CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
THE POLITICAL CONFLICT
THE ARGENTINE invasion of the Falklands commenced at 4.30am on 2nd April 1982 as Commandos from the Special Forces unit Buzo Tactico,
spearheaded the junta’s operation to seize the islands. The capture of UK sovereign territory changed the national mood in Britain as the country stood
united in anger at the South American aggression.

CHAPTER TWO
GALTIERI’S GAMBLE
THE arrival of Argentine scrap dealers at South Georgia had sounded alarm bells in Downing Street. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation with
Buenos Aires were now a priority. The junta claimed it was all a misunderstanding and London initially accepted the junta’s explanation, that the group
were innocent workers simply dismantling old iron whaling buildings as part of an agreed contract.

CHAPTER THREE
OPERATION ROSARIO
ARGENTINA erupted into celebration on 2nd April 1982 as the junta relished in the jubilation of their military success in seizing the Falkland Islands.
The public danced in the streets and flew national flags from taxis and buildings as a wave national excitement swept across the country. Buenos Aires
had not fought a war for more than 100 years. Morale was high and the economic problems were forgotten, at least for the short-term.

CHAPTER FOUR
BRITAIN PREPARES FOR WAR
THE ROYAL NAVY was now on a war footing. Days before the Argentine invasion at a crisis meeting in Downing Street Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
asked what military response could be generated if the Argentines did invade. The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, advised them that
‘Britain could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded’. The day before the invasion Admiral Sir Henry Leach attended another meeting at
which Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked how long it would take to respond. He replied that the fleet would be ready within days and the aircraft
carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible would head the force.

CHAPTER FIVE
BRITAIN STRIKES BACK
THE BRITISH military was now on the move, bound for the Falklands. Argentina had accused the UK of colonial rule, taken their claim to the United
Nations and invaded the Falklands. Now as Argentine troops massed on the islands, they had renamed Las Malvinas and did not expect the UK to
respond. Now a major force was heading to remove them – Britain was about to strike back.

CHAPTER SIX
THE BATTLE FOR SAN CARLOS
THE BRITISH Task Force was now poised in the South Atlantic as commanders finalised their plans to launch the planned amphibious assault and
remove the Argentines from the islands. The junta’s air force continued to be a major threat and as the battle group assembled it would create a major
target opportunity for the enemy.

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 4

 CHAPTER 1
London believed Argentine President Leopoldo
Galtieri, was unlikely to resort to combat. Picture
AG/DPL
a severe recession gripped the country.
Interest rates and unemployment soared,
there was rioting in the streets and food
prices were at an all-time high. He needed
to pull the country together and find a
way to save his political future. Previously,
there had been a period of diplomatic
stability in which Argentina was given
trade access to the Falklands, but since
seizing power the junta was desperate to
settle growing domestic unrest. Capturing
the Falklands would boost national pride
and the announcement by London in 1981
of major cuts to the Royal Navy, including
the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance, based
in the South Atlantic, sent a signal to
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Argentine Commandos were the first ashore into Port Stanley. Picture Charles Menzies/DPL
Argentina that the UK was not giving
any priority to security in the region.
Now was the time to strike. For decades,
ministers in London had failed to resolve
the Falklands issue and instead had given
Buenos Aires hope that they could secure
sovereignty through negotiation. For
Downing street their political game of
posturing and promises had failed – now
the situation was about to get very ugly.
On 19th March 1982, a group of
Argentine scrap metal workers landed
ashore at Leith Harbour in South Georgia,
an island which is part of the British
Falklands dependency and sits 800 miles
south-east of the main islands. Their visit
8
was based on the pretext of removing a
derelict whaling station which had been
agreed in an earlier contract. In December
1981, the ice breaker ARA Almirante Iriza
had called at South Georgia to assess the
work. Then in 1982, the scrap workers
had arrived aboard the 5,000-tonne
transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso,
they stepped ashore but instead of
removing the whaling station they raised
the Argentine flag. At the time, a British
Antarctic Survey (BAS) team was the
only British presence at Leith and the
BAS leader, Trefor Edwards, informed
London about the Argentine presence.
The Foreign Office requested that Edwards
pass a message to the commander of
the Argentine ship, Captain Briatore,
directing him to remove the flag, stop
any activity and put to sea. The Governor
of the Falkland Islands, Rex Hunt, who
was based in Port Stanley had also been
informed of events in South Georgia.
After consulting London, Hunt ordered
the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance, which
had just arrived in the Falklands, to head
for South Georgia with a party of 22 Royal
Marine Commandos embarked. It was
a distance of 800 miles and would take
several days, by which time Downing
Street hoped the unwelcome guests would
have packed their bags and gone. The
political pressure in London was now
rising, but still ministers failed to grasp
the political aspirations of the military
junta in Buenos Aires.
Argentine commanders were now just
weeks away from ordering a top-secret ➽
The scrap workers had arrived aboard the 5,000-tonne transport ship ARA Bahía Buen Suceso. Picture AG/DPL

Aerial picture of Port Stanley. Picture David Reynolds/DPL

9 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 1
operation to mount an amphibious assault
on the islands. Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and her cabinet were concerned
at the arrival of the Argentines in South
Georgia, but not convinced that the scrap
dealers were connected to anything more
serious. Politicians now made telephone
calls to counterparts in Washington in a
bid to find out what American intelligence
could advise through their sources. But
the Americans had very little to report,
they had left the monitoring of intelligence
in the South Atlantic to the Brits. US
diplomats sought to offer political support,
but they too did not believe that the junta
would use military force in the South
Atlantic. They dismissed any suggestion
of an invasion. The Foreign Secretary,
Lord Peter Carrington, was coming
under increased political pressure about
Argentina’s intent – which he could not
answer. London had failed to identify the
increasing activity in the South Atlantic
South Georgia had a reputation as a haven for wild birds. Picture BAS/DPL
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Left: In December
1981, the ice breaker
ARA Almirante Iriza
had called at South
Georgia. Picture AG/
DPL
Right: Foreign office
minister Richard Luce
MP made a statement
to the House of
Commons on South
Georgia. Picture UK
Govt/DPL
and did not want to believe that the junta
would invade. In reflection, military
commanders later thought that the
Argentine scrap dealers in South Georgia
was simply a military distraction to ensure
that HMS Endurance would be diverted to
the region, removing any British maritime
capability to oppose the Argentine force.
But Galtieri had underestimated the
British resolve.
On 23rd March 1982, the junior foreign
office minister Richard Luce MP made a
brief statement to the House of Commons
about developments in South Georgia.
He said: “We were informed on 20th
March by the commander of the British
Antarctic survey base at Grytviken on
South Georgia that a party of Argentines
had landed at Leith harbour. The base
commander informed the Argentine
party that its presence was illegal as it
had not obtained his prior authority for
the landing. We immediately took the
10
matter up with the Argentine authorities
in Buenos Aires and the Argentine
embassy in London and, following our
approach, the ship and most of the
personnel left on 21st March. However,
the base commander has reported
that a small number of men and some
equipment remain. We are therefore
making arrangements to ensure their early
departure.” In response to a question from
Labour’s Denis Healy, Mr Luce added:
“Yes, for a short period the Argentine flag
was planted. It has now been removed.
We are making arrangements to ensure
that those who remain at Leith harbour
will not do so for very much longer.” But
the UK government was keen to avoid
conflict, not least because just a year
earlier in 1981 the then defence secretary
John Nott had approved widespread
reductions across the Royal Navy.
At the time, Britain and Europe were
feeling the impact of the recession,
which was biting hard. In January 1982,
unemployment in the UK hit three
million, for the first time since the 1930s.
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was
constantly given a rough ride by the then
leader of the opposition, Michael Foot
and plans to cut naval assets gave the
opposition plenty of political ammunition.
Amid a wider spending review, the then
defence secretary John Nott was now
directed to make savings.
The Nott Review focussed on the
international context of a Soviet build up
and the domestic perspective of a severe
economic downturn amid the requirement
to control public spending. It was agreed
that the UK would purchase the American
Trident missile systems to replace Polaris
and maintain the nuclear deterrent,
which the Royal Navy’s submarine force
would continue to carry. But the pending
Nott plan was set to inflict serious
equipment cuts to the armed forces and in
particular the fleet. Nott’s proposal would
leave a future fleet with no carriers, no
amphibious assault ships and included
the retirement of HMS Endurance, the
ice patrol ship known as the red plum.
The defence secretary’s announcement
had sent a message that the UK fleet was
downsizing and removing the Falklands
guard ship, HMS Endurance, leaving
almost no presence in the islands.
In the 1960s, the Argentines had been
encouraged by the UK’s decolonisation
of African countries. In 1964, the
administration of President Arturo
Umberto Illia, had observed the handover
of sovereignty from the UK monarch to a
new Republican administration in what
had been Rhodesia. Ministers in Buenos
Aires believed the UK had colonised the
Falklands and should therefore hand them
back. They took their claim for sovereignty
of the Falklands to the United Nations and
on 16th December 1965, the UN General
Assembly voted to pass resolution 2065. It
recognised the existence of a sovereignty
The UK defence budget in 1981 was focussed
on the purchase of the American Trident
missile systems. Picture US/DPL
dispute between Britain and Argentina
over the Falkland Islands and recognised
that the case of the Falklands is framed
in a colonial situation. It added that
this should be taken into consideration,
adding that a previously passed resolution
called for the goal of eliminating all forms
of colonialism. Finally, the UN called on
the UK and Argentina to find a peaceful
conclusion, while taking into account the
interest of the inhabitants of the islands.
Politicians in Argentina were delighted
that the UN recognised their claim.
11
The UN recommendation was not what
London wanted; any negotiation would
give legitimacy to Argentina’s claim of
sovereignty. But the Falkland Islands were
not top of the Foreign Office’s concerns.
In 1964, Britain was engaged in a counter-
insurgency operation in Aden and Brunei,
while the Cold War focussed the minds of
ministers and Army commanders.
In September 1964, islanders had been
shocked when an Argentine pilot landed
his Cessna plane on the Stanley racecourse
and erected his national flag. The
government in Buenos Aires apologised,
but in response, the UK Ministry of
Defence sent the then ice patrol ship
HMS Protector to the Falklands in 1965
and landed a party of Royal Marines,
about 32 in number. The majority of the
group left at the end of the year leaving
a small group of Argentine activists to
believe that all the marines had left – they
hadn’t. In 1966, a military coup in Buenos
Aires ousted President Illia and a junta
of military commanders ran the country
for the next four years. Talks with ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
The Argentine destroyer ARA Almirante Storni which fired on the Shackleton. Picture DPL
guarantee support for military action
against the Falklands. But again, it was
declined. Anaya was furious. Keen to keep
his cohorts happy, Videla was persuaded
to approve landing a force of 50 personnel
on Southern Thule – one of three British
sovereign areas in the Sandwich islands
east of the Falklands.
In November 1976, the unit from the
Argentine Air Force landed on Thule and
built a military base including a weather
station. They erected the Argentine flag
and re-named the island Corbeta Uruguay.
A month later, London discovered the
incursion and protested to Buenos Aires.
The government deployed a nuclear
submarine, HMS Dreadnaught and two
frigates, HMS Phoebe and HMS Alacrity,
as well as the support ships RFA Resurgent
and RFA Olwen, to deter any threat to
the Falklands, but ruled out direct action
against the force on Thule. The occupation
of Thule was leaked to the public in
1979 and the junta’s forces remained
on Southern Thule until six days after
the war in 1982 had ended. On 20 June
1982, Royal Marines landed on Thule in
a mission codenamed Operation Keyhole
and captured the Argentines who failed to
put up any resistance.
Political stalemate now followed and
the islanders made their opinion very
clear through the island’s legislative
council – they wanted a freeze on all
negotiations with Buenos Aires. In May
1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected
Prime Minister. She appointed Lord
Michael Carrington to head the Foreign
Office and John Nott as defence secretary.
Among her other appointments was
Nichols Ridley as a junior foreign office
minister. He was eager to impress and
resolve the Falklands issue. His plan was
based on securing a leaseback deal with
Argentina which would provide security
for the islanders and maintain political
relations with Buenos Aires happy. His
plans raised concerns in Downing Street
and in November 1980, Ridley returned
to the Falklands to seek support for the
leaseback option. On return, in December
he presented his plans to the House of
Commons, but he was savaged by MPs
who opposed his proposals. The initiative
was sunk. In 1981, Argentina was working
hard to rebuild relations with the United
States as Washington aimed to increase
its influence in South America. In Spring
1981, Nicholas Ridley travelled to New
York to meet representatives of the Buenos
15
Aires government. He was accompanied
by two members of the Falklands islands
council – they wanted all negotiations
to be frozen, they offered no room for
manoeuvre – and there was no further
progress to be made. The Falklands policy
was now in shreds.
Now in late 1981, John Nott’s pending
defence review was about to send a clear
message to Argentina that the UK was
reducing its commitment in the South
Atlantic. To the dismay of the Royal Navy,
the planned spending cuts included the
retirement, with no replacement, of the ice
patrol ship HMS Endurance. As if to add
insult to injury, a new British Nationality
Bill was now proposed, which by default
also included fourth-generation settlers in
colonies such as Gibraltar and the Falklands.
But while an amendment did include
Gibraltar more than 800 Falkland islanders
did not qualify – they were furious.
(This was amended in 1983 to grant full
citizenship to all islanders). In Argentina,
the junta had monitored the bill closely
and believed that London was shaping the
ground to stand back from the Falklands.
The islanders had a similar opinion and
the Nationality Bill convinced many that
Downing Street had cast them aside. ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 1
On 30th June 1981, the House
of Lords debated the dispute over
sovereignty. Lord Buxton of Alsa asked
the Government whether they would
be holding further discussions with the
Argentine Government concerning the
Falkland Islands. He said: “The situation
over the Falkland Islands is getting more
serious, not so much as a result of this
Government’s initiative, which I support,
but as a result of traditional British
indifference and the apparent disposition
to wash our hands of the problem as soon
as possible. Practically at no time that I
know of have Her Majesty’s Government
ever shown a tendency towards firmness
and flag-waving. We are all well aware,
and it has often been pointed out in this
House – for instance, last December and
last February – that a resolution of the
dispute with Argentina must be found,
in one form or another, or the British “I am disturbed by what has come to
community will ultimately face economic light in the recent Statement on defence Above: Argentine soldiers in Port Stanley.
collapse. cuts. It is reported that this country’s
“The need for a settlement is not based only presence in the Antarctic, HMS Right: The Falklands were sparsely
on the Argentine claim to sovereignty. Endurance, is to be withdrawn in 1982. populated with small hamlets at Darwin,
There was no great problem before the All that would remain in that event Goose Green and the largest population
coming of jet air travel. In the old days, would be the two British Antarctic being in Stanley. Picture David Reynolds/
communications between Britain and the Survey vessels, which are also being DPL
Falkland Islands were by sea and vessels subjected to cuts of paltry proportions,
went to and fro without being obliged to but on such a marginal basis any cuts
call at any particular country en route. will have critical consequences. A serious who have been there for four or five
But today, the only regular connection prospect arises for the Falklanders over generations. There is no other case in
with the Falklands is by small jets of the the British Nationality Bill. It is argued what remains of British possessions
Argentine Air-force seating 40 passengers that any special measures provided for overseas that could be compromised
and flying now only once a week. This the Falklands could have knock-on by the Falklands. Either we must
flies between an airport in the far south effects for places like Hong Kong. That ensure that the Falkland Islands remain
of Argentina at Comodoro Rivadavia and is manifestly absurd because there is no British forever, or the handful of our
Port Stanley, and this is the only regular comparison. There are no indigenous compatriots must have full British
communication between the Falkland natives in the Falklands – only 1,800 citizenship. We cannot have it both ways.
Islands and the outside world. dyed-in-the-wool British citizens We cannot deny them full citizenship

Argentine Pucara aircraft were produced in the country and played a major role in Falklands. Picture AG/DPL

Right: Cap badge of the Royal Marines – just a small detachment was based on the Falklands.

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 16

and at the same time be wet about
their future. I should be grateful for an
assurance from the Minister on that
point because without it I feel that we
must in due course table an amendment
to the Nationality Bill to protect the
future of the islanders”. This was made in
1983.
Since 1976, Argentina had been run
by President Jorge Rafael Videla and his
military junta, then in March 1981, Videla
handed power to naval officer Roberto
Eduardo Viola who only served for a few
months before standing down due to ill
After the landing on Thule, the UK deployed HMS Phoebe (pictured), the nuclear submarine and frigate HMS Alacrity. Picture Royal Navy
health. Social unrest continued and the
military junta appointed Horacio Tomas
Liendo, who lasted one month before
being replaced by interim President
Carlos Lacoste. He then served three
weeks before the junta-appointed the
former Army General Leopoldo Galtieri
as a permanent head. His regime was
accused of directing a ‘dirty war’ against
groups who opposed his government
with claims of murder, corruption and
people going missing. Galtieri needed
a solution to turn the economy around,
stop the rioting and generate support for
17
the junta and more importantly himself.
In late 1981, he saw his opportunity;
secret plans were now being drawn up.
The only British opposition was the ice
patrol ship HMS Endurance. The arrival
of scrap dealers had called the ship away.
Now in late March, the Falklands were
exposed with just a few lightly armed
Royal Marines stationed on the islands
as a defence force. Striking now would
guarantee success. Galtieri’s gamble was
that he could bring his country together
and remain in office. The political conflict
was about to erupt. ■
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 ARA Piedrabuena, a former US Navy Allen M Summer-class destroyer in service
The Argentine Type 42 destroyer ARA Hercules. Picture AG/DPL with Argentine forces in 1982. Picture AG/DPL

The nearest UK air support to the Falklands was a small RAF unit of four Harriers from 1417 Squadron unit based in Belize. Picture RAF

more than 800 miles from the Falklands
in the middle of the Southern Atlantic.
Historically, the island had been a base for
whale fishing – but while this had ended –
several buildings remained around Leith.
The British Antarctic Survey visited the
island every year. The United Kingdom
claimed sovereignty over South Georgia
in 1775 and the South Sandwich Islands
in 1908. The territory of ‘South Georgia
and the South Sandwich Islands’ was later
formed in 1985 three years after the war.
Previously, it had been governed as part
of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.
Argentina claimed South Georgia in 1927
and claimed the South Sandwich Islands
in 1938. In 1976, Argentine military
forces had landed on Thule island in the
Sandwich islands and renamed it Corbeta
Uruguay. In March 1982 they were still
there.
Royal Marine Lt Keith Mills briefed his
men to shoot only in self-defence, not
endanger life and avoid surrender unless
25
they were overwhelmed. The Argentine
force suspected that the British had landed
marines in the area around Grytviken.
On 3 April, Captain Astiz the Argentine
force commander in Grytviken sent out
a repeating radio message around South
Georgia urging the marines to surrender.
Astiz stated that the British in Port Stanley
had surrendered the day before and the
Argentine forces were now in control.
Several hours later, the corvette ARA
Guerrico approached the harbour ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 2
the islands was codenamed Operation
Rosario and saw the deployment of a
significant part of Argentina’s Navy.
Planners formed three task groups which
would include destroyers and the Navy’s
only aircraft carrier and her protection
force, the landing ships and their escorts
– a separate task force had been directed
to South Georgia. The carrier group, Task
Force 20, was spearheaded by the carrier
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, which acted
as flagship, her escorts included the ARA
Comodoro Py, a Gearing-class destroyer,
as well as three ageing former US Navy
Allen M Sumner-class destroyers; ARA
Comodoro Segui, ARA Hipólito Bouchard
and ARA Piedrabuena. In addition, the
fleet tanker ARA Punta Médanos sailed
with the force.
The carrier had undergone a refit in
1981, when she received an update to her
radar, arresting gear, steam catapult and
the port side angled deck was enhanced
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Above: The
Argentine ship
ARA Bathia
Paraiso which
was involved in
events at South
Georgia. Picture
Royal Navy
Right: ARA
Guerrico a
Drummond-class
corvette. Picture
AG/DPL
Below: Map of
South Georgia
with an enlarged sponson. These upgrades
aimed to enable the carrier to operate the
Super Etendard strike aircraft purchased
from France. But during testing, the
catapult had difficulties launching the
aircraft. Instead, in the short term, her
immediate strike air-wing was limited to
the A-4Q Skyhawks. The 19,900-tonne
carrier gave the Argentines the ability
to deliver to secure the airspace above
the Falklands, which would be vital in
winning any war.
The second group Task Force 40
included the British designed and built
Type 42 destroyers ARA Santisima
Trinidad, the flagship, and her sister ship
ARA Hercules. The force also included
the landing ships ARA Cabo San Antonio
and ARA De Soto County as well as the
corvettes ARA Granville and Drummond,
the ice breaker ARA Almirante Irizar, the
supply ship ARA Isla de los Estados and
28
the submarine ARA Sante Fe. A diesel-
powered boat she had been a former US
Navy submarine and had served in the
1950s as USS Catfish. In addition, the
corvette ARA Guerrico and the Antarctic
survey ship ARA Bahia Paraiso were
assigned to operation in South Georgia.
The ARA Guerrico had limped away from
South Georgia after a fierce engagement
with the small Royal Marine force.
The junta’s naval force also included a
number of merchant vessels to ferry fuel,
equipment and munitions to the islands.
In addition, the Argentines recruited
a number of ‘spy’ trawlers who sat off
the Falklands listening and collating
information. One of them, the Narwal, was
attacked by a Harrier during the conflict
and later captured by Royal Marines.
Other included the Constanza, Invierno,
Captain Canepa, Maria Luisa, Usurbil, Mar
Azul and the cargo vessel Rio de la Plata.
The Argentines also had two German
Type 209 conventional powered
submarines, which they named the Salta-
class – named ARA Salta and ARA San
Louis. A third, former US submarine,
named the Santa Fe was also on service.
After the carrier, the Argentine fleet’s
biggest vessel was the former US Navy
Brooklyn-class light cruiser now in service
as the ARA General Belgrano. After the
initial assault on the Falklands, the plan
was that Belgrano would sail south of
the Falklands and spearhead a new Task
Force, codenamed TF79.2, while the
carrier group remained north as TF79.1.
The Drummond corvettes sat to the
north east as TF 79.4, there was no doubt
Argentina’s force was significant and
highly capable.
The Argentine Air Force had never
considered the possibility of waging a
long-range naval air campaign against a
29
major NATO power – it was not trained
or equipped for such a mission. The
Argentine Fleet Air Arm only had two
tanker aircraft to serve the whole air force
and navy, and its fighter-bomber Mirage
111s and IAI Daggers were not equipped
for aerial refuelling. Their operational
strategy had been focussed on a conflict
with Chile resulting from the Beagle
border dispute. Argentina’s fleet of A-4
Skyhawk attack jets was in very poor
condition.
The arms embargo placed by the United
States in 1976, due to the ‘Dirty War’ of
torture and mis-treatment of innocent
civilians had cut the supply of spare
parts and left most aircraft unusable.
The small air arm of the Argentine Navy
was in the middle of the transition from
the A-4Q Skyhawk to the new Super
Etendard. Only five of the Etendard’s
anti-ship Exocet missiles, purchased ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 Right: Super Étendard fighter aircraft. These
aircraft carried the Exocet missile. Picture
AG/DPL

Below right:Argentine purchased 39

Dagger fighters from Israel in 1978. Picture
AFG/DPL

Bottom right: The Exocet AM-39

anti-ship missile as carried by the Argentine
Super Étendard warplanes during the
Falkland War.

from France, had been delivered at the

time of the conflict, at which point an
arms embargo prevented the delivery
of further shipments. Additionally, the
programming contract to link the missiles
to interact with the Etendard’s computers
had not been completed by French
engineers when the conflict broke out in
1982. France, being an ally of the United
Kingdom, recalled all technicians, which
left Argentine scientists and electronic
engineers to figure out a way to configure
the missiles to the plane’s combat control
system.
Navy pilots, particularly those of the 3rd
Naval Fighters Squadron flying A-4Qs
were the only ones trained in bombing
warships. Air Force pilots trained during
April against the two Argentine Type 42
destroyers, identical to those of the British
Fleet. According to Argentine naval officers,
all the exercises resulted in the planes
being shot down, causing concern to the
High Command. The Argentines were now
bound for the Falklands and only hours
away from landing their troops. Governor
Rex Hunt had warned islanders and the
Royal Marines had deployed around
Stanley. But the British troops were facing
a hopeless task as they faced thousands of
enemy troops who were preparing to drive
ashore in armoured vehicles.
Called the LVTP7 (Landing Vehicle
Track), the vehicle first entered service with
the US Marine Corps in the early 1970s.
Weighing in at 26 tons and able to carry 25
marines, Argentina bought dozens in the
1970s. The next 24 hours of activity would
cast a shadow of shame and humiliation
over the UK. Galtieri was now confident
that his gamble had paid off. But despite
catching Downing street off guard, he and
his cohorts in the junta had underestimated
the response of Mrs Thatcher and in
particular the Royal Navy and the UK’s
armed forces. The junta enjoyed their
victory, but it was to be short-lived. ■
33 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 3
Operation
Rosario ARGENTINA erupted into celebration on 2 April 1982, as the junta relished in
the jubilation of their military success in seizing the Falkland Islands. The public
danced in the streets and flew national flags from taxis and buildings as a wave
of national excitement swept across the country. Buenos Aires had not fought a
war for more than 100 years. Morale was high and the economic problems were
forgotten, at the least for the short-term.

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 34

 Argentine troops pictured shortly after arriving in the Falklands.

Left: The 2,300 tonne Santa Fe, a Balao-class sub, had been purchased from the
United States in 1971. Picture AG/DPL

which was obstructed with barbed wire.
Norman deployed four sections, one
with two machine guns at Hooker’s Point
which would cover one of the approaches
to the airfield. Then to the west of them,
near the airfield, another section was
placed – armed with a machine gun and
an 84mm Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon.
They were also equipped with several
66mm light anti-tank missiles. A third
section was positioned nearby close to an
air navigation beacon. The task for these
sections was to delay the enemy for as
long as possible before withdrawing back
to Government House.
On the other side of Stanley, a fourth
section, also armed with an 84mm Carl
Gustav, was poised ready to engage enemy
landing craft or shipping which tried to
get through the narrow entrance to the
harbour. They had a Gemini inflatable
boat so they could make a dash for it along
the coastline back to Government House.
A further section was placed on Murray
Heights behind Government House
to provide warning of any Argentines
approaching from the south. An
Observation Post (OP) was also set up on
Sapper Hill in the form of a lone marine
– he was equipped with a motorcycle for
a quick getaway. The headquarters group
remained at Government House, with
Major Noott, ensuring the Governor was
safe. Norman planned to place himself
at Look-out Rocks, on the edge of the
town to the southeast so he could direct
the troops on the ground. In addition,
the motor vessel Forrest set out to sea on
a surveillance mission to monitor the
waters off Port William to the north. The
vessel was owned by the Falkland Islands
government and had been used frequently
by the Royal Marines to transit them on
security patrols around the Falklands. On
the night of the invasion, the ship was
ordered to sea to try and locate any sign of
the enemy. The ship using visual lookouts
and her radar, mounted two patrols, the
first sailing just before 3am did not pick
up on anything, but the second journey at
5am identified ships coming from the east
and more ships heading towards Yorke
Bay.
At 0330hrs. Forrest confirmed that
warships were manoeuvring off Cape
Pembroke. At 0430hrs. The OP on Sapper
Hill reported helicopter activity near
Mullet Creek. The Argentine Special
Forces, the Buzo Tactico, had landed
to the south-west of Stanley, near Port
Harriet. Major Norman had realised he
needed to get back to Government House.
He had expected an attack from the north-
east, but instead, they had approached
from the south and marched straight
towards Moody Brook barracks. Norman
had been caught off-guard. He managed
to get back to Government House, but
two of his sections did not have time to ➽

President Galtieri visiting his troops in the

Falklands. Picture DPL

Right: Argentine troops using a field kitchen.

Picture AG/DPL

39 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 3
Above: The Argentine aircraft carrier ARA
Veinticinco de Mayo. Picture DPL
Below: Argentine aircrew enjoy their
moment of victory and pose with a
captured Union Jack flag. Picture AG
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Right: Royal Navy nuclear submarines
were now in the South Atlantic. Picture Guy
Channing/DPL
Bottom: Royal Marines taken prisoner are
flown to the Argentine – but they were soon to
return as part of J Company 42 Commando.
landing craft trying to pass through the
narrows into the harbour and fired their
84mm Carl Gustav at the ship. Its round is
understood to have seriously damaged the
craft and killed a number of Argentines.
The section radioed the headquarters at
Government House and reported several
major warships off the coast. But they
lost radio contact and were now on their
own. They then used a small inflatable
to escape, remaining undetected for four
days.
To the east of Stanley, more Amtracs
were now coming ashore, they were
carrying elements of the 2nd Marine
Infantry Battalion and deployed from the
tank landing ship ARA Cabo San Antonio
at Yorke Bay. They were being watched
by a section of Royal Marines under the
command of Lieutenant Bill Trollope. The
column of vehicles now drove along the
airport road towards Stanley, with three
42
Amtracs in the front. It was almost 7.15am
as they moved along the road they were
engaged by a section of Royal Marines
armed with the 84mm Carl Gustav and
66mm LAW rockets – at a range of about
200 to 250 metres. The first three missiles,
two 84mm and one 66mm, missed. Then a
66mm fired by Marine Mark Gibbs hit the
passenger compartment of the first vehicle
and an 84mm fired by marines George
Brown and Danny Betts hit the front of
the Amtrac. Both rounds exploded and
no fire was received from that vehicle. The
remaining five Amtracs which were about
600 metres away deployed their troops
and opened fire. The marines engaged
them with machine-gun fire from the
GPMG team, SLRs from the section and
sniper Sergeant Ernie Shepherd, armed
with an L42. They then threw a smoke
grenade and leap-frogged back with heavy
incoming fire now directed at them.
Small but intense actions were now
widespread, as the marines slowly fell
back to Government House as ordered.
Some of the sections could not make
it due to being under heavy fire. The
headquarters was under continuous attack
from Buzo Tactico commandos, who
repeatedly tried to storm the building.
The Marines were in confident if anxious
mood and carried on the fight. The
Argentines had now surrounded the
building and the marines were under
fire from three directions. The Governor,
Rex Hunt, learned by telephone that
the enemy force was advancing in
large numbers and would soon be at
Government House and they would
soon be overwhelmed. Corporal Lou
Armour, who commanded ‘One Section’,
was positioned at Hookers Point when
the invasion began. Shortly after the
attack on Moody Brook, he was ordered
43
to withdraw to Government House,
meeting up with Corporal David Carr’s
section along the way. But as they moved
through the edges of the town, they came
under fire at every street corner and
it was eventually so heavy they had to
abandon their plan. Corporals Geordie
Gill and Terry Pares, both snipers, both
armed with L42 rifles had engaged and
killed a number of the attackers. The two
men acted as a team with one spotting
targets and the other firing. The firing
continued as more Argentines arrived at
Government House. Governor Rex Hunt
telephoned Radio Stanley, where Patrick
Watts had been broadcasting throughout
the invasion, and told him that he thought
there were as many as 200 Argentines
now at Government House. The building
was peppered with bullet holes as
Amtracs and armoured vehicles were now
advancing on the Governor’s location. ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 3

Before deploying the marines underwent live firing training with machine guns The British marines based in the Falklands took part in regular training
and rifles. Picture FDPL exercises. Picture DPL

The Royal Marines at Government
saw the approaching Amtracs. Sailors
from HMS Endurance, who had remained
in Stanley when the ship sailed for South
Georgia, began to shred and burn official
documents. Major Norman had earlier
advised Governor Hunt that the Royal
Marines and the governor could break
out to the countryside and set up a ‘seat of
government’ elsewhere. By now Argentine
forces heavily outnumbered the small Royal
Marine detachment – close to 2,000 enemy
troops were ashore. The British marines had
now fired 6,450 small-arms rounds and 12
rockets – Governor Hunt was now thinking
about his options. He had previously served
as Consul-General at the British Embassy in
Saigon in January and was there at the time

Brigadier Thompson picture with his planning staff at Stonehouse barracks, headquarters of 3 Commando Brigade. Picture DPL

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 44

of the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, he had
seen at first hand the savages of war. He
knew the marines could not defeat the
huge Argentine force and he did not want
to see any of his marines killed.
They wanted to fight to the end, but
Hunt, he decided to stop. Shortly after
9.30am he agreed to speak with the
Argentine naval commander Admiral
Carlos Busser. He told Busser: “You have
landed unlawfully on British territory, and
I order you to remove yourself and your
troops forthwith.” The Argentine
told him to surrender adding there was
no alternative, he was surrounded by
more than 2,000 troops who were now
on the Malvinas and more were landing.
It was a hard decision for Governor Hunt
to make, but he told Norman to stop
firing, an order which was not welcomed
by the marines. Hunt later said: “With a
heavy heart, I turned to Mike and told
him to give the order to lay down arms.
I could not bring myself to use the word
‘surrender’. Mike’s face was a mixture of
relief and anguish: it was not part of his
training to surrender, but his good sense
told him that there was no real alternative.
As Gary Noott accompanied Busser to
tend the wounded around Government
House, Mike told his radio operator to
instruct all sections to down arms and
wait to be collected.”
The captured Royal Marines were loaded
into a C-130 Hercules and flown to
Comodoro Rivadavia and then transferred
to a Uruguay airliner and flown to the
UK. Governor Hunt and his wife were
flown in a separate aircraft. Back in the ➽

Above: British Special

Forces were now preparing
to leave the UK – they would
spearhead operations in the
Falklands. Picture DPL

Left: Argentine Special

Forces troops had been
trained with other South
American nations. Before the
war. Picture AG/DPL

Right: HMS Hermes and

HMS Broadsword on the
way to the Falklands. Picture
Royal Navy

45 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 3

Before the invasion Argentine marines had recently taken part in exercises Buenos Aires had purchased the Amtracs from the US government.
where they tested their Amtracs. Picture AG/DPL Picture AG/DPL

UK, the marines and sailors were treated
to a heroes’ welcome when they landed
on 5 April, at RAF Brize Norton. As
they drank tea at the RAF airfield, they
received the news that raised their morale.
Those that wanted to would be issued new
clothing and would be heading back to the
Falklands.
On 3 April 1982, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 502
demanding an immediate withdrawal of
all Argentine forces from the islands and
calling on the governments of Argentina
and the United Kingdom to seek a
diplomatic solution to the situation and to
refrain from further military action.
Meanwhile in the UK at 3 Commando
Brigade in Plymouth, planning was
underway for a major operational
deployment. A Royal Navy task force was
being prepared and in London, military
staff were drawing up a list of commercial
ships that could be requisitioned to support
the Task Force. Nuclear submarines were
already on their way, elements of the UK’s
special forces were preparing to head to
the South Atlantic and the RAF and Fleet
Air Arm were drawing up plans for the
air component of the force. They would
join the carriers HMS Hermes and HMS
Invincible which would head the battle
group. As the naval force sailed, the RAF
made the first strike against the Argentine.
They flew a Vulcan bomber to Stanley to hit
the airfield. It was the first of seven raids.
The Empire was about to strike back. ■

The Argentine marines had taken part in amphibious exercises before the April invasion, but they had little experience. Picture DPL

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 46

Royal Navy nuclear power
submarines were now heading for
the South Atlantic. Picture DPL
 The aircraft carrier HMS Hermes on
its way to the Falklands. Picture RN

THE ROYAL NAVY was now on a war footing. Days before the Argentine invasion
at a crisis meeting in Downing Street, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked
what military response could be generated if the Argentines did invade. The
Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, advised them that ‘Britain
could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded’. The day before
the invasion Admiral Sir Henry Leach attended another meeting at which
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked how long it would take to respond. He
replied that the fleet would be ready within days and the aircraft carriers HMS
Hermes and HMS Invincible would head the force.

I
ronically, just months earlier John
Nott, the defence secretary, had
listed these two carriers, along-
with the amphibious assault ships
HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, for
withdrawal from the fleet as part of
government cost-cutting plans drawn
up in the 1981 review. In February 1982,
the Australian government had agreed
to buy HMS Invincible for £175 million.
Now having escaped being sold or sent
to the scrapyard, these warships were
being prepared for war. The military, in
particular the Navy, were quietly furious
with Nott and his planned cuts, the fleet
was now fighting for its future. On the
day the Argentines invaded, the Admiral’s
office had sent a warning order to the
fleet raising their readiness for operations.
Later in the day, after a subdued meeting
in Downing Street, Admiral Leach ordered
a further signal to be sent it was clear and
direct, it said: ‘The task force is to be made
ready and sailed.’
49
As daylight dawned on 2 April 1982, the
triumphant Argentine force celebrated
in and around Port Stanley, they took
souvenir pictures of themselves and after
they had secured Government House,
the airfield and the harbour, Argentine
commanders focussed on establishing
their force. Troops tore down signs
at Stanley airfield and replaced them
with ones proclaiming the ‘Malvinas
airport’. Air controllers took over the air
traffic control centre, command and ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 4
communications units were located on the
airfield and a massive logistics operation
commenced to bring in more troops and
equipment. Pucara ground attack aircraft
flew in, four arriving on the day of the
invasion and another eight landing six
days later. These Argentine-made aircraft
were ideal for the Falklands, their short
take-off and landing capability suited the
small airfields at Pebble island and Goose
Green where some would be based. They
carried unguided bombs and 2.75in rocket
Argentine personnel remove signs at the airport and erect new ones proclaiming Malvinas aerodrome. Picture AG/DPL
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
pods or could be fitted with 7.62 machine
guns. The Pucaras, were not fast but they
were ideal to support ground forces and
provide forward reconnaissance missions.
In addition, air force commanders
deployed C-130 Hercules transport
aircraft to Stanley and a Shorts Sky-van
in the aero-medical role. The Argentine
Navy also deployed a Grumman S02
Tracker to mount anti-submarine warfare
operations. Fokker F-27 passenger aircraft
flew in troops and Chinook, Sikorsky
50
and Puma helicopters were pictured
at the airfield. Within days, Argentine
commanders pushed an air group,
consisting of Pucaras, a Sky-van and a
Turbo Mentor, to Pebble Island. A second
airbase was established at Goose Green
again with Pucaras. Aircraft at these bases
presented a direct threat to the task force
and potentially any UK invasion force.
In addition, an infantry force of more
than 1,000 troops was deployed to Goose
Green, while other troops deployed to
Pebble Island. Reinforcing the Falkland’s
was a challenge after the UK announced
the Maritime Exclusion Zone. Civilian
cargo vessels were requisitioned to ferry
equipment, aviation and vehicle fuel, food,
ammunition and additional weapons.
The ships hired included the Rio Cincel,
Rio Caraarana, Formosa , Córdoba, Bahía
Buen, Isla de Los Estafos, Yehuín and the
Mar del Norte.
After events at South Georgia, Downing
Street had already taken contingency
action and deployed the support ship RFA
Fort Austin to support the ice patrol ship in the South Atlantic. Admiral Leach now
HMS Endurance in the South Atlantic. sent a signal to Woodward ordering him Above: Argentine forces
The tanker RFA Appleleaf was directed to to ‘co-ordinate his task group and prepare pictured at the airport.
Gibraltar to collect additional stores then covertly to go south’. His force included Picture AG/DPL
head south. The first of three nuclear- HMS Broadsword, HMS Brilliant, HMS
powered submarines had sailed and two Battleaxe, HMS Active as well as the four Opposite: The carrier
others were about to leave within weeks Leander-class frigates HMS Dido, HMS HMS Invincible which
HMS Splendid, HMS Spartan and HMS Aurora, HMS Euryalus and HMS Ariadne. joined HMS Hermes as
Conqueror would soon be in the waters He could not take all of them as they the two Harrier platforms.
around the Falklands. By chance more were short on stores. Woodward and his Picture RN/DPL
than a dozen, Royal Navy warships of staff selected seven warships, based on
the First Flotilla were in the Atlantic capability and headed south. This advance
taking part in routine manoeuvres called force included the County-class destroyers Below: Two Super
Exercise Spring Train. The Flag Officer HMS Antrim, HMS Glamorgan, the Type Étendard fighter aircraft
of the flotilla, Rear Admiral Woodward, 42 air defence destroyers HMS Coventry, which were the platforms
was based aboard HMS Antrim and had HMS Glasgow, HMS Sheffield, the Type for the Exocet. Picture
received a signal from Admiral Leach 21 frigate HMS Arrow and the Type 22 AG/DPL
warning him of the deteriorating situation HMS Brilliant. The remaining ships, ➽

51 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

responsibility for the intelligence failures.
He was replaced by Francis Pym. Left: The Type
In the early hours of 2 April 1982, 21 Amazon-class
Major General Jeremy Moore received were among the
a telephone call informing him that the initial ships who
Argentines were about to mount an armed deployed to the
invasion. Moore could not believe what he South Atlantic.
was hearing. In disbelief, he dressed and David Reynolds/
made his way to the brigade headquarters DPL
in Plymouth. Brigadier Julian Thompson
headed for the same location. Many staff Below: F4-9B
officers were away planning for a future – The Leander-
NATO exercise and with the available staff class frigate HMS
officers, an initial plan was made while Euryalus. Picture
the remainder of the headquarters officers AG/DPL
were ordered to get back as quickly as
possible. The brigade was now put at
immediate readiness to move. At Bickleigh
barracks on the edge of Dartmoor, Lt Col
Nick Vaux was due to be driven to the
airport for a flight to America. Instead he
was driven to the meeting with Moore and
Thompson.
General Moore was a dedicated marine
he had joined the Corps in 1947. His
father had served in the Army and Major
General Moore had fought against the
EOKA in Cyprus, led a famous attack
against insurgents at Limbang in Borneo
and was awarded a bar to a Military
Cross won earlier. He later commanded
in Northern Ireland and even served as
an instructor at Army’s Royal Military ➽

53 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 4

A Harrier lifts off the carrier

HMS Invincible. Picture RN.

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 54

55 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 4
Left: The Type 22 frigate HMS Broadsword which carried the Sea Wolf system.
Picture RN

Bottom: The Royal Navy assault ship HMS Fearless. Picture DPL

Below: The County-class destroyer HMS Glamorgan. Picture AG/DPL

Academy Sandhurst. After commanding
3 Commando Brigade and having been
promoted to Major General he was on the
verge of retirement when Lt Gen Sir Stuart
Pringle, the Commandant General of the
Royal Marines, was seriously injured in a
bomb attack by the IRA. Moore had stood
in for him and in 1982 was now asked to
head the Joint force planning team that
would re-take the Falklands.
On Saturday 3 April, the Prime Minister
held another meeting of her key cabinet
ministers and made her objective clear;
‘to see the islands returned to British
administration’. The Argentines had now
secured South Georgia, the Royal Marines
that had fought back under command of
Lt Mills were now shipped to Stanley and
onwards to the UK. Buenos Aires was
now pouring soldiers into Stanley by air,
helicopters were arriving to airlift troops
to Goose Green, Darwin, Fox Bay and
Port Howard. The enemy’s Special Forces
now pushed further forward across the
island searching for any missing marines
from the force based on the Falklands.
On Sunday 4 April, Brigadier Julian
Thompson, the commander of 3
Commando Brigade, briefed his senior
officers at Stonehouse barracks in
Plymouth on the task ahead of them. It
was Easter weekend and the majority of
marines serving with Plymouth based
3 Commando Brigade were on leave.
Units received urgent signals to recall
their personnel. At railway stations, signs
were erected asking soldiers to contact
their units and in Plymouth, home of
the Royal Marines, hundreds abandoned
their weekend and returned to base. At
Northwood in Middlesex, the home of
the military’s operational headquarters ➽

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 56

The Royal Navy assault ships HMS Fearless
and HMS Intrepid known as Landing
Platform Dock (LPDs spearheaded the
assault force. Picture Guy Channing/DPL

57 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 4
Right: British troops
train aboard the SS
Canberra as they head
for the Falklands.
Picture DPL
Below: A Landing
ship, assault ship
and carrier pictured
at Ascension Island.
Picture DPL
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
planning staff alerted RAF, Army and
additional naval units to be ready to
deploy. In London, John Nott now had his
solution. If an amphibious landing on the
Falklands became necessary, 3 Commando
Brigade would be the force for the job.
It was an opportunity the Royal Marines
gladly accepted. On Monday 5 April
1982, through an incredible amount of
effort, the carriers HMS Hermes and
HMS Invincible left Portsmouth. They
were joined by the assault ship HMS
Fearless and the Type 21 frigates HMS
58
Alacrity, HMS Antelope, the Type 22
HMS Broadsword and Type 12 frigate
HMS Yarmouth. They were bound for
the British territory of Ascension Island
situated 1,000 miles off the west African
coast and 4,400 miles from the UK. The
island – halfway between the UK and the
Falkland Islands – was the perfect staging
post for the military build-up. Within days
of the carrier group departing, Brigadier
Thompson flew out and joined the assault
ship HMS Fearless and began planning.
Thompson was an intense marine, he had
an eye for the smallest detail and was a
fitness fanatic who led from the front. He
had a reputation for always supporting
his men and they held him in great
esteem. His immediate aim was to get to
Ascension where the force could pause for
final training, re-grouping of stores and
equipment as they waited for the signal to
return to the UK or sail south on the final
journey. It was now agreed that Thompson
would have two additional battalions
under his command and the 2nd and 3rd
battalions the Parachute Regiment was
assigned to join 3 Commando Brigade. In
addition, artillery, engineer and logistics
formations within the brigade were now
preparing to deploy.
In London, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse
had directed that South Georgia must
be retaken and Brigadier Thompson had
selected, Major Guy Sheridan a mountain
warfare officer, to head the operation. His
was assigned M Company, 42 Commando
RM, along with a number of specialists
from the unit’s reconnaissance troop, as
well as medics and signallers. He was
also assigned a naval gunfire forward
observation party from 148 Commando
Battery as well as elements of the SAS and
SBS.
Many thought the Task Force would
be halted at Ascension and as the ships
departed the UK, Prime Minister Thatcher
had asked President Ronald Reagan to
negotiate with Buenos Aires with the aim
of securing a ceasefire and the withdrawal
of Argentine forces. Washington
appointed Secretary of State Alexander
Haig, a former Army General. He had
embarked on a series of talks. His shuttle
diplomacy would see him flying between
the United Nations, London, Buenos
Aires and Washington. But there was little
progress. Argentina was not going to stand
down.
Meanwhile, back in the UK, the Ministry
of Defence had been busy requisitioning
commercial vessels in a process known
59
as Ships Taken up from Trade (STUFT).
Cargo vessels, tankers and even ocean
liners were now hired to get the troops
and the logistics sea tail to the Falklands.
Among them was the P&O flagship
Canberra. In just a few days this huge
ocean liner was prepared for war by
dockyard workers at Southampton. They
laid protective flooring to protect delicate
wooden dancing floors and built helidecks
big enough to carry Chinooks. On 9 April
having embarked almost 4,000 Royal
Marines and Paratroopers the Canberra,
nicknamed the ‘white whale’ sailed for
Ascension.
Devonport dockyard in Plymouth was
now tasked with conversion work for
commercial vessels taken up from trade.
The Atlantic Causeway, Atlantic Conveyor,
Contender Bezant and Astronomer would
be ferrying food, ammunition and stores
as well as helicopters and additional
Harrier jump het aircraft. North Sea oil
rig support ships were hired, trawlers ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 4
Above: British troops take part in
training at Ascension Island. Picture DPL
Below: The carrier HMS Eagle which
could carry more fighter aircraft but had
been axed in previous defence cuts.
Picture DPL
Below right: The carrier HMS Ark Royal
which would have offered huge capability
but instead was axed. Picture. Picture
Royal Navy
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
would become minesweepers, civilian
tankers as well as almost a dozen ferries
to transport more troops and equipment.
These included the Norland, the Tor
Caledonia, Nordic Ferry, Baltic Ferry.
The liner Uganda was hired as a hospital
ship and the survey vessels Hecla, Hydra
and Hecla became casualty ferrying
ships. Finally, as planners looked to
possibly expand the ground force if
the war expanded, plans were made
to hire Britain’s most luxurious cruise
liner, Queen Elizabeth 11. At the same
time, Royal Navy warships that had
60
been undergoing overhaul were being
made ready for operations. The Leander
class frigate HMS Minerva had entered
Plymouth on 2 April flying her paying-off
pennant to indicate retirement from the
fleet. Several weeks later after a quick refit,
the warship was heading for the Falklands
to join the Task Force. The Royal Fleet
Auxiliary, the specialist support force
which replenishes warships with food and
fuel at sea, was now preparing its entire
fleet for sea. Several RFA ships had been
among the first to deploy. Now Stromness,
Regent, Resources, Fort Grange, Fort
Austin, Bayleaf, Tidespring, Olna, Tidepool,
Pearleaf and Blue Rover were to join the
task force.
As the ships headed for Ascension,
Admiral Woodward and his command
team now reviewed the configuration
of the force and the threats they faced.
Intelligence was still limited and the
Admiral was under the impression that the
Argentine Air Force, although powerful,
had a limited capability to launch Exocet
missiles from their small number of Super
Etenard aircraft. Woodward had hoped for
a larger maritime exclusion zone to avoid
the Argentine aircraft carrier sitting on the
edge of the MEZ and launching aircraft to
attack and sink one of the carriers, HMS
Hermes or HMS Invincible. The retirement
of the Royal Navy’s fleet carriers in 1978
meant that the force had no airborne early
warning capability which was previously The Gannet was able to lift off and fly ahead of the carriers to warn of any inbound air threat. The lack of
carried by the Fairey Gannet plane and AEW was now a major concern. Picture RN
based on the carriers HMS Ark Royal and
HMS Eagle – both listed for retirement
in 1978. The Gannet was able to lift off
and fly ahead of the carriers to warn of
any inbound air threat. The lack of AEW
was now a major concern. The Admiral,
therefore, formed two key air defence
groups of Type 42 destroyers and Type
21 frigates to intercept any air threat.
The Type 42s were armed with Sea Dart
which was held in high esteem after a
missile from HMS Sheffield fired during
Exercise Spring Train hit a moving target The principal defence against inbound Argentine fighter aircraft would be the Harrier force. However, the
at 51,000 feet. The Sea Dart missiles Harrier was untested in combat. Picture DPL
travelled at 1,500mph. It was magnificent
against high altitude targets. But it was not
effective against targets at low level. The
only system the task force had to counter
low level fast attacking Argentines planes
was Sea Wolf and it was only fitted to two
ships in the force. The principal defence
against inbound Argentine fighter aircraft
would be the Harrier force. However, the
Harrier was untested in combat – it had
only entered service a couple of years
earlier, making its first landing at sea on
the carrier HMS Hermes in November
1978 in the Moray Firth. There were other
concerns such as the 965-surveillance
radar – used by most ships in the force
– which was a generation out of date.
Admiral Woodwood had to defeat the
Argentine Navy and Air Force before the
amphibious assault could begin. It was a
massive task.
On 11 April, the South Georgia force left
Ascension Island aboard HMS Antrim,
HMS Plymouth and RFA Tidespring
with an SBS unit on the submarine HMS
Conqueror. The South Georgia mission ➽ Inside the Royal Navy warships operations staff worked hard to plot and identify threats. Picture DPL

61 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 4
was codenamed Operation Paraquat.
The initial aim was to land special forces
on South Georgia by helicopters from
the support ship RFA Tidespring and
the destroyer HMS Antrim. But the plan
had to be changed when both Wessex
helicopters ferrying the troops crashed
in bad weather on Fortuna Glacier. The
troops and aircrew were rescued by
Antrim’s Wessex helicopter. The Type 22
class frigate HMS Brilliant, which carried
two Lynx helicopters, had been diverted
to South Georgia after the loss of Antrim’s
aircraft and arrived on the morning of 25
April.
Earlier on 9 April, the Argentine
submarine ARA Santa Fe, which had
landed special forces off the Falklands
on the night before the invasion, sailed
for South Georgia with reinforcements
to boost the garrison and arrived in
Grytviken on 24 April. As the submarine
sailed a day later, on the 25 April, it was
caught on the surface and intercepted
by a Wessex helicopter crew from
HMS Antrim, as well as Lynx and Wasp
helicopters from Brilliant and HMS
Plymouth supported the attack on the
Santa Fe. HMS Endurance was much
closer to the action, her Wasp helicopters
But the plan had to be changed when both Wessex helicopters ferrying the troops crashed in bad weather on Fortuna Glacier. Picture Picture RN
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
were able to re-arm and attack several
times. The last missile, believed to be from
HMS Plymouth’s Wasp helicopter, caused
the most damage and caused the Santa Fe
to limp back to Grytviken.
With the submarine alongside, Major
Sheridan decided to seize the opportunity
to strike and ordered an assault. The naval
gunfire support party, a team of Royal
Artillery forward observers, got airborne
in a Wasp helicopter and directed the guns
of both HMS Antrim and HMS Plymouth
as they conducted a naval bombardment
on the hills opposite Grytviken. A
scratch force was put together with
various forces onboard HMS Antrim.
These included M company’s command
element and mortar troop, a number of
SAS and SBS soldiers, as well as a team
of signallers – a total of 79 men. They
flew ashore ready for a fierce firefight
– but within 15 minutes the Argentine
garrison collapsed and surrendered. A
small number of Argentines along with
Lt Cdr Alfredo Astiz surrendered the
following morning without a fight. The
Argentine submarine was now alongside
and the marines were keen to ensure
that the crew did not scuttle it – in
order that they could search it for any
62
sensitive paperwork. But Argentine Petty
Officer Felix Artuso, a crewman of the
Santa Fe, was shot dead after a marine
thought he was going to scuttle the boat.
The Task Group Commander, Captain
Brian Young, aboard HMS Antrim, sent
a signal to London after the capture
of South Georgia. It read; “Be pleased
to inform Her Majesty that the White
Ensign flies alongside the Union Jack in
South Georgia. God save the Queen.”
Wildlife filmmaker Cindy Buxton and
her assistant, who had been filming in
an isolated part of the island before the
invasion, were evacuated by a helicopter
from the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance
on 30 April.
In London, news of the victory in South
Georgia was welcomed with a sense of
relief and euphoria. No lives had been
lost and the island was now back in
British control. On the steps of Downing
Street, Mrs Thatcher responded to media
questions with the comment: ’Just rejoice,
in that news and congratulate our force
and the marines.’ It had also boosted
morale for the Task Force. Now the fleet
was heading for the Falklands. The nuclear
submarines were in position and the
battle group was poised to begin direct ➽
Troops wait to fly ashore. Picture RN

A scratch force was put together with various forces onboard HMS Antrim. Picture RN

63 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

The Argentine submarine pictured at Grytviken. Picture DPL

The Argentine submarine alongside the damage caused by the Royal Navy helicopter attacks clearly visible. Picture DPL

65 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 5
ashington had made it clear
W that while they supported the
UK, they could not get involved
in a conflict in the South Atlantic. There
had been hope that the United States
would provide airborne early warning
planes, known as AWACS, but that
was not going to happen. However,
President Reagan’s administration did
provide intelligence and on 9 April, the
Pentagon passed information to the UK
that revealed Argentina was lengthening
the runway at Stanley in order to
accommodate its fighter aircraft, such
as A-4 Skyhawks, Mirage, Dagger and
Super Étendards. This would give the
junta the strategic advantage of being able
to mount constant air strikes against the
task force. The Argentine Air Force only
had two tanker aircraft to serve the whole
air force and navy. Its fighter bombers,
the Mirage 111s and Daggers were not
fitted for air-to-air refuelling. Without an
extended runway the aircraft would have
to return to Argentina for fuel and re-arm
which would reduce their time around the
Falklands. The upgrading of the airfield at
Stanley threatened to change the dynamic
of the conflict and give the enemy a
strategic advantage. In 1979, Argentina
had purchased 14 Super Étendards from
France, after the United States put an arms
embargo in place and stopped defence
sales to Argentina in protest at the so
called ‘dirty war’ – allegations of torture
and oppression by the government.
Between August and November1981 the
first five Super Étendards arrived from
France, along with five anti-ship sea
skimming Exocet missiles. In the UK it
was unclear if the junta’s pilots had been
able to train with the new aircraft and had
the vital instruction to launch the Exocet,
many presumed they had little capability.
Meanwhile, Admiral Lewin was aware
of the Argentine’s plans to expand the
airfield. The Royal Navy had made the
first strike at South Georgia on 25 April
went the submarine Santa Fe was attacked
and captured during the battle to re-take
the island. Now the RAF were called on
to do what they do best. The Vulcan was
the only aircraft with the capability and
was selected to carry out the mission,
which was codenamed Operation Black
Buck. Politically this was a daring mission
that would strike fear into the heart of
the Argentine occupiers and possibly
encourage Buenos Aires to re-think its
position. For the military the mission was
simply designed to prevent the junta’s
fighter aircraft operating from Stanley. It
was clear that short take off and landing
aviation would still be able to function
from the airfield – but they were not the
main threat. The Vulcan had also been
listed for retirement in defence cuts and in
early 1982 was due to be withdrawn from
service. It was the last of the V bombers
and had been assigned to NATO’s nuclear
operations. The range to the Falklands
would require air-to-air refuelling a
function the RAF had not carried for
many years.
In addition, the Vulcan pilots had not
taken part in any sort of conventional
exercise bombing for years. The
Vulcan bombers were flown forward
to Ascension Island from where they
would mount the raids. To support the
long-range operation, 14 Victor tankers
 from RAF Marham were flown to the
Above: As the island, one of them being converted for
Royal Navy headed photo-reconnaissance. In mid-April
into the South three Vulcans from Numbers 44, 50 and
Atlantic the time 101 Squadrons arrived at Wideawake
was running out airbase on Ascension Island. The plan
for the Argentine’s was simple, the aircraft would fly to the
short stay on the Falklands, bomb the airfield at night and
Falklands. Picture then fly back having carried out, in most
DPL cases, seven or more air-to-air refuelling
operations. The Argentines were known to
Left: The assault have Tigercat anti-aircraft missile systems
ships carried heavy in the Falklands and to avoid this threat
and light landing the RAF fitted electronic countermeasures
craft to put troops (ECM) to the Vulcans. Additional
and equipment navigation systems borrowed from the
ashore. Picture DPL VC-10 fleet were fitted to the aircraft to
help navigate across the featureless seas.
69
Two identically-armed Vulcans took off
for each mission, the second returning to
base, without refuelling, if no problems
arose with the first, or assuming the
main role if the first could not continue.
Each aircraft carried a load of 21 general
purpose bombs, they contained 1,000lb
of explosive. They also carried three
1,000-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks in the
bomb bay.
The first attack took place on the night of
30 April – 1 May and took the Argentines
and the rest of the world by total surprise.
After the success at South Georgia the first
Vulcan attack was also another morale
boost for the force heading south. The
plan was for the Vulcan to fly across the
line of the runway at Stanley at about ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 5

Above: The Argentine Air Force

operated the Mirage which would
have little time over the Falklands
without air-to-air refuelling. Picture
AG/DPL

Left: The UK learnt that Argentina

was planning to lengthen the runway
at Stanley in order to accommodate its
fighter aircraft. Picture AG/DPL

Right: The RAF Vulcan aircraft which

mounted the bombing mission
codenamed Operation Blackbuck.
Picture DPL

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 70

35 degrees. The bomb release system was
timed to drop sequentially from 10,000ft
so that at least one bomb would land on
the runway. For the mission, two Vulcans
took off from Ascension. Callsign XM598
was the lead with XM607 as the reserve
aircraft. Shortly after take-off, XM598,
suffered a pressurisation failure (a rubber
seal on the ‘direct vision’ side window
had perished) and was forced to return to
Ascension. XM607, captained by Flight
Lieutenant Martin Withers, took over.
XM607 made the final approach at around
300ft above the sea before climbing to
attack height. The attack took place at
around 4am local time. XM607 then
climbed away from the airfield and headed
north to a planned rendezvous with a
Victor tanker some way off the coast of
Rio de Janeiro. As it passed, the British
task force pilots signalled the code word
‘super fuse’ indicating a successful attack.
Its journey continued within range of the
South American coast to its rendezvous
with the tanker and then returned to
Ascension. Northwood received the ‘super
fuse’ message by 8:30 and advised the
MoD. The news of the bombing raid was
released and reported on the BBC World
Service before either the Vulcan or the
last tanker arrived at Ascension. The stick
of 21, 1000lb bombs crossed the airfield,
damaged the airport tower, scored a single
direct hit in the centre of the runway
and killed two Argentine personnel.
However, it still remained operational for
the Argentine C-130 Hercules transport
aircraft. The bombs falling on either
side of the runway caused slight damage
to tented installations in the airfield
perimeter. The attack, the first of seven
planned raids – five of which took place
– had achieved its aim and disabled the
runway for use by Argentine fast jets.
71
The Royal Navy’s nuclear submarines,
HMS Spartan, HMS Splendid and HMS
Conqueror were already in the South
Atlantic. HMS Courageous and HMS
Valiant were to join them as was the
conventionally powered sub HMS Onyx.
At this point, military commanders were
tightening the net on Argentina, but
the lack of an airborne early warning
capability was now a serious concern –
enemy fighter aircraft could lift off from
the mainland and strike the task force. On
12 April 1982, the United Kingdom had
announced a Maritime Exclusion Zone
(MEZ) which covered a circle of radius
200 nautical miles from the centre of the
Falkland Islands. Any Argentine warship
or naval auxiliary entering the MEZ was
warned that it could be attacked. Then on
30 April a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
was declared by the United Kingdom –
nobody could enter.
After the invasion, the Argentine Navy
had re-configured its Task Groups into
three forces. The first was headed by the
carrier ARA Vienticino de Mayo and two
Type 42 destroyers. The second group
included three Drummond-class corvettes
– each armed with Exocet missiles. On 26
April, the Argentine warship ARA General
Belgrano, a 12,000 tonne heavily armed
cruiser, sailed from Tierra del Fuego.
Belgrano was joined by two destroyers,
ARA Piedra Buena and ARA Hipólito
Bouchard, together with the tanker Puero
Rosales and formed a third group. On 29
April, the ships were patrolling south of
the Falklands patrolling an area near the
Burdwood Bank. On 30 April, the Royal
Navy submarine HMS Conqueror detected
the Belgrano and continued to shadow
her. The following day, 1 May, Admiral
Juan Lombardo ordered all Argentine
naval units to seek out the British task ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
force around the Falklands and launch
a ‘massive attack’. Lombardo’s signal was
intercepted by British Intelligence and
the task force alerted. The Belgrano, was
a 44-year-old American-built warship
that had survived Pearl Harbor. She had
initially been commissioned into the US
Navy in 1938 and named USS Phoenix.
Then in 1951, the warship had been struck
from service and sold to Argentina and
renamed ARA General Belgrano – she
was now the pride of the Argentine navy.
The commander of the submarine HMS
Conqueror, Commander Chris Wreford-
Brown, had sought permission to attack the
Belgrano. The threat from the cruiser was
considered high and there was no question
the cruiser could inflict serious damage on
the Royal Navy task force. Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and her War Cabinet
met and agreed to the request and approval
was given to sink the Belgrano.
The commander of HMS Conqueror
was now given the go-ahead to attack.
At 15:57 (Falkland’s time) on 2 May,
HMS Conqueror fired three torpedoes.
One struck the bow, a second torpedo
struck about three-quarters of the way
along the ship, just outside the rear limit
of the side armour plating. The torpedo
punched through the side of the ship
before exploding in the aft machine
room. The explosion tore upward through
two messes before finally ripping a
20-metre-long hole in the main deck.
Later reports put the number of deaths
in the area around the explosion at 275
men. After the torpedoes hit, the ship
rapidly filled with smoke. The explosion
also damaged Belgrano’s electrical power
system, preventing her from putting out
a radio distress call. Though the forward
bulkheads held, water was rushing in
through the hole created by the second
torpedo and could not be pumped out
because of the electrical power failure. It
was later revealed that the the ship was
not at action stations and the Belgrano had
been sailing with the water-tight doors
open. As the impact of the explosions
took hold the ship began to list to port
and was sinking. Almost 20 minutes
after the attack, at 16:24, Captain Bonzo
ordered the crew to abandon ship.
Inflatable life rafts were deployed, and
the evacuation began without panic.
However, Belgrano’s two escort ships
were unaware of the submarine attack
due to poor communications. In the
gloom and fading light they had not
seen the distress rockets or lamp signals.
The two ships continued on their course
westward. By the time the ships realised
that something had happened to General
73
Belgrano, it was already dark and the
weather had worsened, scattering the
life rafts. Argentine and Chilean ships
rescued 772 men between 3 and 5 May.
In total, 323 crew members were reported
lost in the attack. After the war, questions
were asked about the legitimacy of the
attack especially as the Belgrano was
outside of the Exclusion Zone. The British
government maintained that the Belgrano
still represented a threat to the Task
Force and in this they were, to an extent,
supported by the Belgrano’s captain. In
2003, Hector Bonzo, the commander
of the Belgrano, said that although the
Belgrano was sailing away from the
Exclusion Zone, it was not sailing to its
port in Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, it was
simply moving to another unspecified
position to await further orders – that
could have included attacking the Task
Force. The naval commander of the Task
Force, Admiral Sandy Woodward, made
the point that the Belgrano and its escorts
were more than capable of turning about
at speed and thus returning to a course
towards the Task Force. The sinking of the
‘General Belgrano’ sent a powerful message
to the military junta in Argentina. The
Belgrano incident was a turning point in
the war which resulted in the Argentine
Naval effectively being confined to port ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 5
in fear of the Royal Navy submarine
capability. The net was closing on the
junta, but in the days ahead Galtieri’s force
were to deliver a deadly show of force.
The Royal Navy task force had entered
the Total Exclusion Zone on 1 May. This
battle group consisted of 13 warships and
Admiral Woodward, who commanded
the force, sailed into the region with
a clear plan to secure and control the
air and naval battlespace before the
amphibious force moved forward. The
carriers sat 70 miles off Stanley when
launching aircraft, then moved further
away when the Harriers were recovered.
This allowed them to remain out of range
from Argentine fighter aircraft. The
Admiral and his staff had assigned roles
to the fleet’s warships in readiness for the
response they expected to face from the
enemy. The Harriers aboard HMS Hermes
would take on the attack role, while those
on HMS Invincible would focus on combat
air patrols to provide air cover for the
fleet. HMS Spartan sat inside the exclusion
zone, HMS Splendid was in a position
to the north west and HMS Conqueror
in the south west. An anti-submarine
group consisting of the Rothesay-class
The Atlantic Conveyor, being loaded with Chinook and Harriers. She was later sunk. Picture DPL frigate HMS Yarmouth and the Type 22

Harriers on the deck of the carrier Hermes, escorted by a Type 22 frigate, on their way to the South Atlantic.Picture RN.

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 74

The Argentine cruiser ARA Belgrano, which had been purchased from the US Navy. Picture AG/DPL

frigate HMS Brilliant hunted the two
elusive Type 209 Argentine submarines,
that were believed to be at sea. The Type
42 destroyer HMS Glamorgan supported
by the Type 21 frigates HMS Arrow and
HMS Alacrity provided a naval gunfire
support capability. They would be required
to steam within 12 miles of Stanley to
commenced their bombardment and their
first mission would be in daylight.
No senior naval officer would ever want
to put a carrier to see without an airborne
early warning capability, but that was
the situation the battle group now faced.
Before the amphibious assault could take
place, the navy needed to control the
airspace and dominate the sea around
the islands. Admiral Woodward was
based aboard HMS Hermes, while the
assault force commander, Commodore
Michael Clapp, sat on HMS Fearless. Their
ships were highly vulnerable to attack
and needed to remain out of range of
the Argentine Air Force. The Argentines
had lost South Georgia, their submarine
Santa Fe had been captured, the RAF
had bombed Stanley and the cruiser
ARA General Belgrano sunk by HMS
Conqueror. Now the Harrier force went
into action. Lifting off at dawn on 2 May,
all 12 aircraft flew in low and fast. As they
neared land, three peeled off to attack
Goose Green, four headed for Stanley’s
radar and anti-aircraft defence while
the remainder bombed the airfield and
command centres. Both Navy and RAF
pilots feared the Mirage would win in a
dogfight and planned to use their amazing
ability to accelerate, turn and decelerate to
evade the Mirages. As the bombardment
by HMS Glamorgan, HMS Alacrity and
HMS Arrow was complete four Mirages ➽

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, tankers and supply vessels, were critical in keeping the task force replenished. Picture DPL

75 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 5
The Belgrano listing to port after being torpedoed by the Royal Navy submarine HMS Conqueror.
Picture AG/DPL
closed on the warships to target them in
the open sea. The aircraft dropped 1,000lb
bombs, which landed either side of HMS
Glamorgan. HMS Arrow received minor
damage and HMS Alacrity’s helicopter
was hit by machine gun fire from the
shore. Harriers from HMS Invincible
chased the Mirages and expected a
dogfight. Having delivered their bombs,
the Argentines needed to fly back to
the mainland in order not to run out of
fuel. After dropping their munitions, the
Mirages pulled away to race back to base.
The Harriers closed in and shot down
HMS Conqueror was the first submarine to sink a warship in action since the Second Word War. Picture DPL
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
two, a third Mirage was shot down by an
Argentine ground defence system ashore
in Stanley. Then the anti-submarine group
located two Argentine Canberra bombers
on radar. Everyone feared an Exocet
attack and a Sea King deployed on anti-
submarine operations fired chaff – used
to deflect incoming missiles. A Harrier
brought down one Canberra and the
second returned to the mainland.
On 3 May, Lynx helicopters from
HMS Glasgow and HMS Coventry were
launched after a Sea King helicopter
from HMS Hermes came under fire from
two Argentine patrol boats, the Alferez
Sobral and the Comodoro Somellera. The
Lynx fired their Sea Skua, one patrol boat
sank, the other was seriously damaged.
The following morning, 4 May, began
with another Vulcan raid on the airfield
at 4.30am. Operational activity was now
increasing with regular Harrier combat
air patrols protecting the task force. The
risks were also rising. During a Harrier
raid on Goose Green on 4 May, a Harrier
was shot down, the first to be lost in the
war. The pilot Lieutenant Nick Taylor,
had joined the Royal Navy as a helicopter
pilot in the early 1970s and initially flew
Sea King helicopters. He later crossed to
fast-jets and in the spring of 1982, he had
just completed a Sea Harrier conversion
and joined 800 Squadron before deploying
to the Falklands. He was flying as part of
a three aircraft attack on the Goose Green
airstrip when he was hit by anti-aircraft
fire as he ran in to attack. The aircraft
exploded and hit the ground very close
to the airstrip. His body was recovered by
the residents of Goose Green and buried,
under Argentine supervision, with full
76

military honours. Today, the site is fenced
off and marked with a headstone and
tended by the residents of Goose Green
who hold a service on the 4 May every
year to remember his gallant action.
Then late in the morning of the same
day, news came that every member of
the task force had dreaded hearing – the
Argentines had hit a warship. The ship
was quickly identified as HMS Sheffield.
Early in the morning two Super Étendard
Argentine fighters lifted off from Rio
Grande naval air base and refuelled at
10am with an Argentine Air Force KC-
130 Hercules tanker. In the two weeks
leading up to the attack, Argentinian
pilots had been practising tactics against
their own ships to perfect their targeting
ability and deployment of Exocet. They
had trained with Argentina’s own Type 42
destroyers of the same design as Sheffield,
and therefore knew the radar horizon,
detection distances, and reaction times
of the ship radar, as well as the optimal
procedure to programme the Exocet
missile for a successful attack mission.
Argentine scientists had also worked
out how to programme the weapons –
after the French instruction package had
been cancelled at the outbreak of the war.
High above the Super Étendards, a P-2
Neptune maritime surveillance aircraft
was scanning the horizon for British naval
targets. Below the fighters flew fast and
low level, at just 100 feet above the sea, and
listened for an update from the Neptune.
They were given the target positions
and climbed but could not identify the
objective. They gained altitude a second
time again and located Sheffield on their
radar. Having loaded the co-ordinates
into their weapon systems and made last
minute checks both pilots launched an
AM39 Exocet. The Argentines claimed at
the time that they fired at a range of 30
miles from the target, but the Royal Navy
indicated that the Exocets were released at
just six miles. Both aircraft returned to Rio
Grande by noon. They had been supported
by the KC-130 tanker, the Neptune
surveillance aircraft, two Daggers and a
Learjet 35 which acted as a decoy.
HMS Sheffield had been at defence
watches and was operating with HMS
77
Harriers on Invincible would take
on the close air support role, while
those on Hermes would mount the
attack. Picture Guy Channing /DPL
Glasgow and HMS Coventry on forward
anti-aircraft picket duty, 30 miles to the
west of the main task force – their role to
protect the carriers in the absence of an
effective airborne early warning system.
Sheffield was the furthest west and nearest
to the incoming Super Étendards. The
weather was calm and visibility very good.
It later transpired that HMS Sheffield’s
radar operators had been experiencing
difficulty in distinguishing the electronic
footprint of Mirage and Super Étendards.
When the two aircraft climbed to 120ft,
to check the target positions passed to
them by the Neptune the operations room
staff onboard HMS Glasgow spotted the
incoming aircraft and immediately went
to ‘actions stations’ sending an urgent
message with the warning codeword
‘handbrake’ to all task force ships –
warning of a potential inbound attack. But
Sheffield had communications problems
and did not receive the message. Seconds
later the Exocets were launched by the
Super Étendards. The Exocet that struck
HMS Sheffield impacted on the starboard
side causing catastrophic damage. ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 CHAPTER 5
As soon as any aircraft lifted off, they
alerted the task Force.
The Royal Navy had ordered the Type
42 destroyers in the early 1970s. In the
1960s the then Labour government had
cancelled the future aircraft carriers
project and with it the Type 82 Bristol-
class destroyer. The Bristol-class was
a 6,400-tonne warship designed as a
specialist air defence escort for the
carriers. But just one ship was built, HMS
Bristol, before the contract was axed.
Instead, the Type 42 was proposed as a
lighter and cheaper replacement, with
similar capabilities to the Type 82. HMS
Sheffield had entered service in 1975
and was one of six Batch 1 destroyers
ordered for the fleet (others included
HMS Birmingham, HMS Newcastle,
HMS Coventry, HMS Glasgow and
HMS Cardiff). By early 1982, there were
eight Type 42s in service the additional
two being HMS Exeter and HMS
Southampton, both Batch 2 ships.
The Royal Navy’s Type 42 destroyer
fleet had been designed and built to a
smaller budget resulting in a slightly small
warships at 4,300 tonnes. The main Sea
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Dart system was highly effective against
medium and high-altitude targets but the Above: The Type 42
fire control radars did not have the ability destroyer HMS Sheffield
to successfully track low-level targets. after being struck by an
The only exception were the new Type Exocet. Picture Royal
22 Broadsword frigates, armed with very Navy
effective Sea Wolf. The sea-skimming
Exocet missile threat was well understood Above right: The Exocet
and the RN possessed their own ship- sea skimming missile
launched Exocets. But in 1982, the entire which the Argentines
Royal Navy fleet lacked effective Close in deployed from their
Weapons Systems (CIWS). At Ascension Super Étendards. Picture
Island, the amphibious force had been David Reynolds/DPL
arriving since mid-April. Assault ships
and landing vessels, as well as Ships Taken Above right: Royal Navy
up from Trade were now re-organised, air defence systems were
troops were cross-decked and equipment significantly improved
configured so that it was in the correct after the 1982 conflict.
order when offloaded in the Falklands. Picture DPL
The Royal Marines and Paras were landed
ashore to carry out fitness training and Right: The Royal Navy
carry out final weapon checks. The attack submarines now sat off
on Sheffield had left the British Task the coast of southern
Force in sombre mood. The Argentines Argentina to alert the
had had their chance to negotiate a task force when fighter
peace settlement. Now there was now a aircraft lifted off. Picture
commitment to defeat the enemy on land, DPL
in the air and at sea. ■
80
81 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
 Navy helicopter pilots flew
troops and equipment
ashore throughout the battle
for San Carlos. Picture DPL

83 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 6

The RAF Chinook ‘Bravo November’ – the only helicopter of its type to operate in the Falklands after two others were lost on the Atlantic Causeway. Picture John
Naughton/DPL

THE BRITISH Task Force was now poised in the South Atlantic as
commanders finalised their plans to launch the planned amphibious
assault and remove the Argentines from the islands. The junta’s air force
continued to be a major threat and as the battle group assembled it
would create a major target opportunity for the enemy.

A
ssault ships, landing vessels and
warships were now about to move
into San Carlos Water – well within
range of the Mirage, Super Étendard and
Skyhawk fighter aircraft. Commanders
knew their warships were exposed to
attack, but Admiral Sandy Woodward
faced a difficult dilemma if he waited until
the Harrier force had won the air battle,
which could take several months, the South
Atlantic winter would start to bite. Bad
weather would impact the land force, limit
the ability of helicopters to fly and delay the
vital logistics chain. The mission was to re-
take the Falklands and Admiral Woodward
opted to thrust forward with the assets at
his disposal.
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
Commodore Michael Clapp, the naval
commander of the fleet’s amphibious
operations, and Brigadier Thompson who
commanded 3 Commando Brigade, had
meticulously planned the assault. The
two worked together and had selected
San Carlos for the landings. Thompson
and his team had identified units, roles
and capabilities. It was Clapp’s job to get
the troops and their equipment ashore
in good order, then Thompson would
take over on land and execute the plan
to march his troops to Stanley and
eject the Argentines. The assault plan
was codenamed Operation Sutton and
involved putting 4,500 troops ashore, as
well as hundreds of items of equipment.
84
This included artillery guns, light
armoured reconnaissance and all-terrain
vehicles, a field hospital and establishing
a logistics base for rations, water and
ammunition. The task force would land
troops at green, red and blue beaches
across San Carlos Water – all of which
needed to be ferried ashore by landing
craft or flown in by helicopter. The
Harrier would provide combat air patrols
throughout the landings to intercept any
Argentine air strike, but the Harriers
could not be in the air all the time, they
needed to refuel and re-arm. Woodward
feared there would be more casualties.
The battle for San Carlos was going to be
bloody. ➽
 CHAPTER 6

Brigadier Julian Thompson who headed 3

Commando Brigade during the Falklands War.
Picture DPL The ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 11 was requisitioned for service as a troop carrier. Picture Cunard/DPL

Close-in weapons to fight air attacks were improved after the war. Picture RN/DPL

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 86

 CHAPTER 6

Additional Chinooks and Harriers on the Atlantic

Causeway which was sunk by an Exocet. Picture DPL

The presence of the Royal Navy submarines forced

Argentine commanders to order their fleet to port.
Picture DPL The Harrier was a vital weapon in the battle to control the skies over San Carlos. UK MoD

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 88


or starboard side of the ship into the
landing craft. Carrying weapons and a
heavy bergen, backpack, taking the step
from a ship onto a bobbing landing craft
was a challenge. Other ships taken up
from trade such as the Norland and some
of the landing Ships Logistics (LSL) would
have to wait or use a powered flat-bed
landing system called mexefloat.
Thompson wanted to get as much air-
defence capability ashore as quickly as he
could with Rapier missile launchers and
air defence troops armed with Blowpipe
among his priorities. These teams would
be vital in defending the beach-head
against Argentine air strikes. Engineers
were also needed ashore to deal with
any potential mine threat. The Brigadier
also wanted to push Scimitar armoured
reconnaissance vehicles ashore, these
small tracked vehicles could provide
troops with a limited combat power
from their 30mm radar cannons. The
Argentine air force had been alerted about
the landings and launched Skyhawks and
Daggers bound for San Carlos. However,
Argentine high command at Stanley
believed the landing was a diversion, their
view was that mounting such an operation
at San Carlos was not feasible. At 1000hrs
on the morning of 21 May, commanders
at Stanley ordered an Aermacchi MB-339
jet to fly to San Carlos on a reconnaissance
flight. As the Aermacchi lifted off, the
first Argentine air force attacks on the
task force were about to take place.
Between 10am and 1800hrs a total of
17 strikes were made on HMS Antrim,
HMS Argonaut, HMS Broadsword, HMS
Brilliant, HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope.
As the waves of A-4 Skyhawks, Daggers
and Mirages swept in over the task force
they were targeted by Rapier and Blowpipe
air defence missiles on shore and naval
89
The assault ship’s internal
harbour allowed landing craft to
pick up troops inside and move
out to sea. Harry Steele/DPL
Sea Cat missiles based aboard the ships.
Harriers who had been in the skies
throughout the landings intercepted and
destroyed eight Argentine aircraft.
Late in the afternoon the air attacks
increased. HMS Ardent and HMS
Yarmouth had moved away from the main
force in order to confuse the incoming
pilots as the warships were now spread
out. As the aircraft closed-in HMS Ardent’s
crew initiated the Sea Cat anti-aircraft
missile system, but it failed to lock onto
the attacking planes who dropped two
bombs. Both exploded in the hangar
area, destroying the ship’s helicopter and
blowing the Sea Cat launcher into the air.
A third bomb crashed through the stern,
damaging the machinery space, but the
bombs failed to explode. Power was now
lost, the hangar was left in flames, and the
crew had suffered a number of casualties.
The frigate was on fire, but was able to ➽
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA
limp towards Port San Carlos. Then an
hour later five Skyhawks approached
and dropped numerous free-fall and
retarded gravity bombs – these contained
‘unwinding’ release fuses which when
fully unwound armed the bomb – some of
which hit the frigate. The dining hall was
shattered and communications between
the bridge and the ship control centre
were cut off, in addition, the ship lost
steering. Casualties increased and HMS
Ardent stopped in the shallow waters of
Grantham Sound. The ship was on fire
and listing forcing Commander Alan
West, later Admiral and First Sea Lord,
to give the order to abandon the ship.
HMS Yarmouth came alongside to take
off the injured and survivors who were
transferred to the liner SS Canberra. The
frigate continued to burn and sank the
following day, 22 members of the crew Sailors wore anti-flash hoods and gloves, carried
died in the attack. life jackets and respirators and had helmets close A Sea King lifts off the deck of HMS Hermes.
The atmosphere aboard the task to hand. Picture RN Picture DPL
force ships was now one of sheer
determination. The loss of both HMS deck it was freezing cold and to provide sleep was a luxury and sailors worked
Sheffield and HMS Ardent had stunned a little more protection against Skyhawk shifts in which they were at their action
the force. Those aboard the warships in strafing attacks sandbag walls were built. stations post for eight hours with four
San Carlos were permanently at actions Those who faced duty on the upper hours off. But the attacks continued. On
stations – a readiness in which sailors deck manning machine guns said it was 23 May, a second Type 21 frigate HMS
wore anti-flash hoods and gloves to terrifying to see the Argentines come in Antelope was hit. Antelope had been on
protect them from explosions, carried fast and low. Meals were taken either at air defence duty at the entrance to San
life-jackets around their waist and their work station or in the galley where Carlos Water protecting the beachhead
worn helmets when on deck. For those the chefs worked around the clock to feed when she came under attack by four
manning machine guns on the upper the crew. The high alert status meant that Argentine A-4B Skyhawks. ➽

Landing craft head for San Carlos as the amphibious assault gets under way. Picture DPL

91 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 6

Task Force landing ships and ferries come under attack as the first wave of Argentine air attacks took place. Picture DPL.

Naval personnel drive a rolling road ashore at San Carlos to allow vehicles to drive off the beach without any difficulty. Picture DPL

WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 92

Harrier aircraft were constantly landing and taking off from the carriers. Picture DPL

The first pair of aircraft attacked from
astern, with the flight leader breaking off
his attack after one of HMS Antelope’s
Sea Cat missiles exploded under the port
wing of the aircraft. The second aircraft
on this flight pressed home his attack and
dropped a 1,000-pound bomb which hit
HMS Antelope’s starboard side. The bomb
did not explode and the Argentine aircraft
was damaged by small arms fire. A second
pair of Skyhawks attacked minutes later
dropping more bombs. Two unexploded
bombs now sat in the warship. After
initial damage control efforts, HMS
Antelope proceeded to more sheltered
waters so that two bomb disposal experts
could board the ships and attempt to
defuse the unexploded bombs. One of
the bombs was inaccessible because of
wreckage; the other had been damaged
and was thought to be in a particularly
dangerous condition. Three attempts by
the bomb disposal team to withdraw the
fuse by remote means failed. A fourth
attempt using a small explosive charge
detonated the bomb, killing Staff Sergeant
James Prescott instantly and severely ➽

Harrier aircraft operated around the clock to protect the naval battle group in Landing craft still bearing camouflage from exercises in Norway land troops at
San Carlos. Picture DPL San Carlos. Picture AFM/DPL

93 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 6
injuring Warrant Officer Phillips, the
other member of the bomb disposal team.
The ship was torn open from waterline
to funnel, with the blast starting major
fires in both engine rooms, which spread
very quickly. The starboard fire main was
fractured, the ship had lost all electrical
power, and the commanding officer,
Commander Nick Tobin, gave the order
to abandon ship. Tobin was the last person
to leave the ship; about five minutes after
his departure, the missile magazines
began exploding. Explosions continued
throughout the night. The following day
HMS Antelope was still afloat, but her keel
had broken and her superstructure melted
into a heap of twisted metal. Antelope
broke in half and sank that day.
On 24 May, the Argentines pressed
home their attack and attempted to
sink RFA Sir Lancelot, Sir Galahad and
Sir Bedivere, but failed and four of the
inbound attack aircraft were shot down.
A day later, HMS Coventry a sister ship
to the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield
was sunk while operating alongside HMS
Broadsword and HMS Argonaut. Both
ships were moving out of San Carlos Bay
to draw Argentine fighters away from the
main task force. HMS Argonaut and HMS
Brilliant were both damaged. Argentine
pilots had been flying low and fast to
avoid radar and air defence systems, but
when they dropped their bombs the slow
‘unwinding’ release of retarted bombs
did not have enough time for the fuse to
arm the bomb. Towards the end of the
conflict the Argentines solved the problem
Royal Artillery Rapier units were established ashore. Picture DPL by fitting improvised retarding devices
which reduced the ‘arming time of the
fuse’ and allowed the pilots to attack at
low-level. On the same day that HMS
Coventry was lost, the container ship
Atlantic Conveyor was hit. The ship which
had been requisitioned from trade was
carrying additional Chinook helicopters
and Harriers to the Falklands. She was was
hit by an Exocert missile fired by a Super
Étendard and sunk while positioned north
east of the Falklands.
Argentina’s military success had been
delivered by the air force. Having sunk
Type 42 destroyers, Type 21 frigates
and a major commercial vessel. Now
commanders pressed the air force to attack
a carrier. Their small number of Exocets
had been successful and the last one was
to be used to sink HMS Invincible. On 30
May, two Super Étendards, one carrying
Argentina’s last Exocet took off from
mainland Argentina escorted by four A-4
HMS Coventry, a Type 42 destroyer sinks after being attacked by Argentine fighter aircraft. Picture RN Skyhawks which each carried two 500lb ➽
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 94
HMS Ardent sinks off San Carlos. The warships are now an official war grave. Picture DPL

The landing ship RFA Sir Galahad on fire after being bombed. Picture DPL

95 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA

 CHAPTER 6
The SS Canberra which was requisitioned for the war pictured off the Falklands. Picture DPL
bombs. Argentine intelligence staff had
been tracking the flight paths of Harriers
and were convinced they knew the
location of the carrier. But as a standing
operational tactic Harrier pilots flew at
low level when departing or returning
the carrier, which had compromised the
Argentine analysis. The Super Étendard
and Skyhawks were directed to a location
40 miles south of the main body of British
warships and were located by HMS Exeter
and HMS Avenger. With the aircraft at
high altitude Exeter’s Sea Dart system
was able to engage and shoot down two
of the Skyhawk escorts. The attempt on
Invincible had been a failure.
The arrival of the Queen Elizabeth 11
group of ships in the South Atlantic with
5 Infantry Brigade boosted the ground
troops and allowed Major General
Jeremy Moore to expedite his advance
on Stanley. Among the arriving troops
was the Welsh Guards who were tasked
to advance along a southern route to
Port Stanley. Their commanders opted
to leapfrog part of the march and move
troops by the landing ships RFA Sir
Galahad and RFA Sir Tristram. On 8
WAR AT SEA | THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
June, as the two ships were about to start
unloading guardsmen at Port Pleasant,
off Fitzroy, when both were attacked by
three Skyhawks each loaded with three
500lb retarding tail bombs. The landing
ship Sir Galahad was hit by two or three
bombs and set alight. Sir Tristram was
strafed and a 500lb bomb hit, but failed
to explode allowing crew to get off the
ship, before it later ignited. Sir Tristram
was extensively damaged but later
recovered to the UK. The remains of the
Galahad were later sunk off the Falklands
and designated an official war grave.
In a separate incident, the frigate HMS
Plymouth faced an attack from Argentine
Daggers from Rio Grande, which struck
her with four 1,000-pound bombs. The
warship sustained severe damage, and
five crewmen were injured. Although all
the bombs failed to explode. Plymouth
had one of the luckiest escapes of the
conflict.
Admiral Woodward had achieved his
aim and kept the attacks away from the
landing ships and allowed Major General
Moore and his troops to hit land. With
the British troops on Falklands soil, a
96
land campaign followed until Argentine
General Mario Menendez surrendered
to Major General Jeremy Moore on
14 June in Stanley. Then on 20 June, a
group of Royal Marines then re-captured
South Sandwich Islands, which involved
accepting the surrender of the Southern
Thule garrison and declared hostilities
over. Argentina had established Corbeta
Uruguay in 1976, but prior to 1982 the
United Kingdom had only contested the
existence of the Argentine base through
diplomatic channels.
Back in the UK, task force sailors,
marines and soldiers were greeted with
huge crowds. The success of the naval task
force was celebrated with parades and
parties across the UK. A special service
was held to pay respect to those who
made the ultimate sacrifice and Prime
Minister Thatcher visited the Falklands.
As a result of her resolve to remove the
Argentines she had been dubbed the ‘Iron
Lady’ and wrote herself into history as
the first woman to lead a country to war
since Elizabeth 1. The events of 1982 sent
a global message of Britain’s capability to
project military power. ■
HMS Antelope is assisted by another warship after being hit by Argentine bombs. Picture DPL

HMS Exeter fires a Sea Dart missile at Argentine aircraft flying at high altitude. Picture DPL

97 THE FALKLAND ISLANDS | WAR AT SEA