Article

Measuring Women’s International Journal of

Rural Management

Self-help Group 15(1) 116–136, 2019

 2019 Institute of Rural Management
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DOI: 10.1177/0973005219836040
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Tiken Das1
Pradyut Guha2

Abstract
The Self-help Group Bank Linkage Programme (SHG-BLP) is now a major
global microfinance programme in India with 8.7 million SHGs with deposit of
over `195,000 million and annual loan offtake of more than `470,000 million.
However, group sustainability is having a wider concern among donor agen-
cies, practitioners, policymakers and academicians to achieve persistent benefit
from SHGs in financial intermediation. The present study made an attempt to
examine the status of group sustainability with the help of multidimensional
sustainability index of SHGs (MDSISHG) by combining organizational, managerial
and financial indicators of 60 SHGs in Assam. It was found that 95 per cent of
SHGs positioned within the range of ‘high’ and ‘moderate’ MDSISHG status and,
therefore, may maintain their function well over a long period of time. Thus, the
study recommends for enlargement of the scope of semiformal financial institu-
tions (in our study: SHGs) in rural areas of Assam only for income-generating
activities with proper market linkages. There is a scope to regenerate and
validate the findings using relatively large sample size with SHGs of varied
socio-economic background.

Keywords
Self-help groups, organizational sustainability index, managerial sustainability
index, financial sustainability index, multidimensional sustainability index

1
Indian Institute of Public Health, Public Health Foundation of India, Shillong, Meghalaya, India.
2
Department of Economics, Central University of Sikkim, Samdur, Tadong, Gangtok, Sikkim, India.

Corresponding author:
Tiken Das, Indian Institute of Public Health, Public Health Foundation of India, Lawmali, Pasteur Hill,
Shillong 793001, Meghalaya, India.
E-mail: tikenhyd@gmail.com
Das and Guha 117

Introduction
Microfinance in India has come a long way since its beginning in the form of Self-
help Group Bank Linkage Programme (SHG-BLP) in 1992–1993 by National
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). Over a period of 25
years, the SHG-BLP programme has become a huge success among all the stake-
holders. It is now a major global microfinance programme with 8.7 million SHGs
with deposit of over `195,000 million and annual loan offtake of more than
`470,000 million (NABARD 2018). There are more than 100 scheduled banks,
300 District Co-operative Central Banks (DCCBs), 27 state rural livelihood
missions and over 5,000 NGOs engaged in the SHG-BLP (NABARD 2018). This
programme widens the financial service delivery system by linking rural popula-
tion with formal financial institutions through SHGs. It primarily generates income
and employment and alleviates poverty, especially in developing countries (Bhuiya
et al. 2016; Khaki and Sangmi 2017; Khandker and Samad 2013; Pati 2017;
Robinson 2001; Von Pischke 1996). Moreover, such programme is helpful in
empowering rural women through entrepreneurial activities, which influence the
income, expenditure and saving habits of rural women (Deininger and Liu 2009;
Kabeer 2005; Pitt et al. 2006; Rahman et al. 2017; Sarma 2008; Tripathy 2017).
Both central and state governments in India through the departments of Rural
Development, and Women and Child Development have promoted a large number
of SHGs by the implementation of various programmes, such as Swarnajayanthi
Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY), Swashakthi, Swavalambana, Mukhyamanthri
Nari Yojana, the Poorest Areas Civil Society Programme against Poverty, National
Rural Livelihoods Mission and National Urban Livelihoods Mission. Moreover,
since the 1980s, many NGOs have been engaging in the promotion and strengthen-
ing of SHGs with the financial support of national and international agencies. As a
result, in many states, the SHG programme has reached its scale. The literature
suggests that a majority of the groups promoted under various government pro-
grammes/schemes, especially the SGSY groups, were formed to avail low cost and
subsidized loans. However, majority of such SHGs became defunct once they got
revolving fund assistance and/or SGSY loan. Under the aforementioned circum-
stances, sustainability of groups is a big challenge. Thus, the success of a microfi-
nance programme depends not only in the quantity of groups formed but also on
the sustainability of these groups (Christen and Morgan 2005; T. Das 2018; Shetty
and Madheswaran 2008; Srinivasan 2009). Therefore, the sustainability of SHGs
is immensely important to create a wider impact on the rural poor.
The SHG-BLP has emerged widely in rural Assam due to the failure of formal
banks to reach the unreached rural people. Accordingly, as on March 2018, the
total number of saving linked SHGs has gone up to 0.376 million with saving
amount of `1,946.696 million (NABARD 2018). However, it is observed that the
proportion of non-performing assets, out of total loan outstanding to SHGs with
public sector commercial banks is higher than the national figure in almost all the
years from 2007–2008 to 2017–2018 (Table A1). Moreover, the per capita loan
disbursed to SHGs and per capita saving of SHGs with public sector commercial
banks are found to be quite low in comparison with national figure during the
118 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

same time period (Table A1). Under such backdrop, this study is conducted in
rural Assam to evaluate the status of group sustainability.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The empirical and theoretical
literature on the measurement of group sustainability is given in the second sec-
tion. The data and methodology are covered in the third section. The fourth sec-
tion describes the results and discussion of the article. Conclusions are given in
the fifth section.

Measurement of Group Sustainability:

Some Existing Studies
Sustainability in microfinance refers to the long-term continuation of the pro-
gramme without the support of external agencies. Moreover, it can also be defined
as the level of skill and confidence of the groups to approach the local institutions
in order to mobilize resources (Rajasekhar 2002).
A number of studies have attempted to assess the sustainability of SHGs in
India. Sustainability of SHGs was measured with the increased value of assets
and saving rate, easy access to institutional loans, higher repayment rate, elimi-
nation of informal sources and social empowerment of rural women (Puhazhendi
and Badatya 2002; Schreiner 1997; Srinivasan 2008). It was also measured with
the ability of SHGs to handle group activities without external support or sub-
sidy (Dunford 2006; Shetty and Madheswaran 2008; Thapa et al. 1992). Meyer
(2002) argued that the SHGs were operationally sustainable, if they can manage
their operational costs with the operating income of groups. Kumari and Malathi
(2009) emphasized that the sustainability of SHGs depends on several factors:
improper maintenance of book keeping, restrictive government procedure, lack
of training, low returns, pressure on repayment of bank loans, inadequate loans
and lack of cooperation among members. Christen and Ivatury (2007) pointed
that the sustainability of SHGs associated with two factors: (a) whether adequate
support services was provided to the SHGs and (b) whether the total costs of
providing support services were paid from operating income of SHGs. Further,
Mahajan (1998) identified four dimensions for sustainability of microfinance
programme in India: sustainability of demand, financial sustainability, organi-
zational sustainability and sustainability of the microfinance institutions (MFIs).
The sustainability of SHGs was also measured through following assessment
indicators: frequency and attendance of meetings, volume of saving, rotation
of own saving, development of financial skill and quality of leadership (Tankha
2002). It was argued that the financial and institutional sustainability of SHGs
depends on the quantity and quality of financial services that the groups provide
to their members, how best the groups mobilize savings from members, loans
from banks and other credit agencies and build group corpus for lending to their
members (APMAS 2017). Suprabha (2014) pointed that the prospect and sur-
vival of SHGs depend on their graduation towards microenterprise development.
However, the growth of women entrepreneurship in India lacks because of social
rejection, family responsibility, gender discrimination and inadequate loans from
Das and Guha 119

banks (Singh et al. 2011). Ahlin and Jiang (2008) identified ‘saver graduation’
and ‘tendency towards membership expansion’ as key to make microfinance pro-
gramme sustainable in India. It was observed that better time management and
commitment to regular meetings may contribute to the sustainability of groups
(Ramakrishna et al. 2013).
The SHGs required a flexible organization and proper incentives to sus-
tain their performance with changes in the economic and social environment
(Schreiner 1997). Srinivasan (2008) emphasized on maintaining internal integrity
while discussing the sustainability of SHGs. The role of the federation was also
argued while providing sustainability to SHGs through financial and organiza-
tional support (Chakrabarti 2004; Christen and Ivatury 2007; Moyle et al. 2006;
Nair 2005; NCAER 2008; Reddy 2008; Shylendra 2018; Srinivasan 2008). The
study of EDA Rural Systems and APMAS (2006) mentioned that the sustainabil-
ity and quality of SHGs were affected by default on bank loans. It was suggested
that, for sustainability of the SHGs, the focus on social intermediation needs to be
combined with gender awareness, education, health, sanitation and social prob-
lems (Ramakrishna et al. 2013). Raja Reddy and Reddy (2012) argued the need
for sustained training and support for capacity building and sustainability of the
SHGs. The study of APMAS (2017) pointed that building strong social capital,
particularly, the SHG book writers, is instrumental for effective functioning and
long-term sustainability of the SHGs. Mahapatra and Dutta (2016) found that
the average loan balance per borrower, size of an MFI, cost per borrower and
yield on gross loan portfolio affect the operational sustainability of Indian micro-
finance programme. It was argued that small loan sizes, quick repayment cycles
and repeated loans of MFIs constrict the borrowers to opt for low-risk ventures,
with women borrowers facing additional barriers as their gendered role forces
them to be less risky and follow traditionally accepted business modes, rather than
making big headway (Dutta and Banerjee 2018). Fragmentation in terms of social
identities, or more specifically religious–linguistic fractionalization, was associ-
ated with a greater probability of group exit (Kolstad et al. 2016).
However, the aforementioned studies analysed various sustainability factors in
isolation. There are limited studies which use multidimensional composite index-
ing with a combination of institutional, managerial and financial sustainability
indicators to evaluate the sustainability of SHGs. In fact, this is probably the first
empirical article in Assam to evaluate the status of group sustainability. Therefore,
the present study is an attempt to bridge this research gap by answering the critical
question: do SHGs sustain their role in the long run?

Data and Methodology

Study Site and the Sample

The study was based on both secondary and primary data. Secondary data were
collected from basic statistical returns of RBI, quarterly statistics on deposits
and credit of scheduled commercial banks, NABARD and Census of India 2011.
120 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

Primary data were collected from September to December 2014, and the region
for field survey was limited to the Lower Brahmaputra Valley of Assam.1
Figure 1 presents a map of Assam showing the study districts and development
blocks. A multistage sampling design was adopted to collect primary data. In
the first stage, three districts, namely Nalbari, Barpeta and Baska, were selected
purposively among eight districts of the stated region (Table A2).1 Nalbari dis-
trict was selected among the districts with high banking performance index
value, while Barpeta and Baska districts were selected among the districts with
average and below average banking performance index value, respectively
(refer to Table A2).1 In the second stage, two development blocks from each

Figure 1. Map of Sampled Districts and Development Blocks in the Study area of Assam
Source: T. Das 2018.
Das and Guha 121

district were selected. Hence, altogether six development blocks were selected
for study. In the third stage, from each block, two villages were chosen keeping
in view the representation of variations in socio-economic conditions. Therefore,
totally 12 villages were chosen for the study. In the fourth stage, from each vil-
lage, five SHGs were chosen purposively for the study, and in total, a sample of
60 SHGs was surveyed.
The authors believe that successful and strong SHGs, rather than weak ones,
are most relevant to assessing the sustainability of the groups. The present study
selected SHGs on the basis of their age (older SHGs with reference to their date
of establishment), saving amount (SHGs with higher amount of saving), loan
amount (SHGs with higher amount of loan), the number of loan taken from banks
(SHGs with multiple numbers of loan) and their economic activities (SHGs with
successful economic activities). The study assumed that the SHGs with the afore-
mentioned criteria were successful and strong.
Table 1 shows that out of 647 members in 60 SHGs, 2.8 per cent are
Muslims; 31.4 per cent and 17.2 per cent members belong to Scheduled Caste
(SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) categories, respectively;, 24 per cent members
are illiterate; and 59.04 per cent members with family income less than 10,000
per month.

Construction of Organizational Sustainability Index of SHGs

The present study attempts to evaluate the organizational sustainability of SHGs
with the dropout rate of the members in line with the study of NCAER (2008). As
the criteria for examining the nature of group sustainability at the organizational
level was being overlooked in the study by NCAER (2008), the present study
attempts to bring it into the consideration with a criterion as developed in Table 2.

Drop Out Rate(OSISHG ) =

Number of Drop Out Members
Number of Current Members + Number of Drop Out Members

Table 1. Socio-economic Profile of Surveyed SHGs

Average group members 10.78
Average age of the groups (years) 7.07
Percentage of Muslim members 2.8
Percentage of Scheduled Tribe (ST) members 17.2
Percentage of Scheduled Caste (SC) members 31.4
Percentage of members having no formal schooling 24
Percentage of members with education primary schooling 37.4
Percentage of members with family income < 10,000 (per month) 59.04
Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.
122 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

Table 2. Criteria to Measure the Status of Organizational Sustainability of SHGs

Specified Range Assigned Score and Nature of Sustainability
OSI SHG
=0 Score: 0; Nature: Highest
0 < OSISHG ≤ 5 Score: 25; Nature: High
6 ≤ OSISHG ≤ 11 Score: 50; Nature: Medium
12 ≤ OSISHG ≤ 17 Score: 75; Nature: Low
OSI SHG
> 17 Score: 100; Nature: Lowest
Source: Authors’ development based on the dropout rate of SHG members.

Construction of Managerial Sustainability Index of SHGs

Based on the literature and theoretical considerations of managerial sustainability
of SHGs, a set of indicators being derived which is listed in Table 3.
Let Zij denote the value of the jth indicators of managerial sustainability for
the ith SHG. Thus, the general form of managerial sustainability index of SHGs
(MSISHG) can be expressed as
6

SHG
∑ Z
j=1 ij
MSI = ;1 ≤ MSISHG ≤ 3
6

The value of MSISHG lies between 1 and 3. Table 4 shows the criteria for examin-
ing the nature of managerial sustainability of SHGs.

Construction of Financial Sustainability Index of SHGs

To play the intended role, SHGs must emerge as sustainable entities not only
organizationally and managerially but also financially. The description of the
indicators used to measure the financial sustainability of SHGs is presented in
Table 5.
Let Zij denote the value of the jth indicators of financial sustainability for the ith
SHGs. Thus, the general form of financial sustainability index of SHGs (FSISHG)
can be expressed as
8

SHG
∑ Z
j=1 ij
FSI = ;1 ≤ FSISHG ≤ 3
8

The value of FSISHG lies between 1 and 3 and follows the same criteria as stated
in Table 4 to measure the status of financial sustainability of SHGs.

Construction of Multidimensional Sustainability Index of SHGs

Let Zij denote the value of the jth indicators of multidimensional sustainability for
the ith SHGs. Thus, the general form of MDSISHG can be expressed as
Das and Guha 123

Table 3. Indicators for Measuring Managerial Sustainability of SHGs

Serial No. Indicators Categories Score
1 Frequency of the group Weekly 3
meeting (FM) Fortnightly 2
Monthly 1
2 Attendance of the Over 90% 3
members in the meeting 70–90% 2
(AM)
Less than 70% 1
3 Maintenance of group Group members 3
records (MGR) Promoter agency 2
Others 1
4 Decision-making process Consensus 3
(DMP) Group leader 2
Promoter agency 1
5 Rotation of group Half yearly 3
leadership (RGL) Annually 2
Not rotating 1
6 Conflict resolve capacity Extremely efficient 3
of the group (CRC) Efficient 2
Poor 1
Source: Authors’ development based on relevant literatures.

Table 4. Criteria to Measure the Status of Managerial Sustainability of SHGs

Specified Range Assigned Score and Nature of Sustainability
MSI SHG
=3 Score: 0; Nature: Highest
2.5 ≤ MSISHG ≤ 2.9 Score: 25; Nature: High
2 ≤ MSISHG ≤ 2.4 Score: 50; Nature: Medium
1.1 ≤ MSISHG ≤ 1.9 Score: 75; Nature: Low
MSISHG = 1 Score: 100; Nature: Lowest
Source: Authors’ development based on the value of different indicators.
Note: This criteria is also used to measure the status of financial sustainability of SHGs.

3
∑ Z
j=1 ij
MDSISHG = ; 0 ≤ MDSISHG ≤ 100
3

j = organizational, managerial and financial sustainability index in terms of

assigned score (i.e., organizational sustainability index of SHGs [OSISHG],
MSISHG and FSISHG value in terms of score—0, 25, 50, 75 and 100)
Zij = sustainability score of jth indicators for ith SHGs
i = number of SHGs—from 1 to 60
124 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

Table 5. Indicators for Measuring Financial Sustainability of SHGs

Indicators Categories Score
Total savings of the SHGs (TSG) More than `10,000 3
`5000–`10,000 2
Less than `5,000 1
Total borrowing of the SHGs (TBG) More than `1,00,000 3
`50000–`1,00,000 2
Less than `50,000 1
Repayment of loan by the SHGs (RLG) Over 90% 3
70–90% 2
Less than 70% 1
Total lending of the SHGs (TLG) More than `10,000 3
`5,000–`10,000 2
Less than `5,000 1
Repayment of loan by the SHGs Over 90% 3
members (RLM) 70–90% 2
Less than 70% 1
Provision of loan for productive Over 90% 3
purposes (PPP) 70–90% 2
Less than 70% 1
Utilization of loan by the SHG members Fully 3
for the productive purposes (UMPP) Partially 2
Other purposes 1
Dependence of SHG members on None 3
informal sources (MDIL) Less than 10% 2
More than 10% 1
Source: Authors’ development based on relevant literatures.

Table 6 presents the criteria for measuring the status of multidimensional sus-
tainability of SHGs.
The MDSISHG value becomes 0 when OSISHG, MSISHG and FSISHG show the
highest level of performance (i.e., when all entire index scored 0). Similarly, the
MDSISHG value becomes 50 when OSISHG, MSISHG and FSISHG show the lowest
level of performance (i.e., when these entire index scored 100).

Results and Discussion

Table 7 indicates that nearly 6.69 per cent of the total 647 SHG members dropped
out from their respective groups. In addition, 35 per cent SHGs (n = 21) experi-
ence drop out owing to the inability to deposit compulsory savings in groups
Das and Guha 125

Table 6. Criteria to Measure the Status of Multidimensional Sustainability of SHGs

Specified Range Nature of Multidimensional Sustainability of SHGs
0 ≤ MDSI SHG
≤ 10 Highest
11 ≤ MDSISHG ≤ 20 High
21 ≤ MDSI SHG
≤ 30 Medium
31 ≤ MDSISHG ≤ 40 Low
41 ≤ MDSI SHG
≤ 100 Lowest
Source: Authors’ development based on the value of different indicators.

Table 7. Distribution of Groups Across Organizational Sustainability Indicator

Total dropout SHGs 21 (35)
No. of dropout members 45 (6.96)
Average no. of dropout members 2.14
Average dropout ratio 2.35
Dropout members because of unable to save 15 (33.33)
Total SHGs 60
Total SHG members 647
Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.
Note: Figures in the parentheses represent proportion.

(Table 7). However, findings of NCAER (2008) revealed that the lack of benefits
from SHGs activities was the key reason for the drop out of the members (in case
of 44% SHG members). Isern et al. (2009) argued that the main reasons for drop-
ping out were death, marriage or migration.
From the results of managerial sustainability indicators as listed in Table 8, it
is noticed that the attendance of the group members at group meeting is not satis-
factory with figures ranging between 70 and 90 per cent (in case of 65% groups).
This is obvious because members may not continue to attend and invest in their
groups unless they find them helpful. It reveals that more than half of the groups
(56.7%) conduct group meetings on monthly basis. Moreover, only 63.3 per cent
of groups maintain group records on their own and in 20 per cent of groups by
the promoter agency (in our study: banks). Kumaran (2002) and APMAS (2017)
pointed that the poor record keeping was responsible for unsustainable activi-
ties of SHGs. The participation rate in decision-making process in 43.3 per cent
of groups is found to be satisfactory. This indicates the participation of all the
group members in decision-making processes of various group activities. Further,
leadership rotation is a concern: group leadership is not rotated in 73.3 per cent
of groups. Sundaram (2007) and APMAS (2017) observed that the lack of leader-
ship was responsible for unsustainable activities of SHGs. However, the conflict
resolving capacity is extremely efficient in 71.1 per cent of groups. It shows the
managerial ability of the SHGs in resolving various internal and external conflicts
by themselves.
126 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

Table 8. Distribution of Groups Across Various Managerial Sustainability Indicators

Managerial Options Proportion
FMi Weekly 43.3
Fortnightly 0
Monthly 56.7
AMi Over 90% 35
70–90% 65
Less than 70% 0
MGRi Groups members 63.3
Promoter agency 20
Others 16.7
DMPi Consensus 43.3
Group leader 38.3
Promoter agency 18.3
RGLi Half yearly 6.7
Annually 20
Not rotating 73.3
CRCi Extremely efficient 71.1
Efficient 21.7
Poor 6.7
Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.

While assessing various financial sustainability indicators, it is noticed that

among all SHGs, 36.7 per cent of groups has a total savings less than `5,000,
whereas 70 per cent of the groups has total borrowing more than `50,000 (Table 9).
This shows the inadequate group corpus and high burden of credit among mem-
bers. This is because, a high amount of cumulative saving in the group indicates
its strong financial base and enhances the possibility of timely repayment of the
loan. Moreover, it helps SHGs to meet the credit requirements of its members
more frequently. It shows that 46.51 per cent of groups repaid more than 70 per
cent of their credit. It is observed that amount of lending exceeding `5,000 is
found in 43.3 per cent of SHGs and out of total borrowed money, less than 70
per cent loan amount (in the case of 45.24% groups) is repaid by SHG members.
38.09 per cent groups lend 90 per cent of their money for productive purposes (in
our study: agriculture, education and house construction), whereas the loans being
partially utilized for productive purposes in 48.84 per cent of groups. They may
use the loans for social needs and consumption purposes, which are not going to
add anything to their income and asset level. This may be one of the reasons of
poor loan collection and interest revenue that cannot cover operating costs. In 80
per cent of SHGs, more than 10 per cent of SHG members are relying on informal
lenders. Such finding reveals the multiple borrowing of SHG members and domi-
nance of informal lenders in rural areas.
Das and Guha 127

Table 9. Distribution of Groups Across Various Financial Sustainability Indicators

Indicators Options Proportion
TSGi More than `10,000 33.3
`5,000–`10,000 30
Less than `5,000 36.7
TBGi More than `100,000 26.7
`50,000–`100,000 3.3
Less than `50,000 70
RLGi Over 90% 13.95
70–90% 39.53
Less than 70% 46.51
TLGi More than `10,000 35
`5,000–`10,000 21.7
Less than `5,000 43.3
RLMi Over 90% 21.43
70–90% 33.33
Less than 70% 45.24
PPPi Over 90% 38.09
70–90% 35.71
Less than 70% 26.19
UMPPi Fully 23.26
Partially 48.84
Other purposes 27.91
MDILi None 10
Less than 10% 10
More than 10% 80
Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.

Figure 2 shows that out of 60 SHGs, about 65 per cent (n = 39) have organiza-
tional sustainability score of ‘0’, while 33.3 per cent (n = 20) have a score of ‘25’.
Thus, majority of SHGs (98.3%) are situated within the range of ‘highest’ and
‘high’ organizational sustainability status (Figure 2). This may be because of their
similar socio-economic status, trust and coordination among group members.
The managerial sustainability score of 50 per cent SHGs is ‘50’, while for 43.3
per cent it is ‘75’ and for rest 6.7 per cent it is ‘25’. Thus, unlike organizational
sustainability, the majority of SHGs (93.3%) are placed in the managerial sustain-
ability status of ‘medium’ and ‘low’ (Figure 2). Dwarakanath (2002) and Satish
(2001) also argued the low managerial sustainability status of SHGs because of
groups’ norms and lack of adequate and timely training.
Likewise, 50 per cent of SHGs (n = 30) secures financial sustainability score of
‘75’, while 25 per cent (n = 15) scores ‘100’ and 21.7 per cent (n = 13) has a score
128 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

Figure 2. Proportion of Groups across Different Sustainability Score

Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.

of ‘50’. Thus, like the managerial sustainability, the majority of SHGs (75%) are
positioned within the range of ‘low’ and ‘lowest’ financial sustainability status
(Figure 2). It means that SHGs may do well in respect of achieving organizational
and managerial sustainability but may not emerge as a financially sustainable one.
It was also revealed that due to lack of proper financial services to the SHGs—
either loan amounts are not delivered on time or insufficient amount of loans are
the prime cause of unsustainable SHG activities (Dutta and Banerjee 2018; Ghate
2009; Mishra et al. 2001).
Figure 3 shows that 1.7 per cent of SHGs (n = 1) secures the ‘highest’ MDSISHG
status, 36.7 per cent (n = 22) are ‘high’, 58.3 per cent (n = 35) are ‘moderate’ and
the rest 3.3 per cent (n = 2) secures ‘low’ MDSISHG status.
However, none of the SHGs are found in the ‘lowest’ MDSISHG status. Hence,
the majority of SHGs (95%) are found within the range of ‘high’ and ‘moder-
ate’ MDSISHG status and may continue to function well over a long period of
time. Despite a first attempt of the present study to construct MDSISHG, the
results of the study are in line with Parida and Sinha (2010) where they argued
that only female SHGs were sustainable. It can be argued that the factors, such
as recovery of loans, per capita savings and linkage, with an SHG federation
determined the sustainability of SHGs. Moreover, some other studies such as
Nair (2005), Moyle et al. (2006), Shylendra (2018) and Chakrabarti (2004)
assessed that SHG federations play a critical role in improving the sustainability
of SHGs. However, in our study, SHGs are constructed by members themselves,
and some of them are promoted by banks. In line with the present study, the
study of Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) argued that the sustainability of SHGs
was well established in terms of increase value of assets and saving rate, better
access to institutional loans, higher rate of repayment, elimination of informal
sources and impressive social empowerment. The findings of the present study
contrasted the observations of Ahlin and Jiang (2008) which identified ‘saver
graduation’ and a ‘built-in tendency towards membership expansion’ as a key to
make microfinance sustainable.
Das and Guha 129

Figure 3. Proportion of SHGs Across Different MDSISHG Status

Source: Authors’ estimation based on field survey.

Conclusions
The SHG-BLP is now a major global microfinance programme in India with 8.7
million SHGs with deposit of over `195,000 million and annual loan offtake of
more than `47,000. However, the success of a microfinance programme depends
not only in the quantity of groups formed but also on the sustainability of these
groups. The existing studies analysed various sustainability factors in isolation.
Therefore, the present study made an attempt to examine the status of group sus-
tainability with the help of multidimensional sustainability index of SHGs by
combining organizational, managerial and financial indicators of 60 SHGs in
Assam. It was noticed that almost all SHGs were situated within the range of
‘highest’ and ‘high’ organizational sustainability status. In addition, unlike organi-
zational sustainability, the majority of SHGs were placed in the managerial sus-
tainability status of ‘medium’ and ‘low’, whereas 75 per cent of SHGs were posi-
tioned within the range of ‘low’ and ‘lowest’ financial sustainability status.
However, it was found that 95 per cent of SHGs positioned within the range of
‘high’ and ‘moderate’ MDSISHG status and, therefore, may maintain their function
well over a long period of time.
Thus, the study recommends for enlargement of the scope of semiformal finan-
cial institutions (in our study: SHGs) in rural areas of Assam only for income-gen-
erating activities with proper market linkages. Moreover, we should develop our
banking structure by involving these institutions which may differ from mainland
India credit policy to expand the income and basic amenities of the people of rural
Assam. In addition, there is a scope to regenerate and validate the findings using
relatively large sample size with SHGs of varied socio-economic background.
Therefore, this limitation is left to future research.
Appendix

Table A1. Parameters of Self-help Group Bank Linkage Programme (Amount in `)

Per cent of Per cent of
NPAOTLO NPAOTLOSGSY PCLD to SHGs PCS of SHGs
Year Assam India Assam India Assam India Assam India
2007–2008 11.4 2.1 15.8 3.7 4688.44 71,718 37508.8 48239.63
2008–2009 13.2 2.4 8.7 4.47 70508.66 79540.03 5667.86 7812.32
2009–2010 5.77 2.6 5.16 4.95 77170.3 99667.61 4753.93 9064.82
2010–2011 7.6 4.8 7.1 7.4 119765.2 146004.1 5406.53 9783.95
2011–2012 5.5 6.48 11.19 8.75 81703.32 164468.5 5830.38 8992.86
2012–2013 11.34 8.39 7.54 9.9 76026.72 181629.2 8069.917 13570.25
2013–2014 10.04 7.02 7.63 9.62 78982.90 209024.79 7878.41 16484.62
2014–2015 16.12 8.02 18.51 9.43 121,244 202566.72 6956.31 16032.29
2015–2016 16.47 6.93 16.75 6.15 68978.38 222426.85 6447.24 21820.38
2016–2017 22.63 7.45 23.12 7.39 82708.06 217628.95 5600.88 22882.63
2017–2018 19.15 6.65 22.99 7.09 118664.85 225531.74 6338.94 25172.52
Source: Authors’ estimation based on the Status of Microfinance Programme in India, NABARD.
Notes: NPAOTLO = NPA out of total loan outstanding, NPAOTLOSGSY = NPAs out of total loan outstanding under SGSY, PCLD = per capita loan disbursed, PCS =
per capita savings.
Table A2. Region and District-wise Distribution of Banking Performance Index Value in Assam
Regions IND 1 IND 2 IND 3 IND 4 IND 5 IND 6 IND 7 IND 8 IND 9 IND 10 IND 11 IND 12 IND 13 IND 14 Index Value Status
North Assam
UDA 0.46 0.64 0.64 1.09 0.30 0.98 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.59 0.47 1.55 0.82 0.87 0.70 Low
DARR 0.89 0.74 0.71 0.94 0.42 0.87 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.53 0.33 1.29 0.81 0.85 0.73 Low
SON 1.15 1.13 0.87 1.04 0.87 1.04 1.49 0.82 0.99 0.79 0.68 1.16 0.90 0.90 0.99 Average
NAG 0.84 0.87 1.06 1.04 0.42 0.98 0.67 0.73 0.85 0.63 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.84 Average
MOR 0.83 0.78 0.58 0.96 0.35 0.95 0.55 0.43 0.53 0.43 0.43 1.44 1.05 1.09 0.74 Low
Total 0.83 0.83 0.77 1.01 0.47 0.96 0.76 0.60 0.69 0.59 0.50 1.29 0.92 0.95 0.80 Average
Lower Brahmaputra Valley of Assam
DHU 0.25 0.04 0.78 0.77 0.36 0.53 0.31 0.64 0.49 0.66 0.34 0.88 0.52 0.48 0.50 Low
KOK 0.50 0.24 1.32 0.86 0.43 0.65 0.46 0.87 0.93 0.83 0.49 0.65 0.83 0.83 0.71 Low
BON 1.10 0.74 0.97 0.96 0.56 0.86 0.79 0.89 1.10 0.82 0.52 0.90 1.31 1.35 0.92 Average
GOAL 0.77 0.92 0.74 0.71 0.38 0.67 0.42 0.65 0.64 0.88 0.63 0.93 1.14 0.92 0.74 Low
BAK 0.52 1.09 0.56 0.65 0.34 0.43 0.24 0.44 0.36 0.83 0.84 0.99 0.74 0.82 0.63 Low
CHI 0.79 1.05 1.29 1.01 0.45 0.71 0.53 0.86 1.03 1.70 1.73 0.71 0.82 0.86 0.97 Average
BAR 0.84 0.91 0.80 0.99 0.43 0.77 0.54 0.64 0.70 0.88 0.86 1.09 0.82 0.83 0.79 Average
NAL 1.21 1.31 0.74 0.88 0.41 1.21 0.81 0.68 0.98 0.87 0.12 1.19 0.84 0.80 1.02 Top
KAM 1.13 1.36 0.63 0.98 1.18 1.66 3.20 0.71 0.96 1.24 1.81 1.01 1.25 1.24 1.31 Top
KAM M) 1.81 1.75 2.80 2.61 1.53 2.70 6.76 5.11 1.78 4.12 5.94 0.80 1.01 1.06 2.84 Top
Total 0.89 0.94 1.06 1.04 0.61 1.02 1.40 1.15 0.90 1.28 1.33 0.92 0.93 0.92 1.03 Top

(Table A2 Continued)
(Table A2 Continued)

Regions IND 1 IND 2 IND 3 IND 4 IND 5 IND 6 IND 7 IND 8 IND 9 IND 10 IND 11 IND 12 IND 13 IND 14 Index Value Status
Upper Brahmaputra Valley of Assam
LAKH 1.06 1.10 0.64 1.06 0.40 1.14 0.75 0.60 0.72 0.71 0.74 1.48 0.75 0.75 0.85 Average
DIBR 1.47 1.34 1.67 1.20 0.64 1.51 1.58 1.71 2.88 1.19 1.27 0.77 1.17 1.14 1.40 Top
DHE 0.48 0.36 0.74 1.14 0.38 0.91 0.56 0.57 0.50 0.73 0.50 1.56 0.79 0.81 0.72 Low
TIN 1.37 1.20 1.10 0.97 0.70 0.91 1.04 1.23 1.72 1.05 0.81 0.87 1.09 1.03 1.08 Top
SIB 1.27 1.22 1.08 1.10 0.05 1.20 0.11 1.00 1.44 1.04 1.18 1.07 1.13 1.19 1.01 Top
JOR 1.40 1.27 1.33 1.32 0.61 1.48 1.48 1.23 2.01 0.96 1.13 1.04 1.56 1.73 1.33 Top
GOL 1.24 1.35 0.93 0.86 0.38 1.22 0.76 0.72 0.95 0.88 1.07 1.13 0.74 0.74 0.93 Average
Total 1.19 1.12 1.07 1.09 0.45 1.20 0.89 1.01 1.46 0.94 0.96 1.13 1.03 1.06 1.04 Top
Hills and Barak Valley
NCH 1.41 1.58 0.74 0.43 0.46 0.74 0.56 1.20 0.15 1.42 1.59 0.49 1.24 1.32 0.95 Average
KA 1.17 1.35 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.36 0.28 0.92 0.95 0.62 0.69 0.69 1.77 1.45 0.85 Average
CAC 1.18 1.12 1.34 1.07 0.59 1.01 0.97 1.41 1.67 1.14 1.15 0.84 0.91 0.87 1.09 Top
HAIL 0.85 0.54 0.89 0.75 0.35 0.84 0.49 0.72 0.08 0.68 0.45 0.82 1.11 1.17 0.70 Low
KAR 0.84 0.91 1.13 0.75 0.49 0.66 0.53 0.82 0.79 0.86 0.76 0.72 0.92 0.91 0.79 Average
Total 1.09 1.10 0.94 0.72 0.48 0.72 0.56 1.01 0.73 0.94 0.93 0.71 1.19 1.14 0.88 Average
Assam 1.18 1.07 1.30 1.26 0.67 1.03 1.08 1.34 1.71 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.98 0.95 1.09 Top
Source: Authors’ estimation based on basic statistical returns of SCBs in India, RBI (2015); quarterly statistics on deposits and credit of SCBs, March 2015; Census of India (2011).
Notes: 1. BAK = Baksa, BAR = Barpeta, BON = Bongaigaon, CAC = Cachar, CHI = Chirang, DARR = Darrang, DHE = Dhemaji, DIBR = Dibrugarh, GOAL = Goalpara, GOL
= Golaghat, HAIL = Hailakandi, JOR = Jorhat, KAM = Kamrup, KAM (M) = Kamrup Metropolitan, KA = Karbi Anglong, KAR = Karimganj, KOK = Kokrajhar, LAKH =
Lakhimpur, MOR = Morigaon, NAG = Nagaon, NAL = Nalbari, NCH = North Cachar Hills, SIB = Sibsagar, SON = Sonitpur, TIN = Tinsukia, UDA = Udalguri.
2. INDj = Indicator 1–14.
3. Value of IND 1 and IND 2 are subtracted by ‘2’ to make it in the same direction with other indicators.
Das and Guha 133

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or
publication of this article.

Note
1. The available literatures (D. Das 2011; T. Das 2015, 2018; Sharma 2011; Sharma and
Matthews 2009) found the immense concentration of informal and semiformal micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) in Lower Brahmaputra Valley of Assam. Therefore, we can
expect a large number of borrowers from these credit sources in this region. Moreover,
we constructed one banking performance composite index (region/district-wise in
Assam) to understand the performance of formal credit sources. We used 14 indica-
tors while constructing this index-average population per bank offices (IND 1), aver-
age population per rural bank offices (IND 2), average deposit per bank offices (IND
3) (in million), average credit per bank offices (IND 4) (in million), average credit
outstanding per credit accounts (IND 5) (in thousands), number of credit accounts per
thousand population (IND 6), per capita credit outstanding (IND 7) (in thousands),
average deposit per thousand deposit accounts (IND 8) (in million), per capita deposit
(IND 9) (in thousands), average deposit per thousand deposit accounts in rural areas
(IND 10) (in million), per capita deposit in rural areas (IND 11) (in thousands), credit
deposit ratio (IND 12), households availing banking services (IND 13) (in %) and rural
households availing banking services (IND 14) (in %). In addition, we used distance-
from-average method while constructing this index. First, for each indicator, the actual
value was divided by the overall average of that indicator.

Yqst
Iq 
Yqst*

where Yqst is the value of indicator q for the state s at time t; Yqst* is the mean value of
indicator q for the state s at time t; q = 1, 2, …, 14. Subsequently, the average of all the
indicators gives us the proposed composite index = (∑q Iq)/14. The status of banking
performance is measured by the following criteria: 1 ≤ index value = top performer,
0.75 ≤ index value ≤ 1 = average performer and 0.75 ≥ index value = low performer.
The study region has an immense concentration of informal and semiformal MFIs, and
‘top’ performer (Table A1) on formal banking services. Therefore, in the study, credit
source availability is not independent with district- and village-specific characteristics.
This is also evident as the study districts are selected from each of the top, average and
the low performer category (Table A2).
134 International Journal of Rural Management 15(1)

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