CASE DIGEST COMPILATION

ADVANCE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

SUNDAY 8-10 AM

CASES CASE DIGEST

1. Arban v. Borja, AM Facts: This is an administrative case filed by Ponciano Arban, the then
No. R-281-RTJ, August District Engineer for Camarines Sur, Ministry of Public Works and
26, 1986 Highways, against Judge Melecio Borja of Branch XX, Regional Trial Court,
Fifth Judicial Region of Naga City on ground of grave misconduct in a
public place.
Allegedly, the judge hit the complainant with his pistol at around lunch
time in a public restaurant. The complainant was rendered momentarily
unconscious. The news circulated and received much coverage by the print
- Marnelie Aguiguid and broadcast media as the acts were “associated only with hoodlums and
hooligans”.

Issue:
Did the judge commit grave misconduct?

Ruling:
Yes, the court pointed out that: “ Whatever the motive may have been, the
violent action of the respondent in a public place constitutes serious
misconduct and the resultant outrage of the community in Naga City is a
blow to the image of the entire judiciary. Judge Borja violated the
established norm for judicial behavior that "a judge's official conduct
should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior
not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also
in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach (Sec. 3, Cannon of Judicial
Ethics)”.

Furthermore, the court ruled in De la Paz v. Inutan (64 SCRA 540), that:
The judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. From him, the people draw their win and awareness to obey the
law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting
interests, specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent
Judge, who have that close and direct contact with the people before
anybody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he
must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others
to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law.

2. Concurring opinion of
Justice Isagani Cruz, Go Title of the Case:
v. CA, GR No. 101837,
February 11, 1992 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
 - Apils, Aris Lee
Facts:

The petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,

nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at
the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued. 6 (six) days after, petitioner
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2)
lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting,
who was at the police station at that time, positively identified the
petitioner as the gunman. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor led the
case to the lower court, setting andF commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation,
that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner argues that he was not
lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six
(6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus,
petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that
he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had
been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had
“personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest.
Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner. It was
shown that the media had depicted the accused as guilty even though the
proceedings were still on-going. This situation led to widespread public
belief in the suspect’s guilt, despite the fact that he had not yet even been
subjected to preliminary investigation.

Issue:

Whether the judge in the instant case manifested impartiality due to the
media's influence?

Ruling:

Yes. In relation to concurring opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz, observed

that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to
public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice."
Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public
about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide
and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not
only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of
complete objectivity in its handling of the case.

The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial,
and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases
but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if
he is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind
bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case who enjoys the
assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide
and unfavorable media coverage may be presumed guilty before trial
and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the importance of
the court always following the Rules.

3. Ramirez v. Corpuz-
Macandog, AM No. R- Facts:
351-RTJ, September 26,
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by Deputy
1986 Sheriff Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to
secure his release from the Caloocan City jail. Ramirez was ordered
arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for direct contempt of court
consisting in his alleged disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction
dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him from
- Awis, Victoria
demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said case.

Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of

Branch CXXIII of the same court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to
demolish the improvements of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380,
C-7361, C-7362, С- 7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said
defendants are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on whose motion
respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction.

The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a

handwritten note of respondent judge addressed to then superintendent of
the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of this
Court, however, Deputy Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail on July 2,
1985. Thereafter, the court resolved to treat the petition as an
administrative case 1 and to require respondent judge to comment thereon.

Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing

the arrest of Ramirez. She justified the arrest as a means of preserving
substantial justice so that any decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8682
may not be rendered moot and academic and as a curative measure to
preserve the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on the
other hand, was explained as a means to preserve the integrity of courts of
justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added that the
writ of preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her
original jurisdiction, while the Order of January 11, 1985 was issued by
Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter
should not have done as she should have remanded the case to the court of
origin for execution.

Issue:

Whether the act of Macandog shows impropriety?

Ruling:

The handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the
least, highly irregular and improper. Her over-zealousness in implementing
the order of arrest creates the impression that she has taken an interest far
and beyond that ordinarily expected of judicial officers with respect to
cases pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in
question.

Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official
duties. They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and
procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority.
They are duty bound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures,
 designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of
justice.

Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally

unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must perforce be effected.

Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the

service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay, and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities.

SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from

judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to
make independently.

4. Libarios v. Dabalos,
AM No. RTJ-89-286, July FACTS:
11, 1991
Respondent judge, issued an order in his capacity as Executive Judge,
directing the raffle of the case with due notice to the parties. Without
conducting any prior hearing, respondent judge directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing at the same time the bail for
accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each. No bail was
recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent
- Balag- ey, Asia judge fixed bail for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and
Mariz Allocod on the ground that evidence of guilt against them was merely
circumstantial. In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims
that the act of respondent judge in granting bail to the accused
Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross
ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the
provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense can be
granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned
warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his
"close association" with the accused Calo, Jr.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty for grave ignorance of
the law, grave partiality and misconduct in handling the case at bar.

Held: Yes. The respondent judge acted with haste and with grave abuse of
discretion, granted and fixed the bail without due process. Furthermore,
considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent
Calo, Jr. as a former employee regard for his position as judge demanded
that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused
5. Republic c. Sereno,
AM No. 18-06-01-SC, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SOLICITOR
July 17, 2018 GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A SERENO) A.M. No.
18-06-01-SC; JULY 17, 2018

FACTS:

On August 30, 2017, an impeachment complaint was lodged before the

Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives against respondent
- Balao-ing, Rosel for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and
betrayal of public trust. Having learned of respondent's disqualification as
a Chief Justice from the House Committee on Justice's hearings, the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
a petition for quo warranto against respondent, basically questioning her
eligibility for the Chief Justice position.

The Court observed that since the filing of the impeachment complaint,
during the pendency of the quo warranto case, and even after the
conclusion of the quo warranto proceedings, respondent continuously
opted to defend herself in public through speaking engagements before
students and faculties in different universities, several public forums,
interviews on national television, and public rallies. As the Court noted in
its decision in the quo warranto case, respondent initially refused to
participate in the congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint.
When the petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent likewise
continuously refused to recognize this Court's jurisdiction.

Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent

standards set forth in the CPR and NCJC, emphasizing that her
participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge but as a
party-litigant and that the imputed acts against respondent did not create
any serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice to warrant
the Court’s exercise of its power of contempt in accordance with the “clear
and present danger” rule.

Respondent also argues that in addressing the matters of impeachment

and quo warranto to the public, she was in fact discharging her duty as a
Justice and a lawyer to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for
the law and legal processes pursuant to the said Codes and assuming
arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR and the
NCJC in her public statements, the same does not warrant the exercise of
the Court's power to discipline in view of the attendant circumstances, to
wit:

(a) no less than the Solicitor General repeatedly made personal

attacks against her and publicly discussed the merits of the case, hence,
she had to respond to such accusations against her; and

(b) she was not given her right to due process despite her repeated
demand.

ISSUE: May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and
public statements as regards the quo warranto case against her during its
pendency?

RULING: That she should be treated as an ordinary litigant in judging her

actions. The fact that respondent was not the judge nor the counsel but a
litigant in the subject case does not strip her off her membership in the
Bar, as well as her being a Member and the head of the highest court of the
land at that time. Her being a litigant does not mean that she was free to
conduct herself in less honorable manner than that expected of a lawyer or
a judge.

In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures

pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies to
6. Marantan v. Diokno,
GR No. 205956, Facts:
February 12, 2014
Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The
criminal cases involve an incident, La'O together with the other petitioners,
prayed,among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set
aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and
that charges formurder be filed.
- Balatong, Leony
On January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay
Lumutan,Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan
was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the
death of thirteen(13) men. Marantan alleges that, riding on the
unpopularity of the Atimonanincident, La'O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno,
and one Ernesto Manzano,organized and conducted a televised/radio
broadcasted press conference.

During the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate

andunreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling G.R.
No.199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the
criminal casesbefore the RTC, branding Marantan and his co-accused
guilty of murder in theOrtigas incident.

Issues:

Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice

rule,making them liable for indirect contempt.

Ruling:

The petition must fail.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to

the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A
violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt.

The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to

the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct
of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462. The comments
seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion
that their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. This is merely a
reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the
Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects
no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their
argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to,
influence the Court.

As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments

reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their
petition.There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate
amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action
from the Court.

There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.

7. Romero v. Estrada, GR FACTS: Reghis Romero II, the owner of R-II Builders was invited by the
No. 174105, April 2, Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development,
2009 which was then chaired by Senator Jinggoy Estrada, for a public hearing.
The said hearing was pursuant to P.S. Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 which
was intended to aid the Senate in the review of the provisions of R.A. 8042,
 “The Migrant Workers Act”.
However Romero requested to be excused which the Committee
denied finding the request unmeritorious. Senator Estrada then issued a
- Baldos, Marie
subpoena to Romero. Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a
Claire
TRO claiming that the subject of the investigation is sub judice to the case
of Chavez vs. National Housing Authority where he is was one of the
respondents.
Respondents arguing that the subject matter of the investigation
focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose is to
aid the Senate in amending the R.A. 8042.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter of the inquiry is sub judice.

RULING: No. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
In the instant case, the subject involved is no longer sub judice
since the case of Chavez has been already finalized on August 15, 2007 so
the issue has been rendered moot and academic.
Also, legislative investigation and court proceedings have
different purpose. Court hearings are conducted to settle actual
controversies between litigants through the application of laws. On the
other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation aims to gather information that
would determine whether there is a need to amend or improve existing
laws.

8. PDCP Development
Bank v. Vestil, AM No. Facts:
RTJ-96-1354, November
21, 1996 ● The case involves a real estate mortgage where PDCP Development
Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure against the spouses
Suico.
● The properties were sold in an auction where PDCP Development
Bank was the highest bidder.
- Bugtong, Regina ● After the redemption period expired without the Suicos redeeming
the properties, PDCP Development Bank filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which was granted by Branch 28 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City.
● The Suicos filed a case for specific performance, injunction, and
damages before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue, presided over by
respondent Judge Vestil.
● The case was based on an alleged agreement between PDCP
Development Bank and the Suicos, where the latter would default on
their loan obligation, allowing the bank to foreclose on the mortgage
and consolidate ownership of the properties in exchange for the right
of the Suicos to later redeem the properties at an agreed price.
● The Suicos also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued
by Branch 28.
● Despite the motion to dismiss and opposition filed by PDCP
Development Bank, Judge Vestil issued the writ of preliminary
injunction.
 Issue:

● Did Judge Vestil commit gross ignorance of the law and interference
with a co-equal court?

Ruling:

● Judge Vestil was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
interference with a co-equal court.

Ratio:

No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or

orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction.
The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by Judge Vestil was
deemed a clear act of interference with the judgment and order of Branch
28, which is a co-equal court.
After the redemption period has expired, the purchaser of the property has
the right to be placed in possession thereof.
Judge Vestil was also found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction to be enforced outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Branch 56.
The act sought to be restrained by the injunction was the enforcement of
the writ of possession by the sheriff of the RTC of Mandaue City against the
mortgaged properties situated in the same city.
The other charges against Judge Vestil were considered subjudice and
judicial matters not subject to administrative scrutiny.
Due to the gravity of Judge Vestil's violations, a fine of P5,000.00 was
imposed and he was warned that a commission of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Previous cases were cited where fines were imposed on judges for similar
acts of interference with co-equal courts.

9. Luciano v. Provincial Facts:

Governor of Rizal, GR No.
Councilor Jose C. Luciano filed a case seeking the suspension of Mayor
L-30306, June 20, 1969
Maximo Estrella and other officials under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Luciano and other officials were elected in Makati, Rizal in the general
elections of November 14, 1967.

- Calig-a, Alpha On January 18, 1969, a criminal case was filed against Mayor Estrella and
other officials for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Provincial Governor sought legal advice on whether to suspend the

officials, and the Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that
suspension is mandatory.

The officials filed a lawsuit to prevent their suspension, arguing that it

violated their constitutional due process rights.

The court issued a restraining order and later a preliminary injunction in

 their favor.

Luciano filed a mandamus petition to compel the suspension of the officials

and to be recognized as the acting mayor.

Issue:

Who has the power to suspend public officials under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?

Ruling:

It is true to say that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act grants with specifity upon the Court of First Instance the
power to suspend an official charged with a violation thereof. It would seem
to us though that suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are
separate and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An
accurate reading of Section 13 yields two methods of investigation, one
separate from the other: one criminal before the courts of justice, and the
other administrative. This is the plain import of the last sentence of Section
13, which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him." Our
interpretation but preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry
between the first part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just quoted.

And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed
in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions —
which here include suspension — should be left to the Court of First
Instance.

10. Barrera v. Barrera,

GR No. L-31589, July Facts:
31, 1970
The case started when the counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a
civil case pending in the Court of First Instance of Cavite requested that the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 111, presided by the Hon. Judge
Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue with the hearing of the above-
entitled case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. The
counsel of the plaintiff explained that the said case is pending trial. The
- Co, Wendy plaintiff has one more witness to present and thereafter, she intends to rest
her case. Unfortunately, on May 22, 1969, when this case was set for
hearing, the Presiding Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District
Judge for the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did
not hold a court session. The trial of this case was then left pending, and it
was only in the month of July when it was reset for hearing on August 6,
1969. However, the case was not again heard because the new Presiding
Judge did not arrive due to bad weather.

A letter was then referred to the Department of Justice, where under the
Undersecretary of Justice, now the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,
referred the matter to respondent judge who pointed out that the first day
of trial on the merits of the case in Barrera v. Barrera having been held on
August 21, 1968, there had elapsed by then the period of fourteen
months, far beyond the three-month limit as set forth in the Rules of
Court and that upon the lapse of three months from the first day of trial on
the merits, the trial judge lost control of the same, and may not continue
trying the same for the only thing possible to be done is to dismiss the
case.
 This policy was adopted by Judge Catolico notwithstanding his awareness
of the ruling in Barrueco v. Abeto, where Justice Laurel, who penned the
decision, interpreted the same to be of directory character rather than
mandatory."

Judge Catolico was given the opportunity to explain in writing and to

appear personally before the Court to show cause why he should not be
dealt with for contempt. His explanation was apparent that further
reflection did not occasion a change of heart. What calls for disciplinary
action is the recklessness warn when the respondent Judge hurled
baseless allegations against the Clerk of Court. Nor did he retreat from
such an indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the
Clerk did was solely in accordance with what was previously decided by
this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the refusal by Judge Catolico to apply the law as

interpreted by the Highest Tribunal led him to his contempt?

Ruling:

Yes, the refusal of the judge to apply the law based on the interpretation of
the Highest Tribunal led him to his contempt.

There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings. If a Judge of a lower Court feels, in
the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a
doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but
rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal
views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as
interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation
from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a
sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the
litigants. And if despite what is said here a Judge, by delicate or acute
qualms of conscience still believes that he cannot follow our rulings, then
he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he
could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case
concerned (Art. 9, C. C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.``

11. Hernandez v. Facts: This civil case involves a compromise agreement between petitioner
Colayco, GR No. L- Romeo Hernandez and private respondent Antonio Non, on a parcel of land.
39800, June 27, 1975 In the compromise agreement, one of the agreements covers a portion of
the land subjected to right-of-way purposes only. The compromise
agreement was submitted to the respondent judge and later was approved
and ordered both parties to comply with the terms. A Deed of Sale with
Mortgage was then executed by petitioner Hernandez in favor of private
respondent Non. A subdivision plan prepared dividing the parcel indicated
- Cuyan, Rochelle in the compromise agreement. However, the right-of-way was not indicated
in the subdivision plan, petitioner Hernandez refused to give his conformity
to the subdivision plan, including the release of the title of the land. Private
respondent Non filed a motion to compel the petitioner Hernandez which
was ruled by the trial court in favor of him while ordering the same to
indicate in the subdivision plan the strip of land for right-of way. There
were a series of motions made by both parties until it went to the Supreme
Court. The court issued a resolution to the respondent judge to explain
himself on the matter which arised from the compromise agreement. The
respondent judge filed a so-called one page “compliance” to the said
 resolution, and without final order coming from the Supreme Court, the
respondent judge issued judgement against petitioner Hernandez guilty of
contempt, penalizing him with a fine of P200 with subsidiary
imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the respondent judge is valid?

Whether or not the “compliance” filed by the respondent judge is
proper?

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that while it’s true that the petitioner is
guilty of contempt, the decision of the respondent judge cannot be enforced
as it appears that the order which it is based on is, incomplete in the sense
that it is indefinite as to the real matter in dispute between the parties.
The court further states that while the order of the respondent judge is not
entirely erroneous, there is an evident that respondent judge failed to
perceive the decisive issue brought about by imprecise and inaccurate
terminology of the compromise agreement. There was an ambiguity in the
compromise agreement as it fails to be stated in the agreement to whom
shall the right-of-way in the subdivision plan be indicated.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court highlighted that resolutions of the
Supreme Court calling for further information from the inferior tribunals
are not made on the spur of the moment but after due consideration of the
whole record and adequate study and deliberation. It is not to be treated by
trial judges as a mere “for compliance” only. The one-paged compliance of
the respondent judge to the resolution shows a deliberate arrogance of an
inferior court judge.

Although the respondent judge was not penalized for his action, the Court
stated that any similar conduct amounting to lack of proper respect for and
due and needed cooperativeness with resolutions of the Supreme Court will
be dealt with differently, so that the dignity of the Court will be preserved
and the more expeditious administration of justice will be achieved. The
issue on the compromise agreement was returned to the respondent judge
to hold further proceedings and to receive evidence to resolve the matter.

12. Domanico v. CA GR
No. L-38139, May 16, Facts: Teodoro and Concepcion Domanico filed a petition to the Court of
1983 Appeals to overturn a judgment in favor of Trinidad Bamba in Civil Case
No. 1731. The case was originally lodged before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte. The trial court rendered a judgment ordering the
defendants to make an inventory of the store and pay the plaintiff the
corresponding value of 1/2 of the inventory goods, as well as attorney's fees
and incidental expenses. The court also ordered the dissolution and
cancellation of the partnership between the plaintiff and defendants. The
- Duque, Alexander defendants argued that the trial judge exhibited bias and lacked
moderation during the trial.

Issue: Whether the attitude and actuations of the trial judge deprived the
petitioners of a fair chance to present their case. Whether a new trial
should be ordered to afford the petitioners a fair chance to present their
evidence.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the decision of

the trial court and affirmed the same. The Supreme Court denied the
 petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

13. People v. Muit, GR

No. L-48875, October 21, Facts: Delfin Muit was charged with murder, appeals his conviction,
1982 claiming denial of witness presentation, violation of due process, and
rejection of self-defense plea.

Delfin Muit, the defendant-appellant, heard rumors that his wife and
Rodolfo Torrero were having an illicit affair. Muit invited Torrero to his
- Egtapen, Mendy house for a talk to confront him about the rumors. The conversation
became heated and Torrero stood up and left the house. Muit followed
Torrero in the yard, pulled out his gun, and fired three times at Torrero,
hitting him in the nape, chest, and left arm. Torrero died on the spot and
Muit immediately surrendered to the authorities. Muit was charged with
and convicted of Murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident
premeditation. The Trial Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

The defense moved to reopen the trial to present a witness who could prove
the bias of the prosecution witness. The Trial Court denied it.

Issues:

1. WoN the Trial Court errs in refusing to reopen the trial to allow the
presentation of a vital witness.

2. WoN the Trial Court violated the accused's right to remain silent and
exhibit bias against the accused.

Held:

1. No. The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies
within the sound discretion of the Trial Court. The statement of the
additional witness would not prove bias on the part of the eyewitness
(Prosecution Witness) to the tragic incident, nor the culpability or non-
culpability of the accused.

2. No. The alleged bias of the Trial Judge against the accused is without
basis. The accused's right to remain silent has not been violated as the
Trial Court drew an inference from his failure to volunteer information.
Clarificatory questions propounded by the Trial Court during the trial do
not indicate bias but are intended to test the credibility of witnesses.

14. Valdez v. Aquilizan,

GR No. L-67411-24, G.R. No. L-67422-24 October 31, 1984
October 31, 1984
FERNANDO VALDEZ alias WILSON VALDEZ, petitioner,vs.HONORABLE
JUDGE GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Kabacan, North
Cotabato, respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari which was posted on March 22, 1984, in
- Evasco, Juliffer Cotabato City by speed airmail but was received only on April 26, 1984.
The petitioner is accused of rape in three cases — filed in the court
presided by the respondent judge. The private complainant is the same in
all the three cases but the rapes were alleged to have been committed on
different dates, namely: February 10, 1982, March 17, 1982 and April 10,
1982.

The petition seeks to annul the proceedings which were conducted by the
respondent judge and to disqualify him from the case. Because the verified
petition imputed serious irregularities to the respondent judge, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order on May 21, 1984, restraining him
from further proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 13, 14 and 15.

In the comment which the respondent judge was required to submit, he

said that he had already decided the three cases. (Petitioner Wilson Valdez
was convicted of rape in each of the three cases and was sentenced to three
reclusion perpetua plus indemnity.) The decision is dated April 2, 1984, but
the petitioner claims that it was promulgated on May 3, 1984, without the
presence of his counsel and even of the Fiscal; that no notice was issued in
respect of the promulgation; and that no copy of the decision was given to
the defense counsel of record.£

The private complainant was to be cross- examined inasmuch as her direct

examination had been finished at the previous hearing, the private
prosecutor, Atty. Norberto Ela, was absent.

On June 23, 1983, a hearing was scheduled. The transcript for that day
shows that Fiscal Camilo Fulvadora appeared for the prosecution but
private prosecutor Ela, was absent. Also absent was Atty. Jorge Zerrudo,
counsel for the accused. The transcript does not show whether or not the
accused was brought to court. Notwithstanding the absence of counsel for
the accused and probably the accused himself, the respondent judge
continued his "cross-examination" of the private complainant.

In his memorandum the respondent judge claims that he "did not proceed
with the trial but merely sought clarifications on vital aspects taken up in
the hearing.

The explanation of the respondent judge is belied by the transcript which

shows that he asked the private complainant searching questions and this
is reflected on pages 4 to 12 of the transcript.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion

which amounts to lack of jurisdiction

HELD: Yes

The statement of the respondent judge that he wanted to protect the right
of the accused to a speedy trial is not appreciated. He "protected" the rights
of the accused by holding a trial in the absence of the latter's counsel. If an
accused has a "protector" like the respondent judge, there is no need for a
fiscal or a private prosecutor. It may not be amiss to state in this
connection that the accused did not complain of delay in the trial of his
case probably because he was not there. At any rate if the respondent
judge had wanted to expedite the trial he should have appointed a
temporary counsel for the accused.

The hearing on the three cases was resumed. On that day. the private
complainant was still on cross-examination. Without any request from the
parties, the respondent judge decided to hold the hearing in his chamber
"due to delicadeza." Present in the chamber were counsel for the accused,
the fiscal and the stenographer only; the accused was not allowed to go
inside.

The respondent judge claims, however, "that the accused together with his
guard were at the door of a make-shift room, so-called judge's chamber."
This might well have been the case but the accused was entitled as of right
to be inside the room because it was his liberty and honor which were at
 stake. On August 31, 1983, the respondent judge announced, "We will hear
this in chamber."

It is obvious from the foregoing that the respondent judge did not manifest
the requisite cold impartiality which the petitioner deserved.

The petition which questions the actuations of the respondent judge and
seeks his disqualification was received by him on March 29, 1984.
Prudence dictated that he refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action
by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge
acted precipitately by deciding the cases on April 2, 1984, and
promulgating his decision on May 3 of the same year. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting
to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

15. People v. Adora, GR

Nos. 116528-31, July 14, FACTS
1997
This appeal seeks the reversal of the July 11, 1994 Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 5, convicting appellant of four
(4) counts of rape and sentencing him to four (4) terms of reclusion
perpetua.

- Fakat, Bruce On December 30, 1992, Complainant Cecilia Cotorno lodged before the
National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City a complaint for rape
against Appellant Marieto Adora. The complainant Cecilia Cotorno was
born on August 16, 1976 as the youngest among the four children of the
spouses Ricardo Cotorno and Fe Echague, the older three others are
Cynthia, Ruben and Cherry. The family was modestly living at Bago
Bantay, Quezon City where the breadwinner, Ricardo was working. When
Cecilia Cotorno’s mother dies, she was entrusted to Apolonia, sister of
Cecilia’s father, Ricardo, and Adora, husband of Apolonia. However, Cecilia
underwent a painful experience. She was raped for four times by Adora
whom he had revered as a father. She had no choice but yields her body
and honor because the accused had threatened to behead her and her
aunt, Apolonia, wife of the accused. It was only after she was noticed to be
pregnant that she revealed the bestial deeds of accused. Adora was
convicted with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an impartial decision by the trial judge?

HELD:

In prosecutions for rape resulting in pregnancy, it is not essential to

establish the exact date of the fertilization of the egg; forensic experts agree
that such exact date is still medically unascertainable. In any event,
pregnancy is a non-issue in a criminal prosecution for rape, the essential
element of which is the absence of the victim’s consent to the sexual
congress.

Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in directing questions to

witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the
record speak the truth. In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material
 testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. This is not only the right but also the duty
of a trial judge.

Under our system of legal procedure where he is judge of both the law and
the facts, it is often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful
administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise of sound
discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon
a full and clear understanding of the facts. In this case, the Court does not
believe that the trial judge transgressed the permissible limits of what
questions he could propound to a witness. The trial judge sought to elicit
information on whether appellant used sufficient “intimidation” on the
victim. For the record, he wanted only to elucidate how the witness
appeared to the court as she was testifying on the stand. That the answers
of the witness formed part of the decision are not proof of prejudgment or
bias towards the prosecution.

16. Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. FACTS:
103501-03, February 17,
1997 President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to
the president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC). Tabuena agreed. About a week later, Tabuena received a
Presidential Memorandum reiterating in black and white such verbal
instructions. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo
Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three
- Fang-asan, Miles
(3) withdrawals. The Sandiganbayan found Tabuena and Peralta guilty for
harvey
malversation of funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tabuena and Peralta filed separate petitions for review, appealing the
Sandiganbayan decision dated 12 October 19990 and the Resolution of 20
December 1991. Although Tabuena and Peralta did not indicate in their
appeal, the Supreme Court’s found out and noted that one of the justices of
the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked
were more the combined questions of the counsels.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of the crime of malversation.

2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan took an active part in the cross

examination of the witnesses and the accused.

HELD:

1. Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta were acquitted of the crime of

malversation. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the then President
Marcos’ Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President
and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the
land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on
its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment
of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its
execution constraint one to act swiftly without question.

2. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the

questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The
questions of the court were in the nature of cross-examinations in the
characteristics of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and
 Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no
impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional basis for a
reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case
open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct
such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they
are made the subject of assignments of error or not.

17. Dela Cruz v.

Bersamira, AM No. RTJ- Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution reprimanding Judge
00-1567, January 19, Jesus Bersamira and imposing on him a fine (see A.M. No. RTJ-001567, 24
2001 July 2000)

Facts:

- Fontanilla, Fernando Dela Cruz, a concerned citizen, filed a complaint against Judge
Crismar Jesus Bersamira with the OCA for violation of RA No. 3019, the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and Code of Judicial
Conduct, for socializing with the parent of one of the accused in the case
assigned to his sala and for issuing unreasonable orders for postponement
which unjustly delayed the administration of justice.

As shown in the investigation, the arraignment of the accused was

postponed 3 times. Also, Bersamira never issued a warrant of arrest
despite the successive absences of the accused, nor even asked them to
explain their absences. Bersamira never checked with the Dangerous
Drugs Board whether or not the two accused had indeed submitted
themselves for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation with said office.
This gives the impression that the respondent’s order for confinement was
made merely to enable him to suspend the proceedings, including the case
for violation of P.D. [No.] 1866, which is not subject to such suspension
under R.A. [No.] 6425, as amended.

Issue: which canon did Judge Bersamira violate

Ruling: Judge Bersamira violated Rule 1.02 (a judge should administer

justice impartially and without delay, Canon 2 ( a judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, Rule 2.01 (a
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and Canon 3 ( a judge should
perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less

than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due
process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate
decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only
render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and
regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the
people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.
18. Olaivar v. Singco, AM Facts:
45-MJ, March 29, 1974

Administrative complaint filed by Leonardo Olaivar against Municipal

Judge Adelaido O. Singco of Duero, Bohol. Olaivar accused of challenging
to duel in two criminal cases in the municipal court of Guindulman, Bohol.
- Gaddang, Jaren
Singco designated to try the cases due to the inhibition of the municipal
judge of Guindulman. During the scheduled hearing on May 16, 1972,
Olaivar's counsel failed to appear without prior notice to the court. Singco
denied Olaivar's request for postponement of the trial and ordered him, a
non-lawyer, to cross-examine the witnesses for the State.

Issue:

Whether Singco's action of compelling Olaivar to cross-examine witnesses

as a non-lawyer were oppressive and without basis in law.

Ruling:

The court severely censured Municipal Judge Adelaido O. Singco for his
oppressive and baseless actions. The court warned Singco that a repetition
of the same oppressive acts would subject him to heavier disciplinary
sanctions. Singco's actions were highly oppressive and absolutely without
basis in law. Singco's decision to compel Olaivar, a non-lawyer, to cross-
examine witnesses was condemned. It transformed the court from a court
of justice to a despot's forum. Singco's motive to dispose of the cases
quickly did not justify the abuse of judicial power and discretion. Singco's
actions deserved severe condemnation and was warned against repeating
such oppressive acts in the future.

19. Presado v. Genova,

AM No. RTJ-91-657, Facts: Seven administrative complaints against respondent Judge Manuel
June 21, 1993 C. Genova (respondent judge) , presiding judge of the regional trial court,
branch 44, Masbate, were filed in the supreme court and subsequently
consolidated and referred to associate justice Gloria c. paras of the court of
appeals for investigation of, and report and recommendation on, the
charges therein.

In this case the focus only would be on the misconduct in office of the
- Gallao, Ryan judge in relation to canon 1 independence section4 thereof which covers
Gamaliel III Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

In August 1991, a man named Jose de Jesus filed a verified complaint

against Judge Manuel C. Genova of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
Branch 44. The complaint accused the Judge and his wife, Emerenciana
Genova, of serious misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming, and
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The couple was alleged to
have been living in the judge’s chambers at the Bulwagan ng Katarungan
in Masbate since May 1991, with the provincial government paying their
electric bills. This act was criticized in a local tabloid and denounced in a
rally held in front of the Hall of Justice.
 In response to the charges, Judge Genova presented a written permit from
the Governor of Masbate, allowing him to stay overnight at the Bulwaganng
Katarungan while he was working and as long as he remained the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate.
However, the Investigating Justice found that they had “permanently
stayed” in the Bulwagan, quoting from the testimony of Judge Genova
himself.

The Investigating Justice concluded that government property is for official

use only and not for the personal use of the official. The permit issued by
the Provincial Governor of Masbate did not confer on Judge Genova the
right to utilize his chambers as his living and residential quarters. The
permit was only for those occasions where the judge was working
overnight.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent judge violated canon 1: Independence,

Section 4 or misconduct in office?

Ruling: Respondent judge demonstrated that he is capable and willing to

devote government property to private and family purposes, a
demonstration which reinforces the Court’s conviction concerning
respondent Judge;s unfitness to remain in the Judiciary.

The court resolved to DISMISS the respondent judge for gross ignorance of
the law amounting to gorss incompetence and misconduct in office, and in
the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges
and benefits he might otherwise be entitlted to, except accrued eaned leave
privileges or the money value thereof. The resolution is immediately
executory and respondent Judge shall vacate his position forthwith.

20. Marces, Sr. v. FACTS:

Arcangel, AM No. RTJ-
Ben Marces, the complainant and Wilfredo Cañas, friend of Judge Paul
91-712, July 9, 1996
Arcangel, the respondent, are neighboors. Sometime in 1984, the domestic
family helper of the Canas family sought help from Marces, who was then
incumbent Purok leader, for alleged maltreatment she had received from
her employers, which then referred to the barangay authorities. B
- Kimayong,
Since then, the Marces and' Cañas had a strained relationship.
Charmagne
The relationship between the families worsened to the point that Cañas
managed to secure an arrest warrant against Ben Cañas for violations
against BP 22, among other things. Throughout this ordel, Judge

Arcangel assisted and provided support to the Cañas as evidenced by his

intervention in the barangay mediation meetings between the families
during which he "introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay Oficials
Upon investigation, the CA finds sufficient the charge that respondent
judge
attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to
intervene
The SC also finds sufficient evidence in the records to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest
by
requesting another judge, before whom the case against the complainant
was
 pending, to issue the warrants; and
(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991
would not have been made without the intervention of the respondent
judge.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Arcangel violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he
ordered the
issuance of the alias warrant and his attempt to intervene in the Barangay
proceedings

RULING
Yes. Judge Arcangel violated the Code when he ordered the MTC to issue
the alias warrant against the complainant and when he attempted to
influence the Barangay proceeding.
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a Judge should uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary. Here, evidence provided by the
complainant proved that Judge Arcangel was the one who caused the
issuance of the alias warrant at the behest of Canas. Moreover his act
of openly announcing to the employees and officials of the Barangay that
he is the executive Judge in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs.
Cañas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

21. Socorro Yulo-Tuvilla

v. Judge Balgos, AM No. Facts:
MTJ-98-1149, March 31,
1998 The case involves a complaint filed by Socorro Yulo-Tuvilla against Judge
Rolando V. Balgos for Grave Abuse of Discretion and Improper Conduct.
The complaint stemmed from a case brought before Judge Balgos for
preliminary examination, wherein a young girl named Myra Gumban was
kidnapped and raped by several men. Gumban managed to escape and
reported that there were other young girls still being held captive. Judge
- Komicho, Tiffany
Balgos issued warrants of arrest against the main suspect, Norman
Mapagay, but later granted a motion to recall the warrant without the
presence of the private complainant. Complainant Tuvilla argued that
Judge Balgos should have recused himself from hearing the motion since
Mapagay's counsel, Atty. Manlapao, was also the lawyer of Judge Balgos'
family in a civil case. Tuvilla claimed that Judge Balgos only recused
himself after public protest, but the damage had already been done. In his
defense, Judge Balgos claimed that he recalled the warrant based on his
discretion and the overwhelming countervailing evidence presented. He
also argued that the civil case involving Atty. Manlapao had been
submitted for decision before the complaint against Mapagay was filed. The
case was referred to Judge Rodolfo Layumas for investigation, who found
that while there was no undue haste in recalling the warrant, Judge Balgos
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by not immediately recusing himself.
The investigating judge noted that Judge Balgos had a mitigating
circumstance in his favor for eventually recusing himself.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether Judge Rolando V. Balgos should
 have recused himself from hearing the motion to recall the warrant of
arrest against Norman Mapagay, considering that Mapagay's counsel, Atty.
Manlapao, was also the lawyer of Judge Balgos' family in a civil case.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the complainant, Socorro Yulo-Tuvilla, and

reprimanded Judge Rolando V. Balgos for his actions. The court concurred
with the investigating judge's findings that Judge Balgos violated the Code
of Judicial Conduct by not immediately recusing himself from the case.
However, the court also recognized that Judge Balgos had a mitigating
circumstance in his favor for eventually recusing himself.

Ratio:

The court based its decision on the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires judges to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
The court emphasized that judges should avoid situations that may
compromise their impartiality and integrity. In this case, Judge Balgos
should have recused himself from hearing the motion to recall the warrant
of arrest against Norman Mapagay due to the conflict of interest arising
from Atty. Manlapao's dual role as Mapagay's counsel and the lawyer of
Judge Balgos' family in a civil case. By failing to immediately recuse
himself, Judge Balgos violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The court acknowledged that Judge Balgos eventually recused himself, but
emphasized that this action came only after public protest. The court
highlighted the importance of judges promptly recusing themselves when
faced with conflicts of interest to maintain public trust and confidence in
the judiciary. The court reprimanded Judge Balgos and reminded him of
his duty to uphold the people's trust and confidence in the judiciary.

22. Garcia v. Bueser, AM Facts:

No. RTJ-03-1792, March
An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Florencio Bueser of
10, 2004
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan, Laguna, for misconduct and
violation of the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
The complaint was filed by Emiliana M. Garcia, widow of Francisco
Lanting, a policeman who was shot multiple times in Siniloan, Laguna. In
- Lad-ey - Neyney,
relation to this, a criminal case for murder was filed against Mayor Felix
Maricris
Carpio, Vice-Mayor Judeo Carpio, and Jose Era. The case was assigned to
Judge Bueser's sala.
After their arraignment, the three accused filed a motion to admit bail,
which was denied by Judge Bueser on May 24, 2001 based on his finding
that the evidence of guilt was strong. On May 25, 2001, the accused filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order.
Meanwhile, on April 21, 2001, the prosecution moved for a change of venue
due to threats on the life of the witnesses. On June 27, 2001, the Supreme
Court issued a resolution granting a change of venue for the case and
directing Judge Bueser to transfer the records to the Calamba City
Regional Trial Court.
Instead of complying with the Supreme Court's directive, Judge Bueser
issued an order dated August 21, 2001 fixing bail for the accused.
Complainant Garcia alleged that the order was antedated to make it appear
that it was issued before the Supreme Court resolution was received.
Judge Bueser explained that the assailed order was dated "06 August
2001" because he really had intended to release it on that day but he was
able it on 21 August 2001 only after some revisions. He further claimed the
accused filed for reconsideration of the denial of bail, he received several
death threats for him and his family, through anonymous letters and
phone calls. After consultation with some friends, fear for his safety and
that of his family got the better of him and he finally decided to rule on the
motion.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Bueser is guilty of misconduct and violation of the
integrity and independence of the judiciary for releasing an order fixing bail
for murder suspects despite receiving a Supreme Court resolution directing
a change of venue for the case.

Ruling:
Yes.
Bueser is guilty of misconduct and of having transgressed the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. Judge Bueser's release of the order despite
receiving the Supreme Court's resolution constituted a violation of the
order of the superior court.
The Court emphasized that a judge is expected to be fearless in rendering
justice and to be unafraid to displease any person, interest, or power.
Further, the independence of the judiciary would be no more than a myth if
judges allowed themselves to be cowered by anyone.
Judge Bueser's actions violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires judges to be embodiments of incorruptibility and non-
subservience.
A judge is always looked up as being the visible representation of law
and, from him, the people draw much of their will and awareness to
obey legal mandates. He is also seen as the personification of justice
between two conflicting interests. It is fitting for the judge then to
return that regard by himself weaving an example for others to follow.
The nature of his position demands equanimity, prudence, fortitude,
and courage in almost everything that he does.
While the Court recognizes the predicament respondent judge must
have been in that possibly has brought him mental and emotional
stress, it, nonetheless, cannot completely excuse him from his sworn
duty to uphold that to which he is held bound. The independence of
the judiciary would be no more than a myth if judges were to allow
themselves to be cowered by anyone. In accepting their exalted
positions, Judges are expected to be fearless in rendering justice, to
be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power, and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the challenges of
the office.
The Code of Judicial Conduct commands that a judge must not succumb
to attempts to influence his judgment and must resist any pressure
from whatever source in order to uphold the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary. The Code projects that a judge is an
embodiment of incorruptibility and non-subservience. The future of
any society, to a great extent, depends upon the maintenance of
justice pure and unsullied.
The Court found Judge Bueser guilty of MISCONDUCT and of having
transgressed the Code of Judicial Conduct. He was fined P20,000.00 with a
WARNING that the commission of an infraction in the future will be dealt
with severely.
23. Alfonso v. Alonzo-
Legasto, AM No. MTJ-94- Facts:
995, September 5, 2002
The case involves an administrative complaint against Judge Rose Marie
Alonzo-Legasto, Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Quezon City, along with Emelita Camaya, Clerk of Court III, and Remedios
"Baby" Garcia, Records Officer I, both from the Office of the Clerk of Court,
- Manipon, Kendra MeTC-Quezon City.

The complainants were employees of the City Government of Quezon City

who were assigned to assist the organic staff of the judiciary in the OCC-
MeTC and different branches of the MeTC-Quezon City.

The complaint stemmed from the transfer of the complainants to other

offices in the City Government made by Judge Legasto.

The complainants alleged conspiracy between the respondents and accused

Garcia of falsifying her daily time records (DTR's) and Camaya of receiving
a bribe from a supplier of court equipment and supplies.

Issue: Whether Judge Alonzo-Legasto violated Section 5 of the Code of

Judicial Conduct

Held:

Yes. Judge Alonzo – Legasto violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states that Judges shall not only be free from appropriate connections with
and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but
must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.

In this case, Judge Alonzo-Legasto violated the rules and regulations

governing the detail, reassignment, or transfer of court employees as she
exceeded her authority under sec. IV of Administrative Order No. 6 which is
limited to the temporary assignments of three months extendible only once
for the same period.

Furthermore, it was Judge Legasto’s duty to apprise the Office of Court

Administrator of the personnel requirements and the alleged need to
streamline the staffing pattern before informing the local government of its
employees and instead she referred the matter personally to the Office of
the Vice Mayor Charito Planas for evaluation and assessment.

While it is proper to consult the responsible employees without

transgressing the authority of the Office of the administrator, she
undoubtedly had the correlative duty to promote the proper discharge of
the courts mandate to improve the judicial services and facilitate the
dispensation of justice by keeping the court duly informed of the plan to
reduce the court’s personnel. It is essential to the proper administration of
justice that courts have full control over the official actions of those
through whom the administration of the affairs of the court proceeds.

24. Sabistana v. FACTS: On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at
Villamor, AM No. 90-474, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, he received a note handcarried by a
October 4, 1991 woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of Guillermo Lipango, the
accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in
the 4th MCTC of Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte. Sometime later, Judge Pitao
sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his application for
leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their
- Manuel, Ervy Jule conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked
Judge Pitao whether the latter had received the note, and again warned the
 latter about a certain "Big Man Egane," who was backing the complainant
therein and that he better acquit the accused. On 25 August 1988, after
hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the accused
of the crime of Theft because the evidence against the accused was very
strong.” On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding
house of Respondent to invite the latter to a birthday party, and while they
were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to Respondent that he had
convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him.” Irked,
Respondent directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's
Court. On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were
elevated to the RTC, Leyte, Branch XVI, over which Respondent presides,
but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5 December 1988. From 1 to
3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of
Lawyers in Cebu City. Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de
la Pena had been designated as Acting Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-
Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked effective 30
November 1988. On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his
decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo Lipango of the crime
charged. This, despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed that no
notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to
enable them to submit their respective memoranda.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Villamor was guilty of giving

undue interest in a pending criminal case.

HELD: Yes. Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words
in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2,
Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in-pending suits with the
end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only
subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's
faith in its integrity and impartiality. Wherefore, the Court resolved to
dismiss respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his
accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

25. Catbagan v. Barte, Facts:

AM No. MTJ-02-1452,
Complainant received information that a church was interested in
April 6, 2005
buying lands in the Province of Antique. She approached the respondent
judge and requested him to assist her in the prospective transaction.
Together with a man named Pedrina the three of them agreed to divide the
commission if they succeeded in brokering the sale of properties to the
church. The church then agrees and purchased the lots and had
transacted only with the respondent.
- Marcelo, Rechel
Respondent judge then delivered the amount due to vendors. When
the complainant heard that the vendors had been paid, she demanded her
commission from respondent. The respondent offered her an amount lesser
than the amount they have agreed upon. Complainant reminded
respondent of their agreement but respondent challenged her “to go to
court”. Instead of pursuing her claim in a civil suit, she opted to file this
present administrative case.
The respondent denied the charges against him and asked for the
 dismissal of the case on the grounds that: a) First, there was ambiguity in
the charge of grave and serious misconduct in the complaint and conduct
of unbecoming of a judge in the OCA endorsement. Because of this
confusion, he was denied his right to be informed of the real charge against
him and was not able to properly prepare his defense, and b) Second, the
complainant's allegations were baseless and designed merely to harass and
dishonor the respondent.
The OCA found the respondent judge not guilty of the charges
against him but recommended a fine of 5,000 for violating Canon 5, Rule
5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The OCA further noted that another
administrative case, entitled Jose Berin and Merly Alorro v. Judge
Felixberto P. Barte has been filed against the respondent. It involved a
similar transaction to the one in this complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Barte is liable for the violation of Canon 5,
Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held:
Yes, he is guilty. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that “a
judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance
of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely
to come to court. A judge should manage investments and other financial
interests to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for
disqualification”. By allowing himself to act as an agent in the sale of the
subject property, respondent judge has increased the possibility of his
disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the event that a dispute
involving the said contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the
parties to the sale might plead before his court is not remote and his
business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his
fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge’s
integrity.
Given the circumstances that this is not the first time an
administrative case of the same nature has been filed against him, the
court said that he should consider leaving the judiciary and become a full-
time broker instead. Judges must not only be “good judges” but must also
“appear to be good persons”. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a
cardinal virtue; it is a necessity.
Wherefore, considering that this was his second offense, the
respondent judge was SUSPENDED for six (6) months.

26. Rural Bank of FACTS:

Barotac Nuevo, Inc vs.
Administrative complaint filed against Judge Sergio Cartagena of
Cartagena, AM No. 707-
Dumangas, Iloilo for dishonesty and irresponsibility.
MJ, July 21, 1978

The Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc., granted agricultural loan

amounting to 300.00 to Judge Cartagena on Feb. 1965. However, the
respondent judge failed to pay his loan despite repeated demands. Thus, on
April 1970, the bank filed a complaint for collection in the lower court of
- Melchor,
Barotac. The lower court ordered him to pay his loan and said that the acts
 Jacqueline and behavior of respondent in not paying a single centavo constitute an act
of dishonesty and irresponsibility.

Then as records show the complaint was forwarded to the Secretary of

Justice in April 1972. In June, 1974, Judge Cartagena submitted to the
SC the receipt of the full payment of the loan and manifested that the
delay in settling his obligation with the bank was predicated on the
resolution of the previous understanding between him and the previous
manager.

RULING:

The case was dismissed for being moot and academic but with admonition
that a repetition of the same act will be dealt accordingly.

A member of the Judiciary is expected to be a model of uprightness,

fairness, and honesty not only in all his personal actuations including
business and commercial transactions.

27. Perfecto v. Esidera,

AM No. RTJ-15-2417, FACTS:
July 22, 2015
Administrative complaint filed against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-
Esidera of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern
Samar.

Complainant, Eladio Perfecto, accused Judge Desales-Esidera of falsifying

her daughter's birth certificate and engaging in an illicit affair.
- Molitas, Clair Hess
Judge Desales-Esidera was first married to Richard Tang Tepace on May 7,
1987, but their marriage was later declared void on January 27, 1992.

On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with

Renato Verano Esidera.

Perfecto alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her daughter's birth

certificate to make it appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were
married on March 18, 1990, and that their daughter was legitimate.

Perfecto prayed for Judge Desales-Esidera's dismissal from office for her
alleged dishonesty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera should be dismissed from office for

dishonesty and immorality.

RULING:

No, The Supreme Court found that Judge Desales-Esidera's omission to

correct her child's birth certificate did not make her administratively liable.
The court emphasized that it is not the proper authority to determine what
is moral according to a particular religion.

The court also ruled that Judge Desales-Esidera's acts of contracting a

second marriage and engaging in an alleged affair were not immoral
 conduct for purposes of administrative liability. The court stated that it is
not within its jurisdiction to determine what is moral according to a
particular religion.

However, the court found that Judge Desales-Esidera may have disobeyed
the law by participating in a marriage ceremony that lacked civil authority.
The court acknowledged the potential constitutional issues with Article 350
of the Revised Penal Code, which criminalizes marriages conducted in
accordance with religious beliefs but without legal requirements. However,
the court held that respondent judge's participation in a religious marriage
ceremony did not violate other people's rights or pose a grave and
imminent danger to society.

A judge who violates marriage obligations under the laws is liable

administratively, as this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in
administering justice. It cannot be expected to condone misconduct done
knowingly on account of personal reasons, including religious expressions.

Therefore, Judge Desales-Esidera is administratively liable for violating her

marriage obligations under the law and is suspended from judicial service
for one month and an investigation is ordered into her claims of illegal
court activities.

28. Vito v. Buslon Jr., Facts:

AM No. RTJ-94-1160,
April 10, 1995
Alexander Vito filed an administrative complaint against Judge Teofilo
Buslon, Jr., the acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Cebu City. The complaint was for ignorance of the law, breach or
violation of ethics, and unjustly rendering interlocutory orders. The case
- Padsing, Jared
stemmed from Civil Case No. CEB-10222, a suit for support in which Vito
Prince
was the defendant1.

The controversy began when Judge Buslon took over the court in 1992 and
encountered a pending decision on Civil Case No. CEB-10222, along with
an unresolved motion for reconsideration of an order that denied the
suspension of support pendente lite and a motion to quash the writ of
execution. Vito alleged that Judge Buslon displayed ignorance of the law by
rendering a decision on June 7, 1993, without resolving the pending
motion for reconsideration.

Further complications arose when, after a timely appeal from the decision,
the plaintiffs filed a motion for execution pending appeal, which was
granted by Judge Buslon. Vito then filed a motion to quash this order,
arguing it was beyond the court’s jurisdiction as an appeal had already
been perfected. The motion to quash became moot when the plaintiffs
withdrew their motion for execution pending appeal due to the inability to
afford the bond premiums. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
cite Vito for contempt for refusing to provide support despite a writ of
execution, leading to further legal proceedings.

In addition, Alexander Vito’s complaint against Judge Teofilo Buslon, Jr.

included an allegation related to the judge’s conduct outside the
courtroom. Vito claimed that during the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration of the hold order, Judge Buslon wrote a letter to Judge De
la Victoria, the presiding judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 6. This
communication was perceived as influencing the denial of the motion,
which was a breach of judicial ethics. Furthermore, Vito alleged that Judge
Buslon’s attendance at a wedding, presumably of a party related to the
 case, was inappropriate and indicative of partiality.

Issue:

Wheter Judge Buslon has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct in

attending the wedding.

Ruling:

YES. Respondent's act of standing as sponsor violated Canon 2 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct, specifically Rule 2.01 which states that "a judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary" (Alfonso v. Juanson, 228 SCRA
239 [1993]). Furthermore it has been said that a magistrate of the law
must conduct himself in a manner that his acts, whether in the office or in
public, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the people that look up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice (Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, 68
SCRA 81 [1975]).

29. Centrum Agri- PER CURIAM

Business Realty
The complaint in this case, dated July 13, 1992 was filed by Centrum
Corporation v. Katalbas-
Agribusiness Realty Corporation (Centrum) against respondent Judge
Moscardon, AM No. RTJ-
Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon of the RTC of Bacolod City charging her with
92-880, August 11, 1995
1.) Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct or
conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, dereliction of
duty 2.) knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and 3.) gross
ignorance of the law. The charges are in relation to her decision in a case
appealed to her court. (CIVIL CASE NO. 6921)

- Piok, Darleen
Facts:

● Complaint filed by Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation

against Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City (Branch 52).
● Complaint alleges corruption, serious misconduct, dereliction of
duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and gross
ignorance of the law.
● Case originated from a complaint filed by Centrum with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City for the
ejectment of several tenants from a building Centrum had acquired.
● MTCC ruled in favor of Centrum, ordering the tenants to vacate the
premises and pay accrued rentals.
● Tenants appealed the decision to the RTC, assigned to Judge
Katalbas-Moscardon.
● Centrum alleges that they obtained a copy of Judge Katalbas-
Moscardon's initial draft of the decision before its official release.
● Premature release and suspicious increases in compensation awards
suggest corruption.
● Centrum also accuses Judge Katalbas-Moscardon of knowingly
rendering an unjust interlocutory order by denying their motion for
execution.
● Atty. Enrique S. Chua testified on behalf of Centrum, implicating
other individuals in the alleged corruption scheme.
● Juan T. Gochangco, who was also implicated, did not testify.
● Investigating Justice recommended exoneration of Judge Katalbas-
Moscardon, but admonished her to be more careful in safeguarding
confidential court documents.
 Issue:

● Whether the judge was negligent in releasing a draft decision to a

lawyer, which was then used for extortion purposes.
● Whether the judge knowingly rendered an unjust order by denying a
motion for execution filed by Centrum.

Ruling:

● Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon found guilty of serious

misconduct and rendering an unjust interlocutory order.
● Ordered to be dismissed from office, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
● Case referred to the Department of Justice for investigation and
possible criminal prosecution of Juan T. Gochangco, Simplicio
Palanca, Lorendo Dilag, and Enrique S. Chua.
● Case referred to the Bar Confidant for investigation and possible
disbarment of Enrique S. Chua, Simplicio Palanca, and Lorendo
Dilag.

Ratio:

● Sufficient evidence to support Centrum's allegations.

● Premature release of draft decision before official release is highly
irregular.
● Changes made in the final decision, particularly substantial
increases in compensation awards, suggest negotiations took place
to secure these increases.
● Delay in release of decision further supports allegations of
corruption.
● Judge Katalbas-Moscardon guilty of serious misconduct and
rendering an unjust interlocutory order.
● Emphasis on importance of safeguarding confidentiality in decision-
making process and maintaining integrity of judiciary.
● Judge's errors were gross and inexcusable, not meeting standards of
integrity required of members of the bench.
●

30. People v. Bocar, 97 Facts: Criminal Case No. 8023-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Phil, 398, July 30, 1955 Pasay City Branch, Oscar Castelo and Hogelio Robles with 14 others were
charged with the crime of murder for the death of Manuel P. Monroy. On
motion of the prosecution defendant Rogelio Robles was discharged from
the information with his consent to be utilized as witness for the
Government as he did in fact testify for the prosecution. After a prolonged
- Sagayo, Cherlyn trial. Judge Emilio Rilloraza in a decision promulgated on March 31, 1955,
found eight of the accused including Castelo guilty of the charge and
sentenced all of them to suffer the death penalty. After promulgation
respondent Castelo filed a motion to be released on bail. In the meantime
respondent Judge Bocar had been detailed to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasay City Branch since February 1, 1955. In the absence of Judge
Rilloraza who, presumably had gone on vacation after promulgating his
decision, Judge Bocar took his place. Acting upon this motion for bail and
over the objection of the City Fiscal of Pasay City, Bocar granted the same
 upon filing a bond in the sum of P30,000.
On April 11, 1955, respondent Castelo filed a motion for new trial with
notice of hearing on April 14th, based mainly on the affidavit of Rogelio
Robles, one of the original accused who as already stated, was excluded
from the information and who testified for the prosecution, recanting his
testimony given during the trial against respondent Castelo, stating in said
affidavit that all his testimony was false but that he had so testified
because of alleged force, intimidation or violence exerted upon him.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Bocar decided accordingly in granting bail
and a new trial for Oscar Castelo.
Ruling: Yes. SC held that in a case where the death sentence is imposed,
the trial court as in ordinary criminal cases may entertain and grant a
motion for new trial, conduct the same and thereafter decide the case anew
as regards said defendant to whom the new trial was granted.

31. Jacinto vs. Vallarta Facts:

A.M. NO. MTJ-04-1541.
On March 2, 2002, Spouses Jesus and Nenita Jacinto filed a complaint
March 10, 2005
against Judge Placido Vallarta for alleged gross negligence, gross ignorance
of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and vulgar and
unbecoming conduct. The complaint stemmed from the issuance of Writ of
Repliven for the isuzu cargo truck against the Spouses Jacinto, favoring
the influential spouses from Nueva Ecija, Spouses Guadencio and Carina
Magundayao. Spouses claimed that the Writ of Replevin was issued
- Sapling, Lovely unjustly as they did not violate any agreements in their Deed of Sale. The
Joy Jacintos attempted to settle the matter amicably with Judge Vallarta after
the issuance of the Writ of Replevin. However, they claimed that their
efforts were met with rudeness and disrespect from Judge Vallarta in which
they cited instances where he made derogatory remarks and displayed
impatience towards them. Judge Vallarta was directed by the Court
Administrator to file a comment on the complaint against him, but he failed
to do so within the specified timeframe. Hence, the Office of Court
Administrator made its report and recommendation on the matters even
without his comment.

Issue: Whether Judge Vallarta should be held administratively liable

Ruling: Yes, the Court found Judge Vallarta guilty of vulgar and
unbecoming conduct. While there was insufficient evidence to prove gross
ignorance of the law or gross negligence, Judge Vallarta's behavior was
deemed inappropriate and detrimental to public confidence in the judiciary.
Judges are viewed as the visible representation of law and justice, from
whom the people will draw the will and inclination to obey the law. Thus,
the official conduct of judges should be free from impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives,
should be beyond reproach.8 Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
provides that a "judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." In this case,
respondent displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected of a
magistrate of the law.10 His unguarded utterances, impatience, and
undisguised lack of concern bordering on contempt for the plight of
complainants, who had humbly looked up to him and sought his help,
constituted vulgar and unbecoming conduct that eroded public confidence
 in the judiciary.

32. In re Undated Letter

of Louis Biraogo, AM No. A.M. No. 09-2-19 SC – In re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo
09-2-19-SC, February petitioner in Biraogo V. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120
24, 2009
February 24, 2009

Facts:

- Sofranes, Marisol On July 15, 2008 during session, the Court En Banc continued its
deliberation on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in consolidated cases of
Limkaichong vs. Comelec, Villando vs. Comelec, Biraogo vs. Nogarales and
Linkaichong, and Paras vs Nograles. Limkaichong case as the working
basis for deliberation, no one raised objections to the draft, the En banc
approved it. Printed on Gilbert paper, Justices concurred “in the result”,
Justice Reyes circulated the ponencia during same session. After session
and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted 7 of the 13
(excluding Justice Reyes) concurred in the result, Justices Minita Chico-
Nazario and Teresita Leonardo-De Catsro then inform the Chief Justice
that they too wanted to concur “in the result”, since 9 Justices would
concur “in the result”, the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the
promulgation of the Gilbert copy, if majority concurred only “in the result”,
the ponencia would have no doctrinal value, decision ousting a sitting
member of the House of Representative should clearly spell the legal basis
relied upon by majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, volunteered to write his Reflection on the ponencia for discussion
for the following week’s En Banc session. The En Banc on July 22, 2008,
deliberated Justice Carpio’s Reflection and hold oral arguments on August
26, 2008.

On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, the petitioner in Biraogo vs

Nograles and Limkaichong, held press conference at Barrio Fiesta
Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, circulated to the media
an undated letter signed by him, and a xerox copy of the unpromulgated
ponencia.

December 10, 2008, the Court created an Investigating Committee

composed of 3 Senior Justices, and issued Show Cause to Mr. Louis C.
Biraogo, 10 days from receipt of the Resolution. Conducted initial hearings
on December 15-16, 2008. Mr. Biraogo submitted on December 10, 2008
the following Annexes, to wit: A. 3-page letter address to “Dear Mr.
Biraogo”; B. copy of Justice Reyes’s Revised Draft ponencia; C. photocopy
of unpromulgated ponencia bearing 14 Justices signatures; D. photocopy
of Justice Carpio’s Reflection.

4 Justices, 3 Attorneys and 11 Court Employees were called as

witnesses/resource persons on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009.

Issue:

Whether Justice Ruben T. Reyes is guilty of leaking Supreme Court

decision that has not yet been officially released?

Held:

Yes, the Committee finds Justice Reyes guilty of leaking the SC decision,
that the leakage was intentionally done, it was not the result of a copy
being misplaced and inadvertently picked by Biraogo or someone in his
behalf, that it was done from the Office of Justice Reyes. Page 1 of the copy
of Biraogo’s possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was
forwarded to the OCJ, page 1 of Biraogo’s copy and Justice Reyes’s new
 copy, glaringly contain no asterisks and footnotes. Advance copies
furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated, while in Biraogo’s
copy, appears Justices Reye’s authenticating initials.

The Committee based on the circumstantial facts and evidence particularly

the interest of Justice Reyes to circulate the draft ponencia of the case even
before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, to withhold information to
Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the ponencias
was put on hold, allows the immediate promulgation after lunch, and
Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.

Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head of Associate Justice

Ruben T. Reyes, remiss his duties, supervision of the operation of the
office, with respect to the promulgation of decisions, incumbent to devise
ways and means to secure the integrity and confidential documents, his
actuation is an evidenced “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness
or indifference”, unlocked drawers of staffs, unused portion to disposed or
shredded, and not aware of the status and promulgation of the ponencias.

Armando Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice

Ruben T. Reyes, kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16,
2008 to December 10, 2008, he should have secured it.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information

acquired by Justices and Judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used
or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. The
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole Canon on
Confidentiality, to wit: Section 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any
unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while
employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized
or unauthorized sources. Section 4. Any disclosure in violation of this
provision shall constitute indirect contempt of court.

Ruling:

Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.), liable for Gross Misconduct, indefinite

suspension as a member of the Bar, Fined in the amount of P500,000 to be
charged against his retirement.

Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, liable for Simple Neglect of Duty and fined of
P10,000.

Armando Del Rosario, liable for Simple Neglect of Duty and fined of P5,000.

33. In re Complaint of FACTS:

Mrs Rotilla Marcos
against Judge Ferdinand
Marcos, AM. No. 97-2- In 1996, complainant, Mrs. Rotilla Marcos and their children filed a
53-RTC, July 6, 2001 complaint against his husband, Judge Ferdinand Marcos, the respondent
for his failure to sufficiently support the family and for having an illicit
relationship with a law student. Complainants prayed that all
remuneration due respondent be directly released to them but the
complaint was later withdrawn and dismissed. In 2000, Chief Justice
Hilario Davide recommended for the suspension of respondent after a
- scandalous incident during an exclusive Fun Run sponsored by the
Philippine Judges Association where respondent brought along a woman.
When Chief Justice pulled respondent aside to validate the facts about the
latter's illicit relationship with the woman, respondent candidly admitted
that he had been living with the woman named Mae Tacaldo, for three (3)
years already. During the investigation, the respondent denied all the
allegations. However, the evidences including a phone bill addressed to the
 respondent not to their conjugal dwelling but to the address of the alleged
mistress, a birthday card which read "MT cares a lot, you know" and a
vehicle which was registered in their names as co-owners and its insurance
policy under the name of both the respondent and his alleged mistress,
among others, proved respondent's infidelity. The matter of the illicit
relationship was even published in the newspapers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ferdinand Marcos violated the Code of

Judicial Conduct

RULING: Yes.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala
and as a private individual. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who
is expected to possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a
judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect
for the judiciary diminishes as he represents the judiciary. Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral
integrity. He has violated the code of Judicial Conduct, which requires
every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence and to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all activities as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the judiciary, he was dismissed from
service.

34. Dela Cruz v. Facts:

Bersamin, RTJ-00-1567,
July 24, 2000

- Tultog, Kyle Jon

35. Rallos v. Gako, AM Facts:

No. RTJ-99-1484,
Two administrative complaints were filed against Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr.
October 24, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5. The first complaint was
filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, accusing the respondent
of ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority. It was alleged that the
respondent ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of imported rice to the
- Wad-asen, Analiza claimants, despite the ongoing seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the
Bureau of Customs. The second complaint was filed by Joselito Rallos,
Simon Rallos, Josefina Rallos Vallar, and Teresita Rallos Yap, who
challenged the respondent's order falsely stating that they were present
during a hearing when they were not.
 Issue:
Did Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. commit ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority in ordering the release of the imported rice?
Did Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr. falsely state that the complainants were
present during a hearing?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the first case in abeyance pending the resolution
of a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the respondent.
In the second case, the Court increased the recommended fine to P10,000.
The Court found the respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority and
partiality aggravated by dishonesty. The Court ordered the respondent to
pay a fine of P10,000. The complaint filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora was held in abeyance.

36. Fernandez v. Hamoy, Facts:

AM No. RTJ-04-1821,
Administrative case was filed by complainant Jose E. Fernandez against
August 12, 2004
respondent judge Jaime T. Hamoy RTC branch 130.

On March 7 the complainant wrote a letter to the court of administrator

seeking help for the speedy disposition of his client case. The court
administrator referred and reminded the respondent judge but failed to
- Waldo, Maspel
submit his comment and appropriate action.

A resolution was issued requiring the respondent judge to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt for his failure to file a comment and to
submit the said comment within ten days from notice.

The judge finally file his comment alleging that he simply forgot to submit
his comment, that he misplaced the records, that his utility at Caloocan
mixed up the records, that the missing cases was only found when old
records were transferred to the newly acquired cabinet, that he was unable
to act on the case notwithstanding the discovery because he had attended
many family related cases, that he had no intention to disregard the
directives of the court administrator, subsequently respondent judge filed a
manifestation that he had already decided the cases on the 2003.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judge Hamoy is guilty of gross inefficiency, dereliction of
duty and violation of canon 3 Rule 3.05 of the judicial conduct.
RULING
Respondent judge Hamoy of Regional trial court of Caloocan City, Branch
130 is dismissed from service with the forfeiture of all retirement benefit,
except accrued leave credit, and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch of agency or instrumentality of the government , including
government- owned and controlled corporation.
37. Dawa v. De Asa, Facts:
MTJ-98-1144, July 22,
1998
Presiding Judge Armando De ASA was charged with sexual harassment
and or acts of lasciviousness by Fluoride Dawa, Femenia Lazaro-Barreto
and NoralizJorgensen. Dawa and Barreto were employed as stenographic
reporters while Jorgensen was a casual employee in the Office of the Mayor
of Caloocan City and detailed to the Office of the Clerk of Court. They
- Zapata, April charged De Asa for allegedly forcing himself on them and kissing them on
Keith the lips .

Issue:

Whether De ASA violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Ruling:

Yes. Cannot 2 provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities. He should behave at all times to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
It therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior, both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
In the present case, the court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants to his subordinates
all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness.

38. Macalintal v. Te, GR Facts:

No. RTJ-97-1375,
This case began with Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal’s letter dated April 1,
October 16, 1997
1996, to the Philippine Supreme Court, detailing the actions of Judge
Angelito C. Teh in Election Case No. R-95-001. Macalintal’s client had
received an adverse resolution from Judge Teh. Macalintal filed a petition
for certiorari with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) while the case
was still pending. Judge Teh actively participated in the COMELEC
proceedings by filing a comment and an urgent manifestation. Macalintal
- Dagway, Gipson then filed a motion to inhibit Judge Teh from further action in the election
case, but instead of deciding on the motion, Judge Teh hired a lawyer and
submitted an answer in his own court, demanding the motion’s dismissal
and attorney’s fees from Macalintal. Upon review, the Supreme Court took
Macalintal’s letter as an administrative complaint and directed Judge Teh
to manage the motion for inhibition as outlined in the Rules of Court and
to submit comments on the complaint. Teh and Macalintal expressed
readiness to resolve the case based on the pleadings. The Supreme Court
noted Judge Teh’s admissions and proceeded with the case despite
Macalintal’s letter not being under oath, applying the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur due to the clear impropriety in Judge Teh’s actions.

Issues:
1. Whether Judge Teh’s personal participation in the certiorari proceedings
was appropriate.
2. Whether Judge Teh improperly acted on the motion for inhibition by
 hiring a lawyer and filing an answer, rather than following the prescribed
judicial procedures.
3. Whether Judge Teh’s actions violated the judicial norms of
independence, competence, and integrity.

Ruling:
The Philippine Supreme Court decisively found Judge Angelito C. Teh
guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The Court ruled that Judge Teh
inappropriately involved himself in the certiorari process despite being only
a nominal party, thereby deviating from established judicial expectations
which dictate a judge’s non-involvement in such proceedings. Furthermore,
Judge Teh’s handling of the motion for inhibition, particularly his self
representation and submission of an answer within his court, was deemed
a serious misstep. Teh’s resolution to deny the motion for inhibition and
impose attorney’s fees on Macalintal was criticized for lacking a sufficient
legal basis and for demonstrating gross incompetence. Consequently,
Judge Teh was dismissed from service, with a forfeiture of all benefits and
a prohibition against government re-employment.

39. Lachica v. Flordeliza, This is an administrative case filed by Dr. Amparo Lachica, the Municipal
AM No. MTJ-94-921, Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, against Judge Rolando
March 5, 1996 Flordeliza of the MCTC of Jose Abad, Santos on the ground of behavior and
decomcum unfitting of a judge.
Allegedly, the complainant was harassed by two women compelling her to
- Aguiguid, Marnelie
sign a death certificate of a certain person of whom the former has no
knowledge about thus, she politely explained her part and did not consent
to sign. The incident happened again where the two women coerced and
threatened the complainant into signing the death certificate as it was
allegedly ordered by the respondent. However, again, the complainant
refused to do so.
After a few days, during the Municipal Employees Night Party, Judge
Flordeliza, through the Municipal Assessor, invited Dr. Lachica to sit next
to him. When she was seated, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, told her in
an angry manner: "Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan ang Death Certificate?"
Complainant tried to explain her reasons but no to avail. After exchanges of
words, respondent threatened complainant that he will file an
administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death
certificate.

Issue:
Did the judge commit grave misconduct?

Ruling:
Yes. The court reiterated that “A judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behaviour, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”
Moreover, “The undue surrender of respondent Judge to the proddings of
 his self-defined pleasure failed him in his duty to conduct himself within
the confines of propriety and to behave in a manner shorn of reproach.
When he yieled to the strength of the "spirit", losing judicial composure and
acting like an uninhibited drunkard in the streets and public places, he not
only stripped himself of his dignity as a man but disrobed the court of the
respect of the people it serves. Such act demeans his judicial office and
elicits suspicion of his capacity to discharge justice. The apprehension may
lie where such suspicion may be stretched too far by the people themselves
and may unduly include the whole judicial machinery. And that would lay
the way for the people to weaken, if not lose, their faith in the
administration of justice.”

40. City of Tagbilaran c.

Hontanosas, AM NO. Title of the Case:
MTJ-98-1169, January
29, 2002 A.M. No. MTJ-98-1169 January 29, 2002

CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGBILARAN, represented by the City

Administrator and Special Counsel, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 1, MTCC
- Apils, Aris Lee
of Tagbilaran City, respondent.

Facts of the Case:

Respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr goes to Cebu on the afternoon

fast boat and comes back on the early trips from Cebu to Tagbilaran. He
does these 3 to 4 times a week. He goes to the Casinos in Cebu and spends
the whole night in the casinos. Also on Sundays, and in every so-called
Derby cockfight, Respondent Judge Hontanosas is seen in the cockpits of
Tagbilaran and the nearby towns. He denies that he gambles in the casinos
of Cebu, but admits that he would sometimes go to Nivel Hills Casino in
Cebu to accompany his wife who wanted to have some excitement and
recreation in said casino playing only the slot machines. He also admits
that he goes to the cockpits during Sundays and holidays and even gamble
a little on these occasions.

Issue:

Whether the respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics?

Ruling:

Yes. The Court Administrator finds that for being present in casinos and
for gambling in cockpits respondent Judge violated (1) Supreme Court
Circular No. 4 dated 27 August1980, which prohibits judges of inferior
courts and court personnel from playing or being present in gambling
casinos; and (2) Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
requires that the judges official conduct and personal behavior be free from
the appearance of impropriety. He then recommends that the respondent
Judge be directed to refrain from frequenting casinos, cockpits and other
gambling places. Such transgression of gambling is also a violation of
Paragraph 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides: The judge
should be studiously careful himself to avoid the slightest infraction of the
law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Even granting arguendo
that respondent did not gamble or personally play the slot machine, his
mere presence in a casino constituted a violation of Circular No. 4 and,
more specifically, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Respondent is also administratively liable for going to cockpits and placing
 bets in cockfights. The fact that the cockpits where he used to go were
licensed and the cockfights were conducted on authorized days will not
absolve him. While such gambling was not illegal, he openly and
deliberately disregarded and violated Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics quoted in Circular No. 4. Verily, it is plainly despicable to see a
judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the
crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge and
undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary itself
suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible representation of the
Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not separate the judge from the
Judiciary. In short, any demeaning act of a judge or court personnel
demeans the institution he represents.

The Court hereby; impose upon him a fine of P12,000 for violation of
Circular No. 4 dated 27 August 1980 and, more specifically, for violation of
Section 5 (3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B and Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics. He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

41. Sibayan-Joaquin v.
Javellana, AM No. RTJ- FACTS:
00-1601, November 13,
2001
- Awis, Victoria
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana,
acting presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of San
Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in the performance
of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The
complaint was an offshoot of a case for estafa entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Romeo Tan y Salazar," filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for
and in behalf of Andersons Group court was present during the
promulgation of the decision in contravention of Section 6, Rule
120, of the Rules of Court. Respondent judge was also cited for
impropriety by complainant because he was often seen with
Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle
respondent judge would even use at times. In the respondent`s
comment, respondent judge admitted that the decision in Criminal
Case No. RTC-1150 was rendered beyond the ninety-day
reglementary period but attributed the delay to his voluminous
workload. He explained that he was suffering from hypertension
which resulted in his frequent requests for leave. Respondent judge
maintained that the decision in Criminal Case No. RTC-1150 was
validly promulgated. He denied any irregularity in the promulgation
of the decision which was duly conducted by Atty. Tarjata Ignalaga,
Clerk of Court VI, of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, in the presence of accused Romeo Tan y Salazar
and his counsel, Atty. Agravante, along with Provincial Prosecutor
Estefanio Libutna, Jr., and private prosecutor Atty. Edwin
Magrinto.Respondent judge denied any close association with Atty.
Agravante. The Investigating Justice held respondent judge
accountable for impropriety for his close association with Atty.
Agravante

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Javellana committed gross misconduct in the

 performance of his duty.

RULING:

The court ruled in positive. It is expressly provided

under the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT that “A Judge shall
not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others to convey the
impressions that they are in special position to influence the judge.

Hence, a judge's official conduct and his behavior in the

performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance
of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. One who occupies an
exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private as well
as his official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions, like Caesar's
wife, a judge must not only be pure but also beyond suspicion. A
judge has the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision,
but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the
judge's integrity.

"It is obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess

proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and
enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have
confidence in their impartiality”.

The respondent is ADMONISHED to constantly be circumspect in

his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases
before him.

42. Luque v. Kayanan,

GR No. L-26826, August FACTS:
29, 1969
Civil Case 4871 was set for trial on November 5, 1965 before Branch I of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon at Lucena City, presided over by
Judge Gabriel Valero. It was on November 5, 1965 that Judge Kayanan
first took cognizance of said Civil Case 4871. According to plaintiffs'
- Balag-ey, Asia attorney in the case below, on November 5, 1965, at 8:30 in the morning,
he found that Civil Case 4871 "was not included in the calendar of cases
Mariz
scheduled for Branch I"; that "he looked up the calendar of the other sala,"
and finding his case there, he thus appeared therein. The "other sala" is
that of Judge Kayanan. Defendant and cross-defendant Baldomero S.
Luque (petitioner herein) were absent therein. Going by petitioner's version,
he was at Branch I "where he should be"; after he was informed by Judge
Gabriel Valero hearing cases at Branch I that Civil Case 4871 was in
Branch IV, he proceeded to said branch but was informed by a clerk that
respondent Judge Kayanan had already left for Manila. The next pertinent
order by respondent judge was made on January 31, 1966, which set the
 case for hearing on February 28, 1966. This last-mentioned date was
admittedly erroneous because the parties agreed on January 31, 1966 to
reset the hearing for March 8.

At the start of the hearing on February 28, 1966, petitioner was present,
the other parties absent. Counsel for plaintiffs came 20 minutes late; he
got wind of the hearing on that date after he left the other sala attending to
another case. He thought all along that the case was to be heard on March
8. Another order of the same date (February 28) reset the case for March 8,
as originally scheduled.

Before the March 8 hearing, petitioner sent by registered mail on March 3

(received by the court on March 7) a motion for postponement. He did not
appear on March 8. This prompted the court to order the resetting of the
hearing to March 23; but the court also directed petitioner Baldomero S.
Luque and another attorney for defendants in "twenty-four (24) hours upon
receipt hereof, to explain why they should not be cited for contempt."
Petitioner again decries that this order is wrong because his explanation on
in writing was already made in his motion for postponement; and that
furthermore since his motion for postponement was dated May 3, not May
7 as stated in the order, said motion was not in violation of the three-day
rule. On April 11, 1966, petitioner moved to disqualify respondent judge
from the case, alleging that:

Judge Union C. Kayanan doctored the records of this case in that he

suppressed the TRUE and GENUINE proceedings had in open Court of
February 28, 1966 (1) that the undersigned defendant moved to dismiss
this case; (2) that this case was set for hearing on March 21, 1966; and (3)
that the undersigned defendant was ordered to make his motion to dismiss
in writing and to set it for hearing also on March 21, 1966.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is disqualified from hearing Civil Case

4871.

RULING: Yes. In the circumstances presented in this case, the Supreme

Court held that it is constrained to state that respondent's taking
cognizance of said case does not square with our sense of justice. It is to be
stressed once again that parties have a right to have their cases tried fairly
by an impartial tribunal. Further, the Supreme Court stated that, one
important judicial norm is that "a judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety." A creed to which a judge is hidebound
is, in the words of the preamble of the Canons of Professional Ethics, that:
"The future of the Republic, to a great extent, depends upon our
maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied."

43. Talens-Dabon v.
Arceo, AM No. RTJ-96- Facts:
13336, July 25, 1996
Complainant, Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court V of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga, charged Judge Hermin E. Arceo,
the Executive Judge thereat with gross misconduct. The complaint was
later amended to include immorality. One afternoon, the respondent called
- Balao-ing, Rosel up the complainant to report to his room. Because of the news about the
respondent’s reputation of sexual harassment, complainant had been
cautious in entering the room of the respondent making sure that all exits
from the room are all open. Inside the room, the respondent gave a poem to
the complainant showing his affection to the complainant which the
complainant was offended by for the poem expresses the sexual desires of
the respondent towards the complainant. Out of disgust, complainant
quickly tried to exit the room but was locked and then the respondent
came behind her then kissed her and almost raped her. Thus, came this
 complaint against the respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Arceo committed gross misconduct and immorality.

Held: The Court found that Judge Arceo’s actions were a violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics. His behavior damaged the integrity of the Judiciary
and undermined public confidence in the judicial system. Judge Arceo’s
lewd and lustful acts toward Talens-Dabon and other female employees
clearly demonstrated a lack of moral uprightness. The Court held, the
integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times,
the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but
may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice,
indeed, is served.

Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in
both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives.
Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this
country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system. With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the
Judiciary, we have the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:

Canon I Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence,

integrity and independence.

Canon II Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A judge should behave at all times to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court has adhered
and set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency which every
member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by
his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such
private morals are externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in
law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people to look up to
him as a virtuous and upright man. The Court also stressed that all trial
judges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with
the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Ethics that they be
exemplars in the communities and the living personification of justice and
the Rule of Law.

44. Tan v. Gallardo, GR

No. L-4123-14, October FACTS: Respondent Judge was required to file a petition for Special Civil
5, 1976 Action for Certiorari with prohibition filed by the petitioners who are
accused in a criminal cases in the Supreme Court for denying their
following motions For the respondent judge to disqualify or inhibit himself
from the hearing and action for new trial and/or Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for New Trial and t compel respondent judge to his
- Balatong, Leony orders of transferring the accused or the petitioner from Camp Bumbus PC
headquarters to National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons and to desist
him from further proceeding. A Temporary Restraining Order was issued.
This motions was filed due to suspicion of bias and prejudice caused by
improper contacts, receiving gift, and accusation of bribery and
amendment of prepared decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the integrity of the court on the decision of

the respondent judge free from impartiality or suspicion of bias and
 prejudice.

HELD: A judge of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent, has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial. It is more important that they
should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them
should have confidence in their impartiality. The respondent judge is no
longer in the judicial service, and his disqualification from further
proceedings already become moot. The courts GRANT the petition and
demands the case to the trial court in order that another judge may hear
the petitioners’ motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on
the basis of the evidence.

45. Pimentel v. Salanga, FACTS: Constante Pimentel was the counsel of record of a civil case, 2
GR No. L-27934, criminal cases and one electoral case pending before judge Salanga.
September 8, 1967 Pimentel’s doubt started from the fact that he was a complainant in an
administrative case against judge Salanga arguing the latter of serious
misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and
incompetence. He contended that the judge be immediately suspended.
Also, Pimentel moved that the judge be disqualified from sitting in the four
- Baldos, Marie cases where he was the counsel of record. The motion was rejected
Claire however. Respondent Judge averred that there is no cause for the
disqualification under the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge is disqualified from acting in litigations in

which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an
administrative case.

RULING: NO. Section 1 (2) of Rule 137, Rules of Court provides that “A
judge may, in exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned by
law.” It is his submission that a judge may now be barred from sitting in
litigation. In the instant case, the judge did not inhibit himself and he is
not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, so the
rule remains as it has been - he has to continue with the case. Also, the
judge has not yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality.
The court further suggested that if he might be induced to act in
favor of one party or with bias against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination.

46. Montemayor v. Facts:

Bermejo, Jr. AM No.
Administrative complaint filed against Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of the
MTJ-04-1535, March 12,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila by Dr. Conrado T. Montemayor.
2004
Accused Judge Bermejo of gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross
negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
- Bugtong, Regina Stemmed from an unlawful detainer case filed by Benjamin and Desmond
T. Montemayor against Lolita Marco.
Pre-trial conference held on May 20, 2002, and Judge Bermejo issued a
Pre-Trial Order defining the issues and directing the parties to submit their
position papers within 10 days.
Plaintiffs submitted their position paper on June 13, 2002, while the
defendant submitted hers on August 14, 2002.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Early Resolution on July 30, 2002, and another
one on September 6, 2002.
Judge Bermejo declared the case submitted for decision on September 23,
2002.
Judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs on October 10, 2002.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Execution on December 12, 2002, but it was not
included in the court calendar.
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on December 20, 2002.
Plaintiffs filed a Second Motion for Execution and a Motion to Require
Defendant's Counsel to Inform the Court of the Date He Received a Copy of
the Judgment on December 26, 2002.
Judge Bermejo did not act on these motions.
On January 6, 2003, he gave due course to the defendant's appeal and
required her to post a supersedeas bond.
Plaintiffs filed a Third Motion for Execution on January 21, 2003, but it
was deemed submitted for resolution.
Defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension on April 23, 2003, claiming
that she had until April 21, 2003, to post a supersedeas bond.
Judge Bermejo granted the motion and gave the defendant until May 5,
2003, to post the bond.
Upon the defendant's posting of the bond, Judge Bermejo ordered the
transmission of the case records to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings.
Dr. Montemayor filed the administrative complaint against Judge Bermejo,
alleging delay in the rendition of judgment and other misconduct.
Judge Bermejo denied the allegations and provided explanations for his
actions.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found merit in the complaint and
recommended a fine of P5,000 for failing to decide the case within the
period fixed by law.
Issue:
Whether Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment and
other misconduct.
Ruling:
Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment.
Ratio:
The Court agreed with the OCA's findings and held Judge Bermejo guilty of
delay in the rendition of judgment.
The Court emphasized that the mandatory period for rendition of judgment
should be computed from the receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers, not from the issuance of the order deeming the case submitted for
 resolution.
Judge Bermejo's failure to decide the case within the prescribed period
constituted gross incompetence and inefficiency.
Judge Bermejo's inaction on the motions for execution and his granting of
the defendant's motion for extension to post a supersedeas bond were
deemed violations of the rules and indicative of his disregard for the
prompt resolution of the case.
The Court emphasized that actions for unlawful detainer should be
resolved promptly, and technicalities causing unnecessary delay should be
avoided.
Judge Bermejo was fined P5,000.
The Court emphasized the importance of prompt and efficient resolution of
cases and the need for judges to adhere to the rules and avoid unnecessary
delays.

47. Letter of Presiding

Judge Conrado M. Facts:
Vasquez Jr, AM No. 08-
8-11-CA, September 9, This administrative case arose from a controversy involving justices of the
Court of Appeals (CA) assigned to CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, entitled “Antonio
2008
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.” The dispute
revolved around the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in
favor of Manila Electric Company (Meralco) to stop implementation of
orders by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pending
resolution of an intra-corporate conflict with the Government Service
- Calig-a, Alpha
Insurance System (GSIS). The division handling the TRO experienced
changes in composition due to the leave of absence of one justice, and this
led to a series of events including allegations of impropriety and bribery
attempts which eventually reached the Supreme Court (SC) for resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether the actions and behavior of certain Justices of the Court of

Appeals involved in the Meralco case were appropriate and within ethical
bounds.

2. The procedural and ethical considerations in handling motions,

especially those involving inhibition and TRO issuance.

3. The role of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals in resolving

disputes concerning court procedure and judicial conduct within its ranks.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas from

service for grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest in the case, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Associate Justice
Jose L. Sabio, Jr. was suspended for two months without pay for simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice. Presiding Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. was severely reprimanded for failure to act
promptly and decisively. Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes was
reprimanded for simple misconduct with mitigating circumstances.
Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal was admonished to be more
circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties. Additionally, the
conduct of PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and private individual Francis de
Borja regarding their attempts to influence and bribe a magistrate were
referred to the Bar Confidant and the Department of Justice, respectively.

This case reiterated several principles, including the paramount

importance of independence, integrity, impartiality, and propriety in
 judicial conduct, the need for judges to resolve matters promptly, and the
requirement for judges to avoid allowing personal relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment.

48. Buenaventura v.
Benedicto, AC No. 137-J, Facts:
March 27, 1971
On January 9, 1969, Marciana Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as
the complainant), the offended party in a criminal prosecution for forcible
abduction with rape, and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action for
annulment of marriage, filed a complaint against the Honorable Mariano V.
- Co, Wendy Benedicto (hereinafter referred to as the respondent judge) in whose sala
both the aforementioned cases fell, seeking his removal from office.

On November 11, 1968, the respondent judge rendered judgment in the

criminal case, acquitting the defendants for failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

On January 15, 1969, the complainant filed a petition with this Court,
seeking to inhibit the respondent judge from hearing the civil case still
pending before the latter's sala but the petition was denied.

Hence, the complainant imputed to the respondent judge the following

charges: (1) serious misconduct in relation to the criminal and civil cases;
(2) immorality in Connection with both Cases; (3) gross inefficiency and
incompetence in relation to the criminal action; and (4) knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment in the criminal case.

In reply to the first charge, the respondent judge asserts that the
documentary and testimonial evidence show that he entrusted his decision
to Tuazon for delivery to the clerk of court and not for promulgation by the
said clerk-messenger. With regard to the decision in the criminal action
involved herein, he explains that he placed the same in an envelope and
sealed it before entrusting it to Tuazon for delivery to the clerk of court and
that he ordered the promulgation of the said decision by the clerk of court.
If Tuazon himself read the dispositive portion of the decision, then he did
so upon the instruction of the clerk of court and not upon his
authorization;

On the second charge, the respondent judge states that when he assumed
office in Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, he found
the court premises in a deplorable "state of disarray", most of the records
laid out or placed on the floor, and the rest kept inside unlocked cabinets.
He also found no available law books at hand. Clerk and employee of the
court shared and occupied one table. Twice, the respondent judge tried to
obtain financial assistance for the improvement of the court premises —
first, from the provincial treasurer, then, from the Department of Justice —
but he received none. Then, the presidents of the bar associations of Nueva
Ecija and other practicing lawyers of the province approached him and
offered suggestions. Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a committee to
raise funds and solicit donations. The respondent judge merely appointed
the members of the committee;

On the third charge, the respondent judge answered that he admits that he
made an exception and agreed to receive the complainant, then
accompanied by her sister, sister-in-law, a court employee and a court
helper, in his chambers. He states that he wanted, to soften, as much as
possible, the impact of her defeat in the criminal case. Moreover, he sought
to find out whether the complainant contemplated withdrawing the civil,
action or was determined or continuing the same; and
On the fourth charge, the respondent judge states that when the
prosecution raised the possibility of the existence of a prejudicial question
and asked for the suspension of the proceedings, he suggested it would be
better for him to continue hearing both the criminal and civil cases. In
effect, the respondent judge alleges, such ruling constituted a denial of the
motion for suspension. In fact, he continues the prosecution construed the
same denial of the motion for suspension and, the fiscal neither raised the
question again in the subsequent hearings on the criminal action nor made
any reference thereto in his memorandum.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct or

inefficiency based on the earlier charges.

Ruling:

No, the respondent judge is not guilty of serious misconduct or inefficiency

based on the earlier charges.

1. Section 67 of Republic Act 296, as amended, provides two

grounds for the removal of judges: serious misconduct and
inefficiency. "Serious" means "important, weighty, momentous, and
not trifling," and "misconduct" refers to "a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer." "Misconduct"
also implies "a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."

The Court found no solid support to hold that the said

respondent judge either acted in wanton disregard of or
intended to violate the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court. They find no reliable evidence on record to
demonstrate that the act complained of was influenced by malice or
induced by an intention to violate the law or spurred by a desire to
debase the integrity of the court.

Nevertheless, although the act charged does not constitute serious

misconduct on the part of the respondent judge as to warrant the
severe administrative penalty of removal from the Bench, the Court
believe that this act manifests the insouciance of the respondent
judge in the supervision of the attendants of the court who aid him
in the performance of his judicial functions. Assuming as true that
the clerk messenger read the dispositive portion of the decision in
the criminal case involved herein upon order of the clerk of court,
the respondent judge should have, upon notice and knowledge
thereof, called the attention of the clerk of court and taken
appropriate disciplinary measure against those who committed
the disservice, instilling in them the sense of propriety and
probity required of those who assist in the performance of
judicial functions.

The slightest semblance of impropriety on the part of the

employees of the court in the performance of their official
duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the
judicial administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and the
slightest irregularity in the conduct of court officers and
employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode the
faith of the people in the judiciary.

2. The Court found no cogent reason to blame the respondent

judge in accepting the help offered by the lawyers in Nueva Ecija to
provide the court with facilities of great utility to the convenient
 dispatch of court work.

A careful reading of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

shows that the said section dwells mainly on the prohibition against
the use by a judge of his official power and prestige to persuade
others to participate or contribute to the success of business
promotion or campaigns for charity. The act of the respondent judge
in appointing the members of the campaign committee does not fall
within its contemplation. To hold otherwise would countenance an
interpretation unduly strained.

The well-intentioned desire of the respondent judge to provide the

court premises with the necessary equipment motivated him to
accept the suggestion of the lawyers of Nueva Ecija and, then, to
appoint the members of the committee for the campaign. However,
for reasons of extreme probity and delicacy, he should have declined
to assume the appointing prerogative to avoid the slightest hint of
involvement, personal or official, in the campaign.

3. The Court ruled that the fact that the respondent judge
agreed to meet with the complainant in his chambers only upon the
latter's request and insistence. Although the Court is inclined to
believe that the respondent judge received the complainant in his
chambers not to discuss the merits of the criminal case but to
assuage whatever emotional ache and distress she felt as a result of
the decision of acquittal in the criminal action and to find out what
course of action she contemplated to take on the civil case in view of
the turn of events, the Court nonetheless feel that the respondent
judge should have precluded any mention whatsoever of the civil
action for the was then pending before his sala. This conduct of the
judge indicates lack of reasonable discretion. Such conduct, too,
more often than not, party-litigants misconstrue as personally
motivated. Many the inferences are, that may be drawn by
suspecting minds from acts of judges over zealously accommodating
to interested parties.

On the other hand, the Court believes that the complainant was not
entirely without fault since the latter endeavored with utmost
persistence to see the respondent judge in his private chambers not
only once but twice.

4. The record reveals that the respondent judge made an earnest

effort to act on the motion for suspension of the hearings on the
criminal action. However, the respondent judge should have made a
formal ruling on the motion to enable the parties to know the reason
or ground for such ruling and to provide the party aggrieved by the
action on the motion sufficient opportunity to avail of the necessary
action for relief from the ruling.

In the case at bar, if the respondent judge really failed to act on the
motion as the complainant points out, then, the subsequent
hearings on the criminal case afforded the prosecution all the
opportunity to ask the respondent judge to make a definitive ruling
on the matter. Yet, the prosecution proceeded to the termination of
the trial, filed its memorandum, and submitted the case for decision
without any further mention of the question.

49. Parayno v. Meneses, Facts: This case involves a mayoralty protest concerning petitioner Rodolfo
April 26, 1994 Parayno who is the incumbent Mayor o f Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The
protest was originally assigned to branch 45 of the RTC of Pangasinan
presided over by Judge Manuel Villanueva. Due to the motion for inhibition
 filed by the petitioner which was promptly granted, the case was reassigned
to another branch. However, petitioner, claiming there is impropriety in the
- Cuyan, Rochelle
assignment of the case, the court issued a temporary restraining order and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition but was
set aside and directed the Executive Judge to include the case in the
regular raffle for reassignment.
The case was then assigned to branch 49 preceded by the respondent
Judge Illuminado Meneses. It is where the councilor's protests were then
pending. The Committee on revision in the Mayoralty protest terminated its
work and was ready to submit its report. However, a motion to use revision
committee report blank form was filed by private respondent, protestant
Lorenzo Mateo, and made manifestation that it seems that the respondent
judge in the case favors the petitioners. The following day, the respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further hearing the two
cases. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the inhibition of the respondent judge is proper?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the action of the respondent judge
inhibiting himself is improper because of no just and valid reasons.

Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it states that no judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.

In the present case,there is no clear reason why the respondent judge

should inhibit himself from hearing the two cases. The SC also said that a
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of a judge.

The assailed order of the respondent judge was set aside by the SC and
directed to proceed with hearing and resolving the election protest as it
involves the public interest and cannot be countenanced.

50. Dimo Realty & Dev. FACTS:

Inc. v. Dimaculangan,
Respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for specific
March 11, 2004
performance against Dimo Realty and Spouses Dizon. The complaint
alleges that sometime in 1967 to 1968, petitioners engaged the services of
respondent as geodetic surveyor to subdivide 2 parcels of land. As payment
- Dagway, gipson
for respondent’s services, petitioner agreed to give him one (1) subdivision
lot and pay him P9,200.00 in cash. After the completion of respondent’s
work, petitioners paid him P9,200.00 in installments and delivered to him
possession of the lot. However, despite respondent’s demands, petitioners
failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the RTC a
complaint for specific performance and damages.
Instead of filing an answer, petitioners, on March 27, 1995, filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the cause of action
has prescribed or is barred by the statute of limitations; (2) venue was
improperly laid considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject property situated in Batangas; (3) the claim is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds; and (3) the complaint fails to state a
sufficient cause of action.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for improper
venue. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for
inhibition. In an Order, the trial court granted the motion for inhibition,
hence, the case was re-raffled to Branch 101 of the same RTC at Quezon
City. On August 21, 1995, this Branch issued an Order granting
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the
complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed with the Court MTC 2 separate complaints for
unlawful detainer and forcible entry against Jose Matibag and spouses
Benjamin and Zenaida Dela Roca (lot buyers), docketed as Civil Cases Nos.
796 and 797, respectively. This prompted respondent to file with the trial
court (Branch 101) a motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a preliminary injunction against petitioner and the MTC. Acting
thereon, the trial court, in an Order issued a TRO and subsequently, a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner and the MTC “from
proceeding with Civil Cases Nos. 796 and 797 pending hearing.
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift the TRO and the writ of
preliminary injunction and an urgent motion for inhibition, but were
denied. petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus (with prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction). CA partially nullified the order of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent’s complaint is a
personal action;

RULING: NO.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction
over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint
of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In this case, it can easily be discerned that respondent is asserting that
petitioners violated the contract of services by refusing to deliver the title of
the subject lot to him and is thus demanding that they comply with their
obligation. It bears emphasis that respondent does not allege in his
complaint that he is seeking to recover the lot from petitioners. This is
because he has been in possession thereof. In fact, petitioner even filed
 with the MTC of Rosario, Batangas two (2) separate complaints for unlawful
detainer and forcible entry against respondent’s buyers. It is thus clear
that what is being claimed by the respondent is simply the delivery of the
title to him as payment for his services. It follows that the complaint below
is not a real action, but a personal action.

51. Cruz v. Iturralde,

April 30, 2003 Facts: Dr. Isagani A. Cruz filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Philbert I. Iturralde of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City,
Branch 72. The complaint was based on alleged bias and partiality
displayed by Judge Iturralde in a case involving a hold-departure order.
The complaint arose from a complaint for injunction filed by Dr. Cruz
- Duque, Alexander against his wife. Dr. Cruz claimed that Judge Iturralde showed partiality by
expressing his inclination to grant his wife's motion to allow her and their
two children to take a vacation to Switzerland and to compel Dr. Cruz to
return her travel documents. Dr. Cruz opposed the motion and requested
the court to issue a hold-departure order, but the court denied the request.
Dr. Cruz also filed a motion to inhibit Judge Iturralde from further hearing
the case, which was also denied. Dr. Cruz further accused Judge Iturralde
of plagiarism for allegedly copying paragraphs from an article in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer. Dr. Cruz charged Judge Iturralde with gross
misconduct, dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, bias, and partiality.

Issue: Whether Judge Philbert I. Iturralde can be held administratively

liable for alleged bias and partiality in the case involving a hold-departure
order.

Ruling: The Supreme Court agreed with the recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) and dismissed the case against Judge
Iturralde. The Court held that the charges against Judge Iturralde are
clearly judicial in nature and cannot be the basis for administrative
liability. The Court emphasized that complainants have the burden of
proving their allegations with substantial evidence. After a careful
examination of the evidence, the Court found no sufficient basis to hold
Judge Iturralde administratively liable. The accusations of dishonesty,
neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law were found to be without
factual basis and pertained to alleged errors in the exercise of Judge
Iturralde's adjudicative functions, which should be addressed through
appropriate judicial remedies.

52. Gochan v. Gochan,

GR No. 143089, Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
February 27, 2003 against the respondents. The case was assigned to Judge Dicdican.
Petitioners argued that Judge Dicdican should be disqualified from hearing
the case due to bias and prejudice. The bias is due to the following reasons:

1. Denial of respondent’s motion to hear Affirmative Defenses

- Egtapen, Mendy
2. Admission of petitioner’s exhibits without indication respondent’s
objections

3. Denial of request for postponement and forced cross examination of

witness

4. Declaration of the absence of possibility of compromise; and

5. Denial of the motion for inhibition.

Issue: WoN Judge Dicdican be disqualified from hearing the case due to
 bias and prejudice.

Held: No. Below are the Supreme Court decisions on the issues raised by
the petitioners.

· Denial of respondent’s motion to hear Affirmative Defenses, SC ruled

that Judge Dicdican’s denial is based on the Rules of Court. Preliminary
hearing on affirmative defenses is discretionary on the part of the judge.

· Admission of petitioner’s exhibits without indication of respondent's

objections, SC said that both parties were allowed to file their
comments/objections to petitioner’s formal offer. The judge allowed them to
be heard and decided based on their submissions.

· Denial of request for postponement and forced cross examination of

witness, SC said that a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume
that their motion would be granted.

· Declaration of the absence of the possibility of compromise, the

parties had more than 7 months to enter into a compromise agreement
which was more than sufficient time which they did not do. So the judge
did not believe in their sincerity to pursue an amicable settlement.

· Denial of the motion for inhibition, SC said that this is the claim that
remains unproven and unsubstantiated. It cannot be the extrajudicial
source from which can be inferred bias and partiality. The judge allowed it
to be filed and even cancelled one hearing until the resolution of the
motion.

Because of all the given circumstances, it reveals that the respondent’s

failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that Judge Dicdican had
been motivated by malice or prejudice in issuing the assailed rulings. They
simply lean on this series of allegedly adverse rulings which they
characterize as tainted with bias and impartiality. There should be concrete
proof that a Judge has a personal interest in the proceedings and that his
bias stems from an extrajudicial source.

53. People v. Veneracion,

GR Nos. 119987-88,
October 12, 1995

- Evasco, Juliffer
54. Ty v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage FACTS:
Bank, GR 149797-98,
February 13, 2004 Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or
disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest
prejudgment and partiality. Respondent judge denied the motion for
inhibition and ruled that all the Orders of the court were based on facts
and applicable law and jurisprudence. Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed
separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
- Fakat, Bruce
Appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed
Orders by the respondent judge.

A Petition for review on certiorari filed by Nancy Ty against Banco Filipino

Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court of Appeals, and Judge Paterno V.
Tac-an. Banco Filipino filed an action for reconveyance of real property
against Nancy Ty and other defendants on August 16, 1995.

On November 15, 1995, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, initially granted by the trial court but
later reinstated upon motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino.

Defendants, except for Nancy Ty and another defendant, filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.

Various orders were issued by the trial court, including an order directing
the production of documents by the defendants and an order admitting
exhibits offered by Banco Filipino.

Defendants filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or

disqualification of the judge, alleging manifest pre-judgment and partiality.

Respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that all the
Orders of the court were based on facts and applicable law and
jurisprudence. Respondent Judge likewise reprimanded the defendants for
filing motions to delay the proceedings Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed
separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
Appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the assailed
Orders by the respondent judge.
Dissatisfied, Defendants filed separate petitions for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which were dismissed and the orders
of the trial court were affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of

discretion in denying the motion for voluntary inhibition

RULING: The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings
should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution of
controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some
obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where the judge's
participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for
one of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule
3.06 which provides: While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste
of time or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue
interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the
ascertainment of truth. There is undue interference if the judge, as in the
instant case, orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence
without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a party when
and who to present as a witness and what matter as such witness will
testify on. To our mind, respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of
impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what evidence to present
to prove its case.While the trial court may interfere in the manner of
presenting evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial,the
final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole prerogative of the
contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of their primary duty to
administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily
and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties,
should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial
attitude in order not to create any false impression in the minds of the
litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the peoples faith in our courts.

The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very
first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or
not, theJudge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and
probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.The
better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify
himself. That way, he avoids beingmisunderstood, his reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of
impartial administration of justice is lived up to.

In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent
judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion
or to a superficial impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing
proof of bias and prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Courts
previous pronouncements that to warrant the judges inhibition from the
case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-
judicial or extrinsic source, this rule does not apply where the judge, as in
the instant case, displays an in ordinate predisposition to deviate from
established procedural precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in
favor of one party. It is also true that the Supreme Court, on several
occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders and decision
that pertain to the judges judicial functions may not be proper
considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be
erroneous. However, where said complained orders,taken not singly but

55. Paco et al. v. Quilala,
AM No. RTJ-02-1699,
October 15, 2003
- Fang-asan, Miles
Harvey
collectively, ineluctably show that the judge has lost the cold neutrality of
an impartial magistrate,due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits
himself from the case.
FACTS:
Complainants filed an administrative complaint against Judge Reinato G.
Quilala, acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang and court stenographer
Lilia N. Batu of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, of Makati City.
Complainants charged respondent judge with bias and partiality on
various occasions, among which was when respondent judge, during the
hearing on plaintiff's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, led
and coached Ramon Collado, a witness for PRAMA, and instructed the
latter's counsel on what questions to ask.
Complainants further averred that during the hearing on the afternoon of
19 February 2001, respondent judge delegated to his acting clerk of court
Aida C. Lomugdang, who was not a member of the bar, the task of receiving
evidence from the parties, as well as of ruling on any objections which
might be proffered thereon, thereby ignoring Section 9, Rule 30, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires (1) that the parties agree to
the delegation in writing, (2) that the clerk of court be a member of the bar,
and (3) that the clerk of court would not issue rulings on any objections
which might be interpose. The procedural rules were alleged to have been
obliterated from the certified transcript of stenographic notes where, in
connivance with respondent judge, respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu
had made it to appear that the session was presided over by Judge Quilala
himself. In the assailed stenographic notes, the statements issued by
Lomugdang were shown to have been made by Judge Quilala although the
judge was neither present nor even in his chambers during the hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Reinato G. Quilala guilty of unbecoming a judge.
RULING:
The Court finds (a) respondent Judge Reinato G. Quilala guilty for conduct
unbecoming a judge and of violating Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of
Court, and he is hereby penalized with a fine of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos; (b) respondent acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang
guilty of having acted in contravention with the rules on the reception by
her, albeit upon the directive of respondent judge, of evidence without
herself being a member of the bar, and she is hereby SEVERELY
REPRIMANDED; and (c) respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu to have
been remiss in her duty to accurately reflect the circumstances
surrounding the proceedings in the afternoon hearing of 19 February 2001,
and she is ADMONISHED to henceforth be circumspect in her duties.
Respondents are each warned against committing any further infraction on
their part.
From the aforequoted `exchanges' of the counsel of the parties, the witness
and respondent Judge during the testimony of plaintiff PRAMA's witness
Collado, it appears that respondent Judge deviated from the ordinary
course of listening merely to the testimony of a witness and merely ruling
on objections. It appears that respondent Judge, instead of ruling on
objections, advised the witness to just understand or answer the question
or respondent Judge ordering the reforming of the question or making
suggestions or asked the question himself.
56. Montemayor v.
Bermejo, AM No. MTJ- Facts: Judge Bermejo did not act on the three motions for execution of
04-1535, March 12, judgment filed by plaintiffs after winning in a case for unlawful detainer
2004 against Lolita Marco. The judge also did not act on the motion of Dr.
Conrado Montemayor to require the counsel of defendant Marco to inform
Topic: Sec. 2, the court of the date he received the notice of judgment.
Impartiality
Dr. Montemayor filed an administrative complaint with the OCA charging
Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency, gross negligence,
gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and /or conduct prejudicial
- Fontanilla, to the best interest of the service, asserting that Judge Bermejo failed to
Crismar decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court), that Judge
Bermejo "did not bother to check defendant’s preposterous claim that she
received a copy of the Judgment only on December 5, 2002, even if it was
released more than forty-five (45) days earlier on October 16, 2002.

According to Dr. Montemayor, it was only after the respondent Judge

received the defendant’s supersedeas bond that the former issued the order
directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to
the appellate court.

The Judge claimed that he did not act on the motion for execution because
it was set for hearing on a non-hearing day, that he did not act on the
second motion because they were having an inventory of cases when it was
filed, and that since the Order deeming the case submitted for resolution
was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment on October
10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.

Issue: WON the Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay; WON delay can result in
impartiality

Ruling: Yes, the Judge is guilty of delay. Delay points to impartiality.

The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of
judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, as provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the
judge deeming the case submitted for resolution.

Assuming that the court received the defendant’s Position Paper on August
14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been
rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was dated October
10, 2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of the mandatory period for
rendition of judgment and almost two months from the receipt of the
defendant’s Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and,
thus, administratively liable.

Judge Bermejo can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the
plaintiffs’ Motions for Execution because it was set on a date that was not a
motion day. He forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to
be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-
working day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules
provides an exception for motions requiring immediate action. He could
have simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion day.
Instead, he untenably ignored the motion.

The Urgent Motion for Extension to post a bond approved by the judge was
filed three days after the last day to post the same, in violation of the rule
 that motions for extension must be filed prior to the expiration of the
period sought to be extended.

By countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays in

obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the
Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his
partiality. It bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only
be impartial but maintain the appearance of impartiality.

Judge Bermejo, Jr. is guilty of delay in the rendition of judgment in

violation of Rules 1.02 (A judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay) and 3.05 (A judge shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.)

57. Martinez v. Gironella Facts:

GR No. L-37635, July
22, 1975
Petitioner Cresencio Martinez seeks a new trial after the trial judge,
Leopodo B. Gironella, previously stated in a decision that Martinez was the
perpetrator of a murder. Martinez was charged with murder along with two
other individuals, but only one of the co-accused, Arnold Bayongan, was
- Gaddang, Jaren
apprehended and tried. Bayongan was acquitted, but the decision stated
that the "offense of murder was clearly established and committed by
Cresencio Martinez." Martinez later surrendered and was arraigned,
pleading not guilty. Before the prosecution presented its evidence, Martinez
moved for the trial judge to inhibit himself from hearing the case due to
prejudice. The motion was denied, and Martinez did not move for
reconsideration. The trial proceeded, and Martinez took no further action to
disqualify the judge until the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the
government. Martinez then filed a petition for prohibition, asking that the
judge be commanded to desist from hearing and deciding the case, that the
hearing be declared a mistrial, and that the case be heard anew by another
judge.

Issue:

Whether a new trial should be ordered for Martinez due to the alleged bias
and prejudice of the trial judge.

Ruling:

A new trial was not necessary because there were no specific

circumstances to show that the trial was unfair or impartial. However, the
trial judge should be precluded from deciding the case due to his previous
statement in the decision alluding to Martinez as the perpetrator of the
crime. The Court emphasized that a judge has a duty to render a just and
impartial decision, free from any suspicion of bias or prejudice. Therefore,
the Court granted the petition and ordered that the case be decided by
another judge.

58. Palang v. Zosa GR

No. L-38229, August 30, Facts: This petition for certiorari and prohibition was predicated on the fear
and the misgivings that the trial judge, respondent Mariano A. Zosa, may
1974
find it difficult to live up to the ideal set forth in Gutierrez v. Santos. The
due process clause requires a "hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, ... every litigant [being] entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Briefly, the basis of the complaint
- Gallao, Ryan was that after respondent Judge had acquitted private respondent Julieto
Gamaliel III P. Herrera of the crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion that the
charge was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies
being" rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciously presented by the
[offended party, now petitioner] causing great damage and prejudice [to
Herrera's moral and social] standing and a destruction of [his] image as
well as (his) character ..., the aforesaid Herrera, thus acquitted, now private
respondent here, filed an action for damages against the complainant, now
petitioner. It is his submission here that considering the language used by
respondent Judge, he would not be able to decide such civil case justly and
impartially.

When required to comment, respondents filed an answer instead,

maintaining that there is no basis for disqualification. Memoranda was
thereafter required from both parties. That was done, and the case was
thus ready for decision. At that stage, there was from private respondent
Herrera a motion to withdraw opposition, wherein he alleged: "1. That
respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] sincerely believes in the early disposition
and termination of the above-entitled case, that it realizes to withdraw his
Opposition to herein Petitioner's petition; 2. That, time is of the essence,
and by way of his withdrawal, the above-entitled case can therefore be
calendared on the earliest possible time by the court who may eventually
be assigned, thereby tried on the merits; 3. That this motion of herein
respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] is made for reason of expediency in order
that early disposition of the case by way of trial on the merits be attained.

After respondent judge received the copy, he inhibited himself in the civil
case.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated canon 3, section 4?

Whether or not respondent judge should be dismissed for violating the

CPRA?

Ruling: The case was dismissed for being moot and academic because the
judge already inhibited himself from hearing the civil case. The supreme
court stated the following statements. This voluntary inhibition by
respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up to what is expected
of occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration
of justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases without
bias and favoritism. It does not suffice that they in fact rid themselves of
prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is an
instance where appearance is just as important as the reality. Like
Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. At
least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is deference to
the due process mandate

59. Chavez v. PEA GR

No. 133250, May 6, 2003 Facts:

With the several motions filed by Amari against Francisco Chavez,

petitioner, they seek the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente of
the Decision, on the ground that Justice Carpio, before his appointment to
- Kimayong, the Court, wrote in his Manila Times column of July 1, 1997, "I have
Charmagne always maintained that the law requires the public bidding of reclamation
projects." Justice Carpio, then a private law practitioner, also stated in the
same column, "The Amari-PEA reclamation contract is legally flawed
because it was not bid out by the PEA." Amari claims that because of these
statements, Justice Carpio should inhibit himself "on the grounds of bias
 and prejudgment" and that the instant case should be "re-deliberated" after
being assigned to a new ponente.

Issue:

Whether or not Justice Carpio’s statements violate impartiality and thus

shall inhibit himself.

Ruling:

No. The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be denied for three reasons.
First, the motion to inhibit came after Justice Carpio had already rendered
his opinion on the merits of the case. The rule is that a motion to inhibit
must be denied if filed after a member of the Court had already given an
opinion on the merits of the case,1 the rationale being that "a litigant
cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court xxx (only to)
object to this sort after a decision has been rendered." Second, as can be
readily gleaned from the summary of the Decision quoted above, the
absence of public bidding is not one of the ratio decidendi of the Decision
which is anchored on violation of specific provisions of the Constitution.
The absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the parties.
The absence of public bidding was mentioned in the Decision only to
complete the discussion on the law affecting reclamation contracts for the
guidance of public officials. At any rate, the Office of the Solicitor General
in its Motion for Reconsideration concedes that the absence of public
bidding in the disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended
JVA null and void.2 Third, judges and justices are not disqualified from
participating in a case just because they have written legal articles on the
law involved in the case. As stated by the Court in Republic v. Cocofed,3 -

The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has

written on the coconut levy will not disqualify him, in the same
manner, that jurists will not be disqualified just because they may
have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question
involved in a case.

Besides, the subject and title of the column in question was "The CCP
reclamation project" and the column referred to the Amari-PEA contract
only in passing in one sentence.

60. Castillo v. Juan GR

No. L-39516-17, January Facts:
28, 1975
The case of Castillo v. Juan involves two rape victims, Rosario Castillo and
Sonia Villasanta, who filed a petition to disqualify Judge Celestino Juan
from hearing their cases due to his lack of impartiality. The incidents
occurred in 1974 and the cases were pending trial before Judge Juan. On
- Komicho, Tiffany two separate occasions, Judge Juan conferred with the victims in his
chambers and informed them that their cases were weak and that the
accused would likely be acquitted. He also suggested that a settlement
would be to their advantage. These conversations took place even before
the prosecution had finished presenting their evidence. The victims filed a
certiorari petition against Judge Juan, arguing that his actions showed
bias and prejudice, violating their right to due process. In response, Judge
Juan claimed that he acted out of charity and as an attempt to humanize
justice.

Issue:

The main issue in this case is whether Judge Juan should be disqualified
 from hearing the rape cases due to his lack of impartiality.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered Judge Juan to desist
from further conducting the trial of the rape cases.

Ratio:

The court emphasized that in every litigation, especially in criminal cases,

the manner and attitude of the trial judge are crucial to everyone involved.
The judge should refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters and should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality.
The court stated that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of the
judge's objectivity and neutrality.

The court also cited the Rules of Court, which provide for the
disqualification of judges for just or valid reasons other than those
specifically mentioned. In this case, the court found that Judge Juan's
actions, even if motivated by sympathy or charity, did not meet the
standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The court concluded
that the victims could no longer have faith in Judge Juan's impartiality and
that the administration of justice would be subject to reproach if he were
not disqualified.

The court made it clear that its decision only pertained to the
disqualification of Judge Juan and did not address the merits of the rape
cases. The hearings should continue, and the outcome would depend on
the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense.

61. Re: Letters of Judge

Eduardo, September 17,
2014

62.Prosecutors Casar, et
al v Soluren, AM No. RTJ Facts: This case involves an administrative complaint of gross misconduct
- 12- 2333, October 22, filed against Judge Soluren of RTC Baler, Aurora. Complainants averred
2012 that Judge Soluren frequently visits the Aurora Provincial Jail and
conferring with the inmates including those who had pending cases before
her sala. This was in contravention of Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) Circular No. 03-2010, which suspended the conduct of jail visitation
- Kendra Manipon and inspection by Executive Judges and Presiding Judges pending results
of the re-examination of the provisions of A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC.

According to complainants, the purpose of Judge Soluren’s visit was to

persuade the prisoners into signing a letter addressed to then Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, calling for the dismissal of the administrative complaint
filed against her by Atty. Juliet M. Isidro-Reyes, District Public Attorney,
Baler, Aurora, and for the removal of Judge Evelyn Atienza-Turla as
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 6, Baler, Aurora.

Judge Soluren admitted that she went to the Aurora Provincial Jail on four
(4) occasions but they were not official jail visitations because she went
there without the presence and assistance of her staff member and not in
compliance with the orders of the Supreme Court.

The OCA issued its Report finding Judge Soluren guilty of Simple
Misconduct and imposing upon her a fine of ten thousand pesos
 (P10,000.00) to be deducted from her retirement benefits in view of her
compulsory retirement from the service.

Issue: Whether Judge Soluren violates Canon 4 Propriety Section 1

Held: Yes, the mere act of Judge Soluren in pursuing the inmates to sign
the letter addressed to the chief justice for the dismissal of her
administrative case and removal of Judge Turla was indeed an act
involving impropriety which is in violation of Canon 4 Section 1 which
states Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.

The Supreme court in it’s decision consistently enjoined judges to avoid not
just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be damaging
as actual bias or prejudice to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s role
in the administration of justice.

63. Facts: Respondent Dumaguete City Regional Trial Court Judge Jose M.
Estacion, Jr. concealed from the appointing authority, at the time he
applied for the judicial post until his appointment, information regarding
OFFICE OF THE COURT the criminal charges for homicide and attempted homicide filed against
ADMINISTRATOR him. Such fact would have totally eluded the Court had it not been
vs.JUDGE JOSE M. complained of by one Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. de Sison who, incidentally, is the
ESTACION, JR. mother of one of the victims.The Court in its January 11, 1990 Per Curiam
Decision dismissed respondent from the service for gross
misrepresentation.Now comes his "Motion To Request For Clemency,
A.M. No. RTJ-87-104, Compassion and Mercy With Leave" highlighting his active membership
August 23, 1995 and involvement in certain religious and civic organizations/activities.

Issue/s: Whether or not the decision for the respondent’s dismissal should
be reversed?

Held: No. After taking another hard look at the records of the case, still,
the court is still not inclined to accede to respondent's renewed plea.
Respondent's purported good reputation in his community hardly mitigates
the gravity of the offense he committed.He continuously suppressed vital
information on his personal circumstances under the false belief that he
can mislead the Court and get away with it for good. What the respondent
did, or omitted to do, was a calculated deception committed not only
against the Court but against the public as well, clearly indicative of his
lack of moral rectitude to sit as magistrate, and sufficiently repulsive that it
detracts from public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Dismissal
indeed is the appropriate retribution for such kind of transgression.Judges
are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys
or other persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire
trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary.Dispositive
portion: “WHEREFORE, respondent's "Motion For Clemency, Compassion
and Mercy" is hereby DENIED.”
64. Jorge P. Royeca vs Facts:
Judge Pedro Samson
Petitioner Jorge P. Royeca, was found guilty of direct contempt by the
Animas, GR. No L-39584
respondent Judge Pedro Samson Animas the presiding judge of the court of
May 3, 1976
the first instance of the south Cotabato Branch 1.This was due to the
motion for inhibition filed by petitioner Royeca for the pending case.
-MASPEL S. WALDO
On august 9, 1974 as requested Royeca and his lawyer appeared and
apologized, but the judge was not appeased.

The judge issued an order on September 6, 1974, finding Royeca guilty of

direct contempt and sentencing him to imprisonment for days and a fine of
200.

Royeca argues that there was a fragrant misuse of the contempt power and
that there was nothing offensive in the motion for inhibition.

ISSUE:
whether the court abused its inherent judicial power to punish for
contempt.

RULING:
The supreme court granted the petitioner and set aside the order finding
Royeca guilty of direct contempt.
with the following emphasis: the power to punish for contempt should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, the judges
must exercise caution and hesitancy when using this power to retain
respect for the administration of justice.

65. Geotina V. Gonzales Facts:

GR. No. L-26310,
September 30, 1971
On October 27. 1965 the petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the
respondent judge from hearing the criminal case, alleging as ground
 therefore the relationship of the latter to the complainant Calderon within
the sixth civil degree by affinity a disqualification explicitly spelled out in
Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. The motion for disqualification,
opposed by, the respondent provincial fiscal, was denied by the respondent
judge upon the ground that he bears no relationship either to the plaintiff,
- Zapata, April the People of the Philippines, or to the defendant, Dr. Jose G. Geotina, the
Keith only parties he considers litigants in the criminal action, not a party within
the contemplation of section 1 Rule 137. Twice, on November 6, 1965 and
on March 1, 1966, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order
denying his motion for disqualification, to no avail. On April 12, 1966 the
respondent provincial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner may appeal the decision of the judge
involving his competency to handle the case while such case is still
pending.

Ruling:

The Court decided in negative. Where, however, the prosecution or the

offended party seeks the judges disqualification, the restriction finds no
application. For where the judge decides in favor of his own competency
proceeds to try the case, and renders a verdict of acquittal, the prosecution
or offended party has neither the right to appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to have the ruling of the
judge on the motion seeking his disqualification reviewed on appeal.
However, there are remedies to aggrieved parties if such denial of
disqualification made the party victim of an unfair and partial trial because
of the judges bias or prejudice. Section 1. Rule 137 of Rules of Courts
provides: No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel or in which he has presided i
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
66. Aspiras vs. Ganay
AM No. RTJ-07-2055, FACTS: An unsigned letter-complaint was filed by the heirs of the late Rev.
December 17, 2009 Father Jose O. Aspiras against respondent Judge Clifton U. Ganay for an
alleged abuse of authority in connection with Special Proceeding Case No.
A-1026. The heirs alleged that respondent previously ordered to withdraw
the amount of P50,000.00 in his favor from the bank account of the late
Fakat, Bruce P. Rev. Father Jose O. Aspiras for him to purchase law books. There are still
other orders issued by Judge Ganay ordering the bank to release certain
amounts from the bank account of the late Rev. Father Jose O. Aspiras in
his favor without the written consent of the guardians.

The OCA conducted a surprise investigation and examination of the

records of SP Case No. A-1026. They found that the Order was indeed
issued by respondent Judge Ganay. For the money received from the said
order, respondent Judge Ganay even issued an Acknowledgement Receipt.
The team also discovered that on several occasions, respondent Judge
Ganay issued numerous Orders directing the manager of the PNB, to draw
checks from the account of the late Rev. Father Fr. Aspiras amounting to
several thousands of pesos in the name of the Officer-in-charge/Branch
Clerk of Court Precilla Olympia P. Eslao(OIC-Clerk of Court Eslao) for the
purpose of purchasing cellular phone prepaid cards. The investigating team
also discovered two other Orders issued by respondent Judge Ganay
directing the Manager of PNB-Agoo to draw from the account of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras checks in the amount of P40K each for the purpose of
purchasing three (3) cellular phones. Respondent tried justifying his act of
receiving cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from
the property guardians of the late Rev. Fr. Aspiras as necessary for the
networking of information about the ward of the court. He likewise
rationalized his acceptance of the law books worth fifty thousand pesos
from the property guardians as his way of showing them that he
“appreciate(d) their show of appreciation of (his) judicial work for the ward
and to all other cases.” Respondent Judge Ganay explained that he did not
want the property guardians “to feel resentful (tampo), frustrated or
shamed (mapahiya) if he would refuse their generosity.”

OCA rejected the explanations of respondent Judge Ganay and found him
guilty of violating Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Hence this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Ganay is administratively liable for

violating Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary

RULING: Yes, Section 13, 14 and 15 of Canon 4 of the New Code of

Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that:

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for,
nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or
to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.
 SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any
gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or
omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public

disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate
to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or
benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the
judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an
appearance of partiality.

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance

of all the activities of a judge. Lower court judges, such as respondent
Judge Ganay, play an important role in the promotion of the people's faith
in the judiciary. They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial
branch at the grassroots level in their interaction with litigants and those
who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that judges must
avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more
sternly applied to them.

Respondent Judge Ganay clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of
receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand pesos, cellular phones and
monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the
late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute
impropriety which the Court cannot allow. Respondent Judge Ganay’s act
of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La Union Branch to
draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late
Rev. Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the
court to suspicion of irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings.

67. Cua Shuk Yin v.

Perello, AM No. RTJ-05- Facts: Complainant Cua Shuk Yin alleges that Judge Norma Perello acted
1961, November 11, only on the case she filed (Civil Case No. 98-031) after Cua filed an
20005 administrative case against Judge Perello for misconduct and/or
inexcusable negligence with the OCA, that despite the lapse of almost two
-Fontanilla, Crismar months invoked Section 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court which, according
to her, is very emphatic on the matter.

The OCA opined that the allegations raised by the complainant pertain to
issues that are judicial in nature, which cannot be solved by way of an
administrative complaint.

However, the OCA took exception to the language used by the respondent
Judge, stating that while the filing of the complaint may have enraged her,
it did not give her the license to use intemperate language and call the
complainant or her counsel names.

Issue: May Judge Perello be the subject of disciplinary action

Ruling: No. The SC agreed with the CA that, as a matter of policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. There is no
showing that the respondent Judge acted in bad faith in the proceedings in
the instant case.

However, the Court also agrees that the respondent Judge should be
admonished for the improper language in her Comment. As observed by
 the OCA, calling the complainant a 'greedy and usurer Chinese woman,
tagging her lawyer as 'lazy and negligent while branding her own clerk of
court as 'equally lazy and incompetent is not language befitting the
esteemed position of a magistrate of the law. A judge's personal behavior,
not only while in the performance of official duties, must be beyond
reproach, being the visible personification of law and of justice.

68. Longboan vs. Polig

A.M. No. R-704-RTJ Facts:

Jun 14, 1990 The case involves a complaint against Judge Emilio L. Polig for negligence,
inefficiency, and misconduct. The complainant, Felixberto M. Longboan,
accused the respondent judge of failing to inform him of the status of Civil
Case No. 641, despite Longboan's repeated requests for information. Civil
KOMICHO, TIFFANY A.
Case No. 641 was a dispute over the collection of a sum of money between
Longboan and Arsenio Cunaden. Longboan had obtained a favorable
judgment from Municipal Circuit Judge Flora M. Tel-equen on October 26,
1981. However, when the case was appealed, Longboan was not informed
of its status by Judge Polig, who had taken over the case after his transfer
to the Regional Trial Court. Longboan sent five registered letters inquiring
about the status of the case, but Judge Polig failed to reply. The Office of
the Court Administrator also sent tracers to Judge Polig, but still received
no response. As a result, Longboan filed a complaint against Judge Polig
for negligence and abuse of authority.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether Judge Emilio L. Polig should
be held liable for negligence, inefficiency, and misconduct for failing to
inform the complainant, Felixberto M. Longboan, of the status of Civil Case
No. 641 despite Longboan's repeated requests for information.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found Judge Emilio L. Polig guilty of negligence,

inefficiency, and misconduct. As a result, Judge Polig was dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave, and
other privileges. He was also barred from re-employment in any branch,
agency, or instrumentality of the government.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized that a judge should diligently discharge

administrative responsibilities and maintain professional competence in
court management. Judge Polig's failure to inform Longboan of the status
of the case, as well as the missing records and unresolved cases in his sala,
demonstrated his unfitness for the judicial office. The court considered
Judge Polig's actions as a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
requires judges to perform their duties with competence, diligence, and
efficiency. The court also noted that Judge Polig's disregard for the court's
 resolutions and his failure to comply with the inquiry showed a lack of
respect for the judicial system. Therefore, the court concluded that Judge
Polig's negligence, inefficiency, and misconduct warranted his dismissal
from service and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits and privileges.

68. Co vs Plata
Jaime Lim Co filed before a Complaint, dated 13 May 2002, against Hon.
cherlyn sagayo Ruben R. Plata, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1 of Santiago City, Isabela, for gross partiality, serious
misconduct, and inefficiency in office. Respondent Judge filed his
Comment and Additional Comment on the said Complaint, dated 11
September 2002 and 2 April 2003, respectively. On the report of the
investigating judge dated 19 May 2004, he has the following findings and
recommendations on the administrative matter: (1) respondent Judge was
guilty of negligence rather than partiality, and should be meted a fine of
₱1,000; (2) respondent Judge was culpable of simple misconduct, instead
of gross misconduct, and should pay a fine of ₱1,000; and (3) the charge of
inefficiency against respondent Judge should be dismissed for lack of
merit. Complainant Co accused respondent Judge of grave misconduct
because the respondent Judge had allegedly demanded tikoy from
complainant Co in consideration for respondent Judge’s voluntary
inhibition from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211; and when
complainant Co was unable to give tikoy, respondent Judge asked for ₱500
instead.

According to complainant Co, he never received a copy of the respondent

Judge’s Order, dated 21 February 2002, granting his Motion to Inhibit, so
on 07 March 2002, he went to see the respondent Judge at Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. I, to personally follow-up on the status of the said Motion. He
did not find the respondent Judge at the office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br.
I, but instead, saw him at the adjoining office of Santiago City, MTCC, Br.
II.

The Respondent Judge informed him that the Motion had already been
approved. Thereafter, the respondent Judge allegedly told complainant Co,
"Magkaibigan pa tayo… And to prove that you still love me, give me tikoy."
When complainant Co replied that he did not know where to buy tikoy,
respondent Judge supposedly said, "Magbigay ka ng pera, kami na ang
bibili." Complainant Co then handed ₱500 to respondent Judge.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of

the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Ruling: SC agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge committed an

indiscretion when he commented to complainant Co, "Papaano ko
malaman kung mahal mo kami?" Although respondent Judge made the
comment jokingly, it was also very understandable how complainant Co
had construed it as an insinuation to do some act or to give something to
prove that he had no hard feelings towards respondent Judge. For making
such a comment, respondent Judge violated Canon 2 of the then Code of
Judicial Ethics, which provided that, "A Judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."Since respondent Judge
occupied an exalted position in the administration of justice, he should pay
a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; and his private, as well as
his official, conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. Although the respondent judge cannot be enjoined from
sharing jokes, he must be more prudent in this regard. As a Judge,
respondent herein is the subject of constant scrutiny. He must freely and
willingly impose upon himself certain restrictions, which might be viewed
as burdensome on an ordinary citizen, because he must conduct himself in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of his judicial office.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra,

Branch II, Cresencio Martinez, as principal, and Viernes Duclan and
Arnold Bayongan, as accessories after the fact, were charged with the
murder of one Alfredo Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial
proceeded with respect to the third, Arnold Bayongan. In the decision of
the respondent judge, Arnold Bayongan was ACQUITTED to the effect,
based on the wordings of the decision, that the “crime was committed by
Cresencio Martinez”, the petitioner.

Subsequent to the acquittal of Bayongan, petitioner surrendered

to the authorities and later was arraigned before the same CFI. After having
pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and before the prosecution started to
present its evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio Martinez moved that
the trial Judge inhibit himself from hearing the case on its merits on the
grounds "(1) that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue
and has formed an opinion as to who committed the crime of murder; (2)
that it would not be fair that he would sit, hear and pass judgment; and (3)
that the respondent is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be
transferred to Branch I of the same Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge should be allowed to decide

petitioner’s case.

HELD: NO.

A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial
decision, but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any
 suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge's
integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to render a just and
impartial decision, his statement in the decision acquitting Arnold
Bayongan to the effect that the "crime was committed by Cresencio
Martinez" renders it impossible for respondent to be free from the suspicion
that in deciding petitioner's case, respondent will be biased and prejudiced.
We therefore hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the right
to have his case decided by another Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted.

Respondent is ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case No. 21 of
the Court of First Instance of Abra to Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, and the Judge presiding the said court will decide
the same.

71. Arnel Mendoza vs Facts:

Hon. Marcos C. Diasen,
Jr., Acting Presiding Administrative case charged to Respondent by Arnel G. Mendoza, driver of
public utility vehicle. Mendoza service Cristy Flores, he met though
Judge Metropolitan
Respondent, Respondent called and asked Mendoza to assist Ms. Flores in
Trial Court, Br. 62, looking for a rice retailer where he could purchase 50 sacks of rice. On
Makati City. November 6, 2012, Carolina Marketing accepted the order and post-dated
check as payment, Mr. Mendoza agreed to guarantee the transaction.
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900 Respondent issued a check for P70,000 for the 50 sacks of rice. On
(Formerly OCA IPI No. November 16, 2012, Respondent increased his order to 70 sacks and
13-2585-MTJ) replace his 1st check with a post-dated check for P112,000 dated November
16, 2012. The check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
August 9, 2017

Issue:
Marisol V. Sofranes
Whether or not Acting Presiding Judge Marcos C. Diasen, Jr. Is guilty of
impropriety by issuing a bouncing check?

Held:

The Makati City Executive Judge Elmo M. Alameda, recommended the

dismissal of the complaint on December 12, 2016, based on the submitted
photocopies of the sales invoice, check, and check return advice was
insufficient, Carolina Anaya proprietor of Carolina Marketing failed to
appear in the investigation, Mr. Mendoza did not file civil or criminal case
despite being allegedly issued a bouncing check.

The Office of the Court Administrator, Memorandum dated April 10, 2017,
recommended Respondent guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge. Judge
Diasen had admitted that he would have profited from the sales of rice had
it been delivered, that he “took in active role in the prospective sale by
notifying employees of the Makati City Hall, advice would be buyers to
come back the following day, which was Saturday”. That Respondent’s
action “disclose a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of
the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and
of his activities as a private individual”.

Ruling:

The OCA recommended that Hon. Diasen, Jr (Ret.), Guilty of conduct

unbecoming a judge and is hereby Fined the amount of P5,000.00.

70. Analiza Wad-asen-

OCA vs. Judge Floro FACTS: This case is made up of three consolidated cases concerning the
RTJ-99-1460, March 31, ability of Judge Floro to serve as a judge due to mental illness. In the First
2006
Case, Atty. Florentino Floro first applied for judgeship in 1995 but later
withdrew his application due to an unfavorable psychological evaluation
revealing evidence of ego disintegration and developing psychotic process.
He applied again after 3 years but was evaluated as unfit to be a judge due
to his psychological evaluation that exposed more problems. However,
because of his impressive academic background, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared to be favorable paving the way
for Atty. Floro to be appointed as a RTC Judge in Malabon. In 1999, he
requested an audit of his sala conducted by the OCA. After such audit, the
OCA recommended that their report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro which the Court adopted in a resolution that
placed him under preventive suspension. The report included
misbehaviours and violations of Judge Floro on various Codes of Judicial
Conduct.

Second Case, is one of the subject matter on the first case. Judge Floro
allegedly used/took advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss a Criminal Case (frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement without presence of the trial
prosecutor.

The Third Case, concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May

1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be
Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The
resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro
and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization
filed by petitioner in that case.

Issues:

WhetherJudge Floro be relieved of his position as Judge due to a medically

disabling condition of the mind.

Ruling:

There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man.

And in fact, despite the Court's disposition of the 13 charges against him,
they have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts of corruption.
However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals
assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and
independence. Therefore, the Court is in agreement with the OCA that
Judge Floro cannot remain as RTV Judge because of the findings of mental
impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of the office.
However, the Court and OCA is not qualified to conclude that the Judge is
insane as in fact the psychologist and psychiatrists in his case never said
so.
71. Rodolfo Parayno v.
Hon. Meneses GR No. FACTS:
112684 , April 26, 1994
Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the orders, dated
22 October 1993 and 16 November 1993, of respondent Judge Iluminado
Fakat, Bruce P. Meneses of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing the election cases and denying
petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof.

Claiming impropriety in the assignment of the case, petitioner Parayno

assailed before this Court the order of the Executive Judge. The Court
issued a temporary restraining order and promptly remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court set aside
the questioned order of 26 October 1992, and it directed the Executive
Judge to instead include the case in the regular raffle for re-assignment.

The case was thereupon re-raffled to Branch 49, where the councilors'
protests were then pending. The following day, respondent judge issued the
assailed order inhibiting himself from further hearing the two cases. The
motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied by the judge. Hence,
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Meneses' decision to voluntarily inhibit himself from

 hearing the election protests was based on valid and legal grounds.

RULING:

Yes, the jurisprudence sees merit in the petition.

Section 1, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise
of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The underlying reason for the above rule is obviously to ensure that a
judge, sitting in a case, will at all times be free from inclinations or
prejudices and be well capable to render a just and independent judgment.
A litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of a judge. Due process requires it. Indeed, he not only must be able to so
act without bias but should even appear to so be. Impartiality is a state of
mind; hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its reality. Verily, a
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself
voluntarily from sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or
ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. We take note that the
electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for quite some
time now. Any further delay in the disposition of the cases, particularly
election protests where public interest is heavily involved, cannot be
countenanced.

72. Pimentel v. Salanga,

G.R. No. 27934, Facts:
September 18, 1967
Petitioner Pimentel is counsel of record in 4 cases pending before
Topic: D. II. Voluntary respondent Judge Salanga.
(Inhibition)
Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify
- Fontanilla, himself from sitting in the 4 aforesaid cases, praying that the records of
Crismar those cases be transferred to another sala because petitioner filed an
administrative case lodged in the SC against respondent judge upon
averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality,
ignorance of the law and incompetence."

Respondent judge rejected the motion, stating that the administrative

complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of
Court, and transfer would only cause delay in the disposition of Pimentel’s
cases.

Petitioner makes his case that his clients will have "the natural hesitation
to retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding judge,"
adding that his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court.

Issue: Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of

record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said
counsel lodged against him

Ruling: No. The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule
137, Rules of Court, 2 which reads in full:

"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall

sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject to review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself

from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned
above."

It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced,
simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against
him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line
that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to
one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness
or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not
otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him.

Prejudice is not to be presumed…To disqualify or not to disqualify himself

then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.

All the foregoing notwithstanding, here are the guidelines in a situation

where the capacity of judges to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties.

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is
not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that
a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that
the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.

If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a

case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action
is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who
forestalls miscarriage of justice.

In the end we are persuaded to say that respondent judge is not legally
under obligation to disqualify himself.