CHATTER YY IMMANUEL KANT I. is said of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that “his failures are fare important than most men's sucess." This man, whe crcings are prerequisite reading forall who desire to understan ninetenth and twentieth entry thought lived fe ngulal” without incident. Kant lived by routine, and, although he had many friends, he never married and never ventured more then forty miles from Kénigsberg, East Prussia, the city of his bith and death. The German writer Heine, although without doubt exercising some poetic licens, has immortalized Kant as an aut0- tuto: "Rising, coffee drinking, wrtng, lecturing, dining, walk ing each had its set time. And when Immanuel Kant, in his 8° ‘vit, cane in hand, appeared atthe door of his hous, and stlled towards the small avenue of linden trees which is still called ‘The Philosopher's Wall,’ the neighbors knew it was exactly hall rastthree by the clock ‘The Kant family belonged to the lower midale class and was evoutly religious. In recognition af his son's academic ability and ‘because of the family's religious persuasion, Immanuel’s father DUTY AND REASON zis sent him to the local Pitstc College to prepare for the ministry, Immanuel continued his studies atthe University of Konigaberg, and became increasingly interested in natural scence and pie, lovophy. Between the years of 1746 and 1755 he supported hineelf asa private teacher for various landed families in and around his native city. He was then appointed to an instructorship at his University and finally, in the year 1770, was promoted to «fall Professorship. Kant was a popular and successful teacher. Perhaps surprisingly for one who was 50 rigorous in his own thinking, hee eputed to have given the following advice in practical : "Attend most to the student of middle ability, the dances wre beyond help, and the geniuses help themselves Kant’ inner life was as dramatic as his outer life was drab: he tenounced the external and emotional side of religion; he evolved fom a man-of-letters philosopher with a free and flowing style of writing and thinking into a “critical” philosopher with a labored style of presenting uncompromisingly profound thoughts; he transformed a spontancous scientific curiosity into an impulse to explore the foundations of science; at frst a passive follower of an accepted school of philosophy, he became the innovator of an important school of thought. What is more, he took a passionate interest in the American and French revolutions. The conservative outer mien of Kant was a deceptive facade forthe inner Kant, ‘The most important of Kant’s scientific writings is his Generel ‘Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1753), in which he ae- counts forthe origin of the solar system by formulating the nebular hypothesis. His revolutionary philosophical work is Critigue of ‘Pare Reason (1781), in which he is concerned to demonstrate that itis possible to have certain knowledge in the natural sciences and mathematic. In his Critique of Judgment (1790) he analyzes, aesthetics and biology. Kant endeavors to show the foundations of genuine morality in The Fundamental Principles of the Meta. physics of Morals (1785) and the Critgue of Practical Rearon (1788); in the latter he investigates the implications of morality. for religion.ss INNANUEL KANT 271 tht Ey Cop. ‘The direction of Kant's philosophical interests is aes his reflection that “two things fill che mind with ever new and rereasing admiration and awe... the sary heavens above and se within.” His concern is with nature and morality Against the background of eighteenth-century scepticism, which called into question the foundations of scientific knowledge and morality, he proposes a comprehensive system of the univers in which their certainty is guaranteed. According to Kant, scepti cism results from the error of seeking a basis for certainty where znnot be found, inthe content of experience. The grounds of certainty, he asserts, are located in the form of reason itself, Ac- cordingly, he undertakes an intensive examination of the nature of thought ro show how we can have certain knowledge of both scientific facts and moral duties, Kant demonstrates by an analysis of the nature of the mental processes and of knowledge that the necessity and universality of scientific knowledge are guaranteed by the laws of the mind. He calls thes laws the “categories of the understanding.” They are the forms of all possible knowledge and are not limited to some specific content. For example, its the nature of the mind to think in accordance with the principle that every event must have a cause. The principle of causality is one of the categories of the understanding. Thus, despite our ignorance of the cause of & given disease, we are nevertheless certain that it has a cause, and this certainty is a product of mind, not of observation. Although itis generally held that nature itself provides the causal order of our experience, Kant reverses this postion, insisting that i it the mind which orders our experience causally. Otherwise, we could rot be certain, as we are of the causal interconnection of events; for, while experience teaches us what actually happens, it does sot teach us what necessarily happens. The categories are @ priori ~ that is, they are not derived from experience; they are uni versaly applicable to experience; and they are the necessary Teast beaded that what Kant oppose in epic sit theory tht knowledge stexpnence, loonege of imate vat or "ingeinshemcver”Creumene) hich is mponsle, DUTY AND REASON 227 preconditions of empirical knowledge. Furthermore, although all knowledge necessarily begins with experience, the @ prior struc- ture of it cannot be gotten by induction from experience, but can be understood only through examining the presuppositions of cur orderly experience of nature Inhis search for the grounds of the validity of ethics, Kant em- ploys the same method by which he establishes the grounds of the Certainty of science. A valid moral principle, he tells us, mast be independent of the empirical data of morality ifitis to be binding upon all men. In short, a genuine morality, i.e, 2 morality which is objectively and universally binding, requires an a prior foun- dation. Kant believes that ordinary moral consciousness, or con- science, reveals to every man that moral precepts are universal and necessary — they are valid for all rational beings. ‘Universal obligation, according to Kant, cannot be discovered by studying such empirical data as human desires or inclinations, for these vary from one person to another. The universal basis of morality in man must lie in his rational nature, since this alone is the same in everyone. No so-called moral law is valid if itis not rational, that is to say, if it cannot be applied to all rational beings without contradiction. Or, putting it another way, a moral principle must be such that a man can will that all men, including himself, should act upon it. Kant uses the test of consistency as the core of the fundamental moral law, which he calls the cate- {orical imperative: hose actions are right which conform to prin- ciples one can consistently will to be principles for all men, and those actions are wrong which are based upon maxims that ‘ational creature could not will that all men should follo. ‘Through the categorical imperative, then, we are enabled to distinguish right from wrong actions. However, Kant ells us, it isnot only the test but it is also the unconditional directive for behavior. Iv is binding upon everyone because each rational man acknowledges his obligation to follow reason. The categorical im- perative is, in fact, the only basis for determining our duties. Kant argues that the validity of the basic moral law is not affected by the fact that it is probably not employed in actual conduct.ys IMMANUEL KANT “peason prescribes duty, and the moral law holds whether or not men actually Follow it 1, Ava preliminary to his construction ofa pure moral philosophy, Kant makes a critical analysis of the commanly accepted " good” singh like health, wealth, and friendship. Asking under what condi- tions these may be considered good, ke concludes tha they are net good ander all circumstances, but only insofar as they are conjoined swith somuhing that is unqualifedly good —a good will. To Kant, a ood will represents the effort of @ rational being todo what he ought te do, rather than to act from inclination or self-interest Nothing can possibly be coneeived in the world, oF even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except 2 Good Wil, Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the othet alent: of the rind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perse- verance, a5 qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of narure may also become extremely bad dnd mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called ‘character, is not good. Itis the same with the gifts of fortune, Power, Fiches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and con- tentment with one's condition which is called Aeppiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the infuence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adape ic co its end. The sight ofz being who is not adorned with a single feacure of a pure and 00d will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself, and may facilitate its action, yet which have no in Uinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, DUTY AND REASON zy and this qualfes the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation inthe affections and passions, self-control and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients, For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness ofa villain not only makes him far more danger. ous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it 2. The good willis not good because it achieves good results, Enen if it wore unable o attain the ends it seeks, it would ail be good in ‘uselj and have a higher worth than the superficial things gained by immoral actions. A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness forthe attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, chat i, itis good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, cen ofthe sum total of all inclinations. Even ifit should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly pro- vison of stepiotherly nature, this wil should wholly lack Power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, robe sue, a mere wish, but che summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as thing which has its whole value in itself Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, ort at- tract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value.*‘Theres, however, somethings atrangein this iden ofthe sbo- ee Be mae all cick 2 acon a of sa vec ntsidiatnding he orugh went of crencoason sey ihe den, yeu supson mun ase that may eras Se ae pected neh een Saag Sot ey {ey tent nak is purport eran sai sen ae or ofour will Theelre we will ecamine the ies hom Sant of view ihe shal osaon of an oad ig, ae 2 bely alapeal slay w de perp el Ue we eum AEE cenval principle that ne crgan for any purpose willbe found thoes ab the fest end bese adapted or that porpose Now in being which hes reason anda nly if the proper obec a pales conunaton i ween award kappa, Seestare would howe hic upon avery bad avrangement i gla the reron af the ereeure to Carry ot chi urpose Forall fhe sedans which the ereatare has to etform with a view wo tis purpose, and the whole rl ofits conduc, woul be far tore surly prescribed oe by instinct and that end would have fuenetsned hereby much more certainly than i ever ean be ‘by reason. Should reason have been communicated to this fav. ore creature over and shows, it must ely have verve itt contemplace the happy conaieaon of its nature, co amie i ‘Tea ta be noted that in emphasing duty rater ha happiness tial theory, ane dacs ot deny that happiness sirable fr man Whi he ols that the im ec cf veasn ithe produc of god wi hich the npreme god Uupeemum Ieeam), he scknoiniges ats man of goed wilder happier. The npreme ood {es vrte he eoened wih happen proportion conse the Beet fe (ummm bw) DUTY AND REASON 231 to congratulate itself thereon, and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause, but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance, and meddle bunglingly with the pur- pose of nature. In a word, nature would have taken care that reason should not bretk forth into practical exercise, nor have the pre- sumption, with its weak insight, to think out for itself the plan ‘of happiness, and of the means of attaining it. Nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends, but also of the ‘means, and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to ‘And, in fact, we ind that the more a cultivated reason applies, itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happi- ness, vo much the more does the man fail of rue satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the ares of common, luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be alter all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than Aespising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct, and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgment of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives usin regard to the happiness and satisfaction of lif, or who would even reduce them below 2270, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgments the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed. For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certaintyMANUEL KANT tas objects and the satisfaction of all our wants to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to fn implanted instinct would have led with much greater weiner: and since, nevertheless, reason is imparted t0 us a8 2 a ical faculty, i.¢., as one which is to have influence on the will, rcore, admitting that nature generally inthe distribution of Shes has adapted the means co the end i ee destina- ve abe to produce 4 wily not meray good a8 4 mean £9 Be eee, bat od el fr which renson was abn aaeean This wil then though ot ndeed the sole and complete “Tee the supreme good andthe condition of every ote, fone dese of happiness Under these circumstances thee Shing meonsstent nth the wisdom of ature in he fact that EPSleeaon of the eon, wish eu fr he st and eesdisonal purpose, does in many ways interfere, a least in Sree neh the Eeainmenc ofthe second, which is always con Tonal namely, happiness Nay, semay even reduce to nothing Sanur ntere thereby fling of her parpose For reason rng see thc ablahmene of good wl its highest practical Genation, and in ataning the purpose capable only of « Seincron of es own proper kind, namely, that fom the atin Aer otan end, which eal agin is determined by reason ony, ‘Powithteanding chat ths may involve many «disappointment f0 the ends of inclination.* 4 Kant then proceeds to explain the relationship between good will and duty: @ good will is one which acts for the sake of duty. Indeed, human actions have moral worth only if they are performed from duty. Actions that recult from inclination or self-interest may Je praiseworthy if they happen, for whatever reason, to accord with duty, but they are not "‘moral." For example, a man who preserves Ais life in routine conformity to duty is acting from an inclination ‘which 12 according to duty, but not from duty. On the other hand, to presers life when 1 has became a burden, only because duty requires 1, 4 morally correct DUTY AND REASON 253 Kant docs mot mean that doing one's duty tr always, oF esem gem rally, unpleasant. However, when our desires lead fo actions which happen to conform to diy, we cannot be sure tha the consciousness of duty, rather than inclination, was our motice. We can better dis cern the efcacy of dusifulness where it stands alone or in opposition to other mative. This, not disapproval of ordinary human motives, is what leads Kant to choote examples which are rather cold and sampleasant Kant warns thet those who fail to understand propery the concept of duty may be tempted to act from motives which may bein accord- ance with uty or may be contrary fit, But ecen action in accordance with duty is not enough; ony respect for duty makes an action moral. We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good without a view to any- thing further, a notion which exiss already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, ‘and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of all the ret. In order to do this we will take the notion of duey, which includes that of a good wil, alchough implying cereain subjective restrictions and, hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering. it unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much the brighter. omit here all actions which are already recognised as incon- sistent with duty; although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even confit with it. [also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. For in this ease we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it. For example, itisBouse, caer vaays a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an "enced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce seopegent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fed « Pe everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any Fa Men are thos Aovestly served; bot this 1s not enough (0 2 ge heve thatthe tradesman has 0 acted from dy and Fam principles of honesty: his own advantage required it; it is frm Pike question in this case to suppose that he might besides cei direct inclination in favour of the buyers so that as it iat “yam love he should give no advantage to one over another TeSringly the action was done neither from duty nr from direct ASNaton, but merely with «selfish view ‘Oe the other hand it isa duty to maintain one’s Tie; and, in adeion, everyone has also-a direct inclination to do 30, But on She tecoune te often anxious care which mort men take for it Re Ro inrinsie worth, and their maxim has no moral import. Rep preserve thie ile os duty requires, no daube, but not beause se epuirs On the other hand, adversiy and hopeless sorrov Meo eemplecely ken away the relish for if; if the unfortunate Bae Grong in mind, indigrant at his fate rather than desponding See thes for death, and yet preserves his life without taing it oot from inclination or fear, but from duty — then fis maxim has « moral worth os, By the use ofan illesraion, Kant difeentiates merely prate- thy behasior from moral ation. Alrisic actions which result rom felings of tociablty desere praise and encouragement, but they connor be classified az posressng sricly moral slut “To be benefcent when we can i dy; and besides this here arsimany snade to sympachetically consticated that, without any Shar mouve of vanity or selkinterest, they find & pleasure in Spreading joy around them, and can take delight im the satsac~ Gon of others ao faras itis their own work, But | maintain that smnuch a care an action of this kind, however proper, however iable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is ha level with other inclinations, e the inclination to honour, DUTY AND REASON 235 which, if itis happily directed to that which isin fact of public utility and accordant with duty, and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not estecin. For the raxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done ‘om dy, otf nln. Pat he stat the id of \at philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of hi own, extinguish. ing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he stil has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now sup- pose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibiliy, and per- forms the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth. Further stil; f nature has put little sympathy in the heart of this or that ‘man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, pezhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude, and supposes, oF even requires, that others should have the same— and such’ a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature — but if nature had not specially framed him fora philanthropist, would he not stil find in himself ‘source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that ‘of a good.natured temperament could be? Unquestionably. Ie is justin this that the moral worth of the characteris brought out which is incomparably the highest of all, namely, chat he is beneficent, not from inclination, bue from duty.* 6. Kans fist ethical proposition, thn, is that an acs must be done from diy inorder to have moral worth. His second propesition is a declopment from the frst: an act dane from duty dees its ‘moral value, not from the results it produces, but from the principle by which it is determined. “The second proposition is: That an action done from duty de~ rives its moral wore, not from the purpose which isto be atained by it, but from the maxim by which i is determined, and there- fore does not depend on the realization of the object ofthe acon,IMMANUEL KANT. or merely nthe principle af soliton by which the action men place, without regard to any object of desire, It is ote et precedes thatthe purpores which we may hee i feet sn our actions, or their eects regarded as ends and springs he will, cannot give to actions any unconditional oF moral Sort. In what, then, can ther worth lie ifs not to consist in nd in reference tits expected eect? It cannot le any Shete but inthe principle ofthe will without regard to the ends hich can be attained by the ation 1. The frst two propositions lead Kant to @ definition of duty. The morally righ ction is one dome solely out of reverence forthe lee, and us unique and unconditioned worth is derived from this ‘The third proposition, which is a consequence of the two pre- ceding, I would express thus: Duty ts the necessity of acting from respect for the law. I may have inclination for an object as the tect of my proposed action, but I eannot have respect for it, just for this reason, that itis an effect and not an energy of will Similarly, I cannot have respect for inclination, whether my own or another's; I can at most, if my own, approve it; if another's, sometimes even love it; 2, look on it as favourable to my own incerest. Ie is only what is connected with my will asa principle, by no means as an effect — what does not subserve my inclina- tion, but overpowers it, or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation — in other words, simply the law of itself, which can be an object of respect, and hence « command. Now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and conse- quently the maxim that T should follow this law even to the ‘hwarting ofall my inclinations. Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effece ‘pected from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow ts motive from ths expected effect. For all these effects — DUTY AND REASON 237 agrecableress of one’s condition, and even the promotion of the happiness of others — could have been also brought about by other causes, so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being; whereas it isin this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found. The pre-eminent ood which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is omy possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the ex- pected effect, determines the will. This is a good whichis already Present in the person who acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result 8. The supreme principle or law of morality which the good man ust follow is the categorical imperative.” Rational beings, tothe stent that they act rationally, will always be guided by ethical prin- ciples or maxims which can be adopted by everyone else without gem crating any contradiction But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect ‘expected from it, in order that this will may be called good abso- lutely and without qualifcation? As I have deprived the wil of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e, Tam never to act otherwise than so that I could also ill that ‘my maxim should Become a universal law. Here now, its the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, chat serves the will as its prin- ple, and must s0 serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its prac- tical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for ex- ample: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish here berween the two sig- niffeations which the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise. The former may‘gg, IMMANUEL KANT rubredly often be the case Ise cleanly indeed hat tis not to extricate myself from a present dificulty by means of She subterfuge, but it must be vell considered whether there jay not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than chat from which T now free myself, and as, with all my sup. curing, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but pat credit once lot may be much more injurious to me than any schief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered Tether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a Triversal maxim, and to make it a habit to promise nothing fxcept with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon clear to fhe that such a maxim will sil only be based on the ear of conse quences. Now it is wholly diferent thing co be truthful from duty, and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the fist case, the very notion of the action already implies « Jaw for me; in the second ease, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me, although to abide by it is Certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is to ask myself, Should I be content that ‘my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) Should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for ‘others? and should I be able to say to myself, “Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himselfin a dificulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself"? Then 1 presently become aware that while Ican will the li, I can by no means wil that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they over-hastily did so, would ay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it thould be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy it sats DUTY AND REASON 239 9. Kant distinguishes the categorical imperative from hypotheti- cal imperatives. The former, an unconditional directive, prescribes actions to be done Because of the moral worth of the maxim, and not for the sake of some consequence that may result. By contrast, @ Aypathtical imperative is a conditional diretoe which advzes us what ought tobe done if a desired goa isto be achieoed. For example, “One ought to tell he truth as & matierof principle” isa categorical imperative, whereas “if you want to avoid punishment, you ought to tell the truth isa hypothetical imperative. ‘The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative. ‘All imperatives are expressed by the word ought (or shall), and shrchyHdeat the elton fan obese Ly fro + will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily de- termined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because itis conceived to be good to doit. ‘That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. Te is distinguished from the ‘pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of senss- tion from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not a a principle of reason, which holds for every one. Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or cate _orically. The former represent the practical ncesity ofa posible ‘ction as means to something ese that is willed (or at leat which ‘one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference co another end, ic, as objectively necessary. Since every practical law represents a possible action as good, and on this account, for a subject whois practically determinable2 jag ANUEL RANT 4 gaso, necessary allamperatives are formulae determining an Fe al cing the ple ol fod it rng ee then the imperative is Ayportical; fit is conceived reo tel! and consequently as being necessarily the principle jo, Hus vst explicit formulation of the categorical imperative re. ies an dividual to obey a maxim which can, without contradic. we, be willed tobe a rule for everyone. This means that the essence ting on the basis of an impersonal principle ryone, including oneself When 1 conceive @ hypothetical imperative in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condi fon [under which tis imperative, ez, the desire which makes this nperative suitable to my purposes]. But when I conceive a cate- oneal imperative I know at ance what it contains. For as che imperative concains besides the law only the necessity thae the sranims shall conform to this law, while the law contains ao condi ons restricting it, there remains nothing but the general state mrent that the maxim of the action should conform to 2 universal law, and iris this conformity alone that the imperative properly Phere therefore but one categorical imperative, namely hi 4 onls on that miaxioe whereby thou canst at the same time wil that should become a universal le Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should re- main undecided whether what is called duty is noc merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means Since the universality of the law according to which elects a roduced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most ener sce (to form) that the existence of things a 4 it is determined by general Laws, the imperative of duty may DUTY AND REASON. 241 bbe expressed thus: ct ar if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature? 11, Kant conceives the categorical imperative to be a tep-fold tes Irequires frst, that maxims for moral action be univerralized with. cout logical contradiction, and second, that they be universal direc. tives for action which do not bring the will into disharmony with itself by requiring it to will ome thing for itelf and another thing for cookers. Kant illustrates failure at the former level with the fst tao examples which follow, and failure atthe later lezel with the second wo examples 1. A man reduced to despair by 4 series of misfortunes feels ‘reared of life, buts stil so fr in possesion of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim ofhis action could become a universal law of mature, His maxim is: From selfove T adope it as a principle to shorten my life when it longer duration is kely to bring more evil chan satsac- tion. Iv is asked then simply whether this principle founded on selflove can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be alaw to destroy life by means ofthe very feeling whose special narure its impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself, and therefore could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist asa universal law of nature, and consequently would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty. 2. Another finds himself forced by necessity t borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay i, bu ses aso chat nothing will be lent to im, unless he promises stotly to repay ie in a definite time. He desires to make ths promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself sit not unlawful and inconsistent with duey fo get out of a difculty in this way? Suppose, however, that he resolves to do so, then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: When I think myself in wane cof money, [ will borrow money and promise to repay it, althoughIMMANUEL KANT yinos that T pever ean do so. Now this principle of self-love or xfone’s own advantage may pethaps be consistent with my whole forare welfare; but the question now is, Is it right? I change then the suggestion of selflove into a universal law, and state the ques- tion thos: How would it be if my maxim were a universal law? ‘Tren I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of ature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it fo be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself ina Gificulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the pose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would be- meetmpensble, to well ab the end that one might have in ve init, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences, "yA third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some colture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances, and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) Should let their talents rust, and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly wil chat this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes. ‘4A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have tocontend with great wretcheciness and that he could help them, thinks: What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; [ will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything co his welfare oF to his assistance in distress! Now no dovbe if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human DUTY AND REASON 243, race might very well subsist, and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible chat a uni- versal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature, For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, ‘and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires. ‘These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be adle to will chat 2 maxim of our action should be a universal law. This isthe canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions areof such a character that their maxim cannot without contradic- tion be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it sould be so. In others this intrinsic impossibility isnot found, but still itis impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature, since such a will would contradict itself. Ie is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous (inflexible) duty; the latter only laxer (meritorious) duty. Thus it has been com- pletely shown by these examples how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation (not the object of the action) on the same principle.* 12, In one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative, swe see more clearly its social implications. It requires ws to treat every human being as an end in himself and never as merely 2 means to an end. In brief, we should respect all human beings im- partially and aooid exploiting anyone. Ends that are ends only be- cause they are desired give us hypothetical imperatives; but if therejo IMMANUEL KANT a im itsel, she imperative to seek itis independent of desire 4 categorical imperative. supposing _. that there were something whose existence has i safer absolute worth, something which, Being amend intel NK bea source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would fr ohe source of a possible categorical imperative, ic. practical bs ‘Now 1 say: man and generally any rational being exists as an ead in himself, not merely ar a means to be arbitrarily used by this Srehac wil, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself Sr other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same fine as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a condi- tonal worth, fr ifthe inclinations and the wants founded on them gid not cxist, then their object would be without value. But the inelinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational feing to be wholly free from them. Thus che worth of any object sthich i be acpuired by our action is always conditional. Beings, those existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called shingss rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must rot be used merely as means, and so far therefore restrict freedom af action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an efiect of our action, but objective ends, that is things whose exist- ence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other ean be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for atherwise nothing whatever would possess aBsolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there ‘ould be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever. then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of. the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, DUTY AND REASON 245 being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itr, constitutes an cobjetive principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational ature txts at an end in ite. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being sb: so far then this is a subjetie principle of human actions. Butevery other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: 0 that itis at the same time an objective principle, from which 4s a supreme practical law all laws ofthe will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So acta to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every cate as an end witha, never as means only! 13. Kant shows the basi identity of the first and second formula- tions ofthe categorical imperatce. Those actions which, om the fist formulation, cannot be universalized without contradiction, €., come ‘iting suicide or refusing to help the needy, will be seen om the second formulation to be inconsistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. ‘The principle: So act in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself, is accordingly essentially identical with this ‘other: Act upon a maxim which, at the same time, involves its ‘own universal validity for every rational being. For that in using ‘means for every end I should limit my maxim by the condition ofits holding good as a law for every subject, this comes to the same thing as that, the fundamental principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i, the rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, chat isin every case as an end likewise.* 14. Having brought to light with logical rigor the implicit pre- supposition: of the common man's awareness of duty and shown itIMMANUFL KANT sicersal categorical imperative, Kant giver eloquent praise We see philosophy brought to a critical position, since ir jas to be firmly fixed, notwithstanding that it has nothing to tupport i either in heaven or earth, Here it must show its purity at pbsolute dictator of its own laws, not the herald of those which ‘whispered to it by an implanted sense ot who knows what futelary nature, Although these may be better than nothing, yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason, which must have their source wholly 2 prior! and thence their commanding authority, expecting everything from the supremacy of the law dnd the due respect for it, nothing from inclination, or else con demning the man to sef-contemps and inward abhorrence Thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid tothe principle of morality, but is even highly preju disial to the purity of moral, for the proper and inestimable roth of an absolutely good will consists just in this, that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds which alone experience can furnish. We cannot t00 much oF 100 ‘often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness i glad to rest on this pillow, and in a dream of sweet illusions (in which, instead of Jeno, it embraces a cloud) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation, which looks like anything one chooses to seein it; only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her im her true form. To behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to con- tenplate morality stripped of all admixture of sensible things af every spurious ornament of reward or self-love, How much she then eclipses everything else chat appears charming to the fections, every one may readily perceive with the least exertion his reason, if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction * DUTY AND REASON. 247 Questions 1. How does Kant's ethical cheory &e into his general philosophy? What similarities does he find between the problems of scientific knowledge and of morality? 4. Account for Kant’s denial of the unqualified goodness of such com rronly valued assets as friendship, health, wealth, and the like, in terms of his interest in that which is good im itself. What does he regard as the only moral quality which is unqualiedly good in ital? |} What isthe moral function of reason in Kant’s philosophy? What is the relationship between reason and happiness? «Explain the relationship between good will and duty in Kant’ ethics. CCan you think of any alternative ways of relating them? 5. Why does Kane object to using “inclinations” or “feelings” as the bass of morality? 6. What criteria of the morality of actions does Kant establish? How vould he evaluate an act of charity performed out of a natural Sympathy forthe sufferings of the poor? State the “categorical imperative” in any ofthe forms Kant gives it, and use examples of moral acts to clarify its meaning. What is the basis of the moral law in Kant’s system of ethics? 4, What i the role of “motives” in Kant’s ethical theory? |What would Kane's postion be as to moral values inthe following. tuations: (a) A man who remains loyal to his wife because he loves her, and (b) A man who recognizes loyalty to his wile as an obliga- tion, although he finds it decidedly unpleasant. to, Tthas been argued against Kant that he introduces “consequences” in his categorical imperative. Examine this argument againat him. What points of strength and weakness do you find in his ethical theory? Key to selections: ‘wowanves Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Meaphysic of Morals, tr. Thomas K: Abbott, from Kent's Critigue of Practical Reason and te Work onthe Thar of this, Lenn, Langman, Green, and 1 ty