Chapter 42

Electora l Syst e ms
in C ont e xt
Ukraine

Erik S. Herron

Introduction

For election rules to exert expected psychological effects on voters, candidates, and
parties, institutions should be durable and consistent. If political actors believe that the
rules are likely to change or perceive that rules are unlikely to be enforced, they may
pursue strategies and tactics that seem to be at odds with the electoral system’s underly-
ing incentive structure.1 Ukraine provides a crucial case for the evaluation of electoral
systems and their effects because the commitment by political actors to adjust to con-
sistent rules and abide by them has been absent. Instead, political actors have regularly
attempted to adjust the rules and test the limits of enforcement.
Ukraine has several features complicating the incentives that electoral systems pro-
duce: it is a relatively new and tenuous democracy, its party system is not yet institution-
alized, no single electoral system has been used in three successive elections, and the
most recent election cycle has been marred by foreign invasion. This chapter describes
the electoral systems that have been in place, how they have influenced the evolution of
the party system and other outcomes, and how conditions have intervened to under-
mine the incentives presented by institutional rules.
The chapter is divided into three sections to evaluate electoral systems and politics
in Ukraine. The first section presents the context in which elections have occurred,
describing how society and politics have developed since the end of the Soviet period.
The second section describes electoral system choice and reform, discussing the Soviet
inheritance and several waves of election rule reform that instituted majority runoff,
mixed-​member majoritarian (MMM), and nationwide proportional representation
904   Erik S. Herron

(PR) rules.2 The third section evaluates the consequences of electoral systems, assessing
how the party system has changed over time.

Political Context
of Ukraine’s Elections

Ukraine’s political trajectory has undulated since the collapse of the USSR. In its first
decade of independence, Ukraine was a semiauthoritarian regime with some competi-
tion, but substantial restrictions on free and fair elections. As the second decade began,
Ukraine moved toward regime change, and from 2005 to 2010, the country made halting
progress toward democracy. After the 2010 presidential elections, authoritarian tenden-
cies once again advanced. The ouster of the president in the wake of protests and regime
repression in 2014 precipitated foreign invasion, Russia’s annexation of one of Ukraine’s
regions, and ongoing violent conflict in two eastern regions. Despite all of these chal-
lenges, independent Ukraine has conducted seven parliamentary and five presidential
elections.
Various measures of democratic quality illustrate how Ukraine’s status has changed
over time. While measures of democracy suffer from several problems (e.g., Munck
and Verkuilen 2002), the recently released Varieties of Democracy (V-​Dem) project3
provides the widest range of criteria and permits scholars to customize evaluations of
democratic quality. V-​Dem scholars have also created several indexes to describe dif-
ferent types of democracy: electoral, liberal, deliberative, egalitarian, and participatory.
With few exceptions, V-​Dem’s indexes suggest that Ukraine’s conditions improved fol-
lowing the collapse of Communism, declined from the late 1990s until 2004, improved
following the Orange Revolution until 2010, and then declined until 2014. The changes
in democratic quality identified in the V-​Dem data track closely with the key milestones
in Ukraine’s post-​Soviet history.
Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected in 1991 during the Soviet
Union’s liberalization, but prior to its dissolution. Kravchuk, a Communist Party official
who resigned from membership in the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt, oversaw
Ukraine’s transition from a Union Republic of the USSR to an independent state. His
tenure was marked by allegations of corruption, economic difficulties, and increasing
tensions with Russia. Kravchuk’s relationship with his prime minister, Leonid Kuchma,
also soured. Kuchma defeated Kravchuk in early presidential elections held in 1994.
The Kuchma era (1994–​2004) was notable for the establishment of a semiauthoritar-
ian regime. Kuchma and his allies permitted some political opposition and media activ-
ity but generally limited challenges to their power. While contestation was extended
widely and opposition candidates could run for office, the use of government resources
to benefit political parties and candidates associated with executive power undermined
the success of antiregime politicians. In extreme cases, members of the opposition were
 Ukraine   905

threatened, subjected to violence, or killed. The most prominent incident occurred in

2000 when the journalist Heorhiy Gongadze was found murdered. Subsequent revela-
tions of secret audio recordings taken in Kuchma’s office implicated the president in the
plan to eliminate Gongadze. An opposition movement, “Ukraine without Kuchma,”
emboldened by public reaction to Gongadze’s death, conducted protests from late 2000
until the spring of 2001. While “Ukraine without Kuchma” was repressed and dissolved,
it set the stage for larger-​scale protests against the regime that would take place later.
As the scheduled 2004 presidential elections approached, the term-​limited Kuchma
selected a preferred successor, Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych faced an increas-
ingly powerful opposition that grew from the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movement
and achieved unexpected successes in the 2002 parliamentary elections. The leading
opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, was poisoned by dioxin during the cam-
paign and faced increasingly malevolent tactics from pro-​regime forces. Yanukovych
and Yushchenko finished in the top two positions in the first round of the presidential
election held in October 2004, and faced off in the second round held in November.
Domestic and international observers documented widespread efforts to falsify results
in the second round that inspired massive protest activity. Hundreds of thousands of
demonstrators occupied the main square and street of the capital city, Kyiv,4 in a popular
uprising known as the Orange Revolution. The opposition set up a tent city and con-
tinued its protest for weeks until a compromise was reached: the second round of the
election would be repeated. In December 2004, Yushchenko defeated Yanukovych and
assumed the presidency in early 2005.
While the opposition won a short-​term victory, it faced discord in its own ranks
and a resurgent Yanukovych. Based on advice from foreign consultants, Yanukovych
rebranded himself and the Party of Regions, and achieved significant success in the
2006 parliamentary election. The weak governing coalition collapsed in the summer of
2006, leading to a snap parliamentary election in 2007. In 2010, Yanukovych capitalized
on the failures of the former opposition and gained a narrow victory in the presidential
election over Yuliya Tymoshenko (Herron 2011).
After Yanukovych occupied the office of the presidency, he made policy decisions that
undermined the democratic progress Ukraine had achieved in the half-​decade since
the failed effort to steal the election in 2004. Increased pressure on the media, growing
corruption, and problematic local elections in 2010 accompanied policy decisions that
some Ukrainians believed undermined sovereignty (e.g., the extended lease provided to
Russia for Crimean military bases) (Herron and Boyko 2012).
Yanukovych attempted to navigate a difficult path between opening opportuni-
ties with Europe and running afoul of Russian government preferences for Ukraine to
remain closely allied. These conflicts came to a head in late 2013 when Yanukovych was
supposed to move forward on an Association Agreement with the European Union.
Late in the process, Yanukovych reneged on his promise to sign the agreement, and
large-​scale protests engulfed the center of Kyiv. Unlike 2004’s peaceful protests, the
demonstrations grew violent, with government repression and violent counterattacks
by some members of the protest movement. In February 2014, violence peaked when
906   Erik S. Herron

snipers killed dozens of protesters. Yanukovych fled the country, de facto abdicating the
presidential office.
The interim government scheduled presidential elections in May 2014 and the newly
elected president, Petro Poroshenko, called snap parliamentary elections in October of
that year. At the same time, Russian military and security forces occupied Crimea, held
an ersatz referendum, and annexed the peninsula. Russian intervention expanded to
Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, with Russian security forces using
“hybrid warfare” tactics to covertly support supposedly indigenous insurgencies. The
snap presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted under challenging cir-
cumstances: a direct threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty, suffrage limited by occupation and
active combat, restrictions on the choice set due to disarray in the party system, and the
disintegration of many political networks that had functioned in the past.
Ukraine’s post-​Soviet elections took place in a constantly changing context. At times,
the regime was semiauthoritarian, restricting activities by opposition politicians and the
media, but not banning them outright. At other times, the regime was semidemocratic,
conducting generally free and fair elections, but failing to address endemic problems of
corruption. The most recent elections have been conducted in wartime conditions in
parts of the country. In addition, the choice set regularly changed: no major party gained
seats in every post-​Communist contest. This instability was also reflected in the election
rules: Ukraine modified its rules more than any other post-​Soviet state, and perhaps
more significantly than any other country since 1992. The following section tracks elec-
toral system reform and discusses how and why the rules changed.

Electoral Systems in Ukraine, 1991–​2016

As Ukraine began its transition from the Communist to the post-​Communist era upon
the USSR’s collapse in December 1991, its electoral rules did not emerge tabula rasa from
the minds of newly selected leaders. The institutional features of the late Soviet elections
served as a point of departure.
The Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies, selected in 1989, featured the first competi-
tive elections since the consolidation of the political system under Josef Stalin in the
late 1920s to early 1930s. For most of the Soviet period, elections were political theater,
designed to showcase descriptive representation in an elected body with no real power
to make meaningful policy changes. Elections during the early formation of the Soviet
Union—​from the October Revolution until the official foundation of the state in 1922—​
featured some competition. Non-​Bolshevik candidates were banned from participation,
but the election rules had not been standardized, producing a “delightful irregularity”
across the country (Carson 1955, 9). With the codification of the Stalin Constitution
in 1936, election rules were formalized and elections began to feature a single candi-
date (Swearer 1961). As the USSR entered into its twilight period in the 1980s, Mikhail
Gorbachev instituted substantial reforms, including competitive elections for the newly
 Ukraine   907

created Congress of People’s Deputies. Competitive Soviet elections were not multiparty
elections; the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remained the only formally recog-
nized political party. However, independent candidates contested and won seats, foster-
ing the first open legislative debates in the USSR’s history (Herron 2009).5
The Congress of People’s Deputies elections paved the way for local legislative elec-
tions, and Ukrainians chose representatives for the regional parliament, the Verkhovna
Rada, in 1990. Unlike the Congress of People’s Deputies, which reserved one-​third of
its seats for selection by public organizations, all of the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada
were allocated by majority-​runoff rules in single-seat constituencies. The following year,
Ukraine held direct presidential elections, shortly before the formal dissolution of the
Soviet Union. The presidential and parliamentary elections held at the end of the Soviet
period ultimately determined who would manage the transition; “founding” elections
did not occur until 1994.6
In response to public protests and strikes, Ukrainian politicians agreed to hold
early elections for the Verkhovna Rada in March 1994 and for president in June 1994.
The Law on the Election of People’s Deputies, initially codified in 1993, retained many
elements of the Soviet-​era election rules: citizens cast “negative” ballots in which
they would strike off the name of any candidate whom they did not support (see
Figure 42.1), and candidates needed to receive a majority of votes with a 50 percent

Figure 42.1. Soviet-​era Ukraine ballot.

Note: The ballot provides space for the candidate’s name and personal information. The instructions indicate that voters
should cross out the names of candidates they are voting against, and that ballots with more than one name identified for
the office will be declared invalid.
908   Erik S. Herron

turnout to win a seat in geographically defined districts. While proposals to institute

a mixed-​member electoral system were circulated at the time, these efforts failed.
Some observers argued that Soviet-​era rules were perpetuated to protect members of
the political elite whose reputations could have been tarnished by associations with
the Communist Party; majority-​runoff rules allowed politicians to “hide” as non-
affiliated independents.7 Maintaining institutional rules designed for a single-​party
system caused significant complications in the competitive environment as only 338
of the 450 seats could be filled, requiring a series of later by-​elections (Birch 1995,
1996; Bojcun 1995).
Relative to its peers in the post-​Soviet space, Ukraine was a laggard in the develop-
ment and codification of new formal institutions: its post-​Soviet constitution was
only ratified in 1996, last among the successor states. The constitution was followed by
changes to the electoral system that eliminated the main features inherited from the
Soviet period.
Prior to the 1998 elections, the new election law substantially modified the electoral
system. One of the law’s authors asserted that the new system emerged from careful
study of the scholarly literature on elections, including consultations with experts. He
also acknowledged that partisan interests influenced the choice as his party expected to
improve its performance.8 While the size of the assembly did not change, the 450 seats
were divided into two for allocation purposes: half would be selected via national-​level
PR with a 4 percent threshold, and half would be selected in first-​past-​the-​post (FPTP)
single-​seat constituencies. Candidates would be permitted to contest both ballots, run-
ning simultaneously in districts and on party lists, but a court decision deemed this
provision unconstitutional.9 The MMM system would remain in place for the next par-
liamentary elections, with some modifications to the rules instituted prior to the 2002
elections, including a formal prohibition on dual candidacy.
Concerns about election fraud, especially in constituency races, prompted the politi-
cal opposition to more vigorously advocate for the adoption of a pure PR system. The
mobilization success of the opposition movement encouraged reform advocates who
believed that they could garner the votes needed to pass a new parliamentary election
law prior to the 2002 elections. Arguing that constituency races were especially likely
to produce results distorted by vote buying, intimidation, ballot-​box stuffing, or other
manipulation, election reformers proposed to allocate all seats by PR using a Hare quota
and largest-​remainders formula. Even President Leonid Kuchma acknowledged flaws in
the MMM system at the time:

I often ask myself if I didn’t make a mistake by agreeing to a mixed [sic] electoral sys-
tem for the last parliamentary elections . . . . The logic of the decision [was that] . . .
elections on the party list would speed the development of blocs and coalitions,
bringing greater clarity, direction, and simplicity to the party palette. It did not turn
out this way. Instead, it was the opposite –​there was a fragmentation of parties that
was engineered by the electoral ambitions of their leadership.10 (Herron 2000)
 Ukraine   909

Despite Kuchma’s concerns about issues with the implementation of Ukraine’s

MMM, he vetoed efforts to change the system to PR prior to the 2002 elections.
However, in 2004, Kuchma proposed a series of constitutional reforms and assented
to election reform in an effort to secure enough legislative support.11 The law enact-
ing PR passed, but the constitutional reform failed (see Herron 2007 and 2009 for a
discussion).12
Election rule reform eliminated constituency races, lowered the electoral thresh-
old, and required all candidates to contest seats as party affiliates. The 2006 parlia-
mentary election used a single national district to allocate all 450 seats among parties
that passed the 3 percent threshold. The snap election held in 2007 after the col-
lapse of the governing coalition maintained the system with minor administrative
changes.
After the 2010 presidential election elevated Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency,
election reform returned to the agenda. Prior to the 2012 elections, the mixed-​member
majoritarian system was reinstated. While the initial statute included dual candidacy, its
constitutionality was once again denied by the judiciary. The provisions finally imple-
mented were similar to the 2002 version of MMM, albeit with a higher threshold for the
party list ballot (5 percent).
The snap 2014 election rules included some minor revisions, but the broad contours
of the electoral system were retained. However, the administration of the 2014 elections
presented significant challenges. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and infiltration of the
eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk undermined the implementation
of elections. Twenty-​seven of the 225 districts designated for representation by single-​
seat constituency deputies could not hold elections (12 in Crimea, 9 in Donetsk, and
6 in Luhansk). The status of these territories also prevented millions of Ukrainian citi-
zens from participating (Herron, Thunberg, and Boyko 2015). The actions of occupying
forces undermined elections; not only did active combat threaten election administra-
tors and voters, but also “insurgents” seized election equipment for use in their own
sham elections. The absence of formal representation for many of Ukraine’s regions
raises questions about the viability of geographically defined constituencies in the cur-
rent climate.
Discussions of election reform regularly occur among politicians and experts, and
following the 2014 elections, new proposals emerged. The 2015 local elections featured
a modified law that purported to introduce open-​list proportional representation
(OLPR). However, the basic features of this system did not conform to most variants of
OLPR in use around the world. Regional council elections featured multiseat districts,
but the ballots substantially constrained the choice set. Each multiseat district was fur-
ther subdivided into smaller districts, and each ballot featured the name of the party, its
leader, and a locally nominated candidate. Instead of having the option of voting for any
party-​affiliated candidate contesting the multiseat district, the ballot linked the party, its
leader, and the candidate vote. Votes cast for the party in each district were aggregated
to determine the overall seat allocation across parties. Within each party that passed the
threshold, the designated party leader whose name was on all district ballots received
910   Erik S. Herron

the first seat. Seats were subsequently allotted to the local candidates based on the per-
centage of the vote that the party received in the district they were assigned.13
In 2016, proposals to institute a similar brand of OLPR in the Verkhovna Rada circu-
lated. Most of the discourse in 2016 revolved around adoption of OLPR (or its improp-
erly labeled variant) for the next elections. While parliamentary elections are not
scheduled until 2019, the threat of early elections looms as the governing ­coalition is
weak. Given past practices, further election reform efforts are likely to occur and
changes to the law finalized close to the time of the scheduled election.14

Electoral System Effects

The previous sections have outlined political and social conditions, as well as the evo-
lution of election laws, focusing on the post-​Soviet era. Ukraine is a transitional state,
wavering between authoritarian and democratic rule, with incomplete adaptation to the
rule of law and a lack of commitment to maintaining institutional rules. The effects of
these conditions can be observed in several areas, including the party system.
The party system exemplifies the fluidity of Ukrainian political life; the number and
identity of parties contesting elections have regularly changed, with slow movement
toward institutionalization. The description of the party system in Poland’s early elec-
tions, presented in John Carey’s chapter in this volume, reflects many of the dynamics
present in Ukraine:

At the initial democratic founding, expectations about [parties’] viability were ill-​
defined, and the choice set was bewildering. After the imposition of a rule estab-
lishing a clear benchmark for strategic alliances and voting, the set of viable choices
narrowed, and actors updated expectations and behavior accordingly.

Like Poland, expectations about party viability were “ill-​defined” and the choice set
was also “bewildering.” Unlike Poland, however, Ukraine’s election rules were not
established and maintained in a way that provided a “clear benchmark” for strate-
gic behavior, the development of alliances, and the institutionalization of the party
system.
Measures of party systems, such as the effective number of parties, have been linked
to institutional and social factors.15 While scholars have extended their assessments of
the effects of electoral rules, several outcomes remain critical consequences attributed
to electoral systems, including the effective number of parties, the development of indi-
vidual parties, the ways in which parties interact, and the network of parties that sur-
vives over time.
As Ukraine began its political transition, it featured one institutionalized politi-
cal party: the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). While the CPU was briefly banned
from participation, it was formally registered in 1993. As the successor to the Soviet-​era
 Ukraine   911

Communist Party, the CPU had access to valuable resources, notably personnel, organ­
izational capacity, and a meaningful “brand.” The end of the ban on alternate political
parties produced incentives for party formation, further enhanced by lack of clarity
about which parties would succeed and the use of majority-​runoff rules, followed by
MMM, and then PR.
At the same time, competitive elections in the late Soviet period that banned alterna-
tive political parties “seeded” early electoral competition with independents. Because
contesting elections as an unaffiliated candidate was the only way to gain ballot access
outside the party apparatus in the late Soviet period, many new electoral participants
registered as independents. Until the codification of PR in 2006, institutional rules
supported participation by independent candidates; the opportunity returned in 2012.
Consequently, in addition to emerging incentives for new party formation, Ukrainian
politicians were also presented with a viable option to compete as formally unaffiliated
candidates.
Table 42.1 shows the affiliations of the 5,608 candidates who contested in the first
round of the 1994 founding elections. Ukrainian law differentiated the party member-
ship of a candidate from the formal source of nomination, and these characteristics
are featured in the table. One of the most notable characteristics of the 1994 elections
is the substantial participation by candidates claiming no party membership, as well as
those who were not nominated by a political party. These two categories of candidates
are “independents,” although nomination rather than membership is the more standard
method to identify independents.
Regardless of how independent candidates are defined, they dominate the nomina-
tions. Almost three-​quarters (4,109, or 73 percent) of candidates claimed membership in
no political party. In addition, 3,495 (62 percent) candidates were nominated by voters
and 1,498 (27 percent) were nominated by labor collectives. In short, the vast majority of
candidates were not party affiliated. Among party-​affiliated candidates, the Communist
Party led the way with 381 members and 200 nominations, followed by a People’s Rukh
(230 members, 96 nominations), Socialist Party (172 members, 98 nominations),
Republican Party (128 members, 83 nominations), and Democratic Party (73 members,
11 nominations). Twenty-​three additional parties had members contesting, and thirteen
additional parties or blocs nominated candidates. Independent candidates also experi-
enced success in the election; among the 338 legislators selected during the initial round
of voting, 136 (40 percent) were not affiliated with a political party by nomination.
Election administration rules, coupled with the incomplete democratic transition,
also supported the proliferation of parties and candidates. Election commissions play
important roles in managing the casting, counting, and compilation of ballots. In the
1990s, the semiauthoritarian regime used its “administrative resources”16 in commis-
sions to undermine opposition competitiveness. One method that developed to control
commissions was the cultivation of “technical parties”: formally registered political par-
ties whose primary objective was to aid allied party control over commissions. Ukraine
allocates commission positions to parties; when more parties seek representation than
commissions can accommodate, a lottery determines who is seated. Liberal party
912   Erik S. Herron

Table 42.1 Party Affiliations, Verkhovna Rada Elections (1994)

Membership Number of Candidates Nomination Number of Candidates

Independent 4,109 Voters 3,495

Labor Collective 1,498

Communist Party 381 Communist Party 200

People’s Rukh 230 People’s Rukh 96
Socialist Party 172 Socialist Party 98
Republican Party 128 Republican Party 83
Liberal Party 81 Liberal Party 35
Democratic Party 73 Democratic Party 11
Peasant Party 53

Congress of Ukrainian 51 Congress of 30

Nationalists Ukrainian
Nationalists
Party of Democratic 48 Party of Democratic 3
Rebirth Rebirth
Christian Democratic 37 Christian Democratic 13
Party Party
Party of Greens 36

Social Democratic 30 Social Democratic 1

Party Party
Conservative 27 Conservative 10
Republican Party Republican Party
Labor Party 26 Labor Party 13
Civic Congress 23

Party of Justice 15 Party of Justice 2

Labor Congress 14 Labor Congress 4
Organization of 11 Organization 9
Ukrainian Nationalists of Ukrainian
Nationalists
State Independence 9
Party
Liberal Democratic 9 Liberal Democratic 3
Party Party
Slavic Unity Party 8
 Ukraine   913

Table 42.1 Continued

Membership Number of Candidates Nomination Number of Candidates

Peasant Democratic 7
Party
Constitutional 6
Democratic Party
National Conservative 6
Party
Economic Revival of 5 Economic Revival of 1
Crimea Party Crimea Party
Party of Solidarity and 5
Social Justice
Ukrainian Christian 3 Ukrainian Christian 1
Democratic Party Democratic Party
Party of Free Peasants 2
and Entrepreneurs
Beer Lovers Party 2

National Salvation 1
Party
Party Bloc “Justice” 2

Total 5,608 5,608

Data Source: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine. Author was provided the data.

registration rules, coupled with an incentive to flood the lottery with allied groups, facil-
itated a proliferation of “technical parties,” especially in the 2000s (Boyko and Herron
2015). This practice further encouraged more parties to be formally registered, although
most of these parties were hopeless electoral competitors by design.
In sum, social, political, and institutional conditions encouraged Ukraine’s party sys-
tem to develop in a peculiar manner. Politicians faced incentives to form parties to either
contest seats or stack the deck on electoral commissions. But most of these parties were
functionally limited and served as a kind of “front” organization to funnel resources
and access without providing many of the benefits traditionally associated with party
organizations. At the same time, many politicians saw clear advantages in maintaining
formally independent status during election competitions; party system volatility, lim-
ited party-​based resources, and the lack of a meaningful “brand” for most parties lim-
ited their value. Business sector connections were valuable substitutes and served some
of the roles of traditional parties for nonaffiliated candidates (Hale 2006).17 They also
served as the foundation for local political machines that could effectively propel candi-
dates to victory with or without formal party organizations (Herron and Sjoberg 2016).
914   Erik S. Herron

The brief period of PR elections provided a shock to the system by eliminating access
for independent candidates, and the party system began to stabilize with a few emer-
gent parties developing more coherent electoral programs. Individual candidates often
found “homes” on party lists under PR, subsequently abandoning those parties to run
as independents or on other labels. While the PR interregnum generated institutional
incentives for political parties to develop into functional organizations, most parties
failed to move past personalistic orientations with limited ideological or programmatic
coherence. It is worth noting that while parties contested in nationwide PR in two elec-
tions, the elections occurred in a short period of time from late March 2006 until late
September 2007. Nationwide PR’s short lifespan likely contributed to the failure of par-
ties to institutionalize. The Euromaidan revolution, ouster of Yanukovych, and Russian
occupation of Ukrainian territory beginning in late 2013 further shocked the system by
denying suffrage to millions of voters, disrupting existing political networks especially
active in the East and South of the country, and altering the election calendar with snap
elections for president and parliament.
In sum, the evolution of Ukrainian electoral institutions and society has not laid a
foundation for the incentives that one typically associates with electoral systems to
become firmly embedded. Rather than adjusting to the incentives provided by stable
institutional rules, politicians have altered the rules. They have further tested the limits
by exploiting party registration and administrative regulations to gain advantages that
violate the spirit if not the letter of the law for free and fair electoral competition. The
remainder of this section describes party system outcomes.
Table 42.2 shows each parliamentary election that has taken place in the post-​Soviet
era, noting key election rules and results. The upper section of the table indicates how
the overall system, formal threshold, and formulas have changed over time. The lower
section of the table displays the number of seats that major parties received in each elec-
tion. For all elections except 1994, the table shows the outcomes for parties that exceeded
the formal threshold for the PR ballot. The 1994 results use 4 percent as a cutoff.
The table reveals several important consequences of elections in Ukraine. First, the
total number of seats allocated in the initial round of the elections did not reach the
total assembly size in all elections. In 1994, districts failed to reach the minimum vote
threshold or the turnout threshold for results to be deemed legitimate. A series of by-​
elections did not fill all of the seats. In 1998 and 2012, elections in five districts were
deemed invalid; by-​elections filled vacant positions. In 2014, elections could not be
held in occupied territories, and the seats remain unfilled at the time this chapter was
completed in early 2017. These outcomes reveal some of the challenges of maintaining
constituency-​based races in a country facing social and political conditions like those
in Ukraine. In the two elections where national-​level PR allocated all seats, no positions
were left vacant for long periods of time. Further, the PR ballot of the MMM system also
yielded full seat allocation. Although the causes of incomplete seat allocation varied,
from the participation and results requirements in 1994, to procedural inadequacies in
some districts in 2002 and 2012, to foreign occupation and violent conflict in 2014, the
 Ukraine   915

Table 42.2 Key Parliamentary Election Features and Results in Ukraine,

1994–​2014
1994 1998 2002 2006 2007 2012 2014

Rules System SSD MMM MMM PR PR MMM MMM

PR Threshold N/​A 4% 4% 3% 3% 5% 5%
SSD Formula MR Plurality Plurality N/​A N/​A Plurality Plurality
Results CPU 86 123 65 21 27 32
For United 121
Ukraine
Freedom 36
Greens 19
Hromada 23
Interregional 15
Reform Bloc
Lytvyn Bloc 20
Opposition Bloc 29
Our Ukraine 112 81 72
Party of Regions 186 175 183
Peasant 18
PDP 27
People’s Front 82
Poroshenko Bloc 127
Radical Party 22
Rukh 25 44
PSP 17
Self-​Reliance 33
SDPU(o) 18 27
Socialist 14 34 22 33
Tymoshenko Bloc/​ 22 129 156 99 19
Fatherland
UDAR 40
Independents 136 102 72 —​ —​ 47 94

(continued)
916   Erik S. Herron

Table 42.2 Continued
1994 1998 2002 2006 2007 2012 2014

Ns with Ind. 4.15 6.32 5.35 -​-​-​-​-​ -​-​-​-​-​ 3.99 5.01

Ns without Ind. 4.52 5.64 4.38 3.41 3.30 3.34 4.04
Total 338 445 450 450 450 445 422
Note: Parties listed in the table passed the PR threshold. Parties in 1994 surpassed 4 percent of the
seats. The “Total” listed on the table refers to the total number of deputies chosen on Election Day, or
in the case of 1994 during the first or second round. The totals do not include subsequent by-​elections.
The Socialist Party ran in a bloc with the Peasant Party in 2002.
The Effective Number of Legislative Parties (Ns) is based on the seat allocation reported by the Central
Electoral Commission for each election. In one version of the Effective Number of Parties calculations,
independents are included as a single party; in another, they are excluded from the calculations.
Affiliations often change within parliament, and independent candidates tend to align with a
parliamentary faction or deputy group.
Sources: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine; Bojcun (1995); Birch and Wilson (1999).

consequence is the same: parliament does not have a full complement of deputies, and
voters fail to have complete representation, in some cases for long periods of time.
Second, the party system remains inchoate. No single political party passed the
threshold in every post-​Communist election. The founding elections spawned dozens
of formally registered political parties, but none of them have survived as major play-
ers in every election. Some of the political parties that participated in the 1994 elections
remained viable for several elections, and a few are active today, albeit as minor parties.
The Communist Party maintained viability throughout the post-​Soviet period, only to
be outlawed by the decommunization process in December 2015. It won seats in all but
the 2014 elections, when its performance was hampered due to the loss of its parliamen-
tary faction. The Socialist Party of Ukraine grew in popularity under Oleksandr Moroz
but was abandoned electorally after it defected from the opposition ruling group to the
Party of Regions group in the summer of 2006. Its dismal performance in the 2007 snap
elections relegated it to an also-​ran status.
Other political parties joined or split from coalitions with other party organizations.
For example, People’s Rukh, an early democratic party, suffered from internal disagree-
ments and a split in the late 1990s, although it participated successfully in elections
as part of a coalition with larger Western-​oriented parties such as Our Ukraine. The
Opposition Bloc, which gained twenty-​nine seats in the 2014 parliamentary elections,
was a successor to the Party of Regions that became dormant after the Euromaidan pro-
tests and abdication by Yanukovych.
Table 42.2 may overstate how much the party system has changed by focusing on
labels rather than relationships among politicians. Many politicians from failed par-
ties have found homes in other political parties. Most recently, former Party of Regions
 Ukraine   917

politicians were nominated by other parties for seats in the 2014 contest. At the same
time, parties emerge and disappear regularly; among the six parties that gained seats in
2014, only one (Fatherland) was officially registered prior to 2010.
Although the mid-​2000s were characterized by government instability, the elec-
tions held in this time period were judged the highest quality in Ukraine’s independ­
ent history by international observers and seemed to be leading toward party system
institutionalization. Ukraine’s salient divisions were covered by competitive parties,
with interests more sympathetic to state involvement in the economy and a closer rela-
tionship with Russia represented by the Party of Regions and Communist Party, and
European, market-​oriented interests represented by Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko
Bloc. Many parties remained personalistic, however, undermining their institution-
alization. For example, while the Tymoshenko Bloc was perceived as oriented toward
a Ukrainian national identity common in the western part of the country and an eco-
nomic orientation focused on Europe, its titular leader emerged from a corrupt party of
business interests and adopted populist rhetoric that sometimes diverged from Western
market-​oriented policies.
Third, nonaffiliated candidates continue to play a significant role in elections. Their
prominence speaks, in part, to the general weakness of party organizations, but also to
the advantages that some candidates seek to exploit in constituency races. Local busi-
ness elites have been shown to seek office in constituency races, and their participation is
associated with higher levels of reported election violations (Herron and Sjoberg 2016).
While permitting independent candidates to participate expands the choice set for vot-
ers and allows ambitious politicians another way to gain ballot access, their presence is
also associated with a higher level of instability. Moreover, party switches in parliament
often involve independent candidates and have plagued the Rada, undermining coher-
ent lawmaking (Herron 2002; Thames 2007).
In sum, the election rules, social conditions, and political environment have been
conducive to the outcomes witnessed in Ukraine: a proliferation of formally regis-
tered parties, many of which are ephemeral or ersatz, and the strong lure of inde-
pendent candidacy encouraging many election participants to remain unaffiliated
during campaigns. Electoral systems contributed to this outcome in several ways. The
rules Ukraine adopted—​majority runoff, MMM, and PR—​all encourage multiparty
competition. The instability of rules, and the common expectation among politicians
that election rules will change, discourages the establishment of consistent, long-​
term, programmatic alliances. Each new system presents different tactical advantages
to exploit; retaining maximum flexibility in affiliations permits politicians to hedge
their bets. Further, as political conditions have changed, some party labels have fallen
out of favor. The ability to quickly disengage from these affiliations (e.g., Communist
Party in 1994 and the Party of Regions in 2014) permits many politicians to cast off
disadvantageous designations and successfully compete under different identities.
Instability has encouraged politicians to take an especially short-​term perspective
on decision making, impeding the institutionalization of election rules and the party
system.
918   Erik S. Herron

Conclusion

Ukraine’s twenty-​five-​year experimentation with electoral systems has generated, in

many ways, expected outcomes: a fluid political environment with a persistent failure
by parties to institutionalize into functioning, programmatic organizations. Electoral
system instability is not the sole cause of the system’s failure to consolidate; endemic cor-
ruption, regime change, and an existential threat to its sovereignty have complicated the
environment in which politicians operate.
Ukrainian politicians understand and respond to incentives, however. When the
Communist Party monopoly was broken, many new political parties were formed. At
the same time, the early success of independent candidates in the last Soviet and first
independent elections showed that alternatives to ballot access via parties could yield
rewards. The partisan organization of electoral commissions, and the use of those
resources to influence elections, encouraged the formation of “technical parties” whose
primary purpose was not to gain legislative seats. The rapid rise and fall of leaders in
elections and popular uprisings has also encouraged politicians to develop short-​term
strategies and pursue tactics that allow them to hedge their bets. Until Ukraine adopts
an approach like its neighbor, Poland, to impose “rule[s]‌establishing a clear benchmark
for strategic alliances and voting,” the system is likely to remain inchoate and unstable.

Notes
1. In addition, political actors make mistakes in the selection of institutional rules and the
strategies to maximize their seat acquisition. Andrews and Jackman (2005) emphasize
uncertainty in their assessment of electoral system choice and consequences.
2. By contrast, presidential election rules were stable over this time period, with a majority-​
runoff system in place. Local election rules varied, but are not the primary focus of this
chapter.
3. See http:/​www.v-​dem.net.
4. This chapter uses transliterations based on Ukrainian-​language names (e.g., Kyiv) rather
than Russian-​language transliterations (e.g., Kiev).
5. See http://​w ww.nytimes.com/​1989/​05/​31/​world/​soviet-​tv-​s-​biggest-​hit-​200-​million-​
watch-​political-​drama.html.
6. Some scholars treat the 1991 presidential election as the founding election (e.g., Birch
1995). Ukraine declared independence in August 1991; the subsequent referendum pre-
ceded the formal dissolution of the USSR by a few weeks in December 1991. I treat the 1994
elections as “founding” elections because they were the first held under the control of a
formally independent Ukraine, free from any connection to the USSR because it no longer
existed as a political entity.
7. This practice would continue in later elections with “technical parties” as well. In
the 2014 parliamentary elections, forty elected deputies who were formally “inde-
pendent” had been elected as nominees of the Party of Regions in earlier elections
 Ukraine   919

(http://​www.pravda.com.ua/​rus/​articles/​2014/​11/​18/​7044545/​). The unaffiliated option

allowed them to obscure their connections with the Party of Regions after it had fallen out
of favor.
8. Author interview with Oleksandr Lavrynovych, 1999. At the time, Lavrynovych was a
deputy associated with People’s Rukh.
9. A Constitutional Court decision eliminated the dual-​candidacy provision, but the ban
was not implemented until the 2002 elections. The Constitutional Court ruled dozens of
provisions as noncompliant but permitted the elections to move forward provided that the
law would be altered for the next elections (Birch and Wilson 1999). The primary concern
motivating the court to declare dual candidacy unconstitutional was that it treated can-
didates differently by providing unequal ballot access; independent candidates could not
contest the PR race.
10. The quote was published on Leonid Kuchma’s website, in an article entitled “About the
Right and the Left.” The quote was accessed in June 2000, but the site is no longer available.
It was originally cited in Herron (2000).
11. The Communists and Socialists agreed to support constitutional reform if it was pack-
aged with election rule reform. The antiregime opposition supported election reform but
opposed constitutional reform.
12. However, constitutional reform was enacted as part of the negotiated settlement at the
time of the Orange Revolution in late 2004.
13. For a description of similar systems, see Allen’s chapter on Indonesia in this volume, the
discussion of Slovenia in Cox (1997), and descriptions of the option occasionally used by
parties in Denmark (Elklit 2005).
14. The 2015 local election law changed after the campaign had officially begun. In most cases,
the laws were amended less than one year prior to the election.
15. See Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994), Amorim Neto and Cox (1997), and Clark and
Golder (2006) for a discussion of how institutional rules and social features fuel party sys-
tem development. Also see Moser, Scheiner, and Stoll’s and Shugart and Taagepera’s chap-
ters in this volume.
16. “Administrative resources” describes a wide range of tools that the ruling regime could use to
influence elections, including control over electoral commissions, local government, and law
enforcement. See Norris’s chapter in this volume for more on election integrity and fraud.
17. Hale (2006) focuses on Russia, but the intersection of business and politics also occurred
in Ukraine.

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