Cases 2.13.
24 Issues:
Marcos vs. Comelec sept 18, 1995
Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-
months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and
a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-
year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing
“seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor
refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time.
Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not
qualified to run and struck off the amended as well as original COCs. The
Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later
on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent
her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en
banc affirmed this ruling
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election.
But the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the
Supreme Court.
Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since
the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days
before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She
contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the
House of Representatives.
1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case after the elections?
3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections?
Held:
1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes,
and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in
Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the
following reasons:
a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought
his family back to Leyte
b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption
of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally
point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile.
What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose
her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is
that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
"domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one
after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable
for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section
78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly
indicated it.
3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18,
1995)
Antionio trillanes vs pimentel June 27, 2008
FACTS:
a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades,
with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Petitioner, who has remained
in detention won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at
noon on June 30, 2007. Before the commencement of his term or on June
22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an “Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests” By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the
requests in the Omnibus Motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner who is charged with coup d’ etat is entitled to bail
RULING:
NO. The petition is dismissed. The Rules also state that no person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply
equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated
range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political
complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. It is
uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported
from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
“regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such justification for
confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188
(2005), it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-
trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pretrial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact
of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo, 49 O.G. No. 5 (May
1953), 1855, to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the
therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, was able to rebut the strong
evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement
therein that “if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.” At the time Montano was
indicted, when only capital offenses were nonbailable where evidence of guilt
is strong, the Court noted the obvious reason that “one who faces
a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee.”
Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely
on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Barbers vs comelec June 22, 1995
In Javier v. COMELEC, we interpreted the phrase "election, returns and
qualifications" as follows: The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the composition of the BOC and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his/her disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his/her certificate of
candidacy. The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the SET underscores the exclusivity of
the SET’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the
Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It
is therefore clear that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th
winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to
act on Barbers’ complaint.
FACT:
On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers proclaimed RODOLFO G. BIAZON (Biazon) as the duly
elected 12th Senatorin the May 10, 2004 National Elections. While the failure
of elections was declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they
would not materially affect the results. ROBERT Z. BARBERS (Barbers), who
ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the
proclamation. Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal
and premature being based on an incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted
that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the
special elections, which were still to be... conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections. When this was denied, he raised the issue
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
HELD:
No, Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The Senate
and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral
Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting the
Commission on Elections of its... jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over
election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress).The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contes tee’s title. The word "election" referred to the conduct of
the... polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass
of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers... and the authenticity
of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his
disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
Biazon is proclaimed and is now a member of congress, it is therefore clear
that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition
Bengson jr vs. Senate blue ribbon committee nov 20 1991
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for
engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves
at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the
Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the Senate on the
alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila
Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the
Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify
on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their
rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the
defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the
SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive
relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance and testimony,
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one
of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the
SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has
provided that the allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task which the
judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and extent of
the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically
provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee
is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36
(or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because,
firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr.
Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government
but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the
banning or prohibition of investigations where a basis right is claimed. It only
requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be
respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness
testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before the
Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is
compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness
stand completely.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE vs MAJADUCON,july 29, 2003
Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted
an inquiry into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of
the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that
the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per
square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds
indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter.
The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing
him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a
petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a
TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the
inquiry. The Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied
the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge
Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of
discretion when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without
legal basis. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that
legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement
of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the
domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served
subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in
connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement
of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no
authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to appear and
testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the
respondent does not apply in this case. The factual circumstances therein are
different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation
was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the
province of the courts rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there
was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look into the
reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the
intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests
of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
Standard charter bank vs senate committe, dec 27,2007
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the
courts in Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of
Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged
the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent
the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation
thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same
issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction
of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would
encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took
cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the
resolution, as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile,
was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in
selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said
speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation.
The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to
a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power
to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of
Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly
evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory
or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend
measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed
during the investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At
best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report
would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and
the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Romero II vs. Estrada. April 2, 2009
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing
the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes issued by the
Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development in connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project. Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543, Petitioner Reghis
Romero II as owner of R-II Builders Inc. was invited by the Committee on
Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to attend a public
hearing at the Senate on August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA
(Overseas Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain
project. The investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and
possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of RA 8042, The Migrant
Workers Act. Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused
from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings
of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537
and 543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date, invitations
were sent to the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors
of R-II Builders Inc. requesting them to attend the September 4,2006
Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as Chairman of
the Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero II
directing him to appear and testify before the Committee relative to the
aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued subpoenas to the
Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered
moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the en banc resolution of
July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus,
there is no more obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is
invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s investigation challenged in
this proceeding. As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who possess it. The court further held that when the
Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it
in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly
provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The court has
no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to appear
and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)
Contempt - lopez vs delo santos nov 5, 1930
This is an appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Manila
Facts
1. This is an application for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner
from restrain of his liberty, by a ranking officer of the Constabulary, under a
warrant of arrest issued by the Speaker of the House finding the petitioner
guilty of contempt.
2. In October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted Honorable
Jose Dimayuga, a member of the House of Reps. while on his way to the hall
of the House of Reps. to attend a session which was about to begin. This
disabled him to attend the said sessions for that day and for the next two
days which also arose from the threats made by Lopez.
3. A resolution was given by the house requiring the Speaker to order the
arrest of Lopez and be confined in Bilibid Prison for 24 hours on Nov. 6 1929.
The House session was adjourned on Nov 8 which no arrest has been served
for Lopez.
4. A new warrant of arrest was issued by the Speaker on Sept. 17, 1930.
Here, Lopez was taking into custody by Colonel De los Reyes, Assistant
Chief of the Constabulary on the 19th.
5. A writ of habeas corpus was obtained with 8 reasons for the illegal restraint
of the petitioner but two were most important namely:
a. That the House of Reps. had no authority and jurisdiction to try and
punish for alleged assault because it lies exclusively on the judicial
department.
b. Because the act was committed on October 23, 1929, and that the
session adjourned on Nov 8, 1929, any order issued after that period
of that session is without force and effect.
6. The trial judge dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and remanded the
petitioner to the custody of the respondent for the compliance of the order of
the House.
Issue:
1. WON the House of Reps. has jurisdiction to punish cases for contempt.
2. WON Lopez would still be punishable in spite of the adjournment of the
session
Held: Trial court erred in refusing to grant the writ of Habeas Corpus and
Lopez is discharged from custody 1. Yes 2. No
Reason:
1. The legislative power to punish for contempt arises from implication, is
justified only by the right of self-preservation, and is the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed. It is an essential to permit the legislature to
perform its duties without impediment.
2. Imprisonment from contempt of a legislative body must terminate with that
of adjournment of the session the contempt occurred. The session was
adjourned as provided by law, without the resolution affecting Lopez having
been enforced. It was this session beyond which the imprisonment could not
be extended as based from the US Laws.
Arnold vs nazareno july 18, 1950
THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of
land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question
that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen,
of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates
that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible
for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
 Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its
hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused
to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to
the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he
answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas
corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so, some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e finds that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was
held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In
fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity
of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that
determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry
but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have
already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called
relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish
for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body
to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would
be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the
Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with
the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim
that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability.
The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.
Neri vs. Senate committee on accountability, march 25, 2009
Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri
Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate
Committees to attend their joint investigation on the alleged anomalies in the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by
the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which involved the amount of
US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he
disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos,
brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million in exchange for his approval of
the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or
not the President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve
it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007.
However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15
November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege
on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,”
and given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to
the President, Neri “cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent
Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring
him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to
attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November, Neri replied
to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the
Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet
taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can
prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of
the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents
found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri
in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter
and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that his
refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to
executive privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of
Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the Senate
Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the
assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to
executive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of petitioner to
answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public information,
and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means
to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest levels of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer
were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
Discussion:
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out
the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim to
executive privilege to be valid. These are:
1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power;
2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and,
3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege
on the argument that the communications elicited by the three questions “fall
under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,”
and that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic
as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” It is clear
then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s
Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the
presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the
branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case,
respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the
answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21,
Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the
legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not
violate the people’s right to information on matters of public concern simply
because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that this right is
“subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Held:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three
questions are covered by presidential communications privilege, and that this
privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department, enough to
shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him
for not answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his arrest and
detention was nullified.
Senate vs ermita april 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees
of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed
in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud
in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the
fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
Akbayan vs Tomas Aquino july 16, 2008
Petitioner(s): AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (“AKBAYAN”),
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN
(“PKSK”), ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR (“APL”), VICENTE A.
FABE, ANGELITO R. MENDOZA, MANUEL P. QUIAMBAO, ROSE BEATRIX
CRUZ-ANGELES, CONG. LORENZO R. TANADA III, CONG. MARIO JOYO
AGUJA, CONG. LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, CONG. ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, AND CONG. EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA
Respondent(s): THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of
DTI and Chairman and Chief Delegate of the PCC for the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement, EDSEL T. CUSTODIO, in his capacity as
Undersecretary of the DFA and Co-Chair of the PCC for the JPEPA,
EDGARDO ABON, in his capacity as Chairman of the Tariff Commission and
lead negotiator for Competition Policy and Emergency Measures of the
JPEPA, MARGARITA SONGCO, in her capacity as Assistant Director-
General of the NEDA and lead negotiator for Trade in Services and
Cooperation of the JPEPA, MALOU MONTERO, in her capacity as Foreign
Service Officer I, Office of the Undersecretary for International Economic
Relations of the DFA and lead negotiator for the General and Final Provisions
of the JPEPA, ERLINDA ARCELLANA, in her capacity as Director of the
Board of Investments and lead negotiator for Trade in Goods (General Rules)
of the JPEPA, RAQUEL ECHAGUE, in her capacity as lead negotiator for
Rules of Origin of the JPEPA, GALLANT SORIANO, in his official capacity as
Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and lead negotiator for
Customs Procedures and Paperless Trading of the JPEPA, MA. LUISA
GIGETTE IMPERIAL, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Local
Employment of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and lead
negotiator for Movement of Natural Persons of the JPEPA, PASCUAL DE
GUZMAN, in his capacity as Director of the Board of Investments and lead
negotiator for Investment of the JPEPA, JESUS MOTOOMULL, in his
capacity as Director for the Bureau of Product Standards of the DTI and lead
negotiator for Mutual Recognition of the JPEPA, LOUIE CALVARIO, in his
capacity as lead negotiator for Intellectual Property of the JPEPA, ELMER H.
DORADO, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the Government
Procurement Policy Board Technical Support Office, the government agency
that is leading the negotiations on Government Procurement of the JPEPA,
RICARDO V. PARAS, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and lead negotiator for Dispute Avoidance and
Settlement of the JPEPA, ADONIS SULIT, in his capacity as lead negotiator
for the General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA, EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and ALBERTO ROMULO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the DFA
Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus and
Prohibition
Date: July 16. 2008
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.
Facts:
Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel
respondents, Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas
Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent
attachments and annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered
into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its
consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which includes trade in goods,
rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement
of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition,
dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment,
and general and final provisions.
Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said
agreement violates their right to information on matters of public concern and
of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents
undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of
social, political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that
the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus
constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full
disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA - that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issues:
Procedural Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus
in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of
the Congress?
2. Whether the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic
because of the subsequent event that occurred.
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to information.
2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the
JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public
disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access
thereto (whether they are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege).
3. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents applies only at
certain stages of the negotiation process.
4. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of
privilege.
5. Whether the Respondents’ failed to claim executive privilege on time.
Dispositive: Petition dismissed.
Held/Ratio:
(Procedural)
1. YES. The right of people to information on matters of public concern is a
public right by its very nature so petitioners need not show that they have any
legal or special interest in the result. It is enough that they are part of the
general public who possess the right. Since in the present position is
anchored on the right of information and the petitioners are suing in their
capacity as citizens, citizen-groups, petitioner-members of the House of Rep,
their standing to file the present suit is grounded on jurisprudence.
2. NOT ENTIRELY. The Supreme Court ruled that the principal relief
petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior
to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text
of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the
present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of
the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has
become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the
“full text” thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because
petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
(Substantive)
1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must
meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. In
determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. ‘Public concern’ and ‘public interest’ both
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception
to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered
by the right to information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is
not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public
concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege,
and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same,
then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that
that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but
for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making.
2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore,
are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is
only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in
all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is
made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, wherein
petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on
the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement.
The Court held that “applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it
is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before
[a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their
offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal
not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.” The Court also stressed that “secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in
treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from
frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal
recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro
quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater
national interest.
The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
saying: “We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a
genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of
executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its
endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be
careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would
strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.”
3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
However, the information must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.
4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be
overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be
made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative
process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh
balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the
relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the
seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the "possibility
of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong and
“sufficient showing of need”. The arguments they proffer to establish their
entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the
decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of
public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public
concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from
the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed
to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their
right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also
published.
5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in
their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of
privilege should not be credited. Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege
during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a
waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from the
House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. The House Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier
resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker
Jose de Venecia’s alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman
Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing
subpoenas to executive officials – out of respect for their office – until resort
to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a
compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an
assertion of executive privilege.
SEPARATE OPINIO
AZCUNA, J.
(fully agrees with J. Puno’s dissent) The equally important and fundamental
power and duty of the Congress- its informing function of investigating for the
purpose of enlightening the electorate has been forgotten. This informing
function should actually be preferred to its legislative function. This should be
more compelling in our polity because of our Constitution’s focus on
transparency, accountability and the right of people to know the facts of
governance.
Transparency is in fact the prevalent trend and non-disclosure is the
diminishing exception. The underlying reason being the recognition of the
fundamental human right of a citizen to take part in governance. The
President, therefore, to show that a particular exception obtains in every case
where the privilege is claimed. Moreover, Executive Secretary Ermita did not
really invoke the privilege but merely said that at the time of the request with
the negotiations ongoing, it was difficult to provide all the papers relative to
the proposed Treaty. Now that the negotiations are over, with the proposed
treaty signed and submitted to Senate, there would be no more difficulty in
complying with the reduced request of giving copies of the starting offers of
Philippines and Japan.
SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINIO
TINGA, J.
If the petitioner in the case had been the Senate of the Philippines, I will vote
for the disclosure of the documents, however the reason for the position
would not be based on the right to information, but rather, on the right of the
Senate to fully exercise its constituent function of ratifying treaties.
PUNO, J.
The Executive as the custodian of records of negotiations of treaties and
other international agreements has the discretion to classify information as
confidential in accordance with applicable laws and not let it become part of
the public record. But when the executive is haled by the court to enforce a
constitutional right to this information, it is the court’s task in each particular
case to balance the executive’s need for secrecy in treaty negotiations with
the constitutional right to information.
Transparency and opacity are not either-or propositions in the conduct of
international trade agreement negotiations, rather the degree of
confidentiality needed in a negotiation is a point in a continuum where
complete disclosure and absolute secrecy are on opposite ends. The Court
should balance the need for secrecy of the Executive and the demand for
information by the legislature or the public in order to safeguard against
disclosure of information prejudicial to the public interest and to uphold the
fundamental principle enunciated in Senate vs. Ermita – that a claim of
executive privilege “may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to
justify it and the context in which it is made.”
We elevated the right to information to constitutional stature not without
reason. In a democracy, debate--by the people directly or through their
representatives in Congress – is a discussion of and by the informed and not
an exchange of surpluses of ignorance. In the arena of economic
governance, the right to debate and participate in exercised not as an end in
itself. Especially for the powerless whose sword and shield against abuse is
their voice, the exercise of the right is not merely rhetoric. It is a fight from the
gut satisfy basic human needs and lead a humane life.
Pangilinan vs cayetano, March 16, 2021
Facts:
The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International
Criminal Court, where the gravest crimes under international law are
prosecuted. Since 1996, under President Ramos’ presidency, the
Philippines has participated in the court's establishment, taking an
active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting Committee. On
December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Estrada, signed
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. President Estrada's act
of signing the Rome Statute signified the Philippines'intent to be bound by the
provisions of the treaty, subject to the domestic requirements for its validity
and enforceability. On December 11, 2009, with Senate concurrence to the
Rome Statute still pending, then President Arroyosigned into law Republic
Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the Philippine Act on Crimes
Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity. Republic Act No. 9851replicated many of the Rome
Statute's provisions. Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute was obtained
following President Aquino election. On August 23,2011, the Senate, with a
vote of 17-1, passed Resolution No. 546 — enabling the Philippines'
consummateaccession to the Rome Statute. On August 30, 2011, the
Philippines deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome
Statute. OnNovember 1, 2011, the Rome Statute entered into force in the
Philippines. The country was the 16th stateparty to belong to the Group of
Asia-Pacific State Parties in the International Criminal Court. On June 30,
2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Duterte took his oath as
chief executive. On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before
the International Criminal Court pertaining toalleged summary killings when
President Duterte was the mayor of Davao City. On June 6, 2017,
Senator Trillanes and Representative Alejano filed a "supplemental
communication"before the International Criminal Court with regard to
President Duterte's drug war. On February 8, 2018, the Office of
ICTC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda commenced the
preliminaryexamination of the atrocities allegedly committed in the
Philippines pursuant to the Duterteadministration's "war on drugs." On
March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from the
International CriminalCourt. President Duterte claimed that the country never
became a state party to the Rome Statute sincethe treaty was not published
in the Official Gazette. On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from the InternationalCriminal Court to
the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent Representative of the
Republic of thePhilippines to the United Nations in New York, deposited the
Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chefde Cabinet of the United
Nations' SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres.On March 17, 2018, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations received the notification
from thePhilippine government.Herein petitioners assail the validity of the
Philippines’ withdrawal from the ICJ
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of
showing that this case isjusticiable?
2. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through
a Note Verbale deliveredto the Secretary-General of the United Nations is
valid, binding, and effectual?
3. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places
the Philippines in breachof its obligations under international law?
4. Whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will
diminish the Filipino people'sprotection under international law; and even if it
does, whether or not this is a justiciable question?
Ruling:
I. No. Petitioners insist that the protection of human rights will be weakened,
yet their contentions are mere surmises. Ample protection for human rights
within the domestic sphere remain formally in place. It is acanon of
adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law
broader than is requiredby the precise facts to which it is applied."Contrary
to petitioners' claim, these cases do not deal with the results of
the ongoing preliminaryexamination by Prosecutor Bensouda. Article 127
of the Rome Statute covers that. 54 Neither at issue hereis whether a future
president may decide to re-enter the Rome Statute and secure the requisite
Senateconcurrence. It is possible that whatever the results in these cases
are, a future administration under anew president can make that decision.The
Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or controversy that
impels this Court's review.In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an
"existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripefor determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory."On March 19, 2019, the International Criminal
Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon Kwon, the president of theAssembly of States
Parties, announced the Philippines' departure from the Rome Statute
effective March17, 2019. Any discussion on the Philippines' withdrawal is, at
this juncture, merely a matter of theory.
II.Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state
party may withdraw from it:
a. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations,withdraw from this Statute. The
withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of
thenotification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
b. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from
the obligations arising from thisStatute while it was a Party to the Statute,
including any financial obligations which may haveaccrued. Its withdrawal
shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with
criminalinvestigations and proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing
State had a duty to cooperateand which were commenced prior to the date
on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall itprejudice in any way
the continued consideration of any matter which was already
underconsideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal
became effective.The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in
accordance with the mechanism provided in thetreaty. The Rome Statute
itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A state party and
itsagents cannot be faulted for merely acting within what the Rome Statute
expressly allows.Treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive
branch, which is headed by the president.Nevertheless, a treaty's
effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordance
with theConstitution's system of checks and balances.While Senate
concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no
similar expressmechanism concerning withdrawal from treaties or
international agreements is provided in the Constitutionor any statute.
Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the
unilateral powerto terminate treaties. This vacuum engenders the
controversy around which the present consolidatedPetitions
revolve.Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant
foreign concepts, and considering ourown historical experience and
prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as
themodality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from
international agreements.First, the president enjoys some leeway in
withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to becontrary to
the Constitution or statutes. Thus, a valid treaty or international agreement
may be effectivejust as a statute is effective. It has the force and effect of
law. Still, statutes enjoy preeminence overinternational agreements. In case
of conflict between a law and a treaty, it is the statute that must
prevail.Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements
which were entered into pursuant tocongressional imprimatur.Third, the
President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements
where the Senateconcurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal
must also be made with its concurrence.At no point and under no
circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw
fromtreaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be
anchored on a determination that theyrun afoul of the Constitution or a
statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis;
anywanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by
judicial review. Moreover, specificcircumstances attending Congress's
injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or theSenate's
specification of the need for its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal,
binds the presidentand may prevent him or her from proceeding with
withdrawal.
No. The Philippines aspired to the establishment of an international criminal
court that would dispensejustice efficiently and effectively; an institution that
was ineffective in addressing the problem of impunityof the perpetrators of
the most heinous violations of the laws of humanity would not serve justice or
helpto maintain international peace and security. The position of
the Philippines, consistent with itsconstitutional and legal traditions,
was based on those considerations and on its desire to uphold
thecurrent evolution of international law.IV.No. This fear of imagined
diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. The Constitution,
whichembodies our fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by the
withdrawal. A litany of statutes thatprotect our rights remain in place and
enforceable.Republic Act No. 9851, or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide,and Other Crimes Against
Humanity, echoes the substantive provisions of the Rome Statute. It was
signedinto law on December 11, 2009, two years before the Senate
concurred with the Rome Statute. RepublicAct No. 9851 covers rights
similarly protected under the Rome Statute. Consequently, no new
obligationsarose from our membership in the International Criminal Court.
Given the variances between the RomeStatute and Republic Act No. 9851, it
may even be said that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No.9851.It
has been opined that the principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally
accepted principles ofinternational law. Assuming that this is true and
considering the incorporation clause, the Philippines'withdrawal from the
Rome Statute would be a superfluity thus, ultimately ineffectual. The
Philippines wouldremain bound by obligations expressed in the Rome
Statute.Treaties may become the basis of customary international
law. While States which are not parties totreaties or international
agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely accepted for
yearsby many States, may transform into customary international laws, in
which case, they bind even non-signatory States. Thus, petitioners' concern
that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectly and
reversiblysubverts our basic human rights appears to be baseless and purely
speculative. All told, the consolidatedPetitions are dismissed for failing to
demonstrate justiciability.The unfolding of events, including the International
Criminal Court's acknowledgment of withdrawal evenbefore the lapse of one
year from initial notice, rendered the Petitions moot, removing any potential
relieffrom this Court's sphere. Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and
protect against the grave offenses sought to be addressedby the Rome
Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, the International
Criminal Courtretains jurisdiction, over any and all acts committed by
government actors until March 17, 2019. Hence,withdrawal from the
Rome Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals charged
before theInternational Criminal Court for acts committed up to this date. As
guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of
foreign policy, the Presidentenjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw
from treaties which are bona fide deemed contrary to
theConstitution or our laws, and to withdraw in keeping with the national
policy adopted pursuant to theConstitution and our laws. However, the
President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative
involvement on themanner by which a treaty was entered into or came into
effect. The President cannot unilaterally withdrawfrom treaties that were
entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested in prior
laws, orsubsequently affirmed by succeeding laws.

Poe vs. Comelec march 8 2016
Facts: In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe
declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11
months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay
in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been
going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found
as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the
US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to
satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents
or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her
COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained
to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue
1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof
of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals
have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before
elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided
on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for
cancellation of her COC.
DISSENT COMELEC’s Broad Quasi-Judicial Power Includes the
Determination of a Candidate’s Eligibility (Grace Poe vs COMELEC, 2016
Brion DISSENT) Grace Poe vs COMELEC Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March
8, 2016 Summary On COMELEC’s Jurisdiction COMELEC’s quasi-judicial
power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the determination of
whether a candidate has made a false material representation in his CoC,
and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is
true. 1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate. 2. The
Court’s conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to determine a candidate’s eligibility
in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia
disregarded the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012
COMELEC Rules was published) where it recognized the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of determining false material
representation in a candidate’s CoC. • In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the
Court affirmed the COMELEC’s cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes’ CoC and
affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen
nor a resident of Marinduque. • The Court even affirmed the COMELEC’s
capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in response to
Ongsiako-Reyes’ allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not been testified on, offered
and admitted in evidence. • In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate
for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted
by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberly’s CoC is considered valid unless the contents
therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a Section 78
proceeding. 2. The ponencia’s reliance on Fermin’s is out of context. Fermin
clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office.
If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that
is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate. A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a
quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in
the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction in determining the eligibility of a candidate in the
course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding. • The second paragraph in Rule
23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78 cancellation proceeding
and a Section 68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the muddling or mixing
of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to provide that
petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text of this second paragraph also
appears in Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for
disqualification. • The only difference between the two proceedings is that,
under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in
the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be
brought on the basis of two grounds – (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after the
proclamation of the election results. • Under section 253, a candidate is
ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he
lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. 4. If we were to follow the
ponencia’s limitation on the COMELEC’s function to determine Poe’s
eligibility to become President in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result
would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poe’s citizenship and
residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC
ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would be obiter dictum. • The
effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELEC’s limited
jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be expressions of the COMELEC’s
opinion and would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the
Section 78 case before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not
need to be resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the present
case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities
open to postelection questions, if still necessary at that point. On the
Citizenship of Foundlings It was never the intent of the framers of 1935
Constitution to presume that foundlings are natural born citizens. 1. Ironically,
the ponencia ‘s citation of Jose M. Aruego’s recounting of the deliberations
even reinforces the position that the framers never intended to include
foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution’s parentage provisions. •
Aruego said that the Rafols amendment “was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of
a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation.” 2. The ponencia’s ruling thus does not only disregard
the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the mother under the 1935
Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly
treats the children of Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who,
although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher
categorization accorded to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots. On
Burden of Proof Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof 1. The original
petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) –
from the perspective of procedure – carried the burden under its Section 78
cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material
representations. 2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her
parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the original
petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original
burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To
arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of
the 1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted
to Poe to prove that despite her admission that she is a foundling, she is in
fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA
in character) and by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling
found in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen. Substantive Aspect:
Citizenship Cannot be Presumed 4. From the substantive perspective, too, a
sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are. 5. The list of
Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and
exhaustive. • In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent
upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after
proof that the claimant has not proven (and even admits the lack of proven)
Filipino parentage. 6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must
be resolved in favor of the State. 7. The exercise by a person of the rights
and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof
that he or she is a Philippine citizen. 8. Based on these considerations, the
Court majority’s ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level appears to
be misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled
jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the legal requirements. Thus,
the Court majority’s positions on where and how the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the
COMELEC level, the present petitioner’s own burden of proof in the present
certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail. ## Issue 2:
W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held: Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino.
For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-
born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her
physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as
an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance
that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to
be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the
intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship
is supported by treaties and the general principles of international law.
Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the
country in which the foundling is found.
DISSENT Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens (Grace Poe
vs Comelec, 2016 Carpio DISSENT) Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary)
Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016 Emotional pleas invoking the sad
plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the express language of the
Constitution reserving those high positions, particularly the Presidency,
exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens,
whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for
President. The natural-born citizenship requirement under the Constitution to
qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule
otherwise amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution. A Mockery of
National Election Process There is no majority of the Supreme Court that
holds Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen since 7 – 5 justices voted
that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the three others withheld their
opinion.
1 Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be
potentially elected to the Office of the President, an office expressly reserved
by the Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to
absurd results.
2 This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the
citizenship
status of petitioner after the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections,
despite petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the
evidence she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status.
3 If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting
as
PET) for not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of the President –
that of being a natural-born Filipino citizen – those who voted for petitioner
would have utterly wasted their votes. On Comelec’s All-Encompassing
Jurisdiction The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the
Comelec clearly falls within the all-encompassing constitutional mandate of
the Comelec to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election.
1 The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those
involving
the right to vote, all questions affecting elections. The power to decide “all
questions affecting elections” necessarily includes the power to decide
whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election
to public office. This broad constitutional power and function vested in the
Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute
affecting elections is left without any legal remedy. – If one who is obviously
not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for
President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the elections
before such candidate may be disqualified.
2 In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of
nuisance candidates. – It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for President puts the
election process in mockery and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such
person’s certificate of candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled by the
COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers the COMELEC to
cancel motu proprio the COC if it has been filed to put the election process in
mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015) Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose mothers are
Filipino citizens and were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
1 The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens
those
born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a
retroactive effect. (Co vs HRET, 1991) – The Court declared that this
constitutional provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted
the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under earlier laws,
if one so elected, he was not conferred the status of a natural-born.
2 Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-
born Filipino citizens. If they are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can
acquire Philippine citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935
Constitution which refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in
accordance with law. Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution There is no
“silence of the Constitution” on foundlings because the majority of the
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention expressly rejected the
proposed amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown
parentage as Filipino citizens. 1. Three delegates voiced their objections to
Rafols’s amendment, namely Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas.
Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter be left in the hands
of the legislature, which meant that Congress would decide whether to
categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers who do not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown
parentage / foundlings. – If that were the case, foundlings were not and
could not validly be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in
the Constitution since Congress would then provide the enabling law for them
to be regarded as Filipino citizens. –
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino
citizenship “in accordance with law” under paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article
IV of the 193 5 Constitution. – Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor
General, conveniently left out Delegate Buslon’s opinion. 2. None of the
framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term “natural-born” in relation
to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only
those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born
Filipino citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
were still required to elect Philippine citizenship, preventing them from being
natural-born Filipino citizens. – If the framers intended that foundlings be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would have created an absurd
situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a better
position than a child whose mother is actually known to be a Filipino citizen.
The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such
an absurdity. 3. Delegate Rafols’s amendment, when put to a vote, was
clearly rejected by the majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention. – The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the
non-inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a provision that children with
unknown parentage are Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the
delegates of the idea or proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at
birth just like natural-born citizens. While the framers discussed the matter
of foundlings because of Delegate Rafols’s amendment, they not only
rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested that foundlings could
not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers. 4.
Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws, which articulated the presumption on the place of
birth of foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution.
The 1930 Hague Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling
at birth. Therefore, there was no prevailing customary international law at that
time, as there is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to
foundlings at birth. International Laws Applicable to Foundlings
1.There is no conventional or customary international law automatically
conferring nationality to foundlings at birth
2.There are only two general principles of international law applicable to
foundlings. – First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country
where the foundling is found. A foundling is merely considered to have a
domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling
receives at birth a domicile of origin which is the country in which the
foundling is found.
– Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed
born in the country where the foundling is found. These two general
principles of international law have nothing to do with conferment of
nationality.
3.There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and
citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be granted to
foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the
1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a
natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at
birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a parent, are
natural-born Filipino citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
4.Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international
law principle has the status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must
conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines. Foundlings
are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens If a child’s parents are neither
Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be considered a Filipino
citizen is through the process of naturalization in accordance with statutory
law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution. – If a child’s parents are
unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the child
as a natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that either the child’s
father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling can
be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the foundling to be naturalized in
accordance with law. On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen
There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-
born citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based alone on statistical
probability. On Adoption Laws Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption
is simply not determinative of natural-born citizenship. On Burden of Proof
Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a
foundling. The burden of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her
status as a foundling with no known biological parents. At that moment, it
became her duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen 1. There is no Philippine law
automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if
there were, such a law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized
Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen. 2. Second, there is no legal
presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or
naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a matter of fact and any
doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship. 3. Third,
the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from
being considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The Constitution adopts the
jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only
those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to
prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen. 4. Fourth, there is
no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international
law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.
Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At
best, there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the
country where the foundling is found. 5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a
customary international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the
country where the foundling is found, or is born to parents possessing the
nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over our
Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of
municipal statutory law. This means that customary international law is
inferior to the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of
conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
identifies naturalborn Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers
are Filipino citizens, then petitioner must prove that either her father or
mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Any international law which contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in
the Constitution must of course be rejected. 6. Sixth, petitioner failed to
discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being
a foundling, she admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and
therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother.
Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioner’s biological father or
mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen. 7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove
his or her status as a foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship. This being
so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the
foundling has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing the citizenship of
foundlings, their citizenship is addressed by customary international law,
namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the State’s
obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of
foundlings. ## Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency
requirement Held: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus
manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not
on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the
BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different
from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently
her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC Held: No. The
COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented
facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds
for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon.
Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is su ffering from
a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may
deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
David vs Arroyo may 3 2006
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria MacapagalArroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: ―The
President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,‖ and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief,do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic
Held: The power of judicial review may be exercised only when the following
requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy;
second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,
the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. It is ―definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest;‖ a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case
or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered ―moot
and academic‖ by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021. Such contention
lacks merit.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances
was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust
or assassinate the
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that
President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers,
according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged
illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present
petitions. It must be stressed that ―an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative.‖ The ―moot and academic‖ principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here
and justify the Supreme Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised
affect the public’s interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court
has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the
bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of
the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents’
contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject
to judicial review.
Issue:
whether petitioners have legal standing Held: Locus standi is defined as ―a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.‖ In private suits,
standing is governed by the ―real-parties-in interest‖ rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that ―every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.‖ Accordingly, the ―realparty-in interest‖ is ―the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.‖ Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought. Case law in most jurisdictions now
allows both ―citizen‖ and ―taxpayer‖ standing in public actions. However, to
prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service the Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent ―direct injury‖ test. For a private individual to invoke
the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion in cases of transcendental importance and far-reaching
implications. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the
cases decided bythe Supreme Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4)
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators,
there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.‖ The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government. It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but
also of duty.
Held:
As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power,
Lansang v. Garcia adopted the test that judicial inquiry can go no further than
to satisfy the Court notthat the President’s decision is correct, but that the
President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court
further ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way
of proof, to support his assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake
an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.

Yes. In IBP v. Zamora, while the Court considered the President’s ―calling-
out‖ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised
in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a
result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution
which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of
judicial power, the courts are authorized not only ―to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,‖ but also ―to determine whether or not there has been a
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the
Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the
Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners
presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
Issue: whether or not the Supreme Court may review the factual bases of the
President’s exercise of his Commander-inChief power any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Issue: whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional Held: Thus,
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only ―spoken words‖ and again, that
―overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.‖ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as ―manifestly
strong medicine,‖ to be used ―sparingly and only as a last resort,‖ and is
―generally disfavored;‖ The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e.,
in other situations not before the Court. The most distinctive feature of the
overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute
is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts
carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the
entire statute ―on its face,‖ not merely ―as applied for‖ so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the ―chilling;‖ deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s ―very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.‖ An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties. In other words, a facial challenge using
the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and
pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or expression. The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing
its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary.
The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above allthe speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. Related
to the ―overbreadth‖ doctrine is the “void for vagueness doctrine” which
holds that ―a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.‖ It is subject
to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an
analytical tool for testing ―on their faces‖ statutes in free speech cases. And
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not
even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application.They also
failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the
meaning and application of PP 1017. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017 First
provision: ―by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII
… do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion‖
―as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.‖ First Provision: Calling-out Power The first
provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court held that Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. 18. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
Second provision: ―and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;‖ Third provision:
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the
privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ―sequence‖ of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. CitingIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that ―whenever it becomes necessary,‖ the President may call
the armed forces ―to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.‖ Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated
earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found
it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence
network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country. Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to
aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves
ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-
out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President
must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater
power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of
our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. It is
pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s
authority to declare a ―state of rebellion‖ (in Sanlakas) and the authority to
proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to
declare a ―state of rebellion‖ emanates from her powers as Chief Executive,
the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. –
Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order. President Arroyo’s declaration of a ―state of rebellion‖ was merely an
act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of
Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls
for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot
be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
ofSanlakas. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is
actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so.
President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the above
disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is
merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. Second
Provision: “Take Care” Power The declaration of Martial Law is a ―warn[ing]
to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency
lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts
which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcement of law.‖ A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which
reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the
President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As
such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of
Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its
nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function
of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be
embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the
Philippines, he will, among others, ―execute its laws.‖ In the exercise of
such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to
his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
(a) Arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship;
and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised
by the
Petitioners argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section
1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in
Congress. They assail the clause ―to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.‖ Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
“decrees”? The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may
issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President
providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or
execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in
executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which
only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of
the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or
compliance, shall be memorandum circulars. Embodied in
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
shall be issued as general or special orders. President Arroyo’s ordinance
power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar
to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution. The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that ―[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.‖ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees. Third Provision: Power to Take Over The pertinent
provision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of
national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience ―to all the laws and to all decrees x x x‖ but also to act pursuant
to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of
national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. What could be the reason of
President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national
emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or
delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim
that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. A distinction must be
drawn between the President’s authority to declare ―a state of national
emergency‖ and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by
the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Constitution reads:
Article VI of the SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of twothirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other
national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof. It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to ―other
national emergency.‖ President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Generally,
Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President.Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or
other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress. Section 17, Article XII must be
understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section
17 states that the ―the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,‖ it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly
intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of
intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)
economic, b) natural disaster, and c) national security. ―Emergency,‖ as
contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include
rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other
similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. In Araneta v.
Dinglasan, the Supreme Court emphasized that legislative power, through
which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in
times of crisis. Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked
by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, the Supreme Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it
be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.