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Employment Law For Human Resource Practice 5Th Edition Walsh Solutions Manual Full Chapter PDF
Employment Law For Human Resource Practice 5Th Edition Walsh Solutions Manual Full Chapter PDF
Johnson, a white male, was passed over for a promotion to the position of road
dispatcher. All candidates that were deemed qualified were given scored interviews.
Johnson was tied for second highest score (with a 75). Joyce, the woman who received
the promotion, had the next highest score (73). The director decided to promote Joyce
following the intervention of the Agency Affirmative Action Coordinator and based in
part on its affirmative action plan.
1.) What was the legal issue in this case? What did the Supreme Court decide? Why?
Did the employer violate Title VII by taking sex into account in making its promotion
decision or was this legal in light of the agency’s affirmative action plan? The court
upheld the legality of the agency’s actions and its use of affirmative action. Overall, the
Court concluded that the agency acted in accordance with its affirmative action plan; the
voluntary affirmative action plan was acceptable because it existed to remedy a
documented problem of underutilization of women in the employer’s workforce,
particularly craft jobs like road dispatcher, and it was a moderate approach to dealing
with this problem without unduly burdening males.
2.) What does this case tell us about the conditions under which affirmative action is
legal?
3.) What evidence does the County have of the need for affirmative action?
Women constituted 36.4 percent of the area labor market, but only 22.4 percent of agency
employees. In the skilled craft classification, none of the 238 positions was held by a
woman. While the County had not at that time developed a short-term goal for craft
positions and it is not known what proportion of the relevant labor market for such
positions consisted of women, it is a safe bet that the number was greater than zero.
4.) Why does the Court conclude that the measures used to implement the County’s
affirmative action plan do not unduly burden white males like Johnson?
Johnson was allowed to compete and was fully considered for the position. Eligibility for
the position was not limited to women. The director had the discretion to choose among
candidates and all those interviewed had already been deemed qualified on other grounds.
Johnson had no entitlement to the position (indeed, there was apparently another male
who scored considerably higher than both Joyce and Johnson on the interview). He did
not lose employment and remains free to seek other promotions in the future.
The mayor of Newark, New Jersey decided that the city would eliminate all single-race
fire companies in the fire department. To do this, dozens of firefighters were
involuntarily transferred to other companies on the basis of their race. Others were denied
desired transfers because of the effects that the transfers would have on the racial balance
of fire houses. At the time, the city was operating under a consent decree that mandated
policies and benchmarks for the hiring and promotion of minority firefighters, but which
made no mention of the racial balance of fire companies. An earlier report had found that
of 108 fire companies, 81 had a majority of white firefighters and 30 of these had white
firefighters only. Fifteen companies were predominantly African-American. Overall, 69
percent of Newark firefighters were white, 24 percent black, and 7 percent Latino. It was
agreed that the primary cause of segregation in fire companies was residential segregation
rather than any policies of the city; firefighters preferred to work nearby their places of
residence and communities tend to be segregated by race. The city argued that integration
in fire companies leads to better relations among co-workers and higher levels of
information sharing, mutual acceptance, and support. Thirty-four firefighters who had
been forced to transfer to other companies sued.
1. What was the legal issue in this case? What did the court decide?
The issue was whether the forced reassignment of firefighters as a means of racially
integrating fire houses violated the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
appeals court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the city, holding
that the forced reassignment on racial grounds violated the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff firefighters.
The city was not shown, either in the past or currently, to have engaged in discrimination
that needed to be remedied. While the need to comply with a consent decree might
provide a compelling interest, it did not do so in this case because the consent decree said
nothing about the particular measure adopted. It established policies and benchmarks for
the hiring and promotion of persons of color in the fire department, but said nothing
about the racial distribution of firefighters across fire houses. The court also rejected the
city’s arguments based on the educational and sociological benefits of diversity. It said
that Grutter’s recognition of diversity as a compelling governmental interest was specific
to the context of higher education and did not apply to firehouses whose mission is not
one of education.
3. If this case had been argued solely under Title VII rather than the Constitution, would
the analysis and outcome have been any different? Why or why not?
The result would probably have been the same. The city did not claim that African
Americans were underutilized by the fire department relative to their availability. To
make an argument for underutilization, they would have to show that the relevant unit is
each individual firehouse, rather than the fire department overall. This seems unlikely. In
Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway, NJ, the same appeals court rejected the
school district’s argument that utilization should be measured at the individual
department level, rather than for the school district as a whole. It’s conceivable under
Title VII that a court might say that reassignment and denial of transfer do not amount to
adverse employment actions, and hence, they would not be actionable even though
racially motivated. In deciding this case on constitutional grounds, the court did not reach
this issue.
4. Should the Supreme Court’s holding that a diverse student body is a compelling
governmental interest for universities be extended to public employment? Why or why
not?
There seems to be a credible argument that for many types of public employment – e.g.,
police departments, health clinics, social service agencies (and perhaps even fire
departments, the Lomack court’s comments notwithstanding) – that some amount of
racial and other diversity is integral to the perceived legitimacy of the public agency and
its ability to achieve its mission. Courts have occasionally extended the logic of Grutter
to public law enforcement agencies, but based on specific “operational needs” of the
employer (e.g., the requirements of community-based policing in a racially diverse city),
rather than broad arguments about the general benefits of diversity. Citing the need for
diversity as a basis for engaging in race-conscious affirmative action creates a difficult
problem in deciding how much diversity is needed and when a sufficient degree of
diversity exists.
5. Do you agree with the court’s decision in this case? Why or why not?
Cleveland Firefighters for Fair Hiring Practices v. City of Cleveland (I)
669 F. 3d 737 (6th Cir. 2012)
In 1977, the district court entered a consent decree which required the city to remedy its
past discrimination practices by implementing a race-based criteria for each round of
firefighter hiring’s that the city conducted. The consent decree remained fundamentally
unchanged until 2000, when the decree was amended. While the percentage of minority
firefighters in the City’s firefighter department had increased to 26% the court
nevertheless amended the decree to require the City to increase that number to at least
33.3 % and to conduct an additional three rounds of firefighter hiring’s where at least one
out of every three hires would be a minority applicant. The decree required the city to
satisfy these standard no later then by September 29, 2008, leaving discretion with the
court to extend that deadline with a showing of “good faith efforts” by the city to attain
these goals.
Although the City failed to reach the 33.3% requirement the court found a “good faith”
showing by the City in its attempt to satisfy the amended decree. The City opposed the
decree extension and noted that the degree that was implemented over thirty years ago
was no longer necessary.
Beginning in 1977, the city of Cleveland entered into a consent decree to recruit more
minority firefighters. It admittedly had discriminated in hiring minority candidates in the
past, and its minority hires were only 4% of the department, but a much larger percent of
the population. The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of supervision and
monitoring. By 2000, the city had improved minority recruiting to 24%. The consent
decree was amended in 2000, with the goal of raising the percentage of new hires to 33%.
But white applicants who had applied between 2000 and 2002, and not hired, sued on the
basis of discrimination because of the consent decree’s race-based hiring requirements.
1. What were the issues before the courts in these two decisions? What did the appeals
court (“Cleveland Firefighters (I)” decide? What did the district court (Cleveland
Firefighters II”) decide?
In Cleveland I, the issues were whether the District Court abused its discretion
when it terminated the consent decree of 1977, as amended in 2000, and whether the
court could extend the decree’s race-based measures to apply more than 31 years after
they were adopted, without violating the constitution. The Cleveland I court decided that
the district court had abused its discretion in terminating the consent decree without any
findings concerning the city’s compliance with the decree, and whether judicial
supervision was still required. As to the constitutional issue, the court remanded the case
back to the District court for factual findings. Since race-based classifications are subject
to strict scrutiny, the court was required to determine whether the remedies were still
needed based on the then-current status of the fire department.
In Cleveland II, the issues were whether the 2000 amended consent decree
remained remedial in operation at that time, and thus, constitutionally permissible, and
whether the continuation of the consent decree would actually remedy any past
discrimination. Also at issue was whether the 2000 amended consent decree should be
continued at all, as there was no evidence presented that there was continuing
discrimination in the hiring practices of the fire department.
2. What did the consent decree, as amended, require of the city? Why was a consent
decree needed in the first place?
In the time period from 19770-2000, the hiring of minority firefighters by the city
had already been increased from 4% to 26%. The consent decree as amended in 2000
required a goal of increasing the percentage of minority firemen to 33 1/3 percent, and set
a deadline of September 29,2008, which could be extended upon the city’s petition, as
long as the city had made a good faith effort to meet the deadline. A longstanding history
of discrimination against African Americans in particular made the first consent decree
necessary to remedy that wrong.
3. Why did the district court conclude that the race-conscious measures called for by the
consent decree were no longer constitutional? Why did the district court’s analysis not
end with that finding?
The court found no evidence that the racial classifications required by the 2000
consent decree were remedial. The one in three minority hiring ratio no longer served to
remedy past discrimination by the department, and there was no evidence of continuing
discrimination in hiring practices of the fire department. Since affirmative action plans
are constitutionally permissible only to remedy past discrimination, the plan was no
longer sound. The court found that the racial classifications in the 2000 amended consent
decree were not narrowly tailored to address a compelling governmental interest, could
not pass strict scrutiny , and were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.
The district court continued its analysis as to whether or not to terminate the
consent decree. Five of the six factors it considered weighed heavily in favor of a finding
that the parties had complied with the decree as well as they were able, and that any
further enforcement of the degree was unlikely to have any substantive effect in
furtherance of the goals of the consent decree. There was also considerable evidence
submitted of the steps the city had taken to avoid discrimination in hiring, including
programs to recruit minority candidates.
4. What are the six factors that the district court considered in reaching its decision that
the consent decree, in its totality, would not be extended? How did the district court
apply those factors?
The six factors were: (1) any specific terms providing for continued supervision
and jurisdiction over the consent decree; (2) the consent decree’s underlying goals; (3)
whether there has been compliance with prior court orders; (4) whether defendants made
a good faith effort to comply; (5) the length of time the consent decree has been in effect;
and, (6) the continuing efficacy of the consent decree’s enforcement. The court
determined that 5 of 6hose six factors weighed heavily in favor of a finding that the
parties had complied, to the best of their abilities, with the terms of the 2000 amended
consent decree.
5. Would the city have made as much progress as it did without the legal challenges and
consent decree? Why or why not? Should we be concerned that, despite this progress, 24
percent of firefighters are minority group members in a city with a nearly 60 percent
minority population – and that this figure has not grown for over a decade? Why or why
not? How likely is it that, released from monitoring for compliance with the consent
decree, the city will backslide? Why do you say that?
It’s certainly doubtful whether the city would have made the progress it did without the
consent decree. Historically, major metropolitan areas, including Cleveland, routinely
discriminated against minority candidates and this was a long-standing practice, changed
only by Title VII and legal challenges.
The court did not seem concerned that the number of minority hires had not risen
above 24% for a decade, citing numerous factors which had an impact on that number,
and seemed persuaded of the city’s genuine efforts. Once having made the change to
recruit minority candidates, once those minority candidates have become a part of the
firefighting community, once the community sees racially mixed firefighters, and the
community accepts these realities as the new “normal” it is doubtful they will backslide.
JUST THE FACTS
The city admitted to having had systematically excluded African Americans from
its fire department. The consent decree established a long-term goal of having the
same proportion of African Americans (and women) in the department as in the relevant
labor market. To move the department toward this goal, an interim hiring goal
was also set. It called for filling at least 50 percent of all firefighter vacancies with
African Americans, subject to the availability of qualified candidates. The city adopted
a hiring process in which candidates who achieved passing scores on the civil service
exam were placed on separate lists according to race and sex. The highest scorers
were selected from each list, ensuring that 50 percent of the males selected to proceed
to the second phase of the hiring process were African Americans. A group of
white males who were denied employment in 2000 and 2002 sued the city, challenging
its hiring practices and the consent decree. What should the court decide? Why? (See
Dean v. Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2006)
While a formal finding of past discrimination was not made because the DOJ’s
suit against the city was settled and a consent decree was entered into, there was ample
evidence of past discrimination. Prior to 1974, the fire department had never hired an
African-American. Faced with a lawsuit in that year, the city hired three African-
American firefighters. It then hired only one African-American until it was sued again in
1977. The city then hired six African-Americans between 1977 and when the consent
decree went into effect in 1980. The city admits that for over 100 years it systematically
excluded African-Americans and that the African-Americans hired during the 1970’s
were hired in direct response to the lawsuits. As of 1980, only 10 of the city’s 270
firefighters was African-American. Even though the city did not perform an adequate
analysis of the availability of qualified, African-American firefighters, the statistical
disparity between the department’s hiring and the racial composition of the surrounding
population was so great, that past discrimination was beyond doubt.
But the question was whether a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-
conscious hiring still existed in 2000-2002. It was not enough for the city to simply cite
the continued existence of the consent decree. The city needed to show that the
percentage of African-American firefighters in the city’s workforce relative to their
presence in the qualified, available workforce demonstrated remaining effects of past
discrimination. The city had not done this to the satisfaction of the court. The court was
critical of the city’s expert witness, who attempted to use the percentage of African-
American candidates who passed the civil service exam as a measure of the percentage of
African-Americans in the qualified labor pool. In the court’s view, this ignored the fact
that the city had not clearly defined “qualified applicant” and that there were six
subsequent components of the selection process, all of which could result in a conclusion
that a candidate was not qualified. On remand, the city has the burden of providing much
more refined data showing a continued disparity between the racial composition of the
city’s firefighters and the qualified workforce.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
What should an employer who has decided to implement an affirmative action program
do to maximize support for the program and minimize resentment or “backlash”?
All applicants for employment can be asked to voluntarily self-identify their protected
class characteristics. This information should be gathered separately from the application
form, the information should go directly to the EEO or affirmative action office of the
employer (if there is one), and the information should be stored separately from applicant
files or employee personnel files. The observations of managers can also be used to
gather this information, although this is a less reliable method.
In general, when organizations want something to get done they clearly communicate that
expectation, evaluate whether it is being met, and allocate rewards accordingly. The idea
of establishing commitment to or promotion of diversity as a performance criterion for
managers has some appeal. It signals the importance of this aspect of the job and provides
an incentive for managers to pay attention to diversity. But evaluating performance in this
area is not straight-forward. What exactly do we measure? To the extent that the hiring of
employees who add diversity to the workforce is part of the equation, does tying financial
rewards to this make reverse discrimination more likely? Unless diversity performance
can be measured by something other than percentages of employees who are women or
persons of color (e.g., perhaps mentoring activities, respectful communications, diversity
training), it is probably not a good idea.
END OF CHAPTER QUESTIONS
1.) A white male applicant took a test for a job at General Motors. GM has an affirmative
action plan that includes a “Pre-Apprentice Program” (PAP). Minority applicants can
participate in this program and receive bonus points added to their test scores. Two
minority applicants that initially scored lower than the white applicant participated in the
PAP, received the bonus points, and were hired. The white applicant was rejected and
sued. (Garnet v. GM Corp., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20942 (6th Cir. 2001); cert. denied,
2002 U.S. LEXIS 1578)
This case was brought under Ohio state law. However, the court had issued an earlier
ruling upholding the PAP under Title VII (Plott v. GM Corp., 71 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir.
1995). The court said that its earlier holding applied with equal force to a state law
claim. The PAP had been adopted as part of a conciliation agreement with the EEOC
settling a discrimination charge. The agreement called for a good faith effort to ensure
that women receive at least 12 percent of apprenticeship openings and minorities 15.5
percent. The EEOC had issued an opinion stating that good faith adherence with the
affirmative action plan would not violate Title VII. Given the lack of bad faith on the part
of GM and the relatively moderate form of affirmative action involved, the court ruled
for GM.
2.) A city fire department has a voluntary affirmative action program. It is not disputed
that the department had previously discriminated against women and that only 1 percent
of fire department employees were females at the time the AA plan was adopted (1984).
The plan established a “long-term” goal of 36 percent female utilization, based on the
proportion of women in the population (52%) reduced by a third to account for the fact
that many women would not have the interest or ability to be firefighters. By 1997, 11.6
percent of firefighters were female. The applicant pool that year was 22 percent female
and 27 percent of the persons hired were female. The department gives preferences to
women in hiring by allowing all women who pass the written test to be included in the
applicant pool (for males, there is a lottery due to the large number of applicants) and by
treating female gender as a plus in making final hiring decisions. A group of males,
unsuccessful in obtaining jobs as firefighters, sued. (Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dept.,
253 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
The affirmative action program was challenged on constitutional grounds. The appeals
court agreed with the lower court that an allegation of unconstitutional sex discrimination
on the part of a public employer should be reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny
standard. Under this standard, the government entity must demonstrate some past
discrimination against women, but not necessarily discrimination by the entity itself.
Additionally, the sex-conscious program need not be a last resort for dealing with sex
discrimination, but it must be a product of “rational analysis rather than a stereotyped
reaction based on habit.” The focus of the legal challenge was a claim that the goal of 36
percent female utilization was unreasonably high because it was based on general
population figures rather than a more fine-grained analysis of the proportion of women
qualified for and interested in becoming firefighters. The court agreed that the goal was
too high, but upheld the program because the plaintiff’s own figures suggested that 16-22
percent of the relevant labor market was composed of women and that this still exceeded
the percentage of female firefighters at the time of the suit. However, the court cautioned
the County to carefully evaluate its hiring goals and to more toward a rapid conclusion of
its affirmative action efforts.
The court began by stating that discrimination against whites is “just as repugnant to
constitutionally protected values of equality” as discrimination against blacks. The court
rejected the term “reverse discrimination” and said that the case should be analyzed the
same as any racial discrimination claim. Regarding the plaintiff’s Title VII claim, the
court found substantial evidence that the department’s stated reason for not hiring him
was pretextual. The court pointed to statements made by the Fire Chief regarding the
department’s race-conscious policies; deviation from its own hiring procedures; and the
hiring of an unqualified candidate over the qualified plaintiff. The court also maintained
that the existence of an affirmative action plan, combined with evidence that the plan was
followed in an employment decision, constitutes direct evidence of discrimination unless
the plan is valid. While this case was unusual because the employer denied acting on the
basis of its affirmative action plan, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence
that the department’s actions were taken pursuant to the plan. The case was remanded
back to the district court which had granted summary judgment. At least with respect to
the equal protection portion of the plaintiff’s claim, the court made it clear that the
affirmative action plan would be reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard and that it
would be the County that bore the burden of defending the plan’s constitutionality.
4.) The Omaha Fire Department had an affirmative action plan that provided for the
following regarding promotions. The percentage of African Americans currently in
promotional positions would be compared against the percentage available within the
department. If there was evidence of underutilization of African-Americans in any
promotional position, hiring goals were set. The goals reflected the number of African
Americans who would have to be promoted to eliminate the underutilization, rounded off
so that numbers with fractions lower than 1/2 (e.g., 2.3) were rounded down and numbers
with fractions above 1/2 (e.g., 2.7) were rounded up. For job categories with
underutilization, the personnel director was required to deviate from the usual procedure
of referring the top scorers on the civil service eligibility list and refer additional
minority candidates. Hiring decisions were made by the fire chief, who in addition to
other factors, took race into account. A white candidate for the position of battalion chief
was passed over for promotion in favor of an African-American candidate lower on the
eligibility list. The chief said that numerous factors were considered in making this
promotion, including the fact that only 1 out of 28 battalion chiefs were African-
American. The white candidate sued. What should the court decide? Why? (Kohlbek v.
City of Omaha, Nebraska, 447 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006))
The affirmative action plan was challenged on constitutional grounds. The trial court
found for the city, but the appeals court reversed and remanded. It was agreed that there
was evidence of past discrimination by the city in hiring and promoting firefighters. Until
1971, the department had excluded African-Americans. The decision focused instead on
whether the particular plan was narrowly tailored. The court held that “the relationship of
Omaha’s numerical goals to the relevant labor market is not sufficiently exact to
withstand [strict scrutiny].” By looking only at evidence of underutilization, the city used
racial classifications to make promotion decisions in the absence of evidence of actual
past discrimination in particular job categories. The court was especially critical of the
“half person rule,” stating that it did not even require a statistically significant showing of
underutilization before calling for race-conscious promotions. In fact, there was no
statistically significant difference between the actual and expected numbers of African-
Americans in the Fire Captain and Battalion Chief classifications. The city’s alternative
argument, based on citing diversity as a compelling governmental interest, was not fully
considered by the lower court and will have to be considered on remand.
5.) A white systems engineer with supervisory responsibilities was terminated. This was
the first discipline he had ever received. His problems stemmed from the incarceration of
one of his employees, an African American, for a dispute with the employee’s girlfriend.
After a convoluted series of events, the supervisor was fired for allegely having been
dishonest with other managers about when he became aware that this employee had been
jailed. He was subsequently replaced by two employees, one of them an African
American who had previously physically threatened the supervisor without any
disciplinary consequences. About a decade earlier, the company had settled a
discrimination suit for $38 million, entered into a consent decree, and agreed to take
affirmative action. The consent decree had expired about four years before these events.
There was evidence that another employee that he supervised had violated rules three
times, costing the company thousands of dollars, but the supervisor was told not to
discipline him because that would “stir up the pot” and “create controversy.” In the
investigation that led to his termination, the investigating manager never interviewed the
supervisor himself. The supervisor sued. What should the court decide? Why? (Mastro v.
Potomac Electric Power Co., 447 F.3d 843 (D.C. Cir. 2006); cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1140 (2007))
The appeals court reversed the lower court’s judgment for the employer on the
employee’s reverse discrimination claim. The court started its analysis from the position
that a plaintiff in a reverse discrimination case must show “additional background
circumstances that support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who
discriminates against the majority.” Such circumstances can take the form of evidence
indicating that the particular employer has some reason to treat non-minority employees
disadvantageously or of “fishy” events (e.g., departures from normal procedures, failure
to review a candidate’s credentials) that suggest unequal treatment. In this case, the court
took into account the expired consent decree, “which a reasonable jury could believe …
encourage[ed] … management to treat minority employees in a preferential manner.
Evidence of the reluctance of management to discipline African-American employees
bolstered the inference of discrimination. The court examined the stated reason for
termination and found it to be likely pretextual. The investigation leading to the
termination was “not just flawed, but inexplicably unfair.” Speaking to everyone
involved except the very person who was at the center of the controversy – and who was
also the only white employee – strongly suggested a desire to reach a conclusion
supporting termination. The court was also critical of the investigator’s failure to assess
the credibility of the witnesses or whether they were friends of the principals.
6.) A female manager who denied a promotion to a male employee had said a few months
earlier “that’s what we need [around here], a little more diversity.” The statement had
been made in response to her learning that an African-American female had been hired.
All three candidates (the plaintiff, another male, and a female) had the experience of
having been temporarily assigned in the past to the position in question, Manager of
Vehicle Maintenance. The two male candidates were judged to have extensive technical
backgrounds, but to be lacking in managerial skills. The manager defended the hiring of
the female candidate by saying that although her experience in the vehicle maintenance
area was much more limited, she had an extensive managerial background. However,
both the successful female and the rejected male candidate had a total of 13 years of
managerial experience. The manager also found that the female candidate performed
better in her interview. At the time of the promotion, the female employee was in a lower
pay grade than the male plaintiff. What should the court decide? Why? (Plumb v. Potter,
212 Fed. Appx. 472 (6th Cir. 2007))
The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.
The court first dismissed the notion that the female manager’s comments constituted
direct evidence of discrimination. “[A] jury could find that [the female manager] believed
that it was good to have more women working at the USPS, yet still conclude that [she]
did not let that personal belief interfere with her decision whether or not to promote a
woman over [the plaintiff].” While the district court had found that the plaintiff did not
establish a prima facie case because he was not similarly situated to the other candidate
whose managerial experience was current, the appeals relied instead on the plaintiff’s
failure to show that the USPS’s stated reason for not promoting him was pretext. Any
differences in qualifications were not of a magnitude that required the conclusion that the
employer selected on grounds other than an honest assessment of qualifications. The
plaintiff’s own subjective assessment that he was the most qualified candidate certainly
didn’t establish that point. The alleged poor performance of the candidate after she was
promoted cannot be used as evidence, since the employer had to base its decision on the
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and arouses religious feeling. Oratorio was his special gift to the
world and one never hears the name of Handel without thinking of
The Messiah.
Handel seemed to reunite the forms: oratorio and opera, under his
massive will. At first some of his oratorios were given in costume,
showing the influence of opera.
Handel had many enemies in England, but he also had friends.
Although imperious, he had a sweet side, and made friends with
humble folk who loved music, even though he hobnobbed with
royalty. Thomas Britton, a coal heaver, his friend, is sketched by an
artist of the day in a picture where Handel is playing The
Harmonious Blacksmith to Alexander Pope, the Duchess of
Queensbury, Colley Cibber and other famous folk. Yet he stormed at
everyone and even royalty “quaked in their boots” and were forced to
behave themselves at rehearsals and concerts which Handel directed.
Accused of using someone’s melody, he answered, “That pig
couldn’t use such a melody as well as I could!” He helped himself to
so many that he was called the “Great Plagiarist.”
His latter life was spent quietly, with a few intimate friends,
drinking his beer and smoking his beloved pipe. He was always
generous and as he grew older seemed to become kindlier and softer.
He contributed largely to the Foundling Asylum and even played the
organ there.
He wanted to die on Good Friday, “in hopes,” he said, “of meeting
his good God, his sweet Lord and Saviour on the day of his
resurrection,” and on Good Friday, April 6th, 1759, he died.
Christoph Willibald Gluck—Father of Modern Opera
1714–1787
Another thing that gave him a push forward and shows how great
people can make a success of failure: he was asked to write a
pasticcio (Italian word meaning a meat-pie), or a string of melodies,
very fashionable in his day. He strung together his best airs from his
Italian operas, and called it Pyramus and Thisbe, but it was a dismal
failure. “Ah, ha!” he must have thought, “why shouldn’t this musical
drivel fail, for it is naught but trash, and with nothing that is needed
to make a good literary drama.” So this was one of the experiences
that led him to reform opera, making the words fit the music and not
stopping a performance, so that a popular soloist could sing a
meaningless trill and then start again with the other part of the word,
—the way that opera was being written at that time.
After his London ups and downs he went to Paris and heard the
operas of Rameau. He realized now the value of musical declamation
and recitative to the meaning and action of opera if used with
thought, and he was not slow in taking suggestions.
Gluck was probably the most all round man of his day, for he knew
literature and science as did few musicians. He knew all the
influential people in the arts, sciences, and music in London,
Hamburg, Dresden and Vienna, and his home was a center of
learned and delightful people. When in Vienna but a short time, he
was commissioned to write an opera and he produced, with success,
La Semiramide, after which he went to Copenhagen. His next opera
Telemacco in which he began to work out his new ideas was well
received, in Rome and Naples.
In 1750 after many disappointments, he was married to a lady he
had long adored. They lived happily together, for Marriane Pergin
not only brought him money which was a great joy, but was always
his devoted and understanding help-mate. She was an accomplished
woman, and a companion that many might envy. But, sad to say,
they had no children, so they adopted a niece of Christoph’s, a lovely
little girl with great musical talent. The three lived lovingly together
until the poor little child sickened and died, making the Glucks most
unhappy, for they adored her, as is often the case, even more than if
she had been their own child.
In 1751 Gluck journeyed to Naples. Didn’t he travel a lot in the
days of the stage coach and brigands! In the same year he became
conductor to Prince Frederick at Vienna and in 1754 was officially
attached to the opera, and Maria Theresa made him court chapel
master.
Soon after, the Pope, pleased with what he had done in Rome,
made him Chevalier of the Golden Spur and from that time he always
styled himself Ritter (Chevalier) von Gluck.
In Il re pastore (The Shepherd King), we see the dawning of
Gluck’s best period of writing (1756). The overture is better music
than he had written before, and from this time on, Gluck became the
genius in the opera world for which he is known. From 1756 to 1760
he lived apart from the world studying and after this he began to
broadcast his ideas in writing and composing.
When the Archduke Joseph of Austria, afterwards the Emperor,
married Isabella of Bourbon, Gluck wrote Tetede which was
performed with great pomp. After this he wrote the ballet Don
Giovanni, or The Libertine, particularly interesting, for it certainly
gave Mozart an idea for his own great work Don Giovanni.
Again our “wandering minstrel” moved, this time to Bologna
where he conducted a new opera which, strange to say, showed not a
sign of his new ideas!
“Orpheus and Euridice” is Born
It is very hard to realize that time was when there were no public
concerts. Music was confined for so many centuries to the churches,
to the public squares, to the King’s Chamber, or to the ball rooms of
wealthy nobles, that it had not become the democratic art that it is
now. Of course the first opera houses in Italy had been steps in the
direction of bringing music to the people. The concerts begun by the
Danish organist, Buxtehude, in Lübeck about 1673, and the
Tonkünstler-societät in Vienna of the same period were the first
public concerts. In England, John Banister started concerts at about
the same time, which were the first to admit an audience by payment
of a fee. Handel’s friend, Thomas Britton, the coal-heaver, gave
concerts at his home for 10 shillings the series!
The 18th century saw a great development in giving public
concerts. In France, the Concerts Spirituels were begun in 1725. The
object of these were to give music to the people on the days of
religious festivals when the opera house was closed. There were
about 24 concerts a year; the political events of 1791 put an end to
the society but it had already given the people a taste for concerts,
and many new societies grew out of it. The festivals of Three Choirs
in West England (see page 190) were founded in 1724, and the
Academy of Ancient Music in 1710. The Musikverein in Leipsic was
founded in 1743 and was later turned into the famous Gewandhaus
concerts in 1781.
This movement for public concerts went hand in hand with the
development of instruments and the perfecting of performers. In fact
the word concert came from “consort—the union or symphony of
various instruments playing in concert to one tune.”
The Mannheim School
About the time in history when Franz Joseph Haydn was born, the
world was very much upset. No one knew what to think or how. It
was a time of battle and struggle as he was born in the midst of the
Seven Years’ War and lived during the French Revolution. Everyone
except for a few great persons felt bitter and discontented and doubt
was everywhere. This seems to be the way wars and conflicts affect
all peoples and it is why wars are so damaging.
Yet out of this mixture of feeling and thinking, the great classic
period of music was created by such men as Bach and Haydn and
Mozart and the finishing touches were put on it by Beethoven, the
colossus.
Franz Joseph Haydn was born in Rohrau (1732), a little town in
Austria near Vienna. His father was a wheelwright and his mother
was a very good cook. Beethoven’s mother, too, was a professional
cook.
These simple parents, his brothers and sisters, measuring not a
baker’s, but a wheelwright’s dozen, had an hour or two of music
every evening after the hard day’s work, and Mathias, the father,
played the harp and sang. It was during these evenings that little
Joseph’s father noticed that at the age of six he was passionately fond
of music.
One time at a festival the drummer failed to appear and there was
no one who could play for the choristers who were to march through
the town. His teacher, Frankh, called Joseph and showed him how to
make the drum stroke and told him to practice it. When he was left
by himself he found a meal tub, over which he stretched a cloth, put
it on a stool and drummed with such vigor that the whole thing
toppled over and he and his drum were covered with meal! But he
learned to drum! And the people laughed when in this solemn church
festival, the little six year old Joseph was seen drumming the big
drum carried by a hunchback in front of him. The drums on which he
played are still at Hainburg. But, we forget, we have not brought him
from Rohrau!
Not long before J. M. Frankh, a relative, came to visit the Haydns,
and it was decided that he should take Joseph to Hainburg to teach
him. The excitement, of course, was great and little Joseph felt very
important with all the hustle and bustle preparing for his departure.
Little did Saperle (his nickname) realize what a hard master he was
getting in Frankh, who only cared for the pay he received from
Joseph’s father. Nevertheless he learned much and showed great
talent while at Hainburg and one day a great thing happened.
Reutter, the organist of St. Stephen’s in Vienna, visited Frankh and
as they talked of music the conversation turned to the choir school
which Reutter directed. Frankh sent for Joseph, a slight, dark haired,
dark eyed little boy, and Reutter asked him to read a piece of music
at sight. Joseph looked at it and said: “How can I, when my teacher
couldn’t?” Yet, Joseph did sing it sweetly and he entered the choir
school. Here his life was a misery, for Reutter was harsh and
unsympathetic, but soon Joseph’s hard life in the choir school was
over, for one very cold winter night, he felt a little frisky, as many a
healthy lad does, and pulled off the wig of a man in the choir.
Reutter, who had wanted an excuse to rid himself of Joseph, because
his voice had begun to break, threw him out into the cold. Poor
Saperle had no other place to go and wandered about all night, until
he met his acquaintance Spangler, a tenor who was very poor and so
had sympathy with Haydn. He took him home to live with him and
his wife and child in his attic,—one small room with no comfort and
no privacy. All this time young Haydn was forced to earn his daily
bread by teaching as much as he could, playing for weddings,
baptisms, funerals, festivals, dances and street serenadings. This
street serenading was a sweet and pretty custom of the time.
One night Haydn and some other youths serenaded Kurz, a
prominent comedian. Kurz, pleased by the music below his window,
called to the lads: “Whose music is that?” “Joseph Haydn’s,” called
back Haydn. “Who is he and where?” asked Kurz. “Down here, I am
Haydn,” said Joseph. Kurz invited him upstairs and Haydn, at the
age of seventeen, received a commission for a comic opera, which
had two special performances.
All this time he mixed with the poor and laboring people, and their
songs became his songs, and his heart was full of their frolics and
their pains. He was of the people and was so filled with their humor
that later he was called the father of humor in music.
Soon, in order to be alone, and to work in peace, he took a room in
another attic, and bade good-bye to his very good friends. His room
was cold in winter and let in the rains and snows, but it did have a
spinet on which Haydn was allowed to play, and fortunately
Metastasio the librettist lived in this house. Here Haydn studied the
works of Karl Philip Emanuel Bach, Fuchs’ Gradus ad Parnassum
(Steps to Parnassus, Parnassus meaning the mountain upon which
the Greek Muses lived and so comes to mean the home of learning).
He practised too, during this time, on any instrument he could find
and learned so much that he became the founder of the modern
orchestra.
When Metastasio discovered that there was a hard working
musician in his house he met him and then introduced him to
Porpora the greatest Italian singing teacher in Vienna. Not long after
meeting him, Porpora entrusted to his care Marianne Van Martines,
his ten year old pupil, the future musical celebrity. At seventeen
Marianne wrote a mass which was used at St. Michael’s Church and
she became the favorite singer and player of Empress Maria Theresa.
You see women even in those days composed and performed!
So began Haydn’s successes. Porpora engaged him as accompanist,
and treated him half way between a valet and a musician, but
Haydn’s sweet nature carried him through all unpleasantnesses and
he was so anxious to learn and to earn his six ducats that he did not
care if he did have to eat with the servants.
In 1751–2, he wrote his first mass, his first string quartet, and his
first comic opera for Kurz, The Crooked Devil, the music of which
has been lost. Soon after he met Gluck at the concerts of the Prince of
Hildburghausen, where Haydn acted as accompanist; at the prince’s
house too, he met Ditter von Dittersdorf, the violinist. The princes
and nobles of these days did much for music for it was usually at
their homes and under their guidance that the composers received
opportunities to work.
Nevertheless, we see Haydn during these days slaving to make his
daily bread, but with the money he made he bought books on music
theory and held himself sternly down to hard work, morning, noon,
and night.
In 1755 Baron von Fürnburg, a music amateur, who gave concerts
at his home, asked him to compose for him, and he wrote eighteen
quartets, six scherzandi for wind instruments (the ancestors of his
own symphonies), four string quartets, to be played by the village
priest, himself, the steward, and the ’cellist Albrechtsberger.
All these pieces show how much happier he was since becoming
part of the Baron’s staff, for they are merry and jolly, and filled with
that humor which Haydn was the first to put into music.
Here, too, he met the cultivated Countess Thun, who was so
interested in his struggle for success, and in the youth himself that
she became his pupil. From this time on he began to earn more and
to live more comfortably.
Everything seemed to be clearing up for him now. The Countess
introduced him to Count Morzin, a Bohemian nobleman of great
wealth, and in 1759 he became his musical director. His orchestra
had eighteen members and here he wrote his first Symphony (the
first of one hundred and twenty-five!)
All this time he kept up his teaching and very soon married the
daughter of a wig-maker, who did not understand him and with
whom he was very unhappy, but he lived with her like the good man
he was until within a few years of his death.