The Role of the Speakers of

Parliament in Ensuring and

Sustaining Executive Accountability
The South African Experience

The constitutional ideal may be that parliament holds the executive to account,
but if that ideal ever applied it has long slipped beneath the murky waters of
realpolitik–Craig Dodds

S M Madue
Pro-Active Public Services College, (Pty) Ltd

ABSTRACT
Legislative oversight is necessary for monitoring the behaviour of the executive
in the implementation of government policies and for taking remedial action
when necessary. The concept of legislative oversight is based on the notion that,
while governance is necessary for democracy to prosper in an orderly fashion,
the implementing agencies and the people who staff them must be accountable
for their actions. Doing otherwise invites those in official positions to abuse their
discretionary powers to pursue their own interests rather than serving the pub-
lic good. Legislative oversight in South Africa developed fairly well since 1994.
However, the development of legislative oversight has been characterised by
friction within the executive branch and countervailing political impulses that
undermine its efficacy. When legislative oversight scholars and other commenta-
tors reflect on the state of deliberations in the South African Parliament, emphasis
is mostly placed on the dramatic decline relating to the practice of holding the
executive to account (legislative oversight) and the lack thereof. The central argu-
ment of this article is that, while the legislative process is expected to be open
for the expression of multiple viewpoints from the members of the legislature–a
fundamental principle of democracy and good governance–the legislature has

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 131

 experienced a steep decline in the tolerance displayed by the Speakers in terms of
the rights of the members of the opposition parties to hold the executive account-
able. The theoretical statement of this article is that Speakers in the South African
Parliament are stifling the rights of members of the opposition parties to exercise
oversight of the executive, by deliberately ruling their chambers with an iron fist
in defence of their political principals (the executive). This article recommends a
strict adoption of the practice of objectivity by the Speakers to promote openness
in holding the executive accountable.

INTRODUCTION
In South Africa, the chaotic events of the National Assembly sitting of Thursday the
13th November 2014 ignited public debates around the conduct of the Speaker and
subsequently gave rise to the writing of this article. This article seeks to analyse the
conduct of the Speakers of Parliament in South Africa since the dawn of democratic
rule in 1994, with specific reference to the Speaker of the fifth parliament. The article
is premised on the notion that parliaments do not operate in a vacuum; their function-
ing and effectiveness is shaped by the context; and particularly the political context of
which they form part. This notion places the Speaker of Parliament as a central figure
in promoting impartiality in parliament when holding the executive accountable. In
attempting to contribute to the discourse of impartiality or lack thereof by the Speaker
of Parliament, this article seeks to respond to the following research questions:

●● What is special about the role of the Speaker of Parliament in accountability

and governance contexts?
●● Is there an inextricable correlation between the conduct of the Speaker and the
continued outcry by opposition parties regarding the apparent lack of impartial-
ity in the South African legislative sector?
●● Are the Speakers stifling speaking truth to power?
●● How can the Speakers regain the trust previously commanded from all
Members of Parliament (MPs) across political parties?

Yeager (2008:46) posits that “… questions are our primary means of dealing with the
unknown and of obtaining new information”. In the quest for responding to the above
research questions, the article has adopted a qualitative research approach, using
secondary sources which include parliamentary publications, academic books, pub-
lished journal articles and newspaper articles. The philosophical orientation adopted

132 African Journal of Public Affairs

for this article is phenomenological and thus interpretative in nature. Literature re-
view and content analysis were the two major data collection techniques. According
to Krippendorff (2004:xvii), content analysis is comprehended as being empirically
grounded, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent. Bowen and
Bowen (2008:689) stress that content analysis is a research technique that is primarily
used to analyse texts. The article is informed by the deliberative democratic theory.
The theoretical statement advanced in this article is that the Speakers of Parliament
(Speakers) are stifling the opportunities for members of opposition parties in exercising
oversight over the executive, by deliberately ruling their chambers with an iron fist in
defence of their political principals. This article argues that in so doing, the Speakers
are deliberately ignoring the principle of good governance.

The point of departure is a brief literature review of the most relevant concepts. A
theoretical framework follows thereafter, before revisiting the role of the Speakers of
Parliament. In justifying the use of theory, Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010:97) argue that
theory is a system used by researchers to explain phenomena or activities to provide
an understanding. The central focus of this article is the importance of Speaker im-
partiality and giving an account of how the Speakers of the South African Parliament
(1994–2016) have performed in this regard.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Itika, Ridder and Tollenaar (2011:v) remind us that the study of Public Administration
and Public Management is a field of scholarship that requires a firm embeddedness in
the society it serves. After all, public administration scholarship is practical by nature.
Scholarship provides practical tools and concepts for public managers and public lead-
ers. These tools and concepts are derived from the study of administrative practices in
a particular society. In this section therefore, selected concepts such as governance,
good governance, ethics, accountability and answerability that are relevant to this arti-
cle are reviewed.

For the purpose of this article, the first concept that needs attention is “governance”.
Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010:105) define governance as the exercise of political, eco-
nomic and administrative authority in managing the affairs of a country at all levels.
They explain that “…governance comprises of complex mechanisms, processes and
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their
differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations”. Thus this article focuses
on Parliament as a vital institution of governance, emphasising that the Speakers of
Parliament play a pivotal role in exercising good governance in the National Assembly.

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 133

According to Olufemi (2013:14), “... governance can also be described as the use of
authority and the exercise of control over society and the management of its resources
for social and economic development. It is the manner in which power is exercised by
governments in the distribution of a country’s social and economic resources.”

When a government exercises power in a manner that is acceptable to its citizenry,

good governance is said to be in place. It is from this understanding that Malapane
(2016:137) emphasises that Parliament’s exercising of oversight over the executive
should yield benefits for the entire citizenry. In this context, good governance is in-
formed by ethics and the conduct of members of parliament (MP’s) in general, and
of the Speakers in particular. Thus Manyaka and Sebola (2013:79) argue that ethics is
one of the important checks and balances against the arbitrary use of public power
and resources.

Kiyaga-Nsubuga (2006:131) posits that “... good governance entails efficient and effec-
tive use of power and resources, constitutionalism and rule of law, justice and equity,
electoral and participatory democracy, security of person and property, promotion of
human rights, transparency and accountability (political, managerial and financial), ex-
emplary and inspirational leadership, and popular participation in social and economic
processes. Its facilitating conditions include a strong state, a robust and dynamic econ-
omy, a vibrant civil society, and informed and empowered citizenry.” Governance,
therefore, concerns not just the integrity, efficiency and economy of government but
also its effectiveness in terms of the extent to which government organisation and ac-
tivity are directed and monitored. Governance is said to have evolved from the need
to organise society towards achieving common goals (Okeke 2010:05 cited in Olufemi
2013:13). Issues of control and accountability become important when viewed from
achieving a common goal.

According to Schedler (1999:13), “... in politics, first comes power, then the need to
control it. Today, it is the fashionable term accountability that expresses the continuing
concern for checks and oversight, for surveillance and institutional constraints on the
exercise of power.” It is from this perspective that Olum (2014:607) stresses that in
terms of the constitutional requirements of democratic states, accountability require-
ments should create the checks and balances needed for a balance of power. The
constitutional checks and balances created by the accountability requirements argu-
ably facilitate the minimisation of corruption in government.

In opening a discourse in accountability, Schedler (1999:14) writes that “... as with

most terms we use in everyday language, we usually assume that we understand what
we say when we talk about accountability, and that others do so as well.” Related

134 African Journal of Public Affairs

discussions therefore regularly proceed on the basis of implicit understandings, with-
out recourse to any explicit definition of the concept. Yet, whenever authors do define
the term explicitly, they tend to associate it with answerability as its “closest” synonym.
Accountability, according to one encyclopaedic definition is, “the ability to ensure that
officials in government are answerable for their actions.”

The notion of answerability indicates that being accountable to somebody implies the
obligation to respond to nasty questions and, vice versa, that holding somebody ac-
countable implies the opportunity to ask uncomfortable questions (Schedler 1999:14).
Promoting and/or institutionalising accountability requires identifying who is to be
held accountable for what, to whom and how. Flowing from this definition of account-
ability, Olum (2014:604) maintains that accountability ensures that actions and deci-
sions taken by public officials are subject to oversight to guarantee that government
initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community.
Keohane (2002:5) explains that when thinking about accountability in a given situa-
tion, it is essential to distinguish between agents, individuals or organisations that make
decisions and their principals, who have authorised their actions. It is from this view
that Olum (2014:604) concludes that taxonomically, accountability is classifiable ac-
cording to the type that is exercised and/or the person, group or institution the public
official answers to. In parliamentary contexts, the Speaker is central to promoting
accountability and facilitating oversight over the executive. Therefore, the centrality
of the Speaker resonates with the principles of the deliberative democratic theory as
espoused by Herbamas (1987; 1992). A consideration of some relevant theories is
therefore necessary.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Since Public Administration is an applied science, Thornhill and Van Dijk (2010:97)
hold forth that the discipline has to relate any theory to the practical situations within
which public administration is practiced. This article, therefore, has adopted the use of
deliberative democratic theory to explain the conduct of the South African Speakers
of Parliament since 1994. Deliberative democracy has long remained an idealised and
principled theory, mostly populated and dominated by political philosophers (Stie
2008:1). Deliberative democratic theory is a normative theory that suggests ways of
enhancing democracy and criticising institutions that do not live up to the normative
standard. Through the use of deliberative democratic theory, this article examined the
conduct of Speakers of Parliament in South Africa, since they are viewed as not main-
taining the normative standard of conduct. Deliberative democratic theory claims to
be a more just and democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggregative or realist

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 135

models of democracy. It begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic
understandings of democracy toward a view anchored in conceptions of account-
ability and discussion (Chambers 2003; Hansen 2008; Lubenow 2012). Deliberative
democratic theory is informed by Cohen’s (1986) “epistemic” theory of democracy.
Part of Cohen’s theory is the assumption that correct choices exist – choices that are
independent of individual preferences and voting. For Cohen, deliberative democracy
can also be supported by different considerations. These considerations include is-
sues of accountability and the way in which the people’s representatives conduct
themselves. Accountability and the conduct of the Speakers of Parliament are essential
components of deliberative democratic theory.

Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 7) define a deliberative democracy as a “form of gov-

ernment in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions
in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and
generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the pres-
ent on all citizens but open to challenge in the future”. Viewed in this way, democracy
involves a dynamic process of open and transparent debate, which aims to result in
making understandable social choices. As Lubenow (2012:60) suggests, the proce-
dural concept of democracy is a formal construct, based on normative exigencies of
enlarging individual participation pertaining to deliberation and decision processes
and developing a democratic political culture. This conception is therefore centred on
formal procedures which indicate “who” participates and “how” it should be done, or
who may legitimately participate or do it, but it does not say anything about “what’
must be decided. Hansen (2008:4) explains that deliberative democracy maintains the
idea of consensus and the common good, but re-interprets these within the frame-
work of Habermasian theory of rationality: the aim of democracy is to facilitate – as
close as possible – power free communications, which will lead to rational decisions
(Hebarmas 1987). Hansen continues to elaborate that besides the explicit introduction
of rationality, deliberative democracy also refrains from the demand of broad partici-
pation. He cites Carleheden (1994) stating that democratic legitimacy does not stem
from everybody actually having been heard, but from everybody having had the op-
portunity of being heard.

According to Stie (2008:5), it is no coincidence that this model has been so successful.
Its viability is based on establishing and maintaining checks and balancing mecha-
nisms. There is a strong emphasis on aspects such as a basic rights catalogue (where
citizens are also given participatory rights against political authorities); separation of
executive, legislative and judicial powers; competence catalogue; separation of state,
market and civil society; and the introduction of separate decision-making, account-
ability, electoral and representation procedures. These are standard mechanisms aimed

136 African Journal of Public Affairs

at ensuring that not only the strong and powerful, but also weaker and less resource-
ful groups get to influence decision-making processes. In a deliberative reading, the
purpose of these mechanisms is to induce – to promote and protect – argumentative
behaviour as far as possible. In a parliamentary context, the Speaker is viewed as the
custodian of deliberative democracy. The role of the Speaker thus needs to be fully
comprehended.

THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT

According to Bergougnous (1997:1), national parliamentary assemblies, as the main
forums for political debate and the expression and confrontation of views, as well as
political argument among the people’s representatives, could not hold orderly and
meaningful discussions that respect the legitimate right of the opposition to make its
views known and of the majority to ensure adoption of its programme, transcending
any obstructionist manoeuvres, unless there is a regulatory authority to act as arbitrator
and guarantee its smooth functioning. This is why the Speakers exist and, as it is a
direct response to the requirements of parliamentary debate, it has been in existence
for as long as Parliament itself. Mkhatshwa (2015:29) postulates that Speakers are an
extremely important cog in the smooth running of the parliamentary machine. In this
sense, Speakers are custodians of good governance which encompasses upholding
high ethical standards. Thus the conduct of the Speakers should be beyond reproach.
Manyaka and Sebola (2013:80) emphasise that public servants (Speakers included)
are expected to subject themselves to ethical conduct consistent with the integrity of
their office.

Every Parliament, and in the South African context, every provincial legislature, has
a Speaker or presiding officer. At the beginning of each term of office of Parliament,
the first item of business is the election of the Speaker in terms of the principles of the
deliberative democratic theory. According to the Parliament of Australia (2013:1), the
most visible role of the Speaker is adjudication of debates in the chamber as presiding
officer. Laban (2014:144) puts it that “... the chairing in the chamber is what the public
sees and in the Westminster tradition the Speaker sits on a throne-like chair between
the sets of opposing benches with the ceremonial mace in front of him. The Speaker
must choose who speaks during a debate and he or she must rule on points of order
so that legislators stay within the rules”. This tradition is also practiced in the South
African Legislative Sector (that is, in the National Parliament and the nine Provincial
Legislatures). The Parliament of Canada (2014) stipulates that the role of the Speaker
is to ensure the orderly flow of business by observing the House rules, both written
and unwritten.

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 137

In South Africa, the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature (2009:3) stresses that the Speaker pre-
sides over the House and ensures that meetings of the House are conducted in an
orderly manner, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996, as well as the Standing Rules of the Legislature. Mahajan (2015: online) asserts
that “... Speakers can play an important role in bringing together people of all the dif-
ferent ideologies. The Speaker is a neutral person in the entire parliamentary set up”.
It is from this perspective that Speakers are expected to be impartial when exercising
their parliamentary duties. They may also perform many other functions as the head
of the legislature for which they are responsible, such as the general administration of
the chamber, the precinct (parliamentary buildings), as well as security aspects. In this
role they may have to act as chairperson for certain parliamentary committees, though
some countries eschew placing the Speaker in such roles, as it could appear to detract
from the impartiality of the office.

IMPARTIALITY AND THE PROTECTION OF DEMOCRACY:

A CHALLENGE FOR THE SPEAKERS
This article posits that Speakers operate from the notion of being a spokesperson.
Latour (2004:64) states that “... with the notion of the spokesperson, we are designat-
ing not the transparency of the speech in question, but the entire gamut, running from
complete doubt (I may be a spokesperson, but I am speaking in my own name and
not of those I represent) to total confidence (when I speak, it is really those who I
represent who speak through my mouth)”. From this understanding of the notion of
the spokesperson, Speakers represent the views of those that have entrusted them with
the responsibility of speaking on their behalf. Therefore, it is expected of Speakers to
exercise impartiality, especially in democratic states or organisations. This implies that
Speakers are not supposed to be viewed as only representing the view of the ruling
party or the party that they belong to. A key feature of the role of the Speaker in a
Commonwealth parliament is ‘impartiality’ and, at least, while holding the post during
a parliamentary term, they are expected to be non-partisan in their actions.

In stressing the importance of the Speaker’s impartiality, Bissonnet, Hickes, Milliken,

Harrison, Kowalski and Scott (2004:4) posit that “... there are two indispensable condi-
tions of being a good Speaker: independence in dealing with the executive and im-
partiality in dealing with all elected members. Speakers must defend the rights and
privileges of all members without exception”. Whereas the Speaker may be the candi-
date of the majority party, the purpose of a collegiate body is to represent all political
groups and trends (Bergougnous 1997:36). This assertion is in line with the principles
of the deliberative democratic theory. In highly developed democracies, once elected

138 African Journal of Public Affairs

as a Speaker, the incumbent must detach themselves from political membership and
government activity in order to guarantee political neutrality and to run the House
impartially. For example, Bissonnet, et al. (2004:5) posit that in order to guarantee
absolute impartiality, “in London and Quebec, as soon as Speakers are elected they
break all ties with their political party. Furthermore, in Quebec Speakers do not attend
caucus meetings, party conventions or general councils”. From the above it is therefore
clear that the Speaker has to interpret the rules impartially, maintain order, and defend
the rights and privileges of the members of the house, including the right to freedom of
expression in accordance with ethical principles.

However, in less developed democracies, as is the case with South Africa, Speakers
are not expected to resign from their political party. This article argues that this prac-
tice creates political party loyalty and challenges in terms of neutrality for Speakers.
Instead, Mkhatshwa (2015:29) stresses that “... it is expected that the Speaker’s rulings
and decisions will be informed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996, rules of parliament, the Freedom Charter and any other relevant post 1994 leg-
islation”. While Mkhatshwa might have a point in an ideal world, the reality is that the
instruments he mentions can in no way guarantee the impartiality of the Speakers. It
is from this perspective that Bissonnet (2008) argues that the neutrality and isolation
which characterise the office of the Speaker contrast sharply with the partisanship of
the Speaker. By observing neutrality and impartiality when conducting their duties,
Speakers command trust from all the parties in parliament. In South Africa, since the
chaotic events of 13 November 2014 in the National Assembly, the opposition parties
have continued expressing the loss of trust in the Speaker whom they accuse of be-
ing biased towards the ANC and of overprotecting the President. The conduct of the
Speaker, Baleka Mbete, during the 2017 State of the Nation Address (Sona) delivered
in the South African Parliament on the 9th February, was also viewed as her using all
means necessary, including the forceful and violent ejection of members of an opposi-
tion party from the parliamentary sitting, in order to protect the president and the rul-
ing party. Members of Parliamentary Legislatures (MPLs) displayed continued mistrust
in the Speaker when several opposition parties opted to stage a walk out when the
President continued with the delivery of the 2017 Sona after opposition party mem-
bers had been removed from the House.

To preserve the trust of the House, the Speaker must be impartial. According to Laban
(2014:144), impartiality is the absolute keystone of the Westminster style of speaker-
ship. While in the chair, Speakers must be totally neutral to ensure that the rules of the
House are respected and that democratic debate can take place in a fair and unhindered
manner. Speakers must, in return, earn the respect of the entire house by applying and
interpreting the rules of parliament in a fair, just and even-handed manner (Mkhatshwa

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 139

2015:29). In so doing, the Speaker complies with Section 195 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996, which stipulates that “... public administration must be
accountable and a high standard of ethics must be promoted”. It can be deduced that
Mkhatshwa was echoing the views of Bissonnet, (2008:2) who states that the key in-
gredients of being an effective Speaker are “neutrality, impartiality, respect, tact, under-
standing, being a good listener, balance, a sense of what makes people tick, sensitivity
and sometimes humour, but also firmness, order, authority and determination”.

In South Africa, while the Speakers who have held office since 1994, have generally
performed fairly well, the same cannot be said of the Speaker of the fifth parliament.
Since the opening of the fifth parliament in 2014, the South African Parliament has
been marred by disruptions, often pointing to the Speaker’s inability to demonstrate
impartiality and neutrality in the face of political parties attempting to deliver on their
mandate of exercising oversight over the executive. Moreover, Naidoo (2012:657)
stresses that certain political and administrative leadership figures entrusted with state
resources are clearly enriching themselves instead of acting as custodians of the state.
Naidoo was echoing the lamentation of the Public Protector (2011) who argued that
there would soon be no funds left for service delivery in South Africa due to the in-
crease in corruption in government departments. Naidoo (2012:672) therefore argues
that corruption undermines the credibility of the government to pursue redistribution
reforms, as many citizens suspect that the government is not pursuing the reforms in
the wider public interest, but only to line the pockets of a few leaders.

Legislative oversight is necessary for monitoring the behaviour of the executive in

implementing government policies and for taking remedial action when necessary.
Nonetheless, in South Africa, the Speaker of Parliament is viewed as stifling the op-
position parties’ right to exercise oversight over the executive by amongst other things
not allowing them to ask questions and follow up questions during question and an-
swer sessions. In so doing, the Speaker is thus considered as protecting the executive,
especially the President and the ruling party. The recent observations of the conduct
of the Speaker during the 2017 Sona delivered on the 9th of February is but one of
many instances that give credence to this view. This practice is also in contraven-
tion of Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. In other
words, the Speaker is stifling the opposition parties’ right to speak truth to power. This
view supports Mattes (2002:28) who argues that “... on several occasions, the African
National Congress (ANC) has, through the lack of the Speaker’s impartiality, invoked
party loyalty to prevent Parliament from conducting effective oversight of executive
action”. The deduction can therefore be made that the conduct of the Speaker is in
contrast with democratic theories, particularly deliberative democratic theory and the
Habermasion theory discussed earlier on.

140 African Journal of Public Affairs

The challenge of the inability of Speakers to maintain impartiality often results in sup-
pressing the ability of members of the opposition parties to hold the executive to ac-
count. This very challenge may create the opportunity for corrupt members of the
executive to take advantage of the constraints faced by members of the opposition
parties when trying to ask them to account for suspected corrupt activities. Exercising
oversight over the executive is a fundamental role of the legislature and is also a tool
that the legislature might use to minimise corruption in the public service, thereby
promoting good governance. Hence Bertrand, Djankov and Hanna (2006) stress that
corruption creates serious consequences in terms of inefficiency. Olum (2014:618)
suggests as a reminder that a basic principle in modern democracies is that the pub-
lic service derives its authority from the citizenry and its responsibilities and duties
from the public interest. As such, the public service must answer to the general public
through the representatives of the citizenry, in line with the principles of the delibera-
tive democratic theory. Therefore, the Speakers’ tendency of stifling speaking truth to
power is not conforming to this basic principle of modern democratic theories.

Commenting on the aftermath of the chaotic National Assembly sitting of Thursday

the 13th November 2014, the Democratic Alliance (DA) parliamentary leader Mmusi
Maimane is quoted in the City Press (November 16 2014) as stating that “... President
Zuma and Baleka Mbete (Speaker) have taken us to the verge of a constitutional cri-
sis. Parliament cannot effectively scrutinise the actions of the executive.” The inabil-
ity of parliament to scrutinise the actions of the executive creates a situation in which
corrupt activities fall through the cracks. This state of affairs resonates with the Public
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (2002) which points out that corruption undermines
the legitimacy and credibility of government and democratic values such as trust
and tolerance. In his April 2015 article titled “Opposition has weakened Mbete”, the
chairperson of the Moral Regeneration Movement, Smangaliso Mkhatshwa writes
that “... the atmosphere of parliamentary sittings and debates since the beginning
of the fifth parliament has been tenuous at best. Opposition political parties have
accused parliamentary speaker Baleka Mbete of being nothing more than a Luthuli
House1 ventriloquist”. This view suggests that the Speaker is unable to perform her
duties in an impartial manner. In other words, there is a correlation between the
conduct of the Speaker and the continued outcry amongst opposition parties of the
apparent lack of impartiality in the South African Parliament. Therefore, this article
argues that the Speaker’s conduct has fuelled the decline of parliamentary etiquette
not only in the National Assembly, but in the entire legislative sector. The disrup-
tions in proceedings of the legislature often crop up in the provincial legislatures,
especially in Gauteng, North-West and the Western Cape provinces. It is at this point
that the need for recommendations to address the shortcomings in the conduct of
the Speaker of the fifth parliament becomes necessary.

Volume 9 number 9 • December 2017 141

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The inability to maintain impartiality has proven to be a weakness of the Speaker of the
fifth parliament of the Republic of South Africa. This inability was yet again demon-
strated during the 2017 Sona which closely resembled the chaotic 13th November 2014
National Assembly sitting. The continuous complaints of the opposition parties regard-
ing the iron fist attitude of the Speaker whenever they pose fundamental questions to
the President, and by extension to the ruling party, attest to this weakness. It is also
interesting to note that even senior ANC members and former parliamentarians such
as Mr Kgalema Motlanthe, Fr Smangaliso Mkhatshwa and Prof Ben Turok lament the
decline of the South African Parliament sittings, which is a direct cause of the inability
of the Speaker to mend the National Assembly in a neutral and impartial manner. The
conduct of the Speaker can thus be said to be in sharp contrast with the principles of
deliberative democratic theory. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the Speaker’s
conduct does not comply with the basic principle of modern democracies as espoused
by Olum (2014). With this as the point of departure, the article firstly recommends that
the National Assembly should consider allowing the elected Speakers to resign from
their political party. In so doing, the pressure imposed on Speakers to blindly protect
members of the political party they are affiliated to, might be minimised.

The second recommendation is that the Speakers and all MPs, particularly those of
the ruling party, should carefully study the House Rules to improve their conduct dur-
ing the House sessions. This recommendation is based on the observation of the suc-
cessive National Assembly sessions in which the members of the opposition parties
appeared to have a better grasp of the House Rules than those of the ruling party,
particularly the Speaker. In a number of instances, the Speaker was called on a point
of order to conduct the affairs of the National Assembly in an impartial manner in ac-
cordance with the House Rules. While this article has mainly focused on the Speaker
of the National Assembly, its recommendations generally apply to all the Speakers of
the nine Provincial Legislatures.

This article has attempted to contribute to the discourse of better understanding the
role of the Speaker of Parliament with specific reference to the conduct of the Speaker
of the fifth parliament in South Africa’s democratic rule. The conduct of the Speaker
can either promote good governance by allowing all political parties represented in
the National Assembly to freely exercise oversight over the executive or derail good
governance by suppressing the rights of the opposition members to speak truth to
power during the House sittings. This implies that the Speaker is expected to play a
pivotal role in promoting accountability by impartially allowing MPs to hold the ex-
ecutive accountable, thereby contributing towards reducing corruption. However, it

142 African Journal of Public Affairs

should be noted that it takes political will for the Speaker to be impartial in promoting
accountability and good governance. Olum (2014:618) concludes that “... there is a
need for political will to tackle the problem of lack of accountability and bad gover-
nance. Political will at all levels enhances institutional capacity to make accountability
more effectual.”

This article has argued that in South Africa, parliamentary decorum has seen a sharp
decline, specifically during the fifth parliament. The continuous decline of parliamen-
tary decorum can be attributed to the inability of the Speaker to conduct the affairs of
the National Assembly in a neutral and impartial manner. A new theory, termed “the
party line towing theory” has emerged from this article, given the challenges in terms
of neutrality experienced by the Speakers of Parliament in South Africa, particularly
the Speaker of the fifth parliament. It can thus be concluded that the Speaker of the
fifth parliament in South Africa is stifling the opportunity of opposition parties to speak
truth to power, as expressed in the theoretical statement of this article.

NOTE
1. The National Head Quarters of the African National Congress (ANC) are located in the building named
Luthuli House, in Johannesburg. The building was named after one of the previous presidents of the
ANC. As such, in the political discourses it is popular to use the phrases Luthuli House when referring
to the ANC Head Quarters.

REFERENCES
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