Dr.

Gurneet Singh
 Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and
applying legislation to decide cases.
 Interpretation is necessary when case involves ambiguous
aspects of a statute.
 Generally, the words of a statute have a plain and
straightforward meaning.
 But in some cases, there may be ambiguity or vagueness in
the words of the statute that must be resolved by the
judge.
 To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools
and methods of statutory interpretation, including
traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative
history, and purpose.
 Interpretation of something means
ascertaining the meaning or significance of
that thing or ascertaining an explanation of
something that is not immediately obvious.
Construction and Interpretation of a statute
is an age-old process and as old as language.
 Interpretation of statute is the process of
ascertaining the true meaning of the words used
in a statute. When the language of the statute is
clear, there is no need for the rules of
interpretation. But, in certain cases, more than
one meaning may be derived from the same
word or sentence. It is therefore necessary to
interpret the statute to find out the real
intention of the statute.
 Interpretation of statutes has been an essential
part of English law since Heydon's Case in 1854
and although it can seem complex, the main
rules used in interpretation are easy to learn.
 We can say, interpretation of Statutes is required
for two basic reasons viz. to ascertain:
1. Legislative Language - Legislative language may
be complicated for a layman, and hence may
require interpretation; and
2. Legislative Intent - The intention of legislature
or Legislative intent assimilates two aspects:
i. the concept of ‘meaning’, i.e., what the word
means; and
ii. the concept of ‘purpose’ and ‘object’ or the
‘reason’ or ‘spirit’ pervading through the statute.
 Necessity of construction would arise only
where the language of a statutory provision
is
ambiguous,
not clear
or where two views are possible
or where the provision gives a different
meaning defeating the object of the statute.
 If the language is clear and unambiguous, no
need of construction would arise.
INTERPRETATION
1. Interpretation refers to
understanding the words and
true sense in the provision of
the Statute.
1. Interpretation is all about the 1. Construction determines the
linguistic meaning of the legal
text. It is all about exploring
the written text.
1. When the literal meaning of
1. When simple meaning of the
legal text is to be drawn, then
that will be called as an
Interpretation.
1. Interpretation precedes
Construction.
CONSTRUCTION
1. Construction is described as
drawing conclusions, in
relation to the case, that lie
beyond the outright
expression of the legal text.
legal effect of the words and
writings of the statute.
the words used in legal text
results in ambiguity then
construction is opted, so as
to decide whether the case is
covered by it or not.
1. Construction is used in
broader sense i.e. it not only
helps in determining the
sense and explanation of the
provisions of the Act but also
elucidates its legal effect.
 In this regard, a Constitution Bench of five
Judges of the Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak v.
A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 has held:

…If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the
plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of
the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises
only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words
used in the Statute would be self defeating.” (para 18)
 Again Supreme Court in Grasim Industries
Ltd. v Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002)
4 SCC 297 has followed the same principle
and observed:
Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity,
and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for
court to take upon itself the task of amending or
altering the statutory provisions. (para 10)
 The purpose of Interpretation of Statutes
is to help the Judge to ascertain the
intention of the Legislature – not to
control that intention or to confine it
within the limits, which the Judge may
deem reasonable or expedient.
 Some Important points to remember in the
context of interpreting Statutes:
i. Statute must be read as a whole in Context
ii. Statute should be Construed so as to make it
Effective and Workable – if statutory provision
is ambiguous and capable of various
constructions, then that construction must be
adopted which will give meaning and effect to
the other provisions of the enactment rather
than that which will give none.
iii. The process of construction combines both the
literal and purposive approaches. The
purposive construction rule highlights that you
should shift from literal construction when it
leads to absurdity.
 Unless the statute contains express words to the contrary it is
assumed that the following presumptions of statutory
interpretation apply, each of which may be rebutted by contrary
evidence.
 Presumptions represent the accepted judicial view of a range of
circumstances that have been predetermined to be the way in
which every manifestation of those circumstances will be viewed,
until any evidence to the contrary is produced. These tend to
arise from theoretical and practical principles of the law.
i. A statute does not alter the existing common law. If a statute
is capable of two interpretations, one involving alteration of
the common law and the other one not, the latter
interpretation is to be preferred.
ii. If a statute deprives a person of his property, say by
nationalization, he is to be compensated for its value.
iii. A statute is not intended to deprive a person of his liberty. If it
does so, clear words must be used. This is relevant in
legislation covering, for example, mental health and
immigration.
iv. A statute does not have retrospective effect to a date earlier
than its becoming law.
v. A statute generally has effect only in the
country enacted.
However a statute does not run counter to
international law
and
should be interpreted so as to give effect to
international obligations.
vi. A statute cannot impose criminal liability
without proof of guilty intention. Many modern
statutes rebut this presumption by imposing
strict liability; for e.g. -dangerous driving.

vii. Any point on which the statute leaves a gap

or omission is outside the scope of the statute.
A Rule is a uniform or established course of
things. It is that which is prescribed or laid
down as a guide for conduct or action; a
governing direction for a specific purpose; an
authoritative enactment; a regulation; a
prescription; a precept; as, the rules of
various societies; the rules governing a
school; a rule of etiquette or propriety etc.
 It should be remembered that these Rules
are Rules of Practice and not Rules of Law.
 Without these rules, it would soon become
impossible to not only understand the law
but even just to apply it, as new situations
are always coming to light which Parliament
and the courts could not have foreseen when
the law was developed.
 Do judges really use the rules of statutory
interpretation? If yes, which rule do they use
first? – Judges rarely if ever, volunteer the
information that they are now applying a
certain rule of interpretation. Often, judges
look to see if there can be a literal meaning
to the words used in the disputed statutory
provision.
 However there is no rule that states that
they must use the literal rule first.
No Legal Rules exist which state which rule of
Interpretation can be used
and
the rules of interpretation that have been
identified, are not themselves legal rules.
 An Aid, on the other hand is a device that helps or
assists. For the purpose of construction or
interpretation, the court has to take recourse to
various internal and external aids.
 Internal aids mean those materials which are
available in the statute itself, though they may not
be part of enactment. These internal aids include,
long title, preamble, headings, marginal notes,
illustrations, punctuation, proviso, schedule,
transitory provisions, etc. When internal aids are not
adequate, court has to take recourse to External
aids.
 External Aids may be parliamentary material,
historical background, reports of a committee or a
commission, official statement, dictionary meanings,
foreign decisions, etc.
 B.
Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of A.P.
and others, AIR 1986 SC 120 O. Chennappa,
Reddy J. has observed :
Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we
can always have recourse to external aids to
discover the object of the legislation. External
aids are not ruled out. This is now a well
settled principle of modern statutory
construction. (para 7)
 District Mining Officer and others v. Tata
Iron & Steel Co. and another, (2001) 7 SCC
358: The Supreme Court has observed:
It is also a cardinal principle of construction that
external aids are brought in by widening the concept of
context as including not only other enacting provisions of
the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of
law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which
the statute was intended to remedy. (para 18)
K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer
Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922:
The Supreme Court has stated that
interpretation of statute being an exercise in
the ascertainment of meaning, everything
which is logically relevant should be
admissible.
I. Primary Rules -
1. Literal Rule (Plain Meaning Rule) - It
means that statutes are to be interpreted
using the ordinary meaning of the
language of the statute unless a statute
explicitly defines some of its terms
otherwise. In other words, the law must
be read, word for word, and it should not
divert from its true meaning.
 It is also known as grammatical interpretation.
 The courts have to follow this principle even if it
results in irrationality or even if it is contrary to
the policy or intention of legislature.
 It does not look beyond the litera legis which
means letter of legislation.
 It just look at what law says.
 Words and phrases are to be interpreted by
courts in their ordinary sense, and the ordinary
rules of grammar and punctuations have to be
applied.
 Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company
Ltd. V. Custodian of Vested Forests, AIR 1990 SC
1747: The intention of the legislature is primarily
to be gathered from the language used which
means attention should be paid to what has been
said.
 Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal
Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 1678: A construction
which requires for its support addition or
substitution of words or which result in rejection
of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
 Oriental Insurance Ltd. Co. v. Sardar Sadhu,
Singh AIR 1994 Raj. 44: the words of a statute
must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning.
 Absoluta Sentantia expositore non
indigent – plain words need no exposition.

 Verbislegis non est recelendum – from the

words of law there should be no departure.

 Noscitur a sociis – meaning of an unclear

word or phrase should be determined by the
words immediately surrounding it. Court
interpret a particular word in the context in
which it has been used.
 Ejusdem Generis: when particular words
forming part of the same class or same
category are followed by general words then
the general words must be construed in the
context of particular words (Example - etc.)
 Casus Omissus: Omissions in a statute cannot
as a general rule be supplied by judicial
construction. It is certainly not the duty of
the court to strech the words used by the
legislature to fill the gaps or omissions in the
provisions of an Act as given in the case
Haradevi v. Dist. Board, AIR 1952 SC 362.
 The literal rule may be understood subject to
the following conditions –
i. Statute may itself provide a special meaning
for a term, which is usually to be found in the
interpretation section.
ii. Technical words are given ordinary
technical meaning if the statute has not
specified any other.
iii. Words will not be inserted by implication.
iv. Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of
time.
v. It should always be remembered that
words acquire significance from their
context.
 In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerala,
(1973) 4 SCC 225 J. Ray pointed out that a
word gets its ‘colour’ in the context in which
it is used.
 State of Karnataka v. Union of India,
(1977) 4 SCC 608: the words gathers its
meaning not only in the context that it has
been used but from the words used in similar
conditions.
 The Plain meaning rule, also known as the
literal rule, is one of three rules of statutory
interpretation traditionally applied by
English Courts.
 It is a rule of interpretation of statutes that
in the first instance the grammatical sense of
the words is to be adhered to. Bharat Singh
v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis
Centre, New Delhi, AIR 1986 SC 842
 In construing Statutes the cardinal rule is to
construe its provisions Literally and
grammatically giving the words their ordinary
and natural meaning.
 This rule is also known as the Plain Meaning
Rule, Litra Scripta Rule, Primal Rule.
 The first and foremost step in the course of
interpretation is to examine the language
and the literal meaning of the statute.
 The words in an enactment have their own
natural effect and the construction of an act
depends on its wording.
 There should be no additions or substitution
of words in the construction of statutes and
in its interpretation.
 The primary rule is to interpret words as
they are.
 It should be taken into note that the rule can
be applied only when the meanings of the
words are clear i.e. words should be simple
so that the language is plain and only one
meaning can be derived out of the statute.
 Lord Atkinson stated:

In the construction of statutes their words must be

interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless
there be something in the context or in the object of the
statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in
which they are used, to show that they were used in a
special sense different from their ordinary grammatical
sense.
 To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include
"definitions" sections within a statute, which
explicitly define the most important terms used
in that statute. But some statutes omit a
definitions section entirely, or (more commonly)
fail to define a particular term. The plain
meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced
with litigation that turns on the meaning of a
term not defined by the statute, or on that of a
word found within a definition itself.
 According to Viscount Haldane, L.C., if the
language used has a natural meaning we cannot
depart from that meaning unless, reading the
statute as a whole, the context directs us to do
so.
A text that means one thing in a legal
context, might mean something else if it
were in a technical manual or a novel. So the
plain meaning of a legal text is something
like the meaning that would be understood
by competent speakers of the natural
language in which the text was written who
are within the intended readership of the
text and who understand that the text is a
legal text of a certain type.
 According to the plain meaning rule, absent
a contrary definition within the statute,
words must be given their plain, ordinary and
literal meaning.
 If the words are clear, they must be applied,
even though the intention of the legislator
may have been different or the result is
harsh or undesirable.
 The literal rule is what the law says instead
of what the law means. (nature of law)
 According to Prof. Larry Solum's Legal Theory
Lexicon;
Some laws are meant for all citizens (e.g., criminal
statutes) and some are meant only for specialists
(e.g., some sections of the tax code). A text that
means one thing in a legal context might mean
something else if it were in a technical manual or a
novel. So the plain meaning of a legal text is
something like the meaning that would be understood
by competent speakers of the natural language in
which the text was written who are within the
intended readership of the text and who understand
that the text is a legal text of a certain type..
A literal construction would not be denied
only because the consequences to comply
with the same may lead to a penalty. The
courts should not be over zealous in
searching for ambiguities or obscurities in
words which are plain.
Tata Consultancy Services V. State of A.P.
(2005) 1 SCC 308
In the case of Pritipal Singh v. Union of India (AIR
1982 SC 1413, P. 1419, it was held that there is a
presumption that the words are used in an Act of
Parliament -
correctly and exactly
and
not loosely and inexactly.
If the literal construction leads to an absurdity,
external aids to construction can be resorted to.
To ascertain the literal meaning it is equally
necessary first to ascertain the juxtaposition in
which the rule is placed, the purpose for which it
is enacted and the object which it is required to
sub serve and the authority by which the rule is
framed
 As held in Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T,
2004 (9) SCC 686: the language
employed in a statute is the
determinative factor of the legislative
intent.
 The legislature is presumed to have made
no mistake.
 The presumption is that it intended to say
what it has said.
 Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. Commissioner of
I.T. (Supreme Court Division Bench Decision
dated 06/02/2007:
 it was observed that Section 271 of the Income
Tax Act 1961 is a penal provision and there are
well established principles for interpretation of
such a penal provision.
 Such a provision has to be construed strictly
and narrowly and not widely or with the
object of advancing the object and intention
of legislature.
 The statute creating the penalty is the first and
the last consideration and must be construed
within the terms and language of the
particular statute.
 Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar,
AIR 1961 SC 838 (5 Judges Bench of the Apex
Court):
 A statute providing for penal prosecution has
to be construed strictly.
 However, this rule is not of universal
application which must be observed in
every case.
 State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR
1982 SC 949 (3 Judge Bench): Where an ambiguity
exists and it has not been possible for the legislature
to express itself clearly, the court exhibits a
preference for the liberty of the subject and
resolves the liability in favour of the subject. (But
with exceptions – not that every statute which is
made to benefit the accused must always give him
solace example the Probation of the Offenders Act,
1958)
 Hiralal Rattan Lal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC
216: Treatment must be given to the whole Section of
a statute that includes provisos, illustrations,
exceptions, main provisions and also not to forget the
context in which the words are used.
Lalita Jalan v. Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., (3
Judge S.C. Bench – Date of Judgment
16/04/2003):
Penal provisions should be construed in a
manner which will suppress the mischief and
advance the object which the legislature
had in view.

Collector of Customs, Bombay v. East Punjab

Traders & ors., (1998) 9 SCC 115: The
provisions of a penal statute cannot be
presumed to have retrospective operation.
 Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (Supreme
Court Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Judgment delivered on 8th July 2010):
 The Rule of Strict Construction requires that
the provisions have to be read in conjunction
with other relevant provisions and scheme of
the act.
 Further the interpretation given should be
one which would avoid absurd results on
the one hand and would further the object
and cause of the law, so enacted, on the
other.
Delhi Financial Corporation v. Rajiv Anand, 2004
(11) SCC 625: Assuming there is a defect or an
omission in the words used by the legislature, the
Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency.

Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI (Supreme Court

Criminal Appeal – Judgment delivered on
02/05/2003 (Division Bench Decision): Supreme
Court stated that unless statutorily provided there
is no vicarious liability under penal law.
 Mayer Hans George v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC
722 (3 Judge Bench):
 The dissenting opinion of J. Subbarao strongly emphasized
the common law presumption of mens rea asserting that a
court cannot ignore mensrea on a slippery ground of
welfare measure unless the statute compels it to do so.
 The nature of mensrea that will be implied in a statute
creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and
provisions thereof.
 Thus according to dissenting judge the question whether
mensrea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence
will be decided by court when a case comes up.
 This is where the doctrine that unless a statute either
clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mensrea, a
constituent part of crimes, the court should not find a man
guilty of the offence unless he had a guilty mind comes
into play.
 Lalita Kumari v State of U.P., AIR 2014 SC 184:
The main question was the interpretation of
Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
 The Court held that the use of word ‘Shall’
leaves no discretion to police officer to hold a
preliminary inquiry before recording an FIR.
 Use of expression ‘information’ without any
qualification also denotes that police has to
record information despite he being unsatisfied
by its reasonableness.
 So court here interpreted the literal meaning of
words.
 Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088:
(Section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is
regarding restriction on imprisonment of offenders
under 21 years of age: it provides that the offenders
who are under 21 years of age when found guilty of
having committed an offence should be released on
probation u/s 3 or 4 as far as possible provided their
offence is not punishable with death sentence or life
imprisonment.)
 Section 6 of the Act is whether the age of offender
for the purpose of application of this section should
be reckoned as on the date of commission of the
offence or the date when the offender is convicted.
The phraseology used in Section 6(1) however
suggests that the age is to be reckoned at the time of
the disposal of the case.
 The object and purpose of the Probation of
Offenders Act 1958 cannot be said to be in
pari materia with the Juvenile Justice Act of
2000 (As the relevant date for the benefit of
probation under Juvenile Justice Act 2002 is
the date of offence).
 The Court would not construe a Section of a
statute unless the latter is in pari materia
with the former. Therefore a decision made
on a provision of a different statute will be
of no relevance unless underlying objects of
the two statutes are in pari materia.
 A.C. Aggarwal v. Mst. Ram Kali, 1968 SCR
(1) 205:
 Under Section 190 (1)(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Magistrate is
bound to take cognizance of any cognizable
offence brought to his notice.
 The word ‘may take cognizance’ in the
context means ‘must take cognizance’. He
has no discretion in the matter.
 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Road Rollers
Owners Welfare Association, 2004 (6) SCC 210:

Where the legislative intent is clear from the

language, the Court should give effect to it, and
the Court should not seek to amend the law in the
garb of interpretation.
 CIT v. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR 1950
SC 265: Hardship or inconvenience cannot
alter the meaning of the language employed
by the Legislature if such meaning is clear
on the face of the statute.

 Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. C.I.T, 2003(5)

SCC 590:
Where the words are unequivocal, there
is no scope for importing any rule of
interpretation.
 Narsiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR 2003 SC
1543:
It is only where the provisions of a statute are
ambiguous that the Court can depart from a literal
or strict construction.

 Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla

2003(1) SCC 692:
Where the words of a statute are plain and
unambiguous effect must be given to them.
 J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan AIR
2003 SC 1405,
 State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh,
2004(10) SC 349: It is for the legislature
to amend the law and not the Court.
 In Jinia Keotin v. K.S. Manjhi, 2003 (1)
SCC 730, this Court observed :
The Court cannot legislate.....under the garb of
interpretation........
In Shiv Shakti Co-operative
Housing Society v. Swaraj
Developers, AIR 2003 SC 2434,
the Court observed:
It is a well settled principle in law that the
Court cannot read anything into a
statutory provision which is plain and
unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the
legislature. The language employed in a
statute is the determinative factor of
legislative intent.
 In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi and others
2002(7)SCC, this Court observed:
It is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that when the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, then the
court must give effect to the words used in
the statute and it would not be open to the
courts to adopt a hypothetical
construction on the grounds that such
construction is more consistent with the
alleged object and policy of the Act.
(para 9)
 In Gurudevdatta v. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 2001 SC 1980, this Court observed:
It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the
words of a statute must be understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their
grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some
absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the
object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule
is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that
when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous,
then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning,
irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words
themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver.
 See also S. Mehta v. State of
Maharashtra, 2001 (8) SCC 257

 PatangraoKaddam v. Prithviraj Sajirao

Yadav Deshmugh, AIR 2001 SC 1121.
A court has to interpret law as it
stand.
See Abdul Husan v. Mahmuli Begum, AIR 1953
Lah. 364,
Chand Shankar v. Sukh Lal, AIR 1951 All 383,
Gopi Nath v. Thakurdin, AIR 1935 All 636,
Kidar Nath v. Bhag Singh, AIR 1937 Lah. 504.
 Ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning
should be given when neither the context nor
any principle of interpretation calls for a
restrictive meaning. CBI v. V. C. Shukla,
(1998) 3 SCC 410
 Where the words of a statute are absolutely
clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be
had to the principles of interpretation other
than the literal rule B. Premanand & Others
v. Mohan Koikal & Others, AIR 2011 SC
1925, Swedish Match AB v. Securities and
Exchange Board, India, AIR 2004 SC 4219
 The words of a statute must prima facie be
given their ordinary meaning. Where the
grammatical interpretation is clear and
manifest and without doubt that
interpretation ought to prevail unless there
be some strong and obvious reason to the
contrary. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Vijay
Anand Mohanraj, AIR 1963 SC 946; State of
Karnataka v. Gopalkrishna Nelli, AIR 1992
Kar. 198
 The Judges have to administer and to apply as
accurately as lies in their power, the precise
words of the relevant statutory enactment.
Abdur Rahman v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal,
pp.316, 327, Dhirendra Nath v. Nural Huda,
AIR 1951 Cal. 133
 Judges are bound to apply the law as it is made
and cannot enter into the question of what it
should have been, however, laudable the object
behind the latter. Gulam Nabi Jan v. State, AIR
1954 J & K 7: Gulam Ahmad v. State, AIR 1954
J&K 59, Sanwaldas v. Narain Das, AIR 1955
Bhopal 3
 In the case of Union of India v. Sankarchand
Himatlal Sheth & another, AIR 1972 SC 2388, it
is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:
“Where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, words
cannot be interpolated. What is true of the interpretation of
all ordinary statute is not any the less true in the case of a
constitutional provision and the same rule applies equally to
both. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the
sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning,
that is to say, if the words are semantically ambiguous, or if a
provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the
other provisions of that instrument, the court would be
justified in construing the words in a manner which will make
the particular provision purposeful. That in essence is the
rule of harmonious construction.”
 Where the language of statute is
unambiguous, it is not necessary to examine
the intent or object Act while interpreting it
provisions. Arual Nadar v. Authorised
Officer, Land Reforms, (1998) 7 SCC 157
 Plain meaning should be ascribed unless
context requires otherwise. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Mafatlal
Industries, AIR 1996 SC 1541
 Plainmeaning is the accepted principle of
interpretation while past practice is an
exception which is to be applied under
special circumstances. Any past practice
dehors the rule cannot be taken into
consideration. (D. Stephen Joseph v. Union
of India, AIR 1997 SC 2602)
 When language used in the statute is
unambiguous and on a plain grammatical
meaning being given to the words in the
statute, the end result is neither arbitrary,
nor irrational nor contrary to the object
of the statute, then it is the duty of the
court to give effect to the words used in the
statute because the words declare the
intention of the law-making authority
best. (Jagdish C. Patnaik v. State of Orissa
(1998) 4 SCC 456).
 Where the language of an Act is clear and
explicit, the Court must give effect to it,
whatever may be the consequences, for in that
case the words of the statute speak of the
intention of the Legislature. Indubai v. Vyankati
Vithoba Sawardha, AIR 1966 Bom. 64
 If any statutory provision is capable of only one
interpretation then it would not be open to the
court to put a different interpretation upon the
said provision merely because the alternative
interpretation would lead to unreasonable or
even absurd consequences. K.H. Ghole v. Y. R.
Dhadvel, AIR 1957 Bom. 200
 In Emperor v. Beneroi Lall, AIR 1943 FC 36,
ROWLAND, J observed : It is not for us to
concern ourselves with policy where the law
is clear but to give effect to its provisions
however injurious we may conceive the
consequences to be.
 See also Popatlal Shah v. State of Madras,
1953 SCR 677 : AIR 1953 SC 274; Darshan
Singh v. State of Punjab, [1953] SCR 319 :
AIR 1953 SC 83
 Legislativeintent can be gathered from the
words used in the Statute. Words are the
skin of the language. The language opens
up the bag of the maker’s mind. The
legislature gives its own meaning and
interpretation of the law. It does so
employing appropriate phraseology to
attain the object of legislative policy
which it seeks to achieve. (Pannalal
bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1996 SC 1023).
 It has been often held that the intention of
the legislature is primarily to the gathered
from the language used, which means that
attention should be paid to what has been
said as also to what has not been said.
Just as it is not permissible to add words or
to fill in a gap or lacuna, similarly it is of
universal application that effort should be
made to give meaning to each and every
word used by legislature. (Mohd. Ali Khan v.
CWT, AIR 1997 SC 1165)
 “Francis Bennion Statutory Interpretation” as
referred to in Ashok Ambu Parmar v. The
Commissioner of Police, Vadodara City and
Ors., AIR 1987 Guj. 147 it has been
succinctly observed as follows:
“In interpreting an Act of Parliament, it is not, in general, a
true line of construction to decide according to the strict
letter of the Act; but the Courts will rather consider what is
it’s fair meaning, and will expound it differently from the
letter, in order to preserve the intent…
…There are many so-called rules of construction that Courts of law
have resorted to in their interpretation of Statutes but the
paramount rule remains that every Statute is to be expounded
according to its manifest and expressed intention.
It is the basic principle of legal policy that law should serve the
public interest. The Court, when considering in relation to the
facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the
enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, should
presume that the legislator intended to observe this principle. It
should, therefore, strive to avoid adopting a construction which
is in anyway adverse to the public interest”.
 Follow words and their natural meaning unless
technical meaning is assigned in the statute and
not to go for searching the intention of the
legislature that essentially being interwoven
with words used in statutes.
 Follow not the policy and object/purpose of a
statute that is forthcoming in Extrinsic Aid (used
when the language in a statute is
vague/unclear/or possible of two meanings.
 When the words are plain then the courts are
bound to give effect to that meaning
irrespective of the consequences as the court
has to interpret law as it stands.
 The text is important, the context is
important. The words derive their force from
the context in which they are used.
 Maxims like Absoluta Sentatia expositore
non-indigent (plain words need no
exposition), Noscitur a Sociis (meaning of an
unclear word or phrase should be determined
by the words immediately surrounding it,
Ejesdem Generis (general words to be
construed in the context of particular words,
Casus Omissus (omissions in a statute cannot
as a general rule be supplied by judicial
construction.) etc. are used.
 Certain criminal law maxims are also
supportive of the Literal Rule of
Interpretation: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege,
Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Actus non facit reum
nisi mensit rea etc.
 Mischief rule - This rule attempts to
determine the legislator's intention.
 Originating from a 16th century case in
the United Kingdom, its main aim is to
determine the "mischief and defect" that
the statute in question has set out to
remedy, and what ruling would
effectively implement this
remedy. Smith vs. Hughes [1960] 2 All
E.R. 859
 In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC
183: The Supreme Court held that the Court
is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature in order to remove the ambiguity
by construing the provisions of the statute as
a whole keeping in view what was the
mischief when the statute was enacted and
for the purpose of removing which the
Legislature enacted the statute.
 Further the Court held that it would be the
duty of the Court to adopt that
construction which would advance the
object underlying the Act.
 The mischief rule is a kind of statutory
interpretation where it attempts to
determine the intention of the legislators.
 It basically originated in the 16th century by
Heydon’s case in United Kingdom.
 The main objective of this is to find out the
mischief and defect of the previous
statute which was in question and how the
new statute will come up with the remedy
that resolves the defect.
 This rule is also called as purposive
construction as there is purpose behind
making this ruling.
 Here court attempts to know the intention of
the legislators for bringing in the change in
the law.
 It also tries to analyze the mischief and the
defect which was present in the previous
law which leads to the creation of the new
law.
 The Mischief Rule is used by judges in statutory
interpretation in order to discover legislature's
intention.
 It essentially asks the question: By creating an
Act of Parliament what was the "mischief"
that the previous or existing law did not cover
and this act covers.
 This rule was developed by Lord Coke in Sir
John Heydon's Case, 1584, where it was stated
that there were four points to be taken into
consideration when interpreting a statute:
1. What was the common law before the
making of the act?
2. What was the "mischief or defect" for
which the common law did not
provide?
3. What remedy the parliament hath
resolved and appointed to cure?
4. What is the true reason of the remedy?
 And then the office of all the judges is always to
make such construction as shall -
1. suppress the mischief/defect and advance
the remedy and
2. to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief and
3. to suppress pro private commodo (for private
benefit, convenience) and
4. to add force & life to cure that defect and
5. to remedy that defect/mischief according to
the true intent of the makers of Act, pro
bono publico. (i.e. in public interest).
 The Court concluded that the purpose of the
statute was to cure a mischief resulting
from a defect in common law. Therefore,
the remedy of the statute was limited to
curing that defect. Judges are supposed to
construe statutes by seeking the true
intent of the makers of the Act which is
presumed to be pro bono publico (intent
for public good).
 The application of this rule gives the judge more
discretion than the literal rule as it allows him
to effectively decide on Parliament's intent.
 Legislative intent is determined by examining
secondary sources, such as:
- committee reports,
- treatises,
- law review articles
- and corresponding statutes.
 The rule was further illustrated in the case of Smith v
Hughes, 1960, where under the Street Offences Act 1959,
it was a crime for prostitutes to "loiter or solicit in the
street for the purposes of prostitution".
 The defendants were calling to men in the street from
balconies and tapping on windows.
 They claimed they were not guilty as they were not in the
"street."
 The judge applied the mischief rule to come to the
conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of the
Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from
prostitutes.
 This rule is of narrower application than
the golden rule or the plain meaning rule,
in that it can only be used to interpret a
statute and only when the statute was
passed to remedy a defect in the
common law.
 This rule has often been used to resolve
ambiguities in cases in which the literal
rule cannot be applied. As seen In Smith v
Hughes, the mischief approach gave a
more sensible outcome than that of the
literal approach.
 This rule has often been used to resolve
ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule
cannot be applied.
 In the case of Thomson v. Lord Clan Morris,
Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in interpreting
any statutory enactment regard must be
had not only to the words used, but also to
the history of the Act and the reasons
which lead to its being passed.
Eliot v. Grey, (1960) 1 Q.B. 367
According to the Road Traffic Act, 1930 uninsured cars
are not allowed to be driven or parked on the road. The
defendant’s car was parked on the road near the public
place but he was not using it.
The defendant was held guilty because the parliament
has passed a bill which states that people should
insure their car only then they can drive the car.
The mischief rule was applied by the court stating that
the car being used on the road if in case the car causes
an accident, insurance would be required. The reason
behind this was that people should be compensated
when they are injured by such incidents and danger is
caused to them by others.
 Royal College of Nursing (RCN) v. DHSS (1981)
case. Here the RCN challenged the involvement
of nurses in abortions. Under the offences
against the Person, (1861) it is an offence for
anyone to carry out an abortion. However, the
Abortion Act, (1967) claims an absolute defence
for medically registered practitioners to carry
out abortions.
 Hormonal abortions are commonly administered
by nurses. The Mischief Rule was used to
interpret that the statute of 1861 was trying
to combat backstreet abortions and therefore
nurses fall within the 1967 abortion act.
Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar (SC
Appeal (civil) 159 of 1953 decided on
06/09/1955)
In this case, they have applied the mischief rule in
the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution
of India, 1950.
Article 286 was in question because before that
every state had its own powers and privileges to
make its own laws regarding taxation.
But the Supreme Court said that Article 286 is
made in order to regulate the interstate taxation
system and to maintain a well organized taxation
system and make the whole of India as one
economic unit.
 Here Supreme Court of India has looked into
the history of Article 286 of the Constitution
of India, 1950 and also the reasoning behind
it by considering both of it they have
interpreted the statute by mischief rule.
 Ranjet Odesiey v. State of Maharashtra (AIR
1965 SC 881): The accused was charged under
section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
which is a punishable offence for selling or
having possession for sale of the obscene book.
 Accused argued that the shopkeeper is not
expected to go through each book to see
whether books contain obscene literature. He
had not read the book ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover
earlier. Therefore, his case does not come under
section 292.
 But the Supreme Court rejected the arguments
of the accused on the basis of Mischief Rule.
 In the case of CIT v. Sundaradevi (1957) (32
ITR 615) (SC), it was held by the Apex Court
that unless there is an ambiguity, it would
not be open to the Court to depart from the
normal rule of construction which is that
the intention of the legislature should
be primarily to gather from the words
which are used.
 It is only when the words used are ambiguous
that they would stand to be examined
and considered on surrounding
circumstances and constitutionally
proposed practices.
Two important formulas related to mischief are:
1. Pro-private commando: and
2. Pro-bona public
 Both these formula means that the Courts should
construe the statute in such a manner as to
suppress the mischief and encourage the
remedy.
 Simultaneously, further mischief could be
prevented from finding out the intention of the
legislature. It should be encouraged in such a
way that the intention of the legislature is
achieved.
Alamgir v. State of Bihar (AIR 1959 SC 436) in this
case the Appellant was charged under Section 498
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
A married woman was living with the appellant on
her own will.
The Appellant argued that he does not fall within
the limits of sec 498.
But Supreme Court said while rejecting this
argument, that section 498 contains words ‘taking’
or ‘enticing’ or ‘concealment’ or ‘detained. The
Appellants case falls within the last word
‘detained’ because the intention of the legislature
is to avoid the mischief of preventing the husband
from having intercourse with his wife.
 Sevantilal Maneklal Sheth v. Income Tax
Commissioner (Single Bench Decision of
Supreme Court) (AIR 1968 SC 697)——The
Supreme Court said that It is an established
rule of interpretation that the words used in
the statute should be construed in such a
way to prevent mischief or consequences
from it and achieve the intention behind
the statute.
Pyarelal v. Ramchandra Mahadev, AIR 1974 SC
223—In this case accused was charged with
sweetening the supari with artificial
sweetener. He argued that supari was not a
food under the Food adulteration Act 1954.
Supreme Court rejected this argument and
held that supari is an article of food. The
definition of food should be interpreted in the
context of the mischief which the provision of
the act was intended to suppress and advance
the remedy
Glaxo Laboratories v. The Presiding Officer,
AIR 1984 SC 505:
Supreme Court said that the purpose of
interpretation is to give effect to the intention
underlying the statute, and therefore, unless
the literal or grammatical construction leads
to absurdity, it has to be given effect to.
If two construction is possible, that
construction which advances the intention of
legislation and remedies the mischief should
be accepted.
1. It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in
sentencing.
2. The rule actually closses loopholes or covers the grey
areas which according to the legislators falls with the
intention of creating a given legislation.
3. It gives basis to the modern purposive approach that is
when the extrinsic aids are resorted to for the purpose
of construction of statutes when the intrinsic aids is not
producing results.
4. It allows the law to develop and adapt to the changing
needs.
5. The rule is intended to rectify mischief/defect in the
statute and interpret the statute justly.
6. It uses common law to determine how the statute is
interpreted.
1. It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the
16th century, when common law was the primary source
of law and parliamentary supremacy was not
established.
2. It gives too much power to judiciary which is argued to
be undemocratic.
3. It creates a crime after the event like in Smith v. Hughes
thus infringing the rule of law.
4. It gives judges law making role infringing the separation
of powers.
5. Judges can bring their own views, sense of morality and
prejudices to a case.
6. It may lead to disparity in sentencing as different judges
give different judgments even on the similar facts of a
given case.
7. It makes the law uncertain.
3. Golden rule - It is a compromise between the plain
meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their
plain, ordinary meaning.
However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is
unlikely to be the legislature's intention, the judge can
depart from this meaning.
where a word can have more than one meaning, the
judge can choose the preferred meaning.
If the word only has one meaning, and applying this
meaning would lead to a bad decision, the judge can
apply a completely different meaning.
 This rule of statutory interpretation allows a
shift from the ordinary sense of a word(s) if
the overall content of the document demands
it. (Context over the Grammatical/Literal Rule)

 This rule is a modification of the literal rule.

 It states that if the literal rule produces an

absurdity, then the court should look for
another meaning of the words to avoid that
absurd result. (What is absurd – that
construction which is not according to the
object, nature and scope of a given enactment)
 It allows a judge to depart from a normal meaning
of the word in order to avoid an absurd result.

 As we know applying the bare letter of law

sometimes may lead us to confusion and gives us an
absurd result.

 In order to overcome these kinds of results judges

will give an opportunity to the lawyer to come up
with the new interpretation to the law which will be
more certain and accurate to the case.

 This rule is used in two main situations:

1. When the meaning of the word is too narrow.
2. When the word itself has an ambiguity or absurdity
 Therule was evolved by Lord Wensleydale
in Becke v Smith, 1836 and in Grey v
Pearson, 1857, who stated,

"The grammatical and ordinary sense of the

words is to be adhered to unless that would
lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument
in which case the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words may be modified so as to
avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but
no farther.”
 Uttar Pradesh Boodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore
AIR 1988 SC 2239 (Supreme Court Division Bench) the
Supreme Court held that the expression “landless
person” used in Section 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna
Act, 1952, which made the provision for grant of land
to landless persons, was limited to “landless
labourers”.
 Landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture
but having no agricultural land.
 The Court further said that “any landless person”
did not include a landless businessman residing in a
city. The object of the Act was to implement the
Bhoodan Movement, which aimed at the distribution
of land to landless labourers who were engaged in
agriculture. A businessman, though landless cannot
claim the benefit of the Act.
 This rule of interpretation is used on the
basis of discretion of the judges on giving
due consideration to the consequences of
the judgment given by them.
 An example of the same is Section 125 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which
deals with maintenance given to women.
The court while interpreting the term ‘wife’
included those women who have entered into
bigamy, talakshuda women and divorced
women. The court has stated that even
though a woman may have relinquished her
rights on divorce, she may claim
maintenance u/s 125.
 In the case of the Chairman, Railway Board
& Ors. V. Chandrima Das (Supreme Court
Division Bench, Date ofJudgment
28/01/2000):
The Court interpreted that Article 21 shall be
available to non-citizens as well as citizens.
 In New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, 1963 SCR
Supl. (2) 459: the Apex Court had held:
“It is a recognized rule of interpretation of statutes that expressions
used therein should ordinary be understood in a sense in which they
best harmonies with the object of the statute and which
effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two
constructions are feasible, the court will prefer that which advances
the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature
envisioned. The Court should adopt a project oriented approach
keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out
so long as interpretative possibility permits.”
 In Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial
Tribunal, (1957) SCR 754: the Supreme Court
said:
“in order to get the true import of the statute, it
is necessary to view
the enactment in retrospect, the reasons for enacting it,
the evils it was to end and the object it was to sub-serve.
The Act has therefore to be viewed as a whole and its intention
determined by construing all the construing parts of the
Act together and not by taking detached section as to
take one word here and another there.”
 In Lee v. Knapp, (1966) 3 AH ER 961 Section
77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, provided
that “a driver causing accident shall stop after
the accident”, the interpretation of the word
“stop” was in question.
 In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle
stopped for a moment after causing an accident
and then ran away.
 Applying the golden rule the court held that the
driver had not fulfilled the requirement of the
section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable
period so as to enable interested persons to
make necessary inquiries from him about the
accident at the spot of the accident.
 InRamji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963
SC 1088: in construing Section 6 of the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, the
Supreme Court laid down that the crucial
date on which the age of the offender had to
be determined is not the date of offence,
but the date on which the sentence is
pronounced by the trial court.
 An accused who on the date of offence was
below 21 years of age but on the date on
which the judgment pronounced, if he was
above 21 years, he is not entitled to the
benefit of the statute.
 This conclusion reached having regard to the
object of the Act.
 The object of the Statute is to prevent the
turning of the youthful offenders into criminals
by their association with the hardened criminals
of mature age within the walls of the prison.
 An accused below 21 years is entitled to the
benefit of the Act by sending him under the
supervision of the probation officer instead of
jail. But not that every person accused of an
offence is supposed to get the benefit under the
Act.
Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil, AIR 1977
SC 2171: Section 33 of the Representation of
People Act, 1951, which permitted inclusion of
the name in the electoral roll “till the last date for
nomination” for an election in the concerned
constituency, has been construed.
Section 33(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 specifies that
the nomination papers shall be presented between
the hours of 11’O clock in the fore noon and 3’0
clock in the after noon. Reading these provisions
together in the light of the object behind them,
the Supreme Court construed the words “last
date” as “last hour of the last date” of
nomination.
 In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U P., AIR 1981 SC
1656 Sales Tax was fixed at two per cent, of the
turnover in the case of “cooked food” under Section
3A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant
firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture
and sale.
 Whether biscuits though intended for human
consumption, can be construed as “cooked food” and
liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under
the said provision.
 Held that if an expression is capable of a wider
meaning, the question whether the wider or
narrower meaning should be accepted depends on
the context of the statute. Here biscuit was not
covered within the words ‘cooked food’.
In Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Government of NCT of
Delhi (SC Division Bench Appeal (Crl.) 778 of 2004, Date
of Judgment: 04/08/2004)
The Supreme Court adjudicated that legal decision is
almost firmly established that where a patient dies due
to negligent medical treatment by doctors, they can be
made liable in civil law by paying compensation and
damages in law of torts and if the degree of negligence
is so gross and his act was reckless as to endanger the
life of the patient he would also be made criminally
liable to offence under section 304-A of IPC.
Thus he cannot be held criminally responsible for a
patient's death unless his negligence or incompetence
showed such disregard for life and safety of his patient
as to amount to a crime against the state.
 In another case Doctor Jacob Matthew Vs. State of
Punjab (SC Three Judge Bench Appeal (Crl.) 14-145
of 2004 Date of Judgment: 05/08/2005)
 Section 304-A of IPC was a sword hanging above the
doctor, working both in government hospitals and in
the private sectors. Since long, this has been made a
malady and they were practicing defensive medicine
so much that even proper treatment/surgical
procedures were being held back with the fear of
untoward results because of which doctors continued
to be sued for no fault of theirs.
 Supreme Court, in the case of Dr. Gupta, had
clarified that for ordinary negligence they could not
be held criminally responsible, it was only gross
negligence and precisely recklessness where they
could be criminally held responsible.
 The term gross is not a reference to Sec 304-A of IPC and
also not in connection to negligence. So in the case of
Doctor Jacob Mathew, the Punjab High Court argued that
doctors could not be considered on a different pedestal as
far as section 304-A is concerned.
 The land mark judgment of the three judges bench of
Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab,
practically absolves the medical professionals of the
liability of section 304-A.
 This is amply clear that Section 304, 304-A of IPC, can be
made applicable to the doctors theoretically but they can
feel unsecured in doing usual practices without any fear,
apprehension of being victimized on trivial grounds.
 The Honorable Supreme Court had gone through the details
of the problems faced by medical professionals and this
land mark judgment will no longer distort the doctor-
patient relationship and benefit the patients in the long
run.
 The bottom line of this land mark judgment
is, while expectations from the professionals
must be realistic and the expected standards
attainable, this implies recognition of the
nature of ordinary human error and human
limitations in the performance of complex
tasks.
 The level of competence of the doctors
should be maintained by continuous medical
education. Incompetence due to lack of
knowledge or due to quackery should be
actively discouraged by the regulating bodies
and associations.
 The judgment give room for criticism that the court,
vested with the power to interpret the written law
has instead, ventured to change the law by
interpreting it in the way it thought would be better
for society.
 Since Section 304 A of IPC refers only to rash or
negligent acts, it's a doubtful proposition that mens
rea must be shown for establishing a case of criminal
negligence.
 The interpretation reading in the prefix gross before
negligence also attracts the same criticism.
 However, the Supreme Court has not stated that
doctors cannot be prosecuted for medical negligence.
It has emphasized the need for care and caution in
prosecuting doctors in the interest of the society.
Advantages
1. This rule prevents absurd results in some cases containing
situations that are completely unimagined by the law makers.
2. It focuses on imparting justice instead of blindly enforcing the
law.
Disadvantages
1. The golden rule provides no clear means to test the existence
or extent of an absurdity. It seems to depend on the result of
each individual case. Whilst the golden rule has the advantage
of avoiding absurdities, it therefore has the disadvantage that
no test exists to determine what is an absurdity.
2. This rule tends to let the judiciary overpower the legislature
by applying its own standards of what is absurd and what it
not.
3. Here judges can technically change the law by changing the
meaning of the words in the statute.
4. This infringes the separation of power among the wings of the
Government that is between judiciary and legislature.
 4. Rule of Harmonious Construction - when
there are two provisions in a statute, which are
in conflict with each other, they should be
interpreted such that effect can be given to both
and the construction which renders either of
them inoperative and useless should not be
adopted except in the last resort. Bengal
immunity Co. v. State of Bihar AIR 1995 SC 661
 It is a settled rule that an interpretation
which results in hardship, injustice,
inconvenience or anomaly should be avoided
and that which supports the sense of justice
should be adopted. The Court leans in
favour of an interpretation which conforms to
justice and fair play and prevents injustice

Union of India v. B.S. Aggarwal, AIR 1998 SC

1537.
 In the case of Raj Krishna v. Binod AIR 1954 SC 202 (5
JUDGE BENCH). In this case, two provisions of
Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in
apparent conflict, were brought forth.
 Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can
nominate or second a person in election but section 123(8)
says that a Government Servant cannot assist any
candidate in election except by casting his vote.
 The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions
should be harmoniously interpreted and held that a
Government Servant was entitled to nominate or second a
candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly.
 This harmony can only be achieved if Section 123(8) is
interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as
well as to nominate or second a candidate and forbidding
him to assist the candidate in any other manner.
 The important aspects of this principle are -
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of
seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so
as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to
defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is
unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.
3. When it is impossible to completely
reconcile the differences in contradictory
provisions, the courts must interpret them in
such as way so that effect is given to both the
provisions as much as possible.
4. Courts must also keep in mind that
interpretation that reduces one provision to a
useless number is not harmonious construction.
5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory
provision or to render it loose.
 This rule of interpretation is adopted when there
is a conflict between two or more statutes or
between two provisions of the same statute.
 Every law has a certain purposes, so judges
should take those purposes into consideration
and it should be read as a whole while
interpreting.
 Judges should apply such provisions which are in
accordance with the public interest.
 The laws which are applied must be consistent
and shouldn’t overlap with other existing laws.
 Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a
rule.
 The reason is that this principle is based on
human tendency to be fair, accommodating, and
just.
 Instead of restricting the people from getting the
benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as
many classes as it can while remaining faithful to
the wordings of the statute.
 When the literal meaning of the statute
defeats the objective of the legislature, the
court may depart from the dictionary and
instead give it a meaning which will advance
the remedy and suppress the mischief.
 This supports the initial and modern
approach that is to effectuate the object and
purpose of the act. The main objective by
extending the meaning of the statute is to
ensure that its initial purpose (public safety,
maintenance of law and order) is justified.
 This rule looks into the reasons as per why
the statute was initially enacted and
promotes the remedial effects by suppressing
the mischief.
 Though the rule almost covers the main
grounds of the statute but cannot be applied
to Fiscal statutes.
 When a word is ambiguous i.e. if it has
multiple meanings, which meaning should be
understood by that word? This is the
predicament that is resolved by the principle
of Beneficial Construction.
 When a statute is meant for the benefit of a
particular class, and if a word in the statute
is capable of two meanings, one which would
preserve the benefits and one which would
not, then the meaning that preserves the
benefit must be adopted.
 Omissions will not be supplied by the court, only
when multiple meanings are possible, can the
court pick the beneficial one.
 Thus, where the court has to choose between a
wider mean that carries out the objective of the
legislature better and a narrow meaning, then it
usually chooses the former.
 Similarly, when the language used by the
legislature fails to achieve the objective of a
statute, an extended meaning could be given to
it to achieve that objective, if the language is
fairly susceptible to the extended meaning.
 This is evident in the case of B Shah v. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court AIR 1978 SC 12 (single
Judge Bench):
 where Section 5 of Maternity Benefits Act, 1961
was is question, where an expectant mother
could take 12 weeks of maternity leave on full
salary.
 In this case, a woman who used to work 6 days a
week was paid for only 6x12=72 days instead of
7x12=84 days.
 SC held that the words 12 weeks were capable of
two meanings and one meaning was beneficial to
the woman. Since it is a beneficial legislation,
the meaning that gives more benefit to the
woman must be used.
 Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. The
Workmen AIR 1961 SC 647 (single Judge Bench),
an industrial tribunal awarded more number of
paid leaves to the workers than what Section
79(1) of Factories Act recommended.
 This was challenged by the appellant.
 The Supreme Court held that the enactment
being a welfare legislation for the workers,
had to be beneficially constructed in the favour
of worker and thus, if the words are capable of
two meanings, the one that gives benefit to the
workers must be used.
 U.Unichoyi v. State of Kerala AIR 1962 SC 12 (5 Judge
Bench):
 the question was whether setting of a minimum wage
through Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is violative of Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution because the Act did not define
what is minimum wage and did not take into account the
capacity of the employer to pay.
 It was held that the Act is a beneficial legislation and it
must be construed in favour of the worker.
 In an under developed country where unemployment is
rampant, it is possible that workers may become ready to
work for extremely low wages but that should not happen.
 The petitioners, representing certain tile factories, challenged
the validity of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, as also the
notification issued by the Kerala Government prescribing
minimum rates of wages in respect of employment in the tile
industry on the report of a committee constituted under the Act
and consisting of the representatives both of the employers and
employees who agreed with its recommendations.
 The case of the petitioners was that the notification had in
effect fixed not minimum wages but fair wages and since neither
the committee nor the Government in fixing them had
considered the capacity of the employers to pay, the notification
was void.
 Held, that in view of the decisions of this Court the
Constitutional validity of the Act could no longer be in doubt and
any hardship that may be caused to employers by the wages
fixed under the Act or their incapacity to pay the same are
irrelevant considerations in fixing such wages.
 The rule of exceptional construction stands for the elimination of words
in a statute which defeat the real objective of the statute or make no
sense.
 It also stands for construction of words ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘may’, ‘shall’ &
‘must’.
 While ‘and’ is normally considered conjunctive so that both provisions
of a statute can be satisfied, ‘or’ is used of satisfying the clauses or
either of the provisions in a statute.
 The word ‘may’ generally has a directory for but is also has a mandatory
force where subject involves discretion coupled with obligation,
 Similarly ‘shall’ is considered to have a mandatory force and is used in
cases of statutes providing specific penalty.
 ‘Must’ on the other hand had a directory force and is used for statutes
against the government or using a mandatory force may result in absurd
results.
 While this rule seems simple, the draftsmanship lies in deciding whether
the statute should use a mandatory for or a directory force.
II. Secondary Rules/Rules of Language -
 Noscitur a sociis - When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be
determined by reference to the rest of the statute. The context is
always to be considered. Noscitur a Sociis literally means “It is known
from its associates”. The rule of language is used by the courts to help
interpret legislation. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis" the
questionable meaning of a word or doubtful words can be derived from
its association with other words within the context of the phrase. This
means that words in a list within a statute have meanings that are
related to each other.

 Ejusdem Generis - When a list of two or more specific descriptors are

followed by more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of
the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any, of
the specific words that precede them e.g. vehicles in "cars,motor
bikes,motor powered vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
and therefore cannot be interpreted as including air planes. See Kerala
Cooperative Consumers' Federation Ltd v CIT (1988) 170 ITR 455 (Ker),
Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd v UOI, AIR 1989 SC 1019,
 CASUS OMISSUS: Casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est. A person, object, or thing
omitted from an enumeration in a statute
must be held to have been omitted
intentionally.
 EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION
ALTERIUS: The express mention of one
person, thing, or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others.
 The Expression literally means “the express mention
of one thing excludes all others”. Where one or more
things are specifically included in some list and
others have been excluded it automatically means
that all others have been excluded. However,
sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not
exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such
as "includes" or “such as”.
 Thus a statute granting certain rights to "police, fire,
and sanitation employees" would be interpreted to
exclude other public employees not enumerated from
the legislation. This is based on presumed legislative
intent and where for some reason this intent cannot
be reasonably inferred the court is free to draw a
different conclusion.
 The maxim has wide application and has been used
by courts to interpret constitutions, treaties, wills,
and contracts as well as statutes. Nevertheless,
Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius does have its
limitations.
 Courts have held that the maxim should be
disregarded where an expanded interpretation of a
statute will lead to beneficial results or will serve the
purpose for which the statute was enacted.
 The general meaning of “Expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another” is also known as The
Negative Implication Rule. This rule assumes that the
legislature intentionally specified one set of criteria
as opposed to the other. Therefore, if the issue to be
decided addresses an item not specifically named in
the statute, it must be assumed the statute does not
apply.
 Contemporanea expositio est optima et
fortissinia in lege: meaning Contemporaneous
exposition is the best and strongest in law.
 It is said that the best exposition of a statute
or any other document is that which it has
received from contemporary authority.
 This maxim has been confirmed by the Apex
Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta v. Delhi Stock
Exchange Asson. Ltd. AIR 1979 SC 1049, 1054
 The maxim Contemporanea expositio as laid down by
Lord Coke was applied to construing ancient statutes,
and usually not applied to interpreting Acts or
statutes which are comparatively modern.
 The meaning publicly given by contemporary or long
professional usage is presumed to be true one, even
where the language has etymologically or popularly a
different meaning.
 It is obvious that the language of a statute must be
understood in the sense in which it was understood
when it was passed, and those who lived at or near
that time when it was passed may reasonably be
supposed to be better acquainted than their
descendants with the circumstances to which it had
relation, as well as with the sense then attached to
legislative expressions.
 Usages and practice developed under a statute is
indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by
contemporary opinion and in case of an ancient statute,
such reference to usage and practice is admissible.
 This principle of ‘contemporanea exposito’ was applied by
the Supreme Court in National and Grindlays Bank v.
Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, AIR 1969 SC
1048 while construing Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
1888.
 The apex court also referred to the actual practice in the
matter of appointment of judges of Supreme Court and
High Court in the context of interpreting Articles 74 and
124 of the Constitution and observed that the practice
being in conformity with the constitutional scheme should
be accorded legal sanction by permissible constitutional
interpretation. (Supreme Court Advocates on Record
Association v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268.)
 K.P. Varghese v. ITO, Ernakulam (1982) 1 SCR
629: It is a well settled principle of
interpretation that courts in construing a
statute will give much weight to the
interpretation put upon it at the time of its
enactment and since, by those whose duty
has been to construe, execute and apply the
same enactment.
 Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Andhra
Sugar Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 625