The Joint App of RCA, HPI and Resilience Engineering Principles

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HPRCT

2019

The Joint Application of RCA, HPI


& Resilience Engineering
Principles

Beth Lay Bob Latino


Director of Safety and CEO
Human Performance Reliability Center, Inc.
Lewis Tree Service, Inc.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 1


After This Presentation You Will Be HPRCT
Able to: 2019

► Describe what “Struck by” incidents are

► Distinguish between the PROACT Root Cause Analysis


(RCA) Approach and the Lewis Tree Service (LTS) HPI
and Resilience Engineering approaches

► Evaluate the findings from the joint analysis

► Compare notes on what we learned as a result of working


together

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 2


HPRCT
2019

What are
“Struck by”
incidents?

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The #1 Most Dangerous Job in America HPRCT
(Tree Work Including Logging Workers) 2019

There are ____ A) 50


fatalities per year B) 75
in the logging C) 100
industry. D) 500

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 4


The #1 Most Dangerous Job in America HPRCT
(Tree Work Including Logging Workers) 2019

There are ____ A) 50


fatalities per year B) 75
in the logging C) 100
industry. D) 500

Logging fatal injury rate was slightly more than 132 per 100,000 people,
making logging by far the most dangerous industry in the U.S.

Electrical power-line installer and repairer The fatal injury rate for
power-line workers was approximately 21 per 100,000.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 5


What are ‘Struck By’ Incidents? HPRCT
2019

• Being struck a by piece of


tree

• Most common accident:


worker being struck by tree
or falling branch

• TCIA*: Typical struck-by


victim remained in the Drop
Zone (DZ)
*The Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) is a trade association of 2300
tree care firms and affiliates worldwide whose mission is to advance tree care

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


What is a ‘Drop Zone’ (DZ)? HPRCT
2019

Traditional DZ
Approach:

• Do not cross
this line while
work is being
performed aloft.

• Do not enter w/o


permission from
worker aloft
using 3-way
communication.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


‘Struck By’ Incidents: HPRCT
The Shape of SURPRISE 2019

• Tree falls in unexpected direction due to


• Cutting Techniques
• Rigging Techniques

• Hidden decay or damage

• Part of adjacent tree

“Boundary areas are discovered only through experience of


surprise.” - David Woods

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 8


HPRCT
2019

Compare
PROACT RCA
Approach and
the LTS HPI &
Resilience
Engineering
Approaches

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 9


Compare Use of ‘Initial’ Event HPRCT
Timelines 2019
Sample RCA Event Time (will generally span over a longer time period):

HPI & RE: What is happening with the person (spans the day of event)?

“It happens fast!”

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 10


Compare Investigative Approaches HPRCT
Speaking in Generalities 2019

Undesirable Facts Thinking


Actions &
Outcome On Actions
People by

Common Traditional Safety Approach


People

PROACT RCA Approach


Physics of Failure
Good
Decisions Practices

HPI / RE Approach
Justification
Inappropriate
Decision-Making
(Sensemaking) Sensemaking
Blame
Hazardous Situation Awareness Inhibitors
Surprises
Procedure Adherence

Safety System Adequacy Normal day


(work as done)
Actions
Supervisory Oversight On
Systems
Deficiencies That day
Workplace Cultural Influences

Traditional PROACT HPI/ RE


How ‘Failure’ Occurs
Safety RCA Approach
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.
The PROACT RCA Approach HPRCT
RCA as a System, Not a Task 2019
Preserve
Retain “First-Pass” Gather Additional

Investigation
Incident Data Data
Information Collection

Order
Determine Select Establish
RCA Is Team Functional
Required Members Guidelines

Analysis
Analyze
Review Develop Determine
Build Logic
Available and Verify Verification Data
Tree
Data Hypothesis Needs

Communicate

Corrective Action
Report
Present Team
Team
Recommendations
Findings

Track
Implement Measure
Recommendations Effectiveness

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 12


Food for Thought: What’s In a Name? HPRCT
2019

What Do You Think About the Term ‘RCA’?

"One honest question: First I thought that I agree that the concept of
root causes is not adequate. Then I reflected it from my perspective
of being a Forest Ecosystem Manager. I came to the conclusion that
it is actually very adequate. Roots change over time, they are
literally countless in numbers, adopt to changing conditions, alter
their environment and even make trees walk (Mangroves can walk
because roots adjust to changing salinity levels). The roots of trees
communicate with each other, creating an intricate web/ parallel
universe. Thus my question: what is it exactly that “does not work
well” with the image/ approach of root causes?“
- Christoph H. Hinske

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 13


Compare Interviewing Styles HPRCT
Learning from Each Other 2019

HPI Incident RCA


• What happened, • What happened, starting
starting from from undesirable outcome
beginning of day? and moving backwards in
• What did you think short increments of time.
was happening? Consistent with confirmed
• How common is this? timeline chronology.
• What would have • Questioning guided by logic
helped? tree reconstruction of
• What good practices incident & evidence, starting
have you seen? with ‘How Could’ questioning
• How can you tell about the physics of what
things are getting happened?
tricky? (weak signals) • When a decision point is
• When do you need to reached, the questions shift
go into drop zone to ‘Why did you feel the
with work overhead? decision you made at the
time was appropriate?
• Drilling down will uncover
system’s flaws, cultural
Start of Day norms and socio-technical
factors.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 14


Compare Evidence Collection HPRCT
Strategies 2019
PROACT RCA HPI / RE
►Parts ► Systems

►Position ►

►People ►People

►Paper ►

►Paradigms ►Stories

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 15


Why Do Event Physics Matter? HPRCT
Comparing Cut Dynamics 2019

Pop-Cut Conventional Humboldt


Wedge-Cut Wedge-Cut

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


Pop-Cut Dynamics HPRCT
Proper Cut/Full Overlap 2019
Direction of force to “pop”

Cut
Opposing Cut
Overlap
Offset
Direction of force to “pop” Fiber Split (“pop”)
Area of Fiber Split
(Offset X Diameter)

Cross-Sectional
View

Profile View
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.
Pop-Cut Dynamics HPRCT
Improper Cut/Partial Overlap 2019
Push

Cut
Opposing Cut
Overlap
No overlap
Fiber Shear
Holding Wood
Push

Cross-Sectional
View

Profile
View

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


The Impact of ‘Holding Wood’ on Fall HPRCT
Direction 2019

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 19


Rotational Dynamics HPRCT
(Forensics) 2019

Push Actual
drop
direction

Incident Incident
Expected drop Piece Piece
direction
Rotation

Front Front
Stalk Stalk

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


Germination of an Undesirable Outcome HPRCT
2019
Undesirable
Outcome

Physical Root
Causes
How one labels
causes/contributing
Human Root
factors, doesn’t matter!
Causes
Latent Root
Causes

Policies & Human Communicati- Technology Training Management


Procedures Factors/ HPI on Systems Systems Systems Oversight

Deficient Organizational Systems

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 21


Reconstructing the Event Using a HPRCT
Logic Tree 2019
The Top Box

1. Describe the Event Event

2. Describe the Modes Mode Mode Mode Mode

3. Hypothesize Hypothesis Hypothesis

4. Verify the Hypotheses

Physical
5. Determine Physical Roots Root

and verify
Human
6. Determine Human Roots Root

and verify 7 Step Process


(Abbreviated
Latent Latent
7. Determine Latent Roots Root Root Structure Only)
and verify
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.
Logic Tree Sample - HPRCT
Defining the Event and Mode(s) 2019

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


Logic Tree Sample - HPRCT
Hypothesis Generation 2019

How Could?

A B C
Employee had to:
1) be in the Drop Zone,
2) something then had to impact him and
3) he was not able to escape.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 24


HPRCT
2019

Evaluate the
findings from
the joint
analysis

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 25


Sample Analysis Findings HPRCT
2019
Sample Latent Root Causes Sample HPI Approach Solutions

Lack of depth and breadth in cutting and Develop skills


rigging skills
Inadequate oversight to capture situations of Perform “forensics” as part of normal
inappropriate cutting techniques observations
“Work Stop” policy exists but not followed Social factors: inviting, “speaking in”, leader
response, identifying specific situations
Worker had overconfidence in ability and Improve calibration: matching capabilities to
knowledge difficulties

Sample of Identified Contributing Actionable Corrective Actions


Factors

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 26


Actual Learning Team Findings HPRCT
Drop Zone Safety 2019
Traditional approach:
• Do not cross this line while work is being
performed aloft.
• Do not enter w/o permission from
worker aloft using 3-way
communication.

Learning Team, we asked:


• How well is DZ policy working?
• How can we get people to comply?

We learned:
• All but one person had “run like hell
to escape a piece of falling wood”
• Procedural cover vs. functional DZ
• DZ too small or too large adds risk
• Situations where DZ boundary per policy
not possible
• Close calls with falling limbs (esp. 27
smaller pieces) not seen as a big deal.

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.


Close Call Mining & Incident Report HPRCT
Actual Interview Excerpt 2019

Excerpts:
“…tree violently shifted… I
ran as fast as I could
downhill, looking for
something to protect me.”
“tree slowly falling on toward
power lines …weight of tree
was too much”
“noticed climber was not tied
in properly… prevented a
fall”

28
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.
HPRCT
2019

What did we
learn as a
result of
working
together?

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 29


What Did We Learn About Each HPRCT
Other’s Approaches? 2019

PROACT RCA HPI / RE


1. Questions based on FACTS! 1. Questions based on learning
2. Key: Data Preservation/Data from surprise and work as
Analytics (Physics) done
3. Proper Stating of Investigation 2. Key: what’s going on with
Objectives person
4. Reliance on Evidence vs Hearsay 3. Objective: learning and
5. The Potential Impact of the ‘Truth’ forward facing actions.
as Received by Those Who 4. Story is more important than
Review Findings and truth.
Recommendations
6. Acceptance of the Truth

We have common goals:


• Avoid blaming worker
• Identify deeper system issues.
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 30
What’s Next for Lewis Tree Service? HPRCT
2019
A Better Question May Be: What is critical for successful work?
Something
happens
Absence of
Safety

Nothing
happens
Presence of
Safety
Opportunities:
• Gain “Outside Insider” insights from unbiased Ohio State Safety Researcher
• Identify “Struck-by” risk factors
• Learn when to slow or stop. “too dangerous to take down” “large piece stuck”
(escalation policy)
• Develop team situational awareness.
“…2nd most variable, dynamic work environment – only one worse was special forces
…little have control over contrasted with factory safety (machines, lighting etc.).
Level of variability is extraordinary.”
© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved.
HPRCT
2019

Thank You!
Q&A Beth Lay
Elizabeth.Lay@lewistree.com

Bob Latino
Blatino@reliability.com

© 2019 Reliability Center Inc. All rights reserved. 32

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