Against The African Normativists-3

ACADEMIA Letters
AGAINST THE AFRICAN NORMATIVISTS

Anayochukwu Kingsley Ugwu, Philosophy Department, University Of Nigeria,
Nsukka
Hilary Ngwoke, Philosophy Department, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
ABSTRACT
This paper is a critique against the African normativists who posit that ‘personhood’ is not
ontological but attained/achieved through compliance to social norms and dictates hence the
primacy of the community(social-self) to the community-member(individual-self). The im-
plication therein therefore is that the concept ‘personhood’ becomes ‘human-definitive’ in-
stead of the ontological concept ‘humanness/humanity’, and by this, the ‘individual-self’ be-
comes inferior to the ‘social-self’ who accepts and determines the existential reality of the
‘individual-self’ and its status. It is upon the bewilderment posed by normativist position that
this paper raises questions: What is the place of ‘personhood’ in the African value-system in
relation to human-conceptualization? What is the relationship between the concepts ‘human-
ness(humanity)’ and ‘personhood’? How ontologically rational(justified) is it for an outsider-
phenomenon (the social-self) to determine the reality and status of an insider-phenomenon (the
individual-self)? It is in this regard that this paper defends that the normativist-personhood-
approach is conceptually and practically un-African, and does not capture the depth of the
African conception of life, hence humanness/humanity is the best conceptual ontological ap-
proach, and the substance from which every human being shares, as against the normativist
viewpoint. At the end, this paper shall provide a philosophical exposition proving the on-
tological loophole of the normativist conception of the human and social values; as more
humanistic ontological position shall be upheld. The paper applies philosophical content and
conceptual analysis and clarifications to critically evaluate the normativist positions.
Academia Letters, November 2021 ©2021 by the authors — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0
Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Citation: Ugwu, A.K., Ngwoke, H. (2021). AGAINST THE AFRICAN NORMATIVISTS. Academia Letters,
Article 4055. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL4055.
1
NORMATIVIST APPROACH OF PERSONHOOD
Normativist approach is a “theoretical, prescriptive approach to sociological studies that has
the aim of appraising or establishing the values and norms that best fit the overall needs and
expectations of society” (https://www.oxfordreference.com). Suffice it to say that the societal
needs and expectations฀ of any sort, are expressed in the norms and values of the society, and
the allegiance and obedience-capability of any community-member to these societal needs and
values, bestow on such an individual the status of ‘personhood’. What is then ‘personhood’?
‘Personhood’ is the “status of being a person” who is “a human being regarded as an
individual.” A person means (1) a “natural person;” (2) “one (as a human being or corpo-
ration) that is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties;” (3) a human as “dis-
tinguished from a thing or lower animal: individual man, woman, or child” (https://www.
merriam-webster.com). Another source (https://www.jyi-org) has it that “personhood may
equate to what we call “humanity” as an individual or collective character trait” hence a person
is “a living human, and an individual with character and personality.” From all indications,
the ‘definition of a person is an individual human being’. So when the normativists argue that
personhood is attained, and can equally be lost, they indirectly say that the state of being a
person who is an individual thinking subject, a human being is achieved and can equally be
lost. In a clearer term, it is said that “personhood is an analytical term used by anthropolo-
gists to indicate who, within any given culture, is considered to be either a fully functioning
and accepted member of adult society, or, in the case of children, who is considered to being
on the way to being a fully functioning and accepted member of adult society” (https://www.
lauraappell-warren.com). The simple implication is that not all human being possesses per-
sonhood and so, is denied certain privileges and humanitarian treatment/approach. Thus, it
is inferable that normativists are gerontocratic, hence age, which should surface in the episte-
mological display in accordance with social norms and values, essentially matters as to who
should accorded ‘personhood’. It must be recalled that the concept ‘personhood’ begins from
the concept of ‘person’ as a human individual being, and it, by subsequence, follows that
the status of being an individual human person, is achieved/attained through the individual’s
knowledge (epistemological level) which is supposed to be expressed in observing the worth of
social norms and values and complying with their principles. Thus, ‘personhood is the status
of being a person’ and according to the law, it is “only a natural person or legal personality has
rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities, and legal liability” (https://en.wikipedia.org).
Personhood therefore “manifests the unity of the spiritual and the corporeal in human exis-
tence, and thereby is an essential characteristic of the human species. Personhood gives to the
human individual a universal worth and an exceptional standing” (https://www.mvorganizing.

2
org; https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). From this, personhood theory “attempts a systematic ac-
count of the qualities that enable individuals who possess them to lead lives of value” (https://
link.springer.com). This explains why some exponents of the mental-capabilities-approach
argue that personhood-criterion does not rely on intelligence capacity “but rather the capacity
to value” (https://link.springer.com).
The analyses above show that two things stand as criteria for personhood attainment: (1)
natural (for instance, rationality, etc.) expressing epistemological-status; (2) social norms
(which incorporates ‘legal’ idea) expressing values. Following this, it is clear that humans
attain personhood naturally; but it is based on this legal perspective that animals as legal
personalities can be designated with personhood following their rights-preservation. In his
2014 work titled “Animal ‘Personhood’: Muddled Alternative to Real Protection”, Klinken-
borg makes it known that a new strategy of granting animals personhood under the law is
advanced by some academia, though, the approach fails to address the fundamental truth that
all species have an equal right to their own existence. Thus, it can be said that “animal per-
sonhood is meant to fill an inherent vacuum in the workings of animal rights” (https://e360.
yale.edu). It here becomes even more ridiculous as this normativist human-definitive term
‘personhood’, could also be used to designate animal฀ that cannot act morally-conscious and
its rights. Nonetheless, this answers why the law sees a person as “anyone regarded as capable
of holding rights, duties, and responsibilities of his or her own. The law confers such status
and decides who deserves to be treated as a person and for what reasons” (https://journals.
openedition.org). Generally, it could be said that “personhood is a social construction that
is attributed by some to others, and also regularly withheld” (http://enhancinglife.uchicago.
edu). From this perception, personhood is nature-based following certain internal qualities
(reasoning, intelligence, consciousness, etc.) and legally as a moral agent in compliance and
allegiance to social norms and values.
However, many criteria(conditions) of personhood have been enumerate; they include:
consciousness, reasoning/rationality(logical-reasoning-ability), intelligence, self-motivating
activity, presence of self-concept and self-awareness, language-use, communication-capacity,
ability to initiate action, and moral agency and the ability to engage in moral judgments (https:/
/medicine.missouri.edu; https://www.alzheimer-europe.org). Again, it becomes worrisome as
without these criteria, a human being is not personhood-qualified, but ironically, legally, even
a non-human can attain personhood because of its legal personality to be accorded certain
rights.
Thus this paper infers that the personhood-concept is a social construct to designate within
the human specie, a categorization to certain people based on certain qualities to include
rationality, language use, communication-ability, etc. This is a fundamental reason this paper

3
argues that the conceptual term is un-African and discriminatory in nature. Ontologically, it
denies humanity/humanness to certain category of people which defiles the African principle
of Ndu-bu-isi (life first, of every quality), hence the identification of life with humanity which
is the substance from which every being (human) shares. This is a problem.
Putting it into a perspective, normativist personhood conception is the position that com-
pliance to social norms and customary principles bestows on an individual the quality/status of
human personhood, which at the final analysis, implies human-beingness or humanness/humanity.
But a factor facilitates the possibility of realization/attainment of the worth and the necessity
of such normative compliance, and that is nothing than epistemological gauge (wisdom or en-
lightenment level) of an individual. Following this, age counts, as it is expected that the older
one becomes, the more one is expected not just to realize the worth of those social norms,
but also to act in accordance with them (1984:173). Thus, primarily, one attains personhood
(human-status/humanness) through epistemological application to observe the community so-
cial norms and morality, without which, one is not a human being(person).
Practically, many African scholars have postulated a normativist conception of the human
being. For them, to be attributed humannes/humanity (or personhood, for those who use ‘per-
son’ in place of ‘human being’), is to comply with a high sense of allegiance/commitment, to
the norms and principles/dictates of the community. The implication therein in this concep-
tion is that the community (the social-self) determines the existential reality and human-status
of the community-individual-member (the individual-self). That is to say that it is the com-
munity (social-self) that will say ‘you are a human being’, determine your real existence and
how you should behave.
But one thing stands out: that it is the conceptualization of, and a high emphasis placed
on the African communality (a life guided by communitarianism), that breeds such viewpoint
of human conceptualization. The African worldview/existence has always been an existence-
with-the-other, an existence-in-and-among-and-within-others. No being is conceived in iso-
lation in the African worldview, and drawing from that, existential quiddity is emphasized
in the community where every member-being lives and fulfils its destiny. So the value of
the community places a high sense of essence and role on the existential realities of the
African, hence the African personality of communality. This communality-phenomenon has
been designated with some terms by some African scholars like Senghor and his ‘Negri-
tude’, Nyerere and his ‘Ujamaa’, Nkrumah and his ‘Consciencism’, Azikiwe and his ‘Eclecti-
cism’, Mbiti and his ‘I-and-We Existential mantra’, Okolo and his ‘Being-with’, Asouzu and
his ‘Ibuanyidanda-Complimentarity’, Ozumba and Chimakonam and their ‘Njikoka-Amaka
Integrative-Humanism’, Nze and his ‘Communalistic-Brotherhood’, Edeh and his ‘EPTAISM
of Mma-di-in-Closeness-not-Closedness’, Kanu and his ‘Igwebuike’, Odimegwu and his ‘Inter-

4
Presencing’, Maduka and his ‘Madukakism’, the author and his ‘Anthropocentricism of Mad-
jvuruism’, among many others.
Having said, thus calls for a review of some African scholars who strongly uphold norma-
tivist viewpoint, and most prominent of them is Menkiti. Menkiti asserts that “in the African
view, it is the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality
of rationality, will or memory…. personhood is something which has to be achieved, and is
not given simply because one is born of human seed” (1984:172; 2004: 324-31). He insists
that “the human community plays a crucial role in the individual’s acquisition of personhood”
hence personhood is achieved by observing social dictates following one’s age which is de-
terminant in one’s epistemic gauge based on eldership-doctrine (171-4, 9).
Another prominent exponent of communitarianism (though moderatist) and normativist
human conception is Gyekye. He sees ‘communitarianism’ as “the doctrine that the group
[the society] constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society”
(1987:155) and compliance to the principles and norms of the group/community(social-self)
bestows on an individual not just a ‘real person’ (onipa) but also a ‘real good person’ (onipa
pa); hence “personhood is fully defined by the community” (1997: 52).
Toeing the same conceptual scheme is Gbadegesin. Describing the Yoruba conceptual-
ization of the human person, Gbadegesin holds that “while confirming the personality of an
individual, destiny also joins each one to the community, and personality becomes meaningful
only by appeal to destiny and community” (2004:318).
Ikuenobe (2006, 117-31) and Imafidon (2014:1-19) are other normativists who insist that
for an individual to be considered a person(human being) depends on his epistemological
awareness and subsequent observance of the communal norms and moral codes stipulated
in/by the society. Thus, morality and(or) keeping the law makes one a person for personhood
is not ontological or by nature, bestowed on any individual. Summarily, personhood is attained
by the extent at which one adheres to social norms, and is moral.
Worthy of mentioning is Egbunu (2013:30-8) who asserts that the term One denotes the
notion of ‘person’ in Igala and can variously mean a person who is now of age, a free born
and a person who is now morally conscious. This implies that slaves, and a person biolog-
ically related (free born) but ignores societal norms and is morally lagging behind, do not
share in the traditional etymological meaning and implication of this term, hence not really a
(human)person.
Another normativist is Dzobo (1992:123-4) who still maintains that the level of moral-
consciousness displaying a certain epistemic acquisition by a person, bestows personhood(humanity)
on that person.

5
CRITICISMS
It is necessary to rectify the normativist argument that normativist conceptualization is natu-
ral to the Igbo. The argument is extracted from, for instance, when the Igbo asks: ibukwarii
or ibukwanu mmadu? (are you (still) a human being?). This humanity-questioning to/in an
individual recognizes the substance of humanity which should be played out by the individ-
ual, but unfortunately not seen; and to call him back to his humanity-consciousness, such a
question becomes necessary. It does not mean that because the individual lacks in exhibit-
ing humanity in his behaviour, that he is no more a human. Thus, the question is not one
that denies humanity/humanness (personhood) to an individual, but recalls him back to his
humanity-consciousness.
This said, it must be noted that normativist conception of personhood is not Igbo-African,
for it is not inclusive-consciousness over every life/existence, which no matter how more or
less, matters to the Igbo-African. More reasons are to include: (1) it is segregating/discriminatory,
(2) it disregards the value/sacredness of life over and above every other value, and (3) it does
not satisfy the quiddity of humanism in the African understanding. By normativist concep-
tion, the elder who suffers from dementias and now turns attitudinally-childish because of old
age; people whose health-impairment has influenced their rational inclinations thereby being
rationally and morally questionable; the insane whose mentality is deterred; not-yet-of-age
who are both rationally and morally lagging behind, and even slaves by the Igala’s One, are
all not human-categorizeable, or denied personhood. By this, normativist view is entirely out
of the African scale of value-conceptualization. By this, it can be posited that European style
of reasoning hugely influenced African normativists most obvious among them is Menkiti for
employing the term ‘person’ and even the ‘it-concept’ to designate the African conception
of the human being and human category of childhood; and finally influenced them to swerve
from the realm of an-all-through African reasoning as shown in this paragraph.
Again, the normativist theory deters the reality and ontology of the ancestry. Mbiti (1970:19-
36) committed a crime against ancestry through his articulation of time, thereby basing ances-
try and subsequently their ontological influences on the memorability of the dead(ancestors)
by the living. African value and dignity on, and reality of ancestry go beyond (Mbiti’s) time
and memorability. No doubt, this crime, a normativist scholar like Menkiti (172-5) repeated;
a clear European emphasis on the metaphysical components of an individual (rationality, con-
sciousness, intelligence, memory, etc.) as conditions of personhood.
A scholar like Gbadegesin links the individual, his right and destiny to the community;
and one may ask: if for instance, destiny is all about ‘that which has been preordained for
one to acquire in life’, why must the community and its norms play in one’s realization or

6
attainment of one’s destiny? (Ugwu and Ozoemena, 2019:79-95). At this, destiny therefore
becomes more empirical/social than ideal/divine.
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

This paper has been able to holistically analyze the position of the normativists and the com-
munitarians; and equally point out their conceptual loopholes; and finally, their philosophical
and conceptual damage to the African philosophy and ontology of ancestry. Following this,
this paper chooses the term ‘human being’ as a more humanistic concept/approach, instead of
other terms like ‘person’/’personhood’, ‘man’, ‘individual’, etc., because of the individualistic
tendencies and gender-insensitivity inherent in their contextual meanings and implications, to
counter the African normativists in dialoguing this human discourse.
After a critical examination of the African worldview, it can be said that two princi-
ples/factors qualify anything valuable to the African: humanism and community. That is
to say that it must be concerned with human welfarism; and of positive effect to the commu-
nity thereby institutionalizing the principles of communitarianism. These two factors shape
the African thinking and conceptualization of ideas.
If the African worldview/value-system should be guided by the principal principles of nor-
mativist conception as embedded in, for instance, Menkiti, existence and unalienable-human-
right therefore are no more ontological but by human-derivation which is totally conceptually
anti-African.
Further to some scholars like Kierkegaard, age never matters in gauging one’s epistemo-
logical level as it relates to his doctrine of ‘human developmental stages’ of Aesthetics, Ethical
and Ontological.

7
References
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(eds.). Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Issues, 1. Washington DC: The
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Egbunu, Fidelis Eleojo. “Personhood (One) in Igala Worldview: A Philosophical Appraisal”.

Cross-Cultural Communication. Canada: Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental
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Gbadegesin, Segun. “Toward a Theory of Destiny”. Wiredu, Kwasi (ed.). A Companion to

African Philosophy. UK: Blackwell Publishing. 2004. 313-23.
Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme.
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Gyekye, Kwame. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Expe-
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Ikuenobe, Polycarp. “The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart”.
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Menkiti, Ifeanyi A. “Person and Community in African Traditioal Thought”. Wright, Richard
A. (ed.). African Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Paulist Press. 1984. 171-81
Menkiti, Ifeanyi A. “On the Normative Conception of a Person”. Wiredu, Kwasi (ed.). A
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ACADEMIA Letters

AGAINST THE AFRICAN NORMATIVISTS

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

Egbunu, Fidelis Eleojo. “Personhood (One) in Igala Worldview: A Philosophical Appraisal”.

Gbadegesin, Segun. “Toward a Theory of Destiny”. Wiredu, Kwasi (ed.). A Companion to

Corresponding Author: Hilary Ngwoke, hillmaris02@gmail.com

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