T19P

T19
T19
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF UPARGANJ
AT UPARGANJ
UNDER 139(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ READ WITH ORDER XL RULE 5 OF THE
SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013
WRIT PETITION(CRIMINAL) NO_/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)

MR. GALON KASRA........................................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ...............................................................................................RESPONDENT
&
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO /2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
MR ASSARDEI JEDPARE................................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
&
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO /2020 (UNDER SECTION 397 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE)
v.
&
SLP (CIVIL) NO /2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
UPARGANJ NEWS NETWORK...........................................................................................PETITIONER
v.
KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ.............................................................................................RESPONDENT
&
SLP (CIVIL) NO /2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)
v.
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

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4 RMLNLU-SCC ONLINE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..............................................................................................v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..............................................................................xii
STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................xiv
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED........................................................................................xvi
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................xvii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED............................................................................................1
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR.

GALON KASRA IS MaiNTaiNABLE?.............................................................................1
[1.1] That the police authorities cannot suo moto investigate until an F.I.R. is filed..........1
[1.2] That the letter of the deceased cannot be considered as first information...................3
[1.3] That the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable............................................................3
2..............................................................................................................................................W
HETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES FRAMED BY SESSIONS JUDGE STAND IN
THIS CASE?.........................................................................................................................5
[2.1] That deceased did not commit suicide as understood by law.......................................5
[2.2]. That Maia is not capable of standing trial..................................................................7
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST,

BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON, ARE REASONABLE?......11
[3.1] That the freedom of expression is guaranteed to press and other forms of media.....11
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[3.2] That there is no compelling state interest which is involved......................................12
[3.3]. That the restrictions imposed by the Superintendent of jail are unreasonable.........12
[3.4] That the imposed restrictions are in contravention with international conventions. 15
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT IN-

CAMERA PROCEEDINGS, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT
TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS?............................................................16
[4.1]. That closing this trial to cameras is not justified under Constitutional and
International standards........................................................................................................16
[4.2] That the ban on recording and broadcasting trials is unconstitutional.....................18
[4.3] That the public and press have a Right of access to Court proceedings....................19
[4.4] That the Right toaccess includes the Right to record and telecast the Proceedings 19
PRAYER......................................................................................................................xxxix
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.R. All India Reporter

A.C.H.P.R. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
A.C.H.R. American Convention on Human Rights
& And
E.C.H.R. European Convention on Human Rights
Ed. Edition
I.C.C.P.R. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
A.C.H.R. American Convention on Human Rights
U.D.H.R. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
U.K. United Kingdom
U.N. United Nation
U.S. Unites States of America
I.O. Investigating Officer
ai Artificial Intelligence
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Cr.L.J Criminal Law Journal
I.P.C. Indian Penal Code
¶¶ PAGE
¶ Paragraph
r/w Read with
S.C. Supreme Court
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
§ Section
v. Versus
W.L.N. Weekly Law Notes
W.A.C.A. West African Court of Appeal
E.H.R.R. European Human Rights Reports
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
DOMESTIC CASES
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO

1. Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 S.C.C. 22. …4
2. Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan & Ors, 2011 3 S.C.C. 758. …2
3. Binoo K. John v. State of Kerala, 1985 S.C.C. OnLine Ker 215. … 12
4. Chintaman Rao v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118. … 13
5. Common Cause v Union of India, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 338. …5
6. Deepak Khosla v. Union of India and Ors., 2011 (182) D.LT. 208. … 20
7. Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 220. …3
8. Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 641. …2
G.B.C.Raj Gopal v The Government Of A.P., 2014 S.C.C Online A.P. … 1,2,3
9.
322.
10. Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of AP, (2010) 1 S.C.C. 750. … 10
11. Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 648. …5
12. Harji v. State of Rajasthan, 1977 W.L.N. 655. …8
13. Hem Raj v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4259. …2
14. Lalita Kumari v. State of UP, (2014) 2 S.C.C. 1. …2
M. Hasan and Anr. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1998 … 13
15.
A.P. 35.
16. M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, A.I.R. 1959 S.C 395. … 13
17. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248. …7
18. Mohammed Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, 2006 (1) S.C.C. 627. …2
Nabisab Maktumsab Chamanamalik S/o Maktumsab Chamanamalik v. …4
19.
State of Karnataka, 2015 Indlaw KAR 8016.
20. Nisha Saim v. State of Kerala, (2009) S.C.C. Online Ker 2404. …4
21. Nkanang Akpan Umo v. The King,. 13 W.A.C.A. 30. …8
22. Om Kumar v. Union Of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386. … 14
23. P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 394. …7
24. Prabha Dutt v Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1. … 12
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25. Radha v. State, 2011 S.C.C. Online Del 2300. …2
26. Ramabatar Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, 1983 Cr.L.J. 122 (Ori). …9
Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 13 S.C.C. …3
27.
501.
28. Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1322. …2
29. Ramnath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1926 All 231. … 10
30. Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State Of Gujarat (1994) 2 S.C.C. 685. …3
31. Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab (2005) 9 S.C.C. 315. … 1,2,3
32. Ruben Banerjee v. State of Orissa, 2000 S.C.C. OnLine Ori 139. … 12
Sandeep Rammilan Shukla v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 S.C.C Online …1
33.
Bom 996.
34. Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373. … 15
35. Soma BhA.I. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 4 S.C.C. 257. …3
36. State of Madras v. V.G. Row, 1952 S.C.R. 597. … 13
37. Surya Prakash Khatri v. Madhu Trehan, 2001 S.C.C. OnLine Del 590. … 11
38. T.T Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 S.C.C. 181. …1
39. Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 2 S.C.C. 113. …3
40. Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 S.C.C. 393. …1
41. Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala, (2011) 10 S.C.C. 781. …4
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and another v. Union of India and another, …2
42.
2015 Indlaw M.P. 243.
43. Vikram v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 332. …3
44. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 889. … 16
INTERNATIONAL CASES
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO

45. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). … 13
46. Barthold v Germany, (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 383. … 15
47. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, H.R., 164, (1997). … 11
48. Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. … 20
Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
49. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). …6
50. Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, I.H.R.L. 1424 (I.A.C.H.R. 1998). … 17
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51. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp. v. Brown, 471 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio Ct. App. … 20
1984).
52. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. S.Ct. 2841, …6
2853, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990).
53. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 …7
(1972)
54. Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) … 18, 20
55. Faretta v. California 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975) … 17
56. Feldek v. Slovakia, App no 29032/95 (E.C.H.R., 12 July 2001) … 14
57. Gaweda v. Poland, (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 4. … 14
58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). …7
59. Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C). … 11
60. Hillery v. Procunier, 1974 WL 185820 (U.S.). … 12, 13
61. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337. … 17
62. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986). … 18
63. Jersild v. Denmark, 19 E.H.R.R. 1 (1994). … 11
64. Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70 (1904). …8
65. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 …4
(1950)
66. Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 923 F.Supp. 580 (1996) … 19, 20
67. Lingens v. Austria, (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407 [40]. … 15
68. Muller v. Switzerland, (1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 212. … 14
69. Mark Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, (1989) … 14
12 E.H.R.R. 161.
70. Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976). …6
71. Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (App. D.C. 1907). …8
72. McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers Ltd, (2009) … 11
E.W.H.C. 2375.
73. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1979). … 13
74. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. … 15
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). …5
76. Ouko v. Kenya, (2002) 9 I.H.R.R. 246. …4

77. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693. …6
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78. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833. … 5, 6
79. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984). … 18
80. R v. Shayler, [2002] U.K.H.L. 11. … 14
81. R. v. McNaughten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). … 10
82. Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, Commc‟n No. 1128/2002 U.N. … 11
Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (2005).
83. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555. …17, 18,
19, 20
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). …7
85. Sect. of state for home affairs v. O’ Brein, 1923 All E.R. Rep 442 (HL). …4
86. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the …6
Maudsley Hospital, [1985] 2 WLR.
87. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 541. …7
88. State, ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d. … 20
89. Sunday Times v United Kingdom, (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245. … 14
90. Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 (1977) …6
91. Thomas Pelham Dale case, (1881) 6 Q.B.D. 376 (C.A.). …4
92. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). … 6, 7
93. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348 (3d Cir. 1994). … 20
94. United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973). …8
95. United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979). …8
96. United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983). …8
97. United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1998). … 10
98. Washington Post Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1991). … 17
99. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). …6
100 Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 … 14
(1994).
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SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO.

1. Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 433 (1950) …9
Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self- … 18
2.
Government 25, 88 (1948)
Arie A. Covrigaru & Robert K. Lindsay, Deterministic Autonomous … 10
3.
Systems, 110 (A.I. MAG., Fall 1991).
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: representative … 18, 19
4.
democracy and the people's elusive“Right to know”, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1
Colin Mcginn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a …9
5.
Resolution 202 (1991)
6. Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance 327 (1987). …9
Georges Rey, Functionalism and the Emotions, in Explaining … 10
7.
Emotions 163 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980)
Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human …9
8.
Intelligence 49 (1988)
James L. Bernat et al., Patient Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: An …6
9. Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide or Voluntary Active
Euthanasia, 153 Archives Internal Med. 2723 (1993)
Jerome Hall, General Principles Of Criminal Law 70-211 (2d ed. …9
10.
2005).
11. John R. Searle, Minds, Brains And Science 28-41 (1984). …9
Judith K. Schwarz, Responding to Persistent Requests for Assistance …5
12. in Dying: A Phenomenological Inquiry, 10 Int'l J. Palliative Nursing
225 (2004).
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences … 8, 9
13.
1231 (70 N.C. L. Rev. 1992).
14. Owen J. Flanagan, JR., The Science of The Mind 254 (2d ed., 1991). … 8, 9
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CONVENTIONS
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M.
58 (1982).
2. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
3. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
7. Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992)
8. U.S.C.A. Constitution Amendment VI. American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 1948
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 10, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
SECONDARY MATERIAL: BOOKS
S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Andrew Nicol, Gavin Miller & Andrew Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (2nd
1.
Ed. 2009).
2. Christian Koeing, Competition and Telecommunications Law (2nd Ed. 2009).
3. D. D. Basu, Constitution of India, (13th Ed. 2010).
4. Duncan Bloy & Sara Hadwin, Law and the Media (2nd Ed. 2013).
5. H M Seervai, Constitution of India, (4th Ed.).
6. Halsbury’s Law of India (2nd Ed. 2014).
7. Halsbury‟s on Law of England (4th Ed. 1992).
8. Hugo Deburgh, Investigative Journalism (2nd Ed. 2008).
9. Jerome Hall, General Principles Of Criminal Law 70-211 (2d Ed. 2005).
10. Kaplan Webisbery Binder, Criminal Law, Cases & Materials, (4th Ed).
11. R. P Kathur, Supreme Court on Criminal Law, (8th Ed. 2014).
12. Ram Jethmalani, Cases and Materials on Media Law (2012).
13. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Code of Criminal Procedure, (20th Ed. 2016).
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14. Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992).

15. Sarkar, Code of Criminal Procedure, (9th Ed. 2011).
16. Sarkar, Law of Evidence, (17th Ed. 2011).
17. Soonaval, Supreme Court Criminal Digest, (4th Ed. 2007).
Tom Welsh and Walter Greenwood, Mcnae’s Essential Law for Journalists (14th Ed.
18.
1997)
LEGISLATIONS
S.NO NAME OF THE STATUES

1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974)
2. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860)
3. The Constitution of India, 1950
4. The Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2002)
5. The Delhi Prisons Rules
6. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
MR. GALON KASRA v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ
The Petitioner invokes the writ jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble High Court of Uparganj under
Article 226 of the Constitution of Uparganj for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus for
illegal detention of Maia.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has suo moto transferred to itself the pending Writ petition,
under Article 139(A) of the Constitution of Uparganj read with Order XL, Rule 5 of the
Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
MR ASSARDEI JEDPARE v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ
The Petitioner invokes the writ jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble High Court of Uparganj under
Article 226 of the Constitution of Uparganj for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari, asking for
the conditions to be stuck down and fresh conditions for conducting interview be granted.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has suo moto transferred to itself the pending Writ petition,
The Petitioner filed revision petition under Section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure
against the charges framed by Sessions Judge.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has suo moto transferred to itself the pending revision petition,
UPARGANJ NEWS NETWORK v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ
The Petitioner invokes a Special Leave Jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of
Uparganj under Article 136 of the Constitution of Uparganj against the rejection of the
application moved by media outlets for conducting audio-video recording of the proceedings.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has passed an interim directing both the Special Leave petition
to be heard together, under Article 139(A) of the Constitution of Uparganj read with Order
XL, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
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The Petitioner invoked the Special Leave Jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of
Uparganj under Article 136 of the Constitution of Uparganj against the directions of the
High Court to conduct trial „in-camera‟.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has passed an interim order directing both the Special Leave
petitions to be heard together, under Article 139(A) of the Constitution of Uparganj read with
Order XL, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
RELEVANT FACTS
I. The Kingdom of Uparganj is a Constitutional monarchy with a Westminster style Parliament.

In the year 2020, Dr Hadvin Ahtme, a renowned scientist of Uparganj, unveiled to the world,
Maia (Multi-faceted Artificial Intelligence Assistant), an android designed to assist the
elderly in as humane a manner as possible, performing all the tasks that a human assistant is
capable of performing. Maia was designed to look, sound and feel like a human and has also
passed the „Turing-test‟ with flying colors.
II. One morning, Dr. Hadvin Ahtme was found dead. She left an e-mail in the inbox of her
family members stating that, she was diagnosed with a terminal form of stomach cancer and
instead of prolonging her life through corrosive drugs, she has decided to take her own life in
a peaceful manner. She had instructed Maia to feed her with less and less food and water.
Maia simply followed her instructions. Deceased vested A.I and all the Intellectual Property
Rights regarding A.I to her nephew, Galon Kasra. After this letter was made public, the
Police Authorities of Uparganj, Ms Dyan Bell, suo moto began to make investigations
without filing of F.I.R and took A.I. into their custody. Later Ms. Bell suo moto filed F.I.R.
and stored A.I in the record room. Subsequently, Galon Kasra filed a writ of Habeas Corpus
in High Court against Superintendent of Police, asking release of Maia to their custody. The
High Court instead, directed police authorities to detain Maia in prison and thereby Maia was
moved from the custody to police to the Hamrak Prison.
III. Meanwhile the ongoing investigation and developments in the case were covered in great
depth by the news media. A journalist of Uparganj News Network (UNN) approached the
Superintendent of Hamrak Prison seeking written permission to interview Maia in the jail
premises. The Superintendent of Hamrak Prison granted permission subject to the conditions-
not to ask any question that would undermine ongoing trial, not to violate any other law of
Uparganj and the footage of interview has to pre-approved by prison authorities. Mr. Jedpare
refused to abide by the conditions imposed as it amounts to violation of freedom of speech
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and expression and approached the High Court seeking Writ of Certiorari, asking High Court
to strike down the conditions and also to grant fresh permission for conducting the interview.
IV. In the meantime, after completing the investigation, the Uparganj police filed charge sheet
with the Sessions Judge intending to prosecute Maia. The Sessions Judge framed charges
against Maia for abetment of suicide under section 306 of the Uparganj Penal Code,
punishable with imprisonment up to ten years. Mr Kasra challenged the order of sessions
Judge by filing a revision petition in the High Court claiming that- Deceased did not commit
suicide as understood in law and that Maia is incapable of understanding the trial. The High
Court then directed police to produce Maia before the Bench in the Court so that they can
satisfy whether Maia can understand trail in the case.
V. The Bench hearing the revision petition filed by Mr. Kasra received multiple applications
seeking permission for audio-video recording of the proceedings. The Bench dismissed the
applications and directed all the proceedings of a case where Maia was present to be held in
camera. U.N.N then filed S.L.P before the Supreme Court asking the court to set aside order
of the High Court for in camera proceedings, as it amounts to violation of citizen‟s right to
know and freedom of press. Separately Mr. Kasra filed SLP against the orders of High Court
as it amounts to violation of Maia freedom of speech and expression.
VI. The Supreme Court of Uparganj directed that both the SLP appeals should be heard together.
In addition, Supreme Court suo moto transferred to itself the pending habeas corpus writ
petition, the writ petition filed by Mr Jedpare, and the revision petition filed by Mr Kasra as
they all concerned the same set of facts and circumstances and therefore needed to be decided
in harmony, since important questions of law were raised. Now all these petitions and appeals
are tagged together for hearing by a five judge Bench of Supreme Court of Uparjang.
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ARGUMENTS PRESENTED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON KASRA IS
MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CHARGES FRAMED BY THE SESSION JUDGE STAND IN THIS CASE?
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST, BY THE

SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON, ARE REASONABLE?
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS IN

CAMERA, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THAT, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON KASRA IS

MAINTAINABLE AND MAIA SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM ILLEGAL CUSTODY
Petitioner humbly contends that the order of the detention of Maia is illegal, as there has been
procedural violation. The police authorities cannot suo motu start investigation until F.I.R. is
registered under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Preliminary investigation is
not permissible under the Cr.P.C prior to the registration of the F.I.R.. Also, the police
authorities cannot detain anyone prior to the registration of the F.I.R.. The High Court of
Uparganj failed to observe the procedural violation involved in detention of Maia. Therefore
the writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable, as the main object of writ of habeas corpus is to
release persons illegally detained or confined.
2. THAT, THE CHARGES FRAMED BY THE SESSIONS JUDGE CANNOT STAND IN THE
PRESENT CASE.
Petitioner humbly contends that Session Judge erred in framing charges under S. 306. It is
humbly submitted that Deceased did not commit suicide as understood by law. Deceased
being an ordinary citizen of the country has enjoyed right to life which is very well inclusive
of right to die with dignity and right to take personal decision of his own. Voluntary
starvation does not constitute any offence under the penal code and therefore the act of
committing is no offence. Further, Maia is not capable of standing trial. Maia is an innocent
agent which does not have any knowledge about the commission of the act. Maia lacks soul,
consciousness, intentionality, feelings and free wills, therefore, cannot be assumed to be an
offender in the commission of the act.
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3. THAT, THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JAIL SUPERINTENDANT ON MR. ASSARDEI

JEDPARA, FOR CONDUCTING INTERVIEW OF MAIA, ARE UNREASONABLE AND NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Petitioner humbly contends that the restrictions imposed on Mr. Jedpare by the
Superintendent of police are unreasonable. The Constitution, under Article 19(1)(a) and
various International Conventions guarantees freedom of speech and expression to press and
media. The citizens also have a right to know under article 19(1)(a). The interview sought to
be conducted by Mr. Jedpare was in the interest of public. Also, there was no compelling
government interest involved. Though journalists, are not expressly referred in the jail
manual, they cannot be denied the opportunity to interview the under trial prisoner. Freedom
of press and media involves access to all sources of information. Free, uncensored and
unhindered press or media constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society.
4. THAT, THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT, FOR NOT PERMITTING AUDIO–VIDEO
RECORDING AND CONDUCTING IN-CAMERA PROCEEDINGS, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF
‘CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW’, ‘FREEDOM OF PRESS’ AND ‘MAIA’S FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION’.
Petitioner humbly contends that the order of the High Court to conduct in-camera
proceedings violates the presumption of just and fair public trial. The accused in any case has
a right of public hearing and such right cannot be restricted, when there is no government
interest involved. Ban on recording and broadcasting court proceedings is unconstitutional as
it violates the freedom of press guaranteed under Article 19 of Constitution and other
international covenants. Further, the citizen‟s and press have a right to access the proceedings
of the court, which includes a right to record and telecast the proceedings. Herein, right to
access is essential for the smooth functioning of the courts and the means to record the
proceedings are hassle free and easy to use.
xviii
TH
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR.

GALON KASRA IS MAINTAINABLE?
1. It is humbly contended before Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the order of Honb‟le High Court,
directing Maia to be detained in prison is invalid, as Police officials of Uparganj has violated
the procedure. It is submitted that police cannot commence suo moto investigation until an
F.I.R is registered [1.1], also letter of Dr. Ahtme (hereinafter referred to as „deceased‟)
cannot be considered as first information [1.2]. Further, due to procedural irregularities, Writ
petition is maintainable in this case [1.3].
[1.1] THAT THE POLICE AUTHORITIES CANNOT SUO MOTO INVESTIGATE UNTIL AN F.I.R. IS
REGISTERED
It is humbly submitted that a procedure established by law subsists for arresting, detaining
and conducting inquiry [1.1.1]. In the instant case, the legal procedure has not been followed,
for the inquiry was initiated without the registration of F.I.R. [1.1.2]
[1.1.1] PROCEDURE FOR MAKING AN ARREST, DETENTION AND INQUIRY
2. It is humbly contented that police cannot suo moto start an investigation until F.I.R. has been
filed under Section 154.1 First information report in a criminal case is extremely valuable. 2
An F.I.R. sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation.3
Conducting an investigation into an offence, after registration of the F.I.R. under Section
154 Cr.P.C., is a procedure established by law.4
3. In the case of Ravi Kumar v. State of Punjab, 5 Supreme Court defined F.I.R. as a report
giving information of the commission of a cognizable crime which may be made by the
complainant or by any other person knowing about the commission of an offence. Section
1
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 154.
2
Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 S.C.C. 393, ¶ 1.
3
T.T Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 S.C.C. 181, ¶ 18; Sandeep Rammilan Shukla v. State of Maharashtra,
2008 S.C.C Online Bom 996 ¶ J.
4
G.B.C. Raj Gopal vs The Government Of A.P., 2014 S.C.C. Online A.P. 322, ¶ 22.
5
(2005) 9 S.C.C. 315, ¶ E.
1
TH
154 Cr.P.C requires information of a cognizable offence to set the investigation machinery
into action.6
[1.1.2] THAT NO ENQUIRY TO BE DONE BEFORE F.I.R IS REGISTERED
4. Petitioner humbly submits that registration of F.I.R is mandatory under Section 154 of
Cr.P.C., if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.7 The registration of the F.I.R empowers the officer-
in-charge of the Police Station to commence investigation with respect to the reported crime.8
5. The police officer is obliged, under statute, to file a case and subsequently proceed with the
investigation, provided, he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence. 9 Law,
expressly, prohibits any inquiry into the commission of offence, prior to registration of
F.I.R.10
6. Commencement of investigation, by a police officer, is subject to two conditions, firstly, the

police officer must have reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence 11, and
secondly, the officer should satisfy himself that there is sufficient ground for entering on an
investigation even before he starts the investigation.12
7. In case where two police officers inquired into the incident but without the registration of
any F.I.R., Supreme Court directed to register an F.I.R first, and then to carry out
investigation.13 Investigation commences with lodging of information relating to the
commission of the offence.14 Even if the offence is a cognizable offence, then also an F.I.R is
required to be registered15 and a subsequent report is required to be sent to the Magistrate.16
8. In the present case, the Investigating officer, started investigating without filing an F.I.R. 17
Therefore, the investigation conducted and taking Maia into custody by the police is invalid.
6
Hem Raj v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4259, ¶ 1.
7
Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 120.
8
Supra note 5 at ¶ 15; Dilawar Singh v. State of Delhi, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 641, ¶ 11.
9
Radha v. State, 2011 S.C.C. Online Del 2300, ¶ 31.
10
Ibid at ¶ 69.
11
Code of Criminal Procedure § 157, cl. 1.
12
Supra note 4 at ¶ 21.
13
Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1322, ¶ 4.
14
Ashok Kumar Todi v. Kishwar Jahan & Ors., 2011 3 S.C.C. 758, ¶ 49; Mohammed Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan,
2006 (1) S.C.C. 627, ¶ 11.
15
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 154.
16
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and another v. Union of India and another, 2015 Indlaw M.P. 243, ¶ 8. See, Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 § 157.
17
¶ 9-12, Fact sheet.
2
TH
As registration of an F.I.R precedes investigation under Sections 156 and 157 of Cr.P.C,18
lodging of a First Information Report is necessary for setting the criminal investigation in
motion and taking actions.19
[1.2] THAT THE LETTER OF THE DECEASED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CREDIBLE FIRST
INFORMATION.
9. It is humbly contented that the letter of deceased, which was made public, cannot be
considered as a credible information. As F.I.R., filed by the complainant or by any other
person knowing about the commission of an offence, gives information of the commission of
a cognizable crime.20
10. Even a telephonic information about commission of a cognizable offence irrespective of the
nature and details of such information cannot be treated as first information report. 21
Anonymous message at police station, does not make it a first information report, merely
because the said information was first in point of time. 22 The vague and indefinite
information, which made the investigating agency only to rush to scene of occurrence to
investigate, cannot be treated as a First Information Report under section 154 of the Cr.P.C..23
11. Similarly, the police authorities, in the present case, erred while commencing investigation on
the basis of letter of the deceased, as it cannot be considered as First Information Report.
[1.3] THAT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS MAINTAINABLE
12. Petitioners humbly contend that the order of Uparganj High Court, directing Maia to be
detained in prison is invalid on account of procedural violation. Investigating Officer started
suo moto investigation before filing of F.I.R.; later filed suo moto F.I.R., and took Maia into
custody.24
18
19
Ramesh Baburao Devaskar v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 13 S.C.C. 501, ¶ 15; Vikram v. State of
Maharashtra, (2007) 12 S.C.C. 332.
20
21
Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v. State Of Gujarat, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 685, ¶ 1; Soma BhA.I. v. State of Gujarat, (1975)
4 S.C.C. 257, ¶ 19.
22
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 2 S.C.C. 113, ¶ 1.
23
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 220, ¶ G.
24
¶ 9-12, Fact sheet.
3
TH
13. It is submitted that F.I.R. is filed on information given by the complainant or by any other
person.25 The police authorities are required to exercise the power with utmost care and
caution.26 Adherence to strict procedural safeguards assures an equal justice under law.27
14. A person procuring the imprisonment of another, if fails to follow every step in the
imprisonment process with extreme regularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to
continue.28 The procedural requirements, of imprisonment, must be strictly complied with.29
15. Under the guise of a preliminary enquiry, no person should be compelled to appear at a police
station on the oral directions of a police officer without even the complaint being registered,
and an investigation commenced.30 The order of detention must satisfy the test of
reasonableness and fair play.31
16. It is further submitted that, Article 9 (1) of I.C.C.P.R., 32 Article 5 (1) of E.C.H.R. 33 and
Article 7 of A.C.H.R.34 - provides that no person should be deprived of his personal liberty
except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Also, Article 6 of A.C.H.P.R.35 -
provides that no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained. Where a person was detained
without trial, the detention was held violative of A.C.H.P.R..36
17. It is essential to note that Maia is a „legal person‟, as Maia is a humanoid robot, which has
passed the Turing test.37 The same can also be inferred from the charges framed by Sessions
Court u/s. 306 of Uparganj Penal Code,38 which maintains that Maia shall be taken as a
„person‟. Therefore, the Writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable, as the main object of writ of
habeas corpus is to release persons illegally detained or confined.39
25
26
Nabisab Maktumsab Chamanamalik S/o Maktumsab Chamanamalik v. State of Karnataka, 2015 Indlaw KAR
8016, ¶ 14.
27
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath , 341 U.S. 123 (1950).
28
Thomas Pelham Dale case, (1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA).
29
Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 S.C.C. 22, ¶ 5.
30
Supra note. 4 at ¶ 32.
31
Nisha Saim v. State of Kerala, (2009) S.C.C. Online Ker 2404, ¶ 8.
32
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
33
European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
34
American Convention on Human Rights art. 7, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
35
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights article 6, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
36
Ouko v. Kenya, (2002) 9 I.H.R.R. 246, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (232/99).
37
¶ 5, Fact sheet.
38
¶ 23 & ¶ 24, Fact sheet.
39
Sect. of State for Home Affairs v. O’ Brein, 1923 All E.R. Rep 442 (HL); Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala,
(2011) 10 S.C.C. 781, ¶ 16.
4
TH
2. WHETHER THE CHARGES FRAMED BY THE

SESSION JUDGE STAND IN THIS CASE OR
NOT?
18. It is humbly contended by the side petitioner that the deceased did not commit suicide as
envisaged by law [2.1] and Maia is not capable of standing trial in this case.40 [2.2]
[2.1] THAT THE DECEASED DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE AS ENVISAGED BY LAW
19. The facts under consideration are that right to life is inclusive of right to die [2.1.1] with
dignity [2.1.2]. That, there is no procedure laid down by law [2.1.3]; and voluntary starvation
is not a crime [2.1.4].
[2.1.1]. THAT RIGHT TO LIFE INCLUDES RIGHT TO DIE
20. It is humbly contended that the deceased was suffering from a terminal form of cancer which
ultimately would have resulted in death. 41 It is not uncommon for patients with advanced
cancers to ask their caregivers for an assisted death.42 „Right to die with dignity‟ is a part of
the „right to live with dignity‟43 as established under Article 21.44
[2.1.2]. THAT RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY IS INCLUSIVE RIGHT TO

PRIVACY
21. The constitution framers sought to protect citizens in their beliefs, thoughts, emotions and
sensations of pain and pleasure. They conferred, as against the government, the „right to be
let alone‟, the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.45
[2.1.2.1]. SCOPE OF LIBERTY
22. Matters involving choices central to personal dignity, lies at the heart of liberty.46 What lies at
the heart of liberty, as enunciated in the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,47 is the right to
40
Indian Penal Code, 1860 §306.
41
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
42
Judith K. Schwarz, Responding to Persistent Requests for Assistance in Dying: A Phenomenological Inquiry,
10 Int'l J. Palliative Nursing 225 (2004).
43
Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 S.C.C. 648, ¶ 24; Common Cause v. U.O.I., (2014) 5 S.C.C. 338, ¶ 10.
44
Indian Const. art 12.
45
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), ¶ 479.
46
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend 14.
5
TH
47
505 U.S. 833, ¶ 2807.
6
TH
define one's own concept of existence and of the mystery of human life. Attributes about
these matters could not be formed where the compulsion is formed by the State.48
[2.1.2.2]. THAT IT IS INCLUSIVE OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY
23. It is humbly submitted that liberty embraces right to personal privacy, 49 in making important
decisions for oneself.50 Constitutional protection is provided to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.51
24. The choice between life and death to be a deeply personal decision, 52 hence, the right to die
with dignity falls squarely within the right of privacy. A competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 53 This right is
interpreted to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment and take decision
for himself and his own body.54 Therefore, in the present case, deceased was justified in
making a decision, of ending his life, by refusing the medical treatment.
[2.1.3]. THAT VOLUNTARILY STARVATION IS NOT AN OFFENCE
25. Eating and drinking are categorized as a life-prolonging measure that can be refused by
capacitated patients who wish to die to escape suffering. 55 Petitioners humbly submit that if
an individual has a constitutionally protected right to refuse life sustaining nutrition, it is
logically impossible to make it a crime for that person to take active steps to terminate his
life.56 Every human being enjoys a right to make his own decision to decide. Such decisions
could be rational or irrational.57
26. No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others unless by clear and unquestioned authority of law.58
48
49
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), ¶ 684.
50
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), ¶ 877.
51
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, ¶ 713.
52
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. S.Ct. 2841 (1990), ¶ 281.
53
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), ¶ 40.
54
Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 (1977), ¶ 739.
55
James L. Bernat et al., Patient Refusal of Hydration and Nutrition: An Alternative to Physician-Assisted
Suicide or Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 153 Archives Internal Med. 2723, 2725 (1993).
56
Supra note 52 at ¶ 281; Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992).
57
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital, [1985] 2 W.L.R..
58
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), ¶ 251.
7
TH
[2.1.4]. THAT THERE IS NO PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY THE LAW
27. A person has the right to control fundamental decisions involving his or her own body.59 This
right of privacy is not absolute, but shall be balanced against certain state interests,60 to which
the petitioners contend that there is no compounding state interest, in the present case.
28. The right of a person to be let alone is a right of complete immunity. 61 Human beings have
the right to control medical decisions affecting one's body. 62 Prohibiting a person from using
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception violated a
right of privacy.63 Voluntary starvation has not been prohibited under any statute or under
any procedure established by law.
29. Under Article 21,64 no person can be deprived of his right except according to the procedure
established by law.65 Since, no law has been provided by the State for regulating or
prohibiting the exercise of such right to die, therefore, interpreting the impugned right to fall
under the definition of suicide, shall be violative of Article 21.
[2.1.5]. THAT COMMITTING SUICIDE IS NOT AN OFFENCE
30. Arguendo, if the right to die is to be interpreted to fall under suicide, it is to be noted that
suicide is longer an offence. S.309 had been declared unconstitutional. 66 Further, suicide or
attempt to commit it causes no harm to others, because of which State's interference with the
personal liberty of the persons concerned is not called for.67
[2.2]. THAT MAIA IS NOT CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL
31. It is humbly contended that Maia is incapable of standing trial in this case. The contentions
which are put forth establish that Maia is not the perpetrator of the offence [2.2.1]; Maia lacks
soul, consciousness, intentionaility, desires that demarcates humans as persons.[2.2.2]
59
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), ¶ 728.
60
Id. at ¶ 727.
61
Supra note 58 ¶ 251.
62
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 541, ¶ 541.
63
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), ¶ 484. See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
¶453.
64
65
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 S.C.C. 248, ¶ 3.
66
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 394, ¶ 109.
67
Ibid.
8
TH
[2.2.1]. THAT MAIA IS NOT THE PERPETRATOR OF CRIME
32. It is humbly contended that Maia is an innocent agent of the commission of the act [2.2.1.1]
and is considered as an innocent agent in every commission of the act [2.2.1.2].
[2.2.1.1]. MAIA IS AN INNOCENT AGENT
33. An innocent agent is one who commits the actus reus of an offence, but is himself devoid of
responsibility, either by reason of incapacity or absence of mens rea.68 Thus, a principal is a
person who by his own act or omission directly brings about the actus reus, or any part of the
actus reus, of a crime.69 Petitioner humbly contends that an innocent acting on the knowledge
of the principal offender, and not on his own, does no abetment to an offence.70
34. Deceased person was suffering from a terminal form of cancer. Instead of prolonging it any
further, he decided to end his life by an act of self starvation. 71 Maia was acting under the
instructions of deceased and had no mens rea, therefore, Maia should not be held criminally
responsible.72
[2.2.1.2] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS CONSIDERED AN INNOCENT AGENT
35. A.I. entity is considered as an innocent agent, a machine is a machine, and is never humans.73
Capabilities of A.I. resemble the parallel capabilities of a mentally limited person, who is
mentally incompetent,74 and one who lacks a criminal state of mind.75 The party orchestrating
the offense is the real perpetrator, who shall be held accountable for the conduct of the
innocent agent. The perpetrator's liability is determined on the basis of his conduct 76 and his
mental state.77 When an offence is done by a perpetrator-via-A.I. entity, programmer's action
shall be held liable. The liability imposed on A.I. entity shall be answered as the
„instrumental usage‟ of the A.I. entity as an innocent agent.78 Hence, A.I. entity shall not be
held liable.
68
Cross and Jones, Introduction to Criminal Law 386 (9th ed.).
69
Halsbury‟s on Law of England 3 (4th ed.)
70
Harji v State of Rajasthan, 1977 WLN 655: 1978 Raj LW 1.
71
¶ 8, Fact sheet.
72
Nkanang Akpan Umo v. The King, 1937 S.C.C. OnLine W.A.C.A. 13.
73
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences 1231 (70 N.C. L. Rev. 1992).
74
Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70 (1904), ¶ 183.
75
United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973), ¶ 91.
76
United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1979), ¶ 410.
77
United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) , ¶ 1100.
78
Maxey v. United States, 30 App. D.C. 63 (App. D.C. 1907), ¶ 3.
9
TH
[2.2.2]. MISSING SOMETHING ARGUMENT
36. It is humbly contended that this sub-contention predicated on the premise that Maia lacks
„that certain something‟.79 This „certain something‟, which demarcates humans as persons, is
presumed to be a soul [2.2.2.1], consciousness [2.2.2.2], intentionality [2.2.2.3], feelings
[2.2.2.4] and free wills [2.2.2.5].80
[2.2.2.1]. MAIA DOES NOT HAVE A SOUL
37. The first variation to the missing-something argument is that Maia lacks soul81 and therefore,
shall not be entitled to hold that Maia possesses any attributes which a natural person has,
with regard to emotions and feelings.
[2.2.2.2]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSESS CONSCIOUSNESS
38. The second variation to the missing-something argument is that Maia lacks consciousness. 82
Organic brains may be the only objects that are actually capable of generating
consciousness.83 It might turn out that A.I. is simply too slow to generate what we recognize
as consciousness.84 A proponent of the proposition that „A.I. is possible‟ says that we can
know whether or not an artifact is intelligent, in the sense that it can pass the Turing Test,
without knowing whether it is conscious.85
[2.2.2.3]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSES INTENTIONALITY
39. “Intentionality, as used in this objection, is a technical concept, which, in the philosophical
sense, is the quality of aboutness.86 The sole mental-state requirements to impose criminal
liability are knowledge, intent, negligence, or mens rea under the general theory of criminal
law,87 which stand absent in the present case.
40. Mens rea is defined as that feature of certain mental states, directed at or about objects and
states of affairs in the world. Thus, beliefs, desires, and intentions are intentional states.88
79
Owen J. Flanagan, JR., The Science of The Mind 254 (2d ed., 1991).
80
See, Lawrence B. Solum , Supra note 73.
81
Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 433 (1950).
82
Colin Mcginn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution 202-13 (1991).
83
Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence 49 (1988).
84
Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance 327-28 (1987).
85
See, Owen J. Flanagan, Supra note 73.
86
See, Owen J. Flanagan, Supra note 73.
87
Jerome Hall, General Principles Of Criminal Law 70 (2d ed. 2005).
88
John R. Searle, Minds, Brains And Science 28 (1984).
10
TH
Maia had no reason to know or believe that what Maia is aiding or supporting, is a criminal
act. Therefore, it cannot be said that Maia intentionally aids the doing of an offence. 89
41. aiding, without having knowledge of the offence being committed or contemplated, will not
constitute an offence.90 Intention, should lead or push the deceased in such a position that he
commits suicide.91
42. Assertion needs to be made whether Maia knew the difference between right and wrong. 92
With intent to defraud or mislead, Maia is required to have knowledge of the essential nature
of the alleged commission of crime,93 which too stands missing in the instant case.
[2.2.2.4]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSESS FEELINGS
43. The fourth variation to the missing-something argument is that Maia lacks the capacity to
possess feelings which consists of the capability to experience emotions, desires, pleasures,
and/or pains.94 Human emotions are tied to our body system through hormones and
neurotransmitters. No computer without these could produce human emotions. 95 Maia cannot
be a person, for it does not possess human-like feelings because it does not possess a relevant
physiology of a human.96
[2.2.2.5]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSESS FREE WILL
44. The fifth missing-something argument is that Maia does not possess freedom of will. 97 Maia
is a mere robot, which carried out the will of deceased, who programmed Maia. Maia is
developed, merely to carry out instructions provided by humans in a mechanical fashion.
45. Henceforth, Petitioner humbly submits that Maia is not capable of standing trial in this case,
as Maia is an innocent agent controlled by another person and lacks intention, free will,
consciousness and does not possess feelings or soul.
89
Ramabatar Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, 1983 Cr.L.J. 122 (Ori), ¶ 10.
90
Ramnath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1926 All. 231, ¶ 7.
91
Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of A.P., (2010) 1 S.C.C. 750, ¶ 17.
92
R. v. McNaughten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
93
United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1998) , ¶ 487.
94
Supra note 79.
95
Supra note 79.
96
Georges Rey, Functionalism and the Emotions, in Explaining Emotions 163, 192 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty
ed., 1980).
97
Arie A. Covrigaru & Robert K. Lindsay, Deterministic Autonomous Systems, 110 (A.I. MAG., Fall 1991).
11
TH
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST,

BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF HAMRAK PRISON, ARE REASONABLE?
46. Petitioners humbly contend before Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the conditions imposed on
the journalist, by the Superintendent of jail are unreasonable. It is contended that media has
right of freedom of speech and expression [3.1], also the interview sought to be conducted, is
in the interest of the public [3.2]. The restrictions are unreasonable [3.3] in nature, being
violative of the Laws of Uparanj and in contravention with the International Covenants [3.4].
[3.1] THAT THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS GUARANTEED TO PRESS AND ALL OTHER
FORMS OF MEDIA.
47. It is humbly submitted that the Constitution under Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of
speech and expression to the press and media [3.1.1], also the same is guaranteed by several
International conventions to the people. Further, pubic also have a right to know[3.1.2].
[3.1.1] FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION OF PRESS
48. The practice of journalism, requires a person to be responsibly involved in activities defined
or comprised in the freedom of expression guaranteed. 98 A free, uncensored and unhindered
press or media is essential in society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the
enjoyment of other Covenant rights. 99 It constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic
society.100 It is essential for journalists and media to enjoy the protection and independence
necessary to fully practice their profession, since they keep society informed.101
[3.1.2] CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW
49. The media has a duty to impart, in a manner consistent with its obligations and
responsibilities, ideas on all matters of public interest. 102 There has to be an active and
intelligent participation of the people in all spheres including the affairs of State.103 It is the
98
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 2 July 2004,
Series C No. 107,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C), ¶117 & ¶118.
99
Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, Commc‟n No. 1128/2002 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (2005),
¶ 6.8.
100
McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers Ltd, (2009) E.W.H.C. 2375, ¶147.
101
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R., 164, (1997), ¶150.
102
Jersild v. Denmark, 19 E.H.R.R. 1, (1994), ¶ 31.
103
Surya Prakash Khatri vs. Madhu Trehan, 2001 S.C.C. OnLine Del 590, ¶ 23.
12
TH
right of people to be informed about current burning and important issues in order to enable
them to consider and form broad opinion about the same.104
[3.2] THAT THERE IS NO COMPELLING STATE INTEREST WHICH IS INVOLVED.
50. It is humbly submitted that the interview sought to be conducted, is in the interest of public as
citizens have a right to know and there is no compelling interest of the state which is
involved. Further media has an unrestrictive right [3.2.1] to conduct interviews [3.2.2], which
can be limited through compelling state interest, which is not present in the present case.
[3.2.1] THAT MEDIA HAS RIGHT TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS
51. Though, the journalists are not expressly referred to in rule 42 of the manual, 105 they cannot
be denied the opportunity to interview the under trial prisoner. 106 Journalists and newspaper
men, therefore, can legitimately be called the friends of the prisoners.107
[3.2.2] UNRESTRICTIVE RIGHT TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS
52. Journalists cannot ordinarily be denied the opportunity of interviewing prisoners. Right of the
Press to interview a prisoner cannot be denied unless there are good and weighty reasons for
such denial.108 Press is free to publish a matter which does not invade other citizens' rights
and/or does not violate the sovereignty and integrity of India and public order.109
53. While prison discipline, inmate safety, and rehabilitation are of indisputably compelling state
interests' but regulations advancing those interests must be tailored so as not to unnecessarily
restrict freedom of speech and expression.110
[3.3]. THAT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF JAIL ARE

UNREASONABLE
54. It is submitted that the restrictions imposed on Mr. Jedpare for conducting interview are
unreasonable as it is violative of freedom of press and media, and also of various
International laws and conventions. Though, under Article 19(2) the state can impose
reasonable restrictions [3.3.1], but same needs to be done in the interest of the public or on
104
Ibid.
105
Delhi prisons (prisoners‟ welfare fund, appeals, petitions, interviews and communication) Rules, 1988.
106
Prabha Dutt v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.C. 1, ¶ 3 & ¶ 4.
107
Binoo K. John v. State of Kerala, 1985 S.C.C. OnLine Ker 215, ¶ 19. Supra note 106 at ¶ 6.
108
Supra note 106.
109
Ruben Banerjee v. State of Orissa, 2000 S.C.C. OnLine Ori 139, ¶ 5.
110
Hillery v. Procunier, 1974 WL 185820 (U.S.).
13
TH
any other ground mentioned thereof. Further, media has unrestricted and uncensored right to
interview [3.3.2], and the restrictions should stand on the reasonability test [3.3.3].
[3.3.1] SCOPE OF REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS
55. Supreme Court observed that 'reasonable restrictions', which the State could impose on the
fundamental rights, should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required
for achieving the objects of the legislation, otherwise it will lack reasonableness. 111
56. The court should take into consideration the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed
and the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil
sought to be remedied, and the prevailing conditions of the time. 112 The restrictions imposed
on journalist to conduct interviews, violates freedom of speech and expression as provided
under Article 19(1)(a).113 Any restriction imposed upon the freedom of speech and expression
is prima facie unconstitutional, unless it can be justified under the limitation Clause provided
under clause 19(2).114
[3.3.2] UNRESTRICTED AND UNCENSORED RIGHT TO INTERVIEW
57. One of the essential elements of freedom of press includes freedom to have access to all
sources of information.115 The widest possible broadcasting of information from diverse
sources is essential for the welfare of public.116 State authorities should ensure that public
broadcasting services operate in an independent manner. 117 In the case of Hillery v.
Procunier,118 court granted unrestricted and uncensored interview to the journalist.
58. Everyone has a right to freedom of thought and expression and the same can be restricted
after the exercise of the such right and not before that. 119 Prior restraints on speech and
publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on such a right. A prior
restraint has an immediate and irreversible sanction.120
111
Chintaman Rao v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 118, ¶ 6.
112
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, 1952 S.C.R. 597, ¶ 19.
113
M. Hasan and Anr. v Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1998 A.P. 35, ¶ 29.
114
Ibid.
115
M.S.M Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, A.I.R. 1959 S.C 395.
116
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
117
Concluding observations on Republic of Moldova (CCPR/CO/75/MDA).
118
Supra note 110.
119
Supra note 34 art. 13, cl. 2.
120
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1979), ¶ 6.
14
TH
[3.3.3] TEST OF REASONABLENESS
59. Article 19 of I.C.C.P.R.121 also ensures freedom of expression to everyone. Any restriction on
such freedom must be provided by law, must address an aim, and must be necessary to
achieve a legitimate purpose.122
60. A reasonable restriction should have a rational relation with the grounds for which the
legislature is entitled to impose such restriction. 123 The restrictions so imposed can be tested
by the principle of proportionality. The court, while looking into reasonableness of
restrictions through this principle will look whether the legislature or administrative authority
„maintains a proper balance between the adverse effects which restrictions may have no
rights, liberties or interest of persons, keeping in mind the purpose intended to serve‟.124 The
reasonableness of the restrictions can be tested through three part test. The three part test
imposes conditions on an interview which shall be Prescribed by law [3.3.3.1], should have a
legitimate aim [3.3.3.2], and be necessary in a democratic society [3.3.3.3].125
[3.3.3.1] PRESCRIBED BY LAW
61. The requirement of prescribed by law essentially is that of precision and clarity. 126 The same
view was consistently upheld by the European Court of Human rights in other cases as
well.127 In the instant case no such conditions are prescribed under the Delhi Prison Act.
[3.3.3.2] LEGITIMATE AIM
62. The courts have recognized risk to national security as a valid case for restricting expression.
The Johannesburg Principles provide that restriction sought to be justified on the ground of
national security are legitimate when they protect its capacity to respond to the use or threat
of force.128. In the instant case there was no such threat to the national security.
[3.3.3.3] NECESSARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
121
Supra note 32 art 19(3).
122
Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, , U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994), ¶ 9.7.
123
M.P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, (7th ed., 2014)
124
Om Kumar v. Union Of India, (2001) 2 S.C.C. 386, ¶ 28.
125
Gaweda v. Poland, (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 4.
126
R v. Shayler, [2002] U.K.H.L. 11,¶ 60.
127
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245, ¶ 49. See, Muller v Switzerland, (1988) 13
E.H.R.R. 212; Mark Intern Verlag Gmbh and Klaus Beermann v. Germany, (1989) 12 E.H.R.R. 161; Feldek v.
Slovakia, App no 29032/95 (E.C.H.R., 12 July 2001), ¶ 56.
128
UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984, E/CN.4/1985/4.
15
TH
63. For restrictions to be necessary in a democratic society, there must be a „pressing social
need‟ and the law framed to address these needs must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.129
64. It is further submitted that in the case in hand, the restrictions imposed by the superintendent
are unreasonable and encroaching upon media‟s freedom of speech and expression.
Reasonableness of restriction is open to judicial review.130
[3.4] THAT THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ARE IN CONTRAVENTION WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS.
65. It is submitted that the restrictions imposed by the Superintended of Jail on Mr. Jedpare, for
interviewing Maia, are also in contravention of various International Conventions.
66. Freedom of expression is guaranteed under Article 19 of the U.D.H.R. 131, and more or less in
similar terms under Article 19, I.C.C.P.R.:- “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.”
67. Freedom of expression is also protected under all three human rights treaties, under Article
10, E.C.H.R.,132 under Article 13, A.C.H.R.133 and under Article 9, African Charter on
Human and Peoples‟ Rights. However, any limitations on such Freedom must remain within
strictly defined parameters. It is expedient to note that, United Nations General Assembly,
at its first session in 1946, declared freedom of information as a fundamental human right.134
68. The First Amendment of US gave freedom of press, the protection it must have, to fulfill its
essential role in democracy. The government's power to censor the press was abolished so
that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected
so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.135
69. States are obligated, under Article 2(2) of I.C.C.P.R., to „take the necessary steps‟ to ensure
its protection, including adopting „laws or other measures as may be necessary‟ and
providing
„an effective remedy‟ to those whose freedom of expression has been violated.
129
Lingens v Austria, (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, ¶ 40. See also, Barthold v Germany, (1985) 7 E.H.R.R 383.
130
See, Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 4 S.C.C. 373.
131
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art 10, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).
132
Supra note 33 art. 10.
133
Supra note 34 art. 7.
134
Resolution 59(1), 14 December 1946.
16
TH
135
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, ¶ 717.
17
TH
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT

PROCEEDINGS IN CAMERA, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE CITIZEN’S
RIGHT
TO KNOW AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS?
70. Petitioner humbly contends before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court to seek an order permitting to
record the court proceedings in this criminal prosecution of extraordinary significance. The
Petitioners contend that the presumption of a just and fair trial will be violated, if proceeding
conducted in camera [4.1]. An absolute ban on recording and broadcasting trials is
unconstitutional [4.2], as the public and press have a right of access to court proceedings
[4.3.] and such a right includes right to record court proceedings [4.4.].
[4.1]. THAT CLOSING THIS TRIAL TO CAMERAS IS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER

CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
It is humbly contended that, in camera trial is against just and fair trail [4.1.1], and right to a
public hearing is getting violated [4.1.2]. Further, it is contended that it is the right of the
accused to public hearing [4.1.3] and there is no government interest involved [4.1.4]
[4.1.1] THAT IN-CAMERA PROCEEDING WILL VIOLATE THE FAIRNESS OF THE TRIAL
71. The need of proceedings to be held in-camera shall be done till the extent necessary in public
interest and to avoid prejudice to the accused. 136 Open and public trial is one of the
Constitutional guarantees of a fair and just trial. 137 Similar rights are conferred to the
petitioners by way of I.C.C.P.R.,138U.D.H.R.,139 A.C.H.P.R.,140 A.C.H.R.141 and E.C.H.R.,142
Sixth Amendment rights143 and The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.144
[4.1.2] THAT THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC HEARING IS VIOLATED
72. Though, the right of free and fair public hearing, under I.C.C.P.R., is subject to certain
restrictions, but such reasonable restrictions shall be enforced, when the parties so require, or
136
Vineet Narain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 889, ¶ 32.
137
138
Supra note 128 at art 14, cl. 1.
139
Supra note 131 at art 10.
140
Supra note 35 at art 7.
141
Supra note 34 at art. 8.
142
Supra note 33 at art. 6, cl. 1.
143
U.S. Const. Amend 6.
144
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
18
TH
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.145 The proceedings must be public, the general public must be present and
the mass media should have its role. This is the principle upheld in I.C.C.P.R.,146 U.D.H.R.147
and A.D.R.D.M.148 What takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if access to observe
the trial could, be foreclosed arbitrarily. 149 Where all the proceedings in the case, even the
hearing itself, were held out of the public eye and in secret, a blatant violation of the right to a
public hearing stands recognized.150
73. In the present case, the High Court‟s order151 in reference to in-camera proceedings, stand in
violation to Uparganj Constitution as well as International Covenants, as the restriction put on
the public trial is neither required by the accused, nor prejudices the interests of justice and
nor any other interest, as mentioned under Article 14(1) of I.C.C.P.R.
[4.1.3] THAT IT IS ACCUSED PERSON’S RIGHT TO PUBLIC HEARING
74. All criminal proceedings before a judge are open to the public. Defendant has an explicit
right to public trial.152 Also, the public and press have an implicit right to access these
proceedings.153 Openness is a value in itself, that judge must consider, even when the parties
in the trial may wish otherwise.154 The general rule of law holds a trial to be public.155
75. In the case of Faretta v. California156 the defendants were themselves of the opinion that in-
camera proceedings shall not pursue in their case as he shall bear the personal consequences
of a conviction. Although, he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment,
his choice must be honored out of „that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.157
[4.1.4] THAT THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT INTEREST INVOLVED
76. There is no compelling government interest, closure must be justified by an overriding

interest based on findings that it is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
145
Supra note 32 at art. 14, cl.1.
146
Ibid.
147
Supra note 131 at art 10 & art 11, cl. 1.
148
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948 art 26.
149
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, ¶ 576-7.
150
Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, I.H.R.L. 1424 (I.A.C.H.R. 1998), ¶ 172.
151
¶ 28, Fact sheet.
152
U.S. Const. Amend 6. See also, Florida Constitution art I, § 16.
153
Criminal Practice & Procedure, 22 Fla. Prac., § 18:4 (ed. 2015).
154
Washington Post Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1991), ¶ 331.
155
U.S. Const. Amend 6; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948 art 26.
156
95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975), ¶ 2541.
157
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, ¶ 351.
19
TH
to serve that interest.158 Access to judicial proceedings and the record therein may be
prohibited, consistent with the freedom of speech, only if - (a) closure serves a compelling
interest, and (b) in the absence of such closure, the compelling interest would be harmed.159
77. It is humbly contended that, there is no such compelling governmental interest present so as
to foreclose the citizen‟s right to know and right to access judicial proceedings under
I.C.C.P.R.160 The High Court of Uparganj, while ordering for in-camera proceedings on
account of inconvenience,161 did not stand up to be a compelling governmental interest and
therefore violates the freedom of speech. Public discussions, merely, on the topic of artificial
intelligence and right to die,162 shall not restrict the Fundamental Rights of Respondent. It
shall be construed that I.C.C.P.R., Uparganj Constitution and First Amendment do not protect
„talkativeness‟, nor does it require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in
public debate. It is essential that a person shall not be restricted from putting forth his opinion
on everything that is worth saying. 163 It is particularly inappropriate for any court to exercise
its discretionary powers so as to restrict access to information for the sole reason that the
subject matter of a proceeding is deemed by the court not to be newsworthy.164
[4.2] THAT THE BAN ON RECORDING AND BROADCASTING TRIALS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
78. Justice Clark's opined in the case of Estes v. State of Texas165 that “we are not dealing here
with future developments in the field of electronics,” nor with “the hypothesis of tomorrow,”
but with “the facts as they are presented today”, in the year 1965. The Press and public rights,
to attend and observe court proceedings, were substantially broadened in the case of
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.166, holding that this public right to access court
proceedings does flow to the print media, with priority.167
79. The court may not base its decision on conclusive assertions alone, but must make specific
factual findings.168 No law in Uparganj prohibits the use of cameras in criminal trials. The
158
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), ¶ 502.
159
In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986), ¶ 392.
160
Supra note 128 at art 19, cl. 2.
161
¶ 28, Fact sheet.
162
¶ 18, Fact sheet.
163
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: representative democracy and the people's elusive “right to
know”, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1. See also, Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government
25, 88 (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245.
164
Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 923 F.Supp. 580 (1996), ¶ 588 & n. 10.
165
Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), ¶ 552.
166
Supra note 149 ¶ 573
167
Supra note 149 ¶ 573.
168
20
TH
advance technology have demonstrated, that the objections on televising trials can readily be
addressed and should no longer stand as a bar to the freedom of speech of press in order to
televise as well as publish court proceedings, and of the public to view those proceedings169.
[4.3] THAT THE PUBLIC AND PRESS HAVE A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS
80. The Universal Declaration proclaims that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.170 The Freedom of Information Act, 1966171 (FOIA) in
U.S. recognizes that citizens need information to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens. The
„right to know‟ is a foundational value of the central animating value of F.O.I.A., and the key
to interpreting F.O.I.A.172 The public is entitled to a right of information regarding public
matters. However, certain documents pertaining to information may be exempted from public
scrutiny.173 None of the exemptions as mentioned under F.O.I.A relates to the condition in the
present case. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the public have a right of access to the
court proceedings.
[4.4] THAT THE RIGHT TOACCESS INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO RECORD AND TELECAST THE
PROCEEDINGS.
81. With respect to freedom of speech and expression of public and media, the Constitution of
Uparganj,174 First Amendment of U.S. Constitution and I.C.C.P.R. 175 are alike. The right to
access court requires that all criminal trials be open to the press and public, until and unless
there are compelling and clearly articulated reasons for closing such proceedings. 176
[4.4.1] THAT THE COURTS WILL STILL FUNCTION SMOOTHLY
82. Instead of acquiring information about trials by first hand observation or by word of mouth
from those who attended, people have now acquired it chiefly through the print and electronic
media.177 It is high time that the Uparganj Courts and State should consider the introduction
169
170
Supra note 131 art 19. See also, Supra note 33 art. 10.
171
5 U.S.C. § 552.
172
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: representative democracy and the people's elusive “right to
know”, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1.
173
5 U.S.C. § 552.
174
Indian Const. art 19, cl. 1(a).
175
Supra note 32 at art. 19, cl.
176
Supra note 149 at ¶ 17& ¶ 580.
177
Supra note 149 at ¶ 572 & ¶ 573.
21
TH
of authenticated audio/video recording of the proceedings in all Courts. In J. Dipak Misra’s

view, audio and video recording shall help smooth functioning of the Courts.178
83. Everyone shall have the right to seek, receive and impart information . . . of all kinds.179 The
right of access shall not only apply to some individuals, but is a right provided to the
public.180 People retain a right of visitation to courts, which enables them to satisfy
themselves that justice is in fact being done. 181 The public is entitled to know what is
happening to the accused. There is no other way the ordinary citizen can evaluate how the
judicial system is administering justice except through the media.182
[4.4.2] THAT MEANS AVAILABLE TO RECORD PROCEEDINGS ARE EASY TO USE
84. Thus, the means that exists, to access the court proceedings, must be allowed into
courtrooms. If the print media, with its pens, pencils and note pads, have a right to access to a
criminal trial, then the electronic media, with its cameras, must be given equal access too. 183
It cannot be denied that television news coverage plays an increasingly prominent part in
informing the public at large of the workings of government.184
85. Justice Harlan, in his dispositive concurring opinion in Estes’ case, recognized that „the day
may come when camera could safely be admitted to our courtrooms. At that time, its usage
may not disparage the judicial processes,185 and rather would uplift the process of the courts.
Taking Justice Harlan‟s view in Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue186 case, the right of
the press to televise as well as publish court proceedings and of the public to view those
proceedings on television shall no longer be barred, reveals that the day has finally come.
86. Therefore, Petitioner humbly submits before this Hon‟ble Supreme Court to dismiss the in-
camera proceedings, in exercise of providing citizen‟s the right to access the court
proceedings. Also, the press shall be given freedom of speech and expression to record the
court proceedings.
178
Deepak Khosla v. Union of India and Ors., 2011 (182) D.LT. 208.
179
Indian Consti. art. 19, cl. 2.
180
United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348 (3d Cir. 1994), ¶ 1360.
181
182
State, ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d, ¶ 467.
183
Cosmos Broadcasting Corp. v. Brown, 471 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), ¶ 882.
184
Cable News Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981), ¶ 1245.
185
Supra note 165 at ¶ 595 & ¶ 596.
186
22
TH
PRAYER
Therefore, in the light of issues involved, arguments advanced, reasons given and the
authorities cited, this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased:
a) To issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the Superintendant of Police and release
Maia to the custody of Mr. Galon Kasra.
b) To quash the charges framed by the Sessions judge and hold Maia to be not capable
of standing trial in this case.
c) To strike down the conditions imposed by Superintendent of Jail and issue fresh
permission for conducting the interview, which are in accordance with law.
d) To set aside the order of the High Court to conduct proceeding in-camera, and to
permit audio-video recording of the court proceedings.
Any other and further relief which this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests
of Justice and Equity. All of which is respectfully submitted.
For This Act of Kindness, the Appellant/Petitioner Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.
Sd/-
(Counsels for the Appellant/Petitioner)
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WRIT PETITION(CRIMINAL) NO_/2020 (UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UPARGANJ)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR.

[1.3] That the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable............................................................3

[2.1] That deceased did not commit suicide as understood by law.......................................5

[2.2]. That Maia is not capable of standing trial..................................................................7

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST,

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT IN-

[4.2] That the ban on recording and broadcasting trials is unconstitutional.....................18

A.I.R. All India Reporter

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO

50. Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, I.H.R.L. 1424 (I.A.C.H.R. 1998). … 17

76. Ouko v. Kenya, (2002) 9 I.H.R.R. 246. …4

SECONDARY MATERIAL: ARTICLES

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION PAGE NO.

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

SECONDARY MATERIAL: BOOKS

S.NO BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

14. Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 388 (1992).

S.NO NAME OF THE STATUES

MR. GALON KASRA v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ

MR ASSARDEI JEDPARE v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ

MR. GALON KASRA v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ

UPARGANJ NEWS NETWORK v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ

MR. GALON KASRA v. KINGDOM OF UPARGANJ

I. The Kingdom of Uparganj is a Constitutional monarchy with a Westminster style Parliament.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED ON THE JOURNALIST, BY THE

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT TO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS IN

1. THAT, THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR. GALON KASRA IS

3. THAT, THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JAIL SUPERINTENDANT ON MR. ASSARDEI

RECORDING AND CONDUCTING IN-CAMERA PROCEEDINGS, IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF

‘CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW’, ‘FREEDOM OF PRESS’ AND ‘MAIA’S FREEDOM OF

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION’.

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED BY MR.

[1.1.1] PROCEDURE FOR MAKING AN ARREST, DETENTION AND INQUIRY

[1.1.2] THAT NO ENQUIRY TO BE DONE BEFORE F.I.R IS REGISTERED

6. Commencement of investigation, by a police officer, is subject to two conditions, firstly, the

[1.3] THAT THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS MAINTAINABLE

2. WHETHER THE CHARGES FRAMED BY THE

[2.1.1]. THAT RIGHT TO LIFE INCLUDES RIGHT TO DIE

[2.1.2]. THAT RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY IS INCLUSIVE RIGHT TO

[2.1.2.1]. SCOPE OF LIBERTY

[2.1.2.2]. THAT IT IS INCLUSIVE OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY

[2.1.3]. THAT VOLUNTARILY STARVATION IS NOT AN OFFENCE

[2.1.4]. THAT THERE IS NO PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY THE LAW

[2.1.5]. THAT COMMITTING SUICIDE IS NOT AN OFFENCE

[2.2]. THAT MAIA IS NOT CAPABLE OF STANDING TRIAL

[2.2.1]. THAT MAIA IS NOT THE PERPETRATOR OF CRIME

[2.2.1.1]. MAIA IS AN INNOCENT AGENT

[2.2.1.2] ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS CONSIDERED AN INNOCENT AGENT

[2.2.2]. MISSING SOMETHING ARGUMENT

[2.2.2.1]. MAIA DOES NOT HAVE A SOUL

[2.2.2.2]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSESS CONSCIOUSNESS

[2.2.2.3]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSES INTENTIONALITY

[2.2.2.4]. MAIA DOES NOT POSSESS FEELINGS