LAND TRANSACTION CASES

Firm X Partners
1. Mpaata Jerome Owagage
2. Julianne Mwebaze
3. Diane Niyogusabwa
4. Aine Raymond
5. Gerald Ndobya
6. Muhanuuzi Dora
7. Mulindwa Fredrick
8. Daphne Musoki
9. Awino Mercy
10. Kule Roland
 LAND TRANSACTIONS
Legislation (This list is not exhaustive.)
1. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 9 Articles 26 (1) & (2), 237, 273
2. The Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 230 sections 46(3), 48,54,59,65,92,139 140, 147, 148,
181,193, 199, 201 etc
3. The Land Act, Cap227 (as amended) ( sections 2,3,29, 32A,34,35,38A, 40 etc
4. The Land Regulations, (2004) ( as amended)
5. The Registration of Documents Act, Cap.81
6. The Citizenship and Immigration Control Act
7. The Citizenship and Immigration Control (Amendments Act) 2009
8. Physical Planning Act, 2010
9. National Environment Act
10. The Survey Act

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11. The Stamps Act. Cap 342 as amended
12. The Contracts Act, 2010
13. The Registration of Documents Act
14. The Advocates Act, Cap 267
15. The Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations
16. The Advocates ( Remuneration and Taxation of Costs) Regulations
17. *Students Practice Regulations
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18. The Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 263 sections 46(3), 48,54,59,65,92,139 & 40 etc
19. The Land Act, Cap.22 (as amended)
20. The Succession Act, Cap.162
21. The Stamps Act (as amended)
22. The Surveyor’s Act, Cap 332
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23. The Surveyor’s Registration At, Cap 275
24. The Contracts Act, 2010
25. The Registration of Documents Act, Cap.81
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CASE LAW AND OTHER READING MATERIALS

1. Meggary: The Law of Real Property…
2. Cheshire & Burns: Modern Law of Real Property, 4th Edition
3. Peter Mukidi Walubiri’s Paper entitled, Indefeasibility of Title: An eroded concept in
Uganda.
4. The law dictionary.

Importance of due diligence in land transactions

1. Mudiima Issa & Ors. V. Elly Kayanja & Ors. HCCS 0232 /2009
Law applicable: Section 29(1)-(2), 35(2) of The Land Act Cap. 227 [Bona fide occupant and
lawful occupant]; Section 177 RTA
Principles
- a tenant being either a lawful and /or a bona fide occupant on registered land has their security
guaranteed under Article 237(8) of the Constitution and Section 31 of the Land Act and is deemed

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to be a tenant of the registered owner. Section 64 (2) RTA further makes any land included in any
certificate of title subject to the interest of any tenant of the land, though it may not be specifically
notified as an encumbrance on the certificate. Therefore, anyone who purchases such land
purchases it subject to the equities existing in the land.
- a bona fide occupant has security of tenure and his interest cannot be alienated except as provided
by the law, and that while the land occupied by a bona fide occupant could be leased to somebody
else, the first option would be given to the bon fide occupant, and if it is not done case, it means the
suit land would not be available for leasing. Under section 35 (2) of the Land Act the first priority
for leasing should be accorded to tenants in occupation the land
- Title may be impeached by court for fraud under s.177 RTA
Facts: Plaintiffs sought declaration that they are bona fide and /or lawful occupants, an order to the
Commissioner for Land Registration to cancel the 1st and 2nd defendants’ title to the suit land, a
permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs’ occupation of
the suit land, general damages, interest on the same, and costs of the suit. Defendants set up a
counterclaim in which they sought orders of eviction against all illegal structures (sic), a declaration

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that the plaintiffs are trespassers on the suit land, an order of a permanent injunction restraining the
plaintiffs, their agents and servants from trespassing on the defendants’ land, mesne profits, general
damages for trespass, interest on mesne profits and general damages from the date of cause of
action until payment in full and costs of the counterclaim. [Defendant had been approached by
plaintiffs to help mediate a land dispute in which the pffs contested the legality of the lease of the
third defendant, instead, the dff bought the suit land from 3rd dff and returned to evict the pffs.]
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2. Sir John Bageire V. Ausi Matovu CACA 7/1996
Principle: Bona fide purchaser for value without notice of fraud [Must be proved by the party
seeking to rely on it who must prove two things: Purchase for value and lack of notice of fraud.
Appellant failed to prove that he purchased for value as he could neither present to court as a
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witness the lawyer who had drawn up the sales agreement nor could he produce the person that had
sold to him.]. on the fact that he couldn’t produce the seller, held Lands are not vegetables which
are bought from unknown sellers….
Facts: Respondent bought land and leased it to Asians for 49 years. When Asians were expelled in
the 70’s, land was taken over by the government and handed over to the custodian board for
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management. Registrar cancelled the respondent's certificate and issued a special certificate in favor
of the appellant. Indians returned in 1993 and when they tried to repossess their lease, it was
discovered that property was in the names of the appellant who claimed to have bought it from
‘Ausi Matovu’, the respondent and claimed to be a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
fraud. Respondent denied sale and sued.

3. Uganda Posts and Telecommunications V. A.K.M Lutaaya CACA 36/1995

Law Applicable: Equivalent of Section 29(1)-(2), 35(2) of The Land Act Cap. 227 [land act had
not yet been enacted at the time]
Principles:
- if a person purchases an estate which he knows to be in the occupation of another than the vendor,
he is bound by all the equities which the parties in such occupation may have in the land.
- respondent, ought to have made enquiries of the person in possession otherwise the property
purchased would be subject to appellant's rights on the land.

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- Government can be a kibanja owner [I must observe that whereas I have not come across an
authority which says that a Government can own land in the capacity of Kibanja Owner. I must add
that I am not aware of any authority which excludes the Government from owning land in that
capacity. In my view, if Customary Tenure is a system of Land Ownership in Uganda for any
person, I can see no jurisdiction for denying the Government to benefit on ….land under that
system, and especially if the owner of that land recognised its existence on that land]
Facts: Dispute land is the one on which Mpoma Earth Satellite station presently sits. Respondents
had purchased the suit land with the station already built after the vendor had failed to resolve the
dispute thereon, she sold to the respondents. Respondents thus sought vacant possession but
appellant argued that the mere fact that respondents bought whilst seeing them on the land was
notice of their occupancy. Appellant was held by a lower court to be a trespasser on the respondent's
land thus the appeal.

4. Gibbs V. Messer (1891) AC 249

Principle: In land transactions, always deal directly with the person whose name appears on the

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register and not their agent. It is the duty of the mortgagee to ascertain the identity of the proprietor
Facts: A Solicitor forged a transfer of a client’s title to a fictitious third party, one that did not in
fact exist. He then presented the forged transfer as an agent of the fictitious party to the registrar
who duly replaced the actual owner’s name with that of the fictitious ‘principal’. Still purporting to
be an agent, he arranged for a loan on behalf of the fictitious person with the defendants to be
secured by mortgage. He drew up the mortgage deed purportedly signed by the fictitious person
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with himself as witness. Money was advanced. When the fraud was discovered, the real owner of
the title sued the solicitor, the registrar, and the lender seeking for his title to be restored free of
encumbrance. Held, had the mortgagees insisted on seeing the fictitious person (whose name was
on title) they would have discovered the fraud.
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5. Hajj Abdu Nasser Katende V. Vathalidas Haridas & Co. Ltd. SCCA 84/2003
Law Applicable: Section 176(c) & (d)
Principles:
1. One with bad/imperfect title cannot pass on good title
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2. Fraud must be pleaded specifically and proved. The standard of proof required is higher than the
usual balance of probabilities in civil matters. However, the standard of proof is not so high to
require proof beyond reasonable doubt.
3. fraud is not only participatory but can be imputed on a person that is when he or she was aware
of the fraud and condoned it, or benefited from it or used it to deprive another person of his rights.
In short all those who actually participate in the fraudulent transaction and who had knowledge of it
are privy and have notice of fraud
4. defines a bona fide purchaser as a person who honestly intends to purchase the property offered
for sale and does not intend to acquire it wrongly. A bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value
without notice has absolute, unqualified and answerable defence against the claims of any prior
equitable owner. The burden to establish or prove the plea lies on a person who sets it up. It is a

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single plea and is not sufficiently made out by proving purchase for value and leaving it to the
opposite party to prove notice if he can.
a. If it can be shown that the buyer's ‘suspicions were aroused, and that he abstained from making
inquiries for fear of learning the truth, the case is very different and fraud may be properly ascribed
to him.’
5. Bona fide purchaser must prove 7 conditions
a. he holds a certificate of title
b. he purchased the property in good faith
c. he had no knowledge of the fraud
d. he purchased for valuable consideration
e. the vendors had apparent valid title

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f. he purchased without notice of any fraud
g. he was not party to the fraud
6. Conditions under which S.59 (indefeasibility of title) may be impeached
a. Fraud
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b. Failure to pay stamp duty [failure to pay stamp duty nullifies the claim of bona fide purchaser]
7. There is a duty on a buyer personally or through his agents to inquire into the title of his
predecessor.
8. Due diligence by lawyers [In the present case the appellant told court that almost everything was
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done for him since he was illiterate and that his lawyers carried out a search in the Land Registry
and found the suit property free of encumbrances, in my view, the search was not done with due
diligence. A proper search would have brought out all the fraudulent dealings on the suit title. As
the appellant's advocates they should have discovered that the relevant documents were not signed
by the Registrar which rendered them null and void.]
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Facts: Appellant bought land, in Old Kampala from Rajab Katamba, who was the administrator of
the estate of Dauda Mugenyi Asooka Nsubuga. A search conducted prior to the purchase revealed
that at the time of the transaction, the suit property was registered in the name of Uganda
Commercial Bank (UCB) and was free of encumbrances. Katamba is said to have executed a deed
of indemnity to the Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB), upon which the suit property was transferred
to the appellant. Later in 1995, the respondent, a returning Indian, claimed ownership of the suit
property by virtue of a repossession certificate. The appellant resisted the Indian’s claim by
contending that he had carried out a diligent search in the Land Office and had paid after he had
been assured that the suit property was free of encumbrances. Further, the appellant claim was
fortified by two letters. Both the Departed Asian Property Custodian Board (DAPCB) and the
Deputy Minister of Housing confirmed that the said land was free of encumbrances and
Government had no interest, so did UCB. However, it was revealed by the Registrar of Titles that
Vithaldas Haridas and Co. Ltd was the registered proprietor of the suit property in 1940. When it
was liquidated in 1947 the property was transferred to Pravilal Haridas 86 Co. Ltd. The respondent

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became the registered proprietor on 22/12/60. Dauda Mugenyi Asooka Nsubunga (from whom
Katamba, the seller derived title) was registered as proprietor on 25/08/1966, 6 years after the
respondent.The record also revealed that there was a substitute title made together with its
instrument 243254 on 29/03/90. However, they had no signature and seal of the Registrar of Titles
as required by the laid down procedure. Issue was whether the appellant was a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice and whether appellant was under a duty to inquire into how the seller had
got his own title.

Interests in land and land tenure systems

6. Mubiru V. Byensiba (1985) HCB 10
Principle: One who under declares value of land for purposes of avoiding stamp duty seeks to cheat
government out of revenue and cannot rely on the doctrine of bona fide purchaser

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Facts: The plaintiff filed suit for an eviction order against the defendants. He contended that he was
a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. It was discovered however that in the sale
agreement, the plaintiff had under-declared the value of land and instead of indicating the price of
2.4M which he paid, he indicated 500K. Held that title was null and void because of fraud and he
could not use court to enforce an illegal contract.
7. Livingstone Mpiima V. Elizabeth Nanteza (2003) KALR 337
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Principle: A buyer of land acquires an in personam equitable interest before transfer and
registration of the land in his name. Transfer is what affords him a legal interest that is in rem. One
with an equitable interest cannot claim the value of the land but rather only special damages
equivalent to the developments he had on the land
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Facts: Plaintiff owned a kibanja on the defendant’s land. He entered an agreement to sub-lease the
land from the defendant. Plaintiff paid the premium and ground rent. However, the defendant
refused to execute the sub-lease and sold a part of the land to third parties. The suit was thus for
specific performance of the sublease agreement and damages.
Held that specific performance is an order of court enjoining a defendant to do exactly what the
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agreement he made with the plaintiff says. Accordingly, whereas the defendant had a 99 year lease
on the suit land at the time he made the agreement, the coming into force of the Land Act had
converted the lease into Mailo land. The defendant as a mailo owner was no longer in position to
grant a sublease but a lease. Since the agreement was specifically for a sublease, the court could not
order the defendant to do that which he could not do anymore. A buyer of land acquires an in
personam equitable interest before transfer and registration of the land in his name. Transfer is what
affords him a legal interest that is in rem. One with an equitable interest cannot claim the value of
the land but rather only special damages equivalent to the developments he had on the land.
8. J.W.R Kazzora V. M.L.S Rukuba SCCA 13/1992 (1992) III KALR 51
The respondent offered to buy suit land from the proprietor, but it was caveated. Nevertheless, a
transfer was effected and notice calling for objections to such transfer advertised for sixty days. 60
days elapsed, but the appellant applied to have the time extended pending the trial of the suit. court
rejected, the transfer was registered, appellant lodged another caveat.

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HELD
-a caveat that merely stated that the caveator had an interest in the property did not preclude a
subsequent sale since the caveat itself was not evidence of sale to someone else. The alleged sale as
claimed by the appellant was not shown to exist in support of the caveat, and the respondent was
still a bona fide purchaser for value.
-the second caveat was in exactly the same terms as the first, and this was tantamount to renewing
the same caveat which is contrary to the provisions of Section 140(3) of the RTA.
-a party relying on fraud must specifically plead it with supporting particulars. the SOP must not be
strictly proved although not beyond reasonable doubt but something more than a mere balance of
probability. it is a conclusion of law.
-the first person to register land takes a better title than a person to whom the land was first sold but
failed to register it provided there was no fraud in the registration.

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9. Hajj Asuman Lule V. Zamu Nalumansi Nalongo & Kakembo Ndiwalana
(1990-1991) KALR 54
While the defendant was in detention, the 1st defendant transferred his land into her name and later
into the name of the 2nd defendant.
HELD
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-Transfer means vesting in property from one individual or group of individuals to another. the law
requires that consideration for such transfer be stated concisely.
-a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of title and ownership of land unless it can be shown
that it was obtained by fraud or any other unlawful means. fraud must be strictly proved.
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Although signing and sealing of documents is essential to constitute a valid deed, strictly speaking
attestation is not necessary but it has become the invariable practice for parties to an agreement that
has been signed and sealed in the presence of a witness who himself signs.
-the first defendant admitted to no consent before the transfer, and this rendered the transaction
illegal.
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-a bonafide purchaser gets a good title even if he purchases from a proprietor who previously
obtained the registration by fraud. if a bona fide purchaser is guilty by fraud, he will cease to be
innocent and therefore lose protection.
-the second defendant did not state the consideration in the transfer form to defraud the government
of revenue. He was not a bona fide purchaser for value.
10. Marko Matovu & Ors. V. Sseviri & Ors. HCCA 7/1978 (1979) HCB 174
appellants applied for a lease of land in respect of which they had usufructuary rights previously.
were offered a lease which they accepted, but they found the 1st respondent had surveyed and
fenced the land. applied for cancellation of his title, that it was obtained fraudulently.
HELD

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-Section 25 of the Public Lands Act which enjoins the controlling authority to grant a lease to a
customary tenant on application was still good law.
-there is no definition of customary tenure, but it is generally accepted even in the absence of
bibanja holding customary rights that customary tenure may be established by the cultivation only
of seasonal crops or the grazing of cattle and related construction of wells to water cattle. These
rights are protected by law.
-the commission can grant title to any applicant, but if a person holding land by customary tenure
also applies, they must be granted the title. Even if the considerations of public policy require that
another person may be able to utilise the land better, the customary tenant must be heard. (natural
justice)
-this was not done in this case, the lease was granted without hearing the appellants.
-a decision arrived at in breach of the natural justice rule is void and of no consequence, as if one

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made without jurisdiction. The RTA empowers the High Court to cancel a title obtained by fraud,
and the same should be done for titles issued in breach of the rules of natural justice. such breach is
not a mere irregularity that would prove ineffective against the indefeasibility principle. it goes to
the root of the tile.
11. National Provincial Bank V. Ainsworth (1965) AC 1175
a man used property on which he was staying with his wife and children as security for a loan. The
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defendant was sole registered proprietor. The man abandoned his family, and the wife claimed
interest in the property.
HELD
-an interest in land had to be proprietary. it must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable
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of assumption by 3rd parties and have some degree of permanence or stability. The wife’s rights
were merely personal against her husband, not proprietary.
12. Fr. Begumisa V. Tibebaga SCCA 17/2002 (2004) KALR 236
appellants were sued in trespass, but they claimed that the respondent’s title related to land that was
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not theirs.
HELD
-Section 59 RTA; a certificate of title shall be received in all courts as evidence of all the particulars
set forth and of entry in the register book. the court cannot receive the certificate as evidence of
particulars not set forth in it. It is evidence that the person named in the certificate as proprietor is
possessed of the estate in the land described in the certificate. such title can only be impeached for
fraud, but is otherwise sacrosanct.
-the inviolability of a certificate of title is circumscribed in as much as it is confined to the
particulars in the certificate.
13. Yoweri Bamuhiga & 5 Others V. Christine Mugara, Martin Bahinduka &
Bundibugyo District Land Board and Yoweri Bamuhiga & 5 Others V. Frank

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 Bagonza & 4 Others, HCCS No.s 63 and 78 of 2006 Fort Portal H/C), Owiny
Dollo, J. (Nature of customary tenure)
The plaintiffs were customary tenants of the land, but the District Land Board Bundibugyo, granted
leases to the defendants.
HELD
- customary land tenure is a matter of evidence and is by no means uniform. each community has its
mode of ownership, individually or communal.
-district land Boards are in a fiduciary position regarding land users in the respective district, must
adhere to the laws and regulations pertaining to their official functions and the interests of such land
users.
- where the application for the alienation of the suit lands by the controlling authority has been
granted without consultation of those in occupation thereof, such grant will not be allowed to stand.

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regulation 23 Land Regulations 2004.
- the regulations on consultation are mandatory, despite the fact that the provisions seem to be
discretionary.
- where land is owned under customary tenure, the District Land Board has no authority to alienate
its powers to persons or authorities. it can only allocate land not owned or claimed by any person or
authority.
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The importance of the Certificate of title
14. Kampala Bottlers V. Damanico (U) Ltd SCCA 26/1992
The plaintiff company sought an eviction order against the defendant company following the fact
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that it is the registered proprietor of approximately 1.030 hectares of land in Leasehold Register
Volume 1972, Folio 2, ‘Plot No. M 271, Nakawa, Industrial Area, Kampala. The plaintiff alleged
that in November in 1991 the respondent had trespassed on the appellants land by clearing and
grading the same. The appellant admitted entry and argued that this was not unlawful based on a
lease that had been granted to him five years ago. The respondent alleged that the respondent that
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title held by the applicant is one that was obtained through fraud. At the court of first instance the
court held so and hence this appeal.
Held
The court referred to Section 56 of the RTA to state that every certificate of title issued under the
provisions herein contained shall be received in all courts as evidence of the particulars therein set
forth and of the entry thereof in the Register Book, and shall be conclusive evidence that the person
named in such certificate as the proprietor of or having any estate or interest
Therefore, according to these provisions, it would appear to me that production of the certificate of
title in the names of the appellant sufficient proof of ownership of the land in question unless falls
within the provisions of section 184 of the Registration of titles Act.
Furthermore, a person registered on to a title of land cannot be ejected for the recovery of that land
unless that except in circumstances provided for under Section 184 of the RTA that includes fraud.

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However in this case, there was fraud since the registrar extended the time without any minute from
the KCC council authorising the same.
15. Abdul Karim V. Lt. Kabarebe & Anor. HCCA No. 373/ 1991
This was a suit against the defendants for eviction and a permanent injunction. It arose on the facts
that while the plaintiff was in exile, Bakitari occupied his house and later sold a piece of it to the
respondent. He further alleged that the defendant has since brought many people on to his land
hence trespassing on it. The plaintiff had a leasehold title over the aforesaid property.
Held:
A certificate of title issued under the Registration of the Titles Act (Cap 205) is conclusive evidence
that the person named in such title is the proprietor seized of the interest in the title. Section 56 of
the Registration of Titles Act. The plaintiff’s registered interest is a lease of 49 years granted by the
Uganda Land Commission. Such title can only be impeached on grounds of fraud in light of

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Section 76 of the Registration of Titles Act. In absence of fraud the court cannot go behind the fact
of registration. As the court has found that the plaintiff is the owner of the land, anyone who
occupies the land without the consent or permission of the plaintiff must be held to be a trespasser.
Co-ownership of land
a) Joint ownership
16. James Katuku V. Kalimbagiza (1987) HCB 75
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The plaintiff in this case sought an order of the court to permanently restrain the defendant from
evicting them from a piece of land. Two brothers were jointly offered a lease of a piece of land that
is disputed in this case. They invited the defendant as a co lease on an agreement of payment of a
given sum of money. The offerees hence added his name on to the lease and the register. The
defendant paid the money and was allowed to enter onto the land. The offerees (the two brothers)
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without informing the defendant went ahead and entered into another agreement with the plaintiffs
in respect of the same piece of land wherein it was sold to them. The plaintiff entered the land and
the defendant objected to that entry. He sought to evict the plaintiff and hence this suit.
Held
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Since the defendant was admitted as a joint tenant, his right of possession, interest, title and time
over the land was the same as those of the offeree. It followed that entry into the land which was in
his possession by any other person without his consent amounted to trespass if the other co-tenant
permitted that entry. Therefore plaintiff who entered the land though with the permission of the
offeree who are co-tenants with the defendant but entered without the permission of the defendant
committed trespass against the defendant and he was entitled to damages thereof and an eviction
order.
17. East Africa General Insurance V. Ntende & Sons (1979) HCB 225
The defendants registered as tenants in common in equal shares mortgaged their property to secure
a loan. They failed to pay and a summary suit was lodged against them as tenants of the premises in
common. However only the 4th defendant was served with summons of leave to appear and defend.
Upon his failure to apply for leave to appear and defend, judgement was rendered against them. The
4th defendant applied to set aside the exparte judgement and set aside the decree on the ground that

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the suit was brought against all the six defendants in the capacity they portrayed themselves in the
mortgage deed but the plaintiff company wanted to burden only him to pay the same alone.
Held
Tenants in common hold in undivided shares but the tenants have quite separate interests and the
only fact which brings them into co-ownership is that they both have shares in a single property
which has not yet been divided among them.
b) Ownership in common
18. Lake V. Craddock (1732)3 PW 158 (Read Cheshire & Burns: Modern Law of Real
Property, 4th Edition)
Five people bought land and it was conveyed to them as joint tenants in fee, but they contributed
rateably. Some died, and one took no part for thirty years.
Held:

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The absent owner was readmitted. They were held to be tenants in common in equity
19. East Africa General Insurance V. Ntende & Sons (1979) HCB 225

20. Melayan Credit LH V. Jack Chia MPH Ltd (1986)1 All ER 711
Principle
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The Court upheld the principle that, in the absence of an express agreement in equity, the
presumption is that joint tenants at law are to be treated as tenants in common in equity of the
beneficial interest. However, this presumption of joint tenancy in equity can be displaced when the
circumstances indicate (1) unequal purchase contributions, (2) unequal loans or mortgages, (3)
business partnerships, and any other circumstances in which equity may infer unequal beneficial
interests. On the facts, the Court overturned the Court of Appeal, and held that, the parties are
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beneficially entitled in unequal shares on the basis of their separate commercial interests, their
predetermined separate areas of occupation, and divisions of liabilities for rent and service charges
in unequal shares. Based on these circumstances, the Court rebutted the ordinary presumption and
held that the parties are tenants in common in equity holding the beneficial interests in unequal
shares to be divided in proportion with each business premises’ allocated areas (3,614 and 2,306
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square feet respectively).

21. Robertson V. Frazer (1870-71) 6 Ch 690

Principle:
Words of severance are words that are used by the creator of a co-owner relationship which
imply an intention to confer a distinct share in the land to each co-owner and therefore create a
tenancy in common. The words do not have to state this intention expressly; any words indicating
an intention to confer proportionate interests upon joint owners will be sufficient. Hence, words
including: ‘in equal shares’, ‘share and share alike’ and ‘amongst or respectively’ would all
constitute words of severance. In other words anything which in the slightest indicates an intention
to divide the property must be held to abrogate the idea of a joint tenancy and to create a tenancy in
common…the word ‘participate’ is sufficient to indicate an intention to divide.

22. Mutual Benefits Ltd V. Patel (1972) EA496

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Principle
A caveat which applies to part only of the land registered under any title should expressly be stated
to be limited to that part.
It was, however, conceded throughout that the owners of the land held as tenants in common, and
this must have been so, otherwise the transfers of shares in the land mentioned above could not
have been registered. Had the original grantees held as joint tenants, the transfers would have
operated to sever the tenancy. The case for the respondents was that the words trading as African
Highland Timber Co." in the original grant were merely descriptive, that the owners held
individually as tenants in common and that J. C. Patel had no power, either as a partner in African
Highland Timber Co. or as a director of African Highland Timber Co. Ltd. to bind his co-owners of
the land.
Legal and equitable interests in land

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23. Uganda Posts and Telecommunications V. Abraham Kitumba SCCA 36/1995
Section 64 RTA
Principles
The law is very clear that if a person purchases an estate which he knows to be in the occupation of
another than the vendor, he is bound by all the equities which the parties in such occupation may
have in the land. If a vendor is not in possession of the land he is selling, the purchaser must make
inquiries of the person in possession or otherwise the property purchased will be subject to that
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person's right. If there is a tenant in possession of land a purchaser is bound by all the equities
which the tenant could enforce against the vendor.
The occupation of the land constitutes constructive notice to a purchaser of the rights of the
occupier. The occupation of the suit land by appellant put the would be purchaser upon notice of
claim adverse to the registered owner.
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Although the respondent is the registered proprietor of the leasehold estate on which the portion in
dispute is situated, it must be noted that this paramountcy of interest in his estate is subject to
appellant's existing adverse possession at the time of respondent's acquisition of the leasehold. The
above finding is reinforced by Section 61 of the Registration of Titles Act
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24. Somali Democratic Republic V.ANOOP S.T. SCCA 4/98

Section 54 RTA – instruments not effectual until registered
Principle
In Souza Figueiredo & Co. vs. Moorings Hotel Co. Ltd 1960 EA 926 the provisions of S.51 were
considered and it was held that an unregistered instrument operates as contract inter parties and can
confer a right to specific performance of the contract. The learned trial Judge erred in law in
deciding that the sale agreement was uncompleted and voidable simply because the appellant did
not register the transfer under the provisions of the Registration of Titles Act.

25. J.W.R Kazzora V. M.L.S Rukuba SCCA 13/1992 (1992) III KALR 51
See above (case no. 8)
Section 140(2) RTA
Principles
Power to remove a caveat by the registrar

11
 26. Lysaght V. Edwards (1876) 2 Ch 499
BRIEF FACTS: The plaintiff bought land from the defendant shortly before his death; after which
it was discovered that he had bequeathed the same land to his children. The plaintiff sued the
executors of the estate in order to determine what the effect of the contract of sale was on the will
and subsequent gift made in the will. It was ruled that the purchaser had a valid claim.
Holding: It is that the moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes in equity a
trustee for the purchaser of the Estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the
vendor having a right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the Estate for the security of the
purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the Estate until the purchase- money is paid, in
the absence of express act as to the time of delivering possession.

27. Katarikawe V. Katwiremu & Oneziforo Bakampata HCCS 2/1973 (1977) HCB 210
BRIEF FACTS: The plaintiff executed a land sale agreement with the first defendant thereafter he
took possession of the suit land. On the other hand, the second defendant claimed to have bought

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the same land from the first defendant earlier on; and he took possession of the title deeds and
subsequently got registered. The question was whether registration invalidated the contract between
the first defendant and the plaintiff.
Holding: Contract of sale does not perfect the sale of land unless the same has been registered in
the names of the purchaser. The second defendant cannot claim to have paid earlier; whoever has an
interest in land has to protect it through a caveat and not taking possession of the title deeds.
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Furthermore, making a deposit, a buyer obtains an equitable interest in the property being sold.
Since the second defendant got registered on the title after the sale between the first defendant and
the plaintiff, his move was fraudulent and as such his title defective.

28. Sharif Osman V. Haji Haruna Mulangwa SCCA 38/1995

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BRIEF FACTS: The appellant executed a purchase agreement with the defendant wherein he
bought land and buildings thereon. It appeared from the contract that time was of the essence in that
money had to be paid by two instalments; and time for vacating the premises by the vendor was
also set. However, during the trial and thus consequent appeal, it was discovered that much as time
was of the essence, the vendor (respondent) had waived the same when he kept demanding the
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balance from the appellant and even received payment two years after the deadline. In allowing the
appeal, it was held:
It is clear from the passages I have referred to above that even if there remains unpaid balance, the
property in the lands passed to the purchaser when a deposit was made. Further even when the
appellant is said to have defaulted on the timelines, the respondent should not have accepted the
late payment that was made two years away from the deadline.

29. White V. Watt (1902) 1 Ch 135

BRIEF FACTS: There was a contract to purchase certain properties from the appellant by the real
estate dealer but contingent upon the properties (houses) being 300 complete units. The contract
was such that it allowed either party to rescind the contract so long as sufficient notice was given.
Shortly thereafter, the purchaser sought to rescind the contract but the vendor declined to refund the
deposit that had been paid. He was ordered to release the money.
Holding: The contract has here been brought to an end, not by any act or default of the vendor, but
by reason of the purchaser exercising a power of rescinding it which is reserved to him by the
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contract itself. And, if we look at that which is really the foundation of the doctrine, namely the
desire to do justice as between vendor and purchaser, it appears to me that reason applies no less
forcibly in the present case than in the ordinary case in which the rescission of the contract takes
place by reason of some default on the part of the vendor. In a case in which the vendor had
rescinded under a power reserved to him, it would, I think, be absolute injustice if the purchaser
were not allowed to have a lien for the purchase-money which he had paid, and by which was the
security on his part for the performance by him of the contract.

30. Sekabanja V. Sajjabi (1983) HCB 54

BRIEF FACTS: Both the plaintiff and the first defendant bought land together and due to trust, the
same was registered in the names of the first defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff constructed a
structure on his portion of the land. Years later, the first defendant gifted the plaintiff’s land to the
second and third defendants who sought to evict the plaintiff while claiming that they were bona
fide purchasers for value without notice.in dismissing that defence, it was held:
It has been established that the plaintiff contributed money towards the purchase of this land. Since

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the plot was given to the defendants as a gift, they could not be said to be bona fide purchasers for
value without notice because they did not offer any value and secondly, the structures on the land
were sufficient notice of occupation.

31. Esther Kiwanuka Nteyafa V. William Musoke HCCS 218/1993

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BRIEF FACTS: The plaintiff bought land from the defendant, took possession of the same but the
defendant declined to sign the transfer forms without giving any reasons. She sued the defendant
for breach of contract and sought for specific performance as a remedy.
Holding: In the circumstances, the court cannot force the defendant to sign the transfer forms.
However, the Registrar of Titles has the residual power to vest property in any applicant so long as
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the said applicant has demonstrated they meet the conditions for vesting as in such a case.
Therefore, the registrar is hereby directed to cancel the defendant’s name from the title and replace
it with the plaintiff’s.
Family Land
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32. Enid Mwebaze V. Mpeire Stephen & Anor. HCCS No. 39/2010
Law Applicable: Section 39 of The Land Act [Family Land]
Principle: Whether sale of family land, if pursuant to a court order excludes the application of s.39
(which requires various levels of consent before sale of family land).
Brief Facts: Ssenkima John Bosco, the husband to the Appellant, pledged as security for money
borrowed from the property where he lived with his spouse, Inid Tumwebaze (the Appellant) to
Mpweirwe Steven. Senkima had, however, not procured consent from; nor informed his spouse Inid
Tumwebaze. Stephen was thus a judgement creditor and Senkima John Bosco, was a judgement
debtor. The appellant was contesting the sale of the suit property averring that said sale offended
section 39 of The Land Act i.e. that the suit land was family land therefore subject to the provisions
of Section 39 of the Land Act.
The respondent argued, based on John T Mugambwa’s book; Principles of Land Law in Uganda
(Fountain Publishers, 2002) at page 38 where the author states that Section 39 of the Land Act
does not apply where it is sought to sell family land in execution of a judgement debt against the

13
landowner. Held that Mugambwa’s statement only applies to a situation where the property was not
mortgaged, but only attached after a judgement of court as a property of a judgement debtor.
According to the facts of the instant case, the sale evidently runs counter to the spirit and letter of
Section 39(1)(c)(i) (supra) which categorically prohibits transactions in such land as the one in
question. Transaction held null and void under Section 39 of The Land Act.

33. Floriane Wakulira V. Regina Nabitalo & 3 Others HCCS 194/ 2015
Kaweesa, J.
[Case could not be found at the exercise of reasonable diligence, but the cause list indicates it was
an application of a permanent injunction and a declaration of rights in respect of land]

Tenants by occupancy on land

34. George Tuhirirwe V. Carolina Rwamuhanda SCCA 15/2007
FACTS
The appellant inherited his mother’s (Anastanzia) land. Late Rwamuhanda (respondent’s husband)

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returned from exile in 1981 and begged their mother, Anastanzia, to allow him to stay temporarily
on the disputed part of Plot No. 138, as he treated his sick children and worked to build on his Plot
No. 4. His mother allowed him to stay for a year but he stayed for 3 years till she died.The
appellant gave notice to the respondent to vacate the plot which was ignored hence the suit.
Issue
Whether the defendant is a lawful or bona fide occupant on the land under dispute
Held
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Section 29(1) and (2) of the Land Act 1998 respectively, defines the terms “lawful occupant” and
“bona fide occupant”. The occupation of the suit land by the respondent and her late husband when
they were living on the homestead of and in the houses built by the father of her late husband as a
child living with his wife on his father’s land, did not constitute a “lawful occupant” within the
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meaning of section 29(1) of the Land Act 1998.
Secondly, their occupation of the suit land between 1981 and 1992, when this suit was instituted
was with a licence of Anastanzia, the registered owner, who allowed them only one year.
Thereafter, they stayed in defiance of the notice to vacate, giving lame excuses for their delayed
departure until Anastanzia died three years later. That kind of occupation also does not qualify a
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person to be a lawful occupant as stated in section 29(4) of the Land Act, 1998.
Even if there were no challenge until 1992 when this suit was filed, that occupation could not
qualify them to be “bona fide occupants” because they did not remain on the land unchallenged for
twelve years before the coming into force of the Constitution of 1995. They were challenged in
their eleventh year. Therefore, section 29(2)(a) is not applicable.

35. Kampala District Land Board & George Mitala V. Venansio Babweyaka & Ors.
SCCA 2/2007Fredrick
Principle: Bonafide occupants must first be given first option of lease; customary tenure must be
proved, obtaining a title by fraud defined as in Katarikawe v Katwiremu
Law Applicable: Section 29 of The Land Act
Facts: Respondents occupied suit land in Ndeeba carrying on a timber dealing business. Land was
leased to the second appellant by the first appellant. Respondents sued arguing that they were
customary owners of the land. Sought declarations that they were the customary owners of the land

14
and that purported lease was unlawful as there was no land available for lease and that subsequent
lease title was obtained unlawfully.
Trial court held that they were not CUSTOMARY owners but Lawful occupants (licensees) who
should have been given first priority on leasing of the land. Also held that lease was unlawful and
therefore void. CoA changed the verdict and held that they were in fact customary owners of suit
land thus appealing to the Supreme Court.
SC held that respondents were not customary owners but licensees. SC also found that respondents
were bonafide occupants as defined in s29 of the Land Act hence should have been given first offer
of lease. Case relied on authority of Kampala District Land Board and Chemical Distributors
vs National Housing and Construction Civil Appeal No. 2 of 2004 (SC)
SC also held that title was obtained by fraud citing the case of Katarikawe vs Katwiremu (1977)
H.C.B 187 which defined fraud in these terms: “Although mere knowledge of unregistered interest
cannot be imported as fraud under the Act, it is my view that where such knowledge is
accompanied by a wrongful intention to defeat such existing interest that would amount to fraud.”

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36. Kampala District Land Board & Chemical Distributors V. National Housing &
Construction Corporation SCCA No.2/2004
Principle/Ratio: Bonafide occupants (as defined in s29 of Land Act) of land should be first given
offer of lease
Law Applicable: Section 33(1) and Section 38 of the Land Act.
Facts: The respondent had occupied the suit land since 1970 and had used the land as a playground
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for children residing in its adjoining estate, among other uses. It had fenced the land and
constructed a toilet on it. The 1st appellant granted a lease over the suit land to the 2nd appellant
ignoring the objections of the respondent and local council officials of the area. The respondent
sued the appellants claiming that the grant of the lease to the 2nd appellant was unlawful and
fraudulent. Held: The respondents’ claim was upheld. Respondents were bonafide occupants as per
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provisions of The Land Act and should have been given first offer of lease. The Court reasoned
thus:
“A bona fide occupant was given security of tenure and his interest could not be alienated except as
provided by the law. For instance the bona fide occupant could apply for a certificate of occupancy
under Section 33(1) of the Land Act. A bona fide occupant could apply for a lease under Section
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38 of the Land Act. While the land occupied by a bona fide occupant could be leased to somebody
else, I think the first option would have to be given to the bona fide occupant. As this was not done
in this case, the suit land was not available for leasing to the 2nd appellant.”

37. Streams of Life Giving Water Ministries V. Agnes Ochieng (2003) KALR 370
Plaintiff claimed that it was a bona fide occupant on the suit land in which it was in physical
possession of. And that in the alternative, it was a purchaser for the value of the same.
HELD; Musoke-Kibuuka.
- On purchaser for value, Agnes Ocheng had no legal capacity to transact a sale of the property of
the estate of her father when she purported to do so. She was merely one of the eight beneficiaries
of the estate generally. She had not made any application for any grant of probate or letters of
administration. She never became the administrator of the estate eventually. Her action in relation
to the disputed property cannot be protected by the provisions of section 191 of the Succession Act.
It amounted to intermeddling the property of the estate, prohibited by section 191 of the Succession
Act. It was therefore illegal.
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- Where illegal has been proved, the court cannot overlook it as it takes precedence over all other
considerations.

- On his being a bona fide occupant. The law regulating the legal concept of bona fide occupancy
is found in section 30 (2) and (5) of the Land Act, 1998.
- According to section 30(2) of the Land Act, a bona fide occupant is a person who before the
coming into force of the constitution:
“had occupied and utilised or developed any land unchallenged by the registered owner or agent of
the registered owner for twelve years or more.
- According to Subsection 5 of Section 30 of the Land Act, “Any person who has purchased or
otherwise acquired the interest of the person qualified to be a bona fide occupant under this section
shall be taken to be a bona fide occupant for the purposes of this Act” Streams of Life Giving water
in this case failed to prove that it had been in possession of the land unchallenged by the registered
owner since 1983. In fact all evidence deduced by correspondence showed that the plaintiff had
only been in possession since 1991.

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38. Kigozi Mayambala V. Sentamu (1987) HCB
Once a party is in actual possession of a part of the land and it is proved that he owns some of it,
there would be a presumption of ownership of the whole in absence of proof to the contrary.

39. Marko Matovu & Ors. V. Sseviri & Ors. (1979) HCB 174 27Diane
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40. George Kasedde Mukasa V. Emmanuel Wambedde (2004) KALR
George inherited suit land from his father and became registered in 1971. He filed against the
defendants for trespass for putting structures on his land. The defendants claimed that they were
kibanja holders and each acquired the land before 1900.
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Issues
Whether the defendants were lawful or bonafide occupants on the land?
Held
The law applicable to persons that acquired customary kibanja before the coming into force of the
1998 Land Act was the Land Reform Decree 1975 that prescribed the manner of acquiring a
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customary kibanja on public land. section 4(1) allowed the owner of a kibanja to sell or transfer as
a gift inter-vivos his developments on the land to another party provided he gave 3 months’ notice
of the impending sale to the prescribed authority.
However, in Paul Kisekka vs Seventh Day Advents Church Association of Uganda
(unreported) it was observed that there was a lacuna as to what was the prescribed authority.
Therefore, failure to notify the authority was an irregularity that did not fault acquisition.
S.4 of the Land Reform Decree provided that the transfer of the kibanja whether inter-vivos or by
sale shall not vest any title in the transferee but only to the extent of the improvements.

41. Tifu Lukwago V. Samwiri Mudde Kizza & Anor. SCCA 13/1996 (1999) KALR
The plaintiff purchased land from the second defendant (kiyaga) who was taking care of the kibanja
on behalf of the first defendant, his brother. When approached by Kizza, the second defendant
claimed that he did not see the kibanja nut leased it. The mailo land owner recognized Tifu as the
buyer who was introduced to him and bought a kanzu.
Held
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section 16(2) of 17(1) of the Judicature statute 1996 preserve the right of court to apply the right
of any person to benefit from such custom as is not compatible with written law. The appellant was
entitled to prove that he was accustomed to invoke the custom of the offer of a kanzu to a mailo
owner as a seal of recognition of the mailo owner of the transfer of the kibanja from one party to
another.
The customary practice of offering a kanzu to the mailo owner by new transferee of kibanja was
rooted in s.8 of the Busulo & Envujjo law which ceased to have effect in Uganda upon the
enactment of the Land Reform Decree 075. Therefore, the alleged customary practice was no
longer compatible with written law and was inapplicable.
The land Reform Decree 1975 converted mailo land to public land and a mailo owner into a lessee
on conversion. It preserved the kibanja land holding as a customary tenure on public land without
any apparent liability or obligation on the part of the kibanja holder to the lessee on conversion. It
expressly stated that the Bussulu & Envujjo law would cease to have effect in Uganda thus the
custom was stopped and though it is still practised it is not enforceable.

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Vesting Orders on account of a completed purchase of land
42. Lwanga V. Registrar of Titles (1980) HCB
Applicant wanted to register the land of Yusuf Galanga who bought land from Mukasa but died
before transferring it to his name. Katemba claimed to have been given this land by Yusuf,
registered the title in his name under forgery and sold it to Salongo. Katemba was convicted for
forgery; the applicant failed to enforce the court order to put the land in Yusef’s name without a
consequential order.
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Held
Before a person who obtains judgement for recovery of land against a registered proprietor could be
registered as a proprietor, he has to first apply to the court to make an order under section 185 of
the RTA, such order is referred to as a consequential order made consequent upon recovery of the
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land.
Under section 189 RTA a title of a bona fide purchaser for value could not be impeached since a
person who was registered through fraud could pass a good title to a bona fide purchaser.

43. Robert Mukanza & Petua Mukanza V. Registrar of Titles HC Misc. Cause 75/2015
FI

Applicants sought a vesting order as administrators of Justice Ignatius Mukanza who was unable to
complete the transfer process before his demise. The proprietor could not be traced.
Held
Section 167 of the RTA states out the circumstances under which a vesting order can be granted;
That the land has been sold by the proprietor and the whole of the purchase money paid. That the
purchaser or those claiming under the purchaser have taken possession under the purchase. That the
entry and possession have been acquiescence by the vendor or his representatives
But that the transfer has never been executed by the vendor and cannot be obtained by reason that
the vendor is dead or residing out of the jurisdiction or cannot be found. The Registrar can then
make a vesting order in the premises and may include a direction of payment of such additional fee
in respect to title.

44. RE Ivan Mutaka (1980) HCB 27

by Odoki Ag. J (as he then was)

17
held
“…Before the court makes a vesting order, the following circumstances must be proved:-
1. That there has been a sale of land the title of which is registered under the Act;
2. That the whole of the purchase price has been paid;
3. That the purchaser (or those claiming under him or her) has taken possession of the land;
4. That the entry into possession by the purchaser has been acquiesced in by the vendor or his or her
representatives;
5. That a transfer has not been executed and cannot be obtained because,
a. The vendor is dead, or
b. The vendor is residing out of jurisdiction, or
c. The vendor cannot be found.”

Caveats
Protectable interest

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45. Sentongo Producers and Coffee Farmers Ltd v Rose Nakufuma Muyiisa (HC
Misc. Cause 690/1999)
The Respondent had claimed an equitable interest on the suit property on the basis of having
contributed money and materials for the construction of the house thereon. Court’s holding was to
the effect that the restrictions on land transfer under S.39 of the Land Act do not affect a legal
mortgage and secondly, that co-ownership cannot be conferred by marriage.
Principle;
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For a caveat to be valid, the caveator must have an interest; legal or equitable, to be protected by
the caveat, otherwise the caveat would be invalid.

46. Ratilal Nanchand Sheth v Dr. C.L.K Ssali (HCCS 728/1994 (1995)
Issues
R
I) On removal of caveat under S 149(2) of the RTA.
Whether a person with a repossession certificate falls within the description of persons entitled to
remove caveat under the Act.
II) on S.I(2) of the Expropriated Properties Act.
Whether a person who bought property formerly belonging to the expelled Asian has better title
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than the Asian.

Held;
The 1st respondent could not move the Acting Commissioner of Registration since he is not the
registered proprietor of the property caveated. Consequently, the notice issued by the Commissioner
to the appellant had no legal basis and consequence.
The applicant was found to have no protectable interest, proprietary or compensatory and thus had
no right to caveat property in which he had no interest.
*Only a registered proprietor can apply for the removal of a caveat.

Caveats generally
47. J.W.R Kazzora v M.L.S Rukuba (SSCA 13/1992 (1992) III KALR 51.
Court held that a caveat that merely stated that the caveator had an interest in the material property
did not necessarily preclude a subsequent sale, since the caveat itself was not evidence of sale.

18
 48. Mutual Benefits Ltd v Patel and Anor (1972) EA 496.
Issue; whether the documents on which the appellant company relied on show a right in the
appellant company to call on the respondents to grant leases to it.
Held;
It is of the essence of tenancy in common that owners can deal with the title to their shares but that
possession is common to them and cannot be granted by one alone. It is common ground that no
right, title or interest in the go-downs and land was vested in the company, and it therefore could
not have passed any interests in the go-downs and land to the appellant.
*A caveat which applies to part only of the land registered under any title should expressly be
stated to be limited to that part.

49. RE; Joseph Muluuka (HC Misc. Application No. 500/1995 (1994-95) HCB
This was an application for extension of a caveat. Under S 148 and 149(2) of the RTA and O. 48 r.1
and 2 of the CPR for an order that court may extend a caveat lodged by the applicant.
Held;

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S. 149 of the RTA provides that a caveat cannot be removed by or on behalf of the same person of
the same estate or interest. However, under certain circumstances S 149, the judge may direct the
register to delay any dealings with the land for a period of time, specified by court.
These circumstances, that is, giving an undertaking or security, and or lodging a sum of money
considered to be sufficient by court to indemnify any person who may be adversely affected by the
court order, is a creation of statute and court may only act upon the application where these
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circumstances have been complied with. In the instant case, the applicant had not complied with the
above circumstances, nor had he made any attempts to meet the requirement of law. The application
was dismissed.

50. Edward Musisi V. Grindlays Bank SCCA 5/1986

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The appellant defaulted payment on a mortgage granted by the respondent. However he still made
payment but the land he'd mortgaged had already been sold to the second defendant and the title
registered in their name after removal of caveats lodged by Cardinal Wamala who had helped the
appellant pay the debt.
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Issue: Whether the caveats were removed in a lawful manner?

Law applicable: Section 140 of the Registration of Titles Act on notice of caveat, removal and
Lapse of caveat.
Held; That the matter be taken back to the High Court under section 148 of the Registration of
Titles Ordinance which requires that the caveator have to be given notice of removal of a caveat
before it is removed. The caveator should be given a chance to explain to the court why the caveat
should not be removed in order to protect their interests.
Beneficiary caveats
51. Sanyu Lwanga Musoke V. Yakobo Ntate Mayanja SCCA 59/1995
The plaintiff was challenging the removal of the caveat she lodged on land inherited from her
deceased grandfather without notice.

19
Law applicable: Section 140 of the Registration of Titles Act on notice of caveat, removal and
Lapse of caveat.
Held: The caveator must be given notice prior to removal of a caveat. That the registrar ought to
keep a copy of a memorandum of notice served on the caveator as evidence of the service of notice
of removal of the caveat.

52. Teja Singh & Ors. V. Isher Singh & Ors. (1957) EA 654
The plaintiffs who were members of a charity organisation known as sikh temple were challenging
removal of the caveat lodged on the land that the defendants wanted to transfer.
Held:
The general power to lodge a caveat can be by a) a beneficiary or on behalf of a beneficiary
claiming under a will or settlement or by Registrar of Titles and b) all other caveats
For Class a; caveats can only be removed by the caveator or by an order of court obtained on
application inter partes by a party having an interest in such removal. This is based on the
substantial and relatively permanent nature of registered interest under class a. Therefore caveats

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under class a are not subject to the more summary procedure whereby the Registrar of Titles can
give notice the intended transaction and thereafter the caveat will lapse. The importance of
distinction between class a and b is that a notice issued by theRegisrar of Titles of an intended
transaction is incompetent and in law a nullity.
In this case, the Sick Temple charity organisation as a trust amounted to a settlement and therefore
the notice served by the registrar of titles was null.
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53. Joyce Kusulakweguya (reported as Kasule Kweguya) V. Appolo Matovu & 3 Ors.
HCCS 509/1991 (1994) KALR 861
The plaintiff was given land by her deceased father but the first defendant as heir to the estate
acquired a special certificate and had the land mutated. The plaintiff was challenging the removal of
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the caveat she placed on the landland and the mutation of the land.
Held: The general power to lodge a caveat can be by a) a beneficiary or on behalf of a beneficiary
claiming under a will or settlement or by Registrar of Titles and b) all other caveats
For Class a; caveats can only be removed by the caveator or by an order of court obtained on
application inter partes by a party having an interest in such removal. This is based on the
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substantial and relatively permanent nature of registered interest under class a. Therefore caveats
under class a are not subject to the more summary procedure whereby the Registrar of Titles can
give notice of the intended transaction and thereafter the caveat will lapse. The importance of
distinction between class a and b is that a notice issued by theRegisrar of Titles of an intended
transaction is incompetent and in law a nullity.
However in this case, the plaintiff did not amount to a beneficiary since the land she owned was not
bequeathed under her father's will.

Registered land; transfer and registration

54. Musa Ndigejjerawa V. Kizito (1953) 7 ULR 31
The first defendant sold land to both the plaintiff and second defendant. He sold to the second
defendant first and later to the plaintiff. Both paid for the land promptly and registered the
documents (letters) they acquired.
Issue: who has the right to transfer the land?
Held:
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The general rule is that instruments of transfer are to be registered in order of production for
registration. However if a person brings a registrable instrument to the Registrar of titles, he gains
priority over a competitor who comes later to the Registrar with an instrument of any kind.
In this case, the defendants both registered improper documents that did not comply with statutory
requirements. Therefore they only have rights against the first defendant in contract for specific
performance. In this case, the date of the contracts is what is relevant as such the second defendant
is the first.

55. Kristofa Zimbe V. Yokana Kamanza (1954) ULR 68

The defendant told his land to two people including the plaintiff. The plaintiff was the second
person to whom the land was sold. However it was the plaintiff who registered a proper statutory
instrument for registration and acquisition of the land.
Held
Fraud: The onus of proving fraud lies on the respondent. The rationale for this is that there is a
register that exists so that the person who may be in some doubt as to whether the land they want to

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buy has been sold.
Transfer of land: No man can become the owner of land until a statutory transfer of the land to him
has been registered. The first person to register land takes better rights than a person to whom the
land was sold first but failed to register it, providing there has been no fraud in the registration.

Transmission of land; dealing in land belonging to estates of people deceased, powers

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and duties of Administrators of estates of persons deceased etc.
56. Ruth Sirimuzawo V. Paulo Mukasa & Ors. (1994) KALR 560
Law Applicable: Section 134 of The RTA
Principle: transfer of the title into the executor or administrator’s name does not mean that the land
devolves upon the personal estate of the executor or administrator such that he can do whatever he
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wishes with the land without recourse to the interest of other beneficiaries. His or her duty is to hold
the land in trust for the beneficiaries.

57. Jonah Senteza Kanyerezi & Anor. Chief Registrar of Titles H.C Misc. Cause
No.919/ 1997
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[not found at the exercise of reasonable diligence]

58. Biles V. Caesar (1957) WLR 156

The landlords were the joint owners of premises in which a shop and workshop on the ground floor
were let to the tenant. They gave notice to the tenant that they would oppose the grant of a new
tenancy to reconstruct. The tenant applied to the court for the grant of a new tenancy. One of the
landlords died, having appointed his son and an accountant to be his executor. The surviving
landlord and the son of the deceased landlord (before obtaining probate of his father’s will) gave
evidence to the effect that they intended to reconstruct a substantial part (but not the whole) of the
premises. The tenant contended that the judgement should be reversed because the relevant
intention of the landlords could not be established in the absence of executors who, before the
hearing was concluded, had proved the will of the deceased landlord.
HELD

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- The term “landlord” meant the landlord with the legal title to the land. The legal landlord was the
surviving brother. He and his deceased brother had been joint owners, and when the deceased
brother died the surviving brother became in law the sole owner.
- He was a trustee, no doubt, but in law he was the sole legal owner, and his intention was all that
mattered.
- The title of the executor derives from the will and speaks only from the will.

59. Shokachati Abdallahv. Said Meralli SCCA 32/1991

Appellant was granted probate and administration of his deceased father’s estate. He alleged that
the defendant with no authority caused the appellant to be registered as proprietor for the uit land,
and later fraudulently transferred the land into his own name.
HELD​
- The appellant’s signature was forged.
- Consent to transfer forms is a preliminary to such transfer of land. The applications for consent
must state the particulars of the registered proprietor as the transferor and those of the transferee.

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- The names of the successor are stated on the certificate of title. They are usually stated in the entry
as such successor by means of the probate and administration which had been granted to him in
respect of the estate of the deceased.
- Land cannot be transferred to beneficiaries unless it is registered in the names of the rightful
administrator first.
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60. Best Kemigisha V. Mable Komuntale HCCS 5/98 (1999) KALR 813
Principle: Speaks to transmission of land to a widow
Justice Katsutsi held that any custom which denied a widow the right to administration of the estate
of her husband was repugnant to natural justice and good conscience.
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Powers of Attorney
61. Powis Bryant Ltd. V. Banque Du People (1893) AC 170
In the present case, an agent representing a company went to the bank and obtained a loan in the
amount of $25,000 on account of the company. Later, the agent went to the bank again and told the
manager $25,000 more was required, and thereupon he obtained a further loan to that amount.
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When payments become due the company refused to pay and informed the bank about disclaiming
liability. The bank brought an action. The company disputed their liability and engaged in legal
proceedings.
The judge at the first instance court decided in favour of the company and held that the power of
attorney did not authorise him to borrow money in the name of the company.
Issue:
Whether the agent was authorised under the power of attorney to borrow money on behalf of the
company?
Held:
The House of Lords gave judgement for the appellant. The Lords considered that the power of
attorney authorised the agent to enter into contracts for three specified purposes: (1) the purchase or
sale of goods; (2) the chartering of vessels; and (3) the employment of agents and servants. So, it is
evident that the power of attorney did not authorise the agent to borrow money on the company’s
behalf, or to bind the company by a contract of loan.

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“…powers of attorney are to be construed strictly – that is to say, that where an act purporting to be
done under a power of attorney is challenged as being in excess of the authority conferred under the
power, it is necessary to shew that on a fair construction of the whole instrument the authority in
question is found to be within the four corners of the instrument, either in express terms or by
necessary implication.” To sum up, the agent and, at the same time, the attorney of the company,
abused his authority and betrayed his trust, and acted out of the scope of his authority given by the
company

62. Fredrick J.K. Zaabwe V. Orient Bank & 5 Ors. SCCA No. 4/2006
Principle: A power of attorney must be construed strictly. Section 146(1) RTA: the donee of a
power of attorney acts as agent of the donor, and for the donor. He cannot use the power of attorney
for his own benefit. Where an agent, who has been given a power of attorney to do certain things,
uses the power to do something for a proper purpose, but the act done is for the agent’s own
purposes to the exclusion and detriment of the principal, the actions of the agent will be outside the
scope of the power of attorney and are not even capable of ratification by the principal.

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Sections 147 and 148 of the R.T.A: Section 147 deals with attestation of instruments and powers of
attorney. Section 148 deals with signature of instruments and power of attorney. the rationale
behind section 148 requiring a signature to be in Latin character must be to make clear to everybody
receiving that document as to who the signatory is so that it can also be ascertained whether he had
the authority or capacity to sign. When the witness attesting to a signature merely scribbles a
signature, without giving his name or capacity, how would the Registrar or anyone else ascertain
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that that witness had capacity to witness in terms of section 147 of the Registration of Titles Act?
As stated in General Parts (U) Limited –Vs- Npart (Civil Appeal No 5 Of 1999) as authority that
where the signatures to a mortgage are not in Latin character, the mortgage is not valid.

Registered land; transfer and registration

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63. Musa Ndigejjerawa V. Kizito (1953) 7 ULR 31
See case no. 54

64. Kristofa Zimbe V. Yokana Kamanza (1954) ULR 68 Fredrick

Principle: A registered proprietor can only be ousted from their land if it is shown that he obtained
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registration by fraud; his own fraud and not the sellers fraud.

Dealing in land owned by minors

65. Akuze V. UNRA & Anor. H.C. Misc. Cause 66/2018 Fredrick
Principle: This case is of little value to the present workshop. It was more about whether liability
for this suit lay with UNRA or the Attorney General. There was a miniature issue on ownership but
court resolved it on a factual basis and the plaintiffs were found to be the owners indeed.
Facts: The plaintiffs claimed special and general damages against the defendants for unauthorized
entry into their land for excavation of rock leading to loss and damage.

66. Re: An application for legal guardianship by Wandera Peter H.C. Family cause
004/2017, Mubiru, J.

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Brief facts: The applicant was seeking the grant in order to administer that land registered in his
daughter's name and that he will require the grant for future purposes in the event that he needs to
use the title as collateral for funds to cater for the child's welfare.
Held:
"since the child has real property in her name, the guardianship in this instance will involve
management of the child's property. For that reason the applicant must meet additional
requirements, viz.;- he should be capable of taking control over the child's real and personal estate,
and make decisions in the best interests of the child. His interests should not be adverse to those of
the child, in the estate for which he proposes to act as manager. He should be able to keep the
property of the child safely. He must be capable of not permitting any unnecessary waste or
destruction of the real property, nor make any sale of such property without the order of the court,
but must so far as it is in his power, maintain the same, with its buildings and appurtenances, out of
the income or other property of the estate, and deliver it to the child or the successors of the child at

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the close of his guardianship, in as good condition as he received it."
67. Onen Cliff Mills & Joyce Laker Onen (minors) H. C. Misc. Civil Application
N0.22/2018, Mubiru, J.
Brief facts:
This was an ex-parte application for Legal Guardianship of a six year old boy-child Onen Cliff
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Mills and a seventeen year old girl-child, Laker Joy Onen, made by their biological mother, Ms.
Akello Lucy.
Held
"An applicant for legal guardianship may show that he or she is the best suited to care for the child
by establishing that he or she is ready and willing to carry out the parental responsibilities for the
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child. Where the child has real property to his or her name, the guardian should be capable of taking
control over the child's real and personal estate, and make decisions in the best interests of the child.
Her interests should not be adverse to those of the child, in the estate for which she proposes to act
as manager. She should be able to keep the property of the child. She must be capable of not
permitting any unnecessary waste or destruction of the real property, nor make any sale of such
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property without the order of the court, but must so far as it is in his power, maintain the same, with
its buildings and appurtenances, out of the income or other property of the estate, and deliver it to
the child or the successors of the child at the close of her guardianship, in as good condition as she
received it."
68. Re: Elijah Amumpaire Amooti & Elisheba Nsimire Akiiki (Infants), H.C. Family
Cause No.155/2015 (P.Tuhaise, J.) (Kampala)
Brief facts: This was an application for legal guardianship over the above named children. The
application was based on grounds that the applicants were the biological parents of the two infants
responsible for the said infants’ welfare, education, shelter and clothing; and were desirous of
obtaining a loan from Centenary Bank to ensure the infants’ welfare is maintained; that the said
infants can only sign documents through a guardian; and that the infants shall not obtain the loan if
the guardianship order is not granted. The same was granted. It was held inter alia that;

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The best interests of the child set out by the Children Act include the ascertainable wishes and
feelings of the child in light of his or her age and understanding; the child’s physical, emotional and
educational needs; the child’s age, background; and other circumstances relevant in the matter. In
this case, where the applicants, who are the infants’ biological parents, seek a guardianship order in
respect of their biological children to enable them obtain a loan and use the infants’ certificate of
title as security so that they construct a house on the land to generate income for the two infants,
such order should be granted as it is for the welfare and best interests of the said infants.

69. IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY MESHAK ADRIKO (THE

BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF THE MINOR); MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL
APPLICATION No. 0008 OF 2016
Brief Facts: This was an application for guardianship by a father in respect of his biological son
aged fourteen years; who had property registered jointly in their names – son and father. Being

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desirous of disposing of that property and using the proceeds of sale for his well-being and that of
his said son, in which case the grant of a guardianship order is a prerequisite, the applicant filed this
application by way of notice of motion under the provisions of section 98 of The Civil Procedure
Act, cap 71 and Order 52 rules 1, 2, and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules, SI 71-1.
In granting the same, it was held that; In matters of this nature, where the legal property rights of a
child are involved, yet by virtue of his status as a legal incompetent, the child does not have the
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capacity to safeguard those rights on his own, courts are expected to exercise a parens patriae
authority. A judge is required to make an independent assessment of these interests, to prioritise
them above the competing interests of adult claimants, and to make orders most likely to safeguard
and promote these interests. Accordingly, a child in whose name property is registered has a
cognizable proprietary right that need not be claimed by way of right of audience before the court.
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The Judge acting as parens patriae is responsible for protecting the interests of children in matters
that come before him or her. The Judge is obligated to do what is best for the interest of the child.
He is to put himself in the position of a “wise, affectionate and careful parent” and make provision
for the child accordingly. When appointing a guardian of this sort, the court ought to consider; - (a)
the capabilities and (b) potential conflicts of interest of the proposed guardian.
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70. Re: Shamilla Naava Kayaga Masimbi, Shanice Naava Nabawanga Masimbi &
Shareen Nava Masimbi ( minors) H.C. Misc. Cause No. 32/2018 (O. Kazaarwe
Mukwaya, J) (Kampala)
Not available
Caveats
Caveatable interest
71. Sentongo Produce & Coffee farmers Ltd. V. Rose Nakafuma Muyiiya HC Misc.
Cause 690/1999
For a caveat to be valid, the caveator must have a protectable interest legal or equitable to be
protected by the caveat otherwise the caveat would be invalid.

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 72. Ratilal Nanchand Sheth V. Dr. C.L.K Ssali HCCS 728/1994 (1995) KALR 176
The applicant was the registered proprietor of the land which he purchased from the Departed
Asians Property Custodian Board. The respondent was the owner of the land before the expulsion
of Asians who repossessed the land and holds a certificate of repossession and has instituted a suit
to recover the land. The applicant lodged a caveat. The Ag commissioner issued the applicant with
notice under s 149 RTA, that unless he gets a court order directing the commissioner to delay the
caveat the same will be removed.
Held
A caveat lasts for 60 days thereafter it elapses automatically.
A proprietor is a person whose name appears or is entered as a proprietor thereof in the Register
Book. According to section 149 of the RTA read together with section 2 for one to apply that the
applicant’s caveat be removed he must be the registered proprietor.
The respondent is not a registered proprietor because he is not in the Register book. He is however
the unregistered proprietor under the Departed Asians Act and the certificate of repossession. This
leaves the applicant without any title in the property protectable by caveat.

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Caveats generally
73. J.W.R Kazzora V. M.L.S. Rukuba SCCA 13/1992 (1992) III KALR 51
Kazzora (Appellant) claimed that there was a verbal contract between himself and the deceased in
which the deceased sold him the suit land. The deceased never mentioned this to anyone. To protect
his interest, the appellant lodged a caveat on the land. After the deceased’s death, his son obtained
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LoA over the estate including the suit land. He wanted to sell suit land and applied to have the
caveat removed. The Registrar has notified the appellant in accordance with Sec. 140(2).
- Sec 139 forbids entering into the Register book any change in proprietorship or transfer or other
instrument purporting to transfer or affect the appellant’s interest.
- Sec 140(2) – Once notice is given, the caveat is required to apply to the HC applying for an order
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delaying the registration of the transfer. Order must be obtained within 60 days otherwise the caveat
lapses
- Sec 145 Once caveat has lapsed, the registrar shall cause the same to be removed from the register
book. Registrar doesn’t have to be moved by any one or ordered by court to remove a caveat which
has lapsed. It’s mandatory for him to do so on his own motion
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- Sec 202 of RTA on service of notices read with Sec. 35 of the Interpretation Act – where any Act
requires any document to be served by post, this service shall be deemed to be effected by properly
addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post a letter containing the document and unless
the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered
ordinarily in the course of the post
- Sec 139 – must have ownership/ interest to lodge a caveat
- Sec 150(3) prohibits renewals of caveat by the same person in respect of the same estate or
interest except where the court directs so.
In this case, an application for delay of registration of the transfer and so extending the caveat’s life
was filed after the expiry of 60 days. So it follows that there was no caveat to be extended by court.
Court no longer had jurisdiction in the matter.

Beneficiary caveats
74. Sanyu Lwanga Musoke V. Yakobo Ntate Mayanja SCCA 59/1995
See above
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 75. Teja Singh & Ors. V. Isher Singh & Ors. (1957) EA 654
Held; If the time within which an extension of a caveat lapses but with reason good enough, it
would be essential that both that the application should have been filed, and the Registrar of Titles
should be duly notified that it has been filed, within the 30 days. The registrar should in all cases
preserve the status quo until an order of court has been received.
It is fully consistent with the intention of S. 149 that the interests of the beneficiaries of a charitable
trust should receive the greater measure of protection which is afforded by a caveat that can only be
removed by the caveator or by an order of court.
Principle; A caveat can only be removed by the caveator or by an order of court.

76. Joyce Kusulakweguya (reported as Kasule Kweguya) V. Appolo Matovu & 3 Ors.
HCCS 509/1991 9 1994) KALR 861
Held;

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The general power to lodge a caveat is given by S. 148 of the RTA, which shows that caveats are of
two classes;
a) caveats lodged by or on behalf of a beneficiary claiming under a will or settlement or by
Registrar of Titles
b) all other caveats.
Those under class (a) can only be removed by the caveator or by an order of court. It must however
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be strictly proven that the person making the application really falls within the prescribed category,
otherwise the application cannot be granted.
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