Energy 293 (2024) 130657

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Energy
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Battery leasing business for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles: Motorists’ costs,
adoption, and manufacturers’ profits
Ke Gong a, *, 1, Wei Zheng a, 1, Yingting Shu b
a
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, 66 Xuefu AVE, Nanan District, China
b
School of Economics, Sichuan Agricultural University, Chengdu, Sichuan, 611130, 211 Huimin AVE, Wenjiang District, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Handling editor: X Ou The high cost of the battery hinders the adoption of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs). Thus, we propose a
battery leasing model to overcome this cost barrier, in which motorists own the vehicle without a battery, and
Keywords: the lifetime of the battery is shared by the subsequent motorists who lease the battery. We proposed a game
Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) model between a manufacturer and motorists and compared the battery leasing model with the traditional
Battery leasing
buyout model, calibrated with U.S. data. We found that, first, the battery leasing model promotes HFCV adop­
Business model innovation
tion; specifically, leasing battery significantly reduces motorists’ costs and increases their utility, especially when
Operations management
Decarbonizing transportation battery cost is high. Compared to Mirai’s lease option, our model motorists’ costs could be reduced by 20%–42%
currently, and 15%–27% in the future. Second, the battery leasing model operates better when hydrogen price
and battery cost decrease, increasing adoption and manufacturer’s profits. Finally, the battery leasing model is
more profitable for manufacturers than the buyout model. In addition, low interest rates and high down pay­
ments will further extend the advantage of the battery lease model. This study deepens the understanding of the
HFCV business model in decarbonizing the transport sector and the sharing economy in vehicle sharing.

1. Introduction
From 1990 to 2021, transport sector emissions grew annually by
nearly 1.7%, surpassing any other end-use sector [1]. Transitioning to an
alternative sustainable energy source is urgent to meet rising energy
demands and reduce carbon emissions [2,3]. Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles
(HFCVs) are pivotal in global decarbonization efforts to reduce fossil
fuel consumption and combat the greenhouse effect [4,5]. They offer
high energy efficiency, zero emissions, quick refueling, and no battery
degradation at low temperatures [6–8]. However, the adoption of
HFCVs remains limited. In 2022, the sales are estimated at under 20,000
units [9]. The high purchase price poses a significant barrier to HFCV
adoption [10,11]. The battery leasing business model offers an effective
strategy for sharing the high purchasing cost to address this issue.
Therefore, a thorough study of this battery leasing model is crucial.
The transport sector is one of the major portions of global greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. Countries are reducing carbon emissions by
adopting electric vehicles (EVs) technology [12,13]. While the impor­
tance of EV technology has been investigated in many previous research,
especially its potential to reduce oil dependence and carbon emissions
[14], the major types of EVs studied remain pure electric vehicles (BEVs)
and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) [15,16].
Despite the contribution of BEVs and PHEVs in reducing carbon
emissions, they have some drawbacks, such as limited charging infra­
structure, longer charging time, and limited range [17–19]. In contrast,
HFCVs offer multiple advantages. First, like fuel vehicles (FVs), HFCVs
can be filled with hydrogen quickly [20]. Secondly, HFCVs have higher
energy utilization efficiency than vehicles using lithium batteries, and
the battery without degradation at low temperatures, which provides a
longer lifetime [21–23]. Third, hydrogen can be stored and transported,
contributing to the flexible energy supply [24]. Finally, the carbon
footprint of hydrogen is nearly zero, whose by-product during operation
is only water, especially when the hydrogen is derived from renewable
energy sources [25]. Therefore, the HFCV adoption is a potential solu­
tion to decarbonization in the transport sector [26].
Due to HFCV’s merits, many countries have developed strategies and
subsidy policies to promote HFCV adoption [27,28], yet the current
market penetration of HFCVs remains low. The high cost is one of the
main factors hindering HFCV adoption by the public [29] due to the use
of precious metals in their battery systems [30]. However, HFCVs’

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: gongke@cqjtu.edu.cn (K. Gong).
1
These authors contributed equally to this work.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.130657
Received 16 October 2023; Received in revised form 8 January 2024; Accepted 8 February 2024
Available online 13 February 2024
0360-5442/© 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
K. Gong et al.
batteries are expected to have a long lifetime. The U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) has set an ultimate goal of 8000 h under real-world
operating conditions for light-duty vehicle fuel cell systems [31].
However, most private vehicle motorists use a vehicle much shorter than
the lifetime of HFCV’s battery. As a result, the residual value of the
battery is not fully utilized.
In this context, we suggest a battery leasing model that leases a
battery to multiple motorists over its lifetime to solve the high-cost
problem, in which motorists own the vehicle without a battery, and
the lifetime of the battery is shared by the subsequent motorists who
lease the battery. However, most previous studies on new energy vehicle
adoption and battery leasing have focused on EVs [32–37], with little
consideration of HFCVs, and even fewer studies have addressed the
HFCV’s high-cost problem from a business model perspective. The
operation of this battery leasing business involves a bank, a manufac­
turer, and multiple motorists. There is a game between the motorists and
the manufacturer, where the manufacturer requires a profit-making
lease pricing, and the motorists choose to drive based on their utility,
which is related to factors such as battery cost and energy prices. Pre­
vious literature in HFCV operations management has not studied this
issue [38,39]. Therefore, the research on the solution of the HFCV bat­
tery leasing business model still needs further study. Within this context,
we pose two research questions.
RQ1. Can the battery leasing model promote HFCV adoption?
RQ2. How does this leasing model affect motorists’ costs and manu­
facturers’ profits?
We proposed a leasing model that can share the battery cost by
sharing the lifetime of the battery with the subsequent motorists who
lease the battery. First, we constructed a sequential game model be­
tween a manufacturer and motorists. In this model, motorists maximize
their utility by choosing between conventional fuel vehicles (FVs) and
HFCVs. Meanwhile, the manufacturer maximizes profits by setting pri­
ces, where motorists’ daily driving behavior is considered. Subse­
quently, we analyzed the operation of the battery leasing model under
the dynamic of energy prices and battery technology levels, and the
effectiveness of the battery leasing model in reducing motorists’ costs,
increasing adoption, and increasing the manufacturer’s profit. Finally,
we calibrated our model using U.S. motorists’ behavior, energy prices,
and HFCV technology data.
We found, first, motorists prefer to lease batteries, especially in high
battery cost conditions, because leasing batteries are cheaper than the
traditional buyout model. The cost of our model is even less than Mirai’s
existing lease option. Compared to Mirai’s lease option, our model
motorists’ costs could be reduced by 20%–42% currently, and 15%–27%
in the future. Leasing batteries significantly reduces motorists’ costs and
increases their utility, thus facilitating the adoption of HFCVs. Second,
the battery leasing model operates better under future energy prices and
battery technology levels. The adoption and profit of the battery leasing
model will be higher at low hydrogen prices and low battery costs.
Finally, the battery leasing model manufacturer is much more profitable
than the buyout model, especially when hydrogen prices and battery
costs are low. Additionally, low interest rates and high down payment
will further extend the advantage of the battery leasing model in these
three respects. These findings provide suggestions to maximize the
HFCV adoption and economic benefits and insights into HFCV business
models for manufacturers and policymakers. They are essential for
promoting the wide-scale adoption of HFCV to accelerate decarbonizing
transportation development.
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we are the first to
propose a battery leasing model for HFCVs that shares the battery cost.
Existing research on battery leasing business models has been primarily
focused on EVs [32–37]. Our study enriches the literature on HFCV
business models and the sharing economy in vehicle sharing. Second,
our study confirms the effectiveness of the battery leasing model in
2
Energy 293 (2024) 130657
promoting HFCV adoption by analyzing the operation of the battery
leasing model under the dynamic of energy prices and battery technol­
ogy levels and comparing it with the buyout model. The results of the
study enrich the literature on the adoption of new energy vehicles
related to operations management. Finally, we make the scenario
analysis that confirms the positive evidence of this new business mode’s
superiority. While existing research suggest that adopting HFCVs has
significant economic and environmental benefits [40–42], our research
results indicate that adopting HFCVs under the battery leasing model
offers superior economic(reduce motorists’ costs and increase the
manufacturer’s profits) and environmental(increase adoption and
reduce reliance on fossil fuels) benefits. Our study expands the literature
on the role of vehicle business models in promoting decarbonizing
transportation and provides a new theoretical foundation for the vehicle
business model study in the clean transport field.
2. Methodology
In this section, we first offer the preliminary requirements for our
modeling. Second, we give the traditional buyout model as the bench­
mark to compare with the subsequent battery leasing model. Finally, we
propose the battery leasing model and discuss the operation under the
dynamic of hydrogen price and battery cost.
Notations are shown in Table 1
2.1. Preliminary
Whether a motorist adopts a vehicle depends on the utility derived
from the relevant attributes of the vehicle [43,44] (see Table 2). We use
driving utility, direct costs, and green utility to describe the motorist
utility.
Driving utility derives from the mileage driven by the motorist daily.
Suppose the mileage driven by a motorist per day is x. As x increases, the
motorist obtains more utility from driving. However, when the daily
driving mileage is too large, it may cause the motorist to feel fatigued or
delayed because of the long driving distance, thus incurring the op­
portunity cost of time, which leads to a decrease in utility. To describe
this relationship more accurately, we use a level-satisfying quadratic
utility function, which has been used in the study of driving mileage
consumption [45]. Thus, we follow Ref. [14] and employ a quadratic
utility function to capture the utility of driving in the following form:
( )
1 x2
u(x) = θx − (1)
b 2
where θ is the average motorist’s satisfaction and b is a scaling factor. It
is clear that u increases with x and marginal utility decreases with x,
u′( ⋅) > 0, u″( ⋅) < 0.
Table 1
Notations.
Notation Definition
mi(f,h) Motorists planned daily mileage, i ∈ (f, h). f for FVs, h for HFCVs.
pj(l,b) Battery price. pl is the lease price in the battery leasing model, pb is the
battery price in the buyout model
μ Percentage of battery cost, the down payment price is μct in the battery
model.
ci(f,h) Energy price per mile. cf is fuel price, ch is hydrogen price.
ct Battery cost of HFCV.
R The interest rates on manufacturer’s loan.
n Battery lifetime of HFCV.
t Average time of motorists replacing a new vehicle.
The green utility of driving HFCVs. ξ is uniformly distributed over [0, a].
ξ
Ui(f,h) Utility of driving a vehicle.
Pj(l,b) Probability of HFCV adoption.
Uj(l,b) Utility of HFCV motorists.
Πj(l,b) Profit of HFCV manufacture.
K. Gong et al.
Direct costs include the vehicle purchasing cost and use cost (such as
fuel costs and repair costs). We normalize the purchase price of FVs and
HFCVs without battery to 0 and all other parameters per day (except for
the battery cost ct ).
Some motorists have a strong environmental awareness, they are
willing to pay a higher cost for driving new energy vehicles. Driving an
HFCV can provide them with additional green utility (ξ), which is
different for individuals and is closely related to their willingness to pay.
We assume that the green utility is uniformly distributed in [0, a] , where
a is the maximum additional cost that the motorist is willing to pay as
compared to a FV.
According to a study (Ref. [14]), a motorist’s daily driving behavior
is considered random, specifically the mileage driven per day. Ref. [14]
used data on the distribution of daily distances traveled by U.S. mo­
torists, as reported in Ref. [46], to determine the distribution of daily
driving distances of motorists. The study found that the gamma distri­
bution fits the total distance traveled well. Therefore, we are following
the approach of [14], assuming that a motorist’s daily driving mileage
(m + ε) follows a gamma distribution (α，β) , where α and β represent
the shape and scale parameters, respectively. Here, m is the expected
daily driving mileage, which we refer to as the planned mileage, and ε is
a random factor of the motorist’s daily driving mileage caused by de­
tours, long-distance travel, and rest at home, referred to as the un­
planned mileage.
The motorists driving utility of FVs and HFCVs respectively:
Ui(f ,h) = Eε [u(mi + ε)] − ci mi (2)
m∗i(f ,h) = argmaxUi (3)
mi
where ci is the energy price of per mile, cf is fuel price and ch is hydrogen
price; Ui is the utility of driving a vehicle. To focus on the battery leasing
model research, we did not consider penalties associated with motorists’
mileage anxiety. The inclusion of penalty, as explored in Ref. [14], was
due to the limited range of EVs at that time, which was less than 200
miles. However, our study focuses on HFCVs, where the refueling pro­
cess is similar to traditional FVs and can be completed within a few
minutes. While there is an issue with the scarcity of hydrogen stations
(time cost to reaching a hydrogen station), the incorporation of mileage
penalty has a minimal impact on our model.
Motorists decide the optimal mileage by maximizing this driving
utility, and according to the first-order condition for driving utility, the
motorist’s optimal mileage decision is:
m∗i(f ,h) = − bci + θ (4)
2.2. Buyout model
The buyout model is the traditional whole-vehicle purchase model,
and we make it a benchmark for the subsequent battery leasing model.
The sequence of the buyout event is as follows. First, the manufacturer
sets the sales price (pb ) (i.e., the battery price of the HFCV); then, the
motorists decide the driving mileages based on the pricing and make a
utility-maximizing choice between the HFCVs and FVs. Since the battery
lifetime (n) far exceeds the average usage time (t) of a vehicle, the
battery residual value cannot be utilized after the HFCV has passed the
usage time. We do not consider the revenue of reselling vehicles after the
average usage time in the buyout model. First, the residual value of the
vehicle parts (apart from the battery) is normalized to zero in section
2.1. Second, the residual value of batteries will be analyzed in Section V.
The current price of battery recycling is very low due to the complex
recycling process [47] and high pollution [48] of the batteries, which
will not affect our model.
We solve the equilibrium outcomes by backward induction, first
solving for motorists’ optimal driving decision and adoption and then
solving for the manufacturer’s pricing decision, where the balanced
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Energy 293 (2024) 130657
driving decisions of motorists have been obtained in the preliminary.
The sequence of the HFCVs buyout model event is shown in Fig. 1.
The motorist utility in this model consists of the driving utility, the
direct cost, and the green utility, where the direct cost is the cost of
purchasing a battery. The utility function is:
Ub = Uh − pb + ξ (5)
where pb is the battery price of buyout model; ξ is the green utility of
driving HFCV, which is uniformly distributed over [0, a]. When this
utility exceeds the FV’s utility, motorists will adopt HFCV. The proba­
bility that motorists adopt HFCV is:
( ) a − pb − Uf + Uh
Pb Ub > Uf = (6)
a
where a is the maximum daily willingness in the motorist population to
pay for HFCVs compared to FVs. Ref [14] estimated that customers are
willing to pay up to $5.3/day for an EV based on survey data from
Ref. [49].
The manufacturer maximizes profits by setting the HFCV selling
price pb . The manufacturer’s profit function is:
( ct )
Π b = Pb p b − (7)
t
where ct is the total cost of the HFCV battery. According to the first-order
condition of Πb , the manufacturer’s optimal battery pricing is:
a + c1 − Uf + Uh
p∗b = (8)
2
where c1 = ctt .Substituting p∗b into Eq. (6), the HFCV adoption probability
in equilibrium is:
( ) a − c1 − Uf + Uh
P∗b Ub > Uf = (9)
2a
Substituting P∗b into Eq. (7), the manufacturer’s profit in equilibrium
is:
( )2
a − c1 − Uf + Uh
Π∗b = (10)
4a
2.3. Battery leasing model
2.3.1. The business model
To overcome the HFCV high purchase price barrier, we propose a
battery leasing model to share battery costs shown in Fig. 2. In this
model, the manufacturer first loans the production cost of the battery
from the bank and then sells the vehicle and leases the battery to mo­
torists. Motorists only need to pay the down payment for leasing the
battery when purchasing the vehicle and pay the lease price on time in
the future. Because the HFCV battery lifetime is much longer than the
average time for motorists to replace their vehicles, once the former
motorist stops leasing, the battery will continue to be leased by the
manufacturer to the next motorist until the battery lifetime is exhausted.
Thus, this leasing model makes the total battery cost to be shared.
It should be noted that the members of the leasing event in reality are
more complex. The vehicle manufacturer usually purchases the battery
from the battery manufacturer, who loans the battery production cost
from the bank. However, the cost of the vehicle manufacturer for pur­
chasing the battery is also from the bank loans. Therefore, we assume
that the loans from the bank and the battery production as events for the
vehicle manufacturer and as simultaneous events with the first motorist
paying a down payment for leasing the battery. Thus, the down payment
paid by the first motorist reduces the total loans of the manufacturer. In
the battery leasing period, motorists lease the battery in the sequential
event, and only after the previous motorist finishes the lease and returns
the battery can the next motorist lease it.
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Fig. 1. Sequence of traditional HFCV buyout event.

Fig. 2. HFCV battery leasing business.

We also assume that motorists will never drive the current vehicle
after they finish leasing, the vehicle residual value is usually recovered
(sold as a used vehicle), and the residual value of the vehicle without
battery is owned by the motorist. The battery will be returned to the
manufacturer, as its ownership always belonged to the manufacturer,
and the motorist only holds the right to use it while leasing the battery.
The manufacturer continues to lease the battery to the following
motorist, making use of the residual value of the battery to keep prof­
itable. The price of a vehicle without a battery is normalized to 0 in the
previous settings, so the residual value of the vehicle without the battery
is not considered in our study.
2.3.2. The game between the manufacturer and motorists
We develop a game model involving an HFCV manufacturer and
motorists, where the manufacturer maximizes profits by setting the
leasing price. Meanwhile, motorists choose between the HFCVs or FVs
based on the leasing price for their travel planning. The sequence of the
battery leasing model is shown in Fig. 3. First, the manufacturer obtains
loans based on the interest rates (R) to cover the battery production cost.
Subsequently, the manufacturer sets the battery leasing price (pl )and the
down payment percentage (μ). Then, motorists decide their driving
mileages based on the pricing and maximize their utility by choosing
between HFCVs and FVs. After a period of vehicle usage time (t), mo­
torists finish leasing, and the manufacturer leases the battery to the
subsequent motorist, repeating this process until the battery lifetime is
exhausted. A battery can serve k motorists within its lifetime, and the
battery’s residual value is fully utilized.
In this model, the motorist utility consists of driving utility, direct
costs, and green utility, with direct costs including the down payment
and the leasing costs. The down payment price is determined by the
manufacturer based on the battery cost, and we simplify the down
payment pricing to be set by the manufacturer in proportion to the
battery cost, where 0 ≤ μ < 1. When μ = 0, it is the no down payment
battery leasing. When the down payment is too large (μ ≥ 1), the
motorist has to pay a down payment larger than the cost of the battery,
which does not make managerial sense, thus we do not consider the case
of μ ≥ 1.
The motorist utility in the battery leasing model is:

Fig. 3. Sequence of HFCV battery leasing event.

4
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Ul = Uh −
μct
− pl + ξ (11) finding highlights the dilemma manufacturers face in the battery leasing
t business, where they need to make trade-off decisions between different
variables to achieve optimal economic efficiency.
where t is the average time that motorists replace a new vehicle (i.e., the
Substituting p∗l into Eq. (12), the HFCV adoption probability in
battery leasing time for a motorist) If this utility exceeds the utility of FV,
equilibrium is:
motorists adopt the HFCV. The probability of the HFCV adoption in the
battery leasing model is: ( ) a − (1 − μ)c2 − Uf + Uh
P∗l Ul > Uf = (15)
( ) a − pl − μc1 − Uf + Uh 2a
Pl Ul > Uf = (12)
a Substituting P∗l into the Eq. (13), the manufacturer’s profit in
equilibrium:
where c1 = ctt . For the manufacturer, the loans are used for the battery ( )2
production cost, then the battery is leased to the motorists, and the a − (1 − μ)c2 − Uf + Uh
Π∗l = (16)
leasing fee is collected on time. Since the manufacturer can only repay 4a
the whole loan at the end of the leasing event, the loan duration in the
leasing model is the battery lifetime. The principal and interest to be 2.3.4. Operation under the dynamic of energy prices and battery technology
repaid by the manufacturer are calculated using the equal principal and levels
interest method. The manufacturer’s profit function in the leasing model This section analyses the operation of our battery leasing model
is: under the dynamic of energy prices and battery technology levels.
( ) Hydrogen price plays a vital role in motorist equilibrium driving
k μc t R(1 + R)n mileage, while battery cost affects equilibrium adoption and manufac­
Π l = Pl + pl − (1 − μ)ct n (13)
n (1 + R) − 1 turer profit. In the future, both factors are expected to change signifi­
cantly. We focus on these two dynamic conditions to analyze our
where n is the lifetime of the HFCV battery. A battery can be leased by k
model’s operation results.
motorists over its lifetime, k = nt. In the leasing model, we consider the
motorist’s leasing down payment to the manufacturer and the manu­ Theorem 1. The HFCV adoption and manufacturer’s profit in the
facturer’s loans as simultaneous events, where the manufacturer only battery leasing model decreases with the hydrogen price and battery
needs to loan the battery cost except for the first motorist’s down pay­ cost.
ment (1 − μ)ct . The manufacturer sets the down payment percentage μ
Formally: < 0, < 0; < 0, < 0.
∂P∗l ∂Π∗l ∂P∗l ∂Π∗l
and the leasing price pl to maximize profit. ∂ch ∂ ch ∂ct ∂ct

In our battery leasing model, we do not consider the newness of the
battery. All motorists lease batteries for the same price. Because the
range of the battery of an HFCV depends on the size of the hydrogen
filling tank, the newness of the battery does not affect the range of the
battery. In addition, the manufacturer is responsible for the mainte­
nance of the battery to ensure that all motorists will lease the same
quality battery. As a result, the newness of the battery does not have an
impact on the motorist’s usage. The uniform price of new and old bat­
teries is also prevalent in real life; for example, the batteries used in
electric vehicle swapping stations are different in old and new, but the
price of battery swapping is uniform. Thus, the battery newness problem
is not included in our model.
2.3.3. Pricing, adoption, and profits
Equilibrium decisions of motorists and manufacturer is also solved
by backward induction. The motorist’s optimal driving decision has
been obtained in the preliminary, and optimal pricing of the manufac­
turer is next solved.
Lemma 1. It is impossible to solve for both pl and μ to guarantee the
concavity of Πl , while pl and μ are functions of each other. The optimal
pricing of the manufacturer’s battery leasing based on the first-order
condition of Πl is:
( )
a + (1 − μ)c2 − 2μc1 − Uf + Uh
p∗l =
2
where c2 = ct R(1+R) − 1, in order to guarantee pl > 0, μ < a+c2c
n
Proof. All proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in Appendix.
Theorem 1 shows that the decrease in hydrogen price and battery
cost benefits the operation of our battery leasing model. According to
Eq. (4), the motorists’ driving mileage is negatively related to the
hydrogen price, m∗h = − b, and as the hydrogen price decreases, mo­
′
torists will drive longer miles. As the driving mileage increases, mo­
torists get higher utility and the adoption increases. The decreasing of
battery cost reduces motorists’ direct cost of adopting HFCVs, which also
increases their utility and thus the adoption increase. More motorists
choose HFCVs, and then the manufacturer profits. This suggests that our
battery leasing model operates with better utilization at future energy
prices and battery technology levels (low hydrogen price and battery
cost).
3. Effectiveness of battery leasing model
In the traditional HFCV buyout business model, motorists need to
pay a higher cost to purchase HFCVs. Therefore, fewer motorists adopt
HFCV, and the manufacturer cannot make more profits. We verify the
effectiveness of the battery leasing model by comparing it with the
buyout model in reducing the motorists’ usage cost, increasing the
adoption and manufacturer’s profit.
3.1. Reducing usage cost
(14)
The primary purpose of the battery leasing model is to share the
.

HFCV’s usage costs, so we verify its effectiveness in reducing the usage

2 − Uf +Uh
(1+R)n 1 +c2

Proof. All proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in the Appendix. cost by comparing the average cost of the battery leasing model with the
The optimal solution expressions for pl and μ can be obtained buyout model. Since motorists who lease batteries pay an additional
through a simultaneous solution approach. However, when these values down payment, the average usage cost is the leasing price plus the down
are substituted into the probability function Eq. (12), resulting in the payment averaged over each day, p∗l + μct /t.
expression for Pl is 0. This is not conducive to the subsequent analysis of
Theorem 2. The battery leasing model is more effective at reducing
our leasing model.
usage cost than the buyout model, particularly in the condition of high
Lemma 1 indicates that the manufacturer cannot decide on both the
battery cost, high battery lifetime, low interest rates, and high down
leasing price pl and the down payment percentage μ to maximize profits, ( )
payment percentage. Formally, △p∗ = p∗l + μtct − p∗b < 0; ∂Δp ∂ct < 0,
∗
{ }
but can only control one of them, and μ < min a+c2c2 −1 +c Uf +Uh
, 1 . This ∂Δp∗
< 0, ∂Δp
∂R > 0, < 0.
∗
2 ∂Δp∗
∂n ∂μ

5
K. Gong et al.
Proof. All proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in Appendix.
Theorem 2 shows the cost advantage of the battery leasing model. In
the battery leasing model, motorists are more likely to adopt HFCV
because battery leasing shares the high battery cost and reduces their
direct cost of driving, which increases their adoption utility. This cost
advantage will be more apparent, especially in high battery cost and
lifetime. In addition, policymakers can decrease the interest rates, and
manufacturers can increase the down payment percentage to motivate
motorists to adopt HFCV and lease batteries.
3.2. Increasing adoption
We consider the HFCV adoption as the second model effectiveness
indicator. In a similar study of EVs adoption [14], the adoption is also
considered an indicator of reducing oil dependence.
Theorem 3. (1)There exists a battery cost threshold cj(b,l) , motorists
only adopt HFCV when the battery cost ct is lower than cj(b,l) ,where cl <
cb . Formally, ct < cj(b,l) , Pj(l,b) > 0,where cl < cb , cb = t(a − Uf + Uh ),
cl = (a− Uf +Uh )(1+R)− n ((1+R)n − 1)
(1− μ)R . lifetime), and interest rates. Therefore, we analyze the scenarios from
(2) When the battery cost is lower than cl , the battery leasing model
is more effective at increasing adoption than the buyout model, partic­
ularly in the condition of high battery cost, high battery lifetime, low
interest rates, and high down payment percentage. Formally, when ct <
cl , ΔP∗ = P∗l − P∗b > 0; ∂ΔP
∂ct > 0, ∂n > 0, ∂R < 0, ∂μ > 0.
∗
∂ΔP∗ ∂ΔP∗ ∂ΔP∗
Proof. All proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in Appendix.
Theorem 3 illustrates that battery cost is a crucial factor influencing
the HFCV adoption, and the adoption in the two models is only gradually
shown when the battery cost is lower than cj(b,l) . The battery leasing
model’s battery cost threshold (cl )is lower than cb of the buyout model,
which further suggests that the leasing model is more widely applicable
and more favorable at high battery cost. In addition, the battery leasing
model adoption is higher than the buyout model when the battery cost is
below the threshold (cl )of the battery leasing model. The advantage of
battery leasing in increasing adoption is more obvious under high bat­
tery cost and battery lifetime conditions.
Under the current high battery cost level, policymakers will favor the
battery leasing model to obtain higher HFCV adoption; the adoption can
be further promoted by setting lower interest rates. Manufacturers can
adopt the battery leasing model and make higher down payment per­
centages to promote HFCV adoption and earn profits.
3.3. Increasing manufacturer’s profits
Profitability is an important indicator of a business model’s effec­
tiveness, and we use the HFCV manufacturer’s profits as the third model
effectiveness indicator.
Theorem 4. The battery leasing model is more effective at increasing
the manufacturer’s profits than the buyout model, particularly in the
condition of low hydrogen price, low battery cost, high battery lifetime,
low interest rates, and high down payment percentage.
Formally, ΔΠ∗ = Π∗l − Π∗b > 0; ∂ΔΠ
∂ch < 0, ∂ct < 0, ∂n > 0, ∂R < 0,
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∂ΔΠ ∂ΔΠ ∂ΔΠ
∂ΔΠ∗
∂μ > 0.
Proof. All proofs of Lemmas and Theorems are in Appendix.
Theorem 4 shows that the battery leasing model has an economic
advantage. HFCV manufacturers can gain more profits by adopting the
battery leasing model. The battery leasing model is more profitable in
the future trend of low battery cost and high battery lifetime. In addi­
tion, policymakers can increase the manufacturers’ profitability by
reducing interest rates. Manufacturers can gain greater profit by
increasing the down payment percentage.
Unlike usage costs and adoption level indicators, this profit advan­
tage is also related to the hydrogen price. The cost of hydrogen will
6
Energy 293 (2024) 130657
decrease, with the U.S. Department of Energy estimating the cost of
hydrogen production at $1 per kilogram in 2031 [31]. In this context,
manufacturers will be more willing to adopt the battery leasing model
due to the greater profitability, thus promoting the popularization of
HFCV.
4. Scenario analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model using motorists’ behavior,
energy price, and HFCV technology data. We consider Mirai, the first
mass-produced and commercially sold HFCV, as the HFCV technology
data source. Toyota’s sales data shows that the highest sales volume in
the U.S. market was 11,368 units until November 2022 [50]. Therefore,
we employed U.S. data for our experiment to analyze the impact of
different parameters on the HFCV usage cost, adoption, and manufac­
turer’s profit.
Based on the model analyses in Section III, we classify the parameters
that affect our model result into three aspects: energy prices (fuel price
and hydrogen price), battery technology levels (battery cost and battery
these three aspects. We analyzed and compared the battery leasing and
buyout model results under different scenarios.
Tables 2 and 3. are the parameter used for this scenario analysis. The
utility function, gamma distribution function, and green utility param­
eters are set referring to Ref. [14], respectively θ = 58.54miles, b =
277.74miles/$; α = 1.0876, β = 34.147; a = $5.33/day.
4.1. Impact of energy prices
Fig. 4 shows how the HFCV usage cost, adoption, and manufacturer’s
profits in the U.S. vary with energy prices. The first panel shows the
current higher hydrogen prices scenario, and the second panel shows the
lower hydrogen price with future advances in hydrogen production
technology and renewable energy sources. From panels (a) and (d), we
find that the average usage cost of the battery leasing model is always
lower than the buyout model. From (b) and (e), (c) and (f), the adoption
and manufacturer’s profit in the battery leasing model are greater
(except when μ < μ at the present energy price) and the advantage of the
battery leasing model becomes more obvious as the down payment
percentage increases. This is consistent with the theorems in Section III.
Further observation of panels (b) and (c) reveals that the buyout
model has no adoption and profit under the current energy price, while
the battery leasing model gradually shows low adoption and profit only
when the down payment percentage is larger than μ = 0.028. This
suggests there is a minimum down payment percentage for manufac­
turers to ensure adoption and their profits in the current energy price,
but not in the future. As hydrogen price decreases, motorists’ usage cost
is cheaper, and the adoption and manufacturer’s profits are higher in
both models. Particularly in panels (e) and (f), the adoption of the future
Table 2
HFCV’s battery technology and driving behavior parameters
Parameter Estimated Estimation method/sources
value
Battery n = The maximum average on-road lifetime of fuel
lifetime 11.7years cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) from 2016 exceeded
4100 h [31], and the average U.S. driver drives
0.96 h per day [51].
Battery cost ct = The energy density of hydrogen is 120 MJ/kg [52]
$14300.16 and an efficiency of 33.6 kWh/kg when converted
to electricity. The reference Mirai hydrogen tank
has a capacity of 5.6 kg [53] and a cell capacity of
188.16 kWh. The projected cost of an 80kwh
automotive polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM)
fuel cell system is $76/kwh [31].
Vehicle hold t = 6.5years The typical American driver holds a new vehicle
time for 6.5 years [54].
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Table 3
Energy prices and interest rates parameters
Parameter Estimated Estimation method/sources
value
Fuel cost cf = The average price of gasoline in the U.S. in
$0.117/mile January 2023 is $3.31/GGE, and the average
Hydrogen ch = $0.275/ price of hydrogen is $19.52/GGE [55]. The
cost mile average fuel economy of a small fuel-efficient
vehicle is 28.2 miles/gal, and the average fuel
economy of an HFCV is 71 miles/gal [56].
Loan Rates R = 6.44% The average interest rate is 6.44% for small
business term loan fixed-rate loans for the fourth
quarter of 2022 [57].
buyout model is 25%. The battery leasing model’s highest adoption even
increased to 73%. The buyout model profit is $0.33, and the battery
leasing model’s highest profit even increases to $2.8, which suggests
that the leasing model is more advantageous than the buyout model
under the future energy price scenario.
4.2. Impact of battery technology levels
Fig. 5 shows the impact of battery technology levels on the usage
cost, adoption, and manufacturer’s profit. We measure the battery
technology level from battery cost and battery lifetime. The first row
shows the condition of the battery cost’s change, and the second row
shows the battery lifetime. As the future battery technology level ad­
vances, the battery cost tends to decrease, and the battery lifetime tends
to increase. From panels (a) and (d), we find that the battery leasing
model is always better than the buyout model in reducing the usage cost.
Panels (b) and (c) show that the adoption and profits are shown only
when the battery cost less than $13897.6 and $11036.2 in the two
models. The battery leasing model is much more effective in increasing
adoption with high battery cost and lifetime and increasing profits with
low battery cost. These are consistent with Theorem 2 and 3.
In addition, panels (e) and (f) show that the battery leasing model’s
adoption and profits gradually increase when the battery lifetime is over
12.5 years. However, the buyout model never shows any adoption and
profits. This suggests that the adoption and profits in the battery leasing
model will only gradually increase after a threshold of battery cost and
lifetime and further illustrates the impact of the battery technology level
on the HFCV’s promotion and the superiority of the battery leasing
model.
4.3. Impact of interest rates
Fig. 6 shows the impact of interest rates on the HFCV leasing model
under different scenarios. The first row represents the current energy
price and battery technology scenario, while the second row represents
the future scenario. In Fig. 5, we find that there is a threshold value for
the interest rates (10.7% in the current and 14.7% in the future) and that
the battery leasing model becomes more advantageous in reducing the
usage cost, increasing adoption and manufacturer’s profits only when
the interest rates is lower than this threshold value. This new finding is
essential for policymakers to decide on interest rates. Moreover, a lower
interest rates within this threshold value leads to more tremendous
advantages of the battery leasing model, consistent with the Theorems
in Section III.
These results illustrate the importance of interest rates in achieving
the HFCV leasing model benefits. Policymakers could consider interest
rates control as an effective management strategy to stimulate motorists
and manufacturers to adopt the leasing model by lowering interest rates,
thus promoting the HFCV popularity and sustainable development.
4.4. A comparison of motorists’ costs for the battery leasing model and
Mirai’s lease option
To reinforce the positive evidence of our battery leasing model’s
superiority, we compare the cost of the battery leasing model with the
lease option of Mirai. We find the average usage cost on our battery
leasing model is lower than the Mirai lease option of Toyota. Toyota

Fig. 4. Impact of energy prices on usage cost, adoption, and profits.

7
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Fig. 5. Impact of battery technology levels on usage cost, adoption, and profits.

Fig. 6. Impact of interest rate on usage cost, adoption, and profits.

offers a 36-month lease, with motorists paying $679 per month, $4999
due at signing (including the first month’s lease down payment), and
$23,922 to purchase the vehicle at the lease’s end. Motorists who lease a
vehicle will receive a $7500 purchase allowance and will receive 3 years
of free fuel [58]. To simplify the calculations, we use the price of the
Camry XLE as the price of the Mirai XLE without the battery [59]. As
shown in Fig. 7, the average cost of the official lease option is $5.90 per
day (calculated on the usage time of t = 6.5 years). Compared to Mirai’s
leasing option, our model motorists’ costs could be reduced by 20%–
42% currently, and 15%–27% in the future. Therefore, our model

8
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Fig. 7. Usage cost of battery leasing model and Toyota Mirai’s lease option.

effectively reduces the motorists’ costs.
5. Robust check
To verify the robustness of our results, we perform additional
experimental analyses in this section. First, we discuss the results under
different utility functions. We repeat the experiments using square root,
logarithmic, and power utility functions, respectively, and find that the
above experimental results still hold.
In addition, we analyzed the battery residual value in the buyout
model by assuming that v is the average to daily residual income of the
motorist reselling the battery. Therefore, the utility of the motorist in the
buyout model is:
U b = U h − pb + ξ + v
The adoption in the equilibrium condition is:
( )
a − c1 − Uf + Uh + v
∗
Pb Ub > Uf =
2a
Fig. 8 shows the adoption considering the battery residual value. Under
current energy prices and battery technology levels, the adoption of the
buyout model appears only at a residual value of $1.40 per day, and the
buyout model completely exceeds the leasing model when the residual
value reaches $3.90 per day. However, based on current battery recy­
cling prices ($0.22 per pound) [60], the resale residual value of batteries
cannot reach an average of $1.40 per day. Thus, the battery residual
value does not affect the results of our model.
Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis on the green utility
parameter a (maximum willingness to pay). As shown in Fig. 9, we
selected two additional levels of a (10% up and down respectively) for
the experiment and found that the adoption of the battery leasing model
is always greater than the buyout model (in the current scenario, for
example), whatever the value of a does not affect the results of the
experiment.
6. Conclusions
(17)
To explore the impact of the HFCV battery leasing business model on
the motorists’ cost, adoption, and manufacturer’s profits, we consider
(18) the vehicle market, including the manufacturer and motorists, and first
construct a sequential game model based on utility theory. In this model,
the manufacturer decides on HFCV prices to maximize profits, and
motorists decide on driving mileage to maximize their utility. Second,
we compared this model with the buyout model and analyzed the

Fig. 8. Robustness check of battery residual value.

9
K. Gong et al.
Fig. 9. Robustness check of green utility.
effectiveness of the battery leasing model in motorists’ usage cost, the
adoption, and manufacturer’s profit. Finally, we provide scenario ana­
lyses under different energy prices (fuel price and hydrogen price),
battery technology levels (battery cost and battery lifetime), interest
rates, and using U.S. data as an example. Our findings have theoretical
and managerial implications.
4.1. Theoretical implications
First, we propose a battery leasing model based on the long lifetime
nature of the HFCV battery that can share the high battery cost,
expanding the literature on new energy vehicle adoption and business
model innovation. The battery leasing model has been widely proven
effective in increasing the adoption and manufacturer’s profit in the EVs
market [32–37]. However, the applicability of this business model in the
HFCVs area has not been fully investigated [38,39]. Our study expands
the literature on HFCV business models and the sharing economy in
vehicle sharing.
Second, we analyze the operation of the battery leasing model under
the dynamic of energy prices and battery technology levels and compare
it with the buyout model to confirm that the battery leasing model can
promote HFCV adoption. Previous studies on the adoption of new en­
ergy vehicles have mostly focused on EVs [15,16], and there is little
literature on the operation and management of HFCV adoption; our
study enriches the literature on the adoption of new energy vehicles
related to operation and management.
Finally, scenario analysis confirms the positive evidence of this new
business mode’s superiority. Our study deepens the understanding of the
battery leasing business and expands the literature on the role of vehicle
business models in promoting decarbonizing transportation develop­
ment. Previous studies demonstrated that the EV business model can
reduce oil dependence and increase adoption, which brings economic
and environmental benefits [40–42]. However, there is a lack of
research addressing the economic and environmental impacts of HFCV
business model innovation on the transport sector. Our results show that
the HFCV adoption under this new battery leasing model can lead to
greater economic benefits (reduce motorists’ costs and increase manu­
facturer’s profits) and environmental benefits (increase adoption). This
result provides a new theoretical foundation for the vehicle business
model study in the clean transport field.
4.2. Managerial implications
Our study reveals the superiority of the battery leasing model in
promoting the HFCV adoption. This finding has important practical
implications for developing HFCV market strategies and business
10
Energy 293 (2024) 130657
models. Policymakers can consider the results of our analyses from
reducing the hydrogen price (increasing the fuel price), reducing battery
cost (increasing battery lifetime), and lowering the interest rates to in­
crease the HFCV adoption and manufacturer’s profitability. In addition,
we find that low interest rates and high down payments can further
extend the benefits of the battery leasing model in reducing motorists’
costs and increasing adoption and profits. Manufacturers can achieve
greater profitability by adopting the battery leasing model and higher
down payment rates.
4.3. Limitations and future developments
This study also ignored some issues. First, our model only considered
the competition between traditional FVs and HFCVs, while in the cur­
rent vehicles market, EVs and PHEVs are also competitors for HFCVs.
Second, we neglected the issue of the battery residual value after use,
which is different between leasing and buyout models and still needs
further investigation. Third, to promote the large-scale adoption of
HFCV, the government may introduce a subsidy policy for the leasing
model, but the subsidy effect is not explicitly analyzed in this paper. In
future research, these situations will be considered for in-depth study.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Ke Gong: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition,
Methodology, Supervision, Writing – review & editing. Wei Zheng:
Formal analysis, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing –
original draft. Yingting Shu: Data curation, Investigation, Software.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgments
Our study has been generously supported by the National Science
Foundation of China (Grant No. 71871034), the Chongqing Natural
Science Foundation (Project No. cstc2021jcyji-msxmX0284), and the
Key Research Base Project of Humanities and Social Sciences of the
Chongqing Municipal Education Commission (Project No. 23SKJD083).
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

Appendix. Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems

2c1 (c1 +c2 ) c22

Proof. of Lemma 1.: Π″l(pl pl) = − 2
a, Π″l(μμ) = − a , Π″l(pl μ) = − 2c1 +c2
a . |H2| = Π″l(pl pl ) Π″l(μμ) − (Πl(pl μ)″)2 = − a2
< 0. Lemma 1 is proved.
bch − θ
Proof. of Theorem 1.: P∗ch = 2a ,
′

′
m∗i(f ,h) = − bci + θ > 0, thus P′j(c ) > 0, P∗ch < 0
f

( ( )( ( ) ) )
′ − (− bch + θ) 2a − cf − ch b cf + ch − 2θ − 2(1 − μ)c2
Π∗l(ch ) =
4a
( ) ) ( )( ( ) )
a − Uf + Uh (1 + R)− n ((1 + R)n − 1 2a − cg − ch b cg + ch − 2θ ′
ct < cl = , then c2 < , thus Π∗l(ch ) < 0
(1 − μ)R 2(1 − μ)

′ − (1 − μ)R(1 + R)n
P∗l(ct ) = <0
2a((1 + R)n − 1)
( ) ( )( ( ) )
′ − (1 − μ)R(1 + R)n a − (1 − μ)c2 − Uf + Uh 2a − cg − ch b cg + ch − 2θ ′
Π∗l(ct ) = , c2 < , thus Π∗l(ct ) < 0.
2a((1 + R)n − 1) 2(1 − μ)
Theorem 1 is proved
(
ct (1+R)n (1− Rt)− 1
Proof. of Theorem 2.: c1 − c2 = ) ，where t((1 + R)n − 1) > 0，It is easy to prove (1 + R)n (1 − Rt) − 1 > 0 by mathematical in­
t((1+R)n − 1)

duction, thus c1 − c2 > 0, c1 > c2 .

( ( )
μct ) 1 + (1 + R)n (1 + Rt(1 − μ)) 1
△p∗ = p∗l + − p∗b = ct n = ((1 − μ)c2 − c1 )
t 2t((1 + R) − 1) 2

0 ≤ μ < 1, c1 > c2 , thus Δp∗ < 0

∂Δp∗ 1 + (1 + R)n (1 + Rt(1 − μ))

= <0
∂ct 2t((1 + R)n − 1)

∂Δp∗ ct (− 1 + μ)R(1 + R)n Log(1 + R)

= 2
<0
∂n 2((1 + R)n − 1)
1+μ)ct (1+R)− 1+n (1+R+nR− (1+R)1+n )
∂Δp∗
, It is easy to prove 1 + R + nR − (1 + R)1+n < 0 by mathematical induction,thus ∂Δp
∂R > 0.
∗

∂R = (− 2((1+R)n − 1)2
nn
∂Δp∗
∂μ = c2(1− (1+R) ) < 0. Theorem 2 is proved.
t ∗R(1+R)

a− (1− μ)c2 − Uf +Uh a− c1 − Uf +Uh

Proof. of Theorem 3.: From Eq. (9) and Eq. (15), if P∗l (Ul > Uf ) = 2a > 0 and P∗b (Ub > Uf ) = 2a > 0,thus cb < t(a − Uf +Uh ) ,
− n n
cl <(a− Uf +Uh )(1+R) ((1+R) − 1)
(1− μ)R .
( )
− 1 + (1 + R)n (1 + Rt(− 1 + μ)) c1 − (1 − μ)c2
ΔP∗ = P∗l − P∗b = ct n =
2at((1 + R) − 1) 2a

where c1 > c2 , 0 ≤ μ < 1,thus ΔP∗ = P∗l − P∗b > 0.

∂ΔP∗ − 1 + (1 + R)n (1 + Rt(− 1 + μ))
= >0
∂ct 2at((1 + R)n − 1)

∂ΔP∗ ct (1 − μ)R(1 + R)n Log(1 + R)

= 2
>0
∂n 2((1 + R)n − 1)
1+n
(1+R+nR− (1+R)1+n )
∂ΔP∗
∂R = (1− μ)ct (1+R)−
2((1+R)n − 1)2
, It is easy to prove 1 + R + nR − (1 + R)1+n < 0 by mathematical induction, therefore ∂ΔP∗
∂R < 0.

∂ΔP∗ ct R(1 + R)n

= >0
∂μ 2a((1 + R)n − 1)
Theorem 3 is proved.
Proof. of Theorem 4.:
( ( ))
( − c1 + (1 − μ)c2 ) c1 + (1 − μ)c2 − 2 a − Uf + Uh
ΔΠ∗ = Π∗l − Π∗b =
4a

c1 − c2 > 0, thus ( − c1 + (1 − μ)c2 ) < 0

a− Uf +Uh
From Eq. (9) and Eq. (15), if P∗b (Ub > Uf ) > 0 and P∗l (Ul > Uf ) > 0,thus c1 < a − Uf + Uh ,c2 < 1− μ .Therefore (c1 + (1 − μ)c2 − 2(a − Uf + Uh ) < 0,
ΔΠ > 0.∗

11
K. Gong et al. Energy 293 (2024) 130657

∂ΔΠ∗ − (− bch + θ)(c1 + c2 (− 1 + μ))

= <0
∂ch 2a
( )( ( ))
∂ΔΠ∗ 1 − 1 + (1 + R)n (1 + Rt(− 1 + μ)) 1
= d − Uf + Uh − c1 + cR(− 1 + μ) 1 +
∂ct 2d ( − 1 + (1 + R)n )t − 1 + (1 + R)n

It is easy to prove − 1 + (1 + R)n (1 +Rt(− 1 +μ)) < 0 by mathematical induction, thus the left equation is less than 0; c1 < a − Uf + Uh ,0 < μ < 1,
therefore the right equation is larger than 0, thus ∂ΔΠ∂ct < 0.
∗

n ( n ( ))
∂ΔΠ∗ cR(1 + R) a − Uf + Uh − (1 + R) a − Uf + Uh + ct R(− 1 + μ) (− 1 + μ)log[1 + R]
= 3
∂n 2a( − 1 + (1 + R)n )

ct <(a− Uf +Uh )(1+R)− n ((1+R)n − 1)

From (a − Uf + Uh − (1 + R)n (a − Uf + Uh + ct R( − 1 + μ))) < 0, ∂ΔΠ
,thus ∂n > 0.
∗
(1− μ)R
( )( ( ) )
∂ΔΠ∗ − ct (1 + R)− 1+n 1 + R + nR − (1 + R)1+n ((1 + R)n − 1) a − Uf + Uh + (1 + R)n ct R(− 1 + μ) (− 1 + μ)
= 3
∂R 2a( − 1 + (1 + R)n )
ct <(a− Uf +Uh )(1+R)− n ((1+R)n − 1)
It has been proved in Theorem 1 that 1 + R + nR − (1 + R)1+n < 0,and (1− μ)R
,therefore (((1 + R)n − 1)(a − Uf + Uh ) + (1 + R)n
ct R( − 1 + μ)) > 0, ∂ΔΠ
< 0.
∗
∂R
∗
( )
∂ΔΠ c2 a − Uf + Uh + c2 (− 1 + μ)
= >0
∂μ 2a
Theorem 4 is proved.

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