VOL.

425, MARCH 9, 2004 11

People vs. Mojello
*
G.R. No. 145566. March 9, 2004.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DINDO “BEBOT”

MOJELLO, appellant.

Constitutional Law; Confessions; Miranda Doctrine; What the

Miranda doctrine requires.—The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any
person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b)
anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he
has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his
counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.

_______________

28 Liana’s Supermarket v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111014, May
31, 1996, 257 SCRA 186.

* EN BANC.

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12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

Same; Same; Same; The extrajudicial confession of the appellant is

valid and therefore admissible in evidence.—The extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with
the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words,
the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore
admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense.—The phrase “preferably
of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise
the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the
accused thereafter subscribed to the veracity of the statement before the
swearing officer.—We ruled in People v. Continente that while the choice of
a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot
afford the services of counsel—or where the preferred lawyer is not
available—is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the
final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the appellant to complain to the
swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly
maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.—The failure of the
appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the
persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do
so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. To hold
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere
allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without
any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another
indicium of

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People vs. Mojello

voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have

been known only to the declarant.

QUISUMBING, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Confessions; Miranda Doctrine; Accused under

custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from
the very start thereof.—As the record shows, at the very start of custodial
investigation, counsel was not assisted by counsel. Nor was he informed of
his right to counsel from the time the police started to extract information
from him regarding the crime that he was charged of. Much less did he
waive his right to counsel in writing. What happened was contrary to the
prevailing doctrine that the accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bogo, Cebu, Br. 61.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, finding appellant Dindo “Bebot” Mojello
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic 1Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the
supreme penalty of death.
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias “Bebot” was charged with the
crime of rape
2 with homicide in an Information dated May 22, 1997,
as follows:

“That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o’clock in the
evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province
of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

_______________

1 Decision penned by Judge Ildefonso G. Mantilla.

2 Original Records, pp. 1-2.

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14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco

under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will
and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to
conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal
violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting
upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused her
death.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of “not

guilty.” Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on
December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00 p.m., Rogelio Rayco was
having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito
and his wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo 3 at the
Capacito residence located at Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On
his way home, he saw his niece, Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo
Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together
4 some thirty
meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota. Since he was used
to seeing them together on other occasions, he5 did not find anything
strange about this. He proceeded to his house.
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco
family was informed that the body of Lenlen was found at the
seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the
site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece.
Rogelio was devastated by what he saw. A remorse of conscience
enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He6 even attempted
to take his own life several days after the incident.

_______________

3 TSN, 20 August 1998, p. 4.

4 Id., p. 12.
5 Id., p. 6.
6 Id., p. 15.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 15

People vs. Mojello

Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a

motor launch bound for Cadiz City. On an investigation conducted
by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator
of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias
Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was
witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo
Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents
of the document
7 were read to appellant who later on voluntarily
signed it. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was sworn before
Judge Cornelio T. Jaca8 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was
conducted on the victim’s cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of 9 the
Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and 10

hymenal lacerations positively indicate that the victim was raped.

He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions11 on

her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. He
indicated the cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to
asphyxia
12 by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the
trunk.
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant is admissible in
evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting
in evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession which he executed
on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the
confession which he executed
13 was not freely, intelligently and
voluntarily entered into. He argues that he was not knowingly and
intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confes-

_______________

7 Id., February 26, 1998, pp. 14-20.

8 Id., pp. 4-7. See also Exhibit “B”, Original Records; pp. 18-20.
9 Id., February 12, 1998, pp. 7-9.
10 Id., p. 9.
11 Id., pp. 11-12.
12 Original Records, p. 28.
13 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

16

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello
14

sion was taken from him. Hence, his confession, and admissions
made therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on
custodial investigation enshrined in Article III, Section 12,
paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:

“Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall

have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.”

The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what

jurisprudence has termed as “Miranda rights” stemming from the
landmark15 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda v.
Arizona. It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and
the ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the
State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under
custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has
the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have
his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he
so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda
16
doctrine was based on17 the leading cases of People v. Galit and
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, rulings subsequently incorporated into the
present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter
took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically
qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of
the suspect’s own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise
provided for stricter requirements compared to its American

_______________

14 Id., pp. 60-64.

15 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 G.R. No. L-51770, 20 March 1985, 135 SCRA 465.
17 G.R. Nos. L-61016 and L-61107, 26 April 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

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People vs. Mojello

counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of

counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial
investigation has evolved to provide for more stringent standards
than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The
purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as
the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to
be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects
a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and
the underlying mission of custodial investigation—to elicit a
confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December
23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in
relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict
constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words,
the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is valid and therefore
admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was 18

undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution.

The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly stated
19

that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. As

further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while
he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was requested
20 by
the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. Appellant
manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his
counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant’s statement taken, he
advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even
told appellant to answer only the questions he understood
21
freely and
not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty. Giduquio
represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the
present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of
appellant within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence
was presented to negate his competence and independence in rep-

_______________

18 Rollo, p. 107.
19 Id.
20 TSN, July 14, 1998, p. 3.
21 Id., at pp. 6-7.

18

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

resenting appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover,

appellant manifested for the record that Atty. Giduquio was his
choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer who, 22 for one reason or another, is not

available to protect his interest. 23

We ruled in People v. Continente that while the choice of a

lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation
cannot afford the services of counsel—or where the preferred lawyer
is not available—is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators
is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection against the counsel’s appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes
24 to the veracity of
the statement before the swearing officer.
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from 25

freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,

this Court held:

The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly
apprised of their right to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance
with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to
the office of Atty. Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three accused, still accompanied
by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their respective written
confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the

_______________

22 G.R. No. 109993, 21 January 1994, 229 SCRA 450, 466; People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA
450.
23 G.R. Nos. 100801-02, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 1.
24 Id.
25 G.R. Nos. 131837-38, 2 April 2002, 380 SCRA 37.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 19

People vs. Mojello

three accused of their constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and
verified that their statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also
translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure
that each accused understood the same before signing it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against
the accused. Their participation in these cases merely involved the
performance of their legal duties as officers of the court. Accused-appellant
Dumalahay’s allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot prevail
over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which
violence and torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia that
the confessions were voluntarily given.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that
they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts
narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession
is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the
statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the
declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary
where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the
essential facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the
accused gave the same detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon
and Escalante were killed. This clearly shows that their confessions could
not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could not have given
such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime
were it not the truth.

Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon

appellant’s apprehension by the police authorities violated the
Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and
(2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the December 23,
1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant’s
confession should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with
Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods
were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a
legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the sub-

20

20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

ject under different 26conditions and circumstances than those which

prevailed originally.
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely,
voluntarily and intelligently entered into the extrajudicial confession
in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2.
SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his
investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the
Visayan dialect, 27 notably Cebuano, a language known to the
appellant, viz.:

PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY): Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa

usa ka inbestigasyon diin ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa
kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos kaniya.
Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa
pagpakahilom ning maong inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna
usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka abogado nga
motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba
nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby
reminded that you are under investigation in which you were
suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO.
Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent about
this investigation on you now and you have also the right to have
counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation
now. Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER): Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION): Human ikaw sayri sa imong
katungod ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto
ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo?
(After you have been apprised of your rights under our
Constitution to remain silent, do you want to proceed this
investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (ANSWER): Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION): Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga
makatabang kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want
counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)

_______________

26 Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (2d
Ed., 1967), p. 200 citing Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) and other cases.
27 Original Records, pp. 18-23.
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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 21

People vs. Mojello

TUBAG (ANSWER) Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.) APPEARANCE Atty.

Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga
unsa man ang imo isulti karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok
kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo nga
mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal
kanimo o nagsaad ba ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby
reminded that all your statements now will be used as evidence
against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you
understood all your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you,
or mauling or promising a reward in the end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) Oo (Yes.) PANGUTANA
(QUESTION) Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo
nga pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free and
voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx xxx xxx
(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
xxx xxx x x x.

The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he

was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain
28 silent and
his right to counsel, as contained in such confession. Appellant was
properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial
confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of Medellin-Daan-bantayan and
acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge
Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the
extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. He
subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his
statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos
29 and his Clerk of
Court were present as well as other people.
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed
the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is

_______________

28 Rollo, p. 211.
29 TSN, February 26, 1998, p. 10.

22

22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello
admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving
credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was
threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial
confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor did he report this to his counsel. He further
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession
which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the
Visayan dialect in his30 daily discourse.
In People v. Pia, we held that “where appellants did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons;
where they failed to complain to officers who administered the
oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative
action against their alleged maltreatment; where there appears no
marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness of confessions.” The failure of the appellant to
complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the
persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the
chances to do31 so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his
confessions. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his
statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion,
intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v.
Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is
the disclosure of details in 32the confession which could have been
known only to the declarant.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is
tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his
claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwill-

_______________

30 G.R. No. L-59604, 14 November 1986, 145 SCRA 581; See also People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. L-32274, 2 April 1984, 128 SCRA 488.
31 People v. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 1.
32 People v. Enanoria, G.R. No. 92957, 8 June 1992, 209 SCRA 594.

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People vs. Mojello
33

ingly executed. Bare 34 assertions will certainly not suffice to

overturn the presumption.
The test for determining if a confession is voluntary is whether
35

the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed. In

cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the test of
voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine
the probative weight of the confession.
 Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant’s
confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present independent
evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law
enforcement officers is to ensure that a suspect has been properly
apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in
the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective
administration of criminal justice relies on the faithful adherence to
the Miranda doctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by
police authorities is central to the criminal justice system; Miranda
rights must in every case be respected, without exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the
constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed
admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the
admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore
not “fruit of the poisonous tree” since the tree itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in
holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty
despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against
him. In his Brief, he argues that the evidence against him is
insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape,
coupled with the corpus delicti as established by the Medico-Legal
Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other
conclusion than that of appellant’s guilt for the rape of Lenlen

_______________

33 Id.
34 Id., at pp. 594-595.
35 29 A Am Jur 2d, Evidence §719, citing United States v. Leby (CA7 Wis) 955
F2d 1098, and other cases.

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24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

Rayco on December 15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty

and must therefore be sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant
admitted to killing the victim. Neither is the circumstantial evidence
sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a
homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical
evidence further precludes us from connecting the slaying of the
victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by
law for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is
essential in making a connection with the appellant’s story that he
went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the
victim were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00
p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim’s lifeless
body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a
time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the
circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely
perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken
chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that
appellant was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are
gaps in the reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the
death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when
she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen
was cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical
injuries; she was strangled to death and left on the seashore as
manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or
DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person
who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have
determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be
convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of
evidence which thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for
the said special complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of
statutory rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco being then eleven years old.
The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex
crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the
victim. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is awarded

25

VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 25

People vs. Mojello
36
upon the finding of the fact of rape. Moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim 37

without need of proof in accordance with current jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case
No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of statutory rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen
Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-

Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Puno, J., On Leave.
Vitug, J., I join the dissent.
Panganiban, J., On Official Leave.
Quisumbing, J., Please see dissenting opinion.
Tinga, J., I join the dissent of Justice Quisumbing.
DISSENTING OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

With due respect, we are unable to concur in the majority opinion,

penned ably by Justice Ynares-Santiago. For here appellant’s
conviction is being anchored on evidence that must be deemed
inadmissible by constitutional fiat. Considering that this case in-

_______________

36 People v. Dumlao, G.R. Nos. 130409-10, 27 November 2001, 370 SCRA 571;
People v. Caniezo, G.R. No. 136594, 13 March 2001, 354 SCRA 298; People v.
Mangompit, Jr., G.R. Nos. 139962-63, 7 March 2001, 353 SCRA 833.
37 People v. Burgos, G.R. Nos. 139959-60, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 325;
People v. Bismonte, G.R. No. 139563, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 305.

26

26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

volves the death penalty imposed on appellant by the trial court for
the crime of rape with homicide, we must apply the strictest standard
of review. Failing to meet this yardstick, the trial court’s decision
should be reversed, and the appellant should be acquitted on grounds
of insufficiency of evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
For clarity of exposition, we set forth the facts of the case as we
see them, based on the records.
Appellant Dindo Mojello is unmarried. At the time of his trial in
Criminal Case
1 No. B-00224, he was 22 years old. His educational 2
attainment is Grade IV. He had worked as a chainsaw operator. At
the time of the incident,3 he lived with his uncle, Roger Capacite, in
Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu.
4 5
The victim Lenlen Rayco was eleven (11) years old when she
died. She lived in the same neighborhood as appellant and his uncle.
Appellant and Lenlen knew each other. According to the
prosecution, she was last seen alive in the company of the appellant.
In an Information dated May 22, 1997, the Provincial Prosecutor
of Cebu charged appellant of rape with homicide committed as
follows:

“That on the 15th day of December, 1996, at about 11:00 o’clock in the
evening, at Sitio Kota, Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with (sic) Lenlen Rayco,
under twelve (12) years of age and with mental deficiency, against her will
and consent, and by reason and/or on the occasion thereof, purposely to
conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal design, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal
violence, attack, assault and kill the victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflict-

_______________

1 TSN, 6 October 1998, p. 15.

2 Id., at p. 8.
3 Id., at p. 9.
4 Also spelled “Lynlyn,” “Linlen” or “Len-Len” in the records.
5 She was born January 21, 1985. See Exh. “E” and sub-markings, Records, p. 138. See also
TSN, 30 July 1998, p. 9 (testimony of the victim’s mother, Carmen Rayco); TSN, 20 August
1998, p. 18 (testimony of the victim’s father, Edilberto Rayco).

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 27

People vs. Mojello

ing upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body which caused
her death. 6
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
7
When arraigned, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that:
At around 9:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996, Lenlen’s uncle,
Rogelio Rayco was at the house in Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu, of his
neighbor, Roger Capacite, the appellant’s uncle. Rogelio was in a
drinking spree8 with Roger and several male and female
companions. The group was 9 drinking Tanduay rum. At about 10:00
p.m., Rogelio went home. He had just reached his house, when he 10

saw Roger’s nephew, herein appellant, conversing with Lenlen.

The two were some 30 meters away from him and thus, he could not
hear what
11 they were talking about. The two then walked towards the
road. Rogelio paid no further attention
12 to the pair since he was used
to seeing them walking together.
The following morning, Lenlen’s naked and bruised corpse was
found along the seashore of Sitio Kota. On hearing the news,
Rogelio immediately proceeded to the area. He 13 saw that the child

had sustained several bruises all over her body.

On December 21, 1996, Dr. Nestor Sator, head medico-legal of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Region VII
conducted a postmortem examination on Lenlen’s remains. His
findings were as follows:

GENERAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished, previously embalmed, female child
cadaver. Stomach is 1/2 full of partially digested food particles. Both

_______________
 6 Records, pp. 1-2.
7 Id., at p. 39.
8 TSN, 20 August 1998, pp. 4-5.
9 Id., at p. 5.
10 Ibid.
11 Id., at pp. 5-6.
12 Id., at pp. 6, 11.
13 Id., at pp. 8, 9.

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28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

lungs are congested, which on cross section revealed froth. Subdural

hemorrhage is noted at the right side of the cranial cavity.
HEAD:
There are contusions at the left face, both upper eyelids, chin, nose, both
sides of the neck and at the back of the head.
TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:

1. Abrasion at the chest, left side, measuring 14 x 13 cm., 6 cm. away

from the anterior midline.
2. Contusion at the right chest, lower portion, measuring 2 x 2 cm., 5
cm. from the anterior midline.
3. Multiple linear abrasions at the right antecubital region, measuring
5 x 5 cm.
4. Abrasions at the left antecubital region, measuring 4 x 2 cm.
5. Contusions are also noted at both axillary regions, anterior aspect.

GENITALIA:
There is swelling at the right labia majora. Deep hymenal laceration 14 is
noted at 6 o’clock position and shallow laceration at 3 o’clock position.

Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the victim’s labia majora and
the hymenal
15 lacerations were positive indications that she had been
raped. He stated that based on the froth in the lungs of the victim
and the contusions on her neck, she was most likely strangled, and
she died of asphyxia. The death certificate of Lenlen Rayco showed
her cause of death to be “cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by
strangulation
16 and physical injuries to the head and trunk (rape-
positive).”
Meanwhile, appellant left Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu. He had
already boarded a motor launch at Bantayan, Cebu, bound for Cadiz
City, when he was apprehended by the authorities and brought in for
investigation.

_______________

14 Records, p. 28.
15 TSN, 12 February 1998, pp. 9-11.
16 Records, p. 133.
 29

VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 29

People vs. Mojello
17

In his statement of December 17, 1996, taken without the

assistance of counsel, before SPO2 Wilfredo A. Giducos in the
presence of SPO2 Tomas A. Gerra, Jr. at the Santa Fe police station,
appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that on the
night of the incident, he was drinking with his uncle, Roger
Capacite, at the latter’s house. Appellant declared that he last saw
Lenlen at around 9:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996, when she went to 18

Roger Capacite’s house and told the appellant that his cousin, Rigie
Capacite, wanted him to quit drinking and get some sleep. The
appellant allegedly told Lenlen that he would just go home after they
were done with their carousing. The appellant stated that the
drinking ended at around 10:00 p.m. after which he went to the
“bodega” of one Titing Esgana and slept there. He woke up at
around 2:00 a.m. the following day and proceeded to the house of
Rigie Capacite, had an early breakfast, after which he proceeded to
Sillon, Santa Fe with a certain Benjie to get spare parts for the
chainsaw.
However,
19 appellant executed another statement dated December
23, 1996, in the presence allegedly of one Atty. Isaias P. Giduquio
and Barangay Captain Wilfredo Batobalonos. In this statement,
appellant changed his tune. He admitted raping Lenlen Rayco,
boxing her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness,
and leaving her unconscious on the shoreline some 350 meters away
from the house of Rigie Capacite. He stated that he had sexual
congress with Lenlen Rayco at around 11:00 p.m. on December 15,
1996 in Sitio Kota, Talisay, Santa Fe, Cebu. On January 16, 1997,
the appellant’s statement, amounting to an extrajudicial confession,
was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Medellin-Daanbantayan 20

and acting judge of the MCTC of Santa Fe-Bantayan-Madredijos.

Judge Jaca later on stated that all that he asked of appellant before
the abovecited statement was subscribed and sworn to before him
was whether the appellant understood21 its contents and whether he
executed the statement voluntarily.

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 14-15.

18 Also spelled “Reggie” in some parts of the records.
19 Records, pp. 18-20.
20 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 3; Records p. 20.
21 Id., at p. 11.

30

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 People vs. Mojello

Atty. Isaias Giduquio, who assisted the appellant at the time

appellant’s statement was taken, there being no other lawyer
available, was requested by the Chief of Police of Santa Fe to assist
Mojello. At that time, Atty. Giduquio
22 was attending a session of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Fe. Atty. Giduquio later on testified
that he witnessed the appellant sign his statement, also called an
extrajudicial confession, but failed to give details on how he assisted
the appellant when the appellant confessed to the crime. On cross-
examination, Atty. Giduquio declared that he told the appellant “to
answer questions
23 freely” and to confer with him if he was not sure
of his answer.
Wilfredo S. Batobalonos, the barangay captain of Talisay, Santa
Fe declared that he was present when the appellant made his
extrajudicial confession and that he saw him voluntarily 24 affix his
signature to the statement admitting authorship of the crime.
The appellant was the sole witness for the defense during the
trial. He admitted knowing the victim, 25 as she was one of the
neighbors of his uncle, Roger Capacite. However, he denied having
anything to do with the rape-slay of the victim. He claimed that on
the night of December 15, 1996, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., he 26
was drinking with friends and neighbors at the house 27of his uncle.
He denied seeing and meeting the victim that night. He claimed
that after their drinking session, he went to sleep at the house of his
cousin, Rigie Capacite.28The house was some 40 meters away from
the house of his uncle. He woke up at 4:00 a.m. and departed for
Cadiz City, but was arrested by two policemen while aboard a
motorized launch. The appellant claimed that he was mauled and
boxed by the policemen at the Santa Fe municipal hall,29where he was
made under duress to sign an extrajudicial confession. He

_______________

22 TSN, 14 July 1998, p. 3.

23 Id., at p. 7.
24 TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 16-19.
25 TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 8-9.
26 Id., at p. 10.
27 Id., at pp. 10-11.
28 Id., at pp. 11-12.
29 Id., at pp. 14-15, 17. See also TSN, 5 November 1998, p. 26. Stress supplied.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 31

People vs. Mojello

claimed that he was not given a 30chance to read the statement he

signed nor was it explained to him.
 The trial court found the prosecution’s version of the incident
credible. It disbelieved appellant’s denial and alibi. It held appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing Lenlen Rayco,
and sentenced him to death by lethal injection.
The core issue now presented to the Court is whether the
extrajudicial confession of appellant taken by the police authorities
could be validly admitted in evidence to convict appellant of a
capital offense.
The Constitution, in Article III, Section 12, embodies the
mandatory safeguards afforded a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of a crime and the concomitant
duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It
declares that:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.

Numerous decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial

confession to be admissible, it must be: (1) voluntary; (2) made with
the assistance of 31competent and independent counsel; (3) express;
and (4) in writing.

_______________

30 Id., at pp. 19-20. Id., at p. 27.

31 See People v. Oranza, G.R. No. 127748, 25 July 2002, 385 SCRA 209; People
v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, 25 September 2000, 341 SCRA 25; People v. Base, G.R.
No. 109773, 30 March 2000, 329 SCRA 158; People v. Lumandong, G.R. No.
132745, 9 March 2000, 327 SCRA 650; People v. Calvo, Jr., G.R. No. 91694, 14
March 1997, 269 SCRA 676.

32

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

Lacking these fundamental requisites, appellant’s conviction under

review could not be sustained.

DURING INITIAL CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION APPELLANT

HAD NO COUNSEL, NOR WAS HE INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT
TO COUNSEL.
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting
confession that leads the accused to admit something false, so as to
incriminate himself. What is sought to be avoided is the “evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of an offense, the32 very evidence
with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.”
The facts show that the appellant Dindo Mojello was actually
arrested by police authorities on December 16, 1996, while he was
on his way to Cadiz City, for the purpose of purchasing a chainsaw
he needed for his job as chainsaw operator. Subsequent to his arrest,
the police conducted custodial investigation of accused-appellant
twice. In the first instance, he was NOT assisted by counsel at all. In
the second instance, wherein his alleged confession was secured, it
took 7 days of DELAY 33 before he was provided legal counsel on
December 23, 1996.
The majority opinion concedes that the first custodial
interrogation was constitutionally infirm because of the absence of
counsel. But the ponencia considers the succeeding interrogation
lawful, without any infirmity, despite appellant’s claim that he was
boxed and mauled by the police. The ponencia holds that the police
complied with the Miranda requirements, given the fact that the
presence of a counsel was finally secured, and that the content of the
extrajudicial confession which appellant signed was translated into
Visayan dialect, which he understood, before he affixed his signature
thereon. On this point, we cannot agree. To our mind, facts on record
do not show compliance with the Miranda mandates aforecited. On
the contrary, the facts unmistakably show a violation by the police of
Section 17 of the Bill of Rights that, “no person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself.”

_______________

32 People v. Olivarez, Jr., G.R. No. 77865, 4 December 1998, 299 SCRA 635.
33 Records, p. 18.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 33

People vs. Mojello

As the record shows, at the very start of custodial investigation,

counsel was not assisted by counsel. Nor was he informed of his
right to counsel from the time the police started to extract
information from him regarding the crime that he was charged of.
Much less did he waive his right to counsel in writing. What
happened was contrary to the prevailing doctrine that the accused
under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. Thus, the recent case of
People v. Delmo, G.R. Nos. 130078-82, October 4, 2002, we said:
Based on the records of these cases, we find that police investigators
violated Danilo’ s constitutional right to competent and independent
counsel. As early as September 16, 1995, Danilo was already taken into
custody by the police for investigation on his possible role in the
Payumo slayings. Yet, there is no showing on record that Danilo was
furnished the services of competent and independent counsel in
accordance with Section 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights. Danilo was only
offered the services of Atty. Hilbero on the night of September 18, 1995,
or after two days of custodial investigation. The records further show
that Atty. Hilbero’s services were tapped only to assist Danilo in making
a confession. Established is the rule that the moment the police try to
elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
suspect, he should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such
waiver by Danilo is on record. Nor is there any showing that Atty.
Hilbero was present at the very start of Danilo’s custodial investigation.
In our view, the process that resulted in Danilo’s extrajudicial
confession is flawed. The constitutional requirement is not met properly
where the lawyer is called in only when the accused is about to put his
confession in writing. Danilo Lapiz was not assisted by counsel from the
start of custodial investigation, when his right to competent and
independent counsel had already attached. Hence, pursuant to Article
III, Section 12 (3) of the Constitution, we declare his confession
inadmissible not only against him, but even against his co-appellants as
well. (Emphasis supplied.)

COUNSEL PROVIDED BY THE POLICE LATER WAS

NEITHER INDEPENDENT NOR COMPETENT, BUT BIASED
AGAINST APPELLANT’S INTEREST.
The right to counsel means the right to competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. It is doubtful whether the
counsel given to Mojello at second instance of custo-

34

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

dial investigation was of his own choice. Atty. Giduquios testified on

how he came to know appellant as follows—

FISCAL CAMOMOT:
Q: Atty. Giduquio, do you remember having assisted, do you know
the accused Dindo Mojello?
A. Yes, I know him.
...
Q: How did you come to know the accused?
A: One time while I was attending the Sangguniang Bayan session,
I was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist one of
 the accused a certain Dindo Mojello, as there was no other
lawyer in connection with a rape case that happened in the town.
Q: You have claimed that you have assisted him in the mak[ing] of
an extrajudicial confession?
34
A: Yes.

What emerges from a perusal of Atty. Giduquio’s testimony in the

present case is that the lawyer was merely picked out from a
Sangguniang Bayan meeting by the law enforcers themselves, for the
sole purpose of making it appear that appellant was assisted by a
counsel in making his confession. All these put into serious doubt his
independence and competence as counsel for appellant for purposes
of complying with Miranda rights of the accused under custodial
investigation. He had no sufficient time to interview the appellant,
much less to intelligently assess his case, and it did not even occur to
him to explore any theory for the defense of his client. Counsel
merely lent his presence so as to validate the alleged confession of
appellant.
Barangay Captain Wifredo Batobalonos, a prosecution witness
who obviously belongs to the side of the police, testified on his
relationship by affinity with Atty. Giduquio. He stated—

Q: Also in Exhibit “B-5” also a typewritten name of Isaias

Giduquio, whose signature is this?
A: Atty. Giduquio because I’m very familiar with his signature in
fact the wife of his nephew35is my nephew also and he was also
there when he sign it. (sic)

_______________

34 TSN, 14 July 1998, pp. 2-3.

35 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 16.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 35

People vs. Mojello

The foregoing revelation on the close ties between prosecution

witness Batobalonos and Atty. Giduquio fortifies the conclusion that
he was the chosen counsel by the prosecution and the police for their
own purposes, contrary to the interest of appellant, and to his great
prejudice.
Notably, after Atty. Giduquio later withdrew as his counsel,
appellant recoiled from and promptly disowned his alleged
confession of guilt. During his arraignment where he was assisted by
Atty. De Jesus as counsel de oficio, appellant gave a categorical plea
of not guilty.
Further, it appears that Atty. Giduquio had no real commitment
36 to
appellant’s defense. This is evident from the manifestation dated
May 20, 1998, which he filed before the lower court. In response to
the subpoena issued by the trial court commanding him to testify on
the case, he filed the aforesaid manifestation, stating that he had
already withdrawn his appearance as counsel for appellant due to
“irreconcilable matters” and prayed that he be relieved of any
obligation and responsibility as counsel for the accused. His
manifestation suggests two things: (1) he did not fully comprehend
what a subpoena to testify means, in which case his competence as a
lawyer becomes highly suspect, or (2) he is nonchalant about the
case due to “irreconcilable matters” with appellant, which suggests
adverse relationship or conflict of interest between counsel and
client. These put to question counsel’s competence as well as
independence when the confession was wheedled out of appellant by
the police.
Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot rest easy with
the assertion of the majority that at the time appellant admitted his
alleged culpability for a crime where the penalty at stake is possibly
death, Atty. Giduquio served his client with competence and
diligence and championed37 the latter’s cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. A huge doubt assails us on this score.

THE CONFESSION OF APPELLANT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY

BUT EXTORTED, “A FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.”

_______________

36 Records, p. 110.
37 Abaqueta v. Florido, A.C. No. 5948, 22 January 2003, 395 SCRA 569.

36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

The mantle of protection afforded by the aforecited constitutional

provision, otherwise known as the “exclusionary rule,” is premised
on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere running through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality 38for compulsion, physical or
psychological, is forcefully apparent.
The negative environment at the time the confession was wrung
from appellant is at once apparent from the following testimony of
Atty. Giduquio:

COURT:
Q: Were there people around at the time while the accused was
signing the confession?
A: There were people around and of course there was a window
inside the room where the investigation was conducted. I rem
embered it was only the investigating Chief of Police and there
were 4 or five policemen and myself.
Q: Outside were there people?
39
A: Yes, including the officials of the town.

There is no doubt in our mind that appellant’s confession was

extracted and therefore involuntary. Custodial investigation in the
police office at the municipal hall was in a highly charged
atmosphere due to the presence of the Chief of Police, several
policemen, the Barangay Captain, and local officials. Obviously they
were on the same side as the police whose tasks include carrying out
peace and order duties at the behest of local authorities. The need for
competent and independent counsel to aid appellant during this time
and under those adverse conditions to him is vital to his defense. The
physical and moral compulsion exerted by the police and municipal
officials weighed heavily on appellant, vitiating his free will and
defeating his morale at the moment critical to preserve his
equanimity and good sense.
Further bolstering the impact of adverse conditions when
appellant’s confession was extracted was the fact that it took three
weeks before it was sworn to before the MCTC trial judge of
Bantayan-Sta. Fe. The judge himself conducted the preliminary
investigation, obviously biased already against the appellant, and
hur-

_______________

38 People v. Base, G.R. No. 109773, 30 March 2000, 329 SCRA 158.
39 TSN, 14 July 1998, pp. 5-6.

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People vs. Mojello

rying to fulfill his task by turning him over to the higher rung of the
prosecution ladder. 40

In People vs. Januario, this Court had the opportunity to

reiterate the rule that evidence gathered by virtue of an illegally
obtained confession is inadmissible. In that case, appellants first
orally admitted participation in the commission of the crime in Naga
City and later executed written confessions in Manila. This Court
held that inasmuch as their initial confessions are unconstitutional
for being uncounselled, the latter one becomes inadmissible as well
for it was a product of the first. Thus—

That appellants indeed admitted participation in the commission of the

crime in Naga City is shown by the fact that the NBI agents brought them to
Manila to facilitate apprehension of the other culprits who could be either in
Cavite or Manila. Because their uncounselled oral admissions in Naga City
resulted in the execution of their written confessions in Manila, the latter
had become41 as constitutionally infirm as the former. In People vs.
Alicando, this Court explained the ramifications of an irregularly
counselled confession or admission:
“We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We
have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rules known as the ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree,’ a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source
(the ‘tree’) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the ‘fruit’) derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the ‘fruit of
the poisonous tree’ is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The ‘fruit of the
poisonous tree’ is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.”
(Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, appellant Mojello’s first signed statement on December

17, 1996, taken illegally and involuntarily, without the presence of
counsel could not be admitted in evidence. Neither should his flawed
second statement taken without assistance of his

_______________

40 G.R. No. 98252, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 608.

41 G.R. No. 117487, 12 December 1995, 251 SCRA 293. See Nardone v. United
States, 308 US 388, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. ed. 307 (1939).

38

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello

chosen counsel on December 23, 1996, be used against him. For the
alleged confession of appellant is the undeniably unlawful
consequence of the first instance of custodial interrogation without
counsel, a classic case of a fruit of the poisonous tree.

THAT MOJELLO’S CONFESSION ALLEGEDLY MATCHES

WITH THE MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT DOES NOT BOLSTER
ITS VALIDITY
Contrary to the ponencia’s disquisition, the fact that appellant
Mojello’s confession allegedly dovetails with the medico-legal
report is irrelevant in determining its admissibility. To hold
otherwise would
42 result in what Justice Florenz Regalado in People v.
dela Cruz, phrased as “putting the cart before the horse.” Justice
Regalado explains—

The proposition that the medical findings jibe with the narration of
appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the fatal
error of figuratively putting the cart before the horse. Precisely, the validity
and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question
and the contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same
cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume
that which has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en
probando. Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme
penal consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit
circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)

PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY FAILS TO

ESTABLISH GUILT OF APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
The only other evidence of the prosecution linking him to the crime
is the testimony of Rogelio Rayco who himself was a suspect
initially as he could not explain the presence of a prominent wound
in his throat which he sustained on or about the time of the fatal
incident involving his niece, the victim in this case. In his first sworn
statement of December 22, 1996, taken at about 10:45 in the evening
before the police authorities at the Bantayan District Hospital where
he was then confined for his neck wounds, Rogelio Rayco explained
that he attempted to commit suicide because he

_______________

42 G.R. Nos. 118866-68, 17 September 1997, 279 SCRA 245.

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People vs. Mojello

learned that he was being suspected for the rape of his niece. The
pertinent portion of his affidavit is quoted as follows:

Q: What is your name?

A: Rogelio Rayco.
Q: Why are here at the hospital?
A: I stabbed myself.
Q: What did you use in stabbing?
A: Kitchen knife (kutsilyo).
Q: What was the reason why you stabbed yourself?
A: Because of the news that I was one43of the suspects in the raping
and killing of my niece, Lenlen . . .

Two weeks later or on January 6, 1997, Rogelio Rayco executed

another affidavit at the Santa Fe police station, this time with a new
explanation as to why he attempted to end his life—he felt a pang of
conscience for not having warned the victim against appellant. He
stated—

...
Q: What was the caused (sic) of the wounds on your neck?
A: Due to my own stabbing.
Q: Why?
A: Because I was bothered by my conscience for not having
warned my niece, Lenlen Rayco in accompanying Dindo
Mojello whom I believed
44 was the one who raped and killed
Lenlen Rayco . . .

It was also in the latter affidavit that he disclosed to the police

authorities for the first time his account of events on the night the
victim was slain, this time implicating appellant to the crime. Thus,
on the basis of Rogelio Rayco’s second affidavit, his brother and
victim’s father—Edilberto Rayco—gave a statement to the police
the next day, or on
45 January 7, 1997, charging appellant for Lenlen’s

rape and death. From Rogelio’s narration, the theory of the

prosecution was formed almost five months after the fatal inci-

_______________

43 Records, p. 17.
44 Id., at p. 12.
45 Id., at p. 10.

40

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mojello
46

dent or on May 22, 1997, with the filing of information against

appellant for the rape and homicide of Lenlen.
Rogelio Rayco’s testimony failed to clarify why he had a sudden
change of heart. Neither did the prosecution show why it took
Rogelio three weeks from the time he got wind of Lenlen’s death
before he reported to the police his knowledge that appellant was
with the victim the night of the incident.
What the records do show is: (1) that Rogelio Rayco was initially
a suspect himself for the rape of his niece, (2) that upon knowing
that he was a suspect, he attempted to commit suicide, and (3) that
two weeks later, he told the law enforcers that appellant did it. By
itself, we are not prepared to accept Rayco’s testimony, line, hook,
and sinker.
Rogelio Rayco’s testimony is merely circumstantial. It only seeks
to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the
crime scene on or about the time when the crime took place. It fails
to meet the following requisites to justify a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
47 exclusion of all

others, is the one who has committed the crime. Rogelio Rayco’s
actuations after the incident were far from being the natural reaction
of an innocent person but in fact invited suspicion and doubt. With
doubt still lurking in our mind as to who is the real killer of the
 victim, we are not prepared to rely on Rayco’s testimony to convict
appellant.
Ultimately, appellant’s conviction rested only upon the
extrajudicial confession extorted by the police while he was under
detention. He was compelled by the police to be a witness against
himself, thereby violating the basic guarantee against self-
incrimination. In the light of appellant’s Miranda rights, this
confession could not be admitted without grievously offending the
Constitution. Despite the inherent weakness of denial and alibi as a
defense, his innocence must be sustained. Not because he is not
guilty, but because the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker

_______________

46 Id., at p. 2.
47 People v. Casitas, Jr., G.R. No. 137404, 14 February 2003, 397 SCRA 382.

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VOL. 425, MARCH 9, 2004 41

Benguet Electric Cooperative vs. Fianza

for being inadmissible under the fundamental law. Hence, appellant

Dindo Mojello ought to be acquitted.
Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—The accused has the final choice of the lawyer as he may

reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. (People
vs. Gonzales, 311 SCRA 547 [1999])

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