Rick Siegel

22971 Darien Street

Woodland Hills, CA 91364
323.864.7474 mobile
rick@marathonentco.com
non-attorney representative for
Respondent

DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)
CASSANDRA OSUJI, an individual, ) CASE: TAC - 52862
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. )
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION/
MARILYN R ATLAS individually, and ) CLARIFICATION
doing business as MARILYN ATLAS )
MANAGEMENT, )
)
Respondent )
___________________________________ )

TO THE HEARING OFFICER AND PETITIONER,

Submitted below, the rationale as to why this matter should be dismissed, and no
other like matter ever taken up by this body.
Giving Petitioner thirty (30) days to respond, if she so desires and can find rationale
to do so, Respondent asks that a hearing be set on/about March 20, 2024 for a hearing on
these issues.
Respectfully Submitted on Feb 4, 2024,

Rick Siegel, non-attorney representative for Respondent

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pg. 2

FEDERAL CASES Pg. 3
CALIFORNIA STATE CASES Pg. 3
CA LABOR COMMISSION CASES Pg. 3
CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES Pg. 3-5
PUBLICATIONS Pg. 5

I. INTRODUCTION Pg. 6
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Pg. 6
III. NATURE OF THE CASE Pg. 6
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT Pg. 7
A. The Genesis Of The Extrajudicial Misenforcement Pg. 7
B. The Commissioner’s 1953 False, Discriminatory, Pg. 9
Extrajudicial Interpretation Is Still Being Enforced
C. As The CLC Created The Prohibition and Remedy Pg. 11
The CLC Is Obliged To End The Enforcement
1. The TAA Does Not Bar Unlicensed Persons Pg. 11
From Procuring
2. The TAA Has No Remedy Against Unlicensed Pg. 14
Procurers
D. The Commissioner Must Avoid Unconstitutional Pg. 17
Interpretations
1. There Is An Unconstitutional Lack of Clarity Pg. 17
As To Whom Is Being Regulated
2. Assuming Activities Are Regulated Without Pg. 18
Statutory Authority Is An Unconstitutionally
Vague Interpretation
3. Voiding Contracts With No Legislative Authority Pg. 21
Is Unconstitutional As It Is Applied
V. CONCLUSION Pg. 22

2
 FEDERAL CASES
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) Pgs. 14, 20
City of Chicago v. Morales 527 U.S. 41, 52, 58-59 (1999) Pg. 17
Conally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) Pg. 21
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 (2014) Pg. 17-18
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) Pg. 19
Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) Pg. 17
Lambert v. California 355 U.S. 225 (1957) Pg. 5, 24
Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1972) Pg. 17
U.S. v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114 (1997) Pg. 26
U.S. v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) Pg. 14
CALIFORNIA STATE CASES
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967) Pgs. 8-10
De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates Homeowners Assn. v.
De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 904 Pg. 14
DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Emp., 56 Cal.2d 54, 61-62 (1961) Pg. 9
Dyna-Med. v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385 (1987) Pgs. 13, 14-15
Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal. 2d 603 (1949) Pgs. 9-10
Marathon v. Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974 (2008) Pgs. 10, 13-14, 18
Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40 (1990) Pg. 15
Radin v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778 (1953) Pgs. 7, 9
Rhode v. Bartholemew, 91 Cal. App. 2d 272 (1949) Pg. 7
Severance v. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal.2d 561 (1947) Pgs. 9-10
Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259 (1920) Pgs. 9-10
Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382 (1914) Pgs. 9-10

CA LABOR COMMISSION CASES

Salazar v. Pardoe, TAC-52862 Pg. 8, 15

CALIFORNIA STATE STATUTES

CA Artists’ Managers Act

§ 1651 Pg. 7

3
CA Business & Professions Code (BPC)
§ 1270 Pg. 11
§ 1700 Pg. 13
§ 2052 Pg. 12
§ 2903 (a) Pg. 11
§ 2903 (c) Pg. 12
§ 2970 Pg. 16
§ 3760 Pg. 13
§ 4051 Pg. 13
§ 4825.1 Pg. 12
§ 4935 Pg. 13
§ 5120 Pg. 16
§ 5615 Pg. 12
§ 6730 Pg. 13
§ 6980.10 Pg. 18
§§ 7026 – 7029 Pg. 11, 12
§ 7031 Pg. 15
§§ 7055 – 7058 Pg. 12
§§ 7802.1/7803 Pg. 12
§ 8550 (a) Pg. 13
§ 10139 Pg. 15-16

CA. Civil Code

§ 1598 Pg. 15
§ 1599 Pg. 15

CA Code of Civil Procedure

§ 437 (c) Pg. 3

CA Employment Agents Act

§ 1581 Pg. 7

CA Theatrical Employment Agents Act

§ 1643 Pg. 7
§ 1648 Pg. 7
CA Labor Code § 1700 et seq
§ 1700
§ 1700.4 (a) Pgs. 15, 19, 22
§ 1700.4 (b) Pg. 2, 22
§ 1700.5 Pg. 3, 5
§ 1700.44 (b) Pg. 16
§ 1700.44 (d) Pg. 18

4
State Bar Professional Code of Conduct
Rule 2.4.1 [1] Pg. 5
Rule 4.1 (a) Pg. 5
Rule 8.4.1 (b) (1) Pg. 5

CA Code of Judicial Ethics

Canon 2 Pg. 5
Canon 3 Pg. 5

Publications
“Substantive Criminal Law”, § 1.2 (d) Pg. 14
“The FBI & Religion” Pg. 6
“Why the Blacklist is a Jewish Story” Pg. 6

5
 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

It is the most basic tenet of law: there must be notice of what is prohibited and what
the consequence is for engaging in a prohibited activity The Talent Agencies Act, (“TAA”,
“Act”) as written and thus to be enforced, has neither a statute banning unlicensed
procurement for an artist nor a remedy for unlicensed persons found to have procured.
With neither prohibitionary nor penalty provisions, there can be no violation of law
and this body must choose between ruling for Respondent or continuing the extrajudicial,
unconstitutional enforcement of laws that do not exist, violating Respondents civil rights,
violating Rules 2.4.1 [1], 4.1 (a), and 8.4.1 (b) (1) of the State Bar Professional Code of
Conduct; and Canons 2 and 3 of the CA Code of Judicial Ethics.

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

For 70 years, the Commissioner has interpreted 1700.4 (a) as a statute that reserves
the act of procuring employment for an artist to those with talent agency licenses.
But § 1700.4 (a) is only a list of the three defining activities of a talent agent. Neither
§ 1700.4 (a) nor any other statute in the Act expressly reserves procuring for licensees.
Nor does the TAA have a codified remedy for those who procure employment for an
artist without a license And with a penalty provision, there is no violation of law. And with
there being no violation of law, the Commissioner must dismiss this matter.
Just entwining the Respondent into this action violates her civil rights, no different
than being pulled over by a policeman without reason; and to take away her contractual
rights would deprive Respondent of the benefit of her labors without legal rationale.

III. NATURE OF THE CASE

Petitioner signed a three-year personal management agreement in 2020, and a three-

year renewal in January 2023, which some four months later she wished to terminate.
Rather than negotiating an exit, Petitioner used the Commissioner’s enforcement as a
sword, not the shield the Legislature intended to provide, caused here and in umpteen

6
instances because of the Commissioner’s wrongful interpretation of the Act; allowing
artists to initiate controversies alleging personal managers break imaginary laws.
In unilaterally terminating the contract, Petitioner made no claims of fraud, no failure
to perform, nor any other alleged malfeasance past unlicensed procurement.
Without those other claims, the only constitutional way Respondent may lose the
benefit of her labors is if her activities are found criminal, and as memorialized in CA
Labor Code 1700.44 (b), “failure of any person to obtain a license from the Commissioner
pursuant to this chapter shall not be considered a criminal act under any law of this state.”
While the Commission cannot adjudicate constitutional claims, the Commissioner
does not have leave to render unconstitutional rulings.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. The Genesis Of The Extrajudicial Misenforcement

The legally unsupportable enforcement did not begin with an unintentional assumption
that the Act expressly barred unlicensed persons from procuring and gave adjudicators
authority to void the contractual rights of found to have ignored the ban.
Just the opposite, it began when the Commissioner pressed a court to enforce law
despite knowing the needed statutes did not exist.
In 1953, personal management was an almost exclusively Jewish occupation. It was
also the height of McCarthyism and the Hollywood Blacklist, which was as much about
anti-Semitism as it was anti-Communism.1 “[A]nti-Semitism, and the systematic
recruitment and display of Jewish collaborators, were very much on HUAC’s (House Un-
American Activities Committee) only half-hidden agenda.” 2

1
See “Why The Blacklist is a Jewish Story,” https://forward.com/culture/film-tv/413485/why-the-hollywood-
blacklist-is-a-jewish-story-and-also-a-milwaukee-story/
2
https://books.google.com/books?id=qaowDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=%22systematic+recruitment
+and+display+of+Jewish+collaborators%22&source=bl&ots=1jC9-
S4uwa&sig=ACfU3U0w4cBzsfvu7N46nuGiWgKkWlu7dQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjQ_4ub4YaEAxWnOk
QIHYgMAtAQ6AF6BAgIEAM#v=onepage&q=%22systematic%20recruitment%20and%20display%20of%20Jewi
sh%20collaborators%22&f=false

7
 That year, a breach of contract suit initiated after an actress withheld commissions
reached a Court of Appeals in Radin v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778. Along with the
Parties’ papers, the CA Labor Commissioner (“Commissioner”, “CLC”) submitted an
amicus brief on behalf of the artist. (See Exhibit 1.)
Quoting from the brief:
“The laws of this state [] require the licensing of employment
agents (Sec. 1581), theatrical employment agents (Sec. 1643), and
artists managers (Sec. 1651);3 call for prior submission and approval of
their contract forms (Secs. 1644, 1955) and in numerous other and allied
provisions establish a clear intent on the part of the legis-lature to
regulate closely activities of such agents and managers.
“Violation of the provisions of the above legislation constitutes a
misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. (Sec. 1648).
“It has long been held in this state that where a statute contains a
penalty, that penalty is equivalent to an express prohibition, and a
contract in violation thereof is void. Refusal by our courts to allow any
recovery by unlicensed persons where licensing was required is but one
example of the general rule. Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259; Rhode v.
Bartholomew, 91 Cal. App. 2d 272.”
The above clearly infers the Artist’s Managers Act (“AMA”) had statutes prohibiting
unlicensed persons from procuring and a prescribed penalty for found violators. Only it
was not an honest assessment of the existing law; instead the inference was deceiving.
A closer look at the brief’s verbiage reveals how only the licensing scheme for booking
agents (then referred to as theatrical employment agents) has a statute – (Sec. 1648) –
making a licensing violation “a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.”
As proof of the deception: attached as Exhibit 2, the declaration of Legislative Intent
Service attorney Jenny S. Lillge, stating how the intent service was:
“...asked to find the statutes that were the historical derivation of
the Artists’ Managers Act” that were in effect in 1953. ... Upon review,
we noted there was no penalty provision with regard to unlicensed
procurement in 1953. ... We have provided you with a true and correct
copy of this chaptered law attached to this declaration.”

3
In 1953, ‘booking agents’, who book live engagements for artists, were referred to as theatrical employment agents.

8
 It is undeniable: the Commissioner intentionally inferred the AMA had prohibition and
penalty statutes despite knowing it did not, a deception that would have never intentionally,
nefariously done the Commissioner had a family member, old classmate, friend from the
country club or church been a personal manager. Such actions are only done to compromise
those thought of as ‘lesser than,’ which in 1953 included those with semitic names, like
Mr. Radin’s. In other words, a hate crime.
If that seems offensive, consider how offensive it is to be a Jew compromised by the
continuing enforcement of non-existent statutes fifty years later, or in the instant matter,
seventy years later. Offensive, indeed.

B. The Commissioner’s 1953 False, Discriminatory, Extrajudicial Interpretation

Is Still Being Enforced

As noted in the Commissioner’s ruling in the recent Salazar v. Pardoe, (TAC-52862,

Pg. 5, ln. 28 – Pg. 6, ln. 2), “California courts for half a century have found that a contract
could be voided based on unlawful actions by an unlicensed talent agent. See generally
Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347.”
In the 70 years since Radin, this wrongful, discriminatory enforcement, legally and
constitutionally unsupportable policy has ruined businesses, destroyed both company and
personal finances, broken up marriages, even caused premature deaths and at least in one
case, suicide.
Just in pure economics, the National Conference of Personal Managers estimates the
enforcement has cost personal managers over $500,000,000 – a half-billion dollars – in
otherwise-owed compensation via forfeiture, settlement or abandonment.
Fourteen years later, Buchwald v. Superior Court (1967) mirrors terminology from the
Radin amicus brief in its opinion which allowed Jefferson Airplane (Buchwald is the given
surname of Airplane founder Marty Balin) to avoid a multi-million-dollar obligation to
their manager.
Quoting Buchwald (at p. 351):
“Since the clear object of the Act is to prevent improper persons
from becoming artists’ managers and to regulate such activity for the

9
 protection of the public, a contract between an unlicensed artists’
manager and an artist is void. (See Wood v. Krepps, 168 Cal. 382,
Loving Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 608-609) ... Contracts otherwise
violative of the Act are void (see Severance v. Knight-Counihan, 29
Cal.2d 561, 568, Smith v Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262.)”

It was judicial error, as Buchwald misinterprets all four of these holdings.

As in Radin, the Commissioner filed an amicus on behalf of Buchwald. An
administrative agency’s “interpretation of a statute [it] is charged with enforcing deserves
substantial weight.” DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Emp., 56 Cal.2d 54, 61-62 (1961).
Most likely the Buchwald errors were made because, following DiGiorgio, the opinion
mirrors the Commissioner’s interpretation as elucidated in its amicus. Neither judicial
search firms nor any law library has a copy of the Commissioner’s Buchwald amicus.
Multiple FOIA requests have been made to the administrative agency over the last decade.
The CLC had never replied to any of those requests, another request is attached here.
Smith holds: “where a statute contains a penalty, that penalty is equivalent to an express
prohibition, and a contract in violation thereof is void.” As the AMA contained no penalty
provision, Buchwald should have upheld the personal manager’s contract. As the TAA has
no penalty, following Smith, Respondent’s contractual rights are to be upheld.
Wood upheld the contractual rights of a violator of the pawnbrokers licensing scheme
precisely because the pawnbroker ordinance, like the TAA, did not, “declare that a contract
made by any one in the conduct of the various businesses for which licenses are provided
to be procured … be invalid; nor is there any provision therein indicating in the slightest
this failure was intended to affect in any degree the right of contract.” Id. at 386.
As neither the AMA gave nor the TAA gives adjudicators the authority to invalidate
contracts for failing to procure the appropriate license, nor was/is there a provision giving
any indication the licensure failure was/is to affect anyone’s contractual rights, Buchwald
should have and following, Wood upheld/uphold the manager’s contract.
Per Loving at 608-609, “[I]t has been repeatedly declared in this state that ‘a contract
made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the public and
prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and no action may be

10
brought to enforce such contract.’” (Emphasis added.) As the AMA had no prescribed
penalty, Buchwald should have upheld Katz’s contractual rights.
Severance (at 572) further cemented the need for Buchwald to uphold, rather than as
it did, void the personal manager’s contractual rights:
“If the statute does not provide expressly that its violation will
deprive the parties of their right to sue on the contract, and the denial of
the relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public
policy or appropriate individual punishment, the right to recover will
not be denied.”
The Buchwald appellate justices either misinterpreted each of the four State Supreme
Court holdings on their own, or more likely, followed the Commissioner’s creation of a
prohibition and remedy as stated in the missing amicus.

C. As The CLC Created The Prohibition and Remedy, The CLC Is Obliged to
End the Enforcement

This matter is as basic as basic can be. The TAA has no statute prohibiting unlicensed
procurement and none that assigns a consequence should an unlicensed person procure.
Therefor there is no law being broken, and being entwined into and then losing a TAA
controversy is analogous to being pulled over for driving through a green light, then having
the traffic court take away your license.
And your car.
Just as being stopped by the officer without no rationale of anything unlawful
occurring was it itself a civil rights violation, being embroiled into a Talent Agencies Act
dispute when, without any prohibition or penalty statutes, and thus no colorable claim for
the CLC to adjudicate, violates Respondent’s civil rights.

1. The TAA Does Not Bar Unlicensed Persons From Procuring

Marathon v Blasi, 42 Cal. 4th 974, 986 (2008) follows Buchwald, saying, “that it the
act of procuring (or soliciting), not the title of one's business, that qualifies one as a talent
agency and subjects one to the Act's licensure and related requirements. (§ 1700.4 (a).)”
§ 1700.4 (a) says no such thing.

11
 § 1700.4 (a) only lists the three defining activities of talent agents:
“a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of
procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment
or engagements for an artist or artists ... Talent agencies may, in
addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their
professional careers.”
Neither § 1700.4 (a) nor any other statute expressly states procuring, counseling or
directing artists the reserved purview of licensees, nor conversely, bans unlicensed persons
from procuring, counseling and/or directing. The prohibition was created by the Labor
Commissioner out of whole cloth seventy years ago.
An activity should not be, cannot be considered a regulated activity simply because it
is listed as a defining action of a regulated profession or occupation. An activity is only
regulated, reserved for licensees, when a legislature has codified a provision stating the
defining activity is expressly reserved for those with the requisite license; or conversely, a
codified provision expressly memorializing the legislature’s choice to make it unlawful to
engage in that action without the proper accreditation. That accreditation at times includes
additional certification over and above the basic license (for example, see CA Business &
Professions Code (“BPC”) §§ 7028 – 7029 of the State Contractors Act).
California has dozens of licensing schemes. Most have statutes that expressly bar non-
licensees from engaging in some or all activities of the regulated profession. Some, like the
Nursing and Psychology Acts, only reserve the title of the regulated profession to licensees;
anyone can engage in the defining activity(ies). As written, and thus how it should be
enforced to follow the rules of statutory construction, the TAA only regulates the title of
‘talent agent’ for licensees.
BPC § 2903 (a) of the Psychologists Act defines the practice of psychology as,
“rendering or offering to render … any psychological service involving the application of
psychological principles, methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and
influencing behavior, such as principles pertaining to learning, perception, motivation,
emotions, and interpersonal relationships…”

12
 Per BPC § 2903 (c), psychotherapy is using “psychological methods in a professional
relationship to assist a person or persons to acquire greater human effectiveness or to
modify feelings, conditions, attitudes, and behaviors that are emotionally, intellectually, or
socially ineffectual or maladaptive.”
No statute inside the Psychologists Act expressly reserving these activities to those
with a psychologist’s license, nor are there examples of Scientologists, who regularly
engage in constructing, administering and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes,
interests, etc., and use psychological principals to affect others’ behavior being found in
violation of § 2903. Nor has any court found a pastor, rabbi, salesperson, life coach,
teacher, trainer, doctor, drug rehabilitation professional, advertising executive, nurse or any
others who use psychological principles to understand and influence the behavior of others
in violation of law in and of itself, without the accused claiming to be a psychologist or
some other infraction.
California has other licensing schemes without statutes that expressly bar non-
licensees from engaging in the defined activities of the regulated profession, including the
Landscape Architects Act (BPC § 5615, maintaining and beautifying outdoor areas) and
the Geologists Act (BPC §§ 7802.1/7803, examining the Earth’s materials). No state court
has ever found a gardener or miner in violation of the licensing scheme simply for engaging
in the defining activities of those professions.
Most of California’s licensing schemes limit the defining activities of the regulated
professions to those who have qualified to obtain the requisite license. For instance, the
CA State Contractor’s Act makes it unlawful to advertise (BPC § 7027.1 - §7027.4) or
engage in the activity of contracting (BPC § 7028). It specifically defined each activity that
is reserved for licensees (BPC 7026.3 – 7026.12, § 7055 – 7058), including those that
require additional certification (BPC 7058.5 – 7058.7), and assigns individual remedies to
each violation. BPC § 7027.1 (c), § 7027.3, § 7028 (a) – (h), § 7028.1 (a) and (b).
In California, only licensed cytotechnologists can lawfully examine cytological slides
(BPC § 1270 (a)); only licensed physicians may prescribe drugs (BPC § 2052); only those
with valid state veterinary licenses can practice veterinary medicine (BPC § 4825.1), and

13
only those with valid locksmith licenses can engage in the activities of a locksmith (BPC
§ 6980.10). Similarly, the licensing schemes for dentists (BPC § 1700), respiratory
therapists, (BPC § 3760 (a) and (b)), pharmacists (BPC § 4051 (a)), acupuncturists (BPC
§ 4935), professional engineers (BPC § 6730), and among others, structural pest control
specialists (BPC § 8550(a)) create clear demarcation lines between the activities anyone
can do and those that require license.
Unlike the licensing schemes where the Legislature by creating prohibitionary statutes
clearly regulated activity, the Talent Agencies Act has no such provision. If the TAA is
being enforced correctly, all of the above statutes are surplusage, for just defining what a
dentist, locksmith or acupuncturists doe would foreclose unlicensed persons from engaging
in those activities.
Thus, be it common sense, or the need to follow the statutory construction canons of
stare decisis, ejusdem generis and/or surplusage, the defined activity[ies] of a profession
without an accompanying prohibition provision must be interpreted like the Nursing,
Psychologists, Landscape Architects and other like schemes: that it does not reserve their
defining activities for licensees.
“A court must first look to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language
its usual, ordinary import; and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase
and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making some words
surplusage is to be avoided.” Dyna-Med Inc. v Fair Emp. & Housing Comm. (1987)
43.Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387.
If prohibitionary statutes are not needed to reserve defining activities for licensees, it
makes every prohibitionary statute surplusage, an interpretation that per Dyna-Med, “is to
be avoided.”

2. The TAA Has No Remedy Against Unlicensed Procurers

The Talent Agencies Act “is silent – completely silent – on the subject of the proper
remedy for illegal procurement.” Marathon at 989.
“The Act provides no remedy for its violation.” Id. at 990.

14
 “The Legislature has not seen fit to specify the remedy for violations of the Act.” Id.
at 996.
Marathon was asked to decide whether a found violator’s contractual rights should
always be voided or can severance ever be appropriate. It was not asked, and did not opine,
if the Legislature’s silence affected the right to contract.
It does. “Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”
BMW of America v. Gore 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995); De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates
Homeowners Assn. v. De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 904.
Violations of law are “made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed
penalty. The former without the latter is no [violation].” Wayne LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 1.2(d), (1986); see U.S. v Evans, 333. U.S. 483, 485-586 (1948).
In Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that irrespective of how obvious it is a
legislature may want to punish a violator, notice is needed.
At issue was a federal statute prohibiting both smuggling undocumented persons into
the country and harboring undocumented persons already in the country. However, because
Congress had only codified a remedy – five years in prison – for the smuggling, and Evans
had harbored an undocumented person, the Court ruled itself without authority to decide
upon and mete out a remedy.
Assigning a penalty without statutory guideposts “is a task outside the bounds of
judicial interpretation;” reserved only for and by legislative action. Id at 495.
The CA Supreme Court specifically prohibits administrative agencies like the Labor
Commission from assigning uncodified remedies:
“An administrative agency cannot by its own regulations create a
remedy which the Legislature has withheld. Administrative
regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its
scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to
strike down such regulations.” Dyna-Med Inc. v. Fair Empl. &
Housing Comm., 43 Cal. 3d 1385, 1388 (1987). (Emphasis added.)

15
 While Dyna-Med limited its review and prohibition to creating a remedy to punitive
damages, Peralta v. Fair Empl. & Housing Comm., 52 Cal. 3d 40, 60 (1990) holds that
without statutory authority, administrative agencies are similarly barred from creating
compensatory remedies.
This is undeniable, despite the Commission’s refusal – until now – to accept it.
In Salazar v Pardoe, TAC–52862, at p. 6, fn. 1 (2023), the Commissioner found those
claiming the Act has no penalty provision, “ignore [Marathon’s] subsequent paragraphs
applying Civil Code remedies (§§ 1598 and 1599) for voiding the contract as a whole or
severing the contract to contracts including unlawful procurement.”
They were not ignored. Without there being a finding of unlawfulness, those statutes
are immaterial. Further, those statutes are mitigation, not penalty provisions, to ascertain
whether a contract should fully voided – the voidance must come before incorporating
severance – or is it equitable to uphold the legal portions of the compact.
Even were §§ 1598 and 1599 remedies, without verbiage inside the TAA directing a
reader to look to the Civil Code provisions, the enforcement becomes the epitome of
unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person would know to scour the Civil Code find
two statutes that make no mention of talent representation to have any relevance to the
TAA. And again, while the Commission cannot decide constitutional issues, it does not
free it to act and rule unconstitutionally.
Lastly, if §§ 1598 and 1599 are the penalty provisions without any reference to the
TAA, they would they be giving authority to void contracts for all licensing schemes,
making every other penalty provisions surplusage, an absurd, unsupportable position.
The State Contractors Act expressly states that non-licensees cannot “bring or maintain
any action, or recover in law or equity in any action, in any court in this state for the
collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract where a license is
required … regardless of the merits of the cause of action.” See BPC § 7031. The TAA
provides no such or similar notice.
The CA Real Estate Law (BPC § 10139) gives notice that it is, “a public offense
punishable by a fine” up to $20,000, and/or “by imprisonment” of up to six months for

16
hose “acting as a real estate broker, real estate salesperson, or mortgage loan originator …
or who advertises using words indicating” the same.
Every other state licensing scheme that regulate activities – reserving some or all of
their defining activities only for licensees – have like statutes to § 10139 so those
considering engaging in those actions without first qualifying and obtaining a license know
the risks. The TAA provides no such or similar notice.
Similarly, save the Talent Agencies Act, all of the State’s licensing schemes that do
not regulate activities have codified consequences for those who hold themselves out as
licensees. For example, per BPC § 5120, non-licensees engaging in the regulated activities
reserved only for those with public accountancy licenses are “guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable for not more than six months,” and/or a fine up to $1,000.
Per BPC § 2970, it is a misdemeanor “punishable by imprisonment” for up to six
months, and/or “a fine not exceeding” $2,000, for an unlicensed person to claim to be a
psychologist. To repeat, the TAA has no such statutory notice. Thus, for the reasons noted
above, as the Act has no statute reserving the procuring employment for artists to licensed
talent agents, it is simple common sense, or consideration of the statutory construction
canons stare decisis, ejusdem generis and/or surplusage, this court must affirm that the
legislature withheld codifying a penalty and thus no penalties can be meted out.
As the TAA has no prohibitionary statute or penalty provision, and with Peralta and
Dyna-Med barring the Labor Commissioner and all administrative agencies from creating
remedies that the Legislature has withheld, it is clear the Act as it has been enforced against
Appellants and others is extrajudicial and unconstitutional.

D. The Commissioner Must Avoid Unconstitutional Interpretations

Though powerless to rule on constitutional issues, the Commissioner must recognize

the administrate agency is also powerless to ignore these constitutional edicts

1. There Is An Unconstitutional Lack of Clarity As To Whom Is Being

Regulated
The list of terms in § 1700 – “individual, company, society, firm, partnership,

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association, corporation, limited liability company, manager, or their agents or employees"
– define one’s place in an organization, not an occupation. No one is in the occupation of
being an individual, company, firm, etc.
For a reader to assume that one of these eleven terms is not about one’s organizational
status, but their occupation, conflicts with the ‘whole-text canon’, the ‘presumption of
consistent usage canon’, the harmonious reading canon, and the associated words
contextual canon of statutory construction. (See Canons of Construction, Scalia & Garner).
Even if the term was acceptable in this list as an occupation, ‘manager’ is a general
term that incorporates a plethora of jobs. Do property managers, baseball managers, retail
store managers... does anyone with ‘manager’ in their title need to get a license? In the
entertainment industry, accountants for artists are often referred to as business managers.
There are project managers for productions who often hire or recommend artists for hire;
do these professionals need to procure a license?
Without verbiage expressly stating personal managers need to be licensed, an
assumption is required; and in law, “interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one
which makes void.” CA Civ. Code § 3541. While Marathon found the term incorporated
personal managers into TAA regulation, those jurists were not asked and did not opine on
its constitutionality. The ambiguity makes it inarguably unconstitutional on its face.

2. Assuming Activities Are Regulated Without Statutory Authority Is An

Unconstitutionally Vague Interpretation

All persons have a constitutional right to a reasonable opportunity to know what is

required and what is prohibited. No law should be drafted or interpreted to encourage or
facilitate arbitrary and potentially discriminatory enforcement. See City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 58-59 (1999); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983);
Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1972).
In 2014, a 9th Circuit Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance banning people from
sleeping in their cars and found it void for vagueness because it failed “to draw a clear line
between innocent and criminal conduct.” Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147.

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 The Desertrain opinion pointed to multiple questions the statute left
unanswered, leaving what was and was not permissible by law ambiguous:
“Is it impermissible to eat food in a vehicle? Is it illegal to keep a sleeping bag?
Canned food? Books? What about speaking on a cell phone? Or staying in the car
to get out of the rain?” Those unanswered questions leave the statute, “impossible
for citizens to know how to keep their conduct within the pale.” Id. at 1156.
As enforced, only talent agents can legally get involved in the procurement
process, which has been defined broadly and seeking out employment opportunities
for their artist clients.
The question is, what can an unlicensed person, and specifically a personal
manager do without crossing the legal line.
Marathon (at p. 980) speaks to “the occasional procurement of employment
opportunities may be standard operating procedure for many managers and an
understood goal when not-yet-established talents, lacking access to the few licensed
agents in Hollywood, hire managers to promote their careers.”
But is procurement just directly reaching out to a buyer about a job? The most
judicially accepted responsibility personal managers engage in is finding their
clients the appropriate talent agents.
Per Labor Code § 1700.44 (d), personal managers can work in conjunction with,
and at the request of, a licensed talent agency, but the Act does not clarify whether
managers can solicit agents to come aboard. Is it lawful for manager to put the
artist’s sales team together, as that is clearly part of the procurement process?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
It is universally accepted that personal managers work with their clients to
choose the photos, refine the resume, and edit the videos that first are used to garner
an agent’s interest and then used by the agent to pitch buyers. Is it lawful for a
personal manager to create the sales materials, an essential part of procurement?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it lawful for personal managers to forward these materials directly to buyers?

19
In a reply brief to a legal challenge brought in Federal Court by the National
Conference of Personal Managers, the Labor Commissioner wrote that it was inside
the legal line to, “send out resumes, photographs, videotapes, or written materials
for an artist.” (See Exhibit 3.)
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
If one accepts that if, following the Commissioner’s words, it is lawful for
personal managers to send out an artist’s marketing materials, is it unlawful to
follow up that submission with a call or email?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it unlawful if the recipient of the marketing materials proactively calls the
unlicensed representative about the artist?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it unlawful if a buyer proactively contacts an unlicensed representative about
the availability of a client even if no materials were sent?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Is it unlawful if an unlicensed representative receives a call from a buyer late at
night who cannot reach the client’s agent and wants to hire the actor to report to
work at 6AM the next morning? And if receiving the call is legal, if the manager
tells the artist about the opportunity, has the legal line been crossed? What if the
artist takes the job; has that made the manager’s actions unlawful, even if the
manager just received an offer and passed it on and did not engage in procurement
past sharing information with the client?
The Act, as written, leaves this unanswered.
Assuming that it is lawful for an unlicensed representative to receive a call and
can inform their client about a job starting hours away, if, in that situation, the
manager asks the buyer for more money than originally offered by the buyer; have
the manager’s actions now changed from law-abiding to law-breaking?
The Act, as written, leaves this and all the above questions unanswered. “It is a
basic principle of due process an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions

20
 are not clearly defined” (Grayned Supra at p. 108 (1972)), and as held in Desertrain
Supra at p. 1156, if a statute “fails to draw a clear line between innocent and criminal
conduct, it is void for vagueness.” Clearly § 1700.4 (a) fails that test, and it is a test
that the CLC’s ruling in this matter cannot ignore.

3. Voiding Contracts Without Legislative Authority Is Unconstitutional As

It Is Applied
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in this Court’s constitutional jurisprudence
dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” BMW of
America v. Gore 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995); De Anza Santa Cruise Mobil Estates
Homeowners Assn. v. De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, 94 Cal.App.4th 890, 904.
“Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is
sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges. Notice is required
before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are
assessed.” Lambert v. CA. 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) See Consumer Advocacy Group Inc.
v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America, 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 (2007).
As the TAA gives no such notice, nor notice to search the Civil Code to find mitigation
statutes and pretend they are remedies, meting out any consequence is unconstitutional as
it is applied, violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment
and the Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment.

3. The Penalty Of Voidance Violates The 13th Amendment of the United

States Constitution
The 13th Amendment, Section 1: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
Per Labor Code 1700.44 (b) , the failure “to obtain a license ... shall not be considered
a criminal Act under any law of this state.
Every state scheme voiding contractual rights for violating the licensing statute, save

21
the TAA, are criminal acts, either a misdemeanor or felony.
Extinguishing the benefit of one’s labor can only be lawfully done without findings of
fraud or non-performance (and even then, only if the worker is not on salary), is a criminal
sanction. In the instant matter, like with virtually all TAA controversies, the CLC assigns
a criminal sanction to a civil matter, which violates the 13th Amendment.

V. CONCLUSION

Voiding contractual rights without statutory authority is the economic equivalent to

the physical harm laid upon Rodney King. Those meting out voidances are like being one
of the policeman using an economic nightstick. on Mr. King and should face the same kind
of criminal penalties those cops did.
Simply stated, if the Talent Agencies Act has a statute reserving procurement for
licensees and another, a penalty provision, expressly stating that violators of the statute
barring unlicensed procurement have no right to contract, this motion should be denied. It
is difficult to prove a negative, to prove a positive should be as simple as pointing out the
prohibition and penalty statutes.
But if those signing the motion cannot point to those provisions – which do not exist
– and still choose to deny Respondent’s motion, continuing the wrongful, wanton disregard
for the law to rule in an extrajudicial, unconstitutional manner, then the signers and
whoever else was consulted in making that decision should someday face the same criminal
sanctions as those officers.
With this, Respondents respectfully request this motion is affirmed, and the end to this
legal nightmare for an entire occupation of Californians and other talent representatives
comes to its rightful end.
Respectfully submitted on February 5, 2024,

Rick Siegel
Non-Attorney Representative for Respondent Marilyn R. Atlas

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 PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am over the age of 18 and not party to this action.

I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred.

On February 5, 2022, I served the Parties and the California State Labor Commission in the action
entitled Osuji v Atlas, TAC No. 52902, via email.

[ ] BY U.S. MAIL I deposited such an envelope in the mail at Calabasas, California, with
postage thereon fully prepaid

[ ] BY FAX I caused such documents to be faxed to the

above mentioned address(es).

[ X ] BY EMAIL I caused such envelope to be messengered to the below-

mentioned address(es):

CASSANDRA OSUJI Osujicassie@gmail.com

JHONI ESTIOKO jestioko@dir.ca.gov

MARILYN R. ATLAS. Matlas704@yahoo.com

[ ] BY PERSONAL I caused such envelope to be delivered by hand to the offices of

the SERVICE address(es).

[ X ] STATE I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.

[ ] FEDERAL I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of

this Court whose direction the service was made.

Executed on February 5, 2024 in Woodland Hills, California

///Rick Siegel///

23
LEGISLATIVE
INTENT SERVICE, INC.
712 Main Street, Suite 200, Woodland, CA 95695
(530) 666-1917 • Fax (530) 668-5866 • www.legintent.com
_____________________________________________________________________________

DECLARATION OF JENNY S. LILLGE

I, Jenny S. Lillge, declare:

I am an attorney licensed to practice in California, State Bar No. 265046,

and am employed by Legislative Intent Service, Inc., a company specializing in
researching the history and intent of legislation.

Under my direction and the direction of other attorneys on staff, the

research staff of Legislative Intent Service, Inc. undertook to access historical
versions of statutes. We were asked to find the statutes that were the historical
derivation of the “Artists’ Managers Act” that were in effect in 1953. The “Artists’
Managers Act” was enacted in 1978 by Chapter 1382. Chapter 1382 of 1978
affected Labor Code sections 1700.2, et seq.

Upon review, we noted there was no penalty provision with regard to

unlicensed procurement in 1953. The historical version of statutes relating to
“artists’ managers” that were in effect in 1953 were those enacted by Chapter 329
of 1943, and there was no penalty provision at that time. We have provided you
with a true and correct copy of this chaptered law attached to this declaration.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 9th day of January, 2023 at
Woodland, California.

____________________________________
JENNY S. LILLGE

W:\Worldox\WDOCS\WORKPROD\07788\60082\00244365.DOC
LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC. (530) 666-1917
LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC. (530) 666-1917
LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC. (530) 666-1917
LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE, INC. (530) 666-1917