What is Modi doctrine?

Analyze foreign policy of india based on this doctrine with

examples?

Modi’s Characteristics:
 Active, energetic and communicative
 Diplomatic skills , authoritarian ideology
 Neighbourhood first policy
 Assertive in IR
 Strong Economic policy (with China)
 Act east policy—economic and domestic development
Narendra Modi came to power in May 2014 in a landslide victory, his Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) becoming the first party to win an outright majority in an Indian
election in 30 years. He won with the promise that he would turn around India’s economy
and raise living standards, as well as tackle the corruption and graft that bedevil India. He
campaigned tirelessly on these issues, addressing huge rallies—sometimes speaking to several
at a time, using hologram projections where he could not be present in person—and making
astute use of old and new media, from newspapers and television to Twitter and Facebook. He
said little, however, about foreign policy. Moreover, the BJP manifesto devoted just 3 out
of 52 pages to India’s international relations (Bharatiya Janata Party 2014), leaving many
Indian and overseas observers to wonder about exactly what kind of approach Modi and his
party had in mind.
Since the election, that approach has become clearer. Modi has now settled his Cabinet and
his team of public servants and advisors. He has made a number of foreign visits,
including a trip to the USA to meet Barack Obama and make an address to the United
Nations General Assembly. He has also attended a BRICS summit in Brazil, an
Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Myanmar, and a Group of 20 summit
in Australia, and visited a number of foreign capitals, including Canberra, Kathmandu,
Suva, Thimphu, Tokyo and, of course, Washington, DC. In Sydney, Suva and New York,
he attended special events for the Indian diaspora, addressing each on his government’s
domestic and foreign policy agendas.
Finding Modi’s Doctrine was hard in Indian FP when he first came in to power. Modi’s foreign
policy in the first six months of his government has reflected his domestic political priorities
rather than any obvious set of guiding ideas. Pragmatism, not principle, and delivery, not
doctrine, are the marks of Modi’s approach.
He had negative image in 2014 when he came into power but gradually he changed this situation
and established a positive image in recent years with strong diplomatic skills. That’s why he is in
power for the second time.
Domestic priorities and foreign policy
Modi’s foreign policy agenda has been pursued along the broad—if vague— lines set out
in the BJP’s election manifesto, which outlined three priority areas for action: improving
India’s international ties with key states (especially in East Asia) in ways that will aid its
economic development; bolstering India’s security with regard to both Pakistan and China;
and leveraging India’s ‘soft power’ in the West and the developing world to increase New
Delhi’s global standing and influence (BJP 2014, 39).
Economy
Modi has put economics first, seeking better connections with India’s skilled, innovative and
capital-rich diaspora communities in places like Australia and the USA, touting for foreign
direct investment, promoting his ‘Make in India’ concept of the country as a manufacturing
centre for multinational corporations, and seeking investment in India’s infrastructure. Modi
has courted East Asian states to build factories in India and invest in infrastructure, extracting a
promise from Japan to provide US$35 billion for various projects (Shankar 2014), as well
as joining China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. At the same time, Modi has reached
out to South Asian regional leaders, inviting all of them, including Pakistan’s prime
minister, Nawaz Sharif, to attend his inauguration, and declaring that he wants to build
better economic ties and improve connectivity in what remains the world’s least integrated
region. Modi wants to inject energy into the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC), in particular, boosting the infrastructure needed to permit greater
cross-border trade.
Security
When it comes to tackling security challenges, Modi’s government has been much more
cautious than some (for example, Pant 2014) had expected. The BJP manifesto promised a
complete ‘overhaul’ of national security arrangements concerning terrorism, including using a
‘firm hand’ to deal with cross-border terrorism, an augmented and accelerated military
modernisation program, and revisions to India’s nuclear doctrine (BJP 2014, 38–39). It also
pledged that a BJP-led government would ‘create a web of allies to mutually further
our interests’ (BJP 2014, 40). But what Modi’s government has done has fallen short of
these objectives. It did break new ground in appointing Ajit Doval, erstwhile head of the
Intelligence Bureau, India’s domestic intelligence agency, as National Security Advisor—a post
normally filled by a member of the Indian Foreign Service. It has announced a shake-up of the
intelligence services. But whether Modi has displayed a ‘secure hand’ in dealing with
cross-border terrorism is less obvious: repeated infiltrations across the Line of Control in
Kashmir since May 2014 have been met more by talk than by action.
Military
Admittedly, Modi’s government has speeded up India’s program of military modernisation,
concluding negotiations on a series of long-standing acquisitions processes, and we can
reasonably expect that the appointment of a dedicated defence minister, Manohar Parrikar,
who took over from the ill and over- worked Arun Jaitley in early November 2014, will
lead to further deals being done in the near future. Moreover, Modi has delivered a series of
upgraded strategic and Arms deal partnership agreements with key partners like Australia,
Japan and the USA. Though there is a trade war between US and India on GSP issue but arms
deal was going on. These fall well short, however, of being the kinds of ‘alliances’ imagined in
the BJP manifesto. And well-informed Indian analysts argue that the Modi government is
struggling to overcome resistance in the foreign policy establishment to more binding deals. C.
Raja Mohan (2014) has argued, for example, that the bureaucracy successfully prevented the
conclusion of a trilateral security pact with Australia and Japan in late 2014, preferring to
stick with looser bilateral arrangements.
Soft power
When it comes to leveraging ‘soft power’, Modi’s record has been equally mixed. The
prime minister himself has cut quite a figure in international diplomacy, with appearances
not just at the White House and the Australian Parliament, but also at major rallies at
Madison Square Garden and Sydney’s Allphones Arena. At the United Nations General
Assembly, he made a plea for more international recognition of one of India’s foremost
cultural exports, calling for an International Yoga Day and greater recognition of the
ancient wisdom his country can offer the world.

Doctrine or delivery?
Modi’s government has said and done a great deal with regard to foreign policy in the first
months of office. But is there a discernable ‘Modi doctrine’ driving it, with a set of clearly
stated principles? It is hard to detect one. In the main, Modi’s foreign policy represents
more continuity than change. Indeed, his approach is best seen as an attempt to deliver
what has long been promised, rather than an attempt to set out a radically new course for
India.
India has pursued a foreign policy much like Modi’s: one that favours economic
development, enhanced regionalism, improved security and greater ‘soft power’. Of
course, successive governments have often failed to meet these objectives. Both of the
NDA governments and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
administrations that followed found it difficult to engineer the necessary domestic reforms to
facilitate ‘Make in India’—and, indeed, trading with India, investing in India, building in India
or providing services for India’s people. Both sets of government tried to ‘look East’,
engaging East Asian states to garner foreign direct investment, know-how and greater trade.
Both also struggled to advance regionalism in a region in which the economic logic of
deeper integration is skewed by external forces: intra-SAARC trade in goods and services is
far outweighed, for almost all South Asian states, by trade with states outside the region,
especially China (Kelegama 2014). Convincing SAARC members that there are more benefits
to be gained by the harder path of improving South Asian connectivity than can be gained by
better bilateral ties with the People’s Republic remains a difficult task.
bolstering India’s national security, especially when economic growth is sluggish, as it has
been for much of the past decade. India does not have sufficient police to address domestic
security challenges, nor does it have the military forces necessary effectively to deter its
neighbours from threatening its territory. It remains one of the most under-policed societies in
the world, with just over 100 officers per 100,000 people, and more than 20 percent of posts in
the various police forces presently unfilled (Tiwary 2014). India continues to play host to
a number of ongoing insurgencies, including that of the Maoist Naxalite movement,
which until recently affected fully one-third of India’s territory. And its military lacks the
capacity to punish groups in Pakistan that infiltrate insurgents into Kashmir and terrorists into
its cities, and to deter China from aggressive behaviour. Since the late 1990s, all of India’s
governments have tried to address each of these challenges, but have failed to make much
progress.
Over the past decade and a half, the NDA and UPA governments both set similar
objectives to the ones that Modi now aims to pursue, with varying degrees of success.
Neither one of them established a clear foreign policy doctrine worthy of the name. They
both steered a via media on India’s role in South Asia between, on the one hand, the Indira
(Gandhi) doctrine’s hegemonic interventionism and, on the other, the (I. K.) Gujral doctrine’s
restrained magnanimity. They both aimed at a measure of ‘strategic autonomy’, despite
declarations (like Vajpayee’s) of ‘natural alliances’ with certain states and landmark
agreements, like the US–India nuclear deal, agreed in principle by Manmohan Singh and
George W. Bush in 2005. And they both favoured bilateralism in relations with South
Asian states and with others, concluding carefully limited arrangements and strategic
partnerships.
Despite the hype and the speculation, what we have seen from India’s new government in
foreign policy is really an attempt at ‘Modi delivery’ rather than the emergence of a ‘Modi
doctrine’. This emphasis on delivery should come as no surprise to students of Modi’s
modus operandi. It fits with the pragmatic approach he adopted as Chief Minister of Gujarat,
when he risked the ire of fellow Hindu nationalists by pursuing development by any means
that worked, rather than adhering to their generally anti-liberal economic thinking (Fer-
nandes 2014). And, above all, it fits with Modi’s aspiration to be India’s Deng Xiaoping,
catching mice with whatever colour cat is to hand.

India-Bangladesh relations (pacts and agreements) ?

Background:
India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent
state and established diplomatic relations with the country immediately after its
independence in December 1971. The relationship between India and Bangladesh is
anchored in history, culture, language and shared values of secularism, democracy, and
countless other commonalities between the two countries. According to India the relationship
is based on sovereignty, equality, trust, understanding and win-win partnership that goes
far beyond a strategic partnership. But In the recent years expecially the recent visit of
Sheikh Hasina, raises questions that whether it is a win-win coop or it is just India is the gainer.
Agreements
At the invitation of H.E. Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India, H.E.
Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, paid an official visit to
India on 05 October 2019. Apart from her official engagements in New Delhi, Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina was also invited as the Chief Guest at the India Economic Summit organized by
the World Economic Forum on 03-04 October 2019.
The two Prime Ministers held detailed discussions in an atmosphere of great cordiality and
warmth. Thereafter, the two Prime Ministers presided over the ceremony to exchange bilateral
MoUs/ Agreements signed during the visit and also inaugurated via videolink three bilateral
projects.
Seven pacts
. MoU for providing a Coastal Surveillance System.

. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the use of Chattogram and Mongla Ports for
Movement of goods to and from India.

. MoU on withdrawal of 1.82 cusec of water from Feni River by India for drinking water supply
scheme for Sabroom town, Tripura, India

. Agreement concerning Implementation of the Lines of Credit (LoCs) committed by India to

Bangladesh.

. MoU between University of Hyderabad and University of Dhaka

. Renewal of Cultural Exchange Programme

. MoU on Co-operation in Youth Affairs

Three projects
The Leaders also inaugurated through video-link three bilateral development partnership projects
on October 5, namely:
a) Import of Bulk LPG from Bangladesh
b) Inauguration of Vivekananda Bhaban (students hostel) at Ramakrishna Mission, Dhaka
c) Inauguration of Bangladesh-India Professional Skill Development Institute (BIPSDI) at the
Institution of Diploma Engineers Bangladesh (IDEB), Khulna

Analysis
India is our closest and important neighbour, with whom we have many unsettled issues relating
to our interests. Whenever there is high-level trip to India, the questions inevitably arises as to
what we got and what we did not. Assumptions noticed on the street corners, in the newspapers
and the electronic media.
During such visits, the prime ministers do not sit and haggle over the issues. That job is done
beforehand by the officials with their prior approval. The prime ministers simply carry out the
formal gestures to approve of the issues already agreed upon. Some official ceremonies are
arranged to highlight the significance of the visit. For example, during Mr Modi’s visit to
Bangladesh, he inaugurated the bus service between the two countries.(Foreign ministry site)

However, there was hardly any such visible activity before the prime minister’s trip to India this
time. Actually, there were hardly any expectations either. It was only the foreign minister’s
statements before the trip that injected a degree of interest about the event.

7 agreements and MOUs and 3 projects were signed. The people were also eager to know how
far India would help in resolving the Rohingya crisis and also about the Assam citizen’s registry.

Three agreements/projects/mou among the seven caught public attention. One, LPG to be
exported from Bangladesh to northeast India. Two, standard operating procedure for the use of
Chattogram and Mongla ports. Three, withdrawal of water from the river Feni for Subroom in
Tripura.

A large part of LPG used in Bangladesh is imported. Business persons import the LPG and
market it. There is nothing really wrong if they make some money by exporting some of the
imported LPG to India’s northeast.

The decision had already been taken to allow India the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports. The
standard operating procedure was needed to determine how this opportunity would be used.

The amount of water to be withdrawn from the river Feni is not huge in volume and will meet
the drinking water requirements of the people of the border-lying town Subroom.

It is Indian interests that lie at the core of all three of these agreements. The public notes that
progress has been made only where Indian interests are concerned. There has been no
advancement in issues pertaining to Bangladesh’s interests.

It is the withdrawal of water from the river Feni that has struck a painful spot. The Teesta river
issue has long been shelved and before this trip the foreign minister has said that an agreement
would be signed pertaining to some of the smaller rivers. There was no sign of that, so the Feni
river agreement simply served to open a festering wound. It is surprising that such an agreement
had to be signed at this time.

India has once against assured that it would extend its assistance to resolve the Rohingya issue.
The matter was raised recently at the UN human rights council and 37 countries extended their
support. China, as expected, voted against the motion and India withheld its vote. So it is simply
back to square one. It is obvious that there is nothing to expect from India regarding the
Rohingya issue.

Modi and his predecessor had both given strong assurances about the river Teesta, but it has
come to nothing. As for Assam’s citizenship register, Indian leaders from top to bottom have
been saying that these ‘illegal migrants’ had come from Bangladesh and would be sent back to
Bangladesh. The language they use when making such statements is undoubtedly objectionable.