Rule 111.

Prosecution of Civil Action

Bernardo v People
G.R. No 182210
October 5, 2015

Facts:
Paz Bernardo obtained a loan amounting to PHP 460,000, payable on or before 30
November 1991 from Carmencita Bumanglag, secured by a promissory note and a TCT.
Before the loan’s maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral
in another transaction. In exchange, she issued five Far East Bank and Trust Company checks
to cover the loan’s aggregate amount. However, she needed the TCT before the loan was due
and replaced it with five checks. The checks bounced and Bumanglag filed a criminal
complaint for five counts of violating of BP 22. The RTC found her guilty and this was
affirmed by the CA, which ordered her to pay the civil indemnity equal to the amount she
owed Bumanglag, plus interest, in addition to a fine. Pending the petition with the SC,
Bernardo passed away and the Court required the substitution of her heirs. The heirs contend
that Bernardo’s death extinguished her civil liability and if it did not, the claim should be
settled in a separate civil case.
The Court said that Bernardo’s death did not extinguish her civil liability. While civil
liability may arise from the offense charged, the same act or omission may give rise to
independent civil liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Thus, it is entirely possible
for one to be free from civil liability from violation of a penal law and still be liable based on
contract or by other laws. There is also no need for a separate civil case. While the general
rule is that independent civil liabilities survive death and an action for recovery may be
pursued by a separate civil action, in cases of BP 22 violations, the criminal action is deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. Only a single suit is filed and tried. The civil
liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for
violation of BP 22 and Bernardo’s death did not automatically extinguish the action. Because
Bernardo was not able to prove that she had paid Bumanglag, the Court affirmed the CA
decision, ordering Bernardo’s heirs to pay the amount of the debt, with interest, but the fine
was deleted.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Bernardo’s civil liability may be enforced despite her death in the
same case
2. Whether or not Bernardo was denied due process
3. Whether or not Bernardo should be civilly liable

Ruling:
1. Yes. Bernardo’s civil liability may be enforced despite her death in the same case.
If the conduct constitutes a felony, accused may be held civilly liable under RPC Art. 100.
Not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As
long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by preponderance of
evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately and institutes
the civil action o Same act may give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other
sources of obligation. Thus, entirely possible for one to be free from civil liability from
violation of a penal law and still be liable based on contract or other laws. Civil actions may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings, regardless of the result of the criminal
action (but offended party cannot recover twice).
As a general rule of BP special rule, Independent civil liabilities survive death and an
action for recovery may be generally pursued by filing a separate civil action, subject to
Section 1, Rule 111. But, BP 22 criminal action deemed to include civil action which rule
enacted to help declog court dockets, death did not automatically extinguish the action and
independent civil liability based on contract, deemed instituted in the criminal action may still
be enforced against her estate.
2. No. Bernardo was not denied due process. RTC took all steps to safeguard her
rights but they just failed to appear repeatedly considering the right to present evidence as
waived followed as a necessary and unavoidable consequence.
3. Yes. Bernardo civilly liable because she failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
payment. Wherein, one who pleads payment carries burden of proving it. The existence of
obligation sufficiently established through promissory note and checks, and that Bernardo
confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory note. If there had been payment, she
should have redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory note, but they remained
with Bumanglag. Weight of evidence on Bumanglag’s position that Bernardo has not yet
settled her obligation.

Maccay v Spouses Nobela

G.R No. 145823
March 31, 2005

Facts:
Adelaida Potenciano and Oscar Maccay had a good relationship with Spouses
Prudencio and Serlina Nobela after the former sold Maccay’s land to the latter. In purchasing
the land, Potenciano and the wife Nobela went to a lawyer and executed a Deed of Sale
prepared and notarized. Nobela paid Php 300,000 to the couple and in turn, she was given the
Deed of Sale, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents.

Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke and he was brought to the Polymedic Hospital.
Potenciano confided that her real name and that the owners of the hospital are her parents and
that there is no need to worry on the hospital bill. However, when it was time for the payment
of the same, Potenciano’s payment with her dollars and yens were not accepted by the
hospital. The foreign exchange dealer refused to change the money saying that those were
fake. Serlina Nobela then had to look for the payment on her own.
 At that time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was
beginning to slip off. Potenciano later invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of
appliances which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlinas dismay,
she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself.
She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. 15 to 15-C) showing her payments. The
last receipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when
Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed,
the relationship began to sour.

Before the last purchase of appliance, without the knowledge of the accused couple,
Potenciano executed an Affidavit of Loss, relating that on her way to Antipolo, the stainless
steel jeep broke down but when she returned with a mechanic, the jeep was gone. Serlina was
beginning to doubt Potenciano and heard that the latter was trying to sell their jeep. She
inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against her.

Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and executed an

affidavitcomplaint against the accused spouses relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and
Serlina Nobela. She related how the accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No.
473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related how she was prayed over and mesmerized
by Serlina.

In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to
them because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help
them in the registration of Deed of Sale. They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real
estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for the P300,000.00 consideration,
they would need around P20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she gave P21,000.00. The
mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new
title was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional 2,000.00 to
de la Vega for other expenses.

Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor
E. Cruz on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for
Estafa and Theft. When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to
receive a subpoena from the Fiscals Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite
sick. Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused
and she was astonished to discover as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the
name of Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains tax as only P1,000.00
plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias
Angelita Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given to them for P300,000.00 which
they paid the Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de
la Vega and her mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration
transaction. They filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still
pending in court at Judge Alfredo Flores sala.
 RTC acquitted respondent spouses and found petitioners swindled the spouses. The
trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses
to turn the tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered
petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages. CA upheld the decision.

Issues:
1. Whether the trial court may rule on the civil liability of complainant in a criminal
case where the civil action was not reserved or filed separately;
2. Whether a witness, who is not a party to the case, may be held liable for damages.

Ruling:
1. A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The
task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to
determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the
private complainants’ civil liability, if any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution
witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000
and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. The appellate court erred in affirming
the trial courts award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim. Nothing in the records
shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim.
The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases.
Section 1 of Rule 111 provides: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x
x No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action.
That paragraph addresses the problem on the absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling
respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate
proceeding.

2. The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano,
together with petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment
cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. A decision of a court cannot operate to
divest the rights of a person who is not a party in the case. It does not however prejudice the
filing by respondent of a claim for damages against petitioners.

Heirs of Simon v Chan

G.R. No. 157547
February 23, 2011

Facts:
In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22.
 Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check with a
de clared amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund
the check he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent. Despite
notice insufficiency of his account s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the
value of the check within 5 days after receiving the notice.

Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in Pasay
City a Civil Action for the collection of the principal amount of P 336,000.00.

On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to

change plaintiffs attachment bond for damages on the ground of litis pendentia as a
consequence of the pendency of another action between parties for the same ca use. The
plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make an y allegation as
to the exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, constituting an implied right to initiate
civil action.

The Plaintiff also cited Rule 111 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action
during the pendency of a criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the CCP. The
case falls under Art. 33 of the CCP. On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted
Simon s urgent Motion to Dismis s with application to charge plaintiff s attachment bond for
damages.

On 31 July 2 001, the RTC of Pasay City upheld MCTC s dismissal of Chan s
initiated Civil Case. Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue;
Whether or not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.

The CA overturned the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the
CA recognized that civil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling o f a criminal
case, the following case falls under the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.

Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for review.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Chan s Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check a s
an independent civil action.
2. Whether or not new Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied
retroactively.

Ruling:
The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on Jun e 25, 2002.
Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2 000 by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
 The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
Any new rules m ay validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their
promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit
or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is requi red at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex
post facto under the Constitution

Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the

concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of
parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in
one would , regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the
other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably
shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the par ties in the civil
action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and
Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No.
0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby indicating that the rights asserted and
the reliefs prayed for, as we ll as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were
identical in al l respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily
bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same
claim.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Cas e No.
915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23, 2000; and that
the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.

Ace Haulers Corp. v Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127934
August 23, 2000

Facts:
 A truck owned by the petitioner and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz collided
with a passenger jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A motorcycle
was bumped and dragged by the jeepney and the rider, Fidel Abiva was run over by the truck
causing his death. Fidel Abiva left behind a wife, respondent Ederlina Abiva and their three
(3) children.

A criminal information for reckless imprudence was filed against the two drivers
before the RTC of Quezon City. When the criminal action was pending, the private
respondent filed a separate civil action against the two drivers, as well as against the
petitioner and Isabelito Rivera, the owners of the vehicles involved in the accident. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts attention the fact that a criminal action
was pending before another branch of the same court, and that under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil action arising from a quasi-delict is no
longer allowed.

The trial court dismissed the action for damages on the ground that no civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. While
pre-trial proceedings were still being set and reset upon motions of the parties, the RTC
rendered judgment and found both drivers guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000 as indemnification for his
death and P4,000 by way of actual damages. After the trial for civil case, the Court granted
the reliefs and remedies which in her complaint the plaintiff prays for.

Issue:
Whether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident plaintiff
may recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case
(delict) and the civil case for damages based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the
same act.

Ruling:
In Padua v. Robles, we held that Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility.
In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.

Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the choice which of the awards to
take, naturally expecting that she would opt to recover the greater amount. It has not been
shown that she has recovered on the award in the criminal case, consequently, she can
unquestionably recover from petitioner in the civil case.