Ocampo vs Ocampo Case Digest

G.R. No. 187879 ; July 5, 2010

PRINCIPLE/S:
Special Proceedings
a) Special administrator
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and
control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth
administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an
agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of
the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to
the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

b) Appointment of Special administrators

- Selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrator
- The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion
- Selection or removalof special administrators is at the discretion of the court as long as the
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted

c) Appointment of Special administrators is interlocutory

Reason: The appointment or removal of special administrators is discretionary.
Effect: May be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

d) Removal of Special Administrator

Even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the
appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and
giving no valid effect thereto

e) Giving of Bond is necessary to be appointed as special or regular administrator

Purpose of Filing a Bond an Administrator
1. The bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator provided
under Section 1 of Rule 81.

2. Section 4 of Rule 81 - The bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of
the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to
(1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased which come to his possession or knowledge;
(2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and
(3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them.
3. Compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and
discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. This woud benefit of the creditors and the heirs.

f) Section 1 of Rule 81 - Duties and obligations of an administrator namely:

(1) to administer the estate and pay the debts;
(2) to perform all judicial orders;
(3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and
(4) to make an inventory within three (3) months.

g) Sec. 1. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court – Who are incompetent to serve as executors
or administrators.
No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude.

h) Sec. 6. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court - When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

i) Sec. 2. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court - Contents of petition for letters of administration.
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors,
of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay et al. are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo. Leonardo,
together with his siblings Renato and Erlinda (Respondents), jointly controlled, managed, and
administered the estate of their parents, Spouses Ocampo. Under such circumstance, Leonardo
had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the
properties of the estate. Subsequently, Leonardo died and he was survived by his wife and the
children (Petitioners Dalisay). When Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and
management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners and the petitoners no longer received
the 1/3 portion of Leonardo.

Petitioners then initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in the RTC. Respondents, in
their counter-petition prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate
of their parents. RTC granted respondents’ counter-petition. Petitioners in their
Comment prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint
administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay
and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses. But RTC later
revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix and substituted her with
Erlinda. Petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration. RTC
granted this and revoked and terminated the appointment of Renato and Erlinda to their failure to
post their bond and accounting as joint special administrators and appointed Melinda as regular
administratrix.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. CA
ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint special
administrators, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal
hearing to determine her competency to assume such role. Hence, this instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE/S:
1)WON it was proper for the RTC to revoke the appointment of respondents as joint special
administrators.
2) WON it was proper for the RTC to appointment Melinda as regular administrator.

HELD:
1) YES. Selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrator. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion. Selection or removal of special administrators is at the discretion of the court as long
as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted Indeed, even if special
administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer
entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect
thereto.

In this case, the RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special administrators for failing to
post their administrators’ bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them,
tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Hence the revocation of respondents’
appointment as Special Administrator was proper

2) NO. Sec. 1 to 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court contains the provision for the determination of the
person to be appointed as regular administrator. But in this case, the capacity, competency, and
legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite
being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a
probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules. Hence, Melinda’s appointment as a
regular administrator was not proper.

Melinda’s appointment is supposed to be revoked. However, having in mind the objective of

facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and posting of bond by Melinda,
with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, Melinda’s appointment should be
converted into one of special administration.
 De Gala vs. Gonzales

FACTS: On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a
niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no
heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the
will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will
on the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate
of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several
demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of
the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.

CFI ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased
but Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix
be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by
both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was
removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the
ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.

LC - declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de
Gala from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix, and Apolinario
Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will.

Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that
a special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in
section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors and
regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different from that of
regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound
discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor
and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the
appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his
removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion
in the present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the
property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented
useless litigation.

The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not
executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by
Act No. 2645.

ISSUE: WON the removal of Serapia is valid.

HELD: Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of
the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay
any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a
special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely
discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case.
In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the property pending the
final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
2nd ISSUE: WON the will was validly executed.

HELD: YES. (please read the will in full text. harhar)The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the
center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.

As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-
mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses,
and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the
body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that,
standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection
with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the
legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.

The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the
will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is
without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.

In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs.
 Anderson vs Perkins | Reyes, JBL, J. (1961)

FACTS
Dora Perkin Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of
the late Eugene Arthur Perkins. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition,
petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an
order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond.
Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of
the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special administrator submitted an
inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased
Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.

About two years later, special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to
sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal
propertiesleft by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc.,
which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further
deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their disposition. When the motion
was heard, court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought
to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator submitted to the court, in
place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the
estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement
that said items were too voluminous to enumerate.

Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale reasoning that (1) most of the
properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband;
and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.

Lower court approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same.
Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds

(1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal
estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2 of Rules of Court;
(2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold
were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court;
(3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of
oppositor;
(4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of
the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the
articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a
substantial part of the personal estate.

Lower court denied the MR. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES/HELD
1. WON the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special
administrator has no legal authority to sell them / NO
2. WON the opposition of the surviving spouse of the deceased that she is entitled to a
large portion of thepersonal properties in question should be entertained / YES
 3. WON the oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which
she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious
claim / NO

RATIO
1. Section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special
administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold",
which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the
property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the
specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown
by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It is
in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the
property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such
administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold" .

Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and
judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of
the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership
property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the
ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal
partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to
which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve
their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to
be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various
gadget and books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and
storage measures in either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio
City) left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed
sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who
may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

2. It does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which
items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale
and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled
by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition
were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the
validity of the grounds of her opposition.

DISPOSITIVE
The lower court's order authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties
of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.
 G.R. No. L-20735
August 14, 1965
Liwanag vs. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D.
Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599 of CFI Manila.
Respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case
No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his
favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime.

On July 18, 1962, petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as
special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. Respondent, Hon.
Jesus de Veyra, denied the motion, whereupon petitioner filed case in Court of Appeals against
respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by writ of certiorari and enjoin said
Judge from entertaining said Case No. 50897.

CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding
with the trial of that case, until further orders. However, subsequently, the CA rendered a
decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs
against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay
any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her
as a special administratrix.

ISSUE: WON the special administrator shall be liable to pay any debts of the deceased.

HELD: YES. In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect
respondent's jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the denial of petitioner's motion
to the same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after
the rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an
action for foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person has
already been rejected by this Court.

In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the
deceased Pio D. Liwanag, a similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage and an
identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as follows:

The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure,
on the theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim
against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue
any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in
the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize
upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may
prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon
his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he
relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the
assets.
 Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action
for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.

Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special
administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find
the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the
present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted
will be defeated.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
 Tan vs. Gedorio

G.R. NO. 166520, March 14, 2008

The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

[OVERVIEW]

Respondent illegitimate children of Gerardo Tan wish to be the administrators over the estate
of the deceased. Petitioners oppose the same as they are already acting as de facto
administrators and, as nearest of kin, they must be given preference in the administration of
the estate.

RTC appointed respondents as special admin. CA affirmed RTC. SC ruled that preference of
nearest of kin does not apply to the appointment special administrator. SC affirmed CA.

FACTS:

Gerardo Tan died leaving no will. Respondents Racoma, who are claiming to be his children,
filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners Tan, also
claiming to be legitimate heirs filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Racoma then moved for the appointment of a special administrator to take possession and
charge of Gerardo’s estate until the petition can be resolved by the RTC. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim be appointed as the special administrator.

Tan filed an Opposition, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the
special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Tan contends further that
Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-
petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his
death.

Vilma, as de facto administratix, was issued directives by the court-appointed commissioner

which, more than a year later, she failed to comply with.

LOWER COURT’S RULING:

RTC- appointed Romualdo as administrator.

CA- Tan’s appeal got denied appeal, affirmed RTC.

Tan relies on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate. Thus, as
the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo they should be given the administration of the estate, as
opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children.
ISSUE:

WON nearest of kin should be the preferred choice as administrator.

HELD:

YES, generally. But for appointment of special administrator, it depends.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) Tothe surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) Ifsuch surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If
there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court,
and is not appealable.

Given the actions of the de facto administratix, Vilma, the Court is called upon to preserve the
estate for the benefit of all heirs. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the
requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate
of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.

Respondents, if they really do want to be admins of the estate, should pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated
the appointment of a special administrator.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. CA decision
AFFIRMED.
 Calma vs. Turla (2018)
Petitioners : MARIA T. CALMA
Respondents : MARILU C. TURLA
Ponente: Peralta (Second Division)
Topic: Remedial Law
SUMMARY: The SC affirmed the CA decision setting aside the RTC order removing Marilu as special
administrator, finding that the DNA testing ordered by the trial court was defective.

DOCTRINE :

The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on
grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the
judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his
judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
principles.Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of DNA testing
application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence
that may be obtained as a result thereof.

FACTS:On March 12, 2009, Marilu C. Turla filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 22, Quezon City a
Petition for Letters of Administration alleging, among others, that her father, Mariano C. Turla, died intestate
onFebruary 5, 2009, leaving real properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, bank deposits and other
personal properties, all with an estimated value of P3,000,000.00; that she is the sole legal heir entitled to inherit and
succeed to the estate of her deceased father who did not leave any other descendant or other heir entitled to the
estate as his wife, Rufina de Castro, had predeceased him; and that she is entitled to be issued letters of
administration. She presented her Certificate of Live Birth signed and registered by the deceased himself with the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. As the petition was sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due
course to it and set the petitionfor hearing. On April 21, 2009, the Letter of Special Administration was issued
to Marilu. Maria Turla Calma, claiming to be the surviving youngest half-sister of Mariano as he was her mother's
illegitimate son before her marriage to her father, filed an Opposition to the petition for administration and alleged
that Marilu is not a daughter of Mariano; that the information recited in her two birth certificates are false, the truth
being that Mariano and his wife Rufina did not have any child. She argued that she is entitled to the administration of
the estate of her half-brother and nominated Norma Bernardino, who has been managing the business and other
financial affairs of the decedent, to take charge of the management and preservation of the estate pending its
distribution to the heirs.Marilu filed her Reply stating that her filiation had been conclusively proven by her record of
birth which was duly authenticated by the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office
(NSO),and only the late Mariano or his wife had the right to impugn her legitimacy; that Maria had no right to oppose
her appointment as Special Administratrix of Mariano's estate since the former is not the latter's heir; that in her
capacity as the Special Administratrix of Mariano's estate, she had filed several cases against Norma and her
husband; and thus, Norma is not qualified to act as an administratrix because she has an interest antagonistic to the
estate. Spouses Robert and Norma Bernardino filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene as Oppositors which
was denied by the RTC in an Order dated June 2, 2010. Maria also filed a Motion to Recall Order appointing Marilu
as Special Administratrix on the ground that she has been collecting rentals from the properties of the decedent for
her personal gain and that she has been filing malicious suits against the Spouses Bernardino. Marilu filed her
Opposition thereto stating, among others,that she has all the right to be appointed as Special Administratrix since
she is the legitimate daughter of the deceased Mariano and that she is able to protect and preserve the estate from
Norma, the one being recommended by Maria.Maria filed an undated Rejoinder claiming that the case filed against
Norma before the RTC Makati,Branch 59, related to two promissory notes where the payee was Mariano Turla

ITF: Norma C. Bernardino,hence, a trust account was created which did not belong to the estate of the deceased.
Marilu filed her Reply to Rejoinder contending that in case Norma is appointed as Regular Administrator of the
estate, she will succeed in taking all the assets of the estate for her own use and benefit.On June 29, 2009, Maria
filed a Motion to Order DNA Testing as Marilu's blood relation to Mariano is in issue. Marilu opposed the same on
the ground that Maria lacked the legal right or personality to request for a DNA test as she has no legal interest in
the matter in litigation.On May 12, 2010, Marilu filed her initial Accounting of the funds that have come to her
possession. In an Order dated June 25, 2010, the RTC granted Maria's motion for an order for DNA testing. Maria
filed a motion to remove Marilu as Special Administratrix on grounds that she had incurred expenses mostly legal
without proper receipts which cannot be returned if the same is disallowed since it is not guaranteed that she will be
declared as one of the heirs. Marilu opposed the same arguing that the grounds raised in the motion are not
sufficient for her removal and are highly speculative; that she has made an honest and truthful accounting for the
approval of the intestate court; and that the said motion was filed for the purposeof stopping her from prosecuting
the various actions she had filed against the Bernardino spouses to recover properties belonging to the estate.On
August 28, 2012, the RTC received the Report of Dr. Maria Corazon A. de Ungria, Head of the DNA Analysis
Laboratory, UP Natural Sciences Research Institute (NSRI), on the DNA test on the blood samples from
Rufina's alleged siblings and Marilu, with the following conclusion:

Based on the results of mitochondrial DNA analysis there is no possibility that Mr. Ireneo S. de
Castro and Ms. Basilia de Castro Maningas are maternal relatives of Ms. Marilu de Castro Turla.
On September 11, 2012, the RTC issued an Order granting Maria’s Motion to Remove Marilu Turla as Special
Administratrix. In finding merit to Maria's motion, the RTC ruled that while Marilu's birth certificate stated her father to
be Mariano and her mother to be Rufina, the DNA test results conclusively showed that she is not Rufina's
daughter.Marilu filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which ruled in Marilu’s favor

ISSUES:

WoN the CA erred when it ruled that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Marilu as
Special Administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla on the basis of the DNA result showing that she is
not maternally related to Rufina, Mariano's wife

o NO. Clearly, the DNA test was ordered to prove Marilu's paternity, but surprisingly, the test was conducted with
the alleged siblings of Rufina, which showed that Marilu is not related to Rufina.While Marilu was shown to be not
blood related to Rufina, however, the DNA result did not at all prove that she is not a daughter of Mariano, as Maria
claims and which the RTC's order of DNA testing wanted to establish. Notably, Maria alleges that she is Mariano's
half-sister, but it baffles us why she was not the one who underwent the DNA testing when such procedure could
satisfactorily prove her contention that Marilu is not Mariano's daughter.

oMoreover, Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of DNA testing
application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence
that may be obtained as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with the Rules on
Evidence. Therefore, we do not find the DNAtest results as a valid ground for the revocation of Marilu's appointment
as Special Administratrix and her removal as such. Marilu's removal was not grounded on reason, justice and legal
principle.

oMariano's execution of an affidavit of adjudication in 1994 for the extrajudicial settlement of the intestate estate of
his late wife Rufina stating among others, "that she did not leave any descendant", would not also prove that Marilu
is not a daughter of Mariano whose estate is under consideration.

WoN Marilu violated her duties as special administratrix

O NO. Records show that Marilu had submitted with the RTC an accounting of the funds that had come to her
possession during the initial year of her administration. While she was directed by the RTC to submit an inventory of
all the assets of the deceased that came into her possession and knowledge and for her to render an accounting
thereof, such directive was only embodied inthe RTC's Order dated September 11, 2012 removing her as Special
Administratrix which she assailed by filing a petition for Certiorari with the CA, which reversed the same and now
the subject of the instant petition.

NOTES: Petition DENIED

 DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner, versus MARGARITA AVILA LORETO
and FLORENCIA AVILAPARREÑO, Respondents
G. R. No. 193161 Promulgated: August 22, 2011

FACTS:
1.Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas (no children of their own).
2.They adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968.
3.Florentino Manungas died intestate on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.
4. Avila was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
5. Engracia Manungas (administatrix) filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas (she stated herself, Avila and Ramon
Manungas [natural son of Florentino] as forced heirs). Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights
and Participation on October 29, 1980.
6. Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings (distributing the
properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas).
7.October 25, 1995, the RTC of Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia Manungas,
as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
8.Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, instituted a Civil Case against the spouses Diosdado
Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) in Panabo City (they’re occupying the property because they said Diosdado is an
illegitimate son of Florentino). Answer was filed beyond the reglementary period, not considered by
the MTC = summary judgment was issued in favor of Engracia. Spouses Salinas appealed in the
RTC of Davao City(affirmed decision of MTC).
9. August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before the RTC, Branch 2
in Tagum City, Davao (Diosdado is Florentino’s illegitimate son = Engracia’s heir).
10.Petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was
incompetent as an administrator of the Estate of Manungas claiming that a) he was not a Manungas,
b) that he was not an heir of Engracia Manungas, c) he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or
her estate and d) that he was in fact a debtor of the estate (liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP
177,000 because of the MTC decision).
11.RTC appointed Parreno AGAIN as the administrator of the Manunga Estate.
12.Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. Parreño’s appointment as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas
a) ceased upon Engracia Manungas’ death (her appointment as special administrator was without
basis),
b) Parreño was not fit to become a special administrator (already been fined by the court for failing
to render a timely accounting of Engracia Manungas’ property as her judicial guardian), c) Parreño
is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas.
13.RTC reversed decision, appointed Diosdado as administrator. CA reversed RTC, appointed
Parreno as Administrator.

ISSUE: WON Diosdado should be an administrator of the Manungas Estate (on the basis that he’s
an illegitimate child of Florentino).

HELD: NO. The mere fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not
mean that he is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas.
RATIO: Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the
discretion of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,[24] it was stated
that:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to
the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have,
the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to
preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the
Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
andpreserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the
heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would
effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from
such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the
estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion.

Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas’ estate:

In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special
Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate
child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to
the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the other hand,
Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is also the
niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia, as
by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s estate. Hence, the
Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as special
administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court exercised its power in a despotic,
arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be
remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.[27] With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is
still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The
CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.