Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

Nov 2022
 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes Included since Nov 2022

The FCOM / QRH / FCTM changes described in this document will be available in the
Operator’ FCOM / QRH / FCTM manuals, based on the Operator’s revision cycle.

1. SOP Cockpit Preparation - Parking Brake 3

2. Autorotation during the Takeoff Roll 3

3. Engine Ice Shedding on Ground 3

4. CAT II, CAT III OPERATIONS - Landing Capability Degradation below 1 000 ft

without ECAM 4

5. Altitude/Distance Crosscheck 5

6. Check of the Barometric Reference 5

7. SOP Parking - Parking Brake Release 6

8. FMS ARRIVAL Page: Update of the Management of the VIAS 7

9. FMS transition from Cruise phase to Descent phase 7

10. QRH IR Alignment in ATT Mode Procedure 7

11. Preventing Identified Risks (PIR) 8

12. New TAB - Not Expected Early CLB Mode Engagement After Takeoff With

QFE Setting 8

13. New TAB - LOSS OF FMS PREDICTIONS IN LOW DENSITY OF AIRPORTS 9

14. New TAB - Erroneous Display of ACTIVE ATC ICAO Code on the DCDU and

MCDU 9

15. New TAB - A330neo Pitch Oscillations after AP Disconnection in Cruise Phase 10

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

1. SOP Cockpit Preparation - Parking Brake

1.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Cockpit Preparation / Pedestal / Parking Brake.

1.2. Summary of the Modifications

Replacement of the sentence "This action increases the brake cooling" by the sentence
"Releasing the parking brake prevents the critical structures from being exposed to high
temperature levels for an extended time. However, if operational conditions dictate (e.g.
slippery tarmac), the parking brake may remain applied."

The effect of the parking brake position on the brake cooling rate is not significant.
Therefore, the modified SOP highlights that the parking brake should be released if brakes
are hot, to prevent the following damage to the parking brake structure.

When the brakes are hot and the parking brake is applied, the hydraulic fluid may be
degraded inside the parking brake pistons, and this can generate a dragging brake effect.

2. Autorotation during the Takeoff Roll

2.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCTM
○ Update of the Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Takeoff / Tail Strike Avoidance.

2.2. Summary of the Modifications

Clarification of the factors that contibute to an early rotation to better identify an autorotation
that may occur during takeoff roll.

No change to the associated technique to counteract the early rotation before VR.

3. Engine Ice Shedding on Ground

3.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM:
○ Introduction of the Procedures / Supplementary Procedures / Adverse
Weather / Engine Operations on Ground in Icing Conditions
○ Update of Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures
/ Preliminary Cockpit Preparation
○ Update of Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures
/ After Start

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes
○ Update of Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures
/ Descent Preparation
○ Update of Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures
/ After Landing
○ Update of Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating Procedures
/ Parking.

3.2. Summary of the Modifications

For aircraft equipped with CFM, PW, and GE engines:

● The descriptions of the Engine Ice Shedding on Ground procedures, present in

Normal Procedures / After Start, After Landing, Parking sections, are revised and
relocated into a new Engine Ice Shedding on Ground procedure in the
Supplementary Procedures / Adverse Weather section.
● No modifications are introduced in terms of time, temperature, or engine acceleration
limits.

For aircraft equipped with RR engines:

● The Supplementary section that already describes the engine ice shedding
procedure is not modified.

For all aircraft:

● A dedicated link to the Supplementary sections that describe the engine ice shedding
on ground is added in Normal Procedures / Preliminary Cockpit Preparation and
Descent Preparation.

4. CAT II, CAT III OPERATIONS - Landing Capability Degradation

below 1 000 ft without ECAM
4.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedure / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Approach / Aircraft Guidance Management / Approach using
LOC G/S Guidance - Management of Degraded Guidance.

4.2. Summary of the Modifications

In FCOM clarification of the condition to enter in the management of the degraded
equipment during CAT II/CAT III approaches: The flight crew should consider the landing
capability degradation below the approach category defined during the briefing.

In addition, the structure of the procedure is updated without additional technical change.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

5. Altitude/Distance Crosscheck
5.1. Effect on the Manuals
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedure / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Approach / Aircraft Guidance Management / Approach using
FINAL APP Guidance - Initial/Intermediate/Final Approach
○ Update of the Procedure / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Approach / Aircraft Guidance Management / Approach using
FINAL APP Guidance for RNAV(RNP) - Initial/Intermediate/Final Approach
○ Update of the Procedure / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Approach / Aircraft Guidance Management / Approach using
F-LOC F-G/S Guidance - Initial/Intermediate/Final Approach

5.2. Summary of the Modifications

The check of the altitude/distance in the final segment was historically included on
approaches flown with FINAL APP to confirm that the vertical profile and guidance are in
accordance with the chart.
Erroneous profile computations by the FMS can occur, and a confirmation of the VDEV is not
sufficient, as VDEV is based on the computed profile.
In some procedures, as for example RNP AR procedures with curved final, or approaches
where an altitude/distance table is not detailed in the chart, this confirmation can not be
performed.

On approaches flown with FINAL APP guidance mode, the check of the altitude when
crossing the FAF and waypoints of the final, as published on the chart, is sufficient to ensure
that the FMS vertical profile is well computed.

On approaches flown with FLS function, a check of the altitude only at the FAF is sufficient,
as there is only one segment (the F-G/S beam).

6. Check of the Barometric Reference

6.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Descent / EFIS CP.

6.2. Summary of the Modifications

The use of an erroneous barometric setting during a barometric referenced approach can
affect the safety of the flight, and may cause the aircraft to fly lower than the published
approach path, and result in a risk of controlled flight into terrain in poor visibility conditions.

When cleared to an altitude, the flight crew should crosscheck the barometric reference
provided by the ATC, with the barometric reference used for the approach preparation.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes
As a reminder, the barometric reference used for the approach preparation, that is set in the
PERF APPR page, is always a QNH. For an altitude clearance in QFE, the flight crew should
crosscheck with the QFE of the ATIS.
In the case of significant difference, the flight crew may suspect an error in the barometric
reference. In this case, the flight crew should use all available means to confirm the
barometric reference (i.e. check of the barometric reference of the ATIS, check of the
METAR/TAF, confirmation with ATC).

Most of the events of a barometric reference value that is erroneous reported a difference of
10 hPa with the current barometric reference.
However, the barometric reference provided by the ATC, when cleared to an altitude, may be
slightly different from the barometric reference of the ATIS, depending on the station used by
the ATC. It does not always mean that there is a QNH error.
Therefore, Airbus does not provide any threshold of difference to detect a barometric
reference error, and highlights that a significant difference can be the symptom of a
barometric reference error.

The purpose of this SOP update is to enhance the flight crew’s awareness to the fact that
this type of barometric reference errors may occur, and that vigilance is required to detect
these errors.

7. SOP Parking - Parking Brake Release

7.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedures / Normal Procedures / Standard Operating
Procedures / Parking / Parking Brake.

7.2. Summary of the Modifications

Addition of a comment to highlight that the flight crew should not press the brake pedals
before they release the parking brake, after engine shutdown. This is to avoid the activation
of the Zero Torque Pressure (ZTP) function.

The Zero Torque Pressure (ZTP) function puts the alternate pistons of the brakes almost in
contact with the brake carbon discs. It prevents the loss of hydraulic fluid from the
accumulator, due to repeated brake applications. The function activates when the flight crew
presses the brake pedals and only the yellow accumulator supplies the brakes (i.e. engines
not running). As the pistons are kept near the carbon brake discs, even when the parking
brake is not engaged, the high temperature of the brake is transferred to the pistons. This
may cause an early degradation of the brake pistons, due to the heat transferred from the
carbon brake discs.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

8. FMS ARRIVAL Page: Update of the Management of the VIAS

8.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Aircraft Systems / 22 - Auto Flight - Flight Management /
Controls and Indicators / MCDU - Page Description / FMS2 Honeywell /
ARRIVAL Pages.

8.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with Honeywell FMS Release 2 P6.

8.3. Summary of the Modifications

For the aircraft with FMS Honeywell Release 2 P6, the flight crew can select on the
APPROACH VIAS page, the VIAS that are not compatible with the STAR, but are compatible
with the selected approach. The MCDU displays the VIAS below the “OTHER APPR VIAS”
subtitle.

9. FMS transition from Cruise phase to Descent phase

9.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Update of the Aircraft Systems / 22 - AFS - Flight Management System /
Flight Planning : Vertical Functions / General / Flight Phases.

9.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with standard Honeywell FMS Release 2 P6.

9.3. Summary of the Modifications

Revision of the table that describes the transitions of flight phases.
The conditions of the transition from the cruise phase to the descent phase are updated.
There is no transition of flight phases from the cruise to the descent phase, if the flight crew
selects an altitude target that the FMS considers as a step.

10. QRH IR Alignment in ATT Mode Procedure

10.1. Effect on the Manuals
● FCOM
○ Update of the Procedures / Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / NAV /
[QRH] IR Alignment in ATT Mode.

● QRH
○ Update of the Abnormal and Emergency Procedures / NAV / IR Alignment in
ATT Mode.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

10.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with TOS2 function (MOD 206531 / MP S33911 or MOD
209095 / MP S35257) and Honeywell FMS standard P6.
Honeywell FMS Release 2 P7 is the corrective standard for aircraft equipped with TOS2.

10.3. Summary of the Modifications

The QRH IR Alignment in ATT Mode procedure is revised to request the deactivation of the
T.O SURV function on ground, in the case of a dispatch with one IR in ATT mode.

The purpose of this change is to prevent possible cases of spurious

T.O RUNWAY TOO SHORT alert during Taxi, or T.O RUNWAY TOO SHORT alert at takeoff.

11. Preventing Identified Risks (PIR)

11.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCTM
○ Removal of the Preventing Identified Risks.

11.2. Summary of the Modifications

The FCTM is a techniques manual and not a training manual. Therefore, the Preventing
Identified Risks (PIR) section from the FCTM is removed. The use of PIR is considered as
no longer required in the operational documentation. Some of the PIRs that were listed in
this section are elements of basic training (basic knowledge of aircraft systems and their
operation), and all are already included in the FCTM and/or FCOM. Indeed, all the
necessary actions to prevent these types of risks are already included in the FCTM and
FCOM procedures and systems description section.

In addition, the PIR section was not an exhaustive list of all the common operational risks
reported in service, and some of them were no longer relevant or up-to-date.

12. New TAB - Not Expected Early CLB Mode Engagement After
Takeoff With QFE Setting
12.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Introduction of the Aircraft Systems / 22 - AFS - Flight Management System /
Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Not Expected Early CLB Mode Engagement
After Takeoff With QFE Setting.

12.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with standard Thales FMS with QFE option. Future Thales
FMS S9 is the corrective standard.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

12.3. Summary of the Modifications

With QFE setting for takeoff, during the takeoff roll, the FMS may modify the THR RED/ACC
altitudes.
As a result, the THR RED/ACC altitudes are lower than expected, and may be set down to
the airport altitude +400 ft.
The TAB provides the description of the abnormal behavior and the associated operational
recommendations.

13. New TAB - LOSS OF FMS PREDICTIONS IN LOW DENSITY OF

AIRPORTS
13.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Introduction of the Aircraft Systems / 22 - AFS - Flight Management System /
Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / FMS2 HONEYWELL Temporary Abnormal
Behaviors / LOSS OF FMS PREDICTIONS IN LOW DENSITY OF
AIRPORTS.

13.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with the minimum standard Honeywell FMS Release 2 P4.
Honeywell FMS Release 2 P7 is the corrective standard.

13.3. Summary of the Modifications

The FMS may encounter temporary and repetitive loss of predictions in the flight plan of the
MCDU during flight, if the FMS finds only four airports in the Navigation Database within
1 200 NM from the aircraft position.

The occurrence rate increases when the flight crew enters a 5th airport on the [5L] key of the
CLOSEST AIRPORTS page. The loss of the time prediction for more than 5 minutes can
trigger a FWD fuel transfer from the TRIM tank.

To avoid new occurrences in flight, the Operator should request the FMS supplier to modify
the Navigation Database, to increase the number of available airports on the flight routes
affected by the loss of predictions. A minimum of 5 airports must be available within 1 200
NM of all expected flight plans.

14. New TAB - Erroneous Display of ACTIVE ATC ICAO Code on

the DCDU and MCDU
14.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Introduction of the Aircraft Systems / 46 – Information Systems - Datalink /
Temporary Abnormal Behaviors / Erroneous Display of ACTIVE ATC ICAO
Code on the DCDU and MCDU.

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 Main FCOM / QRH / FCTM Changes

14.2. Applicability
Applicable to aircraft equipped with standard ATSU CLR 9.
ATSU CLR 10 is the corrective standard.

14.3. Summary of the Modifications

The DCDU and the MCDU may display an erroneous ACTIVE ATC ICAO code after a
transition from an European airspace toward the North Atlantic airspace.

After the transfer from the first North Atlantic ATC center to the next ATC center along the
aircraft’s route, the display of the ACTIVE ATC (DCDU and MCDU) is erroneous and it
continues to display the first North Atlantic ATC center

However, the CPDLC connection is correctly established with the second North Atlantic ATC
center.

The TAB provides the description of the abnormal behavior and the associated operational
recommendations.

15. New TAB - A330neo Pitch Oscillations after AP Disconnection

in Cruise Phase
15.1. Effect on the Manual
● FCOM
○ Introduction of the Aircraft Systems / 27 - Flight Controls / Temporary
Abnormal Behaviors / Pitch Oscillations after AP Disconnection in Cruise.

15.2. Applicability
Applicable to all A330-800 aircraft equipped with the standard FCPC P17a.

15.3. Summary of the Modifications

In manual flight, above FL350, with weight below 180T GW and at a speed above M0.84, the
aircraft may experience longitudinal oscillations, in the case of perturbation, as for example:
‐ Large longitudinal stick inputs, or
‐ Speed brake extension (less than half lever position), or
‐ High angle of attack (entry into AOA protections).

This situation may occur when the AP disconnects during wake turbulence, overspeed, or
system failure.

The TAB provides the description of the abnormal behavior and the associated operational
recommendations.

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