Aboitiz Shipping v. CA (G.R. No.

84458)
Facts:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner Aboitiz Shipping
Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived
at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter
to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. An hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel the
crane operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated,
Viana who had already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes
were still loaded there. He went back and while he was pointing to the crew where his
cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was filed against petitioner for
breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to be a passenger
when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no
longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had
already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises.
Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after
reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after
his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not
terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his
destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his
baggage.

The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify
the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. We believe there exists
such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. As
earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still
deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y

MALECDAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO
CUDLAMAT, MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL
CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA CUDIAMAT, all Heirs of the late Pedrito Cudiamat represented by
Inocencia Cudiamat, respondents.
G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755

FACTS:
 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging
to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro
alighted
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it
suddenly accelerated forward
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their
respective destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital
where he expired
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the
death of Pedro Cudiamat
 Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary
diligence required in the operation of the co. and the supervision of
the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at
large
 RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence
was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the
heirs of Pedrito
 CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual
and compensatory damages and cost of the suit

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus
riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of
increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board the
same
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a
passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
contractual relation
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to
transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that
might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious
condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the
family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a refrigerator
  In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY,
La Mallorca vs CA

Japan Airlines vs CA

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118664 August 7, 1998
ROME
RO, J.:
Facts:
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL in San Francisco, California
bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela
Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles, California for Manila v
ia JAL. As an incentive for travelling on the said airline, both flights were to make an
overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines expense,
thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko
Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their journey, went
to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), rendering it
inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled
indefinitely.
JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991
and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991,
much to the dismay of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again
cancelled due to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents
that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in
Narita.
Private respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their
personal funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on June 22, 1991
when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.
Private respondents commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional
Trial Court. They asserted that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and
comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their hotel and accommodation
expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita, Japan. JAL denied this allegation and
averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is
cancelled due to force majeure.
The trial court rendered its judgment holding JAL liable for damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts finding.

Issue:
Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if the delay were caused by
force majeure.

Ruling:
Private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for the delayed arrival in
Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during their unexpected stay
in Narita since airlines have the obligation to ensure the comfort and convenience of its
passengers.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public interest.
Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards of care
and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its passengers.
However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for all injuries or
damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render
the defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability, illusory and
ineffective.

When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that
he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL
was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers
incurred, cannot be charged to JAL.
PAL vs CA

PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such
occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air
carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations
as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of
carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has
left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary
22

diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they
have reached their final destination.
Title: Gacal v. PAL
Topic: Fortuitous events: Hijacking
Docket: G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990

Facts:

 Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S. Anislag
and his wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman, were then
passengers boarding defendant’s BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to
Manila
 On the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac Pendatum known as Commander Zapata,
Nasser Omar, Liling Pusuan Radia, Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all
of Marawi City and members of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF)
 The hijackers brandishing their respective firearms announced the hijacking of the
aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. However, the pilot explained the
limitations of the fuel so it was directed to Zamboanga for refueling. It was there
that it was met with two armored cars. The battle between the military and the
hijackers which led ultimately to the liberation of the surviving crew and the
passengers, with the final score of ten (10) passengers and three (3) hijackers dead
on the spot and three (3) hijackers captured.
 Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the gross,
wanton and inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel in their
failure to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover hidden weapons in
the bodies of the six (6) hijackers.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be held liable

Held: No.

 This is clearly a case of caso fortuito. The failure to transport (breach) petitioners
safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6)
passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), without any connection with private respondent, hence, independent of
the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.
 Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the
incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a military
take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the
inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights.
 These events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a
nominal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the
performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the
exclusion of the former.

it is necessary that the following elements must concur:

(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the
debtor or the obligor);
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor

Fortune Express v CA
Topic: Defenses in Carriage of Passenger caused by third persons
Docket: G.R. No. 119756. March 18, 1999

Facts:

1) On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney,
including two Maranaos. He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in
Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the
petitioner by burning some of its buses.

2) Three days thereafter, another one of petitioner’s bus wherein Atty. Caorong was boarded,
were seized by the Maranaos. They shot the driver and they started pouring gasoline on the bus.
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At
that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who
had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to
spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living.

3) Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire and he was rushed to the hospital but he
died.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable in view of the Maranao’s acts

Held: Yes.

 It is evident herein that the petitioner did not exercise extraordinary diligence.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its
buses and the assurance of petitioners operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that
the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the
safety of its passengers.
 Such is not a fortuitous event where: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation
must be independent of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable
or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be
free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. However,
since they already had the report of the PC that there were plans to burn the buses,
the said even cannot not be unforeseen
G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.

Maranan v. Perez
Topic: Defenses in Carriage of Passengers, caused by employees
Docket: G.R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967

Facts:

 Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela. The latter was found guilty of homicide and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.
 while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in
self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant
Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
 Claims against Valenzuela was Dismissed.
 Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila
Railroad Co., that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its
employees upon the passengers.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be exonerated from liability

Held: No.

 The Gillaco case had a different factual milieu: when the crime took place, the
guard had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the
deceased. Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab
transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of
executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the
killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty
employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
 The Gillaco case had a different legal milieu: The Civil Code of 1889 which,
unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute
liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts
committed by their employees, to wit Art. 1759:

“Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.”

 Ratio Legis:
1. The special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its
passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of
the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence
and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all,
from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the
passenger’s safety
2. Said liability of the carrier for the servant’s violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant’s
hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the
 passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger
with the utmost care prescribed by law
3. As between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk
of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against
passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.

Singapore Airlines Ltd. vs. Fernandez, GR 142305, Dec. 10, 2003

FACTS:

Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the Philippines and abroad. At the
time of the incident she was availing of an educational grant from the Federal Republic of
Germany pursuing a Master’s Degree in Music major in Voice. She was invited to sing before
the King and Queen of Malaysia on Feb. 3-4, 1991. For this purpose, she took an airline ticket
from Singapore Airlines (SAL) FOR THE Frankfurt-Manila-Malaysia route. Respondent had to
pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe and rehearse with the pianist. SAL issued ticket
for Flight SQ 27 leaving Frankfurt on Jan. 27, 1991 for Singapore with connections to Manila in
the morning of Jan. 28, 1991. On Jan. 27, 1991 SQ 27 LEFT Frankfurt but arrived two hours late
in Singapore on Jan. 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had already left. Upon
deplaning in Singapore, Fernandez approached the transit counter at Changi Airport and was told
by a lady employee that there were no more flights to Manila on that day and that she had to stay
in Singapore, if she wanted, she could fly to HK but at her own expense. Respondent stayed with
a relative in Singapore for the night. The next day, she was brought back to the airport and
approached a counter for immediate booking but was told by a male employee: “Can’t you see I
am doing something.” She explained her predicament but was told: “It’s your problem, not
ours.”

The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight to Malaysia on Jan.
29, 1991 through the efforts of her mother and a travel agency in Manila. Her mother had to
travel to Malaysia with the wardrobe which caused them to incur expenses of ₱ 50,000.

RTC Manila ordered SAL to pay respondent ₱ 50k as actual damages, ₱ 250k as moral
damages, ₱ 100k as exemplary damages, ₱ 75k as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Did SAL break the contract of carriage?

RULING:

Yes, when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular flight on a certain
date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has every right to expect that he be transported
on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of
contract of carriage. A contract of carriage requires common carriers to transport passengers
safely as human care and foresight can provide (Art. 1755, NCC). In an action for brech of a
contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at
fault or was negligent. All that is necessary is to prove the existence of the contract and the fact
of its non-performance by the carrier.
SAL failed to inform of the delay in the turnaround aircraft in Frankfurt, neither did it ask if the
respondent and 25 other delayed passengers are amenable to a stay in Singapore. Even SAL’s
manual mandates that in cases of urgent connections the head office of defendant in Singapore
has to be informed of delays so as to make needed arrangements for connecting passengers.

When respondent conveyed her apprehension in Frankfurt of the impending delay, she was
assured by petitioner’s personnel in Frankfurt that she will be transported to Manila on the same
date. The lady employee at the counter in Singapore only allowed respondent to use the phone
upon threat of suit, the male employee at the counter marked “Immediate Attention to Passengers
with Immediate Booking” was rude to her.
Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.

Title: Bachelor Express v CA

Topic: Defenses in Carriage of Passenger caused by third persons
Docket: G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990

Facts:

 A bus owned by petitioner came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro
City passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked
up a passenger. About fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion
suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the
passengers.
 When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were
found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries
and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later.
 The petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut. They alleged that the driver was able to transport his passengers safely
to their respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent, much less,
the fault of the driver and conductor and the defendants in this case;

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable

Held: Yes.

 The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it
triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the
passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the
falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries.
The stabbing incident herein is a force majeure.
 However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of
force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The
common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident.
 The lower court concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the
passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the window. However,
one witness opines that that the conductor opened the door when the passengers
were shouting that the bus stop while they were in a state of panic. The conductor
testified that he shut the door after the last passenger had boarded the bus. But he
had quite conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers had panicked,
he himself panicked and had gone to open the door.
 The bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion;
the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it
was opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked
and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was
not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found
in the law governing common carriers

Doctrine: In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier
must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.

Title: Gillaco v Manila Railroad

Topic: Defenses in Carriage of Passengers, caused by employees
Docket: G.R. No. L-8034, November 18, 1955
Facts:

 About 7:30 a.m., on the morning of April 1, 1946, Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband
of the plaintiff, was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad
Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached the Paco
Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad
Company assigned in the Manila-San Fernando, La Union Line, happened to be
in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban
Station, where he was going to report for duty.
 Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco, same
dating back during the Japanese occupation and because of this, the former shot
the latter using the carbine furnished to him by the company and the latter died as
a result.
 Appellant’s contention is that, on the foregoing facts, no liability attaches to it as
employer of the killer, Emilio Devesa; that it is not responsible subsidiary ex
delicto, under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, because the crime was not
committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary
duties and service; nor is it responsible ex contractu, since the complaint did not
aver sufficient facts to establish such liability, and no negligence on appellant’s
party was shown.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held liable

Held: No.

 The court held that such even is a caso fortuito. The respondent had no means to
ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee
every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees
and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains.
 The killing was not done in the performance. The slayer’s tour of duty was to start
at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore
under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train,
where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of
duty. As a result, Devesa’s assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco’s
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.
 Ratio Legis: Making the employer liable of every assault committed by such
servant, in any way, as indicated by the employment, is regarded as not only not
sustained by the authorities, but as being unsound and oppressive both to the
employer and the employee.

Doctrine: There can be no quarrel with the principle that a passenger is entitled to protection
from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. But under
the law of the case, this responsibility extends only to those that the carrier could foresee or
avoid through the exercise of the degree of car and diligence required of it.

Cathay Pacific Airways vs. CA G.R. No. 60501. March 5, 1993

Facts: Respondent Tomas Alcantara was a first class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific
Airways from Manila to Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta. The purpose of his
trip was to attend the following day, a conference with the Director General of Trade of
Indonesia. He checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for
personal use but also papers and documents he needed for the conference. Upon his arrival in
Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. Private respondent was told that his
luggage was left behind in Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as
“inconvenience money" to buy his immediate personal needs until the luggage could be
delivered to him. The respondent, as a result of the incident had to seek postponement of his pre-
arranged conference. Issue: 1. WoN there was breach of contract 2. WoN Cathay Pacific is liable
for damages 3. WoN the Warsaw Convention is applicable to this case

Held: 1. Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent when it failed to
deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it being the obligation of a common carrier
to carry its passengers and their luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not
to

delay their transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted fraudulently or in bad
faith.

2.

Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in
instances where the mishap results in death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud
or bad faith. But in the case at bar, the inconvenience money offered to Alcantara was insulting
considering that he paid for a first class accommodation. Petitioner or its agents should have
been more courteous and accommodating. The conduct of petitioner's representative towards
respondent justifies the grant of moral and exemplary damages.

3. Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, said
convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier
liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. It
must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It
does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the
rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilful misconduct on the part
of the carrier's employees is found or established.

G.R. No. 122308 July 8, 1997

PURITA S. MAPA, CARMINA S. MAPA and CORNELIO P. MAPA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-WORLD AIRLINES INC

Facts:
Plaintiffs Cornelio P. Mapa and Purita S. Mapa are respectable members of the society.
Plaintiffs Mapa entered into contract of air transportation with defendant TWA as evidenced
by TWA ticket... purchased in Bangkok, Thailand. Said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New
York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago
Domicile of carrier TWA is Kansas City, Missouri, USA. Its principal place of business is Kansas
City, Missouri, USA. TWA's place of business through which the contracts were made is Bangkok,
Thailand. The place of destination is Chicago, USA.
plaintiffs Purita and Carmina S. Mapa departed for Boston, taking a connecting flight on TWA's
carrier... checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the TWA counter in the JFK Airport.
The seven... baggages were received by a porter who issued seven TWA baggage receipts
Upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina proceeded to the carousel to claim their
baggages and found only three out of the seven they checked in
Plaintiffs immediately reported the loss of their four baggages to the TWA Baggage Office at Logan
Airport. TWA's representative confidently assured them that their baggages would be located within
24 hours and not more... than 48 hours.
plaintiffs' counsel wrote TWA... demanding indemnification for the... grave damage and injury
suffered by the plaintiffs.
TWA offered to amicably settle the case... plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,560.00, as partial
payment for the actual cost of their lost baggages and their contents.
Despite demands by plaintiffs, TWA failed and refused without just cause to indemnify and redress
plaintiffs for the grave injury and damages they have suffered.
petitioners) then filed with the trial court... a complaint[5] for damages
TWA filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint raising, as special and affirmative defense, lack of
jurisdiction of Philippine courts over the action for damages in that pursuant to Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention, the action could only be brought... either in Bangkok where the contract was
entered into, or in Boston which was the place of destination, or in Kansas City which is the carrier's
domicile and principal place of business.
Issues:
whether the contracts of transportation between Purita and Carmina Mapa, on the one hand, and
TWA, on the other, were contracts of "international transportation" under the Warsaw Convention.
Ruling:
TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals impliedly admit that if the sole basis... were the
two TWA tickets for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the contracts cannot be
brought within the term "international transportation," as defined in Article I(2) of the Warsaw
Convention. As provided therein, a contract is one of international transportation... only if according
to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not
there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, or within the... territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate or authority of another
power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.
There are then two categories of international transportation, viz., (1) that where the place of
departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting
Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a... transshipment; and
(2) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single
High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even... though the power is not a party to the
Convention.
The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the two TWA tickets, No.
015:9475:153:304 and No. 015:9475:153:305, both purchased and issued in Bangkok, Thailand. On
the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is obvious that the place of departure and the place... of
destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a single High Contracting Party. The
contracts, therefore, cannot come within the purview of the first category of international
transportation. Neither can it be under the second category since there was NO... agreed stopping
place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power.

PART VI CASES
Standard Vacuum Oil vs. Luzon Stevedoring, April 18,
1956
FACTS:
Defendant's barge No. L-522 was laden with gasoline belonging to the plaintiff to be
transported from Manila to the Port of Iloilo. Defendant's tugboat "Snapper" picked up the barge
outside the breakwater. The barge was placed behind the tugboat, it being connected to the latter
by a tow rope. Behind the barge, three other barges were likewise placed. The weather was good
when on that day the tugboat with its tow started on its voyage. The weather remained good on
February 3, 1947. About 3:00 AM on February 4, the engine of the tugboat came to a dead stop.
The engineer found out that the trouble was due to a broken idler. A message was then sent to the
defendant's radio station in Manila informing its official of the engine trouble. The master of the
Snapper attempted to cast anchor but the water areas around Elefante Island were so deep. In the
afternoon, the weather become worse and due to the rough condition of the sea the anchor chains
of the Snapper' and the four barges broke. They were drifted and were dashed against the rocks.
A hole was opened in the hull of the Snapper', which ultimately caused it to sink, while the barge
No. L522 was so badly damaged that the gasoline it had on board leaked out. Defendant failed to
transport the gasoline so plaintiff brought an action with CFI Manila to recover damages.
Defendant pleaded that its failure to deliver was due to fortuitous event or caused by
circumstances beyond its control and not to its fault or negligence or that of any of its employees.
The court found that the disaster was the result of an unavoidable accident and the loss of the
gasoline was due to a fortuitous event hence it dismissed the case.

ISSUE:
W/N defendant exercised extraordinary diligence and that the accident was due to force
majeure.

HELD:

NO. While the breaking of the idler may be due to an accident, or to something unexpected, the
cause of the disaster which resulted in the loss of the gasoline can only be attributed to the
negligence or lack of precaution to avert it on the part of defendant. Defendant had enough time
to effectuate the rescue if it had only a competent tug for the purpose because the weather was
good from 3:00 o'clock a.m. to 12:00 o'clock noon of February 4, 1947 and it was only in the
afternoon that the wind began to blow with some intensity, but failed to do so because of that
shortcoming. The loss of the gasoline certainly cannot be said to be due to force majeure or
unforeseen event but to the failure of defendant to extend adequate and proper help.
Considering these circumstances, the Court persuaded to conclude that defendant has failed to
established that it is exempt from liability under the law. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
plaintiff the sum of P75,578.50, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint,
with costs.

Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA, Sept. 15, 1993;

FACTS:
Planters Products purchased from Mitsubishi Inter’l Corp. 9.3K metric tons of
Urea (fertilizer), 46% of which the latter shipped in bulk aboard the cargo vessel M/V “Sun
Plum” owned by Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK). A time charter Party on the
vessel M/V “Sun Plum” pursuant to the Uniform General Charter was entered into
between Mitsubishi as shipper/charter and KKKK as shipowner Before loading the
fertilizer aboard the vessel they were inspected by the charterer’s representative and found
fit for loading. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores (somebody whose
job is to load and unload ships) hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel
hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with 3 layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel
bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage. Port
area was windy, certain portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and the weather was
variable, raining occasionally while the discharge was in progress. Survey report revealed a
shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer
approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with sand, rust and dirt. Planters Products sent a
claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies, the resident agent of the carrier, for
damages.

ISSUE:
WON a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party;

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court defined Charter- party as a “contract by which an entire ship, or
some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a
contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of
her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in
consideration of the payment of freight” It went further on discussing the two types of charter-
party: a. contract of affreightment – involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased by the
owner in part or as a whole, to carry goods for others; may either be: i)time charter -vessel is
leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time; or

ii)voyage charter - ship is leased for a single voyage b.charter by demise or bareboat charter –
whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire command and possession
and consequent control over its navigation, including the master and the crew, who are his
servants In both types, the charter party provides for the hire of vessel only, either for a
determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the
ship’s stores, pay for the wages of the master and the crew, and defray the expenses for the
maintenance of the ship. Distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or
special carrier” lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single
transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of
goods for a fee, the person or corporation offering such service is a private carrier. Common
carrier should observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry; in case
of loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, it is presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on it. Private carrier -exercise of ordinary
diligence in the carriage of goods will suffice; no such presumption applies to private carriers
only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a
common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-
party is concerned when Planters Products chartered the vessel M/V “Sun Plum”, the ship
captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the ship owner and therefore
continued to be under its direct supervision and control. As stranger to the crew and to the ship,
Planters Products did not have the duty of caring for its cargo as it did not have control of the
means in doing so.