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Law and Public Choice A Critical Introduction
Law and Public Choice A Critical Introduction
Volume 90 Issue 6
1992
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
William Dubinsky, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1512 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/25
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LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION. By Daniel
A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. 1991. Pp. ix, 159. Cloth $34.95; paper, $13.95.
1512
May 1992] Law and Society 1513
American government. 8
The book's subtitle - A Critical Introduction - accurately por-
trays what Farber and Frickey intend to accomplish. In a format ac-
cessible to readers unfamiliar with the intricacies of political economy,
the book concisely introduces the two major strands of public choice
theory. 9 At the same time, it critically assesses the theory and the
applications of the theory to public law proposed by the existing schol-
arship. The authors reject the claim that the results of preliminary
public choice research justify making dramatic shifts in government
policy. Instead, they argue that if continued inquiry confirms the pre-
liminary :findings, public choice theory might, in time, lead to some
promising applications {p. 6).
11. Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191,
193 (1988).
12. Id. at 194-95.
May 1992] Law and Society 1515
13. Note that only some legislation is influenced by rent-seeking. If the cost of influence is
greater than the perceived benefit, the interest group will not act. The degree to which rent-
seeking pervades the legislative process is unclear. The authors take the position that "in
presuming that statutes are normally the result of self-serving influence, the rent-seeking model is
too cynical about the legislative process." P. 68.
14. ROBERT J. BARRO, MACROECONOMICS 530-31 (1984).
15. Id.
16. Special interest groups, however, may lower the cost to the legislator of gathering infor-
mation upon which to base their legislative decisions. The interest groups presumably have an
incentive to tell legislators at least partial truths in order to avoid discrediting themselves and
losing any chance of influencing future legislation.
17. P. 35; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoreti-
cal and ''Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 226 (1988).
18. See, e.g.• DWIGHT R. LEE, FISCAL POLLUTION AND THE CASE FOR CoNGRESSIONAL
TERM LIMITS 7 (Center for the Study of American Business Contemporary Issue Series No. 51,
1992) (discussing role of bureaucracy in promoting the growth of government spending); George
J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
1516 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1512
The second part of Law and Public Choice applies public choice
theory both to identify defects in the American political system and to
develop solutions to them. In Chapters Three and Four, Farber and
Frickey discuss and largely reject sweeping reform proposals sug-
gested by public choice scholars. Chapter Three responds to an argu-
ment made by Professor Richard Epstein and others that public choice
theory provides persuasive justification for a return to active judicial
review of federal and state economic regulation. Inherent in Epstein's
argument is the public choice belief that government regulation cannot
be presumed to further the public interest. Consequently, where a
court can identify rent-seeking regulation, which by definition is eco-
nomically harmful, it should strike down the regulation in order to
protect the public interest (p. 67).
Farber and Frickey reject the revival of vigorous judicial review of
economic regulation on three primary grounds. First, they find fault
with the idea that rent-seeking behavior by interest groups is so perva-
sive and successful as to dictate political outcomes (p. 68). The au-
thors believe that (1) rent-seeking occurs only where the cost of
influence is less than the benefit, and (2) the cost to the interest group
of exerting countermajoritarian influence increases as the cost to the
May 1992] Law and Society 1517
19. The cost of ignoring voter preferences increases when the voters perceive legislation as
important. For example, voters may have difficulty perceiving the importance of small changes
in the tax code, and such changes are very susceptible to special interest group maneuvering. In
contrast, a special interest group is less likely to prevail in areas where voter interest and under-
standing are high.
1518 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1512
CONCLUSION
20. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case
for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179 (1988). Professors Brennan and Buchanan argue that
critics have gone too far in criticizing public choice's results and that further academic inquiry
should not focus on extreme results but rather on "the nonnative exercise of investigating the
incentive structures embodied in various institutional forms." Id. at 180. Rather than embrac-
ing the view that economic motives dominate political actors, public choice theorists, according
to Brennan and Buchanan, reject the view that "political agents can be satisfactorily modeled as
motivated solely to promote the 'public interest,' somehow conceived." Id. at 181. For an exam-
ple of a critic who attacks public choice theory by setting up such a straw man, see Abner J.
Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
May 1992] Law and Society 1519
ical process; however, Farber and Frickey make perfectly clear that we
have a great deal to learn before drastic action is warranted.
- William Dubinsky