International Journal of African Renaissance Studies -

Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity

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Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa:

Should South Africa follow Zimbabwe's footsteps?

Vusi Gumede

To cite this article: Vusi Gumede (2014) Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa: Should South
Africa follow Zimbabwe's footsteps?, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-,
Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 9:1, 50-68, DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2014.916877

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/18186874.2014.916877

Published online: 03 Jul 2014.

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Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa: Should
South Africa follow Zimbabwe’s footsteps?

Vusi Gumede
Head of the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute
University of South Africa
gumedvt@unisa.ac.za

Abstract
There are two interconnected fundamental policy questions that should shape any
land reform programme in any African context: what kind of land reform and land
tenure is ideal as well as what kind of farming is appropriate? The article argues that
South Africa has never addressed these important questions and other associated
questions, hence there appears to be policy confusion regarding South Africa’s land
reform processes. It is taken for granted that the process of land reform in South
Africa is necessary in redressing apartheid colonialism – this should be the hallmark
of land reform in not just South Africa but Southern Africa as a whole, as Moyo
(2013), Murisa (2013), Hendricks et al. (2013), Hebinck et al. (2013) and many others
have argued recently. Since 1994, the government relied on the 1996 Constitution
and the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform as well as a plethora of legislative pieces
to redistribute land, correct land tenure and address land restitution. However,
land reform as a whole in South Africa has been a dismal failure. It is no surprise
that Hendricks et al. (2013, 1) say ‘there remains a land crisis in South Africa’.
Zimbabwe, by contrast, has been peddled as a possible model to follow. The study
of the Zimbabwean land reform processes amplifies the fundamental point that this
article argues – that policy clarity is critical.

Key words: agriculture in South Africa and Zimbabwe; land reform in South Africa
and Zimbabwe; transformation; policy on land reform

ISSN (Print) 1818-6874 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies

ISSN (Online) 1753-7274 Vol. 9 (1) 2014
© University of South Africa Press pp. 50–68
DOI: 10.1080/18186874.2014.916877
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 51

Introduction

Without attributing the inability to transform society speedily to the past, the historical
experience of apartheid colonialism1 must be recognised as a point of departure for
any endeavour to ameliorate socio-economic development in South Africa. And for the
African continent as a whole, the historical experience of colonialism and imperialism
as well as newer forms of white domination should guide the interventions to ensure
robust development in the continent. In other words, redress requires added efforts
that deal with centuries of underdevelopment as defined by Walter Rodney (1973), in
particular.2 In addition, socio-economic transformation in the continent require human
agency as described by Molefi Kete Asante (2007). In his numerous writings, Asante
argues that (African) agency is critical for Africa’s development. In other words, people
must take part in the pursuit of development.
As Frantz Fanon (1963, 9) aptly put it, ‘for a colonial people the most important
essential value, because the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which
will bring them bread and, above all dignity’. Land remains the most contested issue
in South Africa, as it is in most post-colonial and post-apartheid societies. As Mafeje
(2003) argues, there were many distortions that colonisers introduced to Africa’s natural
economy with regard to land ownership. The political struggle for liberation emphasised
that land and mineral resources should be returned to their original inhabitants, at
least redistributed equitably.3 Zenzo Moyo4 (2013) observes that land owners and the
landless people in South Africa seem to agree that so far land redistribution and the
transformation of land ownership patterns in South Africa are moving at a very slow
pace.5 However, the premise on which this view is held by the different stakeholders
differs fundamentally. Landowners want land reform to be speeded up in order to avoid
the ‘chaotic’ way in which it was done in other countries such as Zimbabwe while, on
the other hand, landless people want land redistribution to be quickened so that they also
participate fully in the economy of the country, and correct the imbalances of the past.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly deals with the different
views on the land question in South Africa against recent developments in land reform
in Zimbabwe, while Section 3 focuses on the details of the evolution of land policy in
Zimbabwe. Sections 2 and 3 inform the discussion in Section 4 which discusses land
reform in South Africa since 1994 and offers different perspectives on what could be a
way forward for land reform in South Africa. The final section concludes the discussion.

The land question in South Africa

Owing to the negligible amount of land that has been redistributed so far in South Africa,
some people may perhaps have begun to doubt the efficacy of a market-oriented land
reform approach. The arguments for land redistribution are many and wide ranging.
There are political, economic, social as well as moral reasons why there should be a
radical transformation process in land ownership patterns in South Africa. Hendricks
et al. (2013, 348-349) openly argue for a radical programme, making such statements
52 Vusi Gumede

as ‘the resolution of the land question by radical land redistribution is a sine qua non
for dismantling the former Bantustans’. Indeed, it is natural that, as part of the process
of decolonisation, the land should be restored back to the people that occupied it.
Sam Moyo (2011) – who has written extensively on the land and agrarian question in
Zimbabwe – commenting on the Zimbabwean land reform process, opines that a wide
range of Africans, especially the poor landless and farm workers, sought land reform
to redress racial and class inequalities, foreign domination and historical loss of land
(Moyo 2011, 496). These reasons, as Zenzo Moyo (2013) points out, are also applicable
to South Africa. As can be deduced in the discussion of both the Zimbabwean and
South African land reform processes, the disagreements that exist between respective
governments and land owners basically relate to the procedures followed and not to the
substance of the action.
In South Africa, despite different views regarding the redistribution procedures,
there appear to be fundamental agreements between the private sector and government
that need to be acknowledged. Not all South Africans acknowledge that land reform
is a central part of the constitutional settlement, but do. Sacrifices and compromises
should, therefore, be made in order to accomplish what the Constitution requires. There
is agreement that land reform should be prioritised by government, because the cost
of failure is too high, as the Zimbabwean model seems to testify. The slow pace so far
of redistribution is flaring up conflict between organised agriculture and government,
and among farmers, officials and farm workers. This article argues that, in order to
accomplish satisfactory land reform, a combination of state and market forces might
be ideal to achieving effective and sustainable transformation. According to the Centre
for Development Enterprise (CDE) (2008), many land claims that have been registered
with the courts in South Africa are justified and these should be settled quickly to avoid
a blocking effect, which will slow the pace of land redistribution.
However, despite areas of commonality, there also exist wide differences between
the state and current land owners. Some apparently claim that market orientated land
reform processes are slowing down the process of land redistribution, while land
owners seem to believe that such processes are efficient mechanisms if used properly.
The notion that land should only be distributed through market friendly processes is
precisely where the Zimbabwean ‘land grabs’ by the masses began. Related to this is the
argument advanced by the private sector that the State does not know how much land it
already has at its disposal (Centre for Development Enterprise 2008). The State should,
of course, know how much more land is required to achieve equitable distribution – a
comprehensive land audit would address this. The argument here is that the state is
paying too little attention to the potential of the land that it already owns.
The practice and process of restitution (as is explained later) are also another area
of disagreement. Government still appears to be satisfied with the progress made, while
some in the private sector and the poor believe that restitution is happening too slowly
and too unpredictably, making farming difficult for both established and new black
farmers. It would seem that government’s 2007 proposed land acquisition measures
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 53

(including increased expropriation and the right of first refusal on all land transactions)
are regarded as counterproductive by large scale land owners. The private sector
believes that government lacks requisite capacity to implement its own land reform
policies quickly, fairly, consistently and in ways that leave land reform beneficiaries
better off in the long run (Centre for Development Enterprise 2008). This has also led
to fears that South Africa may follow Zimbabwe’s ‘chaotic’ land reform footsteps. This
view is, I argue, informed by a poor understanding of developments concerning the
Zimbabwean Fast Track Land Reform Programme.6
A closer look at the Zimbabwean land reform programme may be opportune to
establish whether or not Zimbabwean land reform was as ‘chaotic’ as many in South
Africa fear – this should also determine what lessons South Africa can learn from the
Zimbabwean land reform processes. As Mngxitama (2000) warns, a comparison of
the land reform process between Zimbabwe and South Africa has to be sensitive to
some fundamental differences between the two countries. It is generally argued that the
Zimbabwean liberation struggle was inspired by the land question (See, for instance,
Moyo 2013). The South African political struggle was mainly premised on urban
demands couched principally in terms of freedom and equality (Mngxitama 2000).
This difference should be acknowledged, because it may premise some differences
in approach that may be apparent in these two countries’ land reform programmes.
However, in both countries, colonial conquest is the reason for skewed land ownership
patterns. But, in Zimbabwe, as Moyo (2013) suggests, the guerrilla warfare against
the Ian Smith’s government was mainly about land in Zimbabwe. In South Africa, in
contrast, the political struggle was different because of ‘colonialism of a special type’.7
In addition, the two-stage theory of the national democratic revolution8 envisaged a
different process of transformation from that in Zimbabwe. Lastly, the peaceful political
settlement in South Africa was negotiated whereas in Zimbabwe came about through
confrontation between the opposing (armed) forces.

The land question in Zimbabwe

The land question in Zimbabwe has been a problem since the independence of that
country in 1980 (Moyo 2013). Thomas (2003, 694-695) argues as follows about
Zimbabwe, which is also relevant to South Africa:
It is uncontested that land was simply stolen from its owners throughout the century
before independence. Redistribution would reverse this process and return land to
the dispossessed. Additionally, racial basis of land inequality needs to be specifically
acknowledged. Redistribution is justified at least in part through the need to redress
racial imbalance in land ownership for a number of reasons not least among them
being that the political instability is inevitable when the subordination of Africans is
perpetuated by the inactivity, through collusion or impotence, of an essentially African
government. The eradication of this nexus of privilege and humiliation is essential to the
re-establishment of confidence among a demoralised black population.
54 Vusi Gumede

One of the reasons why people participated in the liberation war was because of the
skewed land ownership patterns that favoured the minority white population (Shoko
2004 and Huddle 2007). Even though land redistribution started immediately after
independence, it was very slow and various reasons contributed to this.
From 1890 to 1965 Zimbabwe, then known as Rhodesia, was under the rule of
the British. In 1965, it declared a unilateral declaration of independence, freeing itself
from the British Crown (Moyo 2013). From the 1960s to 1979, the nationalist parties
(ZAPU and ZANU)9 fought for liberation (Scoones et al. 2010). Through a process
of systematic and ‘legal’ evictions, about 5 000 large commercial farms had come to
occupy 15.5 million hectares of the 33 million hectares of farm land by independence
(Thomas, 2003). Through this process much of the fertile land was in the hands of
white commercial farmers. In 1979, the colonial government led by Ian Smith and
the nationalist parties led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo participated in the
Lancaster House negotiations that were meant to end the war and lead to majority
rule (Moyo, 2013). The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) set the terms for all
land reform policies in the first ten years of Zimbabwe’s independence (Sadomba and
Andrew 2006).
The basis of land acquisition according to the LHA was through the principle
of willing seller willing buyer. This meant that government was to acquire land for
redistribution mainly from white land owners (who numbered a mere 6000, owning
close to 15 million hectares [Moyo 2011]). If the State was not willing or unable to buy
a piece of land, government would issue a ‘certificate of no present interest’ to the land
owner, who could then freely sell it to any other buyer (Sadomba and Andrew 2006).
During this period, the new government played by the rules, keen to gain international
confidence and encourage reconciliation with the white farming community. Arguably,
South Africa has effectively done the same in the past two decades since political
independence.
In 1980, however, the new Zimbabwean government set out to acquire 8.3 million
hectares of land on which to settle 162 000 families under phase one of its Land Reform
and Resettlement Programme (LRRP).10 Between 1980 and 1989, the government
managed to acquire only 2.6 million hectares and resettled only 52 000 families: 70%
of these families were resettled by 1983, the period by which most of the land was
released by the white farmers (Moyo 2013). By the late 1980s, it was clear that plans
for mass resettlement were not going to materialise. As the LHA was approaching its
end date (i.e., 1990) the issue of the Zimbabwean land question was brought back onto
the political agenda (Moyo 2013). It is argued that the expiry of the LHA provided an
opportunity to reform policy to facilitate a more aggressive transformation to neutralise
the looming crisis of expectation on part of the landless masses.
Thereafter, the government of Zimbabwe amended the Constitution to allow for
the compulsory acquisition of land with little compensation and limited right of appeal
(Moyo 2013). The Land Acquisition Act (1992) gave government the right to acquire
land with minimal compensation. However, with escalating land prices, very little land
redistribution actually occurred. In 1997, the government acted radically, launching the
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 55

second phase of the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP II), based on
compulsory acquisition, but with no compensation.
As observed by Scoones et al. (2010), from 1999, in the midst of political confusion
and intense debate generated by the constitutional referendum and the run up to the
much delayed 2000 elections, land invasions started across the country. These invasions
set in motion a process of radical land reform. Scoones et al. (2010) note that there is
active academic debate as to whether these land invasions were spontaneous peasant-
led movements motivated by a genuine desire for land, a bottom up process to force
government into action (as suggested by Sadomba and Andrew [2006] and Moyo
and Yeros [2007]), or whether they were occasioned by political interests to buttress
political position. In parallel to the technical view focused on the commercial viability
of the agricultural sector, other perspectives of the resettlement programme emerged,
including claims for restitution of ancestral lands, compensation for war veterans and
wider social and equity goals linked to a radical restructuring of the agrarian economy
(Scoones et al. 2010).
From 2000 onwards, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) ensued.
The LRRP’s goals were to create political stability and an acceptable property rights
regime; to promote economic growth through wider equity and efficiency gains from
land redistribution; and to foster national food security, self-sufficiency, and agricultural
development through labour intensive small farm production, optimal land productivity,
and returns on invested capital targeting the landless, so-called war veterans and poor
farm workers.11 The FTLRP’s overarching objective was to fast track land redistribution.
Matondi (2012, 4) puts it well by saying that ‘starting in 2000, farmers began a journey
that was to transform their lives for ever’.
The dominant approach to land acquisition from 1981 to 1996 has been characterised
as a state-centred, market based approach to land redistribution (Moyo 2013). Land
was purchased by the state from willing sellers and redistributed to beneficiaries. The
private sector influenced the identification of land and controlled the supply available
for resettlement, while the government played the role of a buyer (Scoones et al. 2010).
The government in turn made land available to people selected mainly by its district
officials under the direct supervision of central government officials. As a result land
reform in the 1980s was unable to redistribute land at any significant scale, because it
was reliant on government accessing enough financial resources to purchase land at
market value. Acquisition of land through the willing buyer willing seller set-up moved
forward with little resistance during the period 1981-83, drawing on substantial supply
of farms abandoned during the war and farms coming onto the market as white settlers
left the country after independence (Moyo 2013).
In the later years of land reform, the process took a more aggressive format that
resulted in political and economic turmoil in Zimbabwe (Moyo 2013). This is the ‘chaos’
that both land owners and the government in South Africa fear. And so, it is necessary to
ensure that transformation does not drag on unnecessarily and that land hungry masses
are assured that the process of land reform is still on track. This can only be ensured if
the government can capture the confidence of the masses. This confidence can only be
56 Vusi Gumede

captured if the government is seen to be doing something tangible to deal with the land
ownership imbalances in the country.12
It is important to acknowledge the upside of the land reform in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe
has a radically altered agrarian structure. In 1980, over 15 million hectares were devoted
to large scale commercial farming, comprising approximately 6 000 farmers, nearly
all of them white. This fell to around 12 million hectares by 1999, in part through the
modest land reform and resettlement programme. It is estimated that there are still five
million hectares under large scale farming, some of it in very large holdings. There
are about 2 000 white-owned commercial farms still operating, with most having been
displaced, along with a substantial number of farm workers (Moyo 2013). Most of the
land is currently under small scale farming, either as communal or resettlement areas.
Estimates vary but about seven million hectares have been taken over through the
FTLRP (Scoones et al. 2010) exceeding the original FTLRP target of expropriating five
million hectares (Moyo 2011).
In Zimbabwe, there have been some major shifts in production, with certain
commodities such as tobacco, beef, horticulture, tea and coffee, seen by some as
Zimbabwe’s mainstay in agricultural economy, being badly affected by land reform,
while others such as cotton, traditionally a small holder crop have been less affected
(Moyo 2013). Food production, particularly maize, has gone down in most years
compared to 1990s’ averages due to the dislocations of land reform and the establishment
of new farms, as well as poor input supply and repeated drought. Food imports and
emergency relief have occurred each year since 2000, although the 2009 maize harvest
was estimated at 1.24 million tonnes, reducing the need for emergency measures (Cross
2009).
The displacement of an estimated 150 000 permanent farm worker households,
formerly resident and working on the large scale commercial farms, along with a
comparable number of temporary workers, many of them women, is another policy
challenge that the Zimbabwean government has to deal with (Moyo 2013). While the
majority of the new farms have benefited the land poor or landless smallholders, some
elites, notably politicians and those in the security services, have taken advantage of the
situation to ‘grab’ large tracts of land and the associated infrastructure, often holding
multiple farms under different names. The need for a transparent land audit to redress
this should be a priority (Scoones et al. 2010).
What has also been of concern in Zimbabwe’s land reform, is the lack of support
for and skills of the newly resettled farmers (Thomas 2003). Moreover, neither the
government nor the banks have weighed in with farming resources that are crucial for
one to start a career as a farmer, mainly because of the uncertainty of the political and
economic environment, but also because most of the newly resettled people have not
been given title deeds of the land they now have, casting doubt on the sustainability of
their ownership (Moyo 2013).
From a broader perspective, the Zimbabwean land reform and resettlement processes
have followed four distinct models. First was the intensive settlement on an individual
family basis (known as Model A) which accounted for close to 80% of the land reform
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 57

in the 1980s and 1990s. Land was acquired by the state and then divided into smaller
plots that were then distributed to beneficiaries. In this model, beneficiaries received
cropping land as well as access to grazing land. Tenure was in the form of permits –
one for settlement, one for cultivation and the final one for livestock grazing (Sadomba
and Andrew 2006). Beneficiaries of this model were to give up any other land that they
owned elsewhere. The second model was village settlement with cooperative farming
(Model B), designed to repossess large commercial farms and then reorganise them as
farms owned and run by cooperatives. Financial resources were to be made available to
the cooperatives and income realised would be allocated either to individual members
of the cooperative or allocated to farm improvement (Zamchiya 2011). The third one
was Model C, state farms with out-growers. In this model, beneficiaries were resettled
around a core estate. Thus the estate provided the settlers with certain services such as
water, seeds, and technical expertise, while the settlers provided labour for the estate.
Cropping land within this estate was allocated to villagers who also gained access to
grazing land for their livestock, which was managed communally. The fourth model
was implemented mostly in the arid southern part of Zimbabwe. In commercial grazing
for communal areas (Model D), the government purchased commercial ranches that
were near communal lands. Livestock was then purchased for these communal areas
and farmers were allowed to fatten the livestock on the ranch before they sold them. The
idea was to reduce grazing pressure on communal lands (Zamchiya 2011).
According to Matondi (2012, 8-12), the models that are associated with the FTLRP
are: A1 (i.e., small farms of between 12 and 30 hectares) and A2 (i.e., farms comprising
individual plots that are classified as small, medium and large scale commercial schemes).
According to Moyo (2013, 253), what has emerged is a ‘tri-modal agrarian structure .
. . characterised by the new dominance of family labour and part-time wage labour
relations’ (citing Chambati 2013). Matondi (2012) argues that the FTLRP would have
worked better, or been more successful, if the following factors had been addressed:
better land administration/audit, security of tenure, and better land use planning and
investments. Murisa (2013), in the context of small scale farming in Southern Africa,
recommends that the following should be rigorously pursued in order to ensure a vibrant
small scale farming sector:
• African-defined an sustainable agrarian revolution
• Commit more resources
• Pursue pro-land reforms
• Strengthen rural mobilisation.

Land reform regime in South Africa

As noted by Thomas (2003), some similarities in relation to the land question in

Zimbabwe and South Africa are indeed striking. Both countries suffer comparable
historical land inequalities. As in Zimbabwe, by 2000 less than 2% of land had been
transferred from white to black Africans in South Africa against a target of the 30%
58 Vusi Gumede

that the ANC had set for itself (Thomas 2003). It is in this context that Hendricks et
al. (2013, 1) argue that the ‘transition from apartheid to democracy has not translated
into a thoroughgoing process of decolonisation’. In both countries (in Zimbabwe only
between 1980 and 1997), only those wishing to sell their land did so, following the
willing seller willing buyer principle – with the state providing financial support.
Both the Zimbabwean and the South African post-colonial and post-apartheid
governments (respectively) believed that there would be sufficient funds to purchase
the land to satisfy the land hungry black majority. The understanding was that those who
held the land would also willingly bring land to the market as a sign of reconciliation
(Mngxitama 2000). In both cases, the process to be pursued for the resolution of the
land issue was predetermined when the majority governments came into power. The
former minority governments had demanded guarantees during negotiations that land
would not be arbitrarily redistributed without permission from the land owner and
compensation should be market related, hence the inclusion of the willing seller willing
buyer principle for both countries (Mngxitama 2000). In addition, global capital backed
up the white minority and oppressive governments in order to maintain the status quo
(Terreblanche 2012).
At present, the South African government is obliged by the Constitution to implement
land reform processes. In order to ‘operationalise’ the dictates of the Constitution, the
Department of Land Affairs developed a White Paper on Land Reform in 1997, which
begins by acknowledging that land ownership in South Africa had long been a source
of conflict and that the history of conquest and dispossession, of forced removals and a
racially imbalanced distribution of land resources has left the country with a complex
legacy (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). The Constitution includes clauses that are
to be pivotal in the process of transforming the land ownership structure in the country.
These clauses state:
A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of
Parliament, either to restitution of that property, or to equitable redress.

The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an
equitable basis.13

As with the Constitution, so the White Paper (1997) envisages a four-fold purpose
for the land reform programme: (1) to redress the injustices of apartheid; (2) to
foster national reconciliation and stability; (3) to underpin economic growth; and (4)
to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty (Weideman 2004). In order to
achieve the purpose outlined in the White Paper, land reform and the transformation
of land ownership patterns use a quadruple approach. These four pillars are, first,
the programme of restitution where the state is to restore or return land or provide
comparable compensation to people whose land had been appropriated by law since
1913 when the Land Act was passed. Secondly, the state is to secure the rights of
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 59

citizens whose tenure on the land they occupy is insecure, or to provide comparable
redress through land tenure reform by modernising land tenure rules. The third pillar,
which is meant to benefit the majority of the landless, is to implement a programme of
redistribution, transferring more land to the previously disadvantaged (black) farmers.
The final component of the land reform programme is for the state to provide funding
and other resources to support the emergence of [black] African farmers (Hall 2003 and
CDE 2008). These are discussed in more detail below.

Restitution

This is an important pillar of the land reform programme, because it concentrates on

restoring cultural land to the people who were the original owners/occupiers. By 2000,
63 455 claims had been lodged since 1994, and only 4 925 had been settled, with the
majority of the settlements being cash payments, and with only 162 involving restoration
of land (Mngxitama 2000). By 2006, according to the Centre for Development Enterprise
(CDE) (2008), validated land claims for restitution numbered nearly 80 000, with most
of them being urban land (81%) (CDE 2008). The government had imposed on itself a
2008 deadline to finalise all the land restitution claims.
Even though most of this land was urban land that could easily be settled with
cash payments, the government still failed to meet this deadline because of legal
processes where current owners would take the government to the Land Claims Court
for determination. Any prolonged challenge to a claim not only disadvantages the
prospective owners of the land, but also the current owner. He/she is not able to access
financial resources to utilise the land. From available statistics (as shown in documents
such as the CDE report quoted above), it would seem as if the country has done
reasonably well in the aspect of restitution, even though this pillar, by its very nature, is
not able to redistribute land to many landless people. Since most of the claimed land is
now part of urban centres, it is likely that the claimants will be compensated in the form
of money, leaving them as landless people who still want to be resettled.

Redistribution

As Moyo (2013) observes, the process of land redistribution in South Africa has been
very slow. By 2007, only 4.2 million hectares (4.7%) of commercial agricultural land
had been redistributed through all government programmes, a far cry from the 30% that
the government had hoped to have redistributed by 2014. White owned commercial
farmland in South Africa comprises 82 million hectares, and the transfer target is 24.6
million hectares. The reasons given for this slow pace are high land prices and the lack
of willing sellers (CDE 2008).
The White Paper (Department of Land Affairs 1997) commits government to
approaching the issue of land redistribution using the willing seller willing buyer
principle. It also states that government will not be an active buyer per se, but will avail
grants and services to assist the needy with the purchase of land from whomsoever
60 Vusi Gumede

is selling. In ensuring equitable land redistribution, the government has to navigate

difficult terrain, because it has to fulfil the expectations of the landless but also respect
the dictates of the law.
There is a belief among some in the ruling political party that the principle of willing
buyer-willing seller is delaying land reform in the sense that, because it is market
driven, land owners will be more willing either to sell land to the highest bidder, or to
charge high prices for the land when selling to the state, making it difficult to purchase
large amounts of land for redistribution to the landless. This belief was clear in the
recommendations passed by the ANC in its 2007 conference, resolving that there should
be a review of market-orientated land reform processes so as to accelerate equitable
distribution of land (ANC 2007).
The delays are comparable to what happened to the Zimbabwean process which
also followed the same principle of willing buyer-willing seller (Moyo 2013), as already
stated. In contrast, the CDE (2008, 17) believes that land redistribution is hampered not
by the high prices or lack of willing sellers, but by inexperienced government officials,
poor relationships and stalled restitution which prevent market transfers. The CDE
suggests that land prices are being pushed up by farmers willing to sell in order to have
disposable money to purchase another piece of land (CDE 2008). If this is happening, it
could be explained as collusion by land owners or construed as a frustration to the land
redistribution process.

Tenure reform

Both farmers and government are not satisfied with the progress made in land tenure
reform, as Moyo (2013) claims. This article argues that Land tenure reform is a
constitutional obligation. The Constitution (1996) makes the following provision:
A person or community whose tenure is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.

In trying to effect this constitutional requirement, the government has passed laws,
some preceding the 1996 Constitution, that seek to redress the weakness of the previous
tenure system. These new laws are the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act of 1996
and the Extension of the Security of Tenure Act (ESTA) (Act 62 of 1997). The Labour
Tenants Act seeks to grant security to labour tenants on privately owned farms, and
also creates a redress process that labour tenants can use to gain full ownership of the
land they occupy. The ESTA seeks to protect dwellers on privately owned land against
arbitrary eviction and allows farm workers to upgrade their rights from tenancy to
freehold. These pieces of legislation have presented their own problems. Farmers have
become reluctant to employ more workers fearing that their land will be taken over and
that they will no longer be able to dismiss workers or to force them to leave the farm
once they are no longer employees of the farm. This is another issue that has led to the
souring of relations between government and commercial land owners.
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 61

The government also aims to modernise communal land tenure and secure individual
land ownership in the former homelands. This was to be realised by the Communal
Land Rights Act of 2004 (CLARA). Government has not been able to do much in this
regard and draft regulations were only published in 2008, after a protracted period of
opposition by different sectors including traditional leaders who feared that CLARA
was going to erode their powers. From 2006, several individuals took government to
the High Court challenging the constitutionality of CLARA. The High Court declared
CLARA unconstitutional on substantive and procedural grounds but the Constitutional
Court affirmed the unconstitutionality only on parliamentary procedural grounds and
did not consider the substantive arguments necessary.14 This process on its own delayed
the process of land reform in rural areas.

State land

The fourth pillar is state owned land. According to the current Minister of Land Affairs,
Gugile Nkwinti, 22% of all land in South Africa is state owned. This means that 78%
of land in South Africa is in private hands.15 Private land owners have been arguing
that the government is focusing a lot of effort and spending too much money on
redistributing privately owned land, neglecting land that it currently owns. This article
poses the question: Is it therefore insincerity on government’s part to want to redistribute
privately owned land when it has vast amounts of land that it can distribute before
chasing ‘commercial farmers’? Of course, some of the reasons stated by the Centre for
Development Enterprise cannot stop the state from redistributing its own land. Some of
this land is currently being leased out at below market value (CDE 2008).

State funding

Funding for land reform has been another problem. There is a mismatch between the
financial resources allocated for the purpose of land reform and the likely costs of
meeting that goal. In 2006/2007, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) was allocated
R4.8 billion; in 2008/2009, it was R6.66 billion and for 2009/2010 it was to be R5.96
billion. In 2009, restitution received R3 billion while redistribution received R2.89
billion. These are very low figures considering that the state is supposed to purchase
land at market related prices. To this end, and in order to ensure that it succeeds in its
endeavour to redistribute land, the DLA is responding to this mismatch, i8n the first
instance, by seeking additional funding, while also depressing prices by threatening
expropriation and advocating new taxes on land. Secondly, of late there have been
moves towards radical solutions. There has been a shift away from applicant driven
reform to direct state action. Even though such measures have not been implemented,
one cannot completely discount the possibility of such measures being adopted as
government comes under pressure for taking too long to redistribute land.
62 Vusi Gumede

Land reform: Way forward

It is important that the process of land reform in South Africa should result in agrarian
transformation which must still ensure food security for the country as well as
environmental sustainability. Consensus appears to be that the land reform process has
not moved as fast as envisaged. As Moyo (2013) argues, a progressive transformation
process should benefit small farmers and emerging [black] African commercial farmers,
who should be capacitated by being equipped with the requisite skills to assist them
not only to own land, but also to contribute to food security within the country and
region. Small farmers should also be assisted to move up the farming ladder and this
can be achieved through deliberate empowerment processes where loans and grants
are available to new entrants into the farming economy. This is one of the issues that
Zimbabwe was not able to get right, partly because of sanctions and other negative
factors during the implementation of the FTLRP.
Land reform must also empower (rural and peri-urban) poor communities – rural and
peri-urban areas are mostly occupied by subsistence farmers. These subsistence farmers
should be given adequate land (including grazing land) for them to be able to practise
their subsistence farming. If there is anything to be copied from the Zimbabwean land
reform process, it should be the model where new land owners are given small plots of
between two and five hectares for them to be able to practise subsistence farming and
petty commodity production [despite the fact that this strategy was unsuccessful even
in the short term after independence in Kenya in the 60s]. This could be achieved by
subdividing large farms into smaller units to act as multifunctional farms that will benefit
more people. New land owners must be enabled to access markets, preferably local
ones, to sell their produce. Off-farm initiatives such as marketing and transportation
services can also provide the multiplier effect to provide more employment in rural
areas (Moyo 2013).
Moyo (2013) argues that youths and women should be the main target groups for
the land reform process. This is mainly because young people and women make up the
majority of the unemployed people in South Africa. The farming industry is a highly
labour intensive sector and it therefore makes sense to equip the youth, who still have
the energy to work the land – the potential challenge with this might be that South
African youth might not be predisposed to working the land. Furthermore, returns in
farming are realised after a long input period, hence the importance of building and
sustaining experience. Inexperienced land reform beneficiaries can gain experience by
being attached to successful neighbouring farms and mentors.
There is a view that the ANC (government) does not have the political will to
deal with the land question effectively and decisively, hence the call to abandon the
principle of willing seller willing buyer by some quarters of civil society (for example,
Mngxitama 2000) and the public. This article suggests that there is nothing wrong with
the redistribution strategies of mixing market driven models with state driven processes.
As argued by Moyo (2011, 527), the Zimbabwean experience shows that even under
neoliberal economies such as South Africa, a radical process of land redistribution is
still possible.
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 63

Among other things, the state should have the right of first refusal for any land
that comes onto the market, and such legislation should be implemented transparently.
Expropriation of land should not be totally abandoned, but must be used as a tie
breaker. With the correct dose of radicalism, and the benefit of retrospection afforded
by the Zimbabwean land reform processes, South Africa should be able to proceed
smoothly towards acceptable redistribution levels within the foreseeable future. The
land redistribution process should speed up in order to avoid a potentially dangerous
situation – it is feared that what occurred in Zimbabwe would be worse in the case of
South Africa.
Cliffe (2007) identifies another important dimension that needs re-examination.
South Africa conducts land transfers through a one-to-one basis where the government
matches the seller of a specific property to a group of purchasers who are supposed to
provide a business plan for that particular property. The government therefore plays
a facilitator’s role and funds the purchasers. This approach acts as a bottleneck and
is costly and therefore retards the process of acquiring land. It also militates against
smallholder and communal subsistence farming (Cliffe 2007). Such an approach should
be done away – an alternative approach should be explored.
The lack of infrastructure, training and capital are the significant factors that affect
land reform in South Africa. Other constraints include lack of access to extension
services, transport and access to local markets (Hall 2007). Therefore, ongoing support
is necessary for beneficiaries to succeed and this should happen over several years.
In addition, the approach by government in encouraging joint operations in the form
of groups or cooperatives does not always produce desired results. Most projects
fail to materialise due to differences of opinion on the part of the beneficiaries who
are supposed to implement a business plan (that may have been drawn by a business
consultant in the first place) (Hall 2007).
It is proposed that the government should also allocate more resources to the
process of land reform so as to attract good land. The failure to define and enforce the
post-transfer support that Hall (2007) identifies presents a major obstacle to people’s
livelihoods. Post-settlement support in the form of loans and farming skills development
should be prioritised and facilitated in order to ensure that distributed land is utilised
productively. The government should also come up with a clear instrument that can be
used for identifying land that should be purchased for redistribution. Such an instrument
could consider excluding highly productive farms so as to ensure continued food security
and export earnings. Once a clear criterion has been set, a people driven participatory
process should be adopted. Such a model would be helpful, because resettled people
would have owned the process and should therefore be likely to use the gained land
purposefully and with commitment.
It is also important that there is clarification on what exactly is the kind of farming
that South Africa envisages the land reform to accomplish. Where does such a system
place smallholder farmers? It is not uncommon for one to see swathes of idle land when
one travels the breadth and depth of South Africa. Is it because this land is unproductive,
or it is because the land reform programme that the country has adopted attaches more
64 Vusi Gumede

value to peri-urban land? Would working that land not help decongest urban centres at
the same time ensuring food security in the rural areas? Cliffe (2007, 2) argues for an
‘alternative farming system’ and demonstrates advantages of smaller-holder production.
This alternative necessitates some form of compulsorily acquiring of land for wholesale
resettlement. Such an approach will also enable the state to know what kind of pre and
post support is needed for which kind of farmers.
Individual entitlement to plots of land is the most secure source for improved
livelihoods. Direct access to land will allow poor beneficiaries to graze their livestock
and to cultivate individual fields for the production of their own household food. As Hall
(2007, 17) and Cliffe (2007, 2) argue, this can still be practised alongside commercial
production. This augurs well with the earlier suggestion that government needs to be the
purchaser of land that will then be distributed to different beneficiaries, accomplishing
redistribution and transformation, but also ensuring food security. It is common
knowledge that the large commercial sector has shed many workers owing to shrinking
markets, the ‘casualisation’ of labour and mechanisation. Such a state of affairs impacts
more painfully on farm labour tenants who would have lived in the farms all their lives,
as did their ancestors for several generations. They know no other life and having been
denied education opportunities by the apartheid government are unable to compete for
work elsewhere (Mngxitama 2000). The agricultural sector has the potential to provide
employment to a lot of people, especially the youth and women, who live in rural areas.
With regard to communal land, government has to revisit its land reform policy
taking into account the variegated and multiple forms of land ownership even after the
1913 Land Act. One of the policy options could be that over and above government
having right of first refusal on all land transactions, government can pass legislation
that discourages the selling of communal land. Hardships that communities go through
could compel communities to sell land, a decision that communities may regret
afterwards. Government should consider other mechanisms to assist communities to
address external shocks. Sale of land, often cheaply, by communities is tantamount to
‘land grabs’ by foreigners, conglomerates or even by those well off in South Africa.

Conclusion

South Africa can learn from the land reform process in Zimbabwe in terms of what
worked and what should be avoided. Moyo (2013) highlights important implications
of the Zimbabwean experience to South Africa’s land reform. Market orientated land
redistribution processes can still be employed in a fast track reform programme. The
state also needs to ensure that those who have been given land are assisted and guided
until they are clear on what they need to do with the land they have gained.
Although the land question for South Africa appears similar to that of Zimbabwe
from a historical sense, it might very well be that the current contexts require different
sets of interventions. The critical issue relates to policy – I have made this argument
in relation to other developmental endeavours in South Africa, particularly in relation
to social and economic policies (see Gumede 2013). It is important that a land reform
Land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 65

programme is informed by clear policy. It should be unequivocal as to what is intended

with a programme such as a land reform programme – for South Africa, arguably, the
land reform programme is an important instrument for redressing the legacy of apartheid
colonialism. It would seem that the post-1994 land reform processes in South Africa
were influenced by a multitude of policy options, understandably informed by multiple
objectives, and not a clear policy direction aimed at addressing the legacy of apartheid
colonialism. As argued, the policy direction has to be informed by, among other things,
the kind of farming that South Africa yearns for. In addition, as Murisa (2013, 209)
puts it in case of land and agrarian reform in Southern Africa, ‘policy reform should be
driven and informed by the needs of affected communities’.

Notes

1. In this article, ‘apartheid colonialism’ – as opposed to apartheid – is a preferred phrase

because it captures the centuries of a discriminatory system of colonialism and decades of
systemic social and economic exclusion of the majority in South Africa; both colonialism
and apartheid were formal systems of white domination.
2. As Walter Rodney (1973) put it ‘at all times, therefore, one of the ideas behind
underdevelopment is a comparative one. It is possible to compare the economic conditions
at two different periods for the same country and determine whether or not it had developed;
and (more importantly) it is possible to compare the economies of any two countries or sets
of countries at any given period in time’.
3. The 1943 Africans’ Claims (the ANC’s response to the Atlantic Charter), the 1955 Freedom
Charter, the 1962 Road to South African Freedom and many other documentation of the
national liberation movement make significant emphasises on land and mineral resources,
departing from the view that Africans were brutally disposed of their land and mineral
resources by the colonialists.
4. I mention Zenzo Moyo and Sam Moyo explicitly at the beginning of this article, because
they are two different people – Sam Moyo is a leading scholar on land reform in Zimbabwe.
Zenzo Moyo, also from Zimbabwe, worked with me on land reform research that compared
South Africa and Zimbabwe. He wrote an article on that and I reference it as Moyo (2013)
– the article is available at: http://www.consultancyafrica. com/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=1323:land-reform-in-south-africa-and-zimbabwe-towards-the-
realisation-of-socio-economic-rights&catid=91:rights-in-focus&Itemid=296.
5. Parliamentary hearings on land reform in 2007, the ANC’s conference resolutions in 2007,
and the parliamentary media briefings in 2008 as well public discourse on the land question
confirm the view that many people (both within and outside the ruling party) are increasingly
unhappy with the pace of land reform.
6. During 18-21 October 2013, I interviewed small scale farmers in Harare and had discussions
with seasoned land and agrarian reform scholars in Zimbabwe. The view, expressed in
literature (see, for instance, Moyo [2013] and Matondi [2012]), was confirmed that the Fast
Track Land Reform Programme was informed by various factors and its results are mixed.
7. The South African Communist Party (1962) used the term ‘colonialism of a special type’
to describe a form of colonialism ‘in which the oppressing White nation occupied the same
territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side by side with them’.
66 Vusi Gumede

8. The gist of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) is the creation of a National Democratic
Society (NDS); a society where all citizens have equal rights, access and responsibilities – a
society free of poverty and underdevelopment. As a theory, the NDR envisages two-stages:
national democracy during the first stage and socialism in the second and last stage. The
NDR was adopted in 1969 in the ANC Conference in Morogoro in Tanzania.
9. ZAPU refers to Zimbabwe African People’s Union and ZANU stands for Zimbabwe African
National Union.
10. Zimbabwe Land Policy Study. Zimbabwe Institute http://www.kubatana.net/docs/landr/
zim_institute_land policy 0508.pdf
11. Lebert, T. (n.d). An introduction to land reform in Zimbabwe. http://www.foodfirst.org /
(accessed 6 May 2013).
12. It should be highlighted that the government seems to be increasingly taking the land
question seriously. New legislation – the Expropriation Bill, Valuation Bill and Restitution
Amendment Bill – has raised pressure of the public debate about land reform. As a
demonstration of a decisive move away from the willing buyer–willing seller principle, the
ANC-led government intends to support an establishment of the Office of the Valuer-General,
the Land Management Commission and the Land Rights Management Board. Government
intends to shift towards independent oversight of valuations for rating and taxing purposes,
and will create institutions that will serve as government’s independent and expert advice in
respect of valuation matters (ANC, 2012).
13. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Act 108 of 1996.
14. The High Court of South Africa, Transvaal Provisional Division, Case No. 11678/06. http://
www.lrc.org.za; Constitutional Court of South Africa Judgement, CCT 100/09, 2010
15. http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/land-audit-complete-minister-1.1473275/ (accessed 6
May 2013).
16. The South Korean process land reform process also demonstrates that a combination of
market and state driven reform processes can be effective. I also looked at selected Asian
land reform experiences, over and above a number of African cases, when I was doing the
research on land reform – the research I have been conducting on land reform is for my
forthcoming review of economic and social policies in South Africa.

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