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edu/anti-natalism/

b. Challenges to the Asymmetry Argument

c. The Deluded Gladness Argument
d. Challenges to Deluded Gladness
e. Overall’s Sexism Challenge to Benatar
f. The Hypothetical Consent Argument
g. Challenges to Hypothetical Consent
h. The No Victim Argument
Anti-Natalism i. The Exploitation Argument
j. Negative Utilitarianism
Anti-natalism is the extremely provocative view that it is either always or usually impermissi-
k. Broader Implications
ble to procreate. Some find the view so offensive that they do not think it should be dis-
2. Additional Objections to Philanthropic Arguments
cussed. Others think their strongly intuitive disagreement with it is enough in itself to reject
a. Procreative Autonomy
all arguments for anti-natalism. In the first twenty years of the twenty-first century, however,
b. Pro-Mortalism
a distinct literature emerged that addressed anti-natalism. Sophisticated arguments both in
3. The Misanthropic Argument
favour of and against anti-natalism have been developed and defended. Philanthropic argu-
a. Premise 2 of the Misanthropic Argument
ments for anti-natalism, that is, arguments that emphasize liking and trusting human beings
i. Harm to Humans
(as opposed to misanthropic arguments), focus on the harm done to individuals who are
ii. Harm to Animals
brought into existence. For example, David Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument says that it is
iii. Harm to the Environment
wrong to procreate because of an asymmetry between pleasure and pain. The absence of pain
b. Premise 1 of the Misanthropic Argument
is good even if no one experiences that good whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad un-
c. The Presumptive Duty Not to Procreate
less someone is deprived of it. Since everyone who comes into existence will inevitably expe-
4. Anti-Natalism and Duties to the Poor
rience nontrivial harm, it is better that they are not brought into existence since no one
5. Future Directions
would be harmed by their non-existence. Other philanthropic arguments include the idea
a. Religious Perspectives on Anti-Natalism
that individuals cannot consent to their creation, that procreating necessarily involves creat-
b. Anti-Natalism and Non-Western Ethics
ing victims, and that procreation involves exploiting babies in order to get fully formed
c. Anti-Natalism and Population Ethics
adults. Misanthropic arguments for anti-natalism, on the other hand, appeal to the harm that
d. Human Extinction as the Goal of Anti-Natalism
individuals who are brought into existence will cause. These include the harms that humans
6. References and Further Reading
inflict upon each other, other animals, and the environment. Finally, it has also been recog-
nized that if we have a duty to relieve extreme poverty when possible, there may be a corre-
sponding duty for both the rich and poor to cease from procreating. 1. Philanthropic Arguments for Anti-Natalism
This section outlines important philanthropic arguments for anti-natalism, which focus on
There are numerous ways to expand the debate about anti-natalism. For instance, scholars of
the harm done to individuals who are created. Philanthropic arguments are particularly con-
religion have had little to say about anti-natalism, but it is unclear that they can completely
troversial because they tend to conclude that it is always all-things-considered impermissi-
dismiss certain of these arguments out of hand. Additionally, the debate about anti-natalism
ble to procreate. The specific arguments outlined in this article include the Asymmetry
has primarily been conducted within the context of Western philosophy. It is an open ques-
Argument, the Deluded Gladness Argument, the Hypothetical Consent Argument, the No
tion how the arguments for anti-natalism would be evaluated by various non-Western ethical
Victim Argument, and the Exploitation Argument. This section concludes by briefly examin-
theories. Finally, environmental ethics and population ethics have had little to say about anti-
ing the broader implications of philanthropic arguments.
natalism, and as such there are many avenues for further exploration.

a. Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument

Table of Contents
The South African philosopher David Benatar is probably the most influential contemporary
1. Philanthropic Arguments for Anti-Natalism
proponent of anti-natalism, although later we will see that he has offered a misanthropic ar-
a. Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument

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gument for anti-natalism, he is best known for defending a strong philanthropic argument
which says that it is always impermissible to procreate.
Benatar’s main defense of philanthropic arguments is to be found in his book, Better Never
to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (2006). Since its publication, he has de-
fended the main lines of argument in this book from various critiques and appears not to
have wavered from his initial conclusions. Benatar explains that “[t]he central idea of [his]
book is that coming into existence is always a serious harm” (2006, 1; emphasis added). He
is well aware that the strong evolutionary tendency towards optimism means that many will
find such a conclusion repulsive. Finally, while Benatar focuses most of his discussion on hu-
man procreation, he is clear from the beginning that his argument applies to all sentient be-
ings because they are capable of experiencing harm (2006, 2).
How does Benatar arrive at such a controversial conclusion? Consider that many people hold
that procreation is often permissible because most individuals who come into existence be-
lieve that their lives are worth living. In other words, many of us think our lives are worth liv-
ing despite facing a certain number of obstacles and difficulties throughout our lives.
Moreover, a problem about personal identity raised by twentieth-century moral philosopher
Derek Parfit complicates matters further. This problem is called the non-identity problem
and raises questions about whether it is even possible for an individual with an extremely low
quality of life to coherently wish that their life had gone differently (1996). For example, if
Sally was born to different parents or in different circumstances, it is doubtful that Sally
would really be the same person at all, and not some other different person, Sally*. Benatar
argues that all of this is the result of a simple mistake. He suggests that the non-identity
problem only arises because people frequently conflate a life worth continuing with a life
worth starting. According to Benatar, these are hardly the same. This is because the former
judgment is one that a person who already exists makes about themselves, while the latter
judgment is one about a potential though non-existent being (Benatar 2006, 19-23).
Benatar’s thesis is that no lives are worth starting, even though many lives are worth continu-
ing once they have been started.
One of the main ways that Benatar defends this view is by appealing to important asymme-
tries between non-existence and existence. For Benatar, “there is a crucial difference between
harms (such as pains) and benefits (such as pleasures) which entails that existence has no
advantage over, but does have disadvantages relative to, non-existence” (Benatar 2006, 30).
Here is a key distinction that Benatar needs to establish the Asymmetry Argument: the ab-
sence of pain is good even if no one experiences that good while the absence of pleasure is not
bad unless someone is deprived of it. Consider:
(1) the presence of pain is bad,
and that
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(2) the presence of pleasure is good (Benatar 2006, 30).
However, Benatar claims that this sort of symmetry does not exist when applied to the ab-
sence of pain:
(3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone,
whereas
(4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence
is a deprivation (Benatar 2006, 30).
One reason for holding the asymmetry between (3) and (4) is that it enjoys great explanatory
power. According to Benatar, it explains four different asymmetries better than competing al-
ternatives. The first asymmetry it explains is also probably the most obvious one. This is the
asymmetry between the claim that we have a strong duty not to intentionally bring someone
into existence who will suffer, but we do not have a corresponding duty to bring happy per-
sons into existence (Benatar 2006, 32). The second asymmetry is between the strangeness of
citing the benefit to a potential child as the reason for bringing them into existence versus the
coherence of citing the harms to a potential child as the reason for not bringing them into ex-
istence (Benatar 2006, 34). The third asymmetry involves our retrospective judgments.
While we can regret both bringing an individual into existence and not bringing an individual
into existence, it is only possible to regret bringing an individual into existence for the sake of
that individual. If that individual had not been brought into existence, they would not exist
and hence nothing could be regretted for their sake (Benatar 2006, 34). The fourth asymme-
try is between our judgments about distant suffering versus uninhabited regions. We should
rightly be sad and regret the former, but we should not be sad or regret that some far away
planet (or island in our own world), is uninhabited (Benatar 2006, 35).
Here is a chart Benatar uses to further explain his view (Benatar 2006, 38):
If X exists If X never exists
Presence of pain (Bad) Absence of pain (Good)
Presence of pleasure (Good) Absence of pleasure (Not bad)
Thus, the absence of pain is good even if the best or perhaps only way to achieve it is by the
very absence of the person who would otherwise experience it. This asymmetry between
harm and pleasure explains why it is wrong to have a child because they will not benefit from
that existence, while “it is not strange to cite a potential child’s interests as a basis for avoid-
ing bringing a child into existence” (Benatar 2005, 34). With this asymmetry established,
Benatar concludes that coming into existence in our world is always a harm. In sum, “[t]he
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fact that one enjoys one’s life does not make one’s existence better than non-existence, be-
cause if one had not come into existence there would have been nobody to have missed the
joy of leading that life and thus the absence of joy would not be bad” (Benatar 2005, 58).
b. Challenges to the Asymmetry Argument
Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument has been challenged in a number of places. Some have sug-
gested that the distinction between a life worth starting and a life worth continuing does not
hold up to scrutiny (DeGrazia 2012; Metz 2011, 241). Why think these are two distinct stan-
dards? For example, why not hold that a life worth starting just is a life that will be worth
continuing? Some have argued that Benatar does not do enough to defend this distinction,
which is an important one for the success of his argument. Another objection has been to
challenge directly the asymmetries defended by Benatar. While Benatar suggests that an ab-
sence of pleasure is not bad unless there is an individual who is deprived of it, perhaps it is
better understood as not good (Metz 2011, 242). Likewise, maybe an absence of pain is better
understood as not bad (Metz 2011, 242-243). This would modify Benatar’s chart to the fol-
lowing:
If X exists If X never exists
Presence of pain (Bad) Absence of pain (Not Bad)
Presence of pleasure (Good) Absence of pleasure (Not Good)
There are at least two reasons to favour this symmetry to the asymmetry posited by Benatar.
First “is the fact of symmetry itself. As many physicists, mathematicians and philosophers of
science have pointed out, symmetrical principles and explanations are to be preferred, ceteris
paribus, to asymmetrical ones” (Metz 2011, 245). Second, the symmetry may better explain
“uncontroversial judgments about the relationship between experiences such as pleasure and
pain and their degree of dis/value” (Metz 2011, 245).
Another alternative understanding of the four procreative asymmetries Benatar claims are
best explained by the basic asymmetry between pain and pleasure is the idea that the four
asymmetries themselves are fundamental. As such they need not rely on a further asymmetry
for their explanation (2002, 354-355). For those who disagree, DeGrazia writes that another
alternative explanation is that “we have much stronger duties not to harm than to benefit and
that this difference makes all the difference when we add the value of reproductive liberty. If
so, the asymmetry about procreative duties does not favor the fundamental asymmetry be-
tween benefit and harm championed by Benatar” (DeGrazia 2010 322).
Ben Bradley argues that Benatar’s asymmetry fails because “there is a conceptual link be-
tween goodness and betterness; but if pleasure were intrinsically good but not better than its
absence, there would be no such link” (Bradley 2013, 39; see also Bradley 2010).
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Elizabeth Harman claims that Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument “equivocates between imper-
sonal goodness and goodness for a person” (2009, 780). It is true that the presence of pain is
bad. It is both personally and impersonally bad. However, the absence of pain is only imper-
sonally good since there is no person who exists to experience its absence (Harman 2009,
780). But for the asymmetry to hold Benatar would have to show that absence of pain is also
personally good. All of the various rejoinders to these claims cannot be discussed, but it is
noteworthy that Benatar has directly responded to many criticisms of his arguments (for ex-
ample, Benatar 2013).
c. The Deluded Gladness Argument
Benatar also offers a second argument in support of his anti-natalist conclusion, which can
be called the Deluded Gladness Argument. The main thrust of this argument is to show that
while typical life assessments are often quite positive, they are almost always mistaken. This
serves as a standalone argument for the claim that we should refrain from procreating since
all (or almost all) lives are quite bad. It also offers support for the Asymmetry Argument
which says that if an individual’s life will contain even the slightest harm, it is impermissible
to bring them into existence. This argument aims to show that in the vast majority of cases,
the harms contained in human lives are far from slight. Benatar argues that “even the best
lives are very bad, and therefore that being brought into existence is always a considerable
harm” (2006, 61).
Most people’s own self-assessments of their lives are positive. In other words, most people
are glad to have been brought into existence and do not think they were seriously harmed by
being brought into existence. The ‘Deluded Gladness Argument’ is Benatar’s reasons for
thinking that such self-assessments are almost always the result of delusion. Benatar explains
that “[t]here are a number of well-known features of human psychology that can account for
the favourable assessment people usually make of their own life’s quality. It is these psycho-
logical phenomena rather than the actual quality of a life that explain (the extent of) the posi-
tive assessment” (2006, 64). The most important psychological factor is the Pollyanna
Principle which says that people are strongly inclined towards optimism in their judgments.
People recall positive experiences with greater frequency and reliability than negative experi-
ences. This means that when people look back on the past, they tend to inflate the positive as-
pects of it while minimizing the negative features. This also affects how people view the fu-
ture, with a bias towards overestimating how well things will go. Subjective assessments
about overall well-being are also consistently over-stated with respect to positive well-being
(Benatar 2006, 64-65). Just consider that “most people believe that they are better off than
most others or than the average person” (Benatar 2006, 66). People’s own assessments of
their health do not correlate with objective assessments of it. The self-assessments of happi-
ness of the poor are (almost) always equivalent to those offered by the rich. Educational and
occupational differences tend to make insignificant differences to quality of life assessments
too (Benatar 2006, 66-67).
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Benatar claims that some of this Pollyannaism can be explained by “adaptation, accommoda-
tion, or habituation” (2006, 67). If there is a significant downturn in a person’s life, their
well-being will suffer. However, they often readjust their expectations to their worse situation
and so eventually their self-assessments do not remain low; they move back towards the orig-
inal level of well-being (Benatar 66-67). Subjective well-being report changes more accu-
rately than actual levels of well-being. People often also assess their own well-being by mak-
ing relative comparisons to others. This means that self-assessments are more often compar-
isons of well-being, instead of assessments of actual well-being (Benatar 2006, 68). Benatar
further argues that on three main theories of how well a life is going–hedonistic theories,
desire-fulfillment theories, and objective list theories—assessments of how well one’s life is
going are almost always too positive. He consistently points out that there is a distinction be-
tween the well-being that an individual ascribes to their own life and the actual well-being of
that individual’s life. Benatar’s point is that these things do not often align. Once we have a
more accurate picture of how bad our lives really are, we should ask whether we would inflict
the harms that occur in any ordinary life to a person who already exists. The answer, accord-
ing to Benatar is clearly ‘no’. (87-88). While it is possible to have a life that avoids most
harms, we are not in a good epistemic position to identify whether this will apply to our own
offspring. Given that the odds of avoidance are slim to begin with, procreation is akin to a
rather nasty game of Russian roulette.
d. Challenges to Deluded Gladness
Regardless of the status of Benatar’s asymmetry thesis, he has also urged that our lives are
far worse than the value at which we normally assess them. If it turns out that most lives are
actually not worth living, then this is a reason in itself not to procreate. But many have sug-
gested that Benatar is mistaken about this fact. For instance, the fact that so many people are
glad for their existence might be evidence in itself that such gladness is not deluded
(DeGrazia 2012, 164). Furthermore, any plausible moral theory must be able to account for
the fact that most people are glad to be alive and think that their lives are going well
(DeGrazia 2012, 158).
Another objection is that it fails to distinguish between higher-order pleasures and minor
pains. Being tired or hungry is a harm, but it is outweighed by more valuable goods such as
loving relationships. Many of the negative features that Benatar associates with existence can
be overridden in this way (Harman 2009, 783).
Alan Gewirth has comprehensively defended the concept of self-fulfillment as key to a mean-
ingful life (1998). Although special relationships like the one between parents and children
violate egalitarian norms, having a family does not violate anyone else’s human rights. This
forms part of the basis for Gewirth claiming that while “children have not themselves volun-
tarily participated in setting up the family, their special concern for their parents and siblings
is appropriately viewed as derivative, both morally and psychologically, from the parents’
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special concern both for one another and for each of their children and, in this way, for the
family as a whole” (1998, 143). At least for some people, procreating and the family unit are
an important part of self-fulfillment. If Gewirth is right about the value of self-fulfillment,
and procreating contributes to self-fulfillment (at least for certain individuals), then these
ideas constitute a reason to reject Deluded Gladness. At the very least, Gewirth’s theory of
self-fulfilment needs to be considered by Benatar in addition to the hedonistic theories,
desire-fulfillment theories, and objective list theories he criticizes for encouraging inaccurate
self assessments about quality of life.
There are also important questions about whether the type of self-deception that seems to be
required by the Undeluded Gladness Argument is even possible. For example, some theories
of deception say that the deceiver knowingly and intentionally deceives another agent. But
this makes it difficult to see how self-deception is even possible. The deceiver would know
they are deceiving themselves since deceit is intentional. A problem arises because the notion
that many people have simply deluded themselves into thinking their lives are better than
they really are could plausibly be thought to be a form of self-deception. And yet on the the-
ory of self-deception just described, we might wonder whether such self-deception is even
possible. Connections between arguments for anti-natalism and self-deception are surely
worthy of more consideration. As it stands, the literature on anti-natalism in general has not
taken into account how different theories of self-deception might affect various arguments.
e. Overall’s Sexism Challenge to Benatar
Christine Overall suggests that Benatar’s arguments, even if true, could have harmful conse-
quences for women. This is thus a moral rather than an epistemic challenge to anti-natalism.
First, Overall holds that we do not have a duty to procreate because women have procreative
control over their own bodies (Overall 2012, 114). Second, she objects to the idea that there
are no costs associated with procreation, especially when one considers the nine-month preg-
nancy and delivery. Third, she worries that adopting Benatar’s views could actually lead to
more female infanticide and violence towards pregnant women. One question here, then, is
whether Benatar is sufficiently sensitive to the plight of women and the potential conse-
quences his arguments might have for them. Is anti-natalism ultimately a sexist position?
Benatar responds to Overall by claiming that a right to not reproduce only exists if there is no
moral duty to reproduce. This reply closely links rights with duties. He also observes that the
costs women incur in procreating are not what is under dispute. The question at stake here is
whether it is permissible to procreate, not whether there are costs involved in procreating.
Finally, Benatar again reiterates that his arguments have to do with morality, which in this
case is distinct from the law. This is why he holds that “contraception and abortion should
not be legally mandatory even though contraception and early abortion are morally required”
(Benatar 2019, 366). Finally, Benatar suggests that Overall has not provided specific evidence
that anti-natalism would harm women. In turning this objection on its head, he claims that
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anti-natalism might actually be good for women. For if widely adopted, then there might be
less of a tendency to view women primarily as child birthers and rearers (Benatar 2019,
366-367). Which of Benatar or Overall is correct about the consequences of anti-natalism for
women appears to be an empirical question.
f. The Hypothetical Consent Argument
After Benatar’s work, the Hypothetical Consent Argument is probably the most discussed ar-
gument for anti-natalism in the literature. The basic idea of the argument is that procreation
imposes unjustified harm on an individual to which they did not consent (Shiffrin 1999;
Singh 2012; Harrison 2012). But what makes procreation an unjustified harm? For there are
clearly certain cases where harming an unconsenting individual is justified. Consider the fol-
lowing oft-discussed case:
Rescue. A man is trapped in a mangled car that apparently will explode within minutes.
You alone can help. It appears that the only way of getting him out of the car will break
his arm, but there is no time to discuss the matter. You pull him free, breaking his arm,
and get him to safety before the car explodes (DeGrazia 2012, 151).
It is permissible in this case to harm the man in a nontrivial way without his consent because
doing so clearly prevents the greater harm of his death. We can say that in such a case you
have the man’s hypothetical consent because he would (or rationally ought to) consent to the
harm if he could. But now consider a different case that is also frequently discussed:
Gold manna. An eccentric millionaire who lives on an island wants to give some money
to inhabitants of a nearby island who are comfortably off but not rich. For various rea-
sons, he cannot communicate with these islanders and has only one way of giving them
money: by flying in his jet and dropping heavy gold cubes, each worth $1 million, near
passers-by. He knows that doing so imposes a risk of injuring one or more of the is-
landers, a harm he would prefer to avoid. But the only place where he can drop the
cubes is very crowded, making significant (but nonlethal and impermanent) injury
highly likely. Figuring that anyone who is injured is nevertheless better off for having
gained $1 million, he proceeds. An inhabitant of the island suffers a broken arm in re-
ceiving her gold manna (DeGrazia 2012, 151-152).
What makes this eccentric millionaire’s actions impermissible in this case is that the benefit
imposed does not involve avoiding a greater harm. This is what ethicists refer to as a pure
benefit. So, the idea is that it is impermissible to confer a pure benefit on someone who has
not consented to it, while it is permissible to confer a benefit on someone to prevent a non-
trivial harm to them. In the Rescue case there is hypothetical consent to the harm, whereas in
the Gold manna case there is no such consent.
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The anti-natalist urges that procreation is analogous to the Gold manna case, not the Rescue
case. Procreation imposes a nontrivial and unconsented harm on the individual who is cre-
ated for the purposes of bestowing a pure benefit. Those who would procreate, then, do not
have the hypothetical consent of the individuals they procreate. Why is this the case? If an in-
dividual does not exist, she cannot be harmed nor benefitted. Language is misleading here
because when procreation does not occur there is no ‘individual’ who does not exist. There is
simply nothing. There is no person in a burning car, no people on the island, and no free-
floating soul waiting to be created. Procreation always involves bestowing a pure benefit,
something this argument says is impermissible.
g. Challenges to Hypothetical Consent
Connected to the counterclaim that our lives usually go well is the idea that it is actually per-
missible to sometimes bestow a pure benefit on someone. There are cases where parents are
better understood as exposing their child to certain harms rather than imposing such harms
on them. Even if the act of procreation is ultimately best understood as imposing harms, it
may be justified in light of bestowing a pure benefit on the created individual. Parents often
make their children participate in activities where the gain is only a pure benefit; the activity
has nothing to do with avoiding a greater harm. Consider parents who encourage excellence
in scholarship, music, or athletics (DeGrazia 2012, 156-157). If this is right, then there is also
reason to reject the Hypothetical Consent Argument for anti-natalism.
h. The No Victim Argument
Gerald Harrison argues that to coherently posit the existence of moral duties means there
must be a possible victim (that can be hurt by the breaking of a duty). In light of this, he sug-
gests that “we have a duty not to create the suffering contained in any prospective life, but we
do not have a duty to create the pleasures contained in any prospective life” (2012, 94). It is
intuitive to think that we have the following two duties: (1) There is a duty to prevent suffer-
ing; and (2) There is a duty to promote pleasure (Harrison 2012, 96). Since there would be no
victim if one failed to create happy people, this nicely explains why we do not have a duty to
procreate even if we are sure our offspring will have very happy lives. However, this also ex-
plains why we have a duty not to create suffering people since if we do so there are clearly
victims (that is, the suffering people who were created).
Since all lives contain suffering, there is a duty to never procreate. For in procreating, we al-
ways fail to do our duty to prevent suffering because there is an actual victim of suffering.
That an individual has an on balance or overall happy life cannot outweigh the duty to not
procreate because in failing to procreate there is no victim (Harrison 2012, 97-99).
According to Harrison, the duty not to procreate is therefore underpinned by two prima facie
duties. First, we have a duty to prevent harm. Second, we have a “duty not to seriously affect
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someone else with [their] prior consent” (2012, 100). However, Harrison acknowledges that
“[f]ulfilling this duty will mean that no more lives are created and this […] is a bad state of af-
fairs, even if it is not bad for anyone” (2012, 100). The reason we do not have a duty from en-
suring that this state of affairs does not obtain is that doing so would involve bringing people
into existence who will in fact be harmed by their existence. On the other hand, that no more
lives are created does not harm anyone. Harrison further notes that though his position en-
tails the strange claim that a person can be happy for being brought into existence, even
though they are harmed by it, there is nothing incoherent in it. For example, someone could
place a large bet in our name without our consent. Doing so is wrong even if the bet is won
and we ultimately benefit from it (Harrison 2012, 100).
i. The Exploitation Argument
The Exploitation Argument for anti-natalism, offered by Christopher Belshaw, involves the
idea that procreation fundamentally involves exploitation (Belshaw 2012). Consider that we
have the intuition that we should end the lives of animals who are suffering even if there is
some chance that they could be happy in the future (Belshaw 2012, 120). Suppose that there
are categorical desires, which involve reasons to ensure our future existence. Further suppose
that there are also conditional desires, which, assuming a future, offer reason to think that
one state of affairs will obtain over some other one (Belshaw 2012, 121). Belshaw continues to
suggest that while a baby is a human animal, it is necessarily not a person in a more robust
sense. This is because babies are not psychologically knit together, nor do they have categori-
cal or conditional desires (Belshaw 2012, 124). Likewise, there is no continuity between a
baby and the adult it becomes; it is implausible to think these are the same person. For a
baby:
[H]as no developed notion of itself, or of time, no desire to live on into the future, no
ability to think about the pain and decide to endure it. Further, if we think seriously
about a baby’s life we’ll probably agree it experiences pain in more than trivial
amounts. Even perfectly healthy babies come into the world screaming, cry a lot, suffer
colic and teething pains, keep people awake at night. None of us can remember any-
thing about it (Belshaw 2012, 124).
An important claim of the Exploitation Argument is that such a life is not worth living. Even
if only through a baby can a person be brought into existence, this does not compensate the
baby for the harm it experiences (Belshaw 2012, 124). This means that we must exploit ba-
bies in order for there to be humans. I might be glad that there was a baby who was exploited
in order for me to come to exist, but it would still be better for that baby had it never been
born. In procreating “we are inevitably free-riding on the several misfortunes of small, help-
less and shortlived creatures.” (Belshaw 2012, 126).
j. Negative Utilitarianism
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Two well-known consequentialist ethical theories are act-utilitarianism and rule-
utilitarianism. The former focuses on evaluating the permissibility of individual actions
based on their effects while the latter instead seeks to discover a set of rules which if followed
will maximize positive effects. This strategy involves categorizing different types of action. It
has been observed that a different type of utilitarianism, negative utilitarianism, entails anti-
natalism (for example, Belshaw 2012; Metz 2011). On this moral theory, the only salient as-
pect of morality is avoiding pain. When assessing whether a particular action is permissible
(or what set of rules to follow) we should only ask whether the effects of that action will be
painful. Obtaining pleasure (in any sense) simply does not factor into moral reasoning on
this view.
Since every life contains at least some pain, it is best to avoid it by simply not starting that life
in the first place. According to negative utilitarianism, no amount of pleasure could outweigh
even the smallest degree of pain, since pleasure does not count for anything morally. While
the connection between negative utilitarianism and anti-natalism has been identified, anti-
natalists have hardly been eager to adopt this as an argumentative strategy. Not only is nega-
tive utilitarianism a highly controversial moral theory in itself, but it seems to entail pro-
mortalism, the view that people should end their lives. This is, after all, seemingly the best
way to avoid any future pains. Since many anti-natalists have gone to great lengths to show
that the view does not in fact entail pro-mortalism, appealing to negative utilitarianism is
largely avoided by proponents of anti-natalism.
k. Broader Implications
It is important to note that there is a difference between offering theoretical arguments for a
particular conclusion and enforcing policies which ensure that conclusion is enacted. The
philosophical debate about anti-natalism is almost entirely theoretical. Many authors defend-
ing anti-natalism seem well aware that there are strong prudential and moral reasons not to
force anti-natalist policies on people. Likewise, though they think anti-natalism is true there
is a general recognition that it will not be widely adopted in practice.
2. Additional Objections to Philanthropic Arguments
a. Procreative Autonomy
One reason that has been offered to reject anti-natalist conclusions in general is that procre-
ative autonomy is more important (for example, Robertson 1994). Procreative autonomy is
important because procreation is often central to an individual’s identity, dignity, and life’s
meaning. In other words:
Whether or not to have children, when and by what means to have them, how many to
have, and similar choices are extremely important to us. These decisions greatly affect
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our narrative identity—for example, whether or not we become parents, what sort of
family we have—and much of the shape of our lives. Few decisions seem as personal
and far-reaching as reproductive decisions. That procreative freedom is very important
seems too obvious to require further defense (DeGrazia 2012, 155).
Those who are attracted to this type of response could admit that anti-natalists get at impor-
tant truths about procreation, but simply maintain that procreative autonomy is more impor-
tant.
b. Pro-Mortalism
Another objection that sometimes gets levelled against anti-natalism is that it entails pro-
mortalism, the view that individuals ought to end their lives. As noted above, this is probably
one reason why anti-natalists have avoided tying their views to negative utilitarianism.
However, it seems doubtful that any of the main arguments for anti-natalism entail pro-
mortalism. With respect to Benatar’s work, he consistently states that even though lives are
not worth creating, most are worth continuing. The same can be said of the Hypothetical
Consent Argument. Once an individual has received the pure benefit of existence, realizing
this fact does not imply they should commit suicide, just as the islander whose arm is broken
by the gold manna ought not to end his life. The No Victim Argument neatly avoids this
worry because one has a duty to promote one’s own pleasure. Once one comes into existence
there is an actual victim if one fails to promote their own pleasures, so there is a duty to pro-
mote one’s pleasure. Presumably, for most people and throughout most of their lives, suicide
would not fulfill this duty. Finally, the Exploitation Argument also avoids this objection. For
on this argument most adult human lives are indeed worth continuing, the problem is rather
the exploitation of the babies to get such lives in the first place. Benatar says that even though
he holds most lives are going poorly, it does not entail that we should commit suicide. This is
because we typically each have interests in continuing to live. Our lives would have to be
worse than death, which is extremely bad, in order for suicide to be justified. This will only
rarely be the case (Benatar 2013, 148).
3. The Misanthropic Argument
The philanthropic arguments which were discussed in the previous section conclude that be-
cause of the harm done to the created individual, it is always all things considered wrong to
procreate. This section explains what is known as the misanthropic argument for anti-
natalism. Unlike the philanthropic arguments, this argument focuses on the harm caused by
the individuals who are created. The conclusion of this argument is slightly weaker, claiming
that procreation is almost always impermissible, or only impermissible given the current sit-
uation in which procreation occurs.
Though Benatar is best known for offering a philanthropic argument for anti-natalism, he
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has also developed a distinct misanthropic argument. He also speculates that misanthropic
arguments are even more likely to be met with scorn than philanthropic arguments. This is
because while the latter are in some sense about protecting individuals, the former focuses on
the bad aspects of humanity (Benatar 2015, 35). Whether Benatar is right about this remains
an open question as most of the anti-natalist literature tends to focus on the philanthropic ar-
guments.
Here’s Benatar’s basic misanthropic argument for anti-natalism:
(1) We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing into existence new members
of species that cause (and will likely continue to cause) vast amounts of pain, suffering
and death.
(2) Humans cause vast amounts of pain, suffering and death.
Therefore,
(3) We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing new humans into existence.
(Benatar 2012, 35).
a. Premise 2 of the Misanthropic Argument
Premise 2 is the one in most need of defense. To defend it Benatar appeals to humanity’s gen-
erally poor impulses, their destructiveness towards one another, the suffering they cause
other animals, and the damage that they do to the environment.
i. Harm to Humans
Regarding humanity’s poor impulse control in general, Benatar is quick to observe that the
vast majority of human achievements are not possible for most humans. We therefore should
not judge the human species in general based on the performance of exceptional people. In
fact, it is now well-document that humans exhibit numerous cognitive biases which cause us
to both think and act irrationally (Benatar 2015, 36). Consider that:
For all the thinking that we do we are actually an amazingly stupid species. There is
much evidence of this stupidity. It is to be found in those who start smoking cigarettes
(despite all that is known about their dangers and their addictive content) and in the
excessive consumption of alcohol—especially in those who drive while under its influ-
ence. It is to be found in the achievements of the advertising industry, which bear am-
ple testament to the credulity of humanity (Benatar 2015, 36).
These cognitive failings often cause humans to harm each other. We exhibit an extreme ten-
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dency toward conformity and following authority, even when doing so leads us to hurt each
other (Benatar 2015, 37).
Even if one contends that our intelligence compensates for these moral deficiencies, it is diffi-
cult to defend this claim in light of human destructiveness:
Many hundreds of millions have been murdered in mass killings. In the twentieth cen-
tury, the genocides include those against the Herero in German South-West Africa; the
Armenians in Turkey; the Jews, Roma, and Sinti in Germany and Nazi-occupied
Europe; the Tutsis in Rwanda; and Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. Other
twentieth-century mass killings were those perpetrated by Mao Zedong, Joseph Stalin,
and Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge. But these mass killings were by no means the first.
Genghis Khan, for example, was responsible for killing 11.1% of all human inhabitants
of earth during his reign in the thirteenth century […] The gargantuan numbers should
not obscure the gruesome details of the how these deaths inflicted and the sorts of suf-
fering the victims endure on their way to death. Humans kill other humans by hacking,
knifing, hanging, bludgeoning, decapitating, shooting, starving, freezing, suffocating,
drowning, crushing, gassing, poisoning, and bombing them (Benatar 2015, 39).
Humans also do not just murder each other. They also “rape, assault, flog, maim, brand, kid-
nap, enslave, torture, and torment other humans” (Benatar 2015, 40). Though these are the
worst harms, humans also frequently “lie, steal, cheat, speak hurtfully, break confidences and
promises, violate privacy, and act ungratefully, inconsiderately, duplicitously, impatiently,
and unfaithfully” (Benatar 2015, 43). Even if justice is sought, it is hardly ever achieved.
Many of the most evil leaders in human history ruled for the course of their natural lives,
while others had peaceful retirements or were only exiled (Benatar 2015, 43). In sum, “‘Bad
guys’ regularly ‘finish first’. They lack the scruples that provide an inner restraint, and the ex-
ternal restraints are either absent or inadequate” (Benatar 2015, 43).
ii. Harm to Animals
The amount of suffering that humans inflict on animals each year is hard to fathom. Given
that the vast majority of humans are not vegetarians or vegans, most of them are complicit in
this suffering. Consider that “[o]ver 63 billion sheep, pigs, cattle, horses, goats, camels, buf-
falo, rabbits, chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys, and other such animals are slaughtered every
year for human consumption. In addition, approximately 103.6 billion aquatic animals are
killed for human consumption and non-food uses” (Benatar 2015, 44). These numbers ex-
clude the hundreds of millions of male chicks killed every year because they cannot produce
eggs. It also excludes the millions of dogs and cats that are eaten in Asia every year (Benatar
2015, 44). Each year there are also 5 billion bycatch sea animals, which are those caught in
nets, but not wanted. Finally, at least 115 million animals are experimented on each year
(Benatar 2015, 45). Furthermore, “[t]he deaths of the overwhelming majority of these ani-
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mals are painful and stressful” (Benatar 2015, 44). The average meat eater will consume at
least 1690 animals in their lifetime (a rather low estimate) which is an extremely large
amount of harm (Benatar 2015, 54-55).
iii. Harm to the Environment
Humans are also incredibly destructive to the environment. The human population is grow-
ing exponentially and the negative environment effects per person continue to increase too.
This is partly due to industrialization and a steady growth in per capita consumption
(Benatar 2015, 48). As a result:
The consequences include unprecedented levels of pollution. Filth is spewed in massive
quantities into the air, rivers, lakes, and oceans, with obvious effects on those humans
and animals who breath the air, live in or near the water, or who get their water from
those sources. The carbon dioxide emissions are having a ‘greenhouse effect,’ leading to
global warming. As a result, the icecaps are melting, water levels are rising, and climate
patterns are changing. The melting icecaps are depriving some animals of their natural
habitat. The rising sea levels endanger coastal communities and threaten to engulf
small, low-lying island states, such as Nauru, Tuvalu, and the Maldives. Such an out-
come would be an obvious harm to its citizens and other inhabitants. The depletion of
the ozone layer is exposing earth’s inhabitants to greater levels of ultraviolet light.
Humans are encroaching on the wild, leading to animal (and plant) extinctions. The de-
struction of the rain forests exacerbates the global warming problem by removing the
trees that would help counter the increasing levels of carbon dioxide (Benatar 2015,
48).
CO2 emissions per year per person are massive. While they are lower in developing countries,
they tend to have much higher birthrates than their wealthier counterparts. As the popula-
tion increases, adding more humans will invariably harm the environment.
b. Premise 1 of the Misanthropic Argument
Notice that premise 1 of this argument does not claim that we should kill members of a dan-
gerous species or stop that dangerous species from procreating. Instead, it merely says “that
one should oneself desist from bringing such beings into existence” (Benatar 2015, 49). For
this premise to be true it also does not have to be the case that every single member of the
species is dangerous. The likelihood that a new member of the species will cause significant
harm is enough to make procreation too dangerous to be justified. Also notice that this
premise is silent on the species in question. It would be easily accepted if it were about some
non-human species: “Imagine, for example, that some people bred a species of non-human
animal that was as destructive (to humans and other animals) as humans actually are. There
would be widespread condemnation of those who bred these animals” (Benatar 2015, 49).
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c. The Presumptive Duty Not to Procreate oping countries who are suffering.

Presumptive duties are defeasible. The duty only holds if there are no good reasons to do oth-
Benatar is so far the only one to make connections between Singer’s argument and anti-
erwise (Benatar 2015, 51). One possible way of avoiding the misanthropic argument is to
natalism. Here is his interpretation of Singer’s argument:
counter that the good that humans do is pervasive enough to often defeat this presumptive
duty. If this is right, then procreation will often be permissible (Benatar 2015, 51). However,
Singer’s Poverty Relief argument on our duty to the poor
in light of the vast harms that humans do, meeting the burden of proof regarding the amount
of counteracting good that humans do, is going to be extremely difficult. Remember that the
(1) If we can prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of
benefits here do not just have to counter the harms to other humans, but the harm done to
comparable moral importance, we ought to do it.
billions of animals every year, in addition to the environment more generally (Benatar 2015,
52). We would also need a clear understanding of what constitutes good outweighing bad.
(2) Extreme poverty is bad.
Does saving two lives outweigh the bad of one violent murder? Benatar is doubtful, claiming
the number of lives needing to be saved to outweigh the bad is much higher than two (2015,
(3) There is some extreme poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of com-
52). Likewise, offering benefits to future generations cannot count as part of the good that
parable moral importance.
outweighs the bad because such humans would not exist if the presumptive duty were fol-
lowed in the first place. Under the current conditions of the world, more new humans add
Therefore,
more additional harms than they do any offsetting benefits (Benatar 2015, 54). Finally, a
more modest response is the assertion that the presumptive duty not to procreate can occa-
(4) We ought to prevent some extreme poverty (Benatar 2020, 416).
sionally be defeated. Perhaps the children of a particular individual would do enough offset-
ting good that it would justify creating them (Benatar 2015, 54). While this scenario is cer-
This argument nicely avoids disagreement between utilitarians and non-utilitarians because
tainly possible, it is doubtful that those considering procreating will be in a good position to
both sides will agree that we should prevent bad things from happening even if there is some
know this about their future offspring.
disagreement about how to measure bad or just what constitutes a comparable moral sacri-
fice. Benatar observes that Singer’s argument has clear implications for procreative ethics.
4. Anti-Natalism and Duties to the Poor We must either accept those implications or give up Singer’s conclusion.

Thus far, very little has been said about how our duties to the poor are impacted by anti-
What does Singer’s argument imply about procreative ethics? The first implication has to do
natalism. However, there are important connections between duties to the poor and procre-
with the opportunity costs of having children. His argument “implies that, at least for now,
ative ethics. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that you are walking on your way to
the relatively affluent ought to desist from having children because they could use the re-
work in the morning. You find yourself walking by a pond and observe a drowning child. If
sources that would be needed to raise resulting children to prevent extreme poverty”
you stop to help the child, you will probably ruin your nice new clothes and also be late for
(Benatar 2020, 417). In wealthy countries it costs anywhere from two hundred thousand to
work. There is no tangible risk of you drowning since the pond is not very deep for an adult.
three hundred thousand dollars to raise a child from birth to the age of eighteen years old.
There is also no one else around. If you do not help the child now, then they will almost cer-
Having children should be forgone by the wealthy so that they can spend this money on alle-
tainly drown. What should you do? This example is modified from Peter Singer, a famous
viating extreme poverty. It also implies that even adoption may be impermissible for the
utilitarian who is well-known for defending the idea that we have rather strong obligations to
wealthy if their resources are still more effectively spent elsewhere (Benatar 2020, 418).
help the poor, particularly those in developing countries. Singer thinks it is obvious what you
should do in this case. You should stop to help the drowning child. The value of the child’s
Another implication of Singer’s argument has to do with natality costs. It implies that many
life is worth much more than what it costs for you to help them, namely, your new clothes
people should refrain from procreating, especially the poor, because of the bad things that
and having to explain to your boss why you were late. The next step is to draw an analogy be-
will inevitably happen to those they bring into existence (Benatar 2020, 420). Sacrificing
tween the children in the pond and the less-well off developing nations. In fact, Singer sug-
procreation is not of comparable moral importance since no one is harmed by not being
gests that people in wealthier countries are in the very position of walking past ponds with
brought into existence. So, it is more important that the poor refrain from procreating to pre-
drowning children everyday. The people we could help are just a bit farther away and we do
vent their children from experiencing extreme poverty. Benatar suggests that if Singer is
not see them directly in front of us. But this is not a morally significant difference. So, those
right, we might even have a duty to prevent the poor from procreating, though this would be
of us in wealthier countries need to devote a lot more of our resources to help those in devel-

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the prevention of a bad thing, not relief from it. Of course, Benatar is well aware that this
conclusion is unlikely to be met by many with approval. According to Benatar at least, no one
would be harmed if people refrained from procreating for these reasons, and much suffering
would be prevented. While these ideas are far from uncontroversial, and likely to even cause
offense to some, it is clear that more work needs to be done exploring how our duties to the
poor are connected to anti-natalism.
5. Future Directions
This section identifies three potential areas for future research into anti-natalism. The first
regards a lack of direct interaction between religious perspectives and arguments for anti-
natalism. The second involves the need for more interaction between anti-natalism and non-
Western approaches to ethics. The third is about the surprising dearth of engagement with
anti-natalism in the philosophical literature on population ethics.
a. Religious Perspectives on Anti-Natalism
Perhaps more than any other group, religious believers cringe when they hear defenses of
anti-natalism. In the classical monotheistic tradition, for example, existence is held to be in-
trinsically good. This has played out in the prizing of the nuclear family. It might seem rather
unsurprising, then, that religious thinkers have had little to say about the anti-natalist de-
bate. However, the rejection of anti-natalism out of hand by the religious believer might turn
out to be short-lived. First, theists who are committed to the claim that existence is intrinsi-
cally good are committed to the further claim that there are literally no lives not worth con-
tinuing. Some might find this conclusion difficult to accept. For even if it were to apply to all
actual lives, it is easy to think of possible lives that are so awful they are not worth continu-
ing. Second, in holding that existence is intrinsically good, theists are under pressure to ex-
plain why they are not obligated to procreate as much as possible. They need to explain this
because an obligation to procreate as much as possible is absurd.
If theists can coherently explain why existence is intrinsically good while avoiding the prob-
lematic results just mentioned, they may well have an answer to philanthropic arguments for
anti-natalism. They can acknowledge that procreation is a weighty moral decision that ought
to be taken more seriously than prospective couples often take it. They can even concede that
certain cases of procreation probably are impermissible. However, if procreating really is to
bring about an individual whose existence is intrinsically valuable, then many instances of
procreation will indeed be permissible. Yet this does not necessarily let the theist off the hook
when it comes to the misanthropic arguments for anti-natalism. The harm that most human
lives will do seems hard to deny. One possibility for the theist is to say that this type of con-
cern reduces to the problem of evil. Therefore, solutions to the problem of evil can be used as
resources to show why procreation is permissible even in light of the harm humans do. But
there are many questions for such a strategy. It is one thing to say that once humans are
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brought into existence God allows them to commit a great deal of evil because of the value of
morally significant freedom, to name just one theistic response to evil. However, it is another
to say that such solutions justify the act of bringing humans into existence who do not al-
ready exist.
Another underexplored connection between a theistic perspective and misanthropic argu-
ments for anti-natalism regards humanity’s treatment of the environment. In the Judeo-
Christian tradition, for example, the planet is a gift from God to humans. We are supposed to
cherish, protect, and look after the environment and the non-human animals that it contains.
Clearly, just the opposite has happened. In light of the fact that population increase is di-
rectly tied to the climate crises, might those in religious traditions who hold that the planet is
a gift be obligated to cease procreating? These and related ideas are at least worthy of explo-
ration by scholars of religion.
b. Anti-Natalism and Non-Western Ethics
The philosophical literature on anti-natalism is dominated by those working in Western phi-
losophy. It is important to briefly consider ways in which debates about procreative ethics
could be forwarded by including non-Western ethical perspectives, African philosophy, for
example. This literature emerged (professionally) in the 1960s, with the demise of coloniza-
tion and the rise of literacy rates on the African continent. There are three main branches of
African ethics. First, African thinkers distinguish the normative conception of personhood
from the metaphysical or biological conceptions of the person (Menkiti 1984). On this under-
standing of ethics, the most central feature of morality is for individuals to develop their per-
sonhood. This is typically done by exercising other-regarding virtues and hence can only be
accomplished within the context of community. On this view personhood is a success term
such that one could fail to be a person (in the normative sense) (Ikuenobe 2006; Molefe
2019). Second, harmony has been postulated as the most important aspect of morality in in-
digenous African societies. Harmony is about establishing a balance or equilibrium amongst
humans with each other and all else, including the natural world. Disrupting the harmony of
the community is one of the worst things an individual can do. That personhood and har-
mony are both understood within the context of relating to others shows why, in part, com-
munity is of supreme importance in the African tradition (Metz forthcoming; Paris 1995;
Ramose 1999). Third, vitalist approaches to morality say that everything, both animate and
inanimate, are imbued with life force, a kind of imperceptible energy. On this approach, the
goal of morality is to increase life force in oneself and others. Procreation is valuable because
it creates a being with life force (Magesa 1997).
On African personhood accounts of morality, an individual can only develop and exercise
moral virtue in the context of the community, traditionally including not merely present gen-
erations but also future ones, often called the ‘not-yet-born’. To deny the importance of the
continuance of the community through procreation seems to fly in the face of such an ethic.
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Likewise, in African relational ethics, harmony amongst individuals is of the upmost impor-
tant. Again, the continuance of the community through procreation appears vital to the exis-
tence of and promotion of harmony in the community. In other words, there can be no per-
sonhood or harmony without a community of persons. Given its importance, the community
ought to continue via procreation. Finally, on vitality accounts, anti-natalism appears to deny
the importance of creating beings with life force. There is thus a rather apparent tension be-
tween anti-natalism and African communitarian ethics.
However, consider that, despite initial appearances, it could be argued that misanthropic ar-
guments for anti-natalism are in conflict with African ethics. Furthermore, it is plausible that
philanthropic arguments are consistent with at least some line of thought in African ethics.
While tensions may remain between the two views, much more exploration of a possible syn-
thesis between anti-natalism, and African ethics is needed. There are least five possible rea-
sons why these two views might be consistent with each other (and in some cases mutually
supportive). First, African ethics emphasizes doing no harm to the community. Procreation
right now harms many communities, given that creating more people means making valuable
resources even more scarce, for example. Second, procreation harms the global community
and environment. An important line in African thought is that humans should strive to be in
harmony with the natural environment, not just with each other. Until we find ways to
greatly reduce our carbon footprints, procreating harms the environment and thereby pro-
duces disharmony. Third, even if strong philanthropic versions of anti-natalism which do not
rely on better resource distribution or environmental considerations are followed, consider
that even if everyone refrained from procreating there would still be a human community for
many years (the next 80 or so), right up until the very last person existed. The opportunity to
develop one’s personhood and seek harmonious relationships would remain. Fourth, not
procreating arguably allows one to better contribute to the common good because one has
more available time, energy, money, among other resources available that are not spent on
one’s children. Again, this remains so in the African understanding because developing per-
sonhood and harmonious relationships are viewed as essential parts of the common good.
Fifth, adoption is a viable alternative to satisfying the interests of the community. This raises
interesting questions about whether it is creating the child itself, instead of merely rearing
one, that is meaningful, morally significant, or otherwise of importance to the African tradi-
tion.
c. Anti-Natalism and Population Ethics
Anti-natalism appears to have relatively underappreciated connections to topics in environ-
mental ethics. This is surprising particularly regarding the misanthropic arguments which fo-
cus, in part, on the harm that humans do to the environment. Trevor Hedberg (2020) ex-
plains that after a long silence beginning the 1980s and 1990s only very recently have theo-
rists begun to explicitly discuss the population problem in connection with the environment.
The continued growth of the planet’s population is a fact. It took all of human history until
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1804 to reach one billion people. A century ago, the world had approximately 1.8 billion peo-
ple. However, the current population sits at approximately 7.8 billion people (Hedberg 2020,
3). Hedberg contends that “population is a serious contributor to our environmental prob-
lems, we are morally obligated to pursue the swift deceleration of population growth, and
there are morally permissible means of achieving this outcome—means that avoid the coer-
cive measures employed in the past” (Hedberg 2020, 3). Indeed, such coercive measures in
the past are probably part of the reason that many environmental organizations and govern-
ments which claim to care deeply about the climate crisis virtually never mention the popula-
tion. Yet it does not matter if humans become more efficient and individually have a less bad
impact on the environment if such improvements are outpaced by population growth. So far,
any improvements in individual impact have been greatly outpaced by population growth. On
the very plausible (if not obvious) assumptions that (1) climate change poses a significant and
existential threat to the human species; and (2) that population growth contributes to climate
change, environmental ethicists need to start contending with misanthropic arguments for
anti-natalism. Remember that these arguments leave open the possibility (however small)
that humans may not cause so much damage in the future and as such it might not be imper-
missible to bring more into existence.
d. Human Extinction as the Goal of Anti-Natalism
At the beginning of Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, Benatar
acknowledges that his work will likely have no (or almost no) impact on people’s procreative
choices. He writes:
Given the deep resistance to the views I shall be defending, I have no expectation that
this book or its arguments will have any impact on baby-making. Procreation will con-
tinue undeterred, causing a vast amount of harm. I have written this book, then, not
under the illusion that it will make (much) difference to the number of people there will
be but rather from the opinion that what I have to say needs to be said whether or not it
is accepted (2006, vii).
But what would happen if everyone accepted Benatar’s arguments and put them into prac-
tice? The current generation of humans (that is, everyone alive right now), would be the last
generation of humans. Benatar’s recommendation is that the human species should voluntar-
ily opt to go extinct. Yet if this course of action were followed, life would very likely be quite
difficult for the last few remaining humans. An anti-natalist policy, then, would actually in-
crease the harm experienced by at least some humans. Deciding if this is worth it may well
come down to whether we agree that the suffering that will inevitably occur by continuing to
propagate the human species outweighs the harm done to those whose lives would be made
quite difficult by being part of the last few remaining humans. Benatar and those who agree
with him appear to believe that the harm of continuing to bring more persons into existence
drastically outweighs the harm done to the last remaining humans. Anti-natalists are well
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Anti-Natalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/anti-natalism/Anti-Natalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/anti-natalism/

aware that they are recommending human extinction. 171-181.

The most influential statement of the African conception of personhood.
Metz, Thaddeus. 2011. “Are Lives Worth Creating?” Philosophical Papers 40 (2): 233-255.
6. References and Further Reading Critical notice on Benatar 2006.
Metz, Thaddeus. forthcoming. A Relational Moral Theory: African Ethics in and beyond the Continent.
Belshaw, Christopher. 2012. “A New Argument for Anti-Natalism.” South African Journal of Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31(1): 117-127. Offers a new ethical theory heavily influenced by African conceptions of morality focused on promoting har-
Defends the exploitation argument. mony.
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. Oxford: Oxford Molefe, Motsamai. 2019. An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics. Palgrave
University Press. Macmillan.
Seminal work containing an extensive defense of the Asymmetry and Deluded Gladness Arguments for anti- Applies the African conception of personhood to various issues in political philosophy.
natalism.
Overall, Christine. 2012. Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate. MIT Press.
Benatar, David. 2013. “Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics. Journal of Ethics Chapter 6 criticizes Benatar 2006.
17: 121-151. Parfit, Derek. 1994. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Replies to Bradley, Grazia, Harman, among others. Contains the most influential discussion of the non-identity problem.
Benatar, David. 2015. “The Misanthropic Argument for Anti-natalism.” In Permissible Progeny?: The Paris, Peter J. 1995. The Spirituality of African Peoples: The Search for a Common Moral Discourse.
Morality of Procreation and Parenting. Sarah Hannon, Samantha Brennan, and Richard Vernon (eds). Fortress Press.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 34-59. Emphasizes promoting life force as salient to African ethics
Defends anti-natalism on the basis of the harm that those who are created will cause. Ramose, Mogobe. 1999. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Mond.
Benatar, David. 2020. “Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite.” Ethical An African-based ethic focused on harmony.
Theory and Moral Practice 23: 415-431. Robertson, John. 1994. Children of Choice. Princeton University Press.
Connects anti-natalism to Peter Singer’s claims about duties to the poor. An early defense of procreative freedom.
Bradley, Ben. 2010. “Benatar and the Logic of Betterness.” Journal of ethics & social philosophy. Shiffrin, Seana. 1999. “Wrongful Life, Procreative responsibility, and the Significance of Harm.” Legal
Critical notice on Benatar 2006 Theory 5: 117-148.
Bradley, Ben. 2013. “Asymmetries in Benefiting, Harming and Creating.” Journal of Ethics 17:37-49. An influential account focusing on issues of consent and harm in procreation.
Discussion of the asymmetries between pain and pleasure. Singh, Asheel. 2012. “Furthering the Case for Anti-Natalism: Seana Shiffrin and the Limits of Permissible
DeGrazia, David. 2010. “Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar. Theoretical Harm.” South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 104-116.
Medicine and Bioethics 31: 317-331. Develops considerations from Shiffrin 1999 into an explicit argument for anti-natalism.
Reply to Benatar 2006.
DeGrazia, David. 2012. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Chapter 5 critically discusses Benatar 2006.
Gewirth, Alan. 1998. Self-Fulfillment. Princeton University Press.
Defends a theory of self-fulfillment that includes the goods of family and children.
Author Information
Harman, Elizabeth. 2009. “Critical Study of David Benatar. Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Kirk Lougheed
Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2006).” Nous 43 (4): 776-785. Email: philosophy@kirklougheed.com
Critical notice on Benatar 2006.
LCC International University
Harrison, Gerald. 2012. “Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties.” South African
Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 94-103. Lithuania
Statement of the No Victim Argument.
Hedberg, Trevor. 2020. The Environmental Impact of Overpopulation. New York: Routledge. and
One of the few places to discuss the impact of population on the environment, while also making explicit con-
nections to anti-natalism.
Ikuenobe, Polycarp. 2006. Philosophical Perspectives on Communitarianism and Morality in African
University of Pretoria
Traditions. Lexington Books. South Africa
An in-depth analysis of the African conception of personhood.
Magesa, Laruenti. 1997. African Religion: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life.
Claims that life force is the most important feature of African ethics.
Menkiti, Ifeanyi. 1984. “Person and Community in African Traditional Thought.” In African Philosophy:
An Introduction. 3d ed. Richard A. Wright (eds). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. pp.

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