Inta 12451

Targeting sanctions and ending
armed conflicts: first steps towards
a new research agenda

MIKAEL ERIKSSON AND PETER WALLENSTEEN
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/91/6/1387/2326929 by guest on 22 March 2024

Targeted sanctions remain one of the instruments more widely used by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to address threats to international peace and
security. The increased use of this policy instrument has been noted by a number
of scholars.1 However, despite the growing body of sanctions research, surpris-
ingly few studies have addressed what must be seen as the most crucial question,
namely whether targeted UN sanctions do have an impact on armed conflicts, and
in particular, whether their imposition enhances the chances of a peaceful settle-
ment. ‘Impact’ is here understood as the potential influence sanctions may have
on the dynamics of a conflict when they are being threatened, adopted or imple-
mented. More specifically, we examine whether sanctions are related to change in
conflict dynamics, as recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
This means that we seek to analyse whether they are associated with changes in
the intensity of the conflict, including efforts towards its resolution, as well as
other types of behaviour related to the conflict. While there is a commonly held
assumption that UN targeted sanctions do have an impact on armed conflicts, few
explorations of this question have been made using systematic and independently
collected data on sanctions as well as on armed conflicts. Apart from the publica-
tions of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC),2 much scholarship on UN
targeted sanctions has taken the form of context-specific case-studies. Scholars
engaged in this type of enterprise run the risk of ignoring recent advances in
research data on armed conflict. Most importantly, these data collection efforts
have been undertaken for purposes other than sanctions research, thus creating an
intellectual distance between data collection and possible hypotheses on sanctions.
To put the point another way, analysis of sanctions has been guided by the policy
setting itself (i.e. the demand by the imposer, the ‘sender’) rather than being
conducted independently from the point of view of conflict dynamics. This is a
challenge this article will try to overcome.
1
See e.g. David Cortright and George Lopez, The sanctions decade: assessing UN strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2000); Andrea Charron, UN sanctions and conflict: responding to peace and security threats (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2011); Mikael Eriksson, Targeting peace: understanding EU and UN targeted sanctions (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2011).
2
Targeted Sanctions Consortium: Database codebook (2015, version 3); Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert
and Marcos Tourinho, eds, Targeted sanctions: the impacts and effectiveness of UN action (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, forthcoming 2016).
International Affairs 91: 6 (2015) 1387–1398

© 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
INTA91_6_FullIssue.indb 1387 28/10/2015 13:37:44

Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallensteen
Although several scholars in the field have been engaged in sanctions research
as well as in conflict data collection, for the most part these two research fields
have been kept separate from each other. In the remainder of this article we will
suggest possible ways of bridging this gap. This will be done by taking stock of
some key features pertaining to UN sanctions and their relation to conflict type,
intensity and ending. We limit our analysis to the activities of the UNSC and do
not consider the broader strategic policies of the Council’s individual members.
Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, we do not deal with the global or regional
setting in which sanctions may be embedded.
In essence, the aim is to lay out a research agenda that can reduce the distance

between two fields that should be more closely engaged with one another. In the
second part of the article we provide an overview of the literature, and in the
third part we initiate a discussion on the connections between sanctions and armed
conflicts, and present some of our observations.
A note on questions, data, definitions and hypotheses

The questions we pose are whether UN targeted sanctions affect the dynamics
of armed conflicts, and if they do, how. By ‘conflict dynamics’ we refer, essen-
tially, to the development of conflict, with particular attention to reducing its
intensity and providing momentum for resolution. By ‘armed conflict’ we refer
to the phenomenon as defined by the UCDP, that is, generally denoting conflicts
between a state and a non-state actor or between two or more states over territory
or government.3 By ‘UN targeted sanctions’ we refer to those measures used by
the UNSC to target individuals, groups, companies, regimes and products, for
example by means of financial sanctions, travel bans, commodity trade restrictions
and sectoral economic means.
Using these definitions we are able to identify 30 sanctions regimes since the
establishment of the UN in 1945, and 27 since the end of the Cold War in 1991.4
The number of armed conflicts is much greater: the UCDP lists 144 between
1989 and 2013.5 This disproportion of course affects the extent to which we can
generalize from our analysis. Hence, rather than testing the role of UN targeted
sanctions quantitatively, we build on qualitatively based observations from the
rich empirical resource made available by recent data collections undertaken
through TSC and UCDP research projects.
Our main hypotheses are that sanctions have an impact (1) on the conduct of
armed conflicts, by reducing intensity; (2) on the possibilities of peace, by making
the parties more interested in negotiations; and (3) on postwar peacebuilding, by
reducing the danger of war recurring. These hypotheses are mainly derived from
3
See the UCDP website at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/, accessed 23 Sept. 2015.
4
See the Special Program on the International Targeted Sanctions (SPITS) website at www.smartsanctions.se,
accessed 23 Sept. 2015.
5
Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed conflicts, 1946–2012’, Journal of Peace Research 50: 4, 2013, pp.
509–21.
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International Affairs 91: 6, 2015
Copyright © 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs © 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Targeting sanctions and ending armed conflicts
recent observations in the sanctions literature.6 As further articulated below, this
article is not yet able to provide conclusive answers on these points. Instead we
see them as the beginning of a research undertaking on the connections between
UN targeted sanctions and armed conflict at large.
The contemporary literature on UN targeted sanctions

Since the 1990s, the practice of the UNSC in terms of sanctions has gone through
marked changes that have opened up avenues for research. First, it has moved
from comprehensive to targeted sanctions (so-called ‘smart sanctions’).7 Second,

the scope of UN sanctions has increasingly expanded to target particular entities,
including individuals,8 organizations and companies. This has opened up an
entirely new research area in the sanctions field, in that previous scholarship
looked mainly at the relations between the UN and governments.9 Third, there
has been a new ambition to examine the impact of UN sanctions within individual
cases, through the lens of sanctions episodes. Rather than assessing the impact of
sanctions over an entire case that may include many decisions and longer periods
of time, it is argued that an assessment is more fruitful if short periods and partic-
ular decisions—known as sanctions ‘episodes’—are examined. This constitutes a
simple but significant methodological step forward.10 It has enlarged the number
of observations from the 25 sanctions cases identified, for example, by the Special
Program on International Targeted Sanctions (SPITS) for the period 1991–2013 to
the 63 episodes registered by the TSC.11
Reflecting the past two decades of sanctions practice, the literature on sanctions
has also taken many turns.12 Much of the theory of UN targeted sanctions devel-
oped alongside UN practice. For example, scholarly attention has been focused on
mapping UN sanctions practice;13 challenges to effective implementation;14 and
6
Mikael Eriksson, Supporting democracy in Africa: African Union’s use of targeted sanctions to deal with unconstitu-
tional changes of government (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2010); Joakim Kreutz, ‘Human
rights, geostrategy, and EU foreign policy, 1989–2008’, International Organization 69: 1, 2015, pp. 195–217; Peter
Wallensteen, ‘Sanctions and peace research’, in Peace research: theory and practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011),
pp. 175–82; Susan Hannah Allen and David J. Lektzian, ‘Economic coercion and currency crises in target
countries’, Journal of Peace Research 50: 1, July 2015, p. 52; Clara Portela, ‘National implementation of United
Nations Security Council sanctions: towards fragmentation’, International Journal (Canada) 65: 1, 2009–10, pp.
13–30.
7
Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, ‘Are smart sanctions feasible?’, World Politics 54: 3, April 2002, pp. 373–403.
8
Peter Wallensteen and Helena Grusell, ‘Targeting the right targets? The UN use of individual sanctions’,
Global Governance 18: 2, 2012, pp. 207–30.
9
Johan Galtung, ‘On the effects of international economic sanctions with examples from the case of Rhodesia’,
World Politics 19: 3, 1967, pp. 378–416.
10
One of the present authors could claim a pioneering role in this development: see Eriksson, Targeting peace, fn.
1, p. 43.
11
There was a new case in 2014, that of Yemen. SPITS also includes the cases of Iraq since 1990 and Cambodia
1992–4, as well as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, to cover the full range of UN sanctions. If these five
cases were included the total number of UN sanctions episodes would now be over 70.
12
Peter Wallensteen, ‘A century of economic sanctions: a field revisited’, in Peace research, pp. 183–205.
13
David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds, Smart sanctions: targeting economic statecraft (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield, 2002).
14
Peter Wallensteen and Carine Staibano, eds, International sanctions: between words and wars in the global system
(Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005).
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the assessment of different types of sanctions in practice.15 A common approach in
the conventional strand of research is to examine the efficacy of sanctions (mainly
by scoring their policy performance in relation to the sender’s objective). An
increasing number of studies of UN targeted sanctions have also been examined
by academics in the legal field, as puzzles related to clear and fair procedures
have become central in UN targeted sanctions implementation.16 This scholarly
development in turn was a result of the sharp increase in the number of entities
placed on the UN terrorism list following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and
the expansion of listing practices.17
The literature on compliance, however, demonstrates that there has not been a

dramatic rise in the efficacy of sanctions. On the contrary, there have been illustra-
tions of negative side-effects and unintended consequences.18 Sanctions remain a
blunt instrument; but targeted sanctions have, in all likelihood, reduced the costs
to both the sender and the targeted country, compared to the earlier, compre-
hensive type of sanctions.19 For instance, they do not involve the paralysis of an
entire economy, and thus avoid the humanitarian consequences that were reported
in the 1990s as ensuing from the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq. In defence of
sanctions, it should be recalled that they are a tool applied short of the use of
military force.
In sum, then, contemporary sanctions research has mainly been concerned
with the degree of compliance with UN demands. Most often, the research focus
relates to the onset, pursuit and ending of armed conflicts. This leads to a signifi-
cant question—whether sanctions are more effective for one or the other general
purpose. Here, we are particularly interested in the impact on armed conflicts.
Very few studies have analysed UN sanctions measures in relation to armed conflict
patterns. This lack of attention to general trends of armed conflict is not surprising
if we look at the theoretical developments in the field of sanctions research, which
take a quite different path by mostly focusing on the sanctions regimes themselves
as units of analysis. Hence, it is fair to say that the impact of UN targeted sanctions
on armed conflicts remains under-researched. This is the gap we wish to address
here, using the data that are available from the UCDP.20 What, then, can we say
about the research data on armed conflicts?
During the 1990s the datasets on armed conflicts, especially those based on
intensity of violence, recorded each conflict event as a case and also on a detailed,
dyadic level (i.e. by dealing with the relations between different conflict parties
15
David Cortright, George A. Lopez and Linda Gerber, Sanctions and the search for security: challenges to UN action
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
16
See e.g. Larissa J. van den Herik, ‘Peripheral hegemony in the quest to ensure Security Council accountability
for its individualized UN sanctions regimes’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 19: 3, 2014, pp. 427–49.
17
These practices and policies have substantial unintended consequences for listed entities on matters such as
due process and the right to free and fair procedures. See Iain Cameron, ed., EU sanctions: law and policy issues
concerning restrictive measures (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013).
18
Mikael Eriksson, ‘The unintended consequences of UN targeted sanctions’, in Biersteker et al., eds, Targeted
sanctions.
19
Wallensteen and Grusell, ‘Targeting the right targets?’.
20
For the history of the UCDP, see Peter Wallensteen, ‘The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1978–2010: the
story, the rationale and the programme’, in Peace research, pp. 111–24.
1390

within a single conflict location); this was the practice initiated by the UCDP.21
Rather than measuring various aspects of, for example, the entire ‘Somalia’
conflict or the ‘Iraq’ conflict as complete, encompassing events, several schol-
arly efforts were made to unpack more conventional data collection challenges
by comparing different datasets and databases on patterns of armed conflict. For
example, data were increasingly being collected and systematized by the UCDP
on different incompatibilities, actors, strategies of violence, levels of violence, all
on the basis of the acting, organized group. By shifting the unit of analysis from
the state to the dyadic level and by enhancing the precision of the data, a more
valid account of conflict dynamics has been developed during recent years. This

in turn has opened up the possibility of reaching a much more nuanced under-
standing of what the micro-dynamics of a conflict look like (and now also how
targeted sanctions fit into these dynamics).
In sum then, we may say that both the field of research into UN targeted
sanctions and the field of conflict data have now advanced to the point where,
if combined, they could open up new ground for research on the role of the
sanctions instrument.
Sanctions and armed conflict since the end of the Cold War
The total number of armed conflicts between 1989 and 2013, according to the
UCDP data, was 144.22 Over the period 1991–2013 examined by the TSC, 74 states
experienced the onset of armed conflict, i.e. a number of conflicts had started
prior to 1991. Over the same period, according to the TSC, the UNSC initiated
23 sanctions regimes.23 However, in only 14 of the conflicts in the UCDP database
were UN sanctions applied: that is, the UNSC refrained from using sanctions
in 60 armed conflicts during this period.24 An overwhelming majority of UN
targeted sanctions in the period were imposed in Africa.
A number of variables are coded in the TSC dataset, which constitutes the most
important resource for our article. We have therefore focused on the 74 locations
of armed conflict identified by the TSC to investigate the relationship between
sanctions and the dynamics of armed conflict. The following preliminary observa-
tions are offered.
21
A first journal article was Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell, ‘Armed conflicts after the Cold War’, Journal of
Peace Research 30: 3, 1993, pp. 331–46. Some years later followed a report on the project backdating conflicts
to 1946: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand,
‘Armed conflict, 1946–2001: a new dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39: 5, 2002, pp. 615–37.
22
Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed conflict: 1946–2013’, Journal of Peace Research 51: 4, 2014, pp.
509–21.
23
On the basis of the TSC definitions there are 63 episodes. Here we concentrate on the first sanctions episode
of each case in the dataset (EP 1).
24
One discrepancy is that the SPITS Sanctions List includes pre-1991 cases; another that it includes also non-
Chapter VII sanctions (e.g. on Cambodia). From the SPITS Sanctions List website, we can observe that the
UNSC has decided to impose UN targeted sanctions in 30 situations since its foundation, most of which have
been in armed conflicts since 1989.
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Armed conflict and the use of UN targeted sanctions

A first observation is that more than half of all UN sanctions regimes identi-
fied by the TSC related directly to armed conflicts. More precisely, there were
14 sanctions regimes that concerned an armed conflict recorded by the UCDP
as initiated during the period. The remaining nine were, thus, not included in
the analysis, although there were conflicts in progress in these cases also.25 This
suggests that the UN use of sanctions is definitely geared towards armed conflict.
However, we believe there is an element of selection here. First, if the permanent
members of the UNSC and other major states do not want to bring a particular

conflict onto the Security Council agenda, they can prevent it from doing so and
thereby also from becoming the target of sanctions. This may be why the UNSC
has not considered the application of sanctions in the cases of Moldova, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Chechnya and Dagestan (owing to Russia’s interest in these areas),
northern India (which India defines as a domestic affair) or Myanmar (owing to
Chinese opposition), etc. The distribution of power in the UNSC would make
conflicts involving western countries more likely to appear on the agenda (e.g.
those in Iraq or Côte d’Ivoire). Furthermore, members of the UNSC may not
want to challenge each other’s special interests—in other words, there may be a
tacit agreement on spheres of influence with potential negative implications for
the contemporary world order.
Owing to this ‘negative selection’, a number of local situations where sanctions
might have been usefully applied, such as the repeated conflicts in Mali and Niger
in the 1990s, never saw the use of this tool; these conflicts only got onto the
UNSC agenda after 2010, by which time they had been recurring for a consider-
able number of years. This implies that the use of UN targeted sanctions is deter-
mined by Security Council politics more than by the evaluation of whether they
would be the most appropriate tool. Sanctions may thus not be used in the cases
for which they are most appropriate.
There is another aspect to the use of UN targeted sanctions in situations of
armed conflict which could be explained by UNSC dynamics. It seems that
when an armed conflict is formally entered on the Security Council agenda of
the UNSC, it may rapidly become a case for sanctions because the Council, as a
crisis management body, is eager to demonstrate that it is doing something. In
other words, once a conflict is on the agenda, the possibility of UN sanctions
being imposed increases dramatically. Even when a permanent member may be
reluctant, sanctions can be accepted as a ‘reasonable’ option. For example, there
was repeated support in the UNSC for UN sanctions against Yugoslavia during
the 1990s, even though the western countries and Russia had been supporting
different actors during the conflict. The decisions on sanctions in the cases of
international terrorism in 2001 and of Libya in 2011 follow a similar pattern.
25
Some armed conflicts had started before 1989, for example those in Angola, Liberia and Somalia. We excluded
these as we wanted to follow the use of sanctions from the beginning of a conflict.
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UN targeted sanctions and type of armed conflict

The UCDP divides the disputes underlying armed conflicts into two catego-
ries: those over control of government and those over control of territory. For
the purposes of this article, we ask: in what types of armed conflict does the
UNSC engage itself ? According to the UCDP, a majority of all armed conflicts
in the period after the Cold War concerned territorial issues, that is, attempts
by non-state actors to break away from the existing state in some way (internal
conflicts) or border issues (interstate conflicts). Yet UN targeted sanctions show
a strikingly different pattern: 20 sanctions regimes concerned government issues

and only three had to do with territorial concerns. This remarkable discrepancy
demonstrates that the use of sanctions deviates significantly from what would be
expected given the pattern of global conflict.
It is reasonable to believe that an intergovernmental organization such as the
UN is reluctant to engage itself in territorial self-determination issues except those
relating to decolonization. UN targeted sanctions are often designed to weaken
the government side in an armed conflict (e.g. the Taylor regime in Liberia or
the Gaddafi regime in Libya), whereas in territorial conflicts sanctions are often
intended to support (directly or indirectly) the rebel movements. It is notable
that it is often the rebels who demand action from international bodies, whereas
governments regularly prefer to define ‘separatism’ as an internal matter, unless
the rebellion is visibly and concretely supported by an outside power.26 However,
a number of other armed conflicts with a strong territorial content were not
brought to the UN and/or did not result in UN sanctions (e.g. the Aceh conflict
in Indonesia, the Basque conflict in Spain and the conflict between the Palestin-
ians and Israel). This suggests another layer of concern for UNSC members: they
do not normally like bringing domestic issues onto the agenda. States in general,
and those at the helm of the international system in particular, are not happy
about actions that threaten to break up states, and thus are reluctant to deal with
separatist disputes in this formal way. The fear is that doing so might threaten
to undermine a pillar of the present international system—the principle of the
territorial integrity of the state.
Sanctions were originally designed to deal with interstate conflicts, and are more
likely to be used in such conflicts. The UNSC’s reaction to the border conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea is typical. Some other interstate conflicts that began
in or after 1991 also saw the use of sanctions: a notable example is the 2003 war in
Iraq, where sanctions had been applied previously, and where targeted sanctions
were imposed on Saddam Hussein, his family and some of his supporters. On the
other hand, only four interstate armed conflicts began in the period under study,
and with so small a sample caution must be exercised in interpreting the data.
In contrast to the UN’s approach to territorial conflicts, sanctions on govern-
ments in office during the Cold War (Rhodesia and South Africa) dealt with
26
Thus, UN targeted sanctions were used in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s (first over
Croatia and Bosnia, then over Kosovo) as well as in the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
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government issues, and were designed to support non-state actors working for
democratization. Conversely, a considerable number of the post-1991 sanctions
captured by the TSC data actually aimed at supporting governments: examples are
the cases of Haiti, where sanctions were imposed in support of the deposed leader,
Rwanda (sanctions on the Hutu militia), the Democratic Republic of Congo (on
the rebels), Afghanistan (on the Taliban) and Al-Qaeda. In, fact the imposition of
targeted UN sanctions on incumbent leaders in armed conflict was rare. The case
of Libya in 2011 stands out in that context. We believe it likely that the failure to
agree on targeted sanctions against the Assad regime in Syria is typical in reflecting
the exercise of considerable Great Power interests.

UN targeted sanctions and the phases and intensity of armed conflict
Sanctions have clearly been related to the initiation or support of peace negotiations.
The TSC data demonstrate that the priority objective most frequently identified
is to support actions that reduce violence and promote peace processes.27 We can
safely say that this has been the objective of more than half of all sanctions intro-
duced in this period, followed by counterterrorism as the second most frequent
objective.28 This suggests an instrumental use of sanctions: they attempt to target
those who object to peace processes or sabotage them in various ways, thus hoping
to shift power to those in favour of negotiations.
This observation is further supported by the fact that parties to conflicts are
more frequently urged by the sanctions senders to exercise restraint. This is quite
clear when sanctions regimes that are related to armed conflict are compared with
those that concern terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, where sanctions
appear more coercive.29
Thus, when an armed conflict is brought to the UNSC it is more likely that
pressure will be exerted on the parties to find ways to negotiate. Taking the
conflict to the UN means also accepting that there will be a measure of media-
tion and cajoling in the direction of an agreement. Sanctions are used accord-
ingly. It may be, as suggested above, that the Council itself disagrees on what is
the best policy, and thus a combination of sanctions and negotiations is seen as
the best available option. In contrast, where sanctions are not related to conflict,
it is more likely that the UN is dealing with a situation where there is strong
consensus within the Council and that the party will be put under considerable
pressure to comply with statements from the Council. Certainly, this is typical for
cases of non-proliferation and counterterrorism. In both these fields, the Council
regularly takes a less compromising and more demanding position. Sanctions are
then used accordingly.
One way of thinking about the phases of armed conflicts is to consider their
intensity at the time decisions are made about sanctions. Does the UNSC show a
27
Variable 22, n = 63 of the TSC database.
28
TSC data find the peace processes category to be the primary objective for 37 of the episodes, compared to
the nine aimed at counterterrorism.
29
TSC variable 51, n = 23.
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propensity to impose targeted sanctions in situations that are more or less intense?30
On the basis of the data (13 cases of armed conflict),31 three observations are worth
making. First, a majority of all UN targeted sanctions regimes dealing with armed
conflict were imposed in conflict situations where the UCDP recorded intense
violence, that is, a state of war.32 Only in two situations, in Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire,
did the UN impose targeted sanctions when the fighting was at a low-intensity
level. A possible reason for this may have been that both situations had at the time
already received considerable political attention from the UN (and key permanent
members of the Security Council). Sanctions were thus one more instrument added
to the policy measures already instituted by the UN at the time. Second, at least

six sanctions regimes were imposed in situations of high-intensity war where the
violence stopped during the same year or the year after the imposition of sanc-
tions—these sanctions regimes were Libya 1, 2; Iraq; Former Republic of Yugo-
slavia 1; Kosovo; Ethiopia–Eritrea.33 This may suggest that sanctions have some
influence on the termination of armed conflicts. The mechanism, however, is open
to debate, as four of these cases attracted considerable attention from the Great
Powers (including occasional use of force, for instance coalition partners engaged
in air bombing campaigns). This suggests that sanctions alone cannot be credited
with ending wars. Third, in two situations, Sudan 2 and the DRC, sanctions were
imposed in an environment of high-intensity violence, and after sanctions were
imposed violence decreased considerably. On the other hand, the imposition of
sanctions against the Taliban, Sierra Leone and Rwanda did not show any significant
impact on the battle dynamic; on the contrary, in these cases, although violence
may have decreased slightly, it increased again over the subsequent years.
The findings above suggest that further research is needed to arrive at a better
understanding of how UN targeted sanctions are working in conjunction with
the dynamics of intense conflict situations.
UN targeted sanctions, armed conflicts and conflict resolution

The new TSC data show that a sizeable proportion of all UN sanctions have
been used to support peace processes. However, there are also a number of other
situations where sanctions are imposed to change particular goals. These are best
illustrated with actual cases. For instance, the first sanctions on Libya from 1992, in
connection with Libya’s involvement in terrorist activity (e.g. the Lockerbie case),
did achieve changes in Libya’s behaviour. By 1999 the UNSC had determined that
Libya had fulfilled the UN demands. Two agents accused of planting the bomb in
the aircraft in the Lockerbie case were handed over to a court in the Netherlands
and Libya paid compensation to the families of the victims. Libya having thus
30
Intensity here is measured as the number of deaths as a result of the armed conflict.
31
We base our observations on 13 cases since we do not count sanctions on Al-Qaeda as relating to a conventional
conflict, even though they are included by both the UCDP and the TSC. Were we to include this case the
total number would be 14.
32
A situation is considered to be one of war when there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.
33
The numbers refer to different episodes of the sanctions regime.
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complied with the demands, and reduced its involvement in conflicts affecting the
United Kingdom and France, normal trade and diplomatic relations were restored.
This ended the dispute over the responsibility for the bombings. From the early
2000s, Libya was no longer seen as a sponsor of terrorism. In this case, sanctions
contributed to changing behaviour, suggesting that sanctions can help to reduce
state-sponsored terrorism.
However, another situation, more typical as a case of armed conflict, is the
second round of sanctions on Libya instituted in 2011. In connection with the
uprising that began in Libya in February that year, new sanctions were imposed
for the purpose of protecting the country’s citizens from violence at the hands

of the governing regime. Again, some discernible impact on behaviour can be
observed. The freezing of assets belonging to the Gaddafi family may have had an
impact on the civil war that followed. Possibly it made it difficult for the regime
to finance loyal forces. Thus the sanctions came to be biased against the regime,
and reduced its chances of defending itself. This is a special type of impact and
it differs from the previous Libyan sanctions experience. Although this was not
explicitly stated as an objective, sanctions contributed to regime change, not just
the ending of a civil war.
Another case indicates how sanctions can become interwoven with the conduct
of war. An arms embargo was instituted against all the states of the former Yugosla-
via in 1991, and specific sanctions were imposed on the successor state, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in 1992. These measures were
removed in 1996 following the implementation of the Dayton peace accords. In
this case, it is likely that the sanctions played an instrumental role, in the end
making some parties more eager to conclude agreements and establish some degree
of ‘normal’ conditions for their international relations. The sanctions, in other
words, helped to terminate an armed conflict, but were not directly promoting
regime change.
Sanctions can also be applied in an even-handed way and thus be supportive of
peace efforts. An example is the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, where sanctions were
imposed to prevent a return to fighting and to support the search for a negotiated
peace. The peace agreement was signed in 2000 and the sanctions expired in 2001.
The arms embargo may have affected these two poor nations at war with each
other in a similar way. Both were dependent on arms deliveries to pursue their
actions. Ending the fighting by a reasonable agreement became a rational choice.
The resumption of arms transfers after the war may have worked as an incen-
tive for not implementing the withdrawal and the demarcation of the border,
suggesting an argument in favour of keeping the arms embargo in place for longer.
The sanctions on Liberia and Sierra Leone have largely been terminated, but
were kept in place long after the war had ended, as a way of keeping up pressure on
the governments to make the changes required. In the postwar situation the UN
sanctions were used for a novel purpose: the promotion of peacebuilding and the
prevention of a recurrence of war. However, by 2014 any continuing impact was
difficult to identify, as the Ebola crisis changed government priorities.
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Other cases remain to be considered (Iraq 1 and 2, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan 1
and 2, as well as the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire). One more deserves mention here:
that of the 2005 sanctions on Lebanon. This regime was aimed at supporting the
investigation into the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, and
thus was not directly related to an ongoing armed conflict (but potentially helped
to prevent a new one).
Sanctions and unresolved conflicts

In addition to the case of Libya, we should also note other cases of sanctions that

have not been terminated. In October 1999, sanctions were introduced against
Afghanistan, directed against the internationally unrecognized Taliban regime.
This was done because of the Taliban’s unwillingness to take action against
terrorism, and in particular because it had not handed over al-Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden to ‘appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and
effectively brought to justice’.34 Following the attacks on the United States of 11
September 2001, there was increased support for stronger measures.35 After the
war that deposed the Taliban regime, the sanctions remained in place, targeting
specific individuals, wherever they were on the globe. These sanctions became part
of the global struggle against terrorism, and additions to the lists of individuals
or organizations covered became a major undertaking for these sanctions regimes.
Conclusion
In this article we have identified a number of factors that could further improve
our understanding of UN targeted sanctions. By building on the newly released
data of the TSC as well as systematic data on patterns of armed conflict, we have
illustrated how sanctions may play out in contemporary world affairs. The prelim-
inary results suggest that sanctions may remain a valuable tool of conflict manage-
ment, but that their record in conflict resolution requires further study. There are
several instances of armed conflict where the UN has decided not to impose sanc-
tions even though it has done so in similar cases. A potential explanation for this
may be that the Council’s decision-making is not consistent and perhaps not opti-
mal. It may also be influenced by an assessment of how likely sanctions are to be
effective. We may also note the tendency of the UNSC to engage in armed conflicts
over government issues as opposed to those based on territorial concerns. This may
be a selective bias in favour of governments and the territorial integrity of the state,
but it may also reflect an unequal distribution of power in the organization, which
is notably weighted in favour of the permanent members of the UNSC and other
major powers in the UN system. Both these observations require more in-depth
examination. The sample used in this article is by necessity limited, and other
factors may also be at work.
34
UN Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999.
35
UN Security Council Resolution 1368 of 2001.
1397

Overall, we conclude that sanctions have a connection to conflict resolution.
Most sanctions imposed in situations of armed conflict are designed to support
peace processes and peacebuilding. There are some successes, but also failures.
Sanctions need to be further understood as a tool embedded in a larger strategic
setting. It would be possible to develop a research agenda to study the peace-
promoting aspect of the use of sanctions, as distinct from the study of compli-
ance. This agenda would include matters of conflict prevention (e.g. sanctions as
threats) and peacebuilding (e.g. the lifting of sanctions as an incentive for peace-
supporting actions), and also how sanctions relate to different types of outcomes
(e.g. victory for one side as against peace agreements). This research can be

pursued for the totality of sanctions, and also for different types and combina-
tions of sanctions. Even though the number of cases is small, by referring to data
on conflicts where sanctions are not used it will be possible to appreciate more
clearly what (if anything) the sanctions contribute. This will be the next step
in our investigations. So far, our findings suggest that further research is needed
to expand the focus beyond the narrow bounds of the demands laid out by the
official resolutions.
1398

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Targeting sanctions and ending

armed conflicts: first steps towards

a new research agenda

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A note on questions, data, definitions and hypotheses

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The contemporary literature on UN targeted sanctions

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Armed conflict and the use of UN targeted sanctions

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UN targeted sanctions and type of armed conflict

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UN targeted sanctions, armed conflicts and conflict resolution

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Sanctions and unresolved conflicts

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