Marcelo Bielsa's Remarkable Athletic Club in 2011:12 - Retro Analysis

Marcelo Bielsa’s remarkable Athletic Club in 2011/12 – Retro Analysis 14.11.
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MARCELO BIELSA’S REMARKABLE ATHLETIC

IN 2011/12 – RETRO ANALYSIS
ANALYSEN LA LIGA
10. JULI 2023 VON CHRISTOPH
IMAGO / Sportimage
INTRODUCTION
Athletic Club in 2011/12 under Marcelo Bielsa was a truly
unforgettable side although not really due to their
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Marcelo Bielsa’s remarkable Athletic Club in 2011/12 – Retro Analysis 14.11.23, 18:54
success but because of the way they played the game and
excited the fans with their intensity, directness, and
offensive style.
Bilbao only finished 10th in the Spanish league that season

but reached the final of the Europa League and Copa del
Rey. Nevertheless, they lost both games by 3-0. Marcelo
Bielsa generally didn’t win a lot of titles throughout his
career but will still go down in history as one of the most
influential football coaches.
“Whoever sacrifices beautiful football for the result, they

can chastise me. The poorest of us only have football as
relaxation. I would be sorry if we only gave them results.”
(Bielsa)
4-3-3 line-up in possession with common individual player movements.
So, what made this team so special?
THE CRUCIAL DETAILS OF

BILBAO’S INTENSE MAN-
MARKING APPROACH
Athletic Club in 2011/12 – like all of Marcelo Bielsa’s sides –
was well-known for their extremely aggressive pressing by
going man to man. The Bilbao players were always
assigned an opposition, who they were supposed to
follow tightly and put under high pressure as soon as he
received the ball.
The idea behind this approach is that each opponent has

almost no time with the ball and is therefore forced to
make quick decisions, which regularly end up in

inaccurate and hurried passes, or the Bilbao player can
win the ball back with a tackle. Moreover, this style of
defending is easier to execute since the players seemingly
have to “just” follow an opponent and don’t care about
anything else, which is although not the case under Bielsa
as we’ll touch on later. Furthermore, after regaining
possession, since Athletic Club used a lot of players to
apply pressure, they also in turn had a high number of
players to perform a counterattack (theoretically with
numerical equality).
Nevertheless, there were also many disadvantages within

this approach of defending but for now, let’s have a look
at what distinguished Bilbao’s (or Bielsa’s) man-marking
style out of possession to other ones.
+1 at the back
To be precise, Athletic Club didn’t actually go fully man to
man all over the pitch. Bielsa always wanted a +1
numerical advantage at the back line with one free centre
back. Bilbao therefore always had to adapt their defensive
formation to the opposition. They used a back four against
one striker and a back three, with Iturraspe moving into
the backline, against two centre forwards.
An overload somewhere on the pitch however always

means that there is an underload in another area. To
ensure this +1 at the backline, Bielsa’s side sacrificed
having one player less in the first line of pressure. Athletic
Club’s striker was therefore mostly tasked with pressing
two opposing centre backs. Llorente usually pressed one
central defender, while keeping the other one in his cover-
shadow to split the field and guide the ball-carrier into the
wide areas.
Moreover, to increase the pressure in the first line and

help Llorente if he is too far away from a centre back, the
striker regularly performed a so-called “pendulum-press”
with his nearest midfield teammate: Bilbao’s centre
forward usually started the press and if for example the
opposing centre back was able to play to his centre back
partner, the nearest Athletic Club midfielder would press
the new ball-carrier by using his cover-shadow on his

initial opponent. Moreover, Llorente would then move
backwards towards the opposition’s midfielder (the initial
opponent of the Bilbao midfielder) to cover. After the
opposing centre back possibly found his partner again
(who had the ball at the beginning of the sequence),
Llorente would now press the ball-carrier and the Athletic
Club midfielder would move back to his initial opponent.
This pendulum enabled Bilbao to effectively press three

opponents with two players and was particularly key
when Llorente got outplayed and an opposing centre
back therefore had lots of time on the ball. With a
midfielder then moving up the distance for the midfielder
to press was shorter.
Llorente just forced the opposing left centre back towards his right-sided partner (dotted
arrow). This triggers Herrera to press the right centre back using his cover-shadow in the
opposition’s 6, while Llorente drops towards that midfielder. Moreover, notice how the
other players are man-marking except Amorebieta, who is the free centre back.
As visible in the graphic above, the free centre back

(either Martinez or Amorebieta) had to cover a lot of
space. This role was especially vital in deeper areas, as the
spare man could potentially take over an opposition after
a teammate got outplayed. In addition, the free centre
back had to be prepared to intercept through balls but
also needed to find the right timing to step up and
potentially double up the opponent.
Even though everyone was tasked with marking an

opponent tightly, despite the free centre back and
Llorente, it was key that the Bilbao players adapted the
distance towards their assigned opponent depending on
the ball and the specific situation of the game. Meaning,
the ball-far winger and fullback normally tucked inside

when the ball was on the other side of the pitch.
Furthermore, if there was a more threatening player,
Bielsa wanted the players to give up their marking
assignments (or at least increase the distance to their
initial opponents) to stop the dangerous opponent and
reduce the space between the Bilbao defenders.
In this video below, the Argentinian Manager brilliantly

explains the concept of the “partial libero” and that the
players should leave their opposition to stop another
player who is hurting his team:
Leaving the opposition to sustain pressure

Other than leaving an assigned opponent to press
another opposition (as mentioned in the video above), the
Bilbao players regularly left their opponents to execute a
switch in tasks. Meaning, two players could simply swap
oppositions. This was often done in deeper zones and
when opposing players rotated. The Athletic Club players
could therefore – in some sort of – stay in their area and
not get dragged out of position (for example a defender
following into the midfield). Communication and knowing
when to perform these switches were key to not leaving
any opponent free.
To continue, the Bilbao players frequently left their

assigned opponents to double up another opponent with
a teammate and therefore pressurise him from two
different angles, which is obviously a lot harder to get out.
Passes into opposing players with a negative body
orientation (facing towards their own goal) were often
pressing triggers for higher Athletic Club players to turn
around, leave their assigned opposition and double up by
pressing backwards. This was vital in particular against
more technical opponents, who would have the abilities
to turn around, get past the pressure of one player and
ultimately access the huge spaces. Again, the timing and
the angle of the pressing movement (ideally using the
cover-shadow) was key when a Bilbao player left his
assigned opponent to press another one.
These backwards pressing occasions regularly occurred
with a winger supporting his fullback or a midfielder

doubling up an opposing forward on the back line, facing
his own goal. Once more, the understanding if there was a
player that could hurt the defence more than the
assigned opponent was key. A lot of ball wins happened
from these situations and the two Basque players
pressing around the ball meant that the ball-winner had
an immediate option to initiate a counterattack.
Susaeta and Amorebieta nicely switched markers with the former pressing backwards
towards a dropping forward and the latter taking over the opposing overlapping left back.
Moreover, Martinez brilliantly intercepts a pass by pressing backwards and doubling up,
since his initial opponent isn’t really threatening in this situation. Additionally, notice the
free centre back (Iturraspe) and how Aurtenetxe (the ball-far fullback) tucked inside.
As can be seen in the image above, the players could still

at times be dragged out of their initial position (e.g.: a
centre back following his opponent into the midfield),
even though this is ideally not the case by applying a
switch. Nevertheless, a marking-switch isn’t always
possible and maybe even too risky if not well-executed.
Every player therefore needed to be defensively intelligent
and have the abilities to win 1v1 duels.
Individual aspects of defending

To begin with, Bielsa’s players were extremely fit, which
was vital to execute this intense pressing approach.
Moreover, after a Bilbao player lost a 1v1 and his opponent
got past him the player would instantly turn around and
try to get behind the ball again to stop the ball-carrier
from further progression. Bielsa regularly preached this
aspect and often used 1v1s in his training sessions to
improve it.
„It is very common that when a player is eliminated, he
doesn’t return. The player does not have it incorporated in

his nature, it’s something that must be taught to him. The
game doesn’t end when they eliminate me.“ (Bielsa)
Another vital point is the aspect that defending only

works within a coherent collective. Even though it
sometimes seems as if every player has to “just” focus on
one opponent, that’s absolutely not the case in Bielsa’s
sides. The Basques did well at communicating and
reacting as a collective to different problems. For example,
when a player got outplayed or to execute a marking-
switch. Additionally, it was often the case that a winger
could press an opposing centre back from out to in (using
his cover-shadow on the opposition’s fullback) to create a
temporary 2v2 in the first line alongside Llorente. The
opposing fullback was therefore now temporarily
unmarked, and the Bilbao players had to be aware of the
situation as a pass into this defender would’ve meant easy
progression. To solve this problem, either the ball-sided
Bilbao fullback or a near midfielder could mark the free
fullback from the opponent. Then, other players had to
react too. The backline for example needed to shift over
and go man to man if the fullback stepped up and left his
initial opponent. As you can see, the players always had to
keep the collective in mind.
Additionally, Bielsa worked a lot on the timing and

anticipation of interceptions. Intercepting passes has the
advantage that the ball win is cleaner than from a tackle
and it’s easier to start a counterattack. That’s because it’s
more difficult for the opposition to whom the pass was
aimed to pressurise the ball winner than after losing the
ball from a dribble. Nevertheless, it’s risky if a player steps
up too early, as this would open up spaces in behind and
passes into these areas are extremely difficult to defend as
the defender is moving in the opposite direction.
However, the Bilbao players mostly did a great job at
evaluating the situation and knowing when they could
intercept a pass or had to stay deeper to defend the
depth.
Barcelona outplayed Bilbao with a simple one-two on the left wing. The ball-carrier then
attempts a through ball into a runner. Nevertheless, Amorebieta (free centre back) can
intercept this pass due to his brilliant anticipation.
DIRECTNESS IN POSSESSION
Apart from their pressing scheme, Bilbao’s approach in
possession was pretty unique as well. Rather than
patiently circulating the ball from side to side to
unbalance the opposition and create gaps, Athletic Club
was very direct with the ball and frequently tried to
quickly reach the final third with a high tempo.
As Bielsa explained in the video above, he wants his teams

to circulate the ball sideways to find a better positioned
player (with more time and space), who could then
execute forward passes. Instead of searching or creating
spaces through passing the ball, Bilbao looked to
generate openings by themselves with clever movements
off the ball.
Movements, quick passing combinations and

overloading the wide areas
Bilbao’s players didn’t just need to be fit to execute the
aggressive high press. Additionally, Bielsa demanded
constant movements in possession to provide passing
options, drag defenders away, challenge the defence and
open spaces. Every movement forces the opposition into a
decision on how to deal with the run. That’s exactly what
the Argentina manager wants. Constantly challenging the
opponent with different movements and mistakes will
eventually happen. Key was also that the runs were
coordinated with other factors such as the teammates,
opponents, and spaces. Moreover, Bielsa frequently asked
for variety in the movements to create more dilemmas.
“I always tell my guys that our playing style is about

movement. A player should always be moving. You can
come up with a reason for every player in every position
and every circumstance, why he should be moving. In
football there is no reason to be immobile.” (Bielsa)
Starting with Athletic Club’s 6, Iturraspe, his different

movements were really important for Bilbao in the build-
up phase. The Spaniard continuously moved horizontally
to either create separation from his marker and be
accessible to receive the ball or drag his marker away to
open passing lanes and give his teammates more time on
the ball. Additionally, he could also at times drop into the
first line to form a temporary back three or dynamically
occupy higher zones in between the lines. Again, it’s
about variety.
Constantly providing passing options for the ball-carrier

with different movements to enable progression is key in
Bielsa’s philosophy. The run indicates the pass, not the
other way around, as the Argentinian explains in the video
below:
To be accessible, create separation from the opposition

and provide an option for the player in possession, the
Bilbao players continuously executed various dismarking
movements. Very common were double movements, runs
in the opposite direction of the opponent and
positionings on the blind-side. Bielsa once explained in a
conference in Amsterdam that there are five ways to lose
your marker (you can watch it here).
Martinez (who played 6 in that game) made a nice decoy movement to open the passing
lane into Muniain (who played right 8 in that game). The 8 made a brilliant dismarking
movement on the blind-side of his marker in the opposite direction. Bilbao just moved the
ball from right to left and the defensive side was therefore moving towards their right side.
Muniain eventually receives the ball, opens up and finds Iraola dynamically occupying a
space in between the lines after advancing on the blind-side as well.
Extremely threatening were the constant over- and

underlaps from Bilbao’s fullbacks (especially by Iraola) to
support the attack, create overloads, provide an option in
behind or drag opponents away. Iraola and Aurtenetxe
usually stayed deeper in the build-up phase but then
frequently advanced higher up the pitch through the
wide areas or the half-spaces. Key was once again the
timing of their movements, enabling them to dart
through with a dynamical advantage.
Most of Athletic Club’s chances generally resulted from

the wings or the half-spaces, where the players frequently
executed different rotations, counter-movements (both
vertically and horizontally) and runs in behind (on the
blind-side, curved runs etc.) to dismantle the defence and
create a free man or break through in behind.
Herrera found Aurtenetxe with a perfectly weighted through ball, who crossed ways with
Muniain and caused marking problems in Sevilla’s defence with this rotation. The right
centre back handed Muniain to his right fullback over but then lost Aurtenetxe out of sight,
who nicely curved his run to stay onside and got through on the blind-side.
Moreover, Bilbao regularly heavily overloaded the wide

areas (especially the right side) with a ball-far 8 or even a
ball-far winger (in particular Muniain) shifting over. These
movements were often not well-tracked since opponents
don’t keep an eye too much on these far-sided players, as
they are viewed as less threatening (since they are
positioned far away from the ball). Moreover, even if the
opposition was aware of these movements, it could still
create a dilemma for the defenders: following and
opening a lot of space on the far side or leaving him but

risking an underload/free man on the ball-near side.
To outplay the wide areas and make use of the rotations

and overloads, Bilbao regularly executed various passing
patterns such as one-two’s, third man combinations and
up-back-throughs. Marcelo Bielsa’s high emphasis on
combination play between 2-3 players is in general an
integral part of his philosophy.
1.: Herrera plays a one-two with Iraola before performing a one-two again with Martinez.
Herrera now passed on to De Marcos, while Susaeta made an untracked run in behind.
This basically created a temporary 2v1 against the opposition’s left back, who couldn’t
decide quickly enough between pressing De Marcos or following Susaeta’s run (dotted blue
arrows). De Marcos makes use of this uncertainty and plays a through ball into Susaeta’s
run.
2.: Iraola plays Muniain, who shifted over as the left 8 and finds Susaeta, the third man
runner advancing on the blind-side in behind.
3.: Muniain plays to Susaeta, who shifted over to create an overload and can access
Herrera in between the lines (3rd man combination). The Spaniard turns and plays a well-
timed chip ball into De Marcos’ bended run (after coming from the right side), who ends up
scoring. Notice the heavy overload from Bilbao and that Aurtenetxe provided a run as well.
Every movement is key!
4.: Iraola plays a quick one-two with Susaeta to bypass the pressure of the opposing left
midfielder. Bilbao’s right back then passed on to Toquero (right 8 in that game), who
shifted over and dragged the left centre back with him. Iraola then moved in behind (red
arrow) and dragged both the opposing left back and left 8 with him (solid purple lines).
This opens a passing lane from Toquero to Susaeta, who inverted dynamically (red arrow)
into the space created by Iraola. The opposing left 8 decides to stop tracking Iraola’s run
and presses Susaeta (dotted purple arrow). Bilbao’s right winger however released the ball
early with the right weight into Iraola’s underlap, who got rid of the opposing left back as
he constantly had to turn his body due to the various passes.
After breaking through the wings or the half-spaces, the

player could either take a shot himself or find a better
positioned player with a cross into the penalty area.
Iraola’s crosses in particular were very threatening
combined with Llorente usually being the target. The
striker made some nice movements in the box to get at
the end of these crosses and regularly positioned himself
on the blind-side to be more difficult to mark. Moreover,
his height and aerial qualities played another big role,
which is why the Basques often utilised crosses.
Llorente: the target man

Speaking of Llorente, the Spanish striker’s heading
abilities were continuously made use of to advance
quickly high up the field using long balls. The centre
backs (especially Martinez) frequently played accurate
passes on the forehead of Llorente. However, this
approach only worked because the striker was well-
supported with lay-off possibilities by his teammates.
Usually an 8 or the ball-near winger could dynamically
invert to provide an option.
Martinez is under pressure and plays a long ball to Llorente. The striker headed the ball
down to Susaeta, who inverted dynamically to provide a lay-off option.
Nevertheless, Llorente shouldn’t only be reduced to his

aerial qualities. The Spaniard often moved horizontally to
support the wide areas and be incorporated in passing
combinations as a wall pass option. His ability to shield
the ball off with an opponent behind his back as well as
his clever movements and positionings to pin defenders
were vital for Bilbao too.
Iraola played into Llorente, while Susaeta let the ball roll through his legs and darted in
behind. Bilbao’s striker brilliantly lays the ball off into Susaeta’s movement, who crosses
inside, and Athletic Club eventually score.
CONCLUSION
Lastly, I hope I was able to give you a good overview on
what made this Athletic Club so remarkable. Games such
as both Europa League legs against Manchester United
and the 2-2 draw against Guardiola’s Barcelona were
definitely the highlights of this season.
Nevertheless, there were still a lot of weaknesses that

probably prevented Bilbao from more success such as
their man-marking approach, which they also used in
deeper zones and regularly revealed huge spaces, or their
offensive setup in possession, which was vulnerable for
counterattacks. I can recommend you Josh Manley’s
article, which highlights some more weaknesses and is
generally a brilliant analysis on Athletic Club (here’s the
link).
However, Marcelo Bielsa was well-aware of these

weaknesses but accepted these risks to play an offensive,
intense, and entertaining style:
“I like to manage the game, rather than speculate. I like to

play in the half of the rival pitch, then in our half. I like the
team to attack rather than defend. I run the risk of
attacking in small spaces and defending in larger spaces. I
bet more on creative players, than players who don’t have
that profile. I accept the risks that the ball progressively
crosses all the lines.” (Bielsa)
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to

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Marcelo Bielsa’s remarkable Athletic Club in 2011/12 – Retro Analysis 14.11.

MARCELO BIELSA’S REMARKABLE ATHLETIC

10. JULI 2023 VON CHRISTOPH

Bilbao only finished 10th in the Spanish league that season

“Whoever sacrifices beautiful football for the result, they

4-3-3 line-up in possession with common individual player movements.

So, what made this team so special?

THE CRUCIAL DETAILS OF

The idea behind this approach is that each opponent has

make quick decisions, which regularly end up in

Nevertheless, there were also many disadvantages within

An overload somewhere on the pitch however always

Moreover, to increase the pressure in the first line and

the new ball-carrier by using his cover-shadow on his

This pendulum enabled Bilbao to effectively press three

As visible in the graphic above, the free centre back

Even though everyone was tasked with marking an

the ball-far winger and fullback normally tucked inside

In this video below, the Argentinian Manager brilliantly

Leaving the opposition to sustain pressure

To continue, the Bilbao players frequently left their

These backwards pressing occasions regularly occurred

with a winger supporting his fullback or a midfielder

As can be seen in the image above, the players could still

Individual aspects of defending

„It is very common that when a player is eliminated, he

doesn’t return. The player does not have it incorporated in

Another vital point is the aspect that defending only

Additionally, Bielsa worked a lot on the timing and

As Bielsa explained in the video above, he wants his teams

Movements, quick passing combinations and

for variety in the movements to create more dilemmas.

“I always tell my guys that our playing style is about

Starting with Athletic Club’s 6, Iturraspe, his different

Constantly providing passing options for the ball-carrier

To be accessible, create separation from the opposition

Extremely threatening were the constant over- and

Most of Athletic Club’s chances generally resulted from

Moreover, Bilbao regularly heavily overloaded the wide

opening a lot of space on the far side or leaving him but

To outplay the wide areas and make use of the rotations

After breaking through the wings or the half-spaces, the

Llorente: the target man

Nevertheless, Llorente shouldn’t only be reduced to his

Nevertheless, there were still a lot of weaknesses that

However, Marcelo Bielsa was well-aware of these

“I like to manage the game, rather than speculate. I like to

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to

You might also like