitly exonerating non-Western elites from responsibility for failures
in administration while sanctioning the perception of the West as a his-
torically near-defunct power complex that is guilty by fiat of theory for
all that turns out wrongly in their societies.
In brief, the Europeanized reformist elites were quickly eliminated
from positions of power and influence after their dreams of indepen-
dence from the West and the Ottoman empire had been realized, and
their successors in this sector of the non-Western orbit have ever since
been busy reversing course.1 The Western concepts of nationalism
xvi
and statehood are thus tightly associated today with indigenous cul-
tural and political legacies—some of them suitably refashioned and
upgraded by present-day imagination—as well as by relentless cam-
paigns to expunge all traces of Westernization from native mind-sets
and societies.
(a) All black African states are officially identified in the United Na-
tions, related world organizations, and diplomatic semantics as sover-
eign, peace-loving, law-abiding states, but none actually rates such
attributes, or aspires at acquiring them. True, membership in the West-
ern-designed states system continues to be greatly valued for purposes
of conducting lucrative relations with non-African states, particularly
those in the Euro-American sector. In the context of intra-African af-
fairs, however, that membership is merely a protective veneer covering
radically contrapuntal African realities. For what really grips present-
day Africans on all levels of existence is an apparently irrepressible urge
to return "home."
"Forward" into the pre-European, preliterate past has therefore been
the unifying cause to which Africans have rallied spontaneously in the
last decades. Since the modern nation state was not associated with those
halcyon centuries, it has been more or less consigned to degenerate into
a loose conglomerate of conflicted communal groups, an open battle-
ground for contentious tribes, tribal subgroups and clans, and into ready
prey not only for rival power-seeking African despots but also for Leninist
agents, policymakers, and military commanders who represented the
geostrategic interests of the Soviet Union and Cuba when they finished
off Ethiopia, Africa's oldest and most accomplished state, and brought
ruination to Mozambique, Angola, and the Republic of South Africa.
Further, since warfare was traditionally a hallowed, essentially unin-
hibited pursuit, it has been reinstated in that mode throughout the conti-
nent. Although the recent massacres in Liberia and Somalia, for example,
may be classed as exceptionally horrendous, few states come to mind
that have not been reduced temporarily at least—to killing fields.
The "full circle return" home to the sources of African authenticity
has naturally had equivalent implications on the planes of social, eco-
nomic, and intellectual life. Since the individual was not recognized in
preliterate African society as an autonomous person, his mind could ob-
viously not be viewed as the source of original thought. And since the
idea of citizenship was not even fathomable at that time, he could not,
and did not have legally protected civil rights and responsibilities. West-
jcvn
em ideas of liberty, self-determination, democracy, and development are
therefore treated as outcast ideas in present-day Africa. No wonder then
that African thought has been stagnant in the last decades, in striking
contrast to those spent in dependence on ultimate European guidance
and protection; that African economies cannot sustain African states; and
are accountable only for famines; and that the vast continent is awash
with refugess fleeing from war, poverty, and repression and seeking op-
portunity and asylum in tiny overpopulated Europe and the United States.
It is historically and politically relevant to note that the themes promi-
nent in twentieth-century cultural relations between Africa and the West
parallel those set between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries in rela-
tions between the Kingdom of the Kongo and the Kingdom of Portugal.
The two kings were equals as individual sovereigns in their spiritual
subserviance to the universal Catholic Church, and the two states be-
came nearly equals as participants in the European states system after
the Kongo had been drawn into diplomatic relations with other Occiden-
tal powers, notably the Vatican. What was desired most by the two sov-
ereigns and the Holy See was the enhancement of acculturation in its
broadest sense—an aim identified already in the 1480s by the Kongolese
king as implying the diffusion of literacy, education, and Christianity
among his people. With respect to literacy, it is certainly true that read-
ing and writing skills were successfully imparted to many aspiring
Kongolese, but there is little in the records left by this elite to suggest
that mastery of the techniques led to a sustained search for knowledge,
the advancement of intellectual frontiers, or the emergence of a specula-
tive type of man—indispensable human prerequisites for fashioning a
progressive society. Nor is there any evidence to indicate that the literate
Kongolese felt under any obligation to communicate some of their new
learning to the less privileged strata of their society. Furthermore, it is
quite significant for an understanding of these cultural interactions that
the semi-Westernized elite of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was
split into the same kind of factions that have arisen in the twentieth cen-
tury; those who affirmed the need to come to terms with the foreign ideas
grafted upon their culture, and those who were persuaded by their en-
counter with European civilization to reaffirm established native ways.
The mental and social conflicts thus engendered by the long coexist-
ence of two diametrically opposite responses to the challenges of life
found particularly disturbing expressions in matters relating to faith.
Mutations of the Christian creed and ritual had to be evolved if tradition-
xviii
bound peoples were not to lose their bearings in life, and the church was
by and large generous in condoning such metamorphoses, even when
they might well be viewed as travesties of the values it was authorized to
uphold. The case of the Kongo was exceptional in the sense that its early
kings aspired to be genuine Christians, even as they, too, conceived of
their affiliation as an increment to political power and prestige. How-
ever, the inroads of Christianity, as those of literacy, were widely re-
sented. These confusions in the value system, allied as they were with
traditional forms of internecine strife and succession struggles at the court,
explain why sizable segments of the Kongolese population were seized
by xenophobia toward the end of the seventeenth century. True to tradi-
tional thoughtways, a prime cause had to be located for all that was dis-
turbing or inexplicable, and in this case the scapegoat was, of course, the
European element.
The inability to assimilate literacy and Christianity in the manner fore-
seen especially by King Alfonso, meant that the primary norms for the
development of the Kongo into a state on the European model could not
be met. It is true that on the purely political, as on the mental and moral
levels, the alien concepts retained some external significance, but their
core meanings, which carried the structuring potential, could not have
the desired impact because they lost their authenticity in the process of
being metamorphosed into stronger native forms. In other words, both
concepts had been dissolved by the power of traditional systems of knowl-
edge and belief.
By 1700 the Kongo had lost its status as an Afro-European state and
was being reabsorbed in the African scheme of things.
In the mid-twentieth century, we learn from an African historian, the
kingdom of the Kongo showed no significant trace of Portugal's 400-
year-long presence;2 and at the end of this century it is justifiable to trans-
pose that particular evaluation into the general conclusion that all of black
Africa has been effectively de-Westernized.
(b) The basic principles distinguishing Islamic culture and statecraft
as set out in chapter 10 (357-381) have not changed between 1956 and
1994. However, they have been dramatically accentuated. And in this
regard nothing is as significant for international history and politics as
the expansion of the Muslim orbit throughout the world and the intensity
of propagating and administering the creed.
The process of extending the geopolitical domain was initiated in the
mid-twentieth century under the auspices of the Western states system
xix
when Europe's colonial empires were dissolved and Islamic peoples ex-
ercised the right to self-determination by opting for statehood and mem-
bership in the United Nations. Scores of newly independent Muslim states
thus arose in the Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia,
and, somewhat later, in black Africa. The embryos of others seem to be
disengaging themselves slowly in the Eurasian space formerly occupied
by the Soviet Union and in the ranks of ethnicities ruled by Turkey, Iran,
and Iraq (chief among them the Kurds), as well as in the confines of
present-day Israel.
The second process, Islamization, which is the unchallenged essence
of this culturally distinct religio-political system, has gone into high -
gear during the last decades. A variety of reasons account for this
resurgence.
The appearance of new Islamic states in all parts of the world in con-
junction with the termination of Europe's official and authoritative pres-
ence and the consequent weakening of the rival Christian faith had the
effect of activating the standing mandate to tutor and oversee newcom-
ers to the fold. Also, it opened unprecedented chances to convert unbe-
lievers and Islamize culturally alien environments, thus furthering the
ordained Islamic end goal by helping to concretize the ideal of a world-
spanning Umma.
In short, the phenomenal increase in the number of Islamic states and
the intensification of proselytizing in behalf of the Islamic faith are or-
ganically linked, mutually reenforcing processes. However, they have
not been monitored and assessed in this light by proponents of Euro-
American culture and statecraft even though it is surely self-evident in
Western perspective that an Islamic Umma would cancel the very notion
of an independent law-based state, thus invalidating the Occidental state
system as universalized today in the United Nations. In twentieth-cen-
tury Islamic perspective, by contrast, it is neither paradoxical nor inten-
tionally deceptive to use Western forms and words as carriers or covers
for concepts that are in no way congruous with the original Western ideas
for which the symbols had been invented. In general it can be said there-
fore that cultural and political relations between the two ideologically
disparate domains are implicity as conflicted now as they were before
the 1940s or, for that matter, before the 1490s. However, long-range sig-
nificance does attach in my view to certain particular changes. The Is-
lamic orbit is now too vast, too divided into subcultures, and too conflicted
to constitute an internationally persuasive Umma. The following region-
xx
ally and culturally coherent units should therefore be distinguished, each
on its own terms:
• The group of classical, long-established non-Arab states in the Middle
East that had been conquered and Islamized by the Arabs chief among
them Egypt, Persia/Iran, and Turkey. Before 1950, neither faced serious
trouble combining their pre-Islamic traditions of statecraft with Islamic
religiosity on one hand and with Western secularism on the other. Each
was thus able to maintain its political integrity on local, regional, and
international levels.3
• The group of newly independent Islamic states in South and Southeast
Asia, chief among them Indonesia and Malaysia, where the impact of
Islam was also buffered and modified by contact with strong indigenous
traditions of religion and statecraft.
• The last but for obvious reasons most important block of newly inde-
pendent Islamic states contains those of the Arabs in West Asia as well as
those of heavily Arabized and Islamized peoples in North Africa such as
the Berbers. Not surprisingly it is here, in the Asian heartland of Islam,
that present-day generations continue to agonize about not being able to
square reality with theory, or naked political power with the shari 'ah;
and here where they go on wondering just why success eludes them in
modern times, and how they might resuscitate their early—our medi-
eval—centuries when they could savor triumph after triumph over Chris-
tian Europe.4
Although the Arabs had been quiescent in international relations be-
tween 1492 when they were defeated by Spain and expelled from south-
western Europe, and the mid-twentieth century when their different
provinces were transformed into states, their grievances had been grow-
ing and smoldering inwardly until they were ignited by the establish-
ment of Israel on formerly Arab territory; by their crushing military defeats
at the hands of their new neighboring foe—also a special Semitic people
in terms of the Old Testament they shared—and by their incapacity to
ward off Israel's subsequent success in regaining most of its biblically
sanctioned frontiers. These radical changes in their cultural and geopo-
litical environment, in conjunction with the fact that Israel's policies and
actions were not seriously contested by Anglo-American diplomacy, had
the psychopolitical effect of filling Arab minds with unmitigated hatred
for the West, specifically the United States, and of reviving the classic
Islamic theory of war and international relations that is encapsuled in the
complex dual concept of jihad.5 However, no unified pan-Arabist poli-
xxi
cies for concretizing either the jihad of the "Heart and the Mind" or the
jihad of the "Sword and the Hand" had a chance of emerging in Arabdom
because it was then—as it is now—a fractured community, torn by irrec-
oncilable divisions between traditional Islamic states and radical, heavily
Leninized and Sovietized despotisms. Rather, the clarion call for death
to the West and eternal life to the Umma came loud and clear from Shi'ite
Iran's6 revolutionary theocracy in 1978-79 after the Ayatollah Khomeini
had dissolved the monarchy, seized absolute power, and declared sol-
emnly that there are only two human groups on earth: Islam and non-
Islam.
This new, fanatically militant Shi'ite creed, which has ever since been
winning converts throughout the Islamic world, carries multifarious theo-
logical, political, and historical connotations. But for purposes of this
discussion it is sufficient to think of it as a determined, well-organized
revolutionary offensive against all manifestations of Western politics and
culture, specifically its secular orders of statecraft and law. Following
models and instructions set by revolutionary Iran as well as by medieval
Persia's Order of the Assassins (see chapter 10) it is being fought as an
external jihad of the sword and the hand against all states in the West and
against non-conformist, usually Sunni Muslim, states. However, it is also
being fought as internal jihad within each Islamic nation for the purpose
of punishing or cleaning out dissidents and traitors. The major instruments
in both types of war are dramatic assassinations of well-known public
figures, wholesale executions of nonconformists, and limitless terror.
The new terrorist jihad against "the state" has struck throughout the
world society in the last decades, but its chosen battlefield for the time
being is the Mediterranean region. As orchestrated by Iran and its Afri-
can satellite, the Sudan—both reliably identified as terrorist states—the
attack here has centered on Egypt, the bastion of statehood from Phara-
onic times onward. Inundated by ever rising tides of religious fervor that
had been deftly managed from the 1970s onward by militant apostles
from without, the liberal Sunni state is internally beleaguered in 1994;
fundamentalists set the tone in schools, universities, the arts, and the
media; militant Muslims have prominant positions in all areas of gov-
ernment;7 death lists are circulating, and assassinations are routine.
The same scenario has been enacted in the North African Islamic states,
nowhere more emphatically so than in Algeria where Muslim militants
are determined to replace Algeria's secularist society with an Iranian-
style Islamic republic, and where recent assassinations of intellectuals,
xxii
secularists, and, more recently, of a highly respected secularist former
prime minister (of Berber descent), reflect a new pattern of terror: the
killings were carried out in the presence of or along with members of
their families and/or service personnel.
What is the likely outcome of this comprehensive terrorist jihad? Is
there a winning strategy for Islamic states in the Mediterranean region?
The Algerian government realized early on that the militant funda-
mentalists in the nation's midst were not just another religious faction or
political party but a well-organized fifth column closely allied with the
Iranian enemy, both determined to finish off the Algerian state. It acted
wisely and prudently in the nation's vital interests when it halted an elec-
tion that the extremists were certain to win; when it placed the country
under military rule8 and, more recently, when it hardened its resolve not
to negotiate with the jihadists.
Egypt, by contrast, was slow in assessing the hostile penetration of the
nation's mind-set and in devising drastic countermeasures after the slay-
ing of Anwar Sadat partly, it seems, because the country's internal order
was also threatened in the 1960s and 70s by militant secularist "left-
ists"—a danger that the government tried to ward off by enlisting the
support of the militant religionists. Furthermore, Egypt's security and
identity are likely to be on hold as long as Sudan, the largest state in the
area, remains a terrorist state in the service of Iran. A winning strategy
here, in one of the world's geopolitically most significant quarters, is
fathomable only if all Arab states—be they radical dictatorships or con-
ventional Islamic kingdoms—are prepared to affirm their shared Arabdom
as well as their close associations with Islamic Egypt and Turkey; to
conclude a peace treaty with Israel that does justice to the cause of the
Palestinian Arabs in order then to push for a collective regional security
system that would commit all Middle Eastern states to joint defensive
and offensive actions against Iran.
The early 1990s are auspicious for the evolution of some such pact.
Hatred for Iran is building up in each of the countries listed. Antagonism
for Israel is waning steadily, and there is no Soviet Union muddying the
issues. However, whether such concerted action is or is not taken, the
projection is reasonable that terrorist warfare will remain a regional real-
ity in the years to come, and that it will not be possible to undo the ad-
verse effects that the uncontested fundamentalist jihad has had on the
conceptual framework of the Dar al-Islam on one hand, and of the West-
ern state system on the other.
xxiii
When I reflected on the problematics of Islamic culture and statecraft
fifty years ago I concluded that the Dar al-Islam was persuasive as an
empire or a political commonwealth of believers only when engaged in
continuous forward movement. This empire-in-motion could not be held
down either by definitions and constitutions or by fixed territorial fron-
tiers because the belief seems immutable that the faith was divinely des-
tined to envelop all mankind. Any boundary once reached thus had to be
transcended by another forward thrust, for what mattered was the con-
stant hallowed journey to reach the far-off end, rather than the end itself.
In purely religious or theoretical terms, then, jihad can be conceived
as a journey to the Umma, the mythical end of Islam. But in history as
recorded between the eighth and fifteenth centuries throughout the Medi-
terranean region, it was conducted as limitless war of the kind we are
witnessing now.9
As noted earlier, compromises in Christian-Islamic relations were ef-
fected in the ensuing centuries after Spain had thwarted the big Islamic
plan to conquer and Islamize Europe and after the Turkish/Islamic con-
querors of the Eastern Christian Empire had matured into a realistic world
power. The dissolution of that Islamic imperium after the first intra-Eu-
ropean war of the twentieth century and the conversion of its Arab prov-
inces first into mandates under French, Italian, and English administration
and thereafter into sovereign states had the ultimate effect of discredit-
ing the theory as well as the reality of the Dar al-Islam in the minds of
believers, of confounding the Arab sense of political identity, and of dis-
ordering existing norms for governance and the conduct of foreign rela-
tions—in brief, of releasing Arabdom into anarchy.
Loosened from traditional moorings and constraints in the Dar al-Is-
lam and hostile to the Western state system, it thus became possible for
Arab and Arabized states (e.g., Iraq, Syria, and Libya) to drift into the
disposition to de-Westernize "statehood" by borrowing the dynamic myth
of the (practically defunct) Dar al-Islam as way-station to the Umma and
all jihad norms they considered relevant for their diverse quests.10
These transpositions of theologically and politically crucial Islamic
concepts were elaborated throughout the Middle East first by Marxist-
Leninist elites and in the last decades by radically fundamentalist reli-
gious elites until they came to stand for the following paradoxical truths:
(1) Islamic "states" can expand at will because no territorial bounds are
set for Islam and because jihad does not know distinctions between war
and peace; and (2) Islamic "states" can establish government by terror in
xxiv
accordance with shari 'ah and jihad law, because they are not bound by
Western systems of secular constitutional law.
At the threshold of the twenty-first century, then, it is reasonable to
conclude that the new religious power elites in the Middle East have
succeeded in deconstructing the alien Western system of statecraft as
well as their own traditional Islamic frame of reference, thus leaving
their respective societies in a moral and political vacuum over which
only individual power people are to exert absolute yet fleeting jurisdic-
tion. And in such conditions "the state" is reduced to a mere extension of
the ruling personality.
The present plight of the Arab homeland of Islam and the Arabized
North African coast is certainly not shared in its intensity by Islamized
black Africa. But since continental Africa has experienced programatic
Islamization at the hands of Arabs from the seventh century onward11
and since Islamic norms and values have proved to be compatible with
African traditions, it has naturally also been deeply penetrated by present-
day militant fundamentalism, be it from Shi'ite or Sunni sources. The
present leader of the African National Congress in the Republic of South
Africa thus assured an audience in 1993 that the people of Africa will
make Iran's Islamic revolution a model for their own revolutionary moves.
This acculturation, however, was countered throughout recorded Afri-
can history by a parallel reverse trend, namely the Africanization of Ara-
bic Islam. The effects of this cultural transposition have been as nefarious
for present day Islamic and non-Islamic thought systems—be they Afri-
can or European—as they proved to be during the first great war be-
tween Occidental and Oriental belief systems when the southern Iberian
ramparts of Europe were invaded and occupied by Islamized Africans.
In regard to present-day state making and statecraft the issue is well il-
lustrated by Libya—a hybrid of Arabized and black African peoples, some
sedentary, others nomadic; and of literate and nonliterate, Islamic and
animist thoughtways—all allegedly unified after the Second World War
by a constitution modeled on seventeen other constitutions, chief among
them that of the United States, but now wrapped up firmly in the person-
ality of Muammar Quaddafi—it, too, evocative of models set by ninteenth-
century Fulani divines.12
The changes now overcoming the Middle East and Africa are natu-
rally relished by action-minded revolutionaries in the affected regions as
great victories and vital progressions toward desired ends. Equally obvi-
ously they are deplored as manifestations of Islamic decadence and feared
xxv
as institutionalized threats to national and individual life and liberty by
citizenries that found themselves suddenly caught up in an unexpected
tide of violence and death. But what do these changes signify for the
world society and the international state system?
A few conclusions impose themselves as a matter of course. The world
arena of the organized society of states is certainly diminished both spa-
tially and quantitatively when several scores of states, all consolidated in
the vast and compact Afro/Asian zone, became defectors. Likewise, the
officially existing normative order of the international state system is
qualitatively put in serious issue when that many states are drawn into
violent antistate activities. And here it is no accident that the attack has
centered on the primary structural concepts of the system, namely the
territorially delimited law-based state and the law of war.
It is this aspect of the renewed ideological contest with Islam that
requires special attention in Europe where the international system origi-
nated. For as matters stand in the last decade of the twentiethth century
both concepts have been deconstructed decisively in the adjoining Afro/
Asian region by the unlimited force of terror, and this means by implica-
tion that they are devalued in their function as generic norms also. In
sum, the Western system is now organically tied up with the jihad sys-
tem. All wars implicating Islam—be they conventional or unconventional
in Western estimation—will thus be fought on jihad terms but under the
traditional auspices of the Western states system unless the organized
world society brings forth a winning strategy against terrorist states and
terrorist wars.
(c) All societies in further Asia have had their "times of trouble" in
the last four decades. Indeed, several—specifically India, Sri Lanka, Cam-
bodia (Kampuchea), Burma (Myanmar), Mainland China and divided
Korea have been wracked by violent upheavals and wars. However, a
general survey of this whole vast sector of the world society has per-
suaded me first, that little of substance has changed in either of these
greatly disparate cultural and political orders; and second that all func-
tion reasonably well in their role as Western-type states.
As noted below on page 118,13 the patterns for Indian political thought
and practical statecraft are laid out clearly in sacred Hindu texts.the
arthasastras, and the theory of mandalas (concentric circles of states)—
all part of Hindu literature that is widely read and pondered particularly
now when the existing, heavily Westernized public order system is seri-
ously challenged by communalism and steadily mounting pressures for
xxvi
secession by disaffected ethnic and religious groups. As anticipated by
leading Indian scholars in the 1950s, religiosity is today resurgent in that
subcontinent, and India's statecraft—like India's chief problem—is likely
to remain rooted in militant Hinduism, probably without breaking the
Westernized facade of the state.
Mainland China continues to be a totalitarian empire anchored in
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ground rules. But contrary to the Soviet Union
which could be identified only with this political ideology, communist
China is also heir to the Han, Sui, T'ang, Ming, and Manchu dynasties.
That is to say, it rests on an authentic, self-contained, and creative civili-
zation that had endured for approximately 2500 years14 before it under-
went its transformation into a communist imperium. Throughout that time
China's statecraft had been sustained by two powerful intellectual forces:
Confucianism and Legalism (the latter, also known as Realism and
Amoralism, is identified with the works of Han Fei Tzu, Sun Tzu, and
Lord Shang). These philosophies worked in tandem as it were until Mao
Tse-tung decided to examine their controversial interpenetration in order
to bring it into a dialectically satisfying relationship to the ideas promul-
gated by Engels, Lenin, and himself. As his writings indicate, he concluded
that "we affirm the progressive character of the Legalist school and criti-
cize the reactionary character of the Confucian school in Chinese history
for the purpose of giving...history its proper place as a science."15
In short, Leninism and Legalism did not meet by chance in China's
recent history—a fact that has important implications for China's future
and therefore also for present-day Western intelligence assessments and
policies regarding China.
It is foreseeable that Communism, now in an advanced wilting stage,
will soon dissolve in Chinese minds as an authoritative guide to thought,
and that it will be melted down as principal instrument of statecraft.
However, this does not mean that China will revert to Confucianism, or
that its ruling elites would ever contemplate "borrowing" Western theo-
ries and institutions of government—a proposition that struck even tra-
ditional nineteenth-century Chinese rulers as offensive and absurd. Rather,
the China of the twenty-first century A.D. will go the way all China's
have gone since the empire was called into being in the third century
B.C.: when there's trouble or doubt, do what the Legalists tell you to do.
This time around, however, the Legalist message is likely to reach
Mainland China in the softened versions that have been fashioned in the
last decades by non-communist Chinese and sinified states—all more
xxvii
innovative and economically successful than the motherland. Chief among
them are Singapore, South Korea, and the Republic of China (ROC).
Indeed, for proponents of the "One China" cause in Taiwan it is a near-
sacred duty to serve as model for a restructured China.
Most states in this region of the world (Mainland China is not in-
cluded) are in my estimation model states in today's multicultural soci-
ety of states. Some are of great antiquity, others quite new. None come to
mind that are as ambivalent and restless as their counterparts in West
Asia and black Africa. Rather, all have shown in the time span here un-
der review that they are self-assured, purposeful, and capable of retain-
ing their identities even in the most stressful circumstances. In brief,
they are exceptional in non-Western as well as in Western terms, prob-
ably because their secular or political values are in harmony with the
norm-setting principles of their basic belief systems.
It is in this context of structure and performance that Japan excels as a
state. Buttressed by the discipline of its Shinto and Buddhist commit-
ments, it could become the most creative of all "borrowing" nations be-
cause its elites always knew how to shape attractive ideas—be they
Chinese, European, or American—without having them break the form,
or denature the irreducible essence of that which calls itself Japan.
Throughout the twentieth century, surely one of the most trying periods
in their history, the Japanese could thus assure stability in law, govern-
ment, and foreign relations by adapting select precepts of European codes
and constitutions to their historically tested and revered imperial institu-
tions. It is this achievement that explains in my view, why and how Ja-
pan became a "superpower" in the last half century.
2. The Leninist Soviet Orbit in Eurasia
The most dramatic, indeed epoch making changes in twentieth-cen-

tury international history also occurred in this particular time span:
• The Soviet Union, which had held Europe and much of Asia in bond-
age throughout the century, suddenly disappeared in 1989-90, and with
it went most of its surrogates, satellites, and assorted power implants in
the rest of the world's cultures and political systems.
• This collapse, for which analogues are hard to find in history, was not
set off either by a violent counterrevolution from within the Gulag
imperium or by determined warring enemies from without but by seem-
ingly docile East and Central European peoples, chief among them
xxviii
Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, who had been en-
slaved by the USSR since 1939 and 1945 and who had no armature ex-
cept their own dimming culture consciousness and their revulsion from
communism.
• The success of the 1989-90 revolution had several instant geopoliti-
cally important effects. In the West it led to the restoration of a united
Germany and the return of Eastern Europe's captive states to the names
and places on Europe's map that had been assigned them in treaties con-
cluded earlier in the century. In the East it led to the fragmentation of the
Soviet monolith into independent "republics" or states: to the political
defection of the former empire's Islamic provinces, and to the vigorous
consolidation of power, nationalism, and policymaking in Russia proper
and the Ukraine. However, neither of these developments can as yet be
judged settled or definitive. Also indeterminate are the norms likely to
mark governmental structures and ideological commitments in the vast
formerly Soviet-occupied space. Since these are in my view the major
outstanding issues in a retrospective survey of politics and culture in the
last fifty years, the following notations are requisite.
True to Lenin's and Dzerzhinskiy's original blueprint, the Soviet Union
functioned throughout the century as a new type of state, one that was
grounded in terror as dispensed at home and abroad by an entirely new
type of party apparatus, one that was controlled by the Committee for
State Security, that is, the KGB.
This political system has been officially dismantled in Russia, Ukraine,
and Eastern Europe, but it is surely unreasonable to assume that it has
not left indelible imprints on social institutions and human understand-
ings of what statehood and government are all about. Moreover, Soviet
models of rule are firmly in place in Mainland China, North Korea, Viet-
nam, Laos, Burma, Cuba, and numerous societies in Latin America and
Africa. Further, no state on earth comes to mind that has not been pen-
etrated—at times decisively so—by the international Soviet-run Com-
munist Party—an anti-state, anti-culture body that appears to be as
immune to dissolution as the Marxist-Leninist ideology that spawned
the world-spanning Soviet terror complex that presided over twentieth-
century world politics and that cannot be counted out in the century to
come.
It is an incontestable fact that ideas—regardless of their merits—do
not die as easily as the humans who conceived them. Leszek Kolakowski
speaks of Marxism as the greatest fantasy of our century.16 And today the
xxix
accumulated evidence indicates clearly that Marxism-Leninism was in-
deed an aberration in economic theorizing, historiography, and political
science. Yet this myth—as others to which allusion is made in this vol-
ume—is a hard fact and should be treated as that in studies of interna-
tional and intercultural relations.
3. The Western Orbits of the World Society
The years 1989-90 stand officially for an ephochal victory of the Euro-
American West on the levels of both politics and culture. The major moral
battle in the protracted ideological contest with Soviet communism was
won when the USSR followed the example set by its captive European
peoples and officially renounced Marxism-Leninism as an erroneous
doctrine, and when this recantation was followed by the publication of
accumulated secret documents bearing witness to the errors of the creed
and the misdeeds committed in its behalf.
Geostrategically speaking "1989" stands for the following gains by
the West:
• The recovery of some of the lands and peoples that had been part of
the quintessential Western culture realm for some 700 years before they
were allotted to the Soviet orbit in the last half century.
• The extension eastward of the invisible but important frontiers sepa-
rating West from East.
• The return of Germany to its historical status as lead state in continen-
tal Europe and the restoration of sovereignty to Eastern European na-
tions that had been deprived of it for the last fifty years.
• The rehabilitation of the European state system and the resurgence of
continental Europe as a culturally and politically unified community of
states.
In cultural political contexts the West's victory has remained hollow
so far because its chief policymakers in the United States had not been
prepared for it.
II
The United States became the West's superpower during the twentieth
century. In that capacity it presided over state making, state breaking,
and the conduct of relations between European states, particularly dur-
ing and after the two great wars against Germany, and it exerted para-
xxx
mount influence in structuring the West's position in regard to the Soviet
Union.
Studies of American foreign policies in this century allow for a few
general conclusions on these two counts. The U.S. has not wavered ei-
ther in its close alliance with the United Kingdom; or its deep hostility
toward Germany; or in its basically friendly disposition toward the So-
viet Union. It is thus noteworthy that the Anglo-American coalition never
seriously contested any of the near countless Soviet aggressions, take-
overs, and cold war penetrations in continental Europe, and that Marx-
ist-Leninist ideology and statecraft never received the official critical
attention that was showered on Fascism and Nazism, nefarious national-
ist ideologies that held sway for only twelve years. These conclusions
are borne out by military and diplomatic records of the Second World
War.
Today it is a matter of public knowledge—fully documented by En-
glish and American state papers and memoirs—that the Soviet Union
received complete, even enthusiastic, Anglo-American support for its
war policy to destroy East Prussia, Germany's historically and geopoliti-
cally most important province, and to depopulate it by killing off as many
civilians as possible and by transferring the rest to labor camps in the
USSR. This design was approved by President Roosevelt when he told
Anthony Eden, the British foreign minister, in March 1943 that arrange-
ments should be made to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the
same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey, and by Winston Churchill
when he declared before the House of Commons on December 15, 1944
"that a clean sweep will be made."17
The clean sweep was made indeed. As George F. Kennan observes:
"The disaster that befell this area with the entry of the Soviet forces
has had no parallel in modern European experience. There were consid-
erable sections of it where, to judge by all existing evidence, scarcely a
man, woman, or child of the indigenous population was left alive after
the initial passage of Soviet forces..."18 Anglo-American policymakers
gave two reasons for their decision to amputate one fourth of Germany's
national territory and expel the indigenous German peoples (15 million)
from East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia,
lands that had been German for 700 years.19 One was the prevalent de-
sire to punish the German people as a whole for having been engaged in
a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.20 The
second reason was the felt need to accede to the Slavic Drang nach Westen.
xxxi
Since the Soviet Union was determined to keep the part of Poland it had
seized in 1939 and to incorporate the northern part of East Prussia which
includes Konigsberg (today Russia's Kaliningrad Enclave), Poland had
to be compensated by receiving East Prussia. Churchill explains the gen-
esis of the Oder-Neisse Line this way:
Eden said that what Poland lost in the East she might gain in the West.... I
then demonstrated with the help of three matches my idea of Poland moving
westward. This pleased Stalin..."21
This chapter in Euro-American history was closed in January 1946

when President Truman took note of the fact that the United States had
been forced by circumstances to accede to the Soviet Union's occupa-
tion of East Poland and to Poland's occupation of German territory east
of the Oder, and that these had been wanton violent actions.22 It is diffi-
cult to think about new approaches to the study and conduct of interna-
tional and intercultural relations unless one knows why old approaches
failed. In the case at hand we deal with the following realities:
• U.S. policymakers were intellectually not prepared either for the vic-
torious outcome of the German-led Eastern European revolt against the
Soviet Union or for the collapse of the latter.
• The Anglo-American coalition lost the war it fought in behalf of the
West.
• The European state system is now deprived of defensible eastern
frontiers.
• The Western state system has lost credibility at home because it has
been deeply divided throughout the century between continental Euro-
pean and Anglo-American states. The issues in contention relate to
Germany's place and role in Europe and to the defense of the invisible
frontier separating Europe from Asia.
• The West's civilization has suffered serious bone loss and its orbit
is contracted and uncertain at the threshold of the twenty-first
century.
The major unanswered questions include the following. How could Eu-
rope be split up and sold out so lightheartedly? Why was the passionate
hatred for Germany not tempered or held in check by dispassionate knowl-
edge of history and geography and by disciplined strategic assessments?
And how should one explain the Anglo-American reluctance to understand
the Soviet Union on its own terms and the corresponding readiness to be
xxxii
taken in by its deception? Above all, what happened to the learned elites and
their traditional advisory function in matters of statecraft?
My tentative answers are to the following effect. England and the
United States are, respectively, insular and continental states bordered,
in the main, by water spaces, not by other continents and foreign culture
realms. They know their particular histories and their geographical iden-
tities, and they do not doubt that they are of the West. Nor do they have to
puzzle much just where their frontiers are, or how their histories are in-
tertwined with those of other nations. English history is dramatically rich
in medieval and Renaissance times, but it is not intimately bonded with
the histories of Eastern and Central European nations between the thir-
teenth and fifteenth centuries while American history has no politically
or historically compelling nexus with this particular time span in which
Western civilization happens to be anchored. It has thus been obvious
throughout the twentieth century, most poignantly so in the course of the
two tragic intra-European wars and the ensuing peace settlements that
Central and Eastern Europe was terra incognita—geographically as well
as historically—to the English and the Americans, and that their
policymakers did not choose to call upon their learned geographers and
historians to give them a belated briefing. Had the missing historian
materialized, he might have reminded them of a few persistent realities
before they decided, with the aid of three matches, to redraw the political
and cultural boundaries in that region.
The German realm emerged from Eurasian history as the "middle"
between Occident and Orient. Not unlike Han China, the middle king-
dom in Sinic Asia, it served consistently as vanguard and rampart for the
European West which was chronically harassed by hordes of invaders
from the Eurasian plain, all bent on destroying Europe's culture and coun-
tryside. Not coincidentally, then, one finds that the eastern limits of the
Occident always coincided with the advanced lines reached by German
colonization. As spelled out in subsequent chapters, this German realm
did not start out as an empire or nation state. But it did provide the impe-
rial factor for the administration of the medieval Holy Roman Empire
which was composed of autonomous states and nonstate bodies, all held
together by Rome's secular law and the Christian faith. Further, Ger-
mans served in the Papal governance of Christendom by staffing
archbishoprics, bishoprics, and crusading knightly orders that were
charged by the church to settle, administer, develop, and defend the prov-
inces their arms had won.
xxxiii
It is in the exercise of these functions that Germans secured and con-
solidated continental Europe's strategically and culturally vital North-
South frontiers. One separates Europe from Asia while linking the Baltic
with the Mediterranean Sea; the other confirms the cultural and political
divisions between European nations christianized by the First Rome and
those christianized by the Second Rome, that is, the Byzantine Greek
Orthodox empire. The basic differences between the two versions of the
faith and the two political systems are set out in the following chapters
as is the record of their tangled, mostly contentious relationships up to
the fifteenthth century when the Eastern Empire was conquered by Turks
and Islamized. For the particular purposes of this introduction, however,
it is important to accentuate the following themes.
These two lines do not necessarily coincide with state frontiers. They
are fluid and for the most part invisible—except perhaps to observers
with an eye for architecture. They do not appear on maps and are not
identified or erased in treaties. Yet they have had a firm place in the
mind-sets and histories of nations on either side of the lines for over a
thousand years, and they should have been studied closely in our times
because they continue to be accepted in Europe and Asia as the lines of
cultural division that really matter, and because familiarity with these
standing East-West conflicts might well have made a salutary difference
in twentieth-century policies of making and unmaking states. The fol-
lowing notations may illustrate this point.
As medieval Europe's gatekeepers in the northeastern and central re-
gion, the Germans had the task to improve the general security environ-
ment by strengthening and pacifying the frontiers they reached. These
objectives were furthered by developing municipalities; by organizing
the transterritorial self-governing Hanseatic League of leading trading
towns (among them Danzig and Riga on the Baltic coast), and by staking
out strategically needed frontier zones. These exposed borderlands, known
in German as "Grenzmarken" ("marches" in French and English; "marca"
in Spanish), functioned for centuries as human shields and intelligence
outposts all along the North-South lines.23 All were essentially self-gov-
erning but only a few evolved into states. Among the latter were the
Mark Brandenburg which grew into the core provinces of what was to
become modern Germany, East Prussia (later included in the Kingdom
of Prussia), and the "Oster Mark" which foreshadowed "Osterreich" and
the Austro-Hungarian empire while functioning effectively as major
xxxiv
western bastion and listening post throughout the complex southern sec-
tor of the two North-South fault lines.
These medieval "circumstances" stemmed from orientations to inter-
national and intercultural relations that stand in stark contrast to those
which yielded "the circumstances" that President Truman found discon-
certing in 1946. The latter were marked by the destruction of continental
Europe's Germanic "Mitte"24 and the distribution of German and Aus-
trian territories among numerous small ethnic groups to the east of the
center that were inexperienced in matters of statehood, conflicted in their
mutual relations and in many cases not committed to the West because
they had been tutored first by Byzantium and in modern times by the
Tsarist Russian, the Turkish Islamic, and the Soviet empires (e.g., the
case of the Serbs and Bulgars).
The determined Anglo-American pursuit of these conjoint policies
throughout the twentieth century led automatically first, to the liquida-
tion of the West's geostrategic frontier that had held enemies at bay be-
cause its human guardians knew when to mediate East-West conflicts
and when to strike; second, to the transformation of the small states into
satellites of the Soviet Union; and third, to the paralysis that gripped the
West's policymaking in 1989-90.25
In accounting for this epochal failure one can single out many rea-
sons, but all converge in the final analysis on one: the Anglo-American
West did not and does not know either the continental West or the Soviet
Union.
As suggested earlier, the knowledge gap in regard to the latter is most
pronounced in the United States where Sovietology has long prospered
in academe and government but where its individual representatives were
in no way prepared for the revolutionary developments in 1989-90. The
most persuasive explanation for this phenomenon is found in an essay by
Z, "a sometime observer of the Soviet scene," entitled "To The Stalin
Mausoleum" and published in Daedalus, Winter 1990 26 from which the
following excerpts are borrowed:
Instead of taking the Soviet leadership at its ideological word—that their task
was to "build socialism"—Western Sovietology has by and large foisted on
Soviet reality social science categories derived from Western realities, with
the result that the extraordinary, indeed surreal, Soviet experience has been
rendered banal to the point of triviality, (p.298)
xxxv
...the time has come to take a fresh look at the starting point of Western
sovietological analysis: namely, the two bases of the totalitarian model, ideol-
ogy and politics, and at the ways in which these factors have modeled the
institutions and the mentalities created by seventy years of "utopia in
power".... As we now know...the Soviet Union, though clearly a failed
Utopia, is neither a developed nor a modern nation. It is rather something SMI
generis, a phenomenon qualitatively different from all other forms of despo-
tism in this or previous centuries, (p.300)
Furthermore, the thought is relevant that the West's leading policy-

makers and Sovietologists might not have lost their bearings, or could
have corrected their trajectory in the wilderness of present-day East-West
relations had they sought guidance from humanist historians. It is thus
unlikely that readers of Robert Conquest's precise and analytical accounts
of life in the Soviet Union would have been seduced by Marxist-Leninist
theories and deceived by Soviet statecraft as readily as American gov-
ernments were in our times.
In sum, and as matters stood in 1989-90, the United States did not
understand the "real" Soviet Union and its basic mentality. It was there-
fore unable to recognize it as an enemy and to conceptualize the East-
West relationship as a serious cold war between rival cultures and idea
systems. And since it also did not understand German and Eastern Euro-
pean mind-sets and national interests it could not have been expected to
acknowledge any need for knowing, holding, advancing, and defending
Europe's long-established cultural frontiers.
These policy and intelligence failures handicapped the United States
when it was drawn into the southwestern sector of the Eurasian North-
South fault line first in 1990 in the context of the Persian Gulf war against
Iraq, and thereafter into the tangled processes attending the dissolution
of Yugoslavia, the second Leninist imperium in Europe;27 for it is here
that the North-South divide links up with the Mediterranian East-West
fault line that has been separating continental Europe from Islamic West
Asia and North Africa since the early eighth century A.D. while connect-
ing that region with the Atlantic Ocean. As noted earlier, it is this line
which has been worked to great advantage in recent years by Qaddafi's
Libyan regime and radical leaders of Islamic fundamentalism.
Continental Europe, then, was effectively encircled throughout most
of the twentieth century by two longtime adversaries of Western civi-
lization. But this actuality was not even perceived in Anglo-Ameri-
xxxvi
can perspectives either before or during the Persian Gulf war. Thus it
was only ex post facto that the Soviet Union had been deeply en-
gaged for three decades in grooming Iraq for its regional wars and its
likely encounter with American armed forces, and that Leninism and
Islam—different as they were and are in most respects, converge on
viewing all foreign relations as war realtions and on not accepting
certain basic norms of traditional Western statecraft, namely those
relative to the territorially bounded state, the absolute distinction be-
tween the condition called "peace" and the condition called "war,"
and the established axiom that aggressive war consists in violating
the territorial borders of established states.
Had contemporary scholarly elites in the Anglo-American West and
some provinces in the continental European West relaxed their disci-
plined concentration on "peace" research and engaged in equally disci-
plined comparative studies of culturally foreign histories, thoughtways,
religions, ideologies, and governmental structures they would have dis-
covered early on that Leninist and Islamic societies are by definition
conflict systems, and that the genus "cold war" is deeply entrenched in
both—a finding that would surely have helped their respective govern-
ments to analyze international relations and draft long-range foreign poli-
cies realistically.28
In the strictly Western or European perspective, by constrast, it is pos-
sible to experience the dramatic actualities of the 1990s as a replay of
history that began with the birth of Europe in the throes of the
GrecoPersian wars 2500 years ago; continued with Europe's expansion
and consolidation in Roman and early Christian times in order then to be
arrested by Islam between the seventh and fifteenth centuries A.D. That
challenge too was launched in the southeastern part of the North-South
faultline where Greek city states had set the precedent for holding the
West's cultural frontier when they contained the Persians. The Muslim
onslaught covered the Mediterranean Sea in its entirety, but the space
that really mattered for the Islamic offensive and the Christian defense
was Europe's southern coastlands (its "soft underbelly" in twentieth-cen-
tury semantic usage). And here the contest remained focused for 700
years on the Byzantine Empire, heir to Greece in its gatekeeping func-
tions, and on the Iberian peninsula in the extreme West of the Mediterra-
nean where Portugal and Spain were to stand steady guard first as
culture-conscious marcas and thereafter as politically highly accomplished
Renaissance states.
xxxvii
The former was fragmented in the course of non-stop Islamic onslaughts
and ceased existing in mid-twentieth century. The Spaniards, by con-
trast, were able to liberate their conquered kingdoms and provinces, one
by one; defeat and oust their Islamic enemies, and regain their national
identities in 1492 because they steadfastly followed a geoculturally com-
plex strategic master plan that had been designed in the eleventh century
by the unconquered kingdoms in northern Spain, chief among them
Aragon.
This remarkable blueprint for freedom and victory called for the gradual
military and moral reconquista of all Spain and for the eventual unification
of its formerly separate kingdoms into a law based Christian Spanish nation
state. The operational tactics prescribed for the attainment of these goals
combined pacification and warfare in a variety of forms that had not been
common in the medieval West. This probably explains why a thirteenth-
century Aragonese scholar (he was also a member of the royal family) coined
a new term—namely guerrafria—for this type of warring.29
The year 1492 not only marks Spain's victory over Islam and its resusci-
tation as an independent state. It is a big year also in international history
because it symbolizes the whole fifteenth century of explorations and dis-
coveries during which seafarers from the West's two small gatekeeping marca
states succeeded in opening the gate to the Atlantic Ocean and providing
direct access to Asia and newly discovered America, thus liberating Europe
from the Islamic stranglehold over the Mediterranean region. Or so it seemed
until the United States and Western Europe realized at the end of the twenti-
eth century that they were the targets of a globe-spanning terrorist jihad and
that they had not been prepared for that.
Reflections on the differences between the 1490s and the 1990s lead
back to "the missing historian." That personaage was not available to
present-day policymakers in the United States, probably because the
whole nation had developed an ahistorical bias, particularly in regard to
its nineteenth-century European inheritance. Yet it is Leopold von Ranke's
searching historical analysis of the standing contradictions between Chris-
tian Europe and Islamic Asia that continues to provide the needed long-
range perspective. For according to Ranke's assessment we are dealing
here with a permanent and fundamental conflict as well as with the big-
gest of all problems in world politics and world history. Being insoluble
in its essentials, it passes from decade to decade, and from century to
century, thus challenging Western states and successive generations to
be always collectively prepared.
xxxviii
Such a state of collective awareness can be reached only, Ranke notes,
after one has found and examined all relevant and reliable historical
records and in this regard he discovered—while looking for reasons that
might explain the Ottoman Empire's crisis between the mid-sixteenth
and the mid-seventeenth centuries—that everything relative to that crisis
was fully set out and annotated only in the Venetian relazioni.
Venice occupies a very special place in the present volume30 as well as
in my specialized studies of political intelligence,31 and that for reasons
set out explicitly. Here I merely want to suggest that Venetian statecraft
continues to deserve close study in the century to come because it is a
time-transcendent model for charting foreign relations successfully—
whether in Renaissance, modern, or "postmodern" times, and because
its success is attributable to the Venetian conviction that history is the
foremost tool for political analysis. This becomes evident after reading a
Venetian edict, dated September 26, 1530,32 which establishes the post
of an official state historian for the purpose of guiding and monitoring
Venetian statesmen. For as explained by the oldest and most reputable
senators on one occasion, Venice enjoyed a particular advantage in her
ability to wait for the opportunity of times and the maturity of occasions.
As noted in chapter 6 of this book, "time" and "history" are conceived
and experienced very differently in the culturally separate provinces of
the world society. But the European scheme of organizing historical time
is nonetheless meaningful internationally in my view33 for some rather
simple reasons.
It is an established fact that Europeans have been identified since clas-
sical times with an innovative civilization ,and a promethean vision for
the proper uses of time. In that spirit they succeeded between the fifth
century B.C. and the twentieth century A.D. to link the continents and
cultures by developing various modes of technical and intellectual com-
munication and by producing an academic universe of learning that has
come to serve all nations equally.
It is in this context, then, that Western scholars studied and assembled
the histories of all "others" in the world society; that they found the kind
of junctions in life experience that allow for integration in unifying time
frames, and that they started structuring international relations as a quasi-
academic discipline.
How should scholars today approach this subject? Which new orien-
tations recommend themselves? Reflections on the complex interplay
between politics and culture as this has been recorded throughout the
xxxix
inhabited world between the 1890s and 1990s allow for the suggestion
that the twentieth century is in a class with the fifth century B.C. and the
fifteenth century A.D. All have been transculturally momentous time spans.
Indeed, the linkages between the three widely separated centuries are so
close that it would not be possible to evaluate the present condition of
any operational civilization or political system unless one recalls the sa-
lient points in the records of the two earlier centuries.34
My analysis of these records persuaded me that Western time scales
have no direct bearing on non-Western conceptions and experiences of
time, but that they are meaningful and significant for all members of the
present world society in the particular context of international history.
The centuries from the fifth century B.C. to 1500 A.D. may thus be said to
constitute the first great chapter in the modern history of international
and intercultural relations. For not only did the outlines of the modem
world become apparent as that period closed with great discoveries and
with the emergence of new nations and their distinct cultures, but it was
then too that the modern law based state evolved in Europe with its at-
tendant institutions. Further, it was in this region and at this time that the
Occident's civilization was consolidated, thus enabling it to supply the
mainsprings of human thought and movement on all continents.35
In light of these revolutionary developments one can conclude that
present international relations have their anchorage in the European re-
gion and in these two millennia.
Ensuing centuries brought scholarly and political elaborations and
modifications to the themes that preoccupied Europeans in the late Middle
Ages and the Renaissance. They are discussed in subsequent chapters as
well as in the analytical examinations of change and continuity in con-
temporary Leninist, non-Western, and Western orbits of the world soci-
ety that are included in this Introduction. The questions facing Western
scholars at the threshold of the twenty-first century include the follow-
ing: How should we think about international relations now? What—if
anything—is missing in our present orientations to this important field
of studies?
In reviewing primary subject matters I concluded that the territorially
bounded, law-based Western-type state is no longer the central principle
in the actual conduct of international relations, and that it should there-
fore not be treated as the lead norm in the academic universe. True, all
Leninist and most non-Western societies had adopted the cause of the
modem state when they joined the United Nations Organization over the
xl
last fifty years. However, the integral substance of statehood as concept
and reality was seriously compromised because they could not—or did
not want to identify their U.N. state status with the complex substantive
values that were projected by the language of the U.N. Charter—chief
among them constitutionalism and peace. Only when nations were found
deadlocked in conflict over the interpretation of a value, or in the pursuit
of mutually antagonistic goals was it realized that the subscription to
internationally approved objectives and methods of attaining these ob-
jectives had not cancelled long-standing local value systems and tradi-
tional methods of coping with political disputes.36 In the meantime all
U.N. member states continued to enjoy their official accreditation as sov-
ereign, independent, peace-loving,and equal states.
In short, the appelation "state" tells you nothing nowadays. You may
be dealing with a non-state like Somalia; or with a state that serves as
cover for anti-state activities or for terrorism; with states that do not sub-
scribe to the principle of territorially bounded space; or that are condi-
tioned by their religious belief systems to be always at war. In the context
of Western scholarship and statecraft this adds up to a serious impasse in
thought and action—since it blocks understanding "others" on their own
terms—surely the basic requirement for dealing with international rela-
tions. It is thus axiomatic in these circumstances (1) that scholars and
statesmen must identify and assess the cultural infrastructure of "State
X" before determining what can or can not be expected from that soci-
ety; and (2) that a culture cannot be understood without knowing its
history.
Notes
1. See infra, for comments on the new American democracy campaign.
2. For a detailed account of this relationship see Adda B. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts
and Realities, Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 331-346. My comments on recent changes
in Africa are more extensive than those covering all other provinces in the non-Western world
because the original edition of my book does not deal either with Africa or with other for-
merly non-literate cultures. Considerations of space in the present issue of the book do not
permit assessments of the African diaspora in Caribbean states and societies, except for the
following brief references to Haiti.
3. It is worth recalling in this context that the Near East and North Africa had been part of the
Hellenistic, Roman, and Christian culture realms before they were subdued by Islam. Cp.,
infra, chapters 1, 10, and 11.
4. Cp., infra., 360-386; also chapters 11 and 12 for assessments of these constant themes.
5. Cp., infra., chapter 10 and Lewis B. Ward, "An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical
Context," in The International Dimension of Culture and Conflict, Proceedings of the Sym-
posium, The Political-Military Affairs Division, Airpower Research Institute, with the par-
ticipation of Adda B. Bozeman (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,
April 1991.
xli
6. It should be recalled that Persia—the core province of Iran—had been forcibly converted to
Shi'ism by the Safavid Dynasty in 1500 A.D. the short-lived twentieth-century Pahlavi dy-
nasty in Iran did its utmost to stem the tide of militant Islamic fundamentalism and the power
of Shi'ite theologians by reactivating the secular norms of statecraft that had sustained the
greatness of the Achaemenid empire (sixth to fourth century, B.C.), and by reviving the ethical
values of fifth-century Zoroastrianism which was to become Sassanian Persia's state religion
many centuries later.
7. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Egypt Fights Militant Islam with More of The Same," New York
Times, August 18,1993, to the effect that the Minister of Religious Affairs uses his office and
his budget to support the radical Islamization of Egypt and the systematic marginalization of
the country's secular establishment and its Christian minority.
8. These decisions were harshly criticized in the United States where liberals focus on the mer-
its of Western democracy while forgeting that non-Western states are not Western states.
9. For assessments of Islamic statecraft see infra., chapter 10 and Strategic Intelligence and
Statecraft, pp. 61, 98, 225. For an analysis of the medieval "guerrafria " between Islam and
Christendom (which spanned 800 years), see ibid., 229-259, "Cold Wars of Ideas."
For extended comments on Persia/Iran see infra., Index "Persia"; also Bozeman, Strate-
gic Intelligence and Statecraft, 92-98, and Bozeman, "Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tra-
dition of Persian Statecraft", ORBIS, vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 1979, 387-402.
10. It is important to note that the Arab ambivalence toward "the state" was not shared by Egypt,
pre-Khomeini Iran, and Turkey.
11. Cp. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities, on these issues.
12. For an early assessment of Libya see Adda B. Bozeman, review of H.S. Villard, : The New
Arab Kingdom of North Africa, (1956) in Middle Eastern Affairs, February 1957, vol. VIII,
no. 2, pp. 68.
13. See also Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, ch. 2, pp. 64 and ch. 3, p. 108.
14. Cp. infra., chapter 4 "The Place of the Chinese State in Asia," pp. 133 ff.; also pp. 162 ff.; pp.
141 ff. for the Legalist School.
15. See "On New Democracy," Selected Works (English edition), vol. II (Peking, 1967), p. 381.
Also Kin-chuan Hsiao, "Legalism and Autocracy in Traditional China," in Li Yu-ning
ed., Shang Yang's Reforms and State Control in China, (White Plains, N.Y., 1977) pp.
125 ff. Cp. also Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, pp. 68-73; pp. 126 ff.; pp.
180 ff.; and The Future of Law in a Multicultural World, (Princeton University Press, 1971),
140-160.
16. See his Main Currents of Marxism, transl. P.S. Falla, vol. 3 OxfordrClarendon Press, 1978, p.
523.
17. Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans from the East (third
edition, revised). Foreword by Robert Murphy, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and
London, 1989, pp. 8 and 11.
18. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, (1967), vol. I, p. 265, and his foreword to Marion Countess
Donhoff, Before The Storm: Memories of My Youth in Old Prussia, Alfred A. Knopf, New
York, 1990.
See also Edgar Gunther Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreussen 1944/45, Podzun-Pallas Verlag,
Dorheim, 1964. This is a narrative account of the flight and the region's depopulation by
terrorist extermination that is based on documents from several German governmental ar-
chives. See p. 322 to the effect that of 2,653,000 East Prussians only 50,000 were left in 1964.
See ch. 13 for excerpts from offical British and American pronouncements on the East Prus-
sian issue and the concessions made to Poland and the Soviet Union.
19. The depopulation program was extended to include the East European "successor states" that
had been carved out of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires at the end of the First
World War. Cp. de Zayas, op.cit., chs. 2 and 3.
20. President Roosevelt in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson, August 26, 1944. It should be
noted that the enemy had originally been identified as Hitler's National Socialist regime. See
ibid. pp. 13 ff. for the evolution of the Collective War Guilt doctrine. It too had a precedent in
the First World War.
21. This is excerpted from Churchill, Closing the Ring, 1953, p. 362, in ibid., p. 38.
xlii
22. See Lass, op. cit., p. 332.
23. I have discussed them at greater length in Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, chapter 8 and
in "Finding and Holding Cultural Frontiers: Reflections on National Security and the Nature
of the State," (in process of publication).
The northernmost German Mark was established in what constitutes Estonia and Latvia
today under the auspices of the Church and the Order of German Knights. Riga was founded
by the Bishop in early thirteenth century. This Baltic frontier zone was different from others
in several ways. It was an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire even though it had no
territorial connection with it and it was administered first by the Bishopric and the Order, and
in later centuries by corporations of the nobilities (i.e., the descendants or the knights) and of
the Hanseatic League. However, political sovereignty was exercised by those who conquered
the lands: Poland and Sweden for brief periods, and Tsarist Russia from the eighteenth century
onward. Significantly the lands were officially known, up to the Bolshevik revolution as "die
Deutschen Ostsee Provinzen Russlands." In brief, in this case politics and culture were split.
24. See Carol Gruber, Mars and Minerva: World War I and The Uses of the Higher Learning in
America, Louisiana State University Press. Baton Rouge, 1975, for an examination of aca-
demic perspectives on these issues. I have discussed them at greater length in Strategic Intel-
ligence and Statecraft and in "Finding and Holding Cultural Frontiers: Reflections on National
Security and the Nature of the State," (in the process of publication).
25. The lone exception is West Germany.
26. It is issued as vol. 119, no. 1, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences.
27. Yugoslavia itself was a metaphor for this junction of cultural boundaries. It evolved as an
assemblage of Slavic and non-Slavic ethnicities—some christianized by Byzantium, others
by the First Rome—that was later split again when some were incorporated into the Islamic
Ottoman empire. Most revolted against the Islamic overlordship and returned to their respec-
tive Christian folds. Bosnia remained Islamic. All were officially sovietized in the course of
the Second World War and in its aftermath.
28. For a thoughtful examination of these academic issues see Robert A. McCaughey, Interna-
tional Studies and Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning
(Columbia University Press), New York, 1984.
29. For a detailed account of this first great European "cold war" between cultures and ideas see
Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, pp. 235-248; also infra, this volume, pp. 389 ff.
Numerous parallels can be drawn between this first cold war fought consciously in the
West and the twentieth-century cold wars that pitted Europe and America against Leninist
Sovietism and Islam. Thus it may not have been mere coincidence that Spain was the only
Western country that fought and won another reconquista when nationalists realized in in the
1930s that their government including its Defense Ministry was controlled by the communist
apparat; that their police forces were fully penetrated; that the Comintern was in complete yet
well-camouflaged control of the International Brigades; and that total terror was dispensed
by the Cheka.
30. Infra., pp. 451-477 and authorities cited.
31. Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, pp., 113 ff. for a brief comparison of Venice and the
United States.
32. I am indebted to Cornell University Libraries for sending me a copy of that edict as published
in Nuovo Archivio Veneto (1530).
33. I do not think that the Western scheme of history can readily accomodate cultures and societ-
ies that had been nonliterate throughout the centuries that preceded the introduction of writ-
ing in the nineteenth century A.D. and I cannot believe that such a gap can be closed by
developing, twentieth-century methods of collecting oral history.
34. Cp. supra, this introduction and the ensuing chapters of the volume, including chapter 6,
"New Perspectives".
35. Cp. infra., pp. 218ff.
36. Cp. the last two pages of the present text for my original discussion of this dilemma. See John
H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, IX (July 1957), 473
ff., for interesting observations.
xliii
POLITICS AND CULTURE IN
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY
INTRODUCTION [1994]
T
he image of the world as a physically indivisible entity was
formulated slowly in the history of mankind as the continents
were discovered and explored. It acquired new dimensions of
meaning with the steady improvement of communications be-
tween the once isolated regions of the earth. The acceleration of contacts
between the world's various peoples that followed in the wake of these
developments suggested a transposition of the image of wholeness, in
the sense that the world could now be viewed as the abode of men whose
various destinies were inextricably intertwined. This spiritual, as well as
physical, version of unity received further definition when it became
evident that certain ideas and institutions, first tested and defined in Eu-
rope and North America, had a universal appeal.
Most of the peoples outside the Atlantic community of nations ac-
cepted the standards of intellectual and material achievement that Occi-
dental thought and enterprise represented, subscribed to the vocabulary
of political symbols that had been composed in the West, adopted the
forms of government that Europeans and Americans had devised, and
acknowledged the validity of the tenets of international intercourse long
associated with the European system of states. They thus came to see
both their present and their future in terms of Western aspirations and
achievements and, since the historical records of most Asian and African
peoples were first compiled and analyzed by Occidental scholars, even
viewed their past in the mirror of Western historiography.
This widespread diffusion of the Western legacy, which was attended
by an intense propagation of the literate knowledge accumulated in Eu-
rope and America, had the undeniable effect of providing the modern
society of nations with a unifying structure. It was instrumental also in
fostering the assumption that all peoples participate in a world culture
and constitute a world community—a development concretized in 1945
by the formation of the United Nations Organization.
Serious doubts whether all peoples were in genuine agreement as to
the paramount values projected by the new world constitution developed
only when the Soviet Union asserted a very different concept of human
destiny and global order. As relayed by its governing communist elites,
this world view put forth an image of mankind gathered, on the one hand,
in the peace-loving camp of socialism under the patronage of the Soviet
Union, and, on the other, in the degenerate camp of capitalism under the
3
INTRODUCTION
leadership of the Western democracies. In the context of this divisive
doctrine neither unity nor lasting peace can be envisaged until the camp
of socialism would be coextensive with the world. The communist chal-
lenge, projected upon the world arena and its many subsidiary stages in
the form of political and psychological warfare, thus had the effect of
disestablishing the halcyon myth of unity and of setting in its place the
rival image of a bipolar world.
This rendition of reality persuaded people everywhere that they must
interpret their destinies in terms of one or the other of these alternative
ways of life, and that it was possible to reduce all tensions in interna-
tional and intercultural relations to the measure of the conflict in which
the protagonists of the Western and the communist value systems were
engaged. Indeed, it must be conceded that in its recognition of the motif
of strife and dissonance the principle of the two worlds was more realis-
tic than the principle of the one. Nevertheless, in its summary treatment
of the deeply various causes of strife and dissonance it was no less mythi-
cal than the latter. For each of the regions of the earth—whether regarded
as a province of one great world society, or as a pawn in the struggle
between two—had its own traditions of life and thought that antedate, in
many cases by millenniums, both the conception of the one world and
that of the two.
Many of these indigenous patterns of life and thought got blurred while
being integrated in the modern Occidental scheme of things. Some were
officially discarded because they seemed to impede the attainment of the
political and social goals associated with the cause of progress, as sug-
gested by voluntary or involuntary contacts with the West. Others sim-
ply withered away with the social structures to which they had given
support. However, when the non-Western peoples began to assume their
places as modern political communities in the world so largely shaped
by Western thought, it became increasingly apparent that the Western
ideas were not the exclusive mainsprings of their political attitudes and
actions. Whether in India, Egypt, or Nigeria, people were generally stimu-
lated by the spread of literacy and the growth of nationalism to probe
their own pasts and to resurrect the realities and myths that antedated
their knowledge and acceptance of the Western ways. Behind the screen
of an offical accord upon Occidental interpretations of such norms or
values as tyranny and freedom, power and law, ignorance and knowl-
edge, discords grew in the field of intercultural relations. The Africans
and Asians proceeded, both consciously and unconsciously, to reinstate
4
INTRODUCTION
their native modes of thought and behavior, while continuing to pay obei-
sance to Western words and forms. The Europeans and Americans, mean-
while, hearing their words employed in senses strangely foreign to
long-familiar definitions and primary concepts, began to realize that not
only their transplanted words but also their institutions had come to stand
for practices and attitudes that differed greatly from the parental norms.
An intense, albeit little-noticed dialogue between substratal or residual
non-Western values on the one hand, and the classical Occidental on the
other, had thus been in progress for some time when the encounter of
civilizations was further complicated by the Soviet Union's strenuous
propagation of the communist doctrine.
In these circumstances each nation, each culture, or each region thus
seemed bound to become a separate stage upon which indigenous, com-
munist, and Western European systems of reference and persuasion would
interact. Barring the contingency of an ultimate obliteration of one or the
other by conquest, each was therefore likely to evolve its own syncretic
system for the ordering of life within its contours and the projection of
its interests abroad. In other words, the realities of world affairs probably
were not rendered adequately when conveyed in the simple myth of a
bipolar world; for between the poles of the contemporary map of the
world were numerous well-defined cultural and political entities as well
as some that were just beginning to define themselves.
Politics and Culture in International History evolved slowly in this
complex epoch of the twentieth century—to be exact between 1947 and
1956. It probably began in my mind as an attempt to understand world
politics in the mid-twentieth century by identifying the causes of conflict
and war and assessing the validity of regnant schemes for peace and
unity. However, the work soon turned into a comprehensive effort to
come to terms with international relations as a world-spanning and time-
transcendent phenomenon on many planes of human communication. So
conceived, it required close multidisciplinary studies of non-European
and non-American thoughtways, historical experiences, and recorded
social and political systems before I could identify the world's different
culture zones and come close to understanding why and how the collec-
tive mind-sets of Asian and African nations differ so strikingly from each
other as well as from those developed in the West.
In brief, or put differently, I concluded early on that political systems
are grounded in cultures, that present day international relations are there-
fore by definition also intercultural relations; and that scholarly analysts
5
INTRODUCTION
and policymakers in the West would be more successful in their respec-
tive callings if they would examine the cultural infrastructures of the
nations and political systems they are dealing with. Further, I was per-
suaded then as I am now when my book is being reissued, that the chal-
lenge of understanding "others"—be they friends or foes—can be met
only after one has found out how they think. And since thought can be
assumed to precede action in all human societies, I concluded that in-
quiry and analysis should focus on mental and moral persuasions, be
they religious, philosophical, or ideological; on basic values and norms
within each society, and on time-transcendent perceptions of the outer
world.
As the new subtitle indicates, the book deals exclusively with thought-
ways of the world's literate civilizations and societies as these had been
recorded after the invention of writing, that is, between the fourth mil-
lennium B.C. and the fifteenth century A.D..
However, while engaged in making my preparatory assessments and
comparisons of culturally different mind-sets, I had become intensely
aware of nonliterate societies—those, namely, whose languages had not
been written down before the nineteenth century and in which thought
and life had evolved and crystallized for millennia without benefit of
writing and in exclusive reliance on speech. Since close studies of non-
literate African, American Indian, and Philippine tribal communities had
convinced me (1) that there could be no deeper divide between thought
systems than that separating traditionally literate from traditionally
nonliterate mental operations; and (2) that non-literate communities had
nontheless been active participants in international and intercultural re-
lations an regional as well as continental levels, I decided to open Poli-
tics and Culture in International History with a discussion of that set of
issues.
These first approximate hundred pages of the original 1956 manu-
script had to be dropped two years later when Princeton University Press
decided to publish the book. The decision was made on good grounds
and had my full support. In fact, it proved most beneficial in my writing
career since it stimulated me in the ensuing fifteen years to further my
interests in ancient and modern Africa and expand major themes in Poli-
tics and Culture by writing a concentrated case study of the standing
conflict between literate Occidental and non-literate African thought sys-
tems. Naturally I was pleased that Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Re-
alities was also published by Princeton (in 1976).
6
INTRODUCTION
I am deeply grateful to Transaction Publishers for reissuing Politics
and Culture in International History in 1994. In particular, I want to
thank Irving Louis Horowitz first for making all the difference in con-
veying the meanings carried by that volume when he added the subtitle,
From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the Modern Age to the
original title; and second, for suggesting that I take a hard look at what I
wrote thirty-eight years ago with a view to deciding just how valid my
analyses are at the threshold of the twenty-first century; whether, or how
the field of international relations has changed in the last four decades;
and what should come next in the historical study of international and
intercultural relations.
The original 1960 introduction sets forth the mainsprings of my per-
spectives on world affairs as well as my approaches to the study of his-
tory. Further, it contains the abstracts of all major themes developed in
ensuing chapters. In short, the introduction is an organic and important
part of my work which readers are entitled to judge themselves before
they meet up with my later thoughts in the preceding introduction to the
Transaction edition.
Introduction [1960]
The world order that the Occidental nations projected during the centu-
ries of their intellectual and political supremacy when they assumed that the
world was likely to become a macrocosm of their own realm is in issue not
only because it has been contested by communists but also because it is not
easily compatible with the traditional local orders that are being revived in
Africa and Asia. Some examples may illustrate this point.
One of the basic concepts in modern international politics is the sov-
ereign democratic nation-state which acquired its connotations in the
histories of Western Europe and America. Since groups of people in all
continents have willingly identified their collective aspirations with this
norm of organization by claiming the right to self-determination, declar-
ing their independence from former authorities and agreeing to constitu-
tions that recognize the individual as the bearer of civic rights, it was
generally understood that the modern state had actually superseded older,
local forms of government. In the prevailing climate of egalitarian think-
ing, it is easy to forget that most communities in the Balkan and Black
Sea regions had matured under the political tutelage of the Byzantine
Empire, whose tenets of rule were quite at variance with those devel-
7
INTRODUCTION
oped in the West; that India had not been a nation before it was unified
by the British; that China's ancient systems of politics and ethics con-
tained no analogues to modern democratic norms; that Islam had not
evolved the kind of secular law from which civic rights could be derived;
and that the various African tribes now assembled in nation states were
not united either by a common ethnicity and language or by traditions of
cooperation.
What is generally being overlooked today as the concept of the mod-
ern state and its allied principles of law and democracy undergo their
various metamarphoses in non-Western environments, is that these norms
originated in the most literate of known civilizations as highly complex
legal abstractions. That is to say, the vocabulary of political ideas for
which world-wide applicability has been claimed in our times was com-
posed by successive generations of people who regarded the written word
as the principal mode of expression and law as the principal source of all
symbols denoting political achievements and objectives. Such an orien-
tation had not evolved in the histories of other cultures. In the ancient
civilization of the Far and Near East, where the art of writing originated,
literate knowledge never spread to the masses, since it was consistently
viewed as the preserve of the intellectually and politically elect. The or-
ganized societies in these regions of the world thus developed symbols
and institutions quite different from those of the generally literate Occi-
dental nations for the conveyance of shared political understandings. Even
greater deviations from the assumed agreement upon the form and sub-
stance of the presently current political language than those implicit in
the contrast just noted can be found in the histories of nonliterate civili-
zations. Here, where the biographies of heroes and histories of peoples
were recited orally and remembered, not written or filed in archives, and
where crime and injustice could be set aright to everyone's satisfaction
through the appropriate gesture of a respected chief, the written word, let
alone the legal term, cannot become the trusted frame of reference, how-
ever intense its propagation among the now-living generations.
In the light of these relationships between politics and culture as well
as between past and present, it appears that many Occidental instruments
of government, such as written constitutions supporting parliamentary
procedures on local, regional, and global levels of political organization,
are fundamentally uncongenial to those peoples who have inherited non-
or semiliterate forms for the expression of their political destinies and
dispositions.
8
INTRODUCTION
As one reviews the present national and international systems, which
certain particularly talented European nations have brought into consti-
tutional forms through generations of revolutionary thinking and plan-
ning, one cannot avoid the realization that these nations in their
overemphasis on the political and constitutional aspects of their social
development have disregarded many sources of cultural strength, not only
in their own civilization, but also in the realms that they came to domi-
nate, and that, as a consequence, the world has been to this extent not
only impoverished of its human heritage but also prevented from attain-
ing the full measure of its possible cultural accords. It is, however, equally
clear that by perfecting their own peculiar approaches to the relations
between politics and cultures, these same Western nations have succeeded
in unifying the world, at least rhetorically, and that this is in itself a re-
markable achievement. However, the achievement has been made at con-
siderable cost, for it has been attended by a steady weakening of the
separate cultures that now are being called upon to support a world society.
In those non-Western parts of the world where an official acceptance
of the unifying Western value system implied the deliberate or involun-
tary devaluation of native norms of thought and behavior, it has fostered
the development of what may be called split cultures, where societies,
wavering between two frames of reference, have become so uncertain of
their true attachments that they risked approaching a state of sociologi-
cal neurosis. Both at home, in their attempts to apply the most modern
Western methods to immemorial local problems, and in the international
field, where the terminology little accords with their actual ideals, they
have affected attitudes and intentions that cannot be brought into accord
with their inheritance. Meanwhile, the Western nations that produced the
Unitarian philosophy of intercultural relations have, in their turn, suf-
fered effects of another kind; by overextending the radius of their culture
realm to include peoples unable to achieve an organic relationship to its
institutions, and by permitting a number of their most cherished values
to receive alien connotations and inflections incompatible with their ac-
tual meanings, they have unwittingly contributed to a denaturing of their
own civilization.
The effort to unify the world by the propagation of a common vocabu-
lary has thus yielded considerable intellectual confusion both in national
and in international affairs, for it is becoming increasingly apparent that
the various peoples of the world are speaking of different things even
while uttering the same words.
9
INTRODUCTION
Many of the fallacies implicit in the early optimistic estimate of
mankind's capacity for cultural and political coalescence are being ex-
posed today as the Western and non-Western nations review the cultural
realities of our time. However, most of the restatements that have been
made are extremely limited in scope and nature. Not only do they con-
tinue to employ the old vocabulary of agreement, which has been dis-
credited by recent history, but they are being addressed almost exclusively
to the current manifestations of two rather recent historic processes. That
is to say, every one of the problems faced by the non-Western peoples of
the world is being reviewed either in terms of the impact that the West
has had in the last few centuries upon their fortunes, or in terms of the
new challenge tossed by the communists onto the stage of African and
Asian affairs. Neither approach reaches the heart of any of the matters
actually at issue in the non-Western areas. No less narrow bounds seem
to restrict the self-analysis in which the Occidental nations themselves
are engaged, since the validity and nonvalidity of Western values are
being defined almost exclusively in counterpoint to communism and with
reference to a competition for the loyalty and support of the so-called
noncommitted nations.
This book does not refute the need for either of the analyses now in
progress, but suggests that the real affinities and differences bewteen the
various cultural and political systems of the present world society can be
uncovered only after a thorough exploration of the historic sources of all
significant patterns of political thought and behavior. Only when one
knows what meanings a particular nation has traditionally attributed to
such prominent words in the current international vocabulary as peace,
war, unity, authority, and freedom, or what other values and institutions,
not included in this dictionary, it has recognized as major structural prin-
ciples, can one test with any hope of accuracy the authenticity and worth
of presently existing international arrangements and assumptions.
The answers to questions such as these can be found only in the sepa-
rate histories of the separate culture forms. However, if such records are
to yield the insights into local value systems requisite for an understand-
ing of present international conflicts and accords, they must be read in
the context of the region and the time to which they refer rather than in
perspectives suggested by contemporary manifestations of international
relationships. Non-Western systems whould therefore be identified in
their pre-Western incarnations, while the Western system should be re-
viewed as it existed before it was projected into foreign realms. Only
10
INTRODUCTION
when each of the disparate political systems presently represented in the
world is recognized in its intrinsic substance will it be possible to under-
stand the various patterns that their mutual relations have assumed.
The aim of this book, therefore, is to bring the separate stories down to
the critical epoch of their fusion, aroung A.D. 1500, when the caravels of
Portugal and Spain opened the seaways of the new world.
The further question of just how to tell these separate stories in a uni-
fying way preoccupied me greatly while planning this book. The cumu-
lative records of literate and nonliterate cultures as well as of international
and intercultural relations had persuaded me that each culture has brought
forth certain lead concepts, mythical visions, or images with which suc-
cessive generations have continued to identify their collective destinies.
Comparative studies of these historically tenacious ideas convinced me,
next, that these myths, apart from being projections of indefinable cul-
ture dreams, are also major structuring principles of reality. This meant
in my view that neither the past and present of a given society nor the
nature of its foreign relations can be even approximately understood un-
less the historian tries to reconstruct as authentically as possible, the in-
terplay between reality and myth in the region's history.
Reality and myth are commonly regarded as opposites. One seems to
denote the realm of reason, the other that of the imagination. Whereas
the former is supposed to include the sum total of rationally ascertainable
facts, the latter is said to be inhabited by all those fictions and beliefs for
whose existence scientific, or other rational proof cannot be adduced.
Poets, artists, and visionaries may dwell in the abode of myth and culti-
vate the fancies that make for myth. Those who claim the mandate to
order society, on the other hand, be they political thinkers, pyschologists,
or statesmen, are generally expected to secure the future of man by con-
tracting the realm of myth and progressively expanding the domain of
reason and reality. They may hold and develop political ideals, it is true,
but their ideals must be rationally tenable and capable of realization;
they may not be myths.
It would thus seem that myth and reality might be distinguished from
each other objectively, if we could endow the two concepts with appro-
priate definitions, or identify their appeals for individuals of different
callings. The tendency to arrange for such a separation is particularly
great in an age such as the present, in which great trust is placed in both
verbalization and professiqnal specialization, However, it becomes clear
upon reflection that most men have resources that cannot be subsumed
11
INTRODUCTION
in their vocations and that concepts such as those here in question have
substances that cannot be bounded by fixed definitions. What is real and
what mythical is therefore determined in the final analysis by the subjec-
tive images that particular human beings form of their environment and
in terms of which they act.
Man's freedom to contrive such images, however, is conditioned by
the time and place in which he finds himself. Distinctions between real-
ity and myth that were convincing in Europe in the thirteenth century
may be found inappropriate or even incomprehensible in the twentieth,
and conceptions of truth prevailing in Egypt at any given date may not be
shared in the contemporary United States. Time and place thus inevita-
bly influence all individual attempts to establish the correct relationship
between illusion, dream, or desire on the one hand, and the facts that are
known or knowable on the other. These are also the principal inhibiting
factors for those who would set themselves the task of reconstructing the
records of the past. What the beholder of the past is inclined to recognize
as having been the real and rationally ascertainable part of human expe-
rience may have been to those whose lives he is reviewing inconsequen-
tial or unreal. Conversely, what today's historian tends to regard as a
myth, or as a figment of the imagination unrelated to the facts of life that
he has uncovered, may in its time have been experienced as the ultimate
reality.
The following examples will serve to suggest some of the ambiguities
that are implicit in all historical interpretations.
The unity of medieval Christendom can scarcely be treated as a verifi-
able fact in the context of presently valid tests of actuality. Belied by the
institutions and policies to which the different component parts of the
so-called Christian commonwealth subscribed, medieval unity appears,
in our perspective, as a messianic dream to which man was beholden
because he was convinced that a united world was indispensable if hu-
manity was ever to achieve the divinely prescribed state of ultimate per-
fection. But this vision, nebulous as it may have been even in the
consciousness of Byzantine or Western European Christians, was never-
theless, according to our most reliable accounts, the solid substance of
all medieval life, with the result that—as Ernst Kantorowicz puts it—
"the myth stands out and becomes almost reality." Similar ambiguities
attend our present historical treatments of such important themes as
"peace" and "law," for each of these conceptions was acknowledged as a
fact by medieval man, even though the twentieth-century reviewer may
12
INTRODUCTION
be hard put to corroborate its actual existence in terms of modern stan-
dards of proof. Indeed, we today cannot extricate ourselves easily from
the web of fact and fancy that our predecessors have woven, however
adept we may have become in separating reality from dream. Even if the
ancient notion of a peaceful harmonious universitas is regarded by us as
an illusion, the fact is incontrovertible that it has generated images upon
which statesmen as well as poets have never ceased to draw, and that it
has supplied the fundamental ideas upon which Europe's major institu-
tions have been built.
No less intricate relationships between reality and myth emerge from
other cultures, whether literate or nonliterate. The myth of China's soli-
tary universal power that controlled the minds of generations of Chinese
was not borne out by physical evidence, yet it was the mainspring of the
actual patterns of political organization with which China has been iden-
tified. The image of a politically unified Muslim community that domi-
nated the Arabized peoples in the Midlle East was gainsaid by the actual
divisions of the Dar al-Islam into multiple sovereignties, yet it gave rise
to a doctrine of indivisible union that is still being experienced as the
conclusive reality. Other poignant mythical interpretions of history are
to be found among those peoples who have committed their experiences
of reality to memory rather than to writing. The nonliterate nations of
Africa, for instance, have formed separate tribal groupings throughout
recorded time; but there was a mythical time, their legends tell us, in
which many of them were joined in greater unions. These traditions,
whether one terms them real or mythical, were reactivated in mid-twen-
tieth century (albeit under the suggestive influence of French and English
constitutionalism), when ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences were
made to merge in the formation of such multitribal and multicultural
societies as Ghana, the Ghana-Guinea Federation and the Mali Federation.
This book has been informed by these reflections. However, it does
not pretend to incorporate the whole mythology and reality of all of the
world's cultures and nations. It is neither a consecutive exposition of
what has often been termed world history, nor a systematic study of the
whole context of international and intercultural relations. It is devoted
to, and accentuates, certain specific themes. Presenting a selection of
records from a spectrum of civilizations, the following chapters suggest
a panoramic view of recorded cultural traditions and invite the conclu-
sion that all history constitutes an internationally shared fund of multi-
farious human experience. However, in tracing the confluences of separate
13
INTRODUCTION
histories and in exploring the evolution of the chief ideas and institutions
to which transnational and transcultural significance can be attached to-
day, the book emphasizes those which have been conducive to peace and
order. While analyzing the development in time and space of these pat-
terns of thought and behavior, it draws attention to the role that informed
elites have played when they have been called upon to regulate encoun-
ters between their civilizations by dispelling conflict and establishing
trusted terms of reference for the conduct of domestic and foreign rela-
tions. This focused approach explains the concentration of the following
chapters on norms of political organization on local, regional, and inter-
national levels. It explains also the stress placed upon the emergence of
writing and the gradual diffusion of literacy throughout the world.
Ideas, symbols, myths, and institutions conducive to peace and order
in a world whose reality would seem attuned to neither have been present
in all epochs and all part of the globe, as the following chapters are de-
signed to show. But they disengaged themselves most emphatically, and—
it is suggested—most instructively for us today, in the Mediterranean
region between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. A considerable part
of the present commentary on international and intercultural relations
has therefore been set aside for an analysis of the Byzantine, Persian,
Muslim, Mongolian, Chinese, and Western European systems of thought
and symbol, which are here treated as the precursors of presently distin-
guishable political orders.
Conceived as an international history, this book will thus address it-
self to the intellectual and political crises that have ensued, and will con-
tinue to ensue, from the close encounter of the greatly different, often
antagonistic civilizations of the world, and to the need of locating prin-
ciples of agreement that are more widely meaningful than the ones pres-
ently in use. It will do so by reviving and reactivating those collective
memories of mankind that seem to be the most promising sources of
international cooperation today, and by recapturing those moments in
recorded time in which men of different continents and cultures suc-
ceeded in transcending their local environment.
Notes
1. Culture as understood in the present book comprises those norms, values, institutions, and
modes of thinking that survive change and remain meaningful to successive generations.
2. "The Problem of Medieval World Unity" in The Quest for Political Unity in World History,
Stanley Pargellis, ed., American Historical Association, 1944, p. 33.
14
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POLITICS AND CULTURE

Published 1994 by Transaction Publishers

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa

New material this edition copyright © 1994 by Taylor & Francis.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 94-8483

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bozeman, Adda B. (Adda Bruemmer), 1908-

Chapter 1. The Ancient Near East in International Relations 17

Chapter 2, The Place of Greece in International History: An

Chapter 4. The Place of the Chinese State in Asia 133

Chapter 5. The Place of Rome in International Relations 162

Chapter 6. New Perspectives 215

Chapter 7. The Chief Elements in Mediterranean Power Politics 226

Chapter 8. The Medieval Western European Realm 238

Chapter 9. The Byzantine Realm 298

Chapter 10. The Muslim Realm 357

Chapter 11. Patterns of International and Intercultural Re-

Chapter 12. The Mediterranean Elites and the Furtherance

Chapter 13. The Political Ascendancy of Western Europe and

1. The Non-Western Orbit

Westernization has spent itself in all newly independent non-Western

2. The Leninist Soviet Orbit in Eurasia

The most dramatic, indeed epoch making changes in twentieth-cen-

3. The Western Orbits of the World Society

This chapter in Euro-American history was closed in January 1946

Furthermore, the thought is relevant that the West's leading policy-

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