244. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. 21450, April 15, 1968, J.

Dizon

Doctrine: Failure and neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence one could or should have done earlier

Facts: On July 19, 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest. Defendants filed their answer in which, after
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and,
after the same had become final and executory, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co.'s bond, against which the Surety filed a written
opposition. The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made
on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment.
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued
without the required summary hearing. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court
of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeal decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.

Issue: Whether the Surety is barred from raising the jurisdictional issue by laches.

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948,
it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of
this is not only patent but revolting.

252. Shipside Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, J. Melo

Doctrine: While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked
by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace
may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land
Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.

Facts: On October 29, 1958, Original Certificate of was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez, over four
parcels of land. Lots No. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra
Llana, Regina Bustos, and Erlinda Balatbat in a deed of sale. Mamaril, et al. sold Lots No. 1 and 4 to
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Unknown to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, the CFI of
La Union, declared the title of Galvez null and void, and ordered its cancellation. Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Company sold to petitioner Lots No. 1 and 4. Rafael Galvez filed his motion for reconsideration
against the order issued by the trial court declaring OCT No. 0-381 null and void which was denied. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
Twenty four long years, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter from Mr. Victor G.
Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, stating that the decision of the
trial court have not been executed by the Register of Deeds despite receipt of the writ of execution. On
April 21, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation
of titles. The Solicitor General argued that since the trial court in LRC Case No. 361 had ruled and
declared OCT No. 0-381 to be null and void, which ruling was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title over the property
covered by OCT No. 0-381, and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be
consequently cancelled. On July 22, 1999, petitioner Shipside, Inc. filed its Motion to Dismiss. An
opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General. The trial cour denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss. Petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, on
the ground that the orders of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration were issued in excess of jurisdiction. On November 4, 1999, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic may still for revival of judgment.

Ruling: No. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked
by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace
may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in Land
Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.
Republic Act No. 7227, Section 4 pertinently provides: (a) To own, hold and/or administer the
military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San
Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of
Metro Manila military camps which may be transferred to it by the President;
Section 2 of Proclamation No. 216, also provides: All areas covered by the Wallace Air Station as
embraced and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
United States of America, as amended, excluding those covered by Presidential Proclamations
and some 25-hectare area for the radar and communication station of the Philippine Air Force,
are hereby transferred to the Bases Conversion Development Authority ...
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest
to protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where
the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
"every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a
person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be
the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp
Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be
benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.

261. Solid Homes Inc. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, J. Garcia

Doctrine: The moment the breach of right and duty occurs, then the right of action accrues, therefore
period of prescription begins to run.
Facts: On April 7, 1980, petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy a
subdivision Lot 18, Block 2, located at Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, Quezon City. Sometime in
February, 1985, the spouses Uy sold the same lot to respondents, the spouses Ancheta K. Tan and
Corazon de Jesus-Tan. From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only to find
out the sad state of development thereat. There was no infrastructure and utility systems for water,
sewerage, electricity and telephone, as announced in the approved plans and advertisements of the
subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its surrounding areas. In short, there has been no
development at all.
Accordingly, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility systems and clear
the area of squatters. Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for specific performance and
damages therein praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to provide the needed facilities in the
premises and rid the same of squatters; or, in the alternative, for petitioner to replace respondents’
property with another lot in the same subdivision where there are facilities and sans squatters.
The Housing and Land Use Arbiter rendered judgment ordering petitioners to perform its
obligation. Petitioner went on appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which affirmed that of the
Arbiter. From there, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President (O.P.). The O.P. affirmed
with modification the appealed decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, On June 25, 1999,
respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration praying for the deletion of that portion giving
petitioner the option of merely paying them the purchase price with interest in the event petitioner "fails
to replace subject lot with a lot of similar size and with available facilities located in the subdivision,
because it had already sold or transferred all of its properties in the subdivision. O.P. denied respondents’
motion. Both parties then went to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside that of the O.P.
and affirmed the earlier decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, but subject to the modification
that petitioner shall pay respondents the current market value of the lot, not merely its purchase price,
should there be no more available lots with facilities in petitioner’s Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.

Issue: Whether or not respondents’ right to bring the instant case against petitioner has already
prescribed.

Ruling: No. Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a
judgment (Emphasis supplied).
It is the legal possibility of bringing the action that determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription. In fine, the ten-year prescriptive period is to be reckoned from
the accrual of the Appellee’s right of action, not necessarily on the very date of the execution of the
contracts subject of the action.
In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part on the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff.
Time and again, we have emphasized that it is only upon the happening of the last element when
it can be said that a cause of action has arisen. In short, it is from the time an act is performed or an
omission incurred which is violative of the plaintiff’s right, that signals the accrual of a cause of action. And
it is from that time that the 10-year prescriptive period commences to run.
Here, it was only on December 18, 1995 when respondents made a written demand upon
petitioner to construct subdivision roads, put up utility facilities and rid the premises of squatters,
obligations which are unquestionably in the nature of an obligation to do. And under Article 1169 of the
Code, a party who is under obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time that the obligee
demands, either judicially or extrajudicially, for the fulfillment of the obligation.
With the reality that in this case, respondents made their written demand upon petitioner to
perform what is incumbent upon it only on December 18, 1995, it was only from that date when the 10-
year prescriptive period under Article 1144 commenced to run. And since respondents’ complaint for
specific performance was filed with the Field Office of the HLURB only on April 1, 1996, or less than four
(4) months after the date of their demand, petitioner’s reliance on prescription of action is simply without
any leg to stand on.