Background Brief:

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123 Who Will be Nguyen Phu
Trong’s Successor?
March 24, 2024

We request your expertise in responding to the following questions:

Q1. Vo Van Thuong was once considered “the morally authoritative leader the
Communist party needs to continue its anti-corruption campaign”, but now he has
also stepped down, most likely because of a corruption scandal. May I ask do you think
this reflects that the corruption problem is deep rooted in Vietnam, or the power and
factional struggle in the party become more serious?
ANSWER: The official announcement of Vo Van Thuong’s resignation was issued by
the Office of the Party Central Committee (Thông cáo Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng)
on 20 March.. This announcement stated, “recently (vừa qua) according to reports
from the Central Inspection Committee and competent agencies (Ủy ban Kiểm tra
Trung ương và các cơ quan chức năng), he violated Regulations on what party
members cannot do and the Regulations on the responsibility of setting an example
for officials and the party members, first of all, members of the Politburo, members
of the Secretariat, members of the Party Central Committtee…” The announcement
concluded, ”Mr Vo Van Thuong’s violations and shortcomings have caused bad public
opinion, affecting the reputation of the Party, the State and him personally.”
There has been intense speculation in Vietnamese social media that Thuong was
implicated in a bribery scandal related to a road development project that he
approved when he was party secretary of Quang Ngai province in 2012. It is unclear
whether Thuong failed to properly monitor his subordinates or whether Thuong or a
family member benefitted from the bribery scheme. Regardless which account is
accurate what explains the charges brought against him twelve years later?
The reference to “recently” in the announcement by the Office of the Party Central
Committee suggests Thuong committed a serious violation of party regulations within
the last two and a half years. Secretariat Regulation No. 37-QD-TW on what party
members should not do (Quy Định V ề những điều đảng viên không được làm) was
issued in October 2021.
What account for Thuong’s demise – the anti-corruption campaign or party in-
fighting? There is no question that corruption is rife at all levels in Vietnam and that
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has made his “burning furnace” (đốt lò)
campaign against corruption not only his highest priority but his legacy to party as he
prepares to step down after an unprecedented third term in office at age 80. The
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campaign has been wide-ranging and left virtually no stone unturned. Since the last
national party congress n 2021, four members of the 18 member Politburo elected
then have been forced to resign for violating party regulations.
In June 2022, on the tenth anniversary of Trong’s anti-corruption campaign, the
Ministry of Information released the following figures:
• 168,000 CPV members were disciplined and 7,390 “punished for corruption or
links with corruption,” including “170 officials under the Party Central
Committee’s management”
• 16,699 cases of corruption, abuse of position, and economic-related
irregularities were prosecuted. US$2.6 billion worth of ‘corrupt assets’ have
been recovered, including 76,000 hectares of wrongfully appropriated land.
US$41.8 billion in fines have been levied.
At least seventy high-ranking party officials, including five ministers or former
ministers, were disciplined since 2021 alone.
Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on Transparency
International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index (PCI) where scores are tabulated on a
scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Vietnam’s PCI score rose from a low of 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of 175 states
surveyed) to 31 in 2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s
first term in office. Vietnam’s PCI score rose to 36 in 2020 (104/180) at the end of
Trong’s second term in office, and to 39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong was elected for
a third term. Vietnam’s PCI score rose to an all-time high of 42 in 2022 (77/80) but
dropped slightly to 41 (87/180) in 2023.
In sum, Vietnam’s PCI score improved over 38 points during Trong’s tenure as party
leader. But Vietnam ranks just below the global average and still has a long way to go.
Prior to Thuong’s resignation, there were only four members of the Politburo,
including Thuong himself, who were qualified under existing regulations to stand for
election to Vietnam’s four top leadership posts at the next party congress in early 2026
– party General Secretary, prime minister, president and chairman of the National
Assembly. Thuong is the youngest member of the Politburo was widely tipped to
replace Throng as party leader. Given his age, Thuong would have been eligible to
serve two consecutive five-years terms before reaching the mandatory retirement age
of 65.
Now that Thuong is out of the picture, the Central Committee will have to grant a
special exemption from the statutory retirement age for another member of the
Politburo to qualify for election. The current Minister of Public Security To Lam is most
likely to benefit from Thuong’s demise.
If Thuong committed a serious breach of party regulations in recent years, then
without question he is a victim of General Secretary Trong’s “burning furnace” anti-
corruption campaign. However, it Thuong’s demise is related to a twelve-year old
bribery case, his is most likely a victim of party-factionalism.
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Q2. As Thuong was seen as an ally and potential successor of General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong, does Thuong’s resignation means that Trong’s power has been
weakened?
ANSWER: Party General Secretary Trong is not all-powerful. At the last national party
congress in 2021, he advanced Tran Quoc Vuong as his successor. The Central
Committee failed to ratify Vuong when a coalition of provincial representatives voted
against him.
In March, General Secretary Trong successfully removed President Nguyen Xuan Phuc
and Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh from the Politburo for their failure to
supervise subordinates involved in corrupt practices. But when Trong considered
taking action against Prime Minster Pham Minh Chinh, whose family members were
allegedly implicated in a COVID-19 related scandal, members of the Politburo pushed
back arguing this would be destabilising.
General Secretary Trong is a “lame duck” leader who is expected to retire at the 2026
national party congress. He had a stroke in 2019 and was reportedly seriously ill earlier
this year. His protege, Thuong, is now out of the running.
In sum, Trong, who heads the Personnel Sub-Committee to select candidates for
election at the next national congress, cannot dictate who will replace him as party
leader. He will have to bargain and seek consensus among members of the Personnel
Sub-Committee before seeking ratification by the Central Committee.
Q3. Based on the current situation, could you please analyze who will replace Thuong
and be the new potential successor of Trong in 2026?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s National Assembly has already approved Tran Thi Anh Xuan, the
current vice president, as acting president. Anh Xuan is unlikely to hold this position
until the end of the term in May 2026 because she is not a member of the Politburo.
It seems likely that the Central Committee will nominate a candidate for state
president at its next executive session, the 9th plenum, in May if not sooner. The
Central Committee must decide whether it should appoint a caretaker to fill out the
term in office and retire, or pick a person who is expected to serve on as the next
president after the next party congress. Truong Thi Mai, Permanent Member of the
Secretariat, and Public Security Minister To Lam, are viewed as the front runners
The Central Committee could follow the precedent set when President Tran Dai Quang
died office, that is, appoint someone on the Politburo to hold two post concurrently
until the end of term.
Regardless of which scenario is followed the new state president can only serve until
the expiration of the current term in May 2026.
At present, only three members of the fourteen member Politburo are qualified to
stand for election to one of the four top leadership posts – Tran Thanh Man (deputy
chairman of the National Assembly), Dinh Tien Dung (secretary of the Hanoi party
committee) and Tran Cam Tu (head of the Central Inspection Committee). All three
persons will be under 65 years of age in early 2026.
If it is assumed that Nguyen Phu Trong will retire, there are ten remaining members
of the Politburo who would need an exemption for exceptional service to serve
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beyond age 65. The current prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, chairman of the
National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, and Permanent Member of the Secretariat,
Truong Thi Mai, are the most senior having served two terms on the Politburo and will
be aged 68-69 when the next party congress is held.
Vuong Dinh Hue would appear to be the most qualified person to replace Trong as
party leader. He would be following in the footsteps of general secretaries Nong Duc
Manh and Nguyen Phu Trong who both served as Chairman of the National
Assembly. Hue scored the second highest number of votes in the National
Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 24, 2024. All background briefs are
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