China’s Increasing Role in Central Asia: Myth or Reality

Central Asia Drifts Out of Russia’s Orbit as Ukraine War Rages: Russia is losing influence
over former Soviet nations in Central Asia as the war in Ukraine increasingly strains
Moscow’s political, military and economic sway, analysts told The Moscow Times “There is
growing friction between the Kremlin, its proxies and local Central Asian elites,” said Paul
Stronski, an expert on Russia’s relations with Central Asia at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Not only are Central Asia officials concerned about the precedent set by
Moscow’s attack on a former Soviet country, but they are also using Russia’s declining
influence to re-orientate their economies, according to experts. In one of the most striking
instances, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev rejected Russian calls to recognize
eastern Ukraine’s pro-Moscow separatists in June when on stage with Putin at the St.
Petersburg Economic Forum. And last month, Tokayev’s Uzbek counterpart Shavkat
Mirziyoyev pointedly denounced Soviet repressions. “Local Central Asian elites are
unnerved about the Ukraine precedent,” said Stronski. Perhaps most significantly, Moscow
was conspicuously absent in a flare-up of violence between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan earlier
this month that left over 100 people dead and involved tanks, aviation and artillery.

Central Asia in Focus: September 7, 2022:Kazakhstan has been having problems lately
shipping its goods through Russia to Europe, so Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev
ordered his government to find alternatives. In comments posted on the Kazakh prime
minister’s website on September 3, Minister of Industry and Infrastructure Kairbek
Uskenbaev said Kazakhstan was looking into creating an “external terminal network at ports
in Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey." Usekbaev’s comments were not a huge surprise.
Kazakh officials have been in contact with counterparts in Azerbaijan and Turkey often in
recent months, and President Toqaev was in Turkey in May, Iran in June, and Azerbaijan in
August and shipping networks were one of the main topics. Disruptions to traditional trade
routes through Russia due to European sanctions on Russia for its war in Ukraine have led all
the Central Asian countries to take a closer look at the possibilities of expanding the so-called
Middle Corridor that connects Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian Sea and the
Caucasus. In Kazakhstan’s case, there has been added urgency due to problems shipping its
oil through the normally reliable Caspian Pipeline Consortium to the Russian Black Sea port
of Novorossiysk. Kazakh officials have said publicly they won’t recognize the independence
of the Russian-occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions of eastern Ukraine and since late
March the loading of Kazakhstan oil onto tankers at Novorossiysk has been temporarily, or
partially suspended four times, twice due to equipment problems, once when a Russian court
ordered operations suspended for ecological violations, and once when Novorossiysk
officials said dozens of WWII mines had been detected in the water near the port.

Central Asia to suffer as remittances from Russia nosedive: As Central Asia begins to the
feel the effect of Western sanctions against Russia, the World Bank has released some dismal
forecasts. Migrant remittances, upon which many families in the region depend, are about to
plunge. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two of the most migrant-dependent countries in the world,
will be most severely affected by the expected fall in remittances sent from Russia, World
Bank data published on March 4 suggests. Kyrgyzstan confronts the largest projected drop
this year out of 10 post-Soviet countries studied, with remittances expected to fall by 33
percent. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, forecasters had expected the cash transfers
from Russia to increase by 3 percent in 2022. Tajikistan faces a 22 percent fall, against a
previously forecast rise of 2 percent.
In Kyrgyzstan, remittances totaled the equivalent of 31.3 percent of GDP in 2020. In
Tajikistan, the figure was 26.7 percent. Kyrgyzstan will be particularly hard hit since the vast
majority of migrant remittances come from Russia: 83 percent in the first three quarters of
2021. In Tajikistan, the figure was 58 percent. Uzbekistan also sends millions of migrant
workers to Russia, but its economy is less dependent on their remittances, which were
equivalent to 11.6 percent of GDP in 2020. Nevertheless, the World Bank predicts a 21
percent decline. Some 55 percent of Uzbekistan’s remittances come from Russia.

Chinese Companies To Invest In Turkmenistan's Growth Development Transit Cargo

Industry:In further examples of how Chinese companies are now using the Belt and Road
Initiative to develop cash-flow generating businesses, China Civil Engineering Construction
Corporation and China Machinery Engineering Corporation are negotiating transit cargo
transportation agreements through Turkmenistan. Discussions have been held between
Mammetkhan Chakiev, Turkemistan’s Director General of the Agency for Transport and
Communications,[.....]

Chinese FM offers reassurance on whirlwind tour of Central Asia | Eurasianet: Going by

trade alone, Russia still retains a dominant position in the Kyrgyz economy. Where Russia
and Kyrgyzstan did $2.5 billion in trade (most of it heading from north to south) in 2021, the
figure for bilateral trade with China was $1.5 billion (almost all of it going east to west).

The War in Ukraine and its Potential Implications for Central Asia: China’s Perspective:
Russia’s potentially total or partial loss in Ukraine will redefine – either by strengthening or
weakening — its role as the security guarantor in Central Asia. Either way, this will likely
destabilise the region in a manner unfavourable to China. If the Kremlin strengthens its
security and political grip, it will spur massive protests against Russian presence, which may
further change the region’s leaderships—something that has already happened several times,
particularly in Kyrgyzstan. Such political instability will make Central Asian countries less
safe for Chinese businesses as well-sealed political ties between China and Central Asia are a
precondition for China’s economic presence in the region. Central Asia’s potential instability
might also affect trade routes along the flagship Silk Road Economic Belt, which have
already been redirected to Belarus due to the war in Ukraine. Finally, the regional turmoil is
likely to remove the existing political and business elites that are essential for providing a
favourable business environment to Chinese entrepreneurs. This, in particular, might also be
a result of the Kremlin’s potentially diminishing influence across Central Asia. Such a
scenario seems already underway as both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – Central Asia’s major
states – officially expressed their support for Ukrainian territorial integrity; both also
announced that they had sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Russian political losses in the
region would indeed pave the way for both the rise of radical political parties or, on the
contrary, grass-root civil society and pro-democratic opposition. The US and EU — which
have long developed and improved their Central Asian strategies— would seek such change,
particularly as it would be in line with Central Asia’s ‘Eurasian’ foreign policy outlook,
seeking greater engagement with multiple countries and international institutions. However,
this would represent another challenge for China: in the case of leadership changes, Beijing
would have to readjust its Central Asian strategy and cooperate with new political elites.
Finally, Russia’s new role in the region may also cause tension in the Sino-Russian power
balance in Central Asia as well as outside the region. China and Russia have recently
renewed their “limitless strategic partnership”and cooperated closely on a range of security,
business, and normative issues. However, the West’s ousting of — and sanctions against —
Russia as a result of the war in Ukraine weakened Moscow’s position in the Sino-Russian
partnership. China will likely use this leverage to advance its own interests, though it will
keep seeing the strategic partnership as necessary to balance against the West. To what extent
Beijing manages — and wishes — to maintain it remains to be seen.
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/war-ukraine-and-its-potential-implications-central-
asia-chinas-perspective-35060

Kazakhstan proposes ban of sanctioned goods to Russia and Belarus: Kazakhstan may
soon ban shipments of sanctioned goods to Russia and Belarus though its territory. The
Ministry of Finance has recently drawn up a directive, targeting goods subject to sanctions by
the EU and the US. The directive has now been posted for public discussion. If the ban is
passed, rail freight traffic between Europe and China, will be greatly affected.

The proposed ban is seen as Kazakhstan’s response to Russia cutting off its oil exports. On
17 June 17, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir
Putin when he participated in an economic forum in St. Petersburg, and publicly stated that
he did not recognise Luhansk and Donetsk as independent regions.

Perhaps the Russian government made a counterattack. On 6 July, a Russian court ordered a
Black Sea terminal in the country that provides oil export services to Kazakhstan to stop
operations for 30 days, citing possible ‘environmental damage’. About 80 per cent of
Kazakhstan’s oil exports to Europe pass through the terminal in the southern Russian port of
Novorossiysk, which transports 67 million tons of oil a year.
https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad/2022/07/08/kazakhstan-proposes-ban-of-sanctioned-
goods-to-russia-and-belarus/

Kazakhstan closes sanctions-dodging loopholes for Russia, Belarus Astana has closed a
loophole that was allowing Russian and Belarusian truckers to bring European Union
cargo across Russia to Kazakhstan without the correct paperwork. The clampdown comes
as Kazakhstan continues efforts to comply with international sanctions against Russia and
Belarus – fellow partners in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a free trade zone – to
avoid Western countries targeting Kazakhstan with secondary sanctions. Kazakh customs
officials have halted on the border at least eight Russian articulated trucks carrying goods
from the EU this week, Russian newspaper Izvestiya reports. On September 20 Astana
explained that truckers must comply with a rule requiring them to present two documents:
one from the cargo’s place of origin, and one from the place where it has been reloaded onto
Russian or Belarusian trucks for transportation out of the EU and onward to Kazakhstan.
With Russian and Belarusian trucks banned from the EU, they will struggle to secure those
documents.

The war in Ukraine is pushing Central Asia away from Russia | Lowy Institute: Russia’s
economic slump under the weight of Western sanctions had a direct impact on Central
Asian currencies, the welfare of its migrant workers in Russia, and imports. The prices
of food staples soared across the region after the Kremlin imposed a ban on grain exports to
fellow members of the Eurasian Economic Union. Central Asian governments and
populations have not been supportive of Russia’s war. Most notably, Kazakhstan’s Tokayev
refused to recognise the legitimacy of Russian-backed statelets in Ukraine’s east — mindful
of the fact that his own country shares a 7,600-kilometre border with Russia and has a
sizeable ethnic Russian population that Putin might want to “liberate”. Therefore, when Xi
said China would resolutely support Kazakhstan, the largest and resource-rich economy in
the region, “in protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” during his
stop in Nur-Sultan, it was perceived as a veiled warning to the Kremlin.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/war-ukraine-pushing-central-asia-away-russia

Central Asia Grapples With Influx Of Russians Fleeing Conscription: But there is also
plenty of anxiety among locals over fresh spikes in the costs of living in a region where
inflation is already surging. Some have doubts about the dazed incomers, many of whom
admit they know nothing about the countries they have arrived in. “It is time to think about
the future of our republic,” the activist, Askar Nurmaganov, citing the threat of rising prices,
soaring rental rates, and competition for employment as the motives for his protest. The two
friends were “running out of options” as ticket prices skyrocketed overnight for all visa-free
destinations with thousands of conscript-age Russian men thinking along the same lines. “We
just wanted to get out of Russia immediately. We were afraid the borders will be closed
soon,” Arkady said. “We won’t return to Russia as long as Putin is in power,” he added,
noting that Uzbekistan would be their next destination. Along with eateries, hotels and short-
term rentals, Central Asian cities are enjoying a postseason mobilization-linked boomtime.
Several hotels in Dushanbe appeared to be charging more than 50 percent their usual rates
with rooms fully booked into the first week of October. A woman named Orzu, who rents out
a two-bedroom apartment in a Soviet-era building not far from the city’s famous Rohat
teahouse, said her flat had never seen such high demand. Orzu has “two Russians staying
until the end of September and I am getting many more phone calls from other potential
customers. Most of them are Russians,” she told RFE/RL. At the same time, the arrival of
tens of thousands of Russians, often with significantly higher disposable incomes than locals,
has contributed to something of an economic boom across Armenia.
https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Central-Asia-Grapples-With-Influx-Of-
Russians-Fleeing-Conscription.html

Volume of remittances to Uzbekistan increasing:

https://kun.uz/en/news/2022/10/27/volume-of-remittances-to-uzbekistan-increasing

Uzbekistan, EU to push signing of EPCA: http://tashkenttimes.uz/national/9827-

uzbekistan-eu-to-push-signing-of-epca

Uzbekistan 2021 Exports Up 34.4%, China The Largest Market, Russia A Close Second:
Uzbekistan’s 2021 total exports reached US$12.5 billion in 2021, an increase of 34.4%
compared to 2020, according to the Uzbek State Statistics Committee. Products exported
were mainly industrial goods, food products, and chemicals, with the bulk of goods and
services in 2021 going to China, Russia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and
Tajikistan. Their share in total volume of exports reached 56.5% of the total. Uzbekistan’s
exports to the other CIS states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Turkmenistan, and Ukraine reached 32.6%. The export centre of Uzbekistan is its capital city,
Tashkent, which accounted for 22.9% of all exports, amounted to US$3.7 billion. However,
Russia overtook China in bilateral trade volumes, with US$7.5 billion in total, China running
a close second with US$7.4 billion. 2021 was the first time since 2014 that Russia-Uzbek
trade has been higher than China-Uzbek trade.
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/02/21/uzbekistan-2021-exports-up-34-4-china-
the-largest-market-russia-a-close-second/

Uzbek leader, Xi sign deals worth $15 bln on sidelines of SCO summit:
https://tass.com/world/1507977
Trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Russia may reach $8.5 billion by year end: Denis
Manturov said that the trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Russia could reach $8.5 billion
by the end of the year. “Obviously, it will be already higher than last year, because the
growth was already 37%. We expect to reach about $8.5 billion by the end of the year,”
Manturov said. According to him, in January-September the trade turnover between the two
states increased by 37%, up to $5.3 billion. We are also interested in the fact that Uzbek
manufacturers of auto components come to our market - now the situation is quite favorable
for this,” he said. https://kun.uz/en/news/2022/10/24/trade-turnover-between-uzbekistan-and-
russia-may-reach-85-billion-by-year-end

Trade Turnover Between Kazakhstan, China Reaches Record-Breaking $11 Billion For
First Half-Year: According to ERI, both import ($4,63 billion) and export ($6,63 billion)
data are at all-time highs, indicating a strong economic momentum between Kazakhstan and
China. This year’s trade volume is three times higher than what it was in the first half of
2016. Overall, the upsurge in exports is largely driven by an increase in oil supplies by 3.8
times up to $1.6 billion, while the rest of exports increased by 10.5 percent. The rapid import
growth, in its turn, is explained by a sharp increase in the supply of Chinese machinery and
equipment, computers, and other high-tech products. In January of this year, Kazakhstan’s
exports reached $771.7 million and imports – $648.5 million.
https://astanatimes.com/2022/08/trade-turnover-between-kazakhstan-china-reaches-record-
breaking-11-billion-for-first-half-year/

To Deepen Relations With Uzbekistan, Turkey Leans on Cultural Appeal – The Diplomat:
Despite all these efforts, Turkey cannot surpass the influence of Russia or China in
Uzbekistan any time soon, even in terms of language and education promotion. There are
already 750,000 ethnic Russians living in Uzbekistan, and up to a third of the population can
communicate in Russian due to the seven decades of Soviet colonization of the region, while
only 130,000 Turkish speakers reside in the country https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/to-
deepen-relations-with-uzbekistan-turkey-leans-on-cultural-appeal/

The Language of the China-Russia Soft Power Rivalry in Uzbekistan: Russia included the
notion of “soft power” in its 2013 foreign policy concept alongside promotion of the Russian
language. Language and education have become instruments to generate influence under the
rule of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia’s soft power in Central Asia is seen as a
“given,” rather than the result of planned strategy, due to the former Russian Empire and later
Soviet Union’s occupation of the region. Yet, with other players such as China and Turkey
entering the game, Moscow has found itself unintentionally rivaling them in the “soft power”
arena. The Russian language has deep roots in Uzbekistan. The country’s 1989 law “On the
State Language” referred to Russian as a language of “inter-ethnic communication.” Its post-
independence amendment in 1995, however, scrapped this status and left it up to citizens to
choose a language for inter-ethnic communications. Although ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan
have decreased in number since independence (from 1,593,800 in 1991 to 750,000 in 2017),
almost a third of the population speaks Russian, according to the Tashkent branch of
Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent
States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation. This
number may be an overestimation. Many people in Uzbekistan can communicate in Russian,
but are not necessarily fluent, especially outside of urban centers. For decades after
independence, there was not any need to promote the Russian language in Uzbekistan.
Learning Russian has always been a part of compulsory education in the country. It is taught
as a foreign language starting from primary school until graduation from secondary school.
Apart from that, there are 88 schools (with over 636,463 students) where the whole
curriculum is taught in Russian. And most public schools have Russian language groups.
Many parents insist their children go to Russian schools or groups – the quality of education
is considered better than in Uzbek schools.

Despite the evident high demand for Russian language education, there is some
local resistance to the prominence of the Russian language. This resistance, importantly, aims
to promote the native Uzbek language rather than simply eradicate Russian. In 2018, the
issue received renewed attention. Russian media started talking a lot about “increasing
attention to the Russian language” in the countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union.
When Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Public Education noted that there was a shortage of teachers
at Russian secondary schools, Russia’s Ministry of Science and Higher
Education proposed sending qualified Russian language teachers to Uzbek schools and
paying their salaries. The same year, the quota for Russian groups at pedagogical universities
in Uzbekistan was increased up to 30 percent. For comparison, in neighboring Kyrgyzstan,
four Confucius Institutes and 21 Confucius classes help around 4,000 Kyrgyz people learn
Chinese each year. In Kazakhstan there are five Confucius Institutes and over 14,000
Kazakhs study at Chinese universities. The numbers are relatively small for Uzbeks
– 6,500 Uzbeks were studying in China in 2019. Reportedly, around 30 percent of them
have funding from Chinese universities. There are no branches of Chinese universities in
Uzbekistan either, but at least three local universities offer Chinese language classes in
Tashkent.

From the perspective of Uzbeks, learning Mandarin is much harder and more time consuming
than learning Russian – not everyone, especially the poor, can afford it. But fluency pays off
as jobs with Chinese businesses can be particularly lucrative. As of May,
2022, 1,984 companies backed by Chinese investment are registered in Uzbekistan. The
Russian language, meanwhile, is pursued for its practicality. Office workers and those in the
service sector in urban areas especially require Russian fluency. Even branches of
international organizations require knowing Russian, while speaking Uzbek remains an
“asset” or “desirable” but not mandatory quality. There are 2,471 enterprises and
organizations with Russian capital – 210 of them launched in 2022 alone. Russian is
especially useful for the millions of Uzbek labor migrants who work in Russia each year.
Reportedly, only one in five Uzbek migrants in Russia knows the language. Due to this, in
2020, free language courses for Uzbek migrants (paid for by Tashkent) were launched in five
cities in Russia. According to Russian government statistics, 4.5 millioncitizens of
Uzbekistan were working in Russia in 2021 and 31,900 Uzbeks became Russian citizens that
year. Moscow’s main aim is to retain the existing legacy status of the Russian language
among locals. To this end, Russia targets every Uzbek as a potential Russian speaker. At the
same time, the importance and prestige of fluency in Mandarin and diplomas from Chinese
universities will keep increasing along with the bilateral relationship between Tashkent and
Beijing. Knowing Russian may provide access to a seasonal job in construction sites or in the
service sector in Russia, but investing in the Chinese language provides bigger opportunities
– and locals know the difference. https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/the-language-of-the-china-
russia-soft-power-rivalry-in-uzbekistan/

The End of the Post-Soviet Order: How Putin’s War Has Hurt Russia in Central Asia and
the Caucasus: On Russia’s bid to formally absorb parts of Ukraine, Central Asian regimes
have shown no ambiguity: they do not recognize the so-called referendums held in September
in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories nor these territories’ annexation. Kazakh President
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has taken the firmest stance on this question, in line with his
country’s refusal to recognize the putative independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The war in Ukraine has also dealt a blow to another kind of
Russian power: the country’s military prestige. Indeed, Russia’s military failures have hugely
surprised Central Asia’s authoritarian governments. Even if they have long seen Russia as a
tricky partner, they have relied on Moscow as a guarantor of security and a source of regime
stability. The war has profoundly shaken that perception. For governments accustomed to
receiving Russian military equipment at discounted prices and training for their officers in
Russian military academies, recent events have suddenly called into question the future
development of their own militaries. To be sure, governments in the region still lean on
Russian military power: in January, Russian troops intervened in Kazakhstan under the rubric
of the CSTO to support Tokayev during countrywide riots. They left quickly without
significantly undermining Astana’s legitimacy. Now, however, Russia’s partners in the
CSTO see Russian forces stretched and strained. Central Asians have, for instance, noted
Russia’s disinterest in the border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that left around
100 people dead in September: even if the clashes fell outside the jurisdiction of the CSTO,
Moscow’s silence was palpable. The mass arrival in the region of Russian citizens—first in
early March, fleeing the outbreak of war, and then at the end of September, fleeing the
“partial mobilization” and the risk of conscription—has inspired mixed feelings in Central
Asia. Some residents have been happy to help the newcomers, seeing these young and high-
skilled Russians as assets for their countries’ development. Others have viewed the arrival of
so many Russians as portending the renewed domination of Russian culture and Russian
language in their countries, a concern only exacerbated by the colonial attitudes of some
refugees and the increase in the cost of daily life that their presence has imposed. Russia’s
weakened status in Central Asia and the Caucasus has benefited other states. The recent
Shanghai Cooperation Summit in Samarkand demonstrated that the Russian president is no
longer the most influential leader in the region but rather one among many other leaders, with
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerging as the
main heavyweights. Central Asian and South Caucasian countries appear to have suffered a
good deal of collateral damage from the decline of the Russian economy and the impact of
Western sanctions targeting Russia: the shrinking of remittances, which make up an
important part of the economies of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, risks
pauperizing many people across the region. And Western countries should not expect some
kind of unequivocal realignment in South Caucasus and Central Asia against the Kremlin.
Albeit diminished, Russia remains a significant regional power. Military, economic, and
people-to-people links between Russia and the countries of the region will persist and not
suddenly disappear. Russian dominance may be crumbling, but no clear order has yet formed
to take its place. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/central-asia/end-post-soviet-order

Tajikistan Foreign Trade Up 20.8% On 2021:Tajikistan’s main trade partners, in order are
Russia, Kazakhstan, and China, followed by Turkey, Uzbekistan and Switzerland. This year
to date, Tajikistan’s foreign trade turnover up to, and including May, increased by 20.8
percent compared to the same period of last year, reaching US$2.9 billion. Tajik regional
trade could also get a boost from Russian trade and investment in the wake of the situation in
Ukraine and Russia’s need to turn east. Russian President Putin has been talking up
the importance of Russia-Tajik trade which has increased by 77% since March as Russian
exporters look for new markets.
https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2022/06/23/tajikistan-foreign-trade-up-20-8-on-
2021/
Russian Draft Dodgers Find a Mixed Reception in Central Asia: As Russia’s European
neighbors restrict entry for Russians in response to the war in Ukraine, the right to free
movement across the Eurasian Economic Union’s borders is truly beginning to be appreciated
for the first time, with tens of thousands of Russian men fleeing the mobilization order
heading to former Soviet states, including the countries of Central Asia. Previously, the open
borders had always been considered a one-way street benefitting so-called “low skilled”
workers from Central Asia heading to Russia for better wages and careers, while Russians
typically tended to look more toward Europe. Now, in a bid to avoid being sent to fight in
Ukraine, Russians are looking east and south, however temporarily. The Kazakh Interior
Ministry reported that about 200,000 Russians entered the country in the two weeks
following September 21, when the mobilization was announced, with many subsequently
going elsewhere: 147,000 left the country during the same period. This time, the costs of
accommodation and other services in some capitals have doubled and tripled. In unregulated
markets, landlords are evicting local families so that they can charge more to affluent Russian
tenants. Students and vulnerable groups have become the primary victims. The Kazakh
authorities have warned against replacing local workers with new Russian arrivals, although
anecdotal evidence suggests that is already happening. Since March, the influx of arrivals
from Russia has sparked a deficit of dollars, causing major problems on local financial
markets. The current mass movement has polarized local societies. Various groups of
ordinary people have sprung up to help the draft dodgers with medical assistance, food,
shelter, and information. Others are less enthusiastic, accusing their more welcoming
compatriots of having a colonial mentality for being willing to help the Russians, since in
Russia racial slurs are frequently used to describe Central Asians, and the phrase “for Slavs
only” is commonplace on Russian real estate websites. There are also references to the
widespread racism and discrimination faced by Central Asians when working in Russia, as
well as concerns about Russians taking jobs from local people, and about the economic
impact of the new wave of arrivals. On the other hand, being dependent on Russia for trade
and military security, among other things, regional leaders are being careful not to burn
bridges with their strategic partners in Moscow. At the beginning of the war in Ukraine,
Central Asian governments adopted a neutral position, balancing between the threat of
international sanctions for backing Russia, and the Kremlin’s possible retaliation for
condemning it.

The region has enough internal problems to deal with, beginning with interstate conflicts
(like the recent clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), the lack of cooperation among
the states, and risky domestic transitions of power, in which Russia could choose to play a
disruptive role. Their current silence on Russia announcing the annexation of Ukrainian
territory speaks volumes about these internal dilemmas. Only Kazakhstan has taken a bold
position, refusing to recognize the sham referenda organized in occupied Ukrainian territory.
Despite the neutrality at the official level, a significant number of people in the Central Asian
nations support Ukraine. Focus groups carried out by this author in all provinces of
Kyrgyzstan in spring 2022 showed that people supported the government’s neutral position
mainly out of concern for labor migrants working in Russia, and for fear of upsetting the
regional security status quo. The mass influx of Russian draft dodgers cannot help but fuel
fears over security and sovereignty. Kazakhstan, which shares the second longest land border
in the world with Russia, has been a target, following Ukraine and Georgia, of Russian
populist imperialist claims. Putin himself has publicly said that the Kazakhs never had
statehood before the collapse of the Soviet Union, something recently repeated by former
president Dmitry Medvedev, while members of the State Duma have claimed that parts of
Kazakh territory were Russian “gifts.” Russian pro-governmental media target local
intellectuals and historians and call them nationalists and Russophobes. The current worries
of Kazakh nationals and government officials about the newly arrived Russians becoming a
“fifth column” should be seen against this backdrop. While Western partners observe the
region from afar, China is the least interested in seeing Russia retaliate against the Central
Asian states, having invested billions of dollars in regional infrastructure projects. In
September 2022, on the way to Samarkand to attend a summit of the China-led Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Astana, where he said that
China supported Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/88202

Perspectives | China cements its dominance in Central Asia | Eurasianet: Vladimir Putin’s
stature shrank in Samarkand. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in
Uzbekistan last week, Russia’s beleaguered leader essentially apologized to his Chinese
counterpart, faced verbal reprimands from India’s Prime Minister, and waited uncomfortably
for the Kyrgyz President to arrive late to a bilateral meeting. The SCO summit provided
visual, real-time evidence of Russia’s diminished standing in Central Asia, which has faded
due to the Kremlin’s foolish and poorly executed invasion of Ukraine. While Moscow’s
already-eroding influence in Central Asia is set to decline even more rapidly, China will
remain somewhat reluctant to assume regional hegemony, due to fears of upsetting its junior
partner. Still, Xi Jinping’s recent visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s
wealthiest and most populous countries, respectively, and other Chinese actions suggest that
Beijing is increasingly willing to assert its regional interests, even at Moscow’s expense.
While China’s rise will bring new risks for the region, it could also bring more economic
opportunities. Beijing and Moscow have, in recent history, conducted a division-of-labor in
Central Asia: China has enjoyed a leading economic role, but has generally deferred to
Russia on security matters, including the uprising in Kazakhstan this past January, which was
suppressed, in part, by the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia’s
ability and willingness to retain its regional security role is doubtful. The Russian military’s
performance in Ukraine has been extraordinarily unimpressive – it will take years to return
the Russian armed forces to its pre-war state. While Russia will remain an important actor in
Central Asian security affairs, its influence is waning.

China will likely fill this security vacuum, albeit somewhat ambivalently. The People’s
Republic wields the world’s second-most capable military and has the capacity to dominate
Central Asian security. But China will continue to try to minimize its role for political
reasons. Beijing still views Moscow as a useful companion in its competition with the West,
particularly the United States, and will attempt to symbolically defer to the Kremlin when
possible, given Russia’s historical role in the region and the need to soothe Moscow’s ego
and anxieties. Moreover, Central Asia is only a tertiary priority for Beijing, which has
grander ambitions for Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Beijing does have important, and
growing, economic interests in Central Asia, however, as China and the five Central Asian
countries conducted $48 billion in bilateral goods trade last year. Central Asia is also an
important hydrocarbon exporter and directly affects Chinese economic interests, through
the Central Asia-to-China natural gas pipelines, and indirectly, via Kazakhstan’s west-bound
oil exports. Central Asia also has good solar and wind energy potential, which could provide
a market for Chinese manufacturers. Moreover, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU)
railway has made some headway over the past year; if realized, it could cut China-Europe rail
freight distances by 900 kilometers and shave a week off shipping time. Some of Beijing’s
regional economic interests contradict Moscow’s. Central Asia’s oil and gas exports compete
with Russia’s, while the CKU railway would also bypass Russia.
https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-china-cements-its-dominance-in-central-asia

Kazakhstan ‘chips away’ at its reliance on Russia: The warm reception for the Russians was
a signal of a new reality for Moscow: across Central Asia and the Caucasus, countries are
seeking to distance themselves from its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhstan,
traditionally one of Russia’s closest partners — Tokayev attended Putin’s 70th birthday party
last week, and welcomed Putin to a regional conference in Astana on Thursday — has
refused to support the invasion or recognise annexations of Ukrainian territory. Russia’s
draining war in Ukraine had created an opportunity for countries such as Kazakhstan to “chip
away wherever it is possible” at their dependency on Moscow, said Temur Umarov, a fellow
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Government officials, western diplomats
and business leaders in the capital Astana describe the “recalibration” as a careful diluting of
ties rather than a full pivot away from Moscow, insisting the landlocked country has no
choice but to maintain good links to its larger neighbour. Forcing Kazakhstan to choose
between Russia and the west would be “a very detrimental move”, one that “leads to a
possible conflict”, one official said. Tokayev has embarked on a diplomatic offensive to
increase the number of world leaders invested in Kazakhstan’s stability and security. In
August he signed an intelligence-sharing agreement with Nato member Turkey. If
Kazakhstan had signed this deal before the war “it would have been seen as a big blow by
Moscow”, Umarov said. “But right now, we don’t see anything that Russia can use to stop
Kazakhstan from doing that.” When Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan last
month, he pledged to support Kazakhstan’s “territorial integrity”, a concern for any country
in the region with a large ethnic Russian population after the invasion of Ukraine was
launched partly on the pretext of “protecting” Russian speakers.Violent border clashes have
also broken out between CSTO members Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Last week, Kyrgyzstan
pulled out of hosting the alliance’s joint drills, which were due to involve Russia and
Tajikistan. The “indivisible brotherhood” exercises were cancelled. Kazakhstan signalled its
new assertiveness this month when it snubbed a demand from Moscow to expel the Ukrainian
ambassador to the country, over comments he made about killing Russians.
https://www.ft.com/content/3af8f2a5-b527-4fd1-8efe-fe2f259cbfb5

Influx of Russians Fleeing Mobilization Increasingly Alienating Central Asians: Many

Central Asians initially welcomed the influx of Russians opposed to the war in Ukraine,
seeing them as allies within Russia against any plans by Putin to attack or absorb their
countries in the future. Yet, from the outset, some officials in many of these countries
appeared to fear that the more independent-minded Russians who have arrived could cause
problems for their authoritarian regimes in the future (Forbes.ru, October 4). And some in the
population and government welcomed those with money to spend and with skills the Central
Asian economies need. But these positive feelings disappeared quickly, with many Central
Asians upset by the sharp increase in inflation brought by the Russians’ arrival, the loss of
jobs in some cases for locals and the new arrivals’ attitudes toward local laws and customs
(Cabar.asia, October 6). All this has led to demands that either Russians be blocked from
entering the region altogether or that those who do come be confined to refugee camps so
they cannot harm the rest of the population with their money and attitudes (Abai.kz,
September 30; Caravan.kz, October 3; Forbes.ru, October 4). Such public feelings concern
Moscow, which views them as a manifestation of rampant Russophobia (QMonitor, October
6; Stan Radar, October 7). But the Russian authorities undoubtedly are more concerned about
how the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine and the resulting influx of Russians into Central Asia
are affecting government attitudes in the region, all of which face enormous pressure to
follow Russia’s line but have increasing reason to oppose what Moscow is doing in Ukraine.
The Central Asian governments are anything but enthusiastic backers of Putin’s war against
Ukraine (K-politika.ru, October 3). But they are, if anything, even more worried by the
impact of Russian efforts to force them to return the recent Russian arrivals, who for
example. in Tajikistan, have been harassed by Russian forces and who elsewhere have been
checked by local police at the Kremlin’s insistence, actions that undermine these countries’
independence (Eurasia Today, September 29; Stan Radar, October 7). The arrival of large
numbers of Russians has thus put the governments of Central Asia in a difficult position.
They welcome the influx of Russian money, which has helped their economies rebound faster
than most expected, and are no doubt happy to show the West that they are opposed to
Putin’s war in Ukraine. But they are also concerned about the growth of anti-Russian
attitudes that the war and the arrival of ethnic Russians are provoking, sentiments that could
deepen ethnic divides within their own countries and produce instability. Indeed, this cold
reception has already alarmed Moscow and led the Kremlin to be even more demanding in its
dealings with these regimes (QMonitor, October 6; Stan Radar, October 7). The Central
Asian governments are thus likely to take steps that will quietly encourage the recent Russian
arrivals to move on to other countries rather than remain—in hopes that this problem will go
away on its own. But whether that will be enough for either the indigenous populations or for
Moscow remains an open question. Local populations, accustomed over recent decades to
the outflow of ethnic Russians, are unlikely to be happy if the number of ethnic Russians
among them increases as it did in Soviet times. And they could become radicalized as a result
(Mk.ru, September 3, 2021). As such, the Kremlin is certain to be alarmed and might even
take more aggressive action against the governments in the region—especially since many in
Moscow are already talking about the possibility that Kazakhstan is on its way to becoming
“a second Ukraine,” with all the ensuing consequences (Svpressa.ru, September 3, 2021).
Both these risks make the fate of the recent Russian arrivals in Central Asia far more critical
to regional security than a more superficial glance might suggest.
https://jamestown.org/program/influx-of-russians-fleeing-mobilization-increasingly-
alienating-central-asians/

Hobbled Russia Cedes Influence to China: The two Eurasian powers, it has been suggested,
have an unofficial division of labor in the Central Asian states that lie between them, a
consequence of their so-called authoritarian security community. According to this
understanding, Russia’s military superiority is largely uncontested, while China presses ahead
in its quest for natural resources and trade growth with all five countries. The unstated deal
allows both Russia and China to pursue bigger geopolitical ambitions without worrying about
what the other is up to in their mutual backyard. This serves as a powerful glue. Animated by
their opposition to the US, the two revisionist actors have preferred to downplay their
differences. Yet increasingly this arrangement seems to be falling apart. Badly weakened by
its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin is simply too feeble to resist China’s widening presence.
Xi’s people cannot do whatever they want, but they have greatly increased freedom of
action. The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in the ancient
Uzbek city of Samarkand on September 15-16 revealed the new outlines. Though for Russia
the trip was mostly about China, for the latter the SCO summit was about advancing its
ambitious agenda which aims to cement its influence in Central Asia and the new
opportunities to have emerged. China’s policies in Central Asia are channeled through the
SCO, and are assessed on the basis of its own interests. For example, an agreement
was signed in September with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on the construction of the
regionally critical railway (CKU) connecting the three countries. Long-delayed — partially
because of the revolutions and lack of finance from Kyrgyzstan — but also because of
implicit Russian opposition, the project is now seemingly going ahead. The timing is notable;
with transportation routes through Russia now hampered as a result of Western sanctions,
China needs alternatives. The Middle Corridor seems attractive, but it needs infrastructure to
make it work. Russia had previously objected to a project on what it sees as its own turf. The
fact that this fell away signals that it was simply unable to say no to China. It may have
offered lukewarm support to the Kremlin’s war, but there is very clearly a price to pay. It’s
fair to assume the rail project is a quid pro quo. In its Central Asian push, China
also signed $16bn worth of deals with Uzbekistan, dwarfing the $4.6bn agreements it agreed
with Russia. Multi-billion deals were reached with Kazakhstan too. Even in the security area,
where Russia has been regarded as an uncontested power, cracks are emerging. Tajik-Kyrgyz
hostilities undermined the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), of
which both countries are members. To this should be added another slap in Kremlin’s face
when the Kyrgyz president canceled his country’s participation on October 10 e exercises.
Sentiments in Kyrgyzstan are increasingly anti-Russian, as Tajikistan’s military activism is
thought to be endorsed by the Kremlin. Given the declining Central Asian faith in Russia,
China can make economic and military inroads. For now, at least, Putin can only sit back and
watch. https://cepa.org/article/hobbled-russia-cedes-influence-to-china/

Chinese FM offers reassurance on whirlwind tour of Central Asia | Eurasianet: Going by

trade alone, Russia still retains a dominant position in the Kyrgyz economy. Where Russia
and Kyrgyzstan did $2.5 billion in trade (most of it heading from north to south) in 2021, the
figure for bilateral trade with China was $1.5 billion (almost all of it going east to west).
https://eurasianet.org/chinese-fm-offers-reassurance-on-whirlwind-tour-of-central-asia

China cosies up with Central Asian ‘stans’ as tensions rise with the West: China is
manoeuvring to play a more pivotal role in Central Asia, as new investments and agreements
further consolidate relationships in the wake of President Xi Jinping’s first overseas trip since
the coronavirus pandemic began, analysts say as the world’s second-largest economy re-
evaluates its trade ties amid rising geopolitical tensions and decoupling calls. There are strong
economic complementarities between China and Central Asia – a cluster of often Russian-
leaning former Soviet republics – that are expected to open new doors for deeper cooperation
on economic matters after Xi’s visit last week to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. China is a vast,
fast-growing market for Central Asia’s exports of commodities, as well as a source of
manufacturing, technology and investment capital. The region also guarantees at least 15 per
cent of China’s natural gas supply. As Xi took part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
summit in Uzbekistan, the governments of China and Central Asia signed about 30 two-way
cooperation documents pertaining to finance, water conservancy, the digital economy, and
“green” development, among other sectors, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on
Friday. In addition, China’s US$40 billion government-run Silk Road Fund will buy a 49 per
cent stake in a US$1 billion gas-fired power plant in Uzbekistan. The financing recipient will
use that investment to provide power capacity in Uzbekistan after commercial operations
begin in 2024, the Silk Road Fund said on its website last week. The Chinese-funded
combined-cycle power plant in Uzbekistan will replace an “old-fashioned, inefficient” gas-
fired plant and generate power for nearly a million local people, the fund says on its website.
Combined-cycle plants use gas and steam turbines together to produce more electricity from
the same fuel than could be produced in a traditional simple-cycle plant. China’s central bank
also announced on Tuesday that it has signed a cooperation memorandum with the National
Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan to allow use for cross-border transactions to be cleared
in Chinese yuan, which will further facilitate bilateral trade and investment, the People’s
Bank of China noted. Analysts believe that fast-growing Central Asia hopes to land more
investment, infrastructure aid and natural gas deals from China as it pivots in Beijing’s
direction during Moscow’s war with Ukraine, while China would improve its image as a
provider for the region, quench a thirst for Central Asian natural gas and use ties with the
“stan” countries to exert more clout in surrounding Russia, India and Europe.
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3193306/china-brings-cash-former-
soviet-republics-bid-win-favour

Central Asia’s Reliance on Russia Has Made It Vulnerable to Conflict: It is only

fashionable to wonder that three decades ago, in all five countries, the first persons were not
feudal lords but the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the republican communist
parties. By the way, even then, Kyrgyzstan was the only one of the republics where the first
secretary of the party’s Central Committee could not win the presidential election in the
Kyrgyz SSR. Such an authoritarian arrangement facilitated Russian influence, of course. For
each country, Moscow had its own ‘recipe’ for control. In the first decades of its
independence, Kazakhstan was forced to reckon with Moscow only because it could fear an
internal explosion: almost half of its population being Russian is a good argument for
maintaining a special relationship with Russia. The economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, were critically dependent on the work of millions of guest workers on
construction sites in Russia. Finally, virtually isolated from the outside world, Turkmenistan
could only rely on Russia to transport its natural gas deposits: when Ashgabat tried to bet on
China, this only led to an economic crisis and new humiliating agreements with Gazprom.
https://visegradinsight.eu/russia-central-asia-conflict-china/

Central Asia: Challenges Intensify, Geopolitics Doesn’t: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
its consequences have exacerbated the need and willingness for the Central Asian republics
(CARs) – namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – to
pursue more proactive and autonomous foreign policies. Russia has been the security
guarantor for the region, as illustrated by its affirmation to support Central Asian states in
securing their southern borders to Afghanistan as well as the deployment of Russian troops
through the Collective Security Treaty Organization after protests across Kazakhstan in
January 2022. Russia’s focus on its war in Ukraine and its difficulty to assert itself there have
Central Asians doubt whether Russia can still offer effective security guarantees. Given
Russian interventionism and willingness to blatantly use force, some in Kazakhstan even fear
they might be next. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine and the subsequent unprecedented
sanctions against Russia have led to serious negative economic repercussions for Central
Asia: large depreciation of national currencies, heavy inflation, significant food insecurities
due to temporary wheat export bans from Russia, and a strong decline of remittances from
Russia. The latter will be especially hard for the poorer Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan, for whom remittances constitute up to a third of GDP. China has pushed its
Belt and Road project for almost a decade and thereby expanded its economic influence in
Central Asia. China-Central Asia trade has outweighed the level of Russia-Central Asia trade
for years. And China is most likely to enhance its economic relations with Central Asia in the
future. Nonetheless, Russia maintains a key economic role with its historically integrated
economies. Namely, labor migration illustrates both the economic interconnectedness with
Russia and the difficulty for China to completely replace Russia. Not only job opportunities
but also linguistic, cultural, and historical factors make Russia attractive for Central Asian
migrants. On the other hand, fearing spillover effects and rising instability from Afghanistan,
China has been expanding its security cooperation with Central Asia, both bilaterally as with
the permanent presence of Chinese security forces in Tajikistan and multilaterally with
increasing military training and joint exercises through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Having said that, China still has no interest in assuming a hegemonic
position and implicit responsibility for the region as Russia had assumed it. As long as
China’s geopolitical and national security interests are met, it has no reason to challenge
Russia in a region where they share core priorities. This was most recently demonstrated by
the SCO summit in September 2022. Other regional powers have also been expanding their
relations with Central Asia. India has focused on expanding political relations through several
high-level dialogues. Driven by strategic and security considerations as well, it could
eventually result in competition with China. However, India has so far remained in a cautious
wait-and-see position and held back from translating its high-level objectives into tangible
cooperation projects. Iran and Turkey have also been investing in their relations with Central
Asia in recent years. While currently mostly focusing on trade and energy relations,
especially Turkey attempts to use its cultural and linguistic proximity as additional leverage
among the Turkic-linguistic republics of Central Asia. In the short term, CARs need to tackle
domestic challenges themselves. In that, regime preservation is generally a priority. In 2022,
socio-economic grievances and dissatisfaction with the ruling elites sparked unrest resulting
in deadly clashes between protesters and security forces in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. With or without Russian support, national governments countered all of
them with repression. This falls in line with the general rise in authoritarianism in Central
Asia. There are no indications for that to change with Russia’s declining role and Central
Asia’s rearrangement of external partnerships. Rather, there is a convergence between
Central Asian governments and external powers’ prioritization of stability and control.
Aiming at stability means favoring the status quo, which equals ruling elites consolidating
their power. At some point, the national governments might lack the resources and recipes to
contain popular dissatisfaction. If this leads to uprisings or open elite infighting in one of the
CARs, external partners might take up a more assertive role and step in for the sake of
stability. At least until then, though, the larger geopolitical consequences of the war in
Ukraine and Russia’s relatively declining role in Central Asia remain limited.
https://isnblog.ethz.ch/css-blog/central-asia-challenges-intensify-geopolitics-doesnt

Can Russia Still Be a Dependable ‘Sheriff’ for Eurasia?: To be sure, Russia’s sway over
the considerable parts of the former Soviet Union is still strong. It has essential and
longstanding bilateral and multilateral political, economic, and military ties with many
Central Asian states. The citizens of some of these nations, especially the poorer states like
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, rely on access to the Russian market for trade and employment.
Moscow also has military bases and facilities in several ex-Soviet states, including Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Belarus. As I have argued elsewhere, Russia has labored to reverse
the trend of its shrinking Central Asian influence for many years. While bilateral relations
with individual states have remained essential, regional organizations are another centerpiece
of its strategy. These helped Russia establish a form of “cooperative hegemony” over parts of
Eurasia. This arrangement worked in security and economic spheres through two critical
regional organizations: the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, since 2015,
the Eurasian Economic Union. While never very efficient or seriously tested (especially in
the case of the CSTO), these regional bodies provided important services and nominal
guarantees to their members. At the same time, apart from Russia-dependent Belarus, which
has been complicit in the invasion, other CSTO members – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Armenia, and Tajikistan – have not signaled a change in attitude and have decided to stand on
the sidelines. Also, none of its members has officially recognized the breakaway Luhansk and
Donetsk Republics, which Russia recognized in February of this year and formally annexed
on September 30. Their unease and disquiet over Russia’s actions were visible during the
economic forum in St. Petersburg in July, when Kazak leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev
(whose government was assisted by the CSTO months earlier) openly stated that for his
country, the question of the supposed sovereignty of the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk
republics was similar to that of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Which is to say, the Kazakh
government would not recognize them. This year was supposed to be a big year for the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. 2022 marks its 20th anniversary, a fact that it
proudly advertises this on the new official website. The year started quite well, with the
CSTO conducting its first “successful” “peacekeeping operation” in January in Kazakhstan.
There are legitimate questions about the real motivation behind Kazakhstan’s request for
CSTO assistance and whether the government inflated the threat. However, the
organization’s service members did not overstay their welcome and withdrew in a timely and
orderly manner. At the same time, the CSTO continues to frustrate its members with
inconsistency and inaction. Before the operation in Kazakhstan, the CSTO had been on the
radar for negative reasons. As early as 2010, some advocated for its reform after the failure to
respond to the Kyrgyz government’s request for aid during that year’s inter-ethnic riots. In
2020, I argued in these pages that the CSTO missed an opportunity to become involved in
providing peacekeepers during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Rather than allowing the
organization to showcase its relevance (and reassure a threatened ally), Russia took matters
into its own hands and, together with Turkey, brokered a ceasefire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. 2022 was supposed to be a turning point. Instead, except for the operation in
Kazakhstan, the year has brought more challenges and disappointments. Two ongoing crises
– one between Armenia and Azerbaijan and one between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have
further discredited the CSTO and complicated Russia’s position as the region’s nominal
sheriff. On the other hand, its nominal leader, Russia, seems to prefer, as one scholar pointed
out, to minimize the conflict’s visibility and work silently via personal diplomacy to stop the
fighting. Russia is a close partner of both countries, which depend on it to access the Russian
market for their migrant workers and provide military and economic assistance. In return,
Russia receives basing rights for its troops in both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Hence,
Moscow is mainly uninterested in resolving the conflict by imposing a solution that
would alienate one of the countries. Nonetheless, the unresolved issue remains a blemish on
the CSTO’s image and Russia’s alleged status as the region’s “police officer.” Moscow’s
failures undermine its standing, but they have not yet opened a door for a replacement of
Russia as a security provider. Other regional bodies have not taken a stance on either of these
conflicts. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (of which Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan are members) held a summit in Uzbekistan during the skirmishes, but the conflict
was not mentioned during official deliberations. In the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia, there
have been more diplomatic efforts by the United States and the European Union. The U.S.
Department of State urgedan immediate cessation of hostilities. This message was reiterated
in a trilateral meeting bringing together the top diplomats of Armenia and Azerbaijan with
U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Notably, other prominent figures – for instance,
Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi – blamedAzerbaijan for the escalation
(an accusation Baku rejected). Pelosi extended warm support for Armenia during her visit to
the country. On the other hand, the European Union actively seeks long-term peace between
the two nations. Four trilateral meetings with both sides have taken place since the end of the
2020 war. The most recent one was in late August, between European Council President
Charles Michel and the Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, and Armenia’s Pashinyan.
https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/can-russia-still-be-a-dependable-sheriff-for-eurasia/

Are Central Asian Migrant Workers Ready to Leave Russia?: Another area where Central
Asian countries are affected by Russia’s economic troubles is trade. For Uzbekistan (using
2020 data) Russia is the second largest export partner, accounting for 12.5 percent of exports
and 21 percent of imports. Inevitably, Russia’s economic difficulties will push Uzbekistan to
seek other markets to sell and buy, but these adjustments are not easy to come by and will
take time. For Tajikistan, Russia is not a big export market; Dushanbe only sends 2.56
percent of its exports to Russia. But Russia is Tajikistan’s second largest import partner.
For Kyrgyzstan, 9 percent of its exports go to Russia and 21.8 percent of imports come from
Russia. It is clear that not all migrants will return, and some will maintain their positions no
matter what how bad the Russia’s economy gets. Others will likely reorient and shift to other
countries rather than return to Central Asia. A large number of Central Asian migrants work
in low-skilled jobs that are highly dependent on the domestic economy, such as construction,
delivery services, and taxi driving, which are usually among the first affected by any
economic contraction. https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/are-central-asian-migrant-workers-
ready-to-leave-russia/

Trade turnover of EAEU countries with China rises to $151.1bln:

https://tass.com/economy/1520749

Russia-China rail underperforms, RZD in search of alternatives:

https://www.railfreight.com/railfreight/2022/09/07/russia-china-rail-underperforms-rzd-in-
search-of-alternatives/

Russia’s Enfeeblement Sends Shudders Through Central Asia: The “linkages” connecting
Russia to Central Asia are extensive, and none of the Central Asian CSTO states (i.e.,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) have withdrawn from the pact. In fact, none of the
“Stans” voted against the Kremlin in the United Nations General Assembly’s March 2022
vote, which condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, although none of the
Central Asian republics have endorsed Russia’s annexation of parts of Donetsk Oblast,
Luhansk Oblast, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Kherson Oblast, none voted against Russia’s
“attempted illegal annexation” in the UN General Assembly either. In essence, the “Stans”
(some of which Russian citizens have fled to, like Kazakhstan, in the hopes of evading
Putin’s “partial mobilization”) are not balancing, but merely hedging, since they have
nowhere to go. All that Central Asia’s leaders can do is voice their concerns about Russia,
and it appears that they must speak up in forums while Putin is physically present for their
words to have any effect whatsoever. https://cepa.org/article/russias-enfeeblement-sends-
shudders-through-central-asia/

In Kazakhstan, EU and Central Asian leaders tout closer cooperation: Speaking alongside
Michel, Tokayev emphasised that his country was the first in Central Asia to sign an
enhanced partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU. He stressed the potential for
cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU in areas such as the transportation of critical raw
materials and green energy, as well as the importance of developing international transport
routes to secure global supply chains. In a joint statement on Thursday, Tokayev and Michel
said they discussed how to avoid an “unintended negative impact on Kazakhstan’s economy”
of EU sanctions against Russia, imposed by the bloc on Moscow over its war in Ukraine.
They also discussed relocating to Kazakhstan “European manufacturing companies”, whose
products are not subject to sanctions. Rich in hydrocarbons and minerals, Kazakhstan lies at
the heart of China’s massive new silk road project. Likewise, the EU’s latest connectivity
strategy, dubbed the Global Gateway, with more than €40 billion in technology and
infrastructure spending is seen by many as an attempted response to China’s Belt and Road
program. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-asia/news/in-kazakhstan-eu-and-central-
asian-leaders-tout-closer-cooperation/
Central Asia Faces a Russian Migrant Crisis: Many of Central Asia’s cities are already on
the brink of a housing crisis with unscrupulous landlords doubling—and sometimes tripling
—rental prices overnight. In Almaty and Bishkek, public discontent is rising, with reports of
local tenants being forced from their apartments to make way for desperate Russians willing
to pay more than double the average local monthly salary in rent. Russian exiles are having to
rely on the hospitality of a Central Asian population that has greatly suffered from
stigmatization, racism, and discrimination under the pejorative label of “migrants” within
Russian society. In a region where hospitality toward visitors is perceived as part of the
national character, Russian émigrés have encountered a welcome reception. At the same time,
there is palpable sense of anger and schadenfreude among some Central Asians at having to
assist their former colonial oppressors. In Bishkek and Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, local
activists and mutual aid groups have therefore placed an emphasis on organizing cultural
sensitivity trainings and public lectures on the history of Russian imperialism and Soviet
hegemony in the region. These initiatives aim to push Russians to think critically about their
country’s past and help undo some of the prejudices toward Central Asia that have been so
prevalent in Russian society. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/04/russia-putin-mobilization-
central-asia-conscripts-flee/

A distracted Russia is losing its grip on its old Soviet sphere: With the Kremlin distracted by
its flagging war more than 1,500 miles away in Ukraine, Russia’s dominium over its old
Soviet empire shows signs of unraveling. Moscow has lost its aura and its grip, creating a
disorderly vacuum that previously obedient former Soviet satraps, as well as China, are
moving to fill. The Kazakh government that Putin helped prop up in January is veering far
from the Kremlin’s script over Ukraine, and is looking to China for help in securing its own
territory, parts of which are inhabited largely by ethnic Russians, and which Russian
nationalists view as belonging to Russia. “Until Ukraine, China and Russia were not
interested in open competition in Central Asia,” said Asel Doolotkeldieva, a senior lecturer at
the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, a center for postgraduate studies focused on security issues.
“There was a tacit division of labor: security for Russia, economics for China. But Russia is
not doing its job anymore. It has shown that it is unable, or unwilling, to protect the region.
Russia still has tremendous leverage in Central Asia. Its biggest foreign military base is in
Tajikistan, and it has a small air base in Kyrgyzstan, a poor, remote country that remains
heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies and remittances from more than 1 million
Kyrgyz migrant workers in Russia. By contrast, Xi has become more assertive. On a visit to
Kazakhstan last month, he pledged to “resolutely support Kazakhstan in the defense of its
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” a remark widely interpreted as a warning
to Moscow not to try anything. A few days later, after Tajik forces advanced, China issued a
similar pledge with respect to Kyrgyzstan, horning in on Russia’s long-standing role as the
guardian of Central Asian borders. The massive project, which is expected to cost more than
$4 billion and still faces immense obstacles, had long been on hold, largely because China
already had rail links to Europe through Kazakhstan and Russia, and did not want to risk
Moscow’s wrath by building an alternative that would break its chokehold on land transport
across Eurasia. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/10/09/world/russia-ukraine-central-
asia/

Diversity and Conflicts in Central Asia Limiting Chinese Expansion: But as China’s
presence has expanded, its problems have also multiplied; and ever more evidence suggests
that its future in the region is far less bright than many in Beijing had hoped. Not only have
anti-Chinese riots broken out in several Central Asian countries (Ia-centr.ru, accessed
October 24; Globalaffairs.ru, September 7, 2020), but Beijing has also been drawn into two
serious territorial clashes in the region. The first involves the territorial dispute between
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. There, China had been forced to deny that it has anything to do
with the conflict but has now declared that it supports Kyrgyzstan’s territorial integrity—a
position that undercuts its standing in Tajikistan (24.kg, September 20). The second involves
the situation in Tajikistan itself, where conditions have deteriorated in the Gorno-Badakhshan
region along the Afghan border, precisely the area where China has opened military facilities
and promised to help stabilize the situation (Fergana.agency, March 14; see EDM, May 24).
https://jamestown.org/program/diversity-and-conflicts-in-central-asia-limiting-chinese-
expansion/

Could weakened Russian influence in Central Asia be an opportunity for China?: In

March, one Moscow official called for the "denazification" of Kazakhstan, the same
justification Russia's government is using for its gambit in Ukraine. In early September, in a
now deleted social media post, deputy chairman of Russia's security council Dmitry
Medvedev said Kazakhstan was an "artificial state" and Russia could turn its attention to the
fate of its northern regions next. Mr Medvedev later said his account had been hacked.
Temur Umarov, a Eurasion analyst for the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace based in Tashkent, said Central Asian countries faced "a very risky situation".
"Because they logically put themselves in the shoes of Ukraine and understand that when
Moscow uses this narrative of artificial state [in Ukraine] … that the same logic could be
used towards them." No Central Asian country has voiced open support for Russia's war in
Ukraine. "So we haven't seen any country in Central Asia that supported Russia … but at the
same time, we haven't seen any country criticising Russia openly," Mr Umarov said. "I would
say that even before the war, it was inevitable that Russia's influence and Russia's soft power
in Central Asia was declining," Mr Umarov said. The post-Soviet generation — those born
after 1991 — are now the majority in Central Asia. Mr Umarov said many no longer looked
to Moscow as an attractive cultural or economic centre of gravity. Ms Kassenova agreed,
saying "three decades of independence did not pass in vain". "There is a generational change,
and indeed, there is a demographic change … there is the foundations for trying to be more
than just a satellite or client of Russia," she says. As for Russia's future in Central Asia, Mr
D'Anieri predicted its power would wane "in the short, medium, and long-term". "Russia
today is much weaker militarily and economically, and it's more isolated diplomatically …
the invasion of Ukraine has really made Russia the big loser in the region," he said.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-02/could-russias-war-in-ukraine-end-old-soviet-
alliances/101487834

Central Asia’s Bidding War for Russian Emigrants: It should come as no surprise that the
Russian expats are already transforming their host countries. With hotels and hostels
crammed to capacity, rents are skyrocketing. Some tenants have been evicted from their
apartments in favor of higher-paying Russians. Nonetheless, sympathetic locals across the
ex-Soviet countries have welcomed the new arrivals. Central Asian governments, for their
part, have quickly realized that taking in highly-skilled Russian professionals, especially
Russia’s much-vaunted tech elite, could boost their economiesand improve their education
systems. Kazakhstan, for example, is enthusiastically attempting to attract Russian
emigrants. The country provides foreigners who work in the Astana Hub industrial park with
five-year visas and exempts them from almost all taxes. It also gives startups business-
development grants of up to $50,000 and 12 months of free office rent. Likewise, Uzbekistan
is now issuing three-year visas that provide tech workers with access to all social services and
the right to apply for permanent residency. Kyrgyzstan has also entered the competition,
granting Russian exiles “digital nomad” status, which allows Russians to work without a
permit, receive a personal-identification number immediately, and obtain simplified services
from the Ministry of Justice and the tax authorities. According to economy and commerce
minister Daniyar Amangeldiev, the goal is “creating favorable conditions for the relocation of
such people to the Kyrgyz Republic.” https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/putin-
draft-emigrants-fleeing-central-asia-by-djoomart-otorbaev-2022-10

How much Saudi Arabia is genuinely interested in gaining influence in Tajikistan or is

merely undercutting Iranian efforts in Central Asia is debatable, but other Central Asian
countries are showing interest in building ties with the oil-rich kingdom. Turkmen President
Serdar Berdimuhamedov visited Saudi Arabia in June, Kazakh President Tokayev in July,
and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in August, paying the first visit by an Uzbek
president to the country in 30 years. All three performed the Umrah, an Islamic pilgrimage,
but they also discussed new business agreements with Saudi officials, indicating the three
Central Asian presidents were interested in financial as well as spiritual salvation.

AS RUSSIA REELS, EURASIA ROILS: Like Armenia, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and have long hosted significant
contingents of Russian forces. While the Russian presence in Central Asia was largely aimed
at checking the spread of instability, jihadism, drug trafficking, and other transnational
challenges, it also helped to keep a lid on territorial disputes resulting from the Soviet
Union’s messy division of the Ferghana Valley among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. When clashes along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border escalated in April 2021, for
instance, Russia played a largely constructive role, encouraging the two sides to implement
and respect a ceasefire.

Kyrgyz-Tajik hostilities resumed, however, in September 2022. Driven by nationalist

politicians on both sides, the fighting killed over 100 people and drove tens of thousands to
flee. With Tajik President Emomali Rahmon one of the few post-Soviet leaders not
expressing reservations over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow appears to be tilting
toward Tajikistan at the expense of its ability to mediate. In early October, Kyrgyzstan called
off planned Collective Security Treaty Organization exercises on its territory, while both
Bishkek and Dushanbe have ignored the organization’s efforts at mediation. In another sign
of Russia’s weakening influence, Kyrgyz officials have suggested that foreign fighters from
Afghanistan, whom Moscow long sought to exclude from Central Asia, had participated in
the Tajik offensive.

The expansion of China’s footprint has been even more dramatic. Though Chinese trade and
investment, especially in Central Asia, were growing long before Russia’s launched its full-
scale invasion, sanctions and the broader decline of the Russian economy will accelerate
Eurasia’s economic pivot to China. With foreign companies fleeing Russia because of
sanctions, China has also turned increasingly to transit routes through Central Asia and the
Caucasus to reach markets in Europe. A regional trade association predicts that the volume of
goods transiting Central Asia and the Caucasus this year will be six times greater than the
volume shipped across the region in 2021. Central Asian governments have also been turning
more to China for security assistance, included weapons, training, and joint exercises.
Questions about the availability and effectiveness of Russian forces in the region will only
reinforce that trend. Meanwhile, China is taking advantage of warming relations to press
Central Asian governments to go along with its brutal crackdown on Uyghurs in neighboring
Xinjiang.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan conflicts suggest how the erosion of
Russian influence could bring further violence and suffering to both the South Caucasus and
Central Asia. In the longer run, though, the retreat of Russian power could set the stage for
the emergence of stronger, more stable states in these regions, as regional elites will have to
take greater responsibility for managing their own problems. The region’s emerging
geopolitical pluralism will also allow the smaller Eurasian states greater agency, since they
will be able to choose between multiple outside partners. They will benefit from being able to
capture a higher share of trade and transit revenue, and from possible investments in their
energy sectors.

The growing influence China and Turkey is not likely to be particularly liberal, and by itself
will do little to address the region’s multiple governance challenges. However, Russia’s
weakness also creates an opening that more liberal players like the United States and
European Union can exploit, especially as the post-Soviet generation of elites slowly passes
from the stage. Even as the United States and its allies focus on helping Ukraine defeat the
Russian invasion, they should also be thinking about how to further encourage the smaller
Eurasian states’ no-longer-gradual escape from Russia’s shadow. Continuing investment,
civil society partnerships, and the cultivation of regional cooperation mechanisms can all play
a vital role in ensuring that Central Asia emerges more democratic and secure from Russia’s
defeat. https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/as-russia-reels-eurasia-roils/

Central Asian countries are subtly distancing themselves from Russia: Economic ties are
crucial. Central Asia relies on remittances from migrant workers in Russia, as well as imports
of sugar and wheat. One of the world’s biggest pipelines carries most of Kazakhstan’s oil to a
Russian port on the Black Sea. Russia employs the ability to close it at will. Its security
services remain powerful in the region. And there is no escaping geography. Kazakhstan’s
7,644km border (4,750-mile) with Russia is second in length only to Canada’s with America.
Towns with big populations of ethnic Russians on Kazakhstan’s side offer plenty of scope for
Mr Putin to stir up trouble by playing on ethnic grievances, as he did for years in eastern
Ukraine. https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/10/20/central-asian-countries-are-subtly-
distancing-themselves-from-russia

THE SHERIFF AND THE BANKER? RUSSIA AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA:
Despite these developments, in the near term, Moscow’s existing network of institutional
links with Central Asia makes it unlikely that it will abandon the region or be supplanted
from its role. It will very much work to remain relevant. Moreover, China’s increased
bilateral security assistance to some of Russia’s more vulnerable allies — especially
Tajikistan — does not threaten Russia’s standing. In fact, it can be seen as a complementary
activity that supports the two countries’ broader agenda of stability and protection of the
regional governments friendly to them.

At the same time, the perception of the “division of labor” between Moscow and Beijing goes
only so far. As I have written elsewhere, Russia had been pursuing a form of “cooperative
hegemony” in the former Soviet Central Asia that sought to reinforce its once-dominant
position.

China has considerable investments across the region — including the 1,833-kilometer-long
gas pipeline that runs from the borders of Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to
China — and seeks to protect them. Research from the Center for Strategic and Security
Studies suggests a possible future deployment of China’s private security companies to
protect China’s considerable investments across the region from terrorism and anti-Chinese
sentiment.

China has also grown as a relevant weapons supplier in the region supplying 18 percent of all
transfers from 2015 to 2020, and donated or upgraded equipment to several individual states.
However, this does not threaten Russia’s dominant role as the arms supplier to Central Asia,
as it provided 80 percent of arms imports to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Its
privileged position in this regard is enhanced by the discounts it offers to members of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization. At that small a price, the operation reaffirmed the
roles of both the treaty organization and Russia role as reliable partners to Central Asian
states. Significantly, in a show of solidarity and respect for Russia’s nominal role of a
“sheriff,” China expressed support for the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s
peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan. This and Russia’s lack of objection to China’s bilateral
security assistance to Tajikistan are part and parcel of the two states’ synchronized vision for
Central Asian security. https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/the-sheriff-and-the-banker-russia-
and-china-in-central-asia/

"They left for 4 months and didn't come back again": Radio Ozodi has recordings of
conversations on the basis of which it can be concluded that from the Russian 201st Division
to 1,500 soldiers and officers were transferred to Ukraine.
https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32030414.html

What Consequences can Central Asian Countries Expect from Russia’s War in Ukraine?:
Over the past 2021, the trade turnover between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation
amounted to more than 1.352 billion USD. Most of all, Tajikistan has a strong dependence on
Russian oil products, supplies of wood and metals. Any changes in these sectors in the
Russian Federation will directly affect our country. https://cabar.asia/en/what-consequences-
can-central-asian-countries-expect-from-russia-s-war-in-ukraine

Central Asian Neighbors To Feel The Pain As Kazakhstan Suspends Wheat, Flour
Exports: Kazakhstan's decision to ban wheat exports is really bad news for the country’s
poorer Central Asian neighbors, which get some 90 percent of their wheat imports from their
northern neighbor. One of the world's major wheat growers, Kazakhstan also imports
relatively inexpensive wheat from Russia to use domestically and to resell to other countries.
But Russia, the world’s largest wheat exporter, temporarily banned grain exports to its fellow
members of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Belarus, and Armenia -- in March.It led the country’s Agriculture Ministry to limit exports to
address the grain “deficit” in Kazakhstan created by Moscow’s export ban, officials said.
According to First Deputy Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov, the Russian ban “forces
Kazakh millers to urgently switch to the purchase of grains from domestic growers,” who sell
their crops at a higher price than Russia. It also comes at a time when prices for wheat and
other food products have risen to record highs globally because of the war in Ukraine, which
is also a major producer of wheat and corn.Kyrgyzstan, a member of the EEU, gets about 40
percent of its imported wheat from Kazakhstan. Bishkek’s main grain supplier is Russia.
https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-suspends-wheat-exports-neighbors-pain/31803803.html
Russia’s Pivot To Asia – Central Asia: Current Russia-Uzbekistan bilateral trade is running
at about US$6 billion, with Russian exports making up about 2/3 of this. Russia exports
lumber, oil, and metals, while Uzbekistan exports gas, ethylene and cotton. Bilateral trade has
been growing at rates of 6% but this can be expected to increase. In light of the Ukraine
situation and sanctions on Russia, it can be expected that the relocation of some Russian
manufacturing capacity to Uzbekistan is likely to occur. Russia’s developing trade and
investment ties in Central Asia will increase as it repositions itself East due to sanctions
placed upon it by the West. This will include the relocation of some Russian manufacturing
to the region, these are emerging economies with significant industrial growth potential.
https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-s-pivot-to-asia-central-asia.html/

Afghanistan, Russia, and the CSTO: The CSTO had already shown its inability to act over a
decade ago in Kyrgyzstan during ethnic clashes, even though it was invited by one of the
member states to come to its assistance. Back then, there were legal constraints emanating
from the CSTO charter that precluded the organization from intervening in intra-state
conflicts of its members. Its role was primarily on fending off external threats. This issue was
later addressed at the CSTO summit in 2011. The increasing threat to CSTO member states
near Afghanistan was recognized by the Council of the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly,
which expressed its concern at the high level of military activity in Afghanistan, especially in
its northern provinces, as well as the continued terrorist attacks and drug production in the
country. Already in May 2021, Russia started verbally reassuring its smaller partners of the
firmness of its commitment to their security. Indeed, Moscow operates its largest military
base in Tajikistan, the 201st military base, where the 201st motorized rifle division has been
stationed since the 1990s. The base has about 7,000 troops. In his conversation with the Tajik
president, Putin reassured him that Russia would do its best to support his country and
reinforce its military and the Tajik forces. To that end, Mi-24 combat helicopters and
transport helicopters with around 100 servicemen from the 201st base conducted exercises
early this July, and the Chief of the CSTO Joint Staff visited the Tajik-Afghan border to
assess the readiness of the border troops. His initial view was that Tajikistan only needed
material and technical assistance and no troops from other CSTO members. It is worth noting
that Tajikistan already mobilized about 20,000 reserve troops to the border with Afghanistan.
https://www.ponarseurasia.org/afghanistan-russia-and-the-csto/

Russia and Uzbekistan expand cooperation in the field of renewable energy sources:
The Russian company Dealan Energo (Udmurtia) signed a license agreement for the right to
produce and sell wind farms in Uzbekistan. The project is being implemented jointly with the
Uzbek enterprise Kokand Mechanical Plant JSC. In addition, the company entered into a
dealer agreement with Amrut Resource LLC for the supply of HPPs to Uzbekistan with the
right to complete and carry out support work. https://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/77092

Agriculture Ministry, Wildberries discuss construction of logistic center: Deputy

Minister of Agriculture of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shukhrat Mirzaev met with Tatyana
Bakalchuk, General Director of Wildberries LLC. The sides discussed the construction of
sorting and logistics centers in Tashkent. Shukhrat Mirzaev said that a similar project is
already being implemented at the expense of the Asian Development Bank for the
construction of three agro-logistics centers in Tashkent, Samarkand and Andijan. They also
discussed the issue of integration of the agricultural trade portal of Uzbekistan, namely the
provision of the necessary information to consider the possibility of mutual integration of
sites Particular attention was paid to the issue of consolidated exports. Shukhrat Mirzaev
proposed organizing a consolidated export of fruits and vegetables through the marketplace
of Wildberry LLC. To this end, we have a well-established system where we supply fruits
and vegetables to foreign partners in accordance with the required volumes and standards.
https://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/77144

Russia canceling limit on quotas for labor migrants from Uzbekistan: According to the
decision adopted by the government of the Russian Federation, the procedure of the pilot
project, which envisages attracting citizens of Uzbekistan to the Russian labor market, will be
fundamentally changed. This is due to the lack of personnel in the wake of partial
mobilization in Russia. https://kun.uz/en/news/2022/11/15/russia-canceling-limit-on-quotas-
for-labor-migrants-from-uzbekistan

Uzbekistan's international trade at oevr US$ 36 billion in 9 months:

http://tashkenttimes.uz/economy/10003-uzbekistan-s-international-trade-at-oevr-us-36-
billion-in-9-months

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are probably the most dependent on Russia of all the Central Asian states.
Some 1.1 million migrant laborers from Kyrgyzstan and 1.6 million from Tajikistan worked abroad in
2021, most in Russia. According to the World Bank, remittances sent to Kyrgyzstan in 2021
accounted for 33 percent of GDP and in Tajikistan 34 percent. Russia has military bases in both
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which has been very important for Tajikistan which shares an
approximately 840-mile border with Afghanistan, and Russia is the main weapons supplier to both
Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also members of the Russian-led Collective
Security Treaty Organization, which also includes Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus.

Russian brand starts importing Uzbek shoes-

https://https://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/77065www.uzdaily.com/en/post/77279

Kazakhstan and other countries in Central Asia are still heavily reliant on Russia. Around 40% of the
food and clothing sold in Kazakhstan comes from Russia, and the Kremlin can still hold Kazakhstan's
energy exports hostage, notes the Carnegie Endowment's Temur Umarov.
https://www.axios.com/2022/11/17/russia-sphere-influence-shrinking-kazakhstan

The trade turnover between Kyrgyzstan and Russia in the first nine months of 2022 exceeded
$2 billion, which is 42% more than in the same period of 2021, Chairman of the Kyrgyz
Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Zhaparov said at a meeting with Russian Deputy Prime
Minister Alexei Overchuk, Interfax reports. http://inozpress.kg/en/11184-2/

In Break With Moscow, Uzbeks Won't Recognize Separatist 'Republics' In Ukraine:

https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-ukraine-separatists-not-recognized/31757881.html