A.

PENNED DECISIONS OF CAGUIAO

1. Roy vs. Herbosa G.R. No. 207246 April 18, 2017

On procedural matters

Other than PLDT, the petitions failed to join or implead other public utility corporations subject
to the same restriction imposed by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These
corporations are in danger of losing their franchise and property if they are found not compliant
with the restrictive interpretation of the constitutional provision under review which is being
espoused by petitioners. They should be afforded due notice and opportunity to be heard, lest
they be deprived of their property without due process.

Petitioners' disregard of the rights of these other corporations and numerous shareholders
constitutes another fatal procedural flaw, justifying the dismissal of their petitions. Without
giving all of them their day in court, they will definitely be deprived of their property
without due process of law.

On substantive matters

On the substantive grounds, the Court disposed of the issue on whether the SEC gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that respondent PLDT is compliant with the limitation on foreign
ownership under the Constitution and other relevant laws as without merit.

The heart of the controversy is the interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
which provides: "No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens x x x."

The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that what the Constitution requires is
"[fJull [and legal] beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled
with 60 percent of the voting rights x x x must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals x x x." And,
precisely that is what SEC-MC No. 8 provides, viz.: "x x x For purposes of determining
compliance [with the constitutional or statutory ownership], the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled
to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote x x x."

Thus, the definition of "beneficial owner or beneficial ownership" in the SRC-IRR, which
is in consonance with the concept of "full beneficial ownership" in the FIA-IRR, is, as
stressed in the Decision, relevant in resolving only the question of who is the beneficial
owner or has beneficial ownership of each "specific stock" of the public utility company
whose stocks are under review. If the Filipino has the voting power of the "specific
stock", i.e., he can vote the stock or direct another to vote for him, or the Filipino has
the investment power over the "specific stock", i.e., he can dispose of the stock or direct another
to dispose of it for him, or both, i.e., he can vote and dispose of that "specific stock" or direct
another to vote or dispose it for him, then such Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific
stock." Being considered Filipino, that "specific stock" is then to be counted as part of the 60%
Filipino ownership requirement under the Constitution. The right to the dividends, jus fruendi - a
right emanating from ownership of that "specific stock" necessarily accrues to its Filipino
"beneficial owner."

2. People vs. Sapla G.R. No. 244045 June 16, 2020

The police received a phone call from a concerned citizen that a certain male individual was
transporting marijuana. The police also received a text message particularly describing the
clothes that the subject male person was wearing and the jeepney where he was onboard. The
police inspected the jeepney and then accused the accused if he was the owner of the blue sack in
front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The accused opened the sack upon the
request of the officers and saw four bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves. The accused was
convicted for violating Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165.

Warrantless search on a moving vehicle

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a
moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific
person." The Court added that "in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed
to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana
such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said
bus."

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of
the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla
nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who
matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

Probable cause

Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers'
suspicion about the block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned
acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers
concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty
remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of
probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's
determination of probable cause when none exists."

For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to
another should not be cite`d to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the
moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on
the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate
the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip,
being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its
substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the
circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that
would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or arresting
officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.

Difference to the Saluday vs. People case

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. Peopl, a bus inspection conducted
by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case,
the authorities merely conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive inspection" of the
accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained
firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search conducted
entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-
appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by
an informant, unlike in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses
in determining probable cause, i.e., having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was
inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks being given by the accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search
of a bus while in transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must
not be discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public
safety; and (4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure
that no evidence was planted against the accused.

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive,
the search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the
contents of the blue sack that he allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was
discriminatory. Unlike in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also
inspected, the search conducted in the instant case focused exclusively on accused-appellant
Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring
public safety. At the most, the search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by
an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal drugs.
Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken
by the police to ensure that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla,
considering that the inventory, photographing, and marking of the evidence were not
immediately conducted after the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of the
incident.
3. Marcos vs. Robredo (PET Case No. 005 February 16, 202)

Caguioa, J. (Concurring)

Rule 65 provides the Tribunal with a litmus test for protestant's grounds as raised in his Protest.
Thus, protestant is given the opportunity to designate three provinces which best
exemplify the frauds or irregularities raised in his Protest. These provinces constitute the
"test cases" by which the Tribunal will make a determination as to whether it would
proceed with the Protest - that is, retrieve and revise the ballots for all the remaining
protested clustered precincts - or simply dismiss the Protest for failure of the protestant to
make out his case.

To reiterate, in order to proceed with the Protest, protestant should have been able to show
reasonable recovery from his designated pilot provinces. Yet, far from doing so, the results of the
revision and appreciation proceedings in the pilot provinces established that protestee increased
her lead over protestant. Given this, the entire Protest should be dismissed for protestant's
failure to make out a case based on his chosen pilot provinces.

Annulment of elections

The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to
the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. The Constitution no less, grants the HRET with
exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests involving the members of the House of
Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections. To deprive the HRET the
prerogative to annul elections would undermine its constitutional fiat to decide election
contests. The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.
Consequently, the annulment of election results is but a power concomitant to the HRET's
constitutional mandate to determine the validity of the contestee's title.

From the foregoing, what Abayon held was that the HRET had jurisdiction to rule on the
annulment of elections as part of the election protest of Daza. Thus, following Abayon,
electoral tribunals - including the PET - has jurisdiction to rule on the existence of
terrorism in order to determine who between protestant and protestee obtained majority of
the legal votes cast, and therefore entitled to hold office.

It is worthy to note that no evidence was presented which will directly point to the protestee as
the one responsible for the incidents which allegedly happened before and during the elections.
Absent anything that would concretely and directly establish protestee as the one who had
induced or actually perpetrated the commission of terroristic acts and demonstrate that
those incidents were part of a scheme to frustrate the free expression of the will of the
electorate, the alluded handing of material considerations, including guns, to the NDF-EV
officials, and the garnering of votes higher than those of the protestant in the protested
clustered precincts, do not per se make him responsible for the charges of terrorism.

Here, applying the foregoing principles from Abayon, protestant utterly failed to even allege,
much less submit proof, that the circumstances of the case warrant the drastic relief of nullifying
the election results in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and Basilan. This conclusion is anchored on
three points:

First, as noted by the ponencia, the threshold of more than fifty percent (50%) of the
precincts in said provinces being affected by the alleged illegality of the ballots was not met.
The affidavits submitted by protestant are far from the required threshold in Abayon. Protestant
submitted affidavits for only four out of the 11 municipalities and two cities of Basilan; only one
out of the 36 municipalities and one city of Maguindanao; and only three out of the 39
municipalities and one city of Lanao del Sur, Accordingly, even assuming that all of these
affidavits are meritorious and credible, they are still not enough to meet the threshold in Abayon.

Second, there is likewise no allegation as to the impossibility of distinguishing with

reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful ballots.

Finally, there is neither allegation nor proof submitted to show that it was protestee who
perpetrated the unlawful acts which supposedly tainted the invalid ballots.

Again, the import of the ruling in Abayon is clear and unequivocal: the annulment of
election results is warranted only when there is evidence directly pointing to protestee as
the one responsible for the fraud and terrorism which happened before and during the
elections to ensure protestant's defeat. In such case, only the votes received by the parties are
deducted and the votes for the other candidates in other positions are unaffected.

Consequently, even assuming that the Tribunal can proceed to the third cause of action
despite the failure of protestant to make out a case under Rule 65, such cause of action
must still fail because protestant did not allege, and did not submit proof of, the requisites
in Abayon to treat his third cause of action as one for annulment of elections.

C. OTHER CASES

1. dhhd

2. Ang Nars Partylist vs Executive Secretary (2019)

FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved R.A. No. 9173. Section 32 of R.A. No.
9173 stating that the minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health
institutions shall not be lower than salary grade 15 prescribed under Republic Act No.
6758.

Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile and then Speaker of the House of Representatives
Prospero C. Nograles approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the
Philippines "to Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian
Personnel and the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the
Government, and For Other Purposes." Joint Resolution No. 4 is a consolidation of
House Joint Resolution No. 36 and Senate Joint Resolution No. 26 that were adopted by
the House of Representatives and the Senate.

President Macapagal-Arroyo signed EO No. 811 to implement Joint Resolution No. 4.

Section 6 of EO No. 811 provides that the salary grade of nurses will be Salary Grade 11.
Rep. Paquiz wrote a letter to then Secretary Enrique T. Ona of the Department of Health
(DOH) inquiring about the non-implementation of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173.

ISSUE:
Whether Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of
Representatives amended Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002. (NO)

RULING:

Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law,
it must pass three readings on separate days, unless the President certifies that its
enactment is urgent.

Joint Resolution
A joint resolution, like a bill, requires the approval of both houses and the signature of the
President. It has the force and effect of a law if approved. There is no real difference
between a bill and a joint resolution. The latter generally is used when dealing with a
single item or issue, such as a continuing or emergency appropriations bill. Joint
resolutions are also used for proposing amendments to the Constitution.

The Senate's definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill.
However, under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be
enacted into law after following certain requirements expressly prescribed in the
Constitution. A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint
resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the
Constitution for enacting a bill into a law.

However, a joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided

in the law itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as a recommendation to the
Executive on how the law can be implemented.
 Justice Caguioa opines that the difference between a bill and a joint resolution is just a
matter of nomenclature. According to Justice Caguioa, joint resolutions also go through
the same process as bills. Joint resolutions go through the same process as bills only
because Congress provides for the process under the Rules of Procedure of both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. However, a new Congress is not bound to adopt
the rules of procedure of the previous Congress. Moreover, the Senate or the House can
at any time amend their rules of procedure to provide for a different procedure to pass
joint resolutions.

Under the theory of Justice Caguioa, whether a joint resolution can become a law or not
depends on the procedure prescribed by the Senate or the House, which procedure may
vary from one Congress to another, or may even change during the same Congress.
Under this theory, if both the House and the Senate adopt the same procedure as
provided in the Constitution for enactment of a bill into law, then a joint resolution
can become a law. However, if either the Senate or the House does not adopt the
same procedure as provided in the Constitution, then a joint resolution cannot
become a law. In short, it is the sole discretion of either the Senate or the House whether
a joint resolution can become a law or not. This is not how the Constitution prescribes the
enactment of a law.

Justice Leonen added: Joint resolutions are not sufficient to notify the public that a statute
is being passed or amended. As in this case, the amendment to a significant empowering
provision in Republic Act No. 7305 was done through a joint resolution. The general
public will be misled when it attempts to understand the state of the law since it will also
have to comb through joint resolutions in order to ensure that published Republic Acts
have not been amended.

In this case, amendment or repeal cannot be effected through a mere joint

resolution. Moreover, EO No. 811, not being a law, cannot also amend or repeal Section
32 of R.A. No. 9173. There can be no dispute whatsoever that EO No. 811, a mere
presidential issuance, cannot amend or repeal a prior law. Nevertheless, despite the
continued existence and validity of Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, this Court cannot grant
petitioners' prayer to compel respondents to implement Section 32 of R.A. No. 9173, an
implementation that requires the appropriation of public funds through a law. The power
of the purse belongs exclusively to Congress under Sections 24 and 25, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, We GRANT the petition in part by declaring that Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 9173 remains valid, and the provisions of paragraph 16 of Joint Resolution No. 4
dated 28 July 2008 and Section 6 of Executive Order No. 811 dated 17 June 2009,
purporting to amend or repeal Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9173, are hereby declared
VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3. Abas Kida v. Senate (G.R. No. 196271)

ISSUE:
a. Whether or not ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the
above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution. (NO)
b. Whether or not COMELEC has authority to hold special elections. (NO)

RULING:

a. No, ARMM Elections are covered.

Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections. While the
Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from the provisions of the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution expresses that there was to be a single election in 1992
for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.

In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections, where we unequivocally stated that "the

Constitution has mandated synchronized national and local elections." The inclusion of
autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
heading "Local Government" indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments. The fact that the ARMM
possesses more powers than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough
reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish.

b. No, COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections.

Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
Section 5. When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other
analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission,
motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due
notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity
to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected
and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the
constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously,
this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or
 Section 6 of BP 881. More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the
next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election
date.

4. Montesclaros vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age
limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed
since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay
elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of
age for membership in the SK.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension is proper.

RULING:
Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of
discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections. The
Comelec exercised its power and duty to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and to
"recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending." The
Comelec's acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there "exists a
connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law."

The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. Petitioners
failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to
Congress the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by
petitioners even establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address
the practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption
remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to Congress the
postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its
official duties.

***Actually the Court didn’t rule per se on the legality of the suspension kasi they
tackled more on the issue that when the case was filed the postponement issue was a bill
palang and not yet a law, so it wasn’t really subject to judicial review. The Court cant
dictate diba kasi what should be a law or not (violation of separation of powers). Tapos
after the passage of the bill, petitioners also failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164
that could be unconstitutional. Plus the petitioners didn’t have standing, that the petition
presented no actual justiciable controversy, that petitioners did not cite any provision of
law that is alleged to be unconstitutional, and that there was no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondents.. So the Court went with the presumption of regularity.
 D. ADMIN LAW CASES

a. Laya, Jr. vs Philippines Veteran Bank (G.R. No. 205813. January 10, 2018)

Facts:
Petitioner Laya, was an employee of Philippine Veterans Bank. Petitioner was informed
thru letter of his retirement. The petitioner requested for an extension of his tenure for
two (2) more years pursuant to the Bank’s Retirement Plan (Late Retirement). The
request was denied hence he filed a case for illegal dismissal and argued the Court should
find and declare PVB as a public instrumentality; that the law applicable to his case was
Presidential Decree No. 1146 (GSIS Law), which stipulated the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years; and that the compulsory retirement age for civil servants could not be
"contracted out."

Issues:
Whether PVB is a private entity or a public instrumentality

Ruling:
It is a private entity. The Constitution provides in its Article IX-B, Section 2(1) that "the
Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." As the Bank is not owned or controlled by the Government although it
does have an original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518, it clearly does not fall
under the Civil Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial
corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides.

Sec. 28. Articles of incorporation. - This Act, upon its approval, shall be deemed
and accepted to all legal intents and purposes as the statutory articles of
incorporation or Charter of the Philippine Veterans' Bank; and that,
notwithstanding the provisions of any existing law to the contrary, said Bank shall
be deemed registered and duly authorized to do business and operate as a
commercial bank as of the date of approval of this Act.

By providing that the creation of the PVB would be in accord with the Corporation Code,
the General Banking Act, and other related laws, Congress undeniably bestowed upon the
PVB the personality of a private commercial bank. The consequence is that the relations
of the Bank with its employees should be governed by the labor laws.

b. Metropolitan Waterworks vs. Quezon City (G.R. No. 194388, November 07, 2018)

Facts:
 Petitioner claims that it is an instrumentality of the Republic; thus, its real properties
should be exempt from real property tax. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that
petitioner is a government-owned and -controlled corporation whose tax exemptions have
since been withdrawn with the effectivity of the Local Government Code.

Issues:
1. Whether there is a difference between a government instrumentality and a GOCC
2. Whether MWSS is an instrumentality of the Republic. Otherwise, whether it is a
GOCC

Ruling:
1. Under the law, real property, even if owned by the Republic or any of its political
subdivisions, may still be subject to real property tax if the beneficial use of the real
property was granted to a taxable person.

A government instrumentality is exempt from the local government unit's levy of

real property tax. The government instrumentality must not have been organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, even though it exercises corporate powers,
administers special funds, and enjoys operational autonomy, usually through its
charter. Its properties are exempt from real property tax because they are properties of
the public dominion: held in trust for the Republic, intended for public use, and
cannot be the subject of levy, encumbrance, or disposition.

A government-owned and controlled corporation, on the other hand, is not exempt

from real property taxes due to the passage of the Local Government Code.

2. The Executive and Legislative Branches have already categorized petitioner not as a
government-owned and controlled corporation but as a Government Instrumentality
with Corporate Powers/Government Corporate Entity like the Manila International
Airport Authority and the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority.

Government Instrumentalities with Corporate Powers (GICP)/Government Corporate

Entities (GCE) refer to instrumentalities or agencies of the government, which are
neither corporations nor agencies integrated within the departmental framework, but
vested by law with special functions or jurisdiction, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy
usually through a charter

c. PH vs. China

Issues:
1. WON the Tribunal has jurisdiction.
2. Whether China have claims under historical rights and the “nine- dash-line”
3. What is the status of features in the South China Sea
4. WON the activities of China in the South China Sea is lawful.
5. WON the actions of China since the commencement of arbitration have aggravated and
extended the dispute.
6. What is China’s future conduct?

Ruling:

1. Article 288 of the Conventions states that “In the event of a dispute as to whether a
court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court
or tribunal.”

2. With respect to Submission No. 1, the Tribunal concludes that, as between the
Philippines and China, the Convention defines the scope of maritime entitlements in
the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein. The
Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’
are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed
the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention. The Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any historic
rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.

3. Features that are above water at high tide generate an entitlement to at least a 12
nautical mile territorial sea, whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not.
The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily modified by land reclamation and
construction, recalled that the Convention classifies features on their natural
condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating the features. Article 121
establishes a regime of islands as follows:

Article 121
Regime of Islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

The tribunal found that although there were evidence of transient habitation on the
features, there was no showing of permanent habitation that the features could
support a stable community therefore they are considered rocks. Thus, Having found
that none of the features claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive
economic zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—
declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of
China.
 4. The Tribunal finds that China has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law
enforcement vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of
collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to
have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to
be in breach of Article 94 of the Convention.

5. Yes, it has.
(a) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning their respective rights and
entitlements in the area of Mischief Reef by building a large artificial island on a low-
tide elevation located in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.
(b) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and
preservation of the marine environment at Mischief Reef by inflicting permanent,
irreparable harm to the coral reef habitat of that feature.
(c) China has extended the Parties’ dispute concerning the protection and preservation
of the marine environment by commencing large-scale island-building and
construction works at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North),
Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, and Subi Reef.
(d) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning the status of maritime
features in the Spratly Islands and their capacity to generate entitlements to maritime
zones by permanently destroying evidence of the natural condition of Mischief Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef,
and Subi Reef.

6. The Tribunal considers it beyond dispute that both Parties are obliged to comply with
the Convention, including its provisions regarding the resolution of disputes, and to
respect the rights and freedoms of other States under the Convention. Neither Party
contests this, and the Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that it is necessary or
appropriate for it to make any further declaration.
7.

d. GR 212719

DOCTRINE:

It is a settled principle that laws shall have no retroactive application[2]. However, a

penal law that is favorable to the accused can be applied retroactively, provided that the
accused is not a habitual criminal. This is provided in Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). In the words of the Supreme Court, these foregoing principles are the rules,
the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.

A question arises when a law affects criminals but is not penal in nature. This was
resolved in the case of Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. DOJ Secretary De Lima and
DILG Secretary Roxas. The said case involves Republic Act 10592 (R.A. No. 10592) or
"An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 And 99 Of Act No. 3815, As Amended,
Otherwise Known As The Revised Penal Code[4]", which increased the good conduct
time allowance (GCTA) to be deducted from a prisoner's sentence. GCTA is a sentence
reduction provision afforded to prisoners who show good behavior.

In line with this, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) issued Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Section 4,
Rule 1 of such IRR states that the provisions of the law shall be applied prospectively.
This prompted the petitioners in this case, being prisoners who would have benefited
from R.A. No. 10592, to assail the validity of the abovementioned provision in the IRR.
They contended that R.A. No. 10592 is penal in nature and is beneficial to the accused.
Therefore, it must be given retroactive application, pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC.

The Court upheld the petitioners' argument that R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law because by
amending the RPC, it becomes an integral part of the Code. The Court went further to
rule that the prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 would
deprive the prisoners of time off, thus making more onerous the punishment for the
crimes the committed. While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or
provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of
our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing
the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the
penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and
convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.