The Antinomy, Section 3–8 18

447

Eric Watkins

The Antinomy of
Pure Reason, Sections 3–8
(A462/B490–A515/B543)

18.1 Position and Function of Antinomy,

Sections 3–8
Within the Antinomy chapter sections 1 and 2 introduce and
present the four antinomies, whereas section 9 develops a de-
tailed resolution of each of the four antinomies. Sections 3
through 8 link these endeavors by a) explaining reason’s essen-
tial role in generating the antinomies, b) presenting transcen-
dental idealism, c) showing how transcendental idealism can
reveal the faulty inferences involved in each thesis and antithe-
sis argument, and d) reassigning to reason a positive, albeit
merely regulative (as opposed to constitutive), role in the for-
mation of our knowledge of the world.

18.2 Structure and Main Claims of Sections 3–8

18.2.1 Section 3. – (1) Kant claims that the four antinomies
presented in Section 2 arise from reason because reason neces-
sarily searches for the unconditioned set of conditions for ob-
jects that are given in experience. However, because everything
given in experience is conditioned, its search for conditions that
are themselves unconditioned will force it to go beyond what is
given in experience and thus to create ideas, i. e., representa-
tions to which no adequate object can be given in experience (cf.
A311/B367).

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448 Eric Watkins

(2) Since reason itself leads to the antinomies (by searching

for the unconditioned conditions of objects given in experi-
ence), it can neither treat them with indifference nor command
peace from a neutral standpoint. Accordingly, reason must con-
sider whether the conflict might not arise from a misunder-
standing or false (e. g., transcendentally realistic) assumption
that derives from reason itself. Kant takes up this issue primarily
in Section 7. – (3) Kant finally considers the interests in support
of each side of the antinomies.

18.2.2 Section 4. – (1) Kant first asks whether it is sensible to

expect reason (or transcendental philosophy) to be able to an-
swer all of the questions that it poses. Kant states that it must be
able to answer any question it poses concerning an empirically
given object. Accordingly, only cosmological questions must be
answerable, not questions arising in rational psychology or the-
ology because in these disciplines reason constructs an idea of
an object without that object being given empirically; God and
the soul are not empirically given objects, whereas the world is.
(2) Kant supports his contention that reason should be able to
answer all questions it raises by suggesting that two other pure
rational sciences, namely mathematics and ethics, are also in a
position to answer all questions that reason raises. The same
does not hold for the natural sciences because they continuously
make suppositions that can never be known with certainty.
(3) Kant presents another argument for the claim that reason
can answer all cosmological questions by suggesting that the
only other possible source of answers to such questions, namely
experience, is unable to do so insofar as experience cannot
explain the world as an absolute whole; rather, reason must do
so.

18.2.3 Section 5. – (1) Kant first illustrates how reason’s repre-

sentation of the world (i. e., the cosmological idea) is either too
large or too small to fit what we can experience. The idea is too
large in the case of each antithesis and too small in the case of
each thesis (except for the Fourth Antinomy, in which case the
situation is reversed).
(2) Kant then argues that reason is to be blamed for the
mismatch between it and possible experience. Possible experi-

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 449

ence is not at fault, since it and it alone can establish that any
given representation actually refers to an object.

18.2.4 Section 6. – (1) Kant first presents transcendental ideal-

ism, which may be summarized as follows:
a) The distinction thesis: There is a distinction between
things in themselves and appearances. (See Phaenomena/Nou-
mena, A235/B294 ff.)
b) The ideality thesis: appearances are in some sense ideal,
i. e., subject-dependent, whereas things in themselves are not.
(Appearances “have no independent existence outside our
thoughts”, A491/B519.)
c) The grounding thesis: Things in themselves “ground” and/
or “affect” appearances. (A19/B33 or, more clearly, in the
GMS, IV 451)
d) The spatio-temporal thesis: Space, time, and the spatio-
temporal (i. e., sensible) world are appearances. (”Everything
intuited in space or time and therefore all objects of any
experience possible for us are nothing but appearances”,
A490 f./B518 f.)
e) The thesis of the non-spatio-temporal nature of things in
themselves: Things in themselves are not in space and time.
(A thing in itself qua non-sensible cause of appearances
“would have to be represented as in neither space nor time”,
A494/B522.)
f) The knowledge thesis: We can have empirical knowledge
of appearances, but not of things in themselves, which can
only be thought. (“The non-sensible cause of these represen-
tations is completely unknown to us”, A494/B522.)
(2) In the course of his explanation of transcendental idealism,
Kant distinguishes this doctrine from transcendental realism,
empirical idealism, and a certain version of phenomenalism
according to which objects are nothing but (sets of) actual re-
presentations.

18.2.5 Section 7 – (1) Kant first analyzes the fallacious inference

made on both the thesis and antithesis sides of the antinomies.
The crucial premise is: “If the conditioned is given, then the
entire series of all its conditions is likewise given” (cf. A409/
B436). It fits into the antinomies insofar as we do have experi-

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450 Eric Watkins

ence of sensible objects that are conditioned. Reason then infers

that the conditions of these sensible objects must also be given.
However, this inference holds only for things in themselves, not
for appearances. If the conditioned given is sensible, then the
series of its conditions is not thereby given, but must be sought
in an empirical regress.
(2) This analysis shows only that the arguments presented for
each thesis and antithesis are fallacious, not that the claims each
makes must be false. At this point, one might still think that the
claims of either the theses or the antitheses must be true since
the one denies what the other affirms. Accordingly, Kant must
also show that the very claims of each thesis and antithesis are
inappropriate. Kant argues that the thesis and antithesis claims
are not really contradictory and thus that it is not the case that
one of the two must be true. Rather, they are what he calls
dialectical contradictions and hence rest on a common assump-
tion, namely that the world has completely determinate proper-
ties (e. g., determinate size, shape, position). For only if the
world has determinate properties can one infer that the world
must be, e. g., either finite or infinite in size. Thus, in order to
prevent either the thesis or antithesis claims from being true, it
must be the case that the world is not a completely determinate
whole. However, according to reason’s conception of them,
things in themselves do constitute a completely determinate
whole. Therefore, the world we experience is not a thing in
itself, but rather merely an appearance, that is, transcendental
idealism must be true. It is by means of this line of argument
that Kant thinks that he has provided an “indirect proof of the
transcendental ideality of appearances” (A506/B534).

18.2.6 Section 8. – (1) Kant first explains how reason’s search for
the unconditioned is a regulative, not a constitutive rule for
experience. That is, it does not concern the object, but rather
what reason ought to do with respect to the object, namely
search for its conditions.
(2) Kant then distinguishes two different ways in which this
regulative principle of reason can be instantiated in experience.
Reason must search for the conditions of a given object in either
a “progressus in infinitum” (A510/B538) or a “progressus in
indefinitum” (A511/B539). In other words, reason may search

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 451

for conditions either to infinity or indefinitely, depending on

whether the whole object is given in intuition or not. The
former is the case only for the Second Antinomy.

18.3 Textual Commentary

18.3.1 Section 3. – In the first paragraph of this section (A462/
B490) Kant first argues that reason naturally and inevitably
leads to the difficulties expressed by the antinomies. It is rea-
son’s nature to search for the conditions for conditioned objects
and not to stop until all conditions (and thus the unconditioned)
have been found. At the same time, it is the nature of objects as
they are given to us in intuition that they do not contain all of
their own conditions. For all objects that we intuit are finite,
limited, contingent, and thus conditioned. This fundamental
tension is what gives rise to the antinomies. The one require-
ment demands completeness of conditions and the other re-
quirement prohibits it insofar as intuition cannot provide every
relevant condition.
Kant also claims (A462/B490) that reason (insofar as it is
concerned with cosmological ideas, i. e., ideas that concern the
world as a whole) generates exactly four antinomies. Kant justi-
fies this claim by asserting that there are only four series of
synthetic presuppositions which impose a priori limitations on
empirical syntheses. Kant’s explicit justification for this claim
occurs in Section 1. Kant also indicates that his treatment of
these fundamental conflicts is not meant to be exhaustive or to
involve any empirical features that they may have in other
contexts. Rather, insofar as he is presenting his transcendental
philosophy, he is interested in indicating the non-empirical or
normative basis for these tensions as they may arise in a variety
of empirical contexts.
In the second and third paragraphs of this section (A463–465/
B491 ff.) Kant emphasizes the dignity and value philosophy
exemplifies in reason’s valiant search for the unconditioned, a
worth far surpassing that of other sciences because its ends
concern humanity more closely. Precisely because reason de-
rives its value from such lofty concerns, it is completely com-
promised by the contradictions expressed in the antinomies.

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452 Eric Watkins

Accordingly, it cannot respond to these contradictions in more

standard ways, e. g., by remaining neutral at a distance or by
settling the dispute as an arbitrator would. Kant suggests that
the only solution reason can hope for is to identify a misunder-
standing that is assumed in the arguments of both sides of the
antinomies.
Rather than immediately stating what this assumption might
be (which Kant will do in Sections 6 and 7), in the remaining
paragraphs of this section (A465–76/B493–504) Kant proceeds
to highlight the standpoint and interests of each side to the
dispute. His apparent reason for undertaking this task is not that
it reveals any objective advantage to one side or the other, but
rather that it should help us to understand why each side has
adopted its respective standpoint.
The standpoint of the antitheses is alleged to be that of “pure
empiricism” (A466/B494) insofar as what is given in experience
is emphasized, whereas that of the theses is supposed to repre-
sent “the dogmatism of pure reason” (ibid.) insofar as the theses
tend to stress intelligible beginnings (e. g., the principle of suffi-
cient reason). Kant first discusses dogmatism’s interests as ex-
pressed in the theses (A466 f./B494 f.). Dogmatism displays a
practical interest insofar as its claims appear to be the founda-
tions of morality and religion. It also has a speculative interest
insofar as dogmatism can grasp the entire chain of conditions
a priori. Finally, dogmatism is “popular” (A467/B495), that is
part of, or compatible with, pre-philosophical common sense.
Kant then turns to empiricism (A468/B496). Empiricism has no
practical interest on its side (rather the converse seems to be the
case), but it does enjoy important speculative advantages over
dogmatism insofar as it always finds itself on proper ground by
sticking to what is given in experience. In fact, Kant expresses
considerable sympathy for empiricism, complaining that it goes
awry primarily insofar as it does not merely urge epistemic
moderation but rather becomes dogmatic by denying whatever
lies beyond intuition. It does not enjoy much support in pre-
philosophical common sense, though Kant seems to express
genuine surprise at this fact. Kant finishes his assessment of
empiricism’s interests by noting an important conceptual diffi-
culty with empiricism, namely that it does not allow for the
possibility of the systematic nature of our knowledge. Kant’s way

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 453

of putting the point is to say that “the architectonic interest

of reason” (A475/B503) is inconsistent with empiricism (see
Höffe’s contribution on the Architectonic). After presenting these
various interests, Kant concludes this section (A475/B503) by
noting that considering these interests alone would cause one to
vacillate back and forth from dogmatism to empiricism.

18.3.2 Section 4. – In this section Kant explicitly addresses one

response that one might have towards the antinomies, namely
that of excusing oneself from the debate on the grounds that
reason has asked a question it is incapable of answering due to
insufficient resources or due to the fact that the problem under-
lying the antinomies is too deep, too impenetrable, or simply
unfathomable for reason. Kant rejects this response for any
cosmological question because “the very concept that puts us in
a position to ask the question must also qualify us to answer it”
(A477/B505). Kant’s point is that it is reason itself which creates
the idea of the world on the basis of empirically given objects.
Given that reason starts with an empirically given object and
then creates an idea that is supposed to correspond to it, it is
clear that reason must be able to decide whether the idea it
creates really does correspond to the object experienced.
It is important to note that Kant holds this claim only for the
antinomies and not for the paralogisms and the transcendental
ideal (A478/B506). Kant’s justification for this restriction lies in
the radically different structure of reason’s idea in each case. For
the antinomies reason starts with an empirically given object,
our spatio-temporal world (taking “world” in a loose, non-tech-
nical sense), and then asks whether this object would have a
particular property if one continued the series of empirical
syntheses to completion (i. e., until the absolute totality of con-
ditions were attained as reason demands). Accordingly, reason
forms an idea of what the object would be like if all of its
conditions were given. In the case of the paralogisms and the
transcendental ideal, however, reason does not start from an
empirically given object and thus does not compare such an
object to the idea that it creates for itself (the idea of the soul or
that of God). This is particularly clear in the case of the paralo-
gisms, where the fallacious inferences occur precisely because
we have no intuition of the “I”.

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One might attempt to avoid the difficulties posed by such

cosmological questions by arguing that the fault lies with expe-
rience insofar as the information it provides about the world is
not sufficient to answer all of the questions reason poses. To put
the point in a slightly different way, one might think that the
antinomies arise from a mismatch between reason and what is
given in experience (when reason poses questions for which
experience does not have the answer). Kant rejects such a re-
sponse because the antinomies would arise even if one were to
suppose that “the whole of nature is spread out before us and
that of all that is presented to our intuition nothing is concealed
from our senses” (A482/B510). For even in such a case we
would still not have an object that corresponds exactly to the
idea reason creates for itself. In order for an object that does
correspond exactly to such an idea to be given, one would need
“a completed synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute
totality” (A482 f./B510 f.), something that cannot be given in
any intuition. Kant presents the same (or a very similar) argu-
ment from a different, reversed perspective. Even if one knew
(on the basis of reason) that bodies were composed of ultimately
simple parts, such knowledge would be of no help whatsoever in
explaining the appearances, i. e., what could be given in possible
experience. In short, because there can be no exact correspond-
ence between possible experience and reason’s ideas, even if
possible experience were given in its fullest possible form, possi-
ble experience could neither solve nor be blamed for problems
that arise for reason’s ideas.
In the course of Kant’s various arguments for the claim that
reason must be able to answer cosmological questions, Kant
makes several noteworthy remarks about the concept of the
world. In his metaphysics lectures Kant defines the world gene-
rically as a substantial whole that is not part of another or as a
series of substances that stand in real connection with another.
In his Critical period he then differentiates this generic concept
into that of the intelligible and the sensible world. Towards the
end of this section of the Antinomy chapter Kant seems to be
making a very similar distinction between an “empirical” or
sensible and a rational or intelligible concept of the world. The
empirical concept of the sensible world (as a “whole”) is always
comparative, never absolute, whereas the rational concept of

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 455

the intelligible world concerns the absolute totality of objects

and their conditions (A483/B511). Given this explanation, one
can provide a diagnosis of the conflict leading to the antinomies
(as Kant does explicitly in the Mrongovius lectures on meta-
physics, XXIX 849), according to which the antinomies arise
when we conflate the sensible and intelligible worlds.
As we saw above, Kant clearly thinks that the structure of the
antinomies is different from that of either the paralogisms or
the transcendental ideal (especially insofar as only the antino-
mies provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism). Fur-
ther, this difference in structure seems to support Kant’s claim
that reason must be able to answer all cosmological questions it
poses. At the same time, it is not obvious how all of Kant’s
explanations of the special status of the cosmological questions
can be rendered coherent. For example, Kant boldly states that
“transcendental philosophy is unique in the whole field of spec-
ulative knowledge, in that no question concerning an object
given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same human
reason […] since the object is not to be met with outside the
concept” (A477/B505). Such a claim, if true, would require all
questions about God and the soul to be answerable as well. Nor
is this an isolated claim. Kant also remarks that “our sole ques-
tion is as to what lies in the idea” (A479/B507). Again, such a
remark would lead one to expect that all questions in rational
psychology and natural theology must be answerable by reason.
The situation is not helped by taking into consideration Kant’s
most explicit explanation of the special status of cosmological
questions, namely that reason’s idea of the world stems from an
empirically given object (A478/B506). For it is not clear why
having an empirically given object which underlies reason’s idea
puts reason in a position to answer any questions about either
the idea in question or its relation to the empirically given
object. Rather, the converse would seem to be more likely; since
cosmological questions cannot focus merely on reason’s idea,
but rather must compare it to an external empirical object
(which may not always cooperate, given that it is independent of
reason), such questions might be more difficult for reason to
answer than questions focusing only on its own ideas.

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18.3.3 Section 5. – Kant’s strategy in this section is to demon-

strate that since what is given to us in possible experience can
never conform to reason’s representation of the world, reason’s
idea is “entirely empty and without meaning” (A486/B514)
which for Kant means that such a representation has no re-
ferent. Accordingly, one makes a “groundless presupposition”
(A485/B513) in thinking that such an idea has any referent.
Kant also describes the problem as arising from the fact that
such an idea “may perhaps rest on an empty and merely ficti-
tious concept of the manner in which the object of these ideas is
given to us” (A490/B518). In other words, one may be conflat-
ing the intelligible and sensible worlds insofar as one thinks that
what is given in the sensible world must satisfy the demands
reason places on the world qua intelligible world.
Kant shows that what is given to us in possible experience can
never conform to reason’s idea by briefly illustrating that rea-
son’s idea of the world will be either too large or too small for
what is given through possible experience (A486/B514). Rea-
son’s idea is “too large” if the idea represents objects or condi-
tions that are not met with in possible experience, whereas
reason’s idea is “too small” insofar as possible experience re-
quires objects or conditions that extend beyond reason’s idea.
Kant shows how reason’s idea is too large or too small for each
of the topics treated in each of the antinomies. Kant’s considera-
tions tend to be similar to those presented in the theses and
antitheses, albeit in very abbreviated form.
At the end of this section (A489/B517) Kant argues that
reason and not possible experience is to be faulted for the lack of
fit between reason’s idea and possible experience. Whenever
there is a mismatch between two things (A and B), in principle
one can say that either A is too large for B or B is too small for A.
If a ball cannot fit through a hole, the reason for the lack of fit
can be expressed in such a way that either the ball is too large for
the hole or the hole is too small for the ball. However, Kant sees
an important disanalogy in this case which forces one to blame
reason rather than possible experience. For in this case reason
relies upon possible experience and not vice versa, because in
theoretical contexts only possible experience can establish that
our representations actually refer to objects.

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18.3.4 Section 6. – The main purpose of this section is to clarify

transcendental idealism by contrasting it with transcendental
realism, empirical idealism, and a certain kind of phenomenal-
ism. According to Kant, a transcendental realist denies the
distinction between appearances and things in themselves by
treating subject-dependent objects (or “mere representations”,
A491/B519) as if they were subject-independent entities. Al-
though Kant presents a more detailed explanation of the error
underlying the antinomies in Sections 7 and 9, one can note
here that the antinomies make a transcendental realist presup-
position insofar as they assume that objects given as part of the
sensible world, i. e., subject-dependent objects, are taken to
constitute the intelligible world, which is subject-independent.
According to Kant, the empirical idealist either denies (Ber-
keley) or doubts (Descartes) the existence of spatial objects
(A491/B519). Kant’s transcendental idealism is distinct from
empirical idealism, since for Kant spatial objects do exist and we
can have knowledge of them, even if they are ideal (i. e., have no
independent existence outside our thoughts). Also, empirical
idealism has, according to Kant, difficulty distinguishing be-
tween dreams and veridical experience (since both are mere
collections of representations), whereas transcendental idealism
allegedly does not encounter a similar difficulty insofar as it can
require veridical experience to cohere internally according to
empirical laws (A492/B520). Kant presents a more detailed ar-
gument against empirical idealism in his Refutation of Idealism
(see Guyer’s contribution above).
Kant also addresses the obvious objection that objects may
exist which have never in fact been perceived (A492/B521).
Such an objection rests on a misunderstanding, according to
Kant, because transcendental idealism does not require that an
object actually be perceived in order to exist. Rather, what this
doctrine requires is that there be an appropriate connection
between a possible perception of the object and a current per-
ception. Accordingly, even if I am not currently perceiving
whether the moon is inhabited, I could have such perceptions, if
I were to proceed in appropriate fashion from my current per-
ception of the book in front of me to a future perception of the
moon. Kant employs the same kind of response to concerns
about objects that existed prior to one’s own existence. Such

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objects “really mean nothing but the possibility of extending the

chain of experience from the present perception back to the
conditions which determine this perception in respect of time”
(A495/B523). In other words, we can know such objects insofar
as we can reveal them to be, e. g., causally necessary conditions
for what we are currently experiencing.

18.3.5 Section 7. – In this section Kant provides an analysis of

the fallacious nature of the basic inference underlying each
Thesis and Antithesis argument in terms of reason’s search for
the unconditioned. Kant first presents the main argumentative
structure of all of the thesis and antithesis arguments (A497/
B525). The first premise is: If the conditioned is given, then the
entire series of all its conditions is likewise given. The second
premise is: Objects of the senses are given as conditioned. The
conclusion seems to follow immediately: Therefore, the entire
series of the conditions of such objects is likewise given. In
order to determine what is fallacious in this type of argument,
Kant sees the need to clarify some basic concepts.
Kant first notes that the following principle is analytically
true and thus cannot be rejected: if the conditioned is given,
then a regress in the series of all its conditions is set as a task
(A497/B526). For the concept of a conditioned thing contains
the concept of the condition(s) under which the conditioned
stands. Kant then argues that the first premise of the main
argumentative structure in question (if the conditioned is given,
then all its conditions are given as well) is true for things
in themselves, but not for appearances. But since the second
premise concerns appearances, the argument is fallacious. The
first premise is true for things in themselves, because when we
consider things in themselves, we are considering them as they
are, not as we can know them. Accordingly, if an object really is
conditioned, then there must also be a condition (or set of
conditions) which conditions it. However, the first premise is
not true for appearances, because insofar as we are focusing on
our knowledge of objects, the mere fact that we know an object
as conditioned does not imply that we know the conditions
under which it holds (even if we know that the object has some
condition or other). More specifically, the mere fact that an
object is given to me in intuition does not imply that all of the

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 459

conditions for that object are also given to me in intuition. Since

an object as appearance is merely an empirical synthesis in space
and time, it depends on a synthesis for its existence. According-
ly, if the conditions for such an object are also appearances, one
would have to perform additional syntheses so that they would
exist. Insofar as reason demands that all conditions be given, it
demands (or sets as a task) that further syntheses be performed.
Given this analysis of the major and minor premises of the
argument underlying both the theses and antitheses, Kant pro-
ceeds to explain in a variety of ways how the major and minor
premises combine to form a fallacious argument (A499 f./
B527 f.). Kant first suggests that the major premise takes the
conditioned in its transcendental meaning in the sense of a pure
category, whereas the minor premise takes the conditioned in its
empirical meaning insofar as the categories are applied to
appearances. Since the conditioned does not have a univocal
meaning in the major and minor premises, it is fallacious, in
particular an instance of what Kant calls a sophisma figurae dic-
tionis. Kant then explains that the fallacy consists in the fact that
the relation between the conditioned and its condition(s) is not
temporal in the major premise, but is temporal in the minor
premise, since for appearances the synthesis of the conditioned
and its conditions must occur in time.
At this point Kant explains that his previous analysis of what is
fallacious in the thesis and antithesis arguments does not com-
pletely resolve the problem represented by the antinomies
(A501/B529). For this analysis shows only that the arguments
given in support of each claim are invalid, not that the claims of
each must both be false (as is the case at least for the First
Antinomy). In fact, one might think that one of the claims must
be true, since each one seems to deny what the other one asserts.
Accordingly, Kant claims that the dispute can be resolved only if
both sides become convinced “that a certain transcendental
illusion has mocked them with a reality where none is to be
found” (A501/B529). Kant first notes that there are two differ-
ent kinds of oppositions: dialectical and analytical (A503/B531).
An opposition is dialectical either if the opposites do not exhaust
the possible options (i. e., there is a third option beyond those
expressed by the opposites) or if they do not in fact conflict
(e. g., if they could both be true). For example, “all bodies have

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either a good smell or a smell that is not good” is a dialectical

opposition, because some bodies may have no smell at all. By
contrast, an opposition is analytical if one of the opposites must
be true. For example, “all bodies are either good-smelling or
not good-smelling” contains an analytical opposition since one
of the two predicates must be true insofar as bodies that do not
have a smell at all fall under the predicate “not good-smelling”.
The first and second antinomies involve dialectical opposition
because they do not exhaust the possible options, while the third
and fourth antinomies involve dialectical opposition because
they do not in fact conflict.
Given this distinction, Kant then claims that “the world is
either finite or infinite” represents an analytical opposition if
“the world” is taken to be a thing in itself, whereas it repre-
sents a dialectical opposition if “the world” is taken to be an
appearance (A504/B532). Kant justifies this claim by noting
that if the world is a thing in itself, then it must be completely
given and determinate with respect to its conditions (and the
claim of either the thesis or antithesis of each antinomy would
in fact have to be true.) However, if the world is an appear-
ance, then it is given only through the empirical regress of
synthesis and since this regress is never complete (i. e., one has
never discovered all the conditions for a given conditioned),
the world is essentially indeterminate. But if the world is inde-
terminate, then it may not have a determinate size and thus
may not be either finite or infinite. But how can the world be
indeterminate? It can be indeterminate only if epistemic sub-
jects must determine it with respect to its properties, i. e., only
if it is subject-dependent or ideal. Accordingly, the problem
posed by the antinomies can be resolved only if transcendental
idealism is true, i. e., only if one takes the world as an appear-
ance, thereby transforming an analytical opposition into a dia-
lectical one.
Kant concludes (A506 f./B534 f.) by summarizing the indirect
argument for transcendental idealism as follows: If the world is
a whole existing in itself, then it is either finite or infinite.
However, the (spatio-temporal or sensible) world can be neither
finite nor infinite (as the thesis and antithesis arguments have
shown). Therefore (by modus tollens), the (sensible) world is
not a whole existing in itself, from which Kant infers that the

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 461

(sensible) world must be an appearance, i. e., nothing outside

our representations.

18.3.6 Section 8. – Since the antinomies and their general reso-

lution in the previous sections have established that the com-
plete set of conditions for any sensible object is not given in
intuition, reason must consider sensible objects differently from
how it views things in themselves. Accordingly, for appearances
the requirement that the conditioned must have a complete set
of conditions is not so much a requirement for the given objects
as a requirement for one’s epistemic capacities. This require-
ment cannot determine what the object and its properties are; it
is not constitutive of objects. Rather, it specifies how reason
must carry out the empirical regress of searching for conditions;
it is regulative for experience (A509/B537). (See Horstmann’s
discussion of the regulative use of ideas below.)
As was established above in section 3, reason can never in fact
find all of the conditions for the conditioned objects that are
given to us in intuition. Thus, reason can never finish its task or
entirely discharge its obligation. It must continuously undertake
a regress in the series of conditions for whatever conditioned
objects are given to it. Kant characterizes this continuous re-
gress in two ways, namely as a progressus in infinitum and as a
progressus in indefinitum, that is, as an infinite and an indefinite
advance (A511/B539). The former implies that one must pro-
ceed to infinity, whereas the latter signifies that one may pro-
ceed as long as one pleases. Since reason is concerned with
finding the conditions for the conditioned, one may proceed
indefinitely in finding further conditioned objects for any given
condition. Kant’s example of following the descendants of a
given pair of parents illustrates this point. The real question
concerns the proper characterization of regresses that search
for the conditions for conditioned objects that are given. Kant
argues that such a regress must proceed indefinitely unless the
whole object is given in intuition (A512/B540). Kant justifies
this distinction by noting that if the whole object is given in
intuition, then so are all its conditions (given that the whole
consists of its parts) and there is therefore no empirical reason
stemming from intuition for stopping the regress (i. e., nothing
is lacking in terms of what is given in intuition). However, if the

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462 Eric Watkins

whole object is not given in intuition, i. e., when only some

members of the series of conditions are given, then one must
proceed in the regress indefinitely, because one must search for
further conditions in additional intuitions (and there is no guar-
antee that any specific intuition will reveal a relevant condition,
i. e., the search is indefinite). In both cases, however, the regress
will never be complete and thus one will never completely
determine sensible objects and their conditions.

18.4 Questions of Interpretation

Considerable debate has arisen about the exact nature of tran-
scendental idealism. The above summary – comprised of theses
(a) through (f), cf. 18.2.4 – is an attempt at stating the essential
claims of transcendental idealism without prejudicing the out-
come of this debate. While each and every thesis stated above
has been discussed at great length, the majority of debate has
focused on the distinction thesis, the ideality thesis, and the
grounding thesis.
The distinction between things in themselves and appearances
has been understood in a variety of different ways. Traditionally, it
was thought that things in themselves and appearances constitute
two numerically distinct classes of objects, or two distinct worlds,
whereas more recently it has been argued (Prauss 1974, Allison
1983) that things in themselves and appearances do not constitute
two numerically distinct classes of objects, but rather two differ-
ent ways of considering one reality. According to this latter view,
appearances are things as they appear to us, whereas things in
themselves are those very same things as they do not appear to us
or rather considered apart from how they appear to us. Another
debate about the distinction between things in themselves and
appearances focuses on whether the distinction is an ontological
one or whether it is primarily epistemological or methodological.
According to the ontological version (Ameriks 1992), the distinc-
tion concerns the metaphysical status of objects, whereas accord-
ing to the epistemological or methodological version (Allison
1983) the distinction pertains to our epistemic access to reality or
how we conceive of the object, abstracting from whether the
object has such properties independently of such a conception.

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 The Antinomy, Section 3–8 463

Debate has focused on the ideality thesis primarily because

one can conceive of the sense in which appearances are ideal or
subject-dependent in a number of ways. One might think (Broad
1978) that appearances are simply collections of possible per-
ceptions and thus that Kant is a kind of phenomenalist. Alterna-
tively, one might think that appearances depend on the human
mind for their existence but still deny that appearances are
collections of possible perceptions. One version of such a view
(Aquila 1979) claims that appearances are intentional objects
like numbers whose existence does not depend on actually being
thought. Another version of such a view (though not incompat-
ible with the previous version) (Ameriks 1982) claims that ap-
pearances depend not on actual human beings, but rather on
(the very idea of) any epistemic subject that has sensible forms
of intuition (such as space and time) and the categories as dis-
cursive forms of thought.
The grounding thesis has also been discussed at considerable
length. It has sometimes been objected that the grounding the-
sis is incompatible with Kant’s claim that the category of causal-
ity can be applied only within the realm of appearances. One
might attempt to respond to such an objection by noting that the
unschematized categories can be used to think things in them-
selves and thus the unschematized category of causality can be
used to think the relationship between things in themselves and
appearances. Problems are also thought to arise insofar as one
attempts to think specific instances of the grounding relation-
ship. E. g., one might ask “Is there one thing in itself for each
appearance?” Whether or not Kant can remain agnostic about
such specifics is a difficult issue.
Another concern about Kant’s transcendental idealism stems
from his “indirect” argument for transcendental idealism in the
Antinomy chapter. As we saw above, the argument assumes that
an object is indeterminate if its conditions have not been com-
pletely discovered. Such an assumption may well be legitimate if
it is taken to imply only that there is some part of the world that
is indeterminate (namely that part which contains conditions of
the object that have not yet been revealed). However, it is rather
questionable if it is taken to imply something stronger, namely
that every object is indeterminate. For from the fact that the
table in front of me has conditions which I have not yet discov-

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464 Eric Watkins

ered it hardly follows that the table itself is indeterminate (even

if it may follow that something in the world, namely some causal
ancestor of the table, is indeterminate). However, Kant needs
the stronger claim insofar as he needs all of the objects consti-
tuting the sensible world to be indeterminate, since the subject-
dependency (or transcendental ideality) of objects is established
only through their indeterminacy. Another way to bring out the
problem is to consider that the Antinomy, even if it is completely
successful, shows only that some properties, namely those prop-
erties discussed in each antinomy (e. g., the magnitude of the
world, the division of the world), are transcendentally ideal, but
not that all properties in the sensible world are transcendentally
ideal. Kant would seem to need a further argument to establish
the stronger claim that the entire sensible world is transcenden-
tally ideal.

Literature
Allison, Henry E. 1983: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and
Defense, New Haven/London.
Ameriks, Karl 1982: Kant’s Theory of Mind. Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure
Reason, Oxford.
Ameriks, Karl 1992: “Kantian Idealism Today”, in: History of Philosophy Quar-
terly 9, 329–342.
Aquila, Richard E. 1979: “Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality
and Reality in Kant”, in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61, 293–307.
Broad, C. D. 1978: Kant. An Introduction, Cambridge.
Prauss, Gerold 1974: Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, Bonn.

Translations from the KrV are Kemp-Smith’s (Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by
Norman Kemp-Smith, London 1929, 21933) with occasional changes by the
author.

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